1
FIRST DIVISION Upon their separate arraignments, 6 the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, the
G.R. No. 115367 September 28, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELEUTERIO DE LEON and REYNALDO MANAYAO, accused. ELEUTERIO DE LEON, accused-
appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused-appellant Eleuterio de Leon seeks the reversal of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 2320-M-92 finding him and his co-
accused, Reynaldo Manayao, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of
the victim jointly in the amount of P50,000.00; and to pay the victim's wife the amounts of
P180,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral damages. Accused Reynaldo
Manayao chose not to appeal from the decision.
In an information filed with the trial court on 10 November 1992, the accused were charged
with the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
That at or about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1992, in the
Municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with Armalite rifles and
Caliber .45 pistols, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another,
with common design, with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with
the aid of armed men, employing means to the [sic] weaken the defense or of
means or persons to insure or afford impunity, and with evident premeditation,
and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
ambush, attack and shoot from behind Marcelino Santiago who was hit at the head
while he was driving his owner-type jeep, and as a result he died instantaneously to
the prejudice and damage of his legal heirs.
Contrary to law. 2
Accused Eleuterio de Leon was arrested on 13 April 1993, 3 and afterwards, he filed a motion
to fix bail. 4 Accused Reynaldo Manayao, on the other hand, was arrested on 24 May 1993. 5
court conducted hearings on the motion to fix bail with the express agreement between the
parties that the evidence to be presented at such hearings would be considered as evidence
on the merits of the case. 7
The prosecution presented three witnesses: the two eyewitnesses, namely, Simon Mariano, a
farmer from Angat, Bulacan, and Ramon Chavez, an employee of Robal Transit; and SPO2
Alfredo Bartolome. The substance of their testimony was that at approximately 9:30 a.m. of
23 August 1992 in the vicinity of the Robal Transit Terminal in Angat, Bulacan, they saw the
accused gun down Marcelino Santiago, one of the managers of Robal Transit, while the latter
was driving his jeep. Mariano was walking in the opposite direction that the jeep was
headed, 8 while Chavez was following the vehicle of the victim as the former wanted to tell
the latter something. 9
The victim's jeep had already passed Mariano when the shots were fired. Turning around,
Mariano saw the accused shooting the victim, with de Leon holding an Armalite at waist level
and Manayao, a .45 caliber pistol at shoulder height. 10 Mariano heard six shots in all. As he
was only about ten meters away from the accused, he could still see the gun barrels emitting
smoke. After shooting the victim, both accused, joined by a third male whom Mariano could
not identify, left the area by leisurely walking towards an alley, which was right in front of
Mariano. Mariano immediately recognized the two accused because they were his
townmates. Mariano went home at once. It was only after the funeral that he told the wife of
the victim that he knew her husband's killers. He then gave his statement to the police. 11
Chavez was on the street in front of the bus terminal and about six meters from the accused
when the latter fired at the victim. Because of fear, Chavez went inside the bus terminal, only
to return to the scene of the crime later to assist in carrying into the funeral parlor's vehicle
the body of the victim, which was then slumped sidewise in his jeep. The jeep had swerved to
the sidewalk after the victim was hit. Later that day, Chavez informed the victim's wife that
he had witnessed the commission of the crime. 12
SPO2 Alfredo Bartolome, a police investigator, took down the statement of Simon Mariano
on 24 August 1992. 13
Immediately after the termination of the testimony of Bartolome, the trial court orally
denied the application for bail because the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. 14 It
then required the prosecution to present its other witnesses. 15
The prosecution forthwith presented Dr. Rosauro Villarama, the Municipal Health Officer of
Angat, Bulacan, who performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, Marcelino Santiago,
at 11:00 a.m. of 23 August 1992. 16 He found one gunshot wound on the victim's head, the
entry point being above the right ear and the point of exit, "slightly above 3 in. front of left
ear," causing a fracture and laceration. He concluded that the cause of the victim's death was
"cerebral hemorrhage, gunshot wound, head." 17 This gunshot wound was caused by an
Armalite. 18

After Dr. Villarama completed his testimony, the trial court dictated an order 19 formally
denying the petition for bail because "[s]ufficient evidence has been established to prove
that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong."
Three additional witnesses were presented by the prosecution, namely, Eduardo Valencia,
Chief of the Intelligence and Investigation Division of the Angat Police Station; Senior
Inspector Carlito Feliciano, Chief of the Angat Police Station; and Mrs. Mercedes Villarama-
Santiago, widow of the victim.
Valencia declared that upon receiving a report from PO3 Enriquez about a shooting incident
at the bus terminal of Sta. Maria Liner, he, together with two other companions, went to the
terminal and found the jeep of Marcelino Santiago on the right side of the road going to
Bustos with the corpse of Santiago bathed in blood. They tried to run after the assassins.
Failing to catch the latter, they returned to the scene of the crime where they found empty
cartridges from an Armalite. Thereafter, they called their district office, which sent
investigators to whom Valencia turned over the empty cartridges. During the investigation,
Simon Mariano told him that the assassins were the accused herein. Valencia then prepared
a spot report. At the trial, he submitted a case folder of accused Reynaldo Manayao showing
that the latter had pending cases for illegal possession of firearms, robbery in band,
extortion, and destruction of property. 20
Senior Inspector Feliciano testified on the arrest by his team of accused Reynaldo Manayao,
who was included in their order of battle, being a leader of an "organized syndicated crime
group." 21
Mrs. Santiago declared that she and the victim were married in 1966 and were blessed with
five children. She believed that her husband was killed because of his having testified on the
Tuesday preceding his death in a civil case involving the lot rented by Robal Transit or
because of business competition between Robal Transit and Sta. Maria Liner. Her husband
earned from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 a month as operations manager of Robal Transit and
as a farmer. For his burial, she spent P50,000.00 for the casket; P60,000.00 for the burial lot;
and P70,000.00 as miscellaneous expenses. She left to the discretion of the court the
determination of the monetary value of the moral shock and anxiety she suffered as a
consequence of the death of her husband. 22
The appellant interposed alibi as his defense. He presented three witnesses to corroborate
his story, namely, Elmer Tosoc, Manuel Santos, and Cezar Santos. He declared that in the
morning of 23 August 1992, he was waiting for his salary to be paid at the house of Architect
Elmer Tosoc in Tibagan, Bustos, Bulacan. The latter employed him as a custodian of
construction materials at job sites. He did not leave the Tosoc residence at any time on the
date in question. He further claimed that prosecution witness Simon Mariano bore a grudge
against him, as he (appellant) fathered a child with Mariano's niece seven years prior and did
not marry the woman. 23
2
On cross-examination, the appellant admitted that Tibagan, Bustos, Bulacan, was only about
eight kilometers away from Angat, Bulacan, and that it would take approximately half an
hour to traverse the distance by bus or passenger jeep. 24 He also admitted that he had
known Simon Mariano for about seven years and that if Mariano saw him during the day,
Mariano could easily recognize him. 25
On 23 March 1994, the trial court promulgated the challenged decision wherein it gave full
faith and credence to the prosecution's evidence and declared the alibi offered by the
defense to be feeble. Thus:
Alibi is not a proper defense where it is not impossible for the accused to be at the
scene of the crime and no improper motive was shown against the witnesses who
identified the accused.
Again, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over positive identification of the accused
by the prosecution witnesses and because it was not physically impossible for said
accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time of commission considering the
proximity of the place where the accused were, hence, the defense of alibi is
rejected. The testimony of the eyewitnesses are sufficient for conviction. Mariano's
and Chavez' testimonies were sufficient to convict both accused because it was
given unhesitatingly in a straight forward manner and it was full of details which by
their nature could not have been merely invented. The Court again considered the
fact that alibi is one of the weakest defense[s] an accused can invoke, easily lending
itself to concoction and embroidery. It must invariably be viewed with suspicion
and may be considered only when established by positive, clear and satisfactory
evidence to be given credence. It must not only appear that the accused
interposing the same was at some other place but only that it was physically
impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
In the case at bar, both accused testified that they are only about 5 minutes away
from the scene of the incident and has all the time and opportunity to perpetuate
the crime.
In addition thereto, there maybe some few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution but they refer to minor details and
do not in actuality touch upon the basic aspects of the why's and where of the
crime committed, thus, credibility is not impaired. 26
As earlier adverted to, only appellant Eleuterio de Leon appealed from the decision. In his
Brief, he assigns the following errors:

I Q One (1) meter?
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION AND IN THE PROCESS DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
FINDING HIM GUILTY ONLY OF HOMICIDE.
We find no merit in the appeal.
In his first assigned error, the appellant invites our attention to alleged material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the eyewitnesses.
First, he alleges that Mariano's testimony regarding the relative positions of the victim and
the appellant is contradictory. He cites Mariano's initial testimony that the two accused were
behind the victim when they shot him. Then, he proceeds to point out that under questions
from the court, Mariano said that the two accused were facing the jeep when they shot the
victim; yet, the medico legal officer testified that the bullet entered the victim's right ear,
clearly showing that the assailants were on the right side of the victim. 27
This alleged inconsistency is more apparent than real for the appellant is merely confused as
to the juxtaposition of the accused and the victim. The Appellee, however, has put things and
people in their proper place and explains:
Facing the victim's jeepney does not mean that the gunwielders were right in front
of the victim's jeep and they shot the victim frontally. It only means that the
gunwielders were facing towards the jeep (not necessarily the front portion
thereof) when they shot the victim. But as the physical evidence indicates the
gunwielders must [have] be[en] facing towards the rear side of the jeep when they
shot the victim as the latter was actually hit from behind. 28
Second, the appellant calls this Court's attention to the portion of Mariano's testimony that
the appellant was more or less six to seven meters away from the victim, while Chavez
testified that the appellant was approximately twelve meters away from the victim. These
estimations, the appellant concludes, are "incredible" in light of the medico-legal officer's
testimony that the gunman must have been about one meter away when he fired the shots.
29 Such a conclusion is baseless and can only stem from a misreading of the transcript of the
stenographic notes to mislead this Court. It is based on a single clarificatory question
propounded by the lower court to the medico-legal officer, viz.,
3
A Yes, sir. 30
The appellant clearly overlooked the immediately preceding question and the corresponding
answer of the medico-legal officer which indubitably showed that the distance was more
than one meter. Thus:
Q Can you determine the distance of the gunman?
A It is possible that the gunman is more than 1 meter [away]. 31 (emphasis supplied)
Third, the appellant points out that at first Mariano testified that he had heard six shots, but
later he said that he had heard only three shots. 32 This inconsistency was never shown to be
of crucial importance as to affect the credibility of the witness. It is to us a minor, if not trivial
one.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the
weight of their testimony. In fact, these inconsistencies, if only in minor details, reinforce
rather than weaken their credibility, for it is usual that witnesses to a stirring event would see
differently some details of a startling occurrence. Rather than discredit the testimony of the
witnesses, such discrepancies serve to add credence and veracity to their categorical,
straightforward, and spontaneous testimony. 33
The appellant next contends that Mariano could not have clearly seen the incident, as
Mariano "was already several meters away not to mention the fact that it was a busy street
then being a Sunday and at a time when people were on the street attending to their Sunday
obligations. 34 The contemplation lacks any semblance of substantiation. There is unrebutted
evidence that the street was not bustling with activity that fateful morning when the crime
was committed. Thus:
Q Do I understand Mr. witness, that . . . the street there [sic] was a busy street meaning that
there were so many vehicles that were parked along the highway?
A At that time there was [sic] none, sir.
Q Not even a Sta. Maria Liner parked along the highway?
A None, sir. 35
The appellant admitted during cross-examination that Mariano could have easily recognized
him, since Mariano and the appellant had known each other for at least seven years. 36 The

veracity of the positive identification is strengthened by the trial court's efforts to satisfy
itself with the certainty of the eyewitnesses' identification of the perpetrators of the crime as
shown by the following questions it asked them and their answers thereto:
Court: [addressing eyewitness Mariano]
Q Now, the 2 accused both are charged with a grave offense and you are pointing your finger
at them as the culprit[s]. Since the penalty here is very grave, you must be sure of your
statement? Now, I will ask you, are you sure that these 2 accused were the ones who shot
Santiago?
A Yes, sir. 37
Court: [addressing eyewitness Chavez]
Q Do you know that if you are testifying falsely, these two (2) persons might go to jail and
taste a life sentence?
A Yes, sir.
Q You still claim that they were the killers?
A Yes, sir.
Court:
Q Walang kargo de konsiyensiya, hindi ka nagkakamali?
A Hindi po. 38
Fast realizing that his cause lacks the proverbial "leg to stand on," the appellant capitalizes on
Mariano's admission that he was charged with homicide or murder before another court. He
then submits that no credence could be given to Mariano because the latter was himself
accused of having killed somebody. 39 Such a submission fails to impress us. Section 20, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court provides that except as provided for in the succeeding sections
[Sections 21, 22, 23, 20, and 25], all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Religious or political belief, interest in
the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not
be a ground for disqualification. Clearly, the mere pendency of a criminal case against a
person does not disqualify him from becoming a witness. As a matter of fact, conviction of a
crime does not disqualify such person from being presented as a witness unless otherwise
provided by law. 40
4
The appellant's claim that Mariano bore a grudge against him because he (appellant)
impregnated Mariano's niece was not established by credible proof.
In an attempt to discredit the other eyewitness, Chavez, the appellant contends that the
former "is only an afterthought witness to shore up the sinking ship of Simon Mariano" as
evidenced by the fact that he "informed the authorities . . . only nine (9) months after the
killing and was an employee of the company owned by the victim." 41
We are not persuaded. We agree with the following counter-arguments of the Appellee,
thus:
As regards Ramon Chavez, he substantially corroborated the testimony of Simon
Mariano on all significant points. The fact that he stepped forward as [an]
eyewitness only after nine months following the incident, does not per se destroy
his credibility. People's natural hesitation to get involved in cases, whether civil or
criminal, is a matter of public knowledge. Also, the fact that Ramon Chavez was a
subordinate employee of the victim . . . does not diminish his truthfulness as a
witness. On the contrary, being an employee of Robal Transit, Ramon Chavez
would only be interested to punish the real wrongdoer in the murder of his boss . .
. . 42
The natural reticence of most people to get involved as a witness in a criminal case is of
judicial notice. Their failure to submit to an investigation by any public authority or to
execute a sworn statement does not by itself diminish or impair their credibility. 43 We need
only to reiterate here what we stated in People vs. Kyamko: 44
Not every witness to a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably to
the expectation of mankind. Human nature teaches us that people may react
differently to the same situation. One person's spontaneous or unthinking, or even
instinctive, response to a horrid and repulsive stimulus may be aggression while
other's may be cold indifference. We have taken judicial notice of the fact that
witnesses in our country are reluctant to volunteer information to the authorities.
In any event, [the witness] did in fact immediately inform the victim's mother of
the stabbing incident. This was sufficient to remove any doubt that he had
witnessed the commission of the crime.
Chavez testified that he did not go to the police because he was afraid. 45 It was only on 31
May 1993, or a week after the arrest of accused Manayao but a day before the court started
hearing the case, that he went to see Prosecutor Alberto Vizcocho and volunteered to testify
in this case. 46 Anyhow, the fact remains that he told the victim's wife on the day the
shooting incident took place that he had witnessed the killing. 47
 5

With respect to the presence or absence of an ulterior motive, this Court has had occasion to
rule that the relation of superior and subordinate, by itself, does not constitute such ulterior
motive:
[A] witness' relationship to a victim, far from rendering his testimony biased, would
even render it more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is
interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.
Nor is the testimony of a witness discredited by the mere fact that he is an
employee of the complainant. 48
Having now come full circle, this Court is left with no recourse but to reject the defense of
alibi invoked by the appellant.
We have time and again ruled that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to
fabricate and difficult to prove; it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused by the witnesses. 49 Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements
of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must also demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time the same was committed. 50
We are in full accord with the said contention. Given the attendant circumstances, it cannot
be disputed that the appellant employed means and methods in the execution of the crime
which directly and especially insured such execution without the slightest risk to themselves,
since the victim did hot have the slightest chance to defend himself.
The trial court, however, should not have appreciated the other qualifying aggravating
circumstance of "use of superior force and armed men." In using this phrase, the trial court
must have had in mind the qualifying aggravating circumstances of (a) with the aid of armed
men and (b) taking advantage of superior strength, which are distinct from each other. 54
Taking advantage of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, i.e., it cannot be estimated as
an independent aggravating circumstance when treachery is present. 55 There is, as well, no
factual basis for the other aggravating circumstance which, of course, presupposes the
presence of armed men other than the accused themselves.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the challenged decision of Branch 15 of
the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 2320-M-92 is AFFIRMED in toto, with
costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.

In the instant case, such physical impossibility was not shown to have existed. By the
appellant's own admission, the place where he claimed to be was only about eight kilometers
away from the scene of the crime and that it would have taken only half an hour to traverse
the distance by bus or passenger jeep. 51 Such distance was not so great as to preclude his
having been at the scene of the crime when the shooting occurred.

The appellant's second assigned error must also fail. The trial court appreciated against the
appellant the qualifying circumstances of treachery and use of superior force and armed
men, which are alleged in the information. We agree in its appreciation of treachery. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defenses which the offended
party might make. 52 As correctly contended by the Appellee:

The factual milieu of the case undeniably shows that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery attended the killing of the victim. The attack was synchronal, sudden and
unexpected, with the assailants each armed with high-powered weapons. In fine,
the attack was carried out in such a manner that the victim was totally helpless and
in no position to either fight back or escape. Moreover, in view of the fact that the
assailants fired at the victim as the latter was driving his jeep, the inescapable
conclusion is that the attack was coolly and deliberately adopted . . . to ensure its
accomplishment without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the
victim might put up. 53

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and G.R. No. 119407 July 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO MEJIA y VILLAFANIA, EDWIN BENITO, PEDRO PARAAN, and JOSEPH FABITO,
accused-appellants.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In the evening of 10 March 1994, along the expressway at Barangay Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan, several persons on board a passenger jeepney driven by Teofilo Landingin
attacked the latter and a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, thereby inflicting upon them multiple
stab wounds. Landingin was pulled out from his seat and dumped on the shoulder of the
road. One of the attackers took the wheel of the jeepney and drove away. Catugas was
thrown out to the middle of the road when the jeepney started to move away. Landingin
died as a consequence of the injuries he sustained. Catugas survived.
Held to account for the above acts were Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, Joseph
Fabito, Romulo Calimquim, one alias Dennis, Alex Mamaril, one alias Mondragon, and
another unidentified person. Mejia and Benito were taken into police custody a few hours
after the incident; Paraan, the following day; and Fabito, five days after. Calimquim was
found dead three days after the incident in question, while the others have remained at
large. Three separate criminal complaints for murder, 1 frustrated murder, 2 and violation of
R.A. No. 6539 (Anti Carnapping Act of 1992, as amended) 3 were filed against them with the
Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
Despite service on them of subpoenas requiring submission of counter- affidavits, accused
Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito and did not submit their counter-affidavits.
On 9 May 1994, Judge Lilia C. Espanol issued an order 4 declaring the accused "to have
waived their right to be heard in preliminary investigation"; finding a prima facie case against
the accused; recommending that they be charged with and prosecuted for the crimes of
murder, frustrated murder, and violation of R.A. No. 6539, as amended; and ordering that
the records of the cases be forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for
appropriate action.
After appropriate proceedings, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City three separate informations for murder,
frustrated murder, and violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, against the
aforenamed persons. The informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D,
94-00619-D, and 94-00620-D, respectively. The first was later amended. The accusatory
portions of the informations read as follows:
6
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00617-D (as amended)
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at barangay
Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with knives with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation and taking
advantage of superior strength, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab
TEOFILO LANDINGIN inflicting upon him stab wounds which caused his instant
death to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No.
7659. 5
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00619-D
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at barangay
Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with knives and with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, and taking
advantage of superior strength, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab
VIRGILIO CATUGAS Y CASTAÑEDA inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds, the
accused having then performed all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused and that is
due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Virgilio Catugas y
Castañeda which prevented his death to his damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Art. 248 in relation with Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. 6
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00620-D
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at barangay
Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed
with knives by means of violence against person by stabbing to death TEOFILO
LANDINGIN, owner-driver of a passenger jeep bearing Plate No. APP-432 with
marking Lovely and thereafter with intent to gain, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take and drive away said passenger jeep bearing Plate No. APP-432 with
marking Lovely owned and driven by Teofilo Landingin without the latter's consent,
to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

Contrary to Republic Act 6539 as amended. 7
The first two were assigned to Branch 44 of the RTC of Dagupan City presided by Judge
Crispin C. Laron (hereafter, LARON court) and thereafter consolidated and jointly tried. The
third was assigned to Branch 43 of the said court presided by Judge Silverio Q. Castillo
(hereafter, CASTILLO court).
At their arraignments, Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito entered a plea of innocence in each
case.
I
THE CASE IN THE LARON COURT
In Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D (Murder) and Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D (Frustrated
Murder) in the LARON court, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Virgilio
Catugas, policemen Dominguillo Gulen and Bernardo Clemente, Dr. Cristito Garcia, Ma. Nora
Landingin, and Dr. Roberto Valenzuela. Virgilio Catugas was recalled as rebuttal witness. In
their defense, accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito took the witness stand. They also
presented as additional witnesses Roberto Lambot, Shirley Lomboy, Conrado Benito,
policeman Bernardo Clemente, and Felicidad Fabito in their evidence in chief and Julia
Paraan as sur-rebuttal witness.
The evidence for the prosecution in these cases may be summarized as follows:
At around 7:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, Virgilio Catugas was in front of the CSI Supermarket in
Dagupan City waiting for a transportation to take him to his home at Talibaew, Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Later, a passenger jeepney plying the Dagupan City — Calasiao route and driven
by Teofilo Landingin arrived. He boarded it and occupied that portion of the passengers' seat
behind the driver's seat. There were already some passengers inside the jeepney, but they
disembarked before the jeepney reached the boundary of Dagupan City and Calasiao, leaving
behind Landingin, Catugas, and two other passengers. 8
When the jeepney reached the MacArthur Highway in San Miguel, Calasiao, nine persons
flagged down the jeepney and boarded it. One of them, whom Catugas identified to be
accused Edwin Benito, sat beside the driver; the rest took the passenger seats behind the
driver's seat. Catugas fully recognized Benito because there was light at the ceiling of the
jeepney and at the "signboard" portion of the jeepney and the latter sometimes turned his
face toward the back where Catugas was seated. Catugas had further observed Benito's face,
ears, and eyes. 9 He also recognized accused Mejia, Fabito, and Paraan. 10
The nine passengers told Landingin that they were bound for Pangasinan Village Inn (PVI) in
Bued, Calasiao. But when they reached PVI, one of them said that his companions did not
know where they were going, and informed Landingin that he would take care of the fare
upon reaching Nansangaan, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan. Upon reaching Nansangaan, one of the
7
nine passengers asked Landingin to drive a little farther. Later, Mejia asked Catugas whether
he was Landingin's companion; Catugas answered in the affirmative. Mejia then announced:
"[T]his is a hold-up"; while Benito said: "[N]obody will be able to be saved his life [sic]."
Another companion of Mejia said: "Proceed." All of the nine drew their daggers and stabbed
Landingin and Catugas. 11
Landingin died on that same evening. Dr. Cristito Garcia, who conducted an autopsy on
Landingin's cadaver, found three stab wounds — two of which were fatal. According to him,
the cause of Landingin's death was cardiorespiratory arrest resulting from hypovolemic shock
due to internal hemorrhage. 12 Nora Landingin, wife of Teofilo Landingin, spent P1,500 daily
during the wake of her husband; P12,000 for his burial; and P16,000 for the tomb. Nora felt
sad because of his death. 13
On the other hand, Catugas, who was pushed out of the jeepney and landed on the road, was
brought by some people to the Villaflor Memorial Hospital. 14 Dr. Roberto Valenzuela
performed on Catugas exploratory laparatomy debridement and found three multi-
lacerations in the right upper extremities and several others on the left upper extremities
which could have been caused by bladed instruments. 15 Catugas survived and was confined
for seven days. He spent more than P50,000 for his hospitalization and medical expenses.
The hospital billed him in the amount of P44,667.25. 16
In the same evening of 10 March 1994, while Policeman Dominguillo Gulen of the Mabini
Police Station, Mabini, Pangasinan, was approaching his residence at the poblacion in Sual,
Pangasinan, on board a police patrol car, he saw six men walking in front of his house. When
he stopped the car, the men ran away. He gave chase and caught two of them, namely,
accused Mejia and Benito. Gulen thought that they belonged to an "akyat-bahay gang."
When asked what they were doing, the two answered that they were not doing anything and
that they were not robbers. They told Gulen that they were from Sta. Barbara. Benito even
showed his driver's license and told Gulen that he did not commit any crime and that he was
willing to go to the police station. Gulen then brought the two and turned them over to the
police station in Sual, Pangasinan. 17
Policeman Bernardo Clemente, who was the desk officer at 1:00 a.m. of 11 March 1994,
entered in the police blotter this turn-over and talked to the two. In the course of their
conversation, Benito reported that they rode on a jeepney, which was abandoned
somewhere in Sual. Clemente decided to make a follow-up of this report. With Benito as
their guide, Clemente and three other policemen were able to find the jeepney with the
marking LOVELY in Sitio Nipa, Barangay Baguioen, Sual, Pangasinan. The jeepney had
bloodstains on the front and back seats. They brought it to the police station and had the
matter recorded in the police blotter. Clemente then instructed the radio operator to call the
police station of Sta. Barbara and inform it of the turn-over of Mejia and Benito. At 1:45 a.m.
of 11 March 1994, the PNP elements of Sta. Barbara Police Station came and received the
two, as well as the passenger jeepney. 18

Also on 11 March 1994, at 12:00 noon, some concerned citizens of Sual apprehended Joseph
Fabito in Sitio Looc, Poblacion Sual, as a murder suspect. He was turned over to the Sual
Police Station. After having been informed of this arrest, the Sta. Barbara Police Station took
him into its custody. These facts were entered in the Sual Police Station blotter. 19
The accused admitted to having flagged down and boarded Landingin's jeepney that fateful
evening of 10 March 1994, but denied having committed the crimes. They claimed that it was
Romulo Calimquim and his companions who killed Landingin, stabbed Catugas, and drove
away the jeepney. The following is a summary of their version of the events.
Edwin Benito, a resident of Ventinilla West, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, was the driver of the
Elf truck of Lito Lomboy of Bued, Calasiao, Pangasinan, which was used in hauling sand and
gravel. His co-accused Mejia Paraan and Fabito were his helpers.
At around 3:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, after they completed delivering sand and gravel, the
accused returned the truck and went to the house of Fabito's brother-in-law in San Miguel,
Calasiao. After two hours of waiting in vain for the brother-in-law, Paraan suggested that
they go to the house of his future brother-in-law in Bacayao Norte, Calasiao. After some
snacks they proceeded to the town proper and strolled for a while. Then, Benito thought that
it was time to go home to Sta. Barbara and suggested that they should. They proceeded to a
waiting shed near the National High School to wait for a transportation for Sta. Barbara. At
the waiting shed, they saw Romulo Calimquim with three other companions, who were also
waiting for a transportation for Sta. Barbara. Calimquim then flagged down an approaching
passenger jeepney. He and his companions boarded it. So did Benito and his companions.
Calimquim sat beside the driver. The rest took the back seat. 20
According to Paraan, it was Alex Mamaril, the man with a "huge body," who sat beside the
driver. 21
At the junction of the roads leading to the Municipal Hall of Sta. Barbara and that leading to
the national highway, the man who sat beside the driver (Calimquim, according to Benito;
Mamaril, according to Paraan) ordered the driver to proceed to the national highway; the
driver did. But after reaching the highway, in Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara, the former ordered the
latter to stop, announced that "this is a hold up," then stabbed the driver several times,
pulled his body out of the jeepney, took over the wheel, and drove the jeepney. 22 In the
meantime, at the back seat, one of the companions of Calimquim pointed a knife at Benito;
while the others told Benito's companions to lie on their belly. It was when Catugas
attempted to fight back that he was stabbed. 23 Catugas was then thrown out of the jeepney.
24
Benito and his companions were prevented by the group of Calimquim from alighting from
the jeepney. Upon reaching a mountain in Sual,
Pangasinan, 25 the man on the wheel ordered Benito, Mejia, Paraan, and Fabito to alight from
the jeepney. The group of Calimquim pointed knives 26 and a
8
gun 27 at them. Then suddenly there was a light coming from below. They ran away from the
group of Calimquim. 28
Benito and Mejia were together. 29 Later, a policeman saw them. The two told the policeman
that they are not "troublesome persons." The policeman brought them to the Police Station
of Sual. There, Benito reported what had happened and accompanied the policemen to the
place where the jeepney in question was located. 30 Afterwards, the two were detained at
Sta. Barbara Police Station. While in detention, they were informed that Calimquim was
killed and his body was found in Alaminos. 31
Paraan lost his way. He returned to Sta. Barbara only on 14 March 1994 and went to the
house of Roland, his brother-in-law, in Bacayao Norte, to ask him to request a barangay
councilman to accompany him to the police station. It was the barangay captain who
accompanied him the following day to the police station. There, the police authorities told
him that he was among the assailants of Landingin and that he was the one who stabbed
Catugas in the night of 10 March 1994 and one of the suspects in the carnapping of the
jeepney of Landingin. 32 Paraan was forthwith placed inside the jail.
Fabito stayed for awhile in the mountain. At 2:00 a.m. of 11 March 1994, he was by the
seashore. He stayed there until 6:00 a.m. and inquired from someone the location of the
police station. He went to that station which happened to be Sual Police Station. There, he
narrated to the policemen what had happened. When a policeman asked him whether he
was the killer, he answered in the negative. At around 1:00 p.m., he was brought to the Sta.
Barbara Municipal Jail, where he was detained for three months. Then, he was committed to
the Provincial Jail. 33
Sometime after Catugas was discharged from the hospital and was already driving a tricycle,
the parents of the accused met with him and informed him that the accused told them that
they (the accused) did not commit any wrong. Catugas answered that he had suffered several
wounds and spent much for his hospitalization and that since the accused were the ones
apprehended, he would just tell a lie so he could recover the amounts he spent. Catugas then
asked P20,000 from each of the accused, or a total of P80,000, and repeated this demand
five to six times. 34
The defense, through the testimony of Policemen Bernardo Clemente, also proved that
Romulo Calimquim died due to a gunshot wound on 13 March 1994 in Barangay Paitan West,
Sual, Pangasinan, as evidenced by Entry No. 4338 of Page 260 of the Police Blotter. 35
On rebuttal, Catugas insisted that it was accused Edwin Benito who stabbed Landingin and
that accused Mejia, Paraan, and Fabito were the ones who stabbed him. He further declared
that it was the parents of the accused who offered to pay him, but he refused because such
an offer could not "be accepted by [his] conscience." 36

The defense then presented Julia Paraan as surrebuttal witness. She denounced as untrue
the testimony on rebuttal of Catugas that the parents of accused were the ones who offered
to pay him money. Julia declared that they visited Catugas to ask him whether it was true
that their children committed the crime. On their first visit, Catugas told them that he could
not yet answer that question; but when they returned, Catugas told them that they had to
pay the aggregate sum of P80,000, or P20,000 per family of the accused. 37
The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and relied heavily on the
identification of the accused by Catugas, the absence of ulterior motive on the part of the
latter, and the offer of the parents of the accused to compromise the cases.
In its decision dated 17 November 1994, 38 the LARON court convicted accused Mejia, Benito,
Paraan, and Fabito of the crime of murder and of frustrated murder, with treachery as the
qualifying circumstance and nighttime and band as aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, it
sentenced the first three accused to suffer the penalty of death for the crime of murder; and
ten years and one day of prision mayor to seventeen years, four months, and one day of
reclusion temporal for the crime of frustrated murder. It credited Paraan with the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, he being only seventeen years old at the time of the
commission of the crimes charged; and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for murder, and
six years of prision correccional to ten years an one day of prision mayor for frustrated
murder. The Court also ordered the four accused to pay the heirs of Teofilo Landingin the
amounts of P50,000 as death indemnity; P16,000 for the cost of the tomb; and P12,000 for
funeral expenses; and to pay Catugas the amount of P44,687.25 for hospital expenses, plus
costs.
II
THE CASE IN THE CASTILLO COURT
In Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D (violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act) in the CASTILLO Court,
the prosecution presented as its witnesses Virgilio Catugas and Nora Landingin. The former
was recalled as rebuttal witness. The accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito took the
witness stand and presented as additional witnesses Conrado Benito and Felicidad Fabito.
Their testimonies were substantially the same as those they made in the murder and
frustrated murder cases in the LARON court.
Prosecution witness Virgilio Catugas added that after Landingin was stabbed, he was thrown
out of the jeepney to the shoulder of the road and that one of the culprits took the wheel of
the jeepney, started off its engine, and drove off. 39 He further declared that while he was
confined at the hospital, the policemen of Sta. Barbara investigated him, showed him
pictures of the suspects, supplied the suspect's names, 40 and took his statement. 41 After he
was discharged therefrom, he was able to talk with the father of accused Benito. He told the
father of his hospitalization expenses and asked P80,000, as a settlement of the case, to be
paid by the parents of the accused on an agreed date; but before that date came, he had
already testified against the accused. 42
9
Prosecution witness Nora Landingin, widow of Teofilo Landingin, further testified that her
husband owned the passenger jeepney in question, as evidenced by Certificate of
Registration No. 19253856, 43 and Official Receipt No. MVRR 91354948. 44 The jeepney was
worth P140,000. 45
The CASTILLO court gave full faith to the testimony of Virgilio Catugas. It debunked the
version of the defense on account of the following "inculpating evidence," which, according
to it, bolstered its finding that the accused were the authors of the crime charged:
1. Accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Joseph Fabito and Pedro Paraan speak of
innocence and fear for their lives during the ruthless incident, unfortunately they
never sustained any bodily injury on their bodies.
If the intention of Mok Calimquim and company is to hurt anybody, they could not
have concentrated on the persons of Teofilo Landingin and Virgilio Catugas only but
they should have also inflicted stabbing thrusts against their persons (accused).
2. They (accused) posited that for fear of their lives they did not do anything except
to passively stay at the back seat of the jeepney motionless from the place of
stabbing incident in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan up to the mountains in Sual,
Pangasinan.
Again, if one of the motives of Mok and company is to carnapp [sic] the passenger
jeepney of Teofilo Landingin then the logical conclusion that can be had in the
instant situation is for the group of Mok to liquidate the driver and all passengers
for that matter, including the four (4) accused to eliminate the presence of
eyewitnesses.
Unfortunately, the four (4) accused joined the group of Mok in going to Sual,
Pangasinan without offering any slight resistance in the premises.
The natural conclusion that can be derived thereat is that, Mok and company
belonged to the group of the four (4) accused who were responsible in
perpetrating the offense charged.
3. Assuming en gratia argumenti that Mok and company are the real offenders,
why is it that during the long span of travel from Sta. Barbara to Sual, they never
made any attempt to jump off the passenger jeepney; neither did they show
positive signs to invite the attention of PNP members stationed along the long
route starting in Dagupan City, Binmaley, Lingayen, Bugallon, Labrador, Pangasinan.
4. Accused Gregorio Mejia and Edwin Benito steadfastly claim innocence of the
crime charged. In fact, they averred that upon reaching Sual, Pangasinan, they

reported to the responding peace officers what happened to them and that their
reports was recorded in the Police Blotter of Sual Station.
The assertion of accused Benito and Mejia is tainted with absolute falsity and is
debunked by the entry in the Police Blotter of Sual Police Station (Exh. G); the
subject certification negates accused's statement of innocence. The subject entry
which is contained in the Book of Events of Sual Police Station belies any
complaint/report made by accused Edwin Benito/Gregorio Mejia that they were
kidnapped or deprived of their liberty with the use of guns and bladed weapons.
Upon the other hand, the Certification squarely bespeaks of the
incarceration/detention of said accused (Mejia and Benito) at Sual Police Station
for they were suspected of having carnapped the passenger jeepney involved in the
above case.
5. With respect to accused Joseph Fabito and Pedro Paraan, they likewise
vehemently denied the accusation lodged against them. Unfortunately, their
conclusion of innocence crumbled when they joined the group from the crime
scene starting in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan up to their destination in Sual,
Pangasinan. In fact when they reached Sual, Pangasinan they scampered and run
away to different directions to avoid apprehension.
Instead of proceeding to the Sual Police Station or making any report to the nearest
authority i.e. Barangay Captain of the place they decided to escape which they did
with impunity. The records in the Police Blotter of Sual is negatived (sic) of any
entry about the whereabouts of accused Paraan and Fabito. 46
The court then convicted accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, and Joseph
Fabito guilty of the violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended. It sentenced
the first three accused to death; and Paraan, to reclusion perpetua on account of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. It also ordered them to pay the costs.
III
THE APPEALS AND ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Although review in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court is automatic
pursuant to Section 22 of R.A. No. 7659, 47 the convicted accused filed with this Court their
notices of appeal from the decision of the LARON court and of the CASTILLO court on 18
November 1994 and 22 February 1995, respectively.
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D and 94-00619-D were docketed in this Court as G.R. Nos.
118940-41, and Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D was docketed as G.R. No. 119407.
10
On 2 February 1996, after they filed separate Appellant's Briefs in G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and in
G.R. No. 119407, the appellants filed a motion for the consolidation of these cases, which we
granted on 27 February 1996.
In their Appellant's Brief in G.R. Nos. 118940-41, the appellants impute upon the trial court
the following errors: (a) in giving full faith and credence to the unsubstantiated testimony of
prosecution witness Virgilio Catugas relative to the incident in question; (b) in holding them
as the persons who stabbed the jeepney driver and Virgilio Catugas in the evening of 10
March 1994 despite the fact that clear and convincing evidence were proffered to point at
the real culprits, Romulo Calimquim and his companions; (c) in rendering a verdict of
conviction notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; and (d) in convicting them of the crimes charged instead of the crimes
homicide and frustrated homicide — on the assumption that they are guilty.
Being interrelated, the appellants discussed jointly these assigned errors. They submit that:
(1) The uncorroborated testimony of Catugas on the identification of the appellants
leaves much to be desired. He should not be believed, for he could not even
remember who among the appellants were wearing short pants, hat, and shoes at
that time. If policeman Gulen could not even identify in court appellant Mejia
whom he apprehended in the evening of 10 March 1994 and brought to the Sual
Police Station, it was with more reason that Catugas could not have identified the
assailants since it was nighttime. The possibility that Catugas got confused, if not
mentally and physically drained, as a result of the shocking incident is not far-
fetched. There is then a very strong and compelling reason to believe that Catugas
mistook the appellants as the real hold-uppers.
(2) Catugas told Conrado Benito and Felicidad Fabito that their children did not
commit any wrong, but Catugas "vacillated and testified falsely against accused-
appellants when they were not able to produce the amount of P20,000.00 each as
earlier demanded from them." Catuga's denial of their testimony is self-serving and
cannot overcome the positive testimony of Conrado and Felicidad.
(3) The actuations of appellants specifically that of Edwin Benito augurs well with
their claim of innocence," when they were apprehended. Benito readily showed his
driver's license, answered questions propounded by policeman Clemente, and
without hesitation he helped or guided the policemen in locating the jeepney at
the place where it was abandoned. He did not try to hide or conceal anything when
he was confronted about the incident. Moreover, when Benito and Mejia were
picked up by a policeman on that fateful night, they were not "tainted with blood."
(4) On the assumption that they are guilty they could only be liable for homicide
and frustrated homicide, since treachery was not established.

In their Appellants' Brief in G.R. No. 119407, they make the following assignment of errors:
(a) the facts charged in the information do not constitute violation of the crime of Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended; (b) The court a quo erred in convicting them of the
crime charged on the basis of surmises and conjecture; and (c) the court a quo erred in
convicting them by relying fully on the evidence of the prosecution and completely
disregarding the evidence of the defense.
As to the first, the appellants argue that intent to gain, which is an essential ingredient of the
crime of carnapping, was not proved. They claim that from the evidence adduced "it is very
clear that the incident was only a hold-up and that the jeepney was taken to Sual as escape
vehicle."
In support of the second and third assigned errors, which they discussed jointly, the
appellants submit that:
(1) The trial court's conclusion on their culpability was based on mere surmises and
conjectures and contradicted by the evidence on the record. The fact that the
group of Calimqium did not hurt any of the four appellants and that the latter
offered no resistance does not prove appellant's membership in Calimquim's
group. That they did not even jump off the passenger jeepney or show positive
signs to invite the attention of the PNP stationed along the route from Dagupan
City to Sual, it was because of fear since Calimquim's group pointed knives at each
of them and ordered them to lie down in stooping position. The absence of
conspiracy was shown by the fact that in Sual, after they were released as
hostages, they ran in separate directions and did not join the group of Calimquim.
(2) The entry in the Sual Police Station police blotter that Benito and Mejia were
suspected of having carnapped the passenger jeepney does not bind them, for it
was made by a police officer and was contrary to what they had reported.
(3) There is no basis for the conclusion that Paraan and Fabito had escaped.
(4) The trial court should not have relied on the testimony of Catugas whose
identification of the appellants was based only on the pictures and on the
information of the policemen. It was impossible for Catugas to narrate in detail the
participation of each accused, considering that the light in the jeepney was dim and
his principal attention was concentrated on defending himself.
(5) Appellant's reporting of the incident disproved their membership in the group
of Calimquim. If they were members, their natural course would have been to hide
from the authorities. Their voluntary submission to the police immediately after
the incident should have been given credence as part of the res gestae.
11
In the Consolidated Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) urges us to
affirm in toto the challenged decisions for failure of the appellants to show that the trial
court committed error in finding the prosecution evidence clear, sufficient, and convincing to
convict. Catugas, who made an eyewitness account, had the opportunity to observe the
appellants during the commission of the crime and had no ill-motive to implicate the
appellants falsely. As to the charge that he perjured because the appellants were not able to
produce the amount of P80,000 which he allegedly demanded from them, the same should
not be believed. The truth is, it was the parents of the appellants who approached Catugas
and offered him P80,000 in order that he would not testify against the appellants. Catugas
did not accept the offer, as it was against his principles to tell a lie.
The OSG also maintains that treachery was duly proved and, hence, the trial court was
correct in convicting the appellants of murder for the death of Teofilo Landingin and
frustrated murder for stabbing Virgilio Catugas. Their conviction for violation of the Anti-
Carnapping Act is also proper, since their main purpose was to get the jeepney and they
killed Landingin in order that they could get it. They presented to evidence to prove that they
ran away with the jeepney for any lawful purpose.
In their Consolidated Reply Brief, the appellants try to show that the identification made by
prosecution witness Catugas cannot be denominated as clear, positive, and convincing; for,
while it may be true that he "could have taken glimpse or glance at the faces of all the
accused-appellants, this fact alone is not adequate and fell short of the required test of
'positive identification'." They strongly suggest that Catugas had ill-motive to testify falsely
against them in that he was not paid the P80,000 he demanded.
IV
THE CRIMES COMMITTED AND THE
ISSUE OF CULPABILITY OF APPELLANTS
Before we go any further, remarks on some procedural matters are in order. The crimes
charged in the informations filed before the LARON court and CASTILLO court are
irretrievably linked with or related to one another. They arose out of the same incident, are
founded on the same factual milieu, and would be proved by testimonies of the same
witnesses. The three cases then should have been consolidated and jointly tried in one
branch of the RTC of Dagupan City. What were jointly tried were only the cases for murder
and frustrated murder. Section 14 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 14. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. Charges for offenses founded on
the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be
tried jointly at the court's discretion.
The purpose or object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against
oppression or abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial
court, and save unnecessary cost or expense; in short, the attainment of justice with the least
expense and vexation to the parties

litigants. 48 In Raymundo v. Elipe, 49 we held that although consolidation of several cases
involving the same parties and the same subject matter is one addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, joint hearing becomes a matter of duty if two or more cases are
tried before the same judge, or even filed with the different branches of the same court,
provided one of such cases has not been partially tried.
We are unable to understand why neither the LARON court or the CASTILLO court nor any of
the parties caused, or moved for, a consolidation of the case for violation of the Anti-
Carnapping Act (which has the higher docket number) with the cases for murder and
frustrated murder in the LARON court (which have lower docket numbers). It was only after
the filing of their separate Appellant's Brief in G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and in G.R. No. 119407
that the appellants moved to consolidate the latter with the former.
This failure to consolidate the three cases at the trial court level could contribute some
difficulty in the appreciation of the evidence. The principal witnesses of the parties testified
in all the three cases. Yet, the assessment of their testimony and credibility in the LARON
court must not be influenced by their testimonies in the case before the CASTILLO court, and
vice versa. In the LARON court, prosecution witness Catugas was unclear in some details of
the incident, but clear in the CASTILLO court. Upon the other hand, there were details he
disclosed in one of the courts which were not given in the other court. The same observation
may be had on the testimonies of the appellants before both courts. As one reads the
transcripts of the testimonies of these witnesses in both cases, it would be quite difficult to
avoid forming impressions in light of the totality of their testimonies in both courts. Our
minds and mental processes must be kept away from the pitfalls of such impressions, for the
rules on evidence and the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the appellants
dictate that we resolve the appeals in the cases before the LARON court and the case before
the CASTILLO court solely on the basis of the evidence presented before such courts,
respectively.
The next preliminary matter to be resolved is whether the crimes of murder in Criminal Case
No. 94-00617-D and frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D are absorbed in the
violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act in Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D.
R.A. No. 7659 which took effect on 31 December 1993 50 is applicable to these cases because
the crimes were committed on 10 March 1994. Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act was
amended by Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659 and now imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death when the owner, driver, or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or
raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. This
Section, as amended, reads in full as follows:
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. — Any person who is found guilty of carnapping,
as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of
motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years
and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
12
things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months
and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof . (Emphasis supplied).
In the original Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, the last clause read as follows:
and the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed in the commission of the
carnapping. (emphasis supplied).
Three amendments have thus been made, viz: (1) the change of the penalty of life
imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the
phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof." The latter makes clear the intention of the law to
make the offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons. As such, the killing (or the rape) merely qualifies the crime of carnapping which for
lack of specific nomenclature may be known as qualified carnapping or carnapping in an
aggravated form. In short, considering the phraseology of the amended Section 14, 51 the
carnapping and the killing (or the rape) may be considered as a single or indivisible crime or a
special complex crime which, however, is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Since Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539 uses the words "IS KILLED," no distinction must be made
between homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the other which is committed "in the
course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof" makes no difference insofar as the penalty
is concerned.
It follows then that the killing of the driver, Teofilo Landingin — whether it be homicide or
murder — cannot be treated as a separate offense, but should only be considered to qualify
the crime of carnapping.
Nonetheless, although there could only be one single offense of qualified carnapping or
carnapping in an aggravated form, the prosecution had still to prove the essential requisites
of the homicide or murder of Landingin and that of carnapping. This should have been
another reason for the consolidation of the carnapping case in the CASTILLO court with the
cases before the LARON court.
But do the words "IS KILLED" in the last clause of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, as amended,
include the crime of frustrated murder or homicide? Put a little differently, does murder or
homicide in its frustrated stage also qualify carnapping if it is committed "in the course of the

commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof"? The answer must be in the
negative in light of the use in said Section 14 of the words "IS KILLED". The unmistakable
import thereof is that it refers only to the consummated felony of either murder or homicide.
If attempted or frustrated murder or homicide is committed "in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof," then it must be deemed to fall
under the clause (of Section 14) "when the carnapping is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person."
We shall now take up the issue of the culpability of the appellants.
The evidence adduced by the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the
carnapping of Teofilo Landingin's passenger jeepney, which is a motor vehicle under the
definition in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539. 52 The passenger jeepney was taken, with intent of
gain, from Landingin by means of violence against him which caused his death and against a
passenger, Virgilio Catugas, who suffered physical injuries.
But, has the prosecution established with moral certainty the guilt of the appellants? The
LARON and the CASTILLO courts held that it did.
Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. 53 To overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable
doubt must be established by the prosecution. 54 Save in certain circumstances as where, for
instance, the accused admits the commission of the acts alleged to constitute a crime but
interposes justifying circumstances, the burden is never shifted to the accused or diminished
by the weakness of his defense. Indeed, unless the prosecution successfully discharges that
burden, the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf. 55
In our jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The freedom of the accused is
forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. This, of
course, requires the most careful scrutiny of the evidence for the State, both oral and
documentary, independent of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Every
circumstance favoring the accused's innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof
against the accused must survive the test of reason. Strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be
laid the responsibility for the offense charged. 56 If the prosecution fails to discharge the
burden, then it is not only the accused's right to be freed; it is, even more, the court's
constitutional duty to acquit him. 57
After a painstaking review of the records and the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the
testimonies of the witnesses in the cases before the LARON court and the CASTILLO court, we
are not convinced with moral certainty that the appellants committed the crimes charged.
Reasonable doubt burdens our conscience; our minds cannot rest easy on a verdict of
conviction.
13
The prosecution had nine suspects in these cases: the four appellants and the five others,
namely, Romulo Calimquim, Alex Mamaril, a certain Dennis, a certain Mondragon, and
another described as John Doe. All nine were forthwith charged with the crimes of murder,
frustrated murder, and carnapping in Criminal Cases Nos. 3310, 58 3313, 59 3311, 60
respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, and then in the
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D, 61 and 94-00619-D 62 of the LARON court and
Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D 63 of the CASTILLO court, respectively.
The theory of the appellants is that they were not members of the group of Romulo
Calimquim. The prosecution has no proof to prove otherwise; but the LARON and the
CASTILLO courts, through inferences from certain facts, concluded that the appellants were.
The conclusion is rather tenuous. While the rigorous cross-examination of the appellants in
all these cases has established close relationship among the appellants by reason of their
residence and work, (Benito, as sand-and-gravel truck driver and Mejia, Fabito, and Paraan as
his keepers), it miserably failed to establish any relationship between them and the five
others headed by Calimquim. What then looms large in our minds is that the appellants and
the five others happened to be passengers of Landingin's jeepney by accident, not by design.
If the appellants were with the five others until Sual, Pangasinan, it was because they were
intimidated and made to lie down on their belies inside the jeepney.
Another circumstance further proves that the appellants did not belong to the group of
Calimquim. Upon arrival in the mountains of Sual, they fled from the Calimquim group when
the first opportunity to do so came. We find to be absolutely without basis the statement of
the CASTILLO court that the appellants abandoned Landingin's jeepney in Sitio Nipa,
Baquioen, Sual, Pangasinan, "upon seeing the arrival of concerned citizens and members of
the Sual Police Station; the responding peace officers effected the recovery of the subject
jeepney sans the accused/culprits." No prosecution witness so testified. In the CASTILLO
court, no policeman was presented as witness for the prosecution. The evidence presented
by both the prosecution and the defense reveal that after appellants Benito and Mejia were
picked up by Policeman Gulen on the latter's suspicion that they were members of an akyat-
bahay gang, they voluntarily informed the police authorities of the Sual Police Station of
what happened. It was this information that brought the policemen to where the subject
jeepney was located. Benito even accompanied the policemen. This resulted in the recovery
of the jeepney by the policemen. Appellant Paraan also presented himself later to the Police
Station of Sta. Barbara. Appellant Fabito, although apprehended by concerned citizens of the
place to where he had fled, voluntarily reported what he knew to the police authorities of
Sual and Sta. Barbara.
Unfortunately, the CASTILLO court relied heavily on the entries in the police blotters of the
police stations of Sual and Sta. Barbara. The silence of the entries on what the appellants had
declared in court is not conclusive evidence that they did not report the incident to the police
authorities. They had no participation in the preparation of the entries. Entries in the police
blotters should not be given undue significance or probative value, for they are normally
incomplete and inaccurate sometimes from either partial suggestion of for want of
 14

suggestion or inquiries. 64 The entries in question are sadly wanting in material particulars. At A I can remember those persons who sat near me.
the very most, they only recorded the impression that the appellants were "suspects."
Q Who of the four (4) accused who sitted [sic] near you?
As to the alleged participation of the appellants in the commission of the crimes, the
prosecution had to rely solely on the testimony of Virgilio Catugas. The totality of his A The one wearing red T-shirt, the second to the last of the four accused.
testimony in the cases before the LARON court leaves much to be desired. The prosecutor
who conducted the direct examination was unable to propound sensible questions to elicit
Q So, how were you able to identify these [sic] persons who is [sic] wearing in [sic] red T-
clear answers bound to reconstruct faithfully the events surrounding the commission of the
shirt?
alleged crimes. This deficiency thus tempted the trial judge to ask more questions. Despite
the latter's participation, the testimony of Catugas fails to convince us that the appellants
indeed participated in the commission of the crimes. On cross-examination in the LARON A I saw his face, sir.
court, Catugas categorically admitted that he did not know the names of the appellants and
that he could recognize only three of the nine accused. Thus: Q How were you able to recognize the last person (referring to Edwin Benito)?

ATTY. TAMINAYA: A He was besides [sic] the driver, Sir. 65

Q Now, in paragraph 8 of your statement, you said and you mentioned the names of the Further indicating the uncertainty of his identification, he made the following admissions on
person and I will now read: cross-examination:

Q How about the true names of the suspect, do you know them? Q Now, you said you recognized the persons who sat besides [sic] the driver, is it not?

A In fact I do not know, however, based on the police investigation of Sta. Barbara PNP, they A Yes, sir.
were, Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Joseph Fabito, Pedro Paraan, Mok Calimquim, alyas
Dennis, Alex Mamaril, Dennis Abrigo alyas Mondragon and one unidentified person. Q Please point to him?

can you tell this Court why these persons were written in your statement? A He was wearing a dark color.

A Because of the police investigation. Q Was it a T-shirt or a polo shirt?

Q So, were it not of the police and the pictures, you were not able to identify the accused, is A I cannot tell, sir.
that correct?

Q How about the person sitting in front of you whom you pointed to this person wearing in
A I can recognize the others, sir. red T-shirt?

Q How many of the nine (9) can you recognize? A I can no longer remember, sir.

A Three (3) of them, sir. Q How about the person next to the one with red t-shirt, do you remember his shirt?

COURT: A I don't know, sir.

Q What you do mean when you said that that you can recognize three (3) of them? Q How about Gregorio Mejia, do you remember his clothes?
 15

A I cannot remember, sir. Q And you cannot recognize the person who stabbed your?

Q You can't remember also whether one of these accused was wearing a hat at that time? A I can identify him, sir.

A I cannot remember, sir. Q How many persons stabbed you then?

In the case before the CASTILLO court, he declared that he was stabbed by the nine persons. A Only one (1) person, sir. 67
Thus:
Upon further questioning by the court, Catugas declared that six of the nine stabbed him:
COURT:
COURT:
Q Who were involved in stabbing?
Q How many stab wounds did you sustain?
A All of them, sir.
A More than twenty (20) stab wounds, sir.
Q Who was the assailant and who was stabbed?
Q A while ago you mentioned there were two (2) initial stab blows with respect to the other
A The 9 persons, sir. stab blow who delivered this stab blow?

Q When you said 9 persons, they were the 9 persons who participated in the stabbing A His companions and also Gregorio Mejia, sir.
incident and who were the victims?
COURT:
A Me and the driver, sir.
Proceed.
PROS. MARATA:
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q How many times were you stabbed by the nine persons, four of whom were inside the
courtroom? Q When you said his companions and Gregorio Mejia are you referring to the five (5) other
persons as the companions of Gregorio Mejia who participated in stabbing you?
A From the scar left of my body, there are 22 stabbed wounds, sir. 66
A I think it is about six (6) of them who stabbed me, sir. 68
Yet, no further questions were asked for him to convincingly show that the appellants
inflicted any of the stab wounds on his body. Further compounding the uncertainty and He could not remember anymore the person who inflicted the last stab wound, and then
unreliability of Catuga's testimony, he candidly admitted on cross-examination that only one declined to point to anyone of the herein four appellants as the person who did it. Thus:
person stabbed him. Thus:
COURT:
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q When they stopped stabbing you they did not stab you anymore?
Q How many times were you stabbed by them?
A They still stabbed me on my right upper arm, sir. (Witness showing his scar near the
A Twice, sir. shoulder.)
 16

Q You said you were stabbed on your right shoulder, who stabbed you among these nine (9) A I was asking P80,000.00, sir.
persons?
COURT:
A I could not remember anymore, sir.
Q Why were you asking the amount of P80,000.00 then?
Q When you said you cannot remember, you cannot tell this Court whether it was one
among the four (4) accused in this case who stabbed you on your right upper arm? A Because he pleaded to me, sir.

A I could not point the person responsible in stabbing my shoulder because that is the last Q What you are trying to convey to the Court is that you are settling the case with Edwin
stab wound, sir. 69 Benito the amount of P80,000.00?

It would thus be sheer speculation and conjecture to conclude from Catuga's testimony in A Yes, sir.
the CASTILLO court that the appellants had inflicted any of the stab wounds on Catugas.
COURT:
Moreover, on question by the trial judge in the CASTILLO court, Catugas categorically
admitted that none of the appellants participated in the stabbing of Landingin. Thus:
Proceed.

COURT:
ATTY. TIMANAYA:

Q These two persons who participated in stabbing Teofilo Landingin, can you inform the
Q And the parents of Edwin Benito cannot pay that P80,000.00 because they are poor?
Court if the four (4) accused now or these two persons are among the four (4) accused now?

A They will not pay that amount on that date, we have agreed of another date for them to
A They are not here, sir. 70
pay, sir.

Finally, Catugas was not entirely free from any ulterior motive in implicating the appellants.
COURT:
He admitted that he demanded P80,000 from the parents of the appellants, but before they
could give the money on the agreed date, he testified against the appellants in the LARON
court. The following exchanges between him and counsel for the defense before the Q Did the parents of Edwin Benito made a counter offer?
CASTILLO court are revealing:
A That is already their counter proposal, sir.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q What you want to tell the Honorable Court is that you agreed to pay you P80,000.00 but
Q After you were released from the hospital, were you able to talk with the father of Edwin he cannot pay you at that very moment?
Benito?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q And you told them about your expenses in the hospital, is that correct?
Proceed.
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q And you demanded from them to pay P40,000.00 is that correct?
 17

Q Did you agree for the amount of P80,000.00? pinpoint them so that he could recover what he had spent. He then demanded P80,000,
which he equally apportioned among the parents of the four appellants. Conrado Benito
COURT: testified as follows:

That is the settlement money. Q What did you tell him?

ATTY. TAMINAYA: A I told him that our children telling us that they did not commit any wrong and I told them
to tell the truth and we are not consenting them to whatever they have done if they done
something wrong.
Q So, it is clear that if only they have given P80,000.00, you should not have testified in this
case?
Q What was the answer of Virgilio Catugas?
A PROSECUTOR MARATA:
A He said, he suffered several wounds and that he spent so much for his hospitalization, and
he said also that they were the persons who were apprehended and so, I will just tell a lie for
Improper, your honor.
the same because how could I collect for the amount I spent if I will not tell a lie?

ATTY. TAMINAYA
COURT:

As follow-up question, you Honor.

Q You consider Virgilio Catugas as a liar and you are not a liar?

COURT:
A Yes, sir.

Sustained. Hypothetical.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:

ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q Can you tell this Court what did you tell him about that expenses?

Q You said that there was the agreed date, what happened on the agreed date?
A I said, "then we can at least help you", because he is saying that he suffered several
wounds.
A The date has not yet arrived but I have already testified, sir.
Q How much did Virgilio Catugas tell you?
COURT:
A The last time that we talked, he ask[ed] us to give P20,000.00 each.
Q When you said you have already testified, you are referring to your testimony in RTC
Branch 44?
COURT:

A Yes, sir. 71
Q How many times did he tell your?

In the LARON court, efforts were made by the prosecution to cushion the impact of Catugas'
A For 5 to 6 times because he told us to return to him. 72
demand for payment of P80,000 in consideration of his exculpatory testimony. It wanted to
prove that the parents of the appellants were in fact the ones who proposed. But the
testimony of Conrado Benito, which the prosecution failed to satisfactorily rebut, is that the But the parents could not deliver the P20,000 each was to pay, for they could not afford it.
parents went to see him to verify whether their children had indeed committed the crimes; Conrado so declared, thus:
but Catugas replied that since the appellants were the ones apprehended, he would just
 18

ATTY. TAMINAYA:

Q When Virgilio Catugas told you to give P20,000.00, can you tell this court if he made
mention to the wife of Teofilo Landingin?

A Because he is collecting from us P20,000.00, he told us that we would not tell the same to
Mrs. Landingin.

Q Were you able to give that P20,000.00?

A No sir, not even a single centavo.

Q Why?

A We cannot pay because even payment for attorney's fees, we cannot afford. 73

The LARON court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and even took the incident
as offer of compromise, which may be considered an implied admission of guilt. Said court
misapplied Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 74 There is no evidence whatsoever
that any of the appellants authorized his parents to approach Catugas or knew the matter of
payment of P80,000. Moreover, if one were to believe the explanation of Catugas that the
amount of P80,000 represented the expenses he incurred for his hospitalization and medical
bills, then the offer to reimburse it is not admissible in evidence as proof of criminal liability
pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 27 of Rule 130.

On the whole then we entertain, unavoidably, serious doubt on the participation of the
appellants in the commission of the crimes charged.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decisions in Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D (for Murder) and
Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D (for Frustrated Murder) of Branch 44 and in Criminal Case No.
94-00620-D (violation of Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) of Branch 43 of the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City are REVERSED. Accused-appellants Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito,
Pedro Paraan, and Joseph Fabito are ACQUITTED on the ground that their guilt therefor has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt or with moral certainty. Their immediate release
from detention is hereby ordered, unless other lawful and valid grounds for their further
detention exist.

No costs.

SO ORDERED
 19

SECOND DIVISION granted by the court a quo 3 but the preliminary attachment was subsequently lifted upon
the filing by private respondent of a counterbond amounting to P990,000.00. 4
G.R. No. 108253 February 23, 1994
During the pendency of said civil case for damages, petitioner also filed other complaints
LYDIA L. GERALDEZ, petitioner, before the Department of Tourism in DOT Case No. 90-121 and the Securities and Exchange
vs. Commission in PED Case No. 90-3738, 5 wherein, according to petitioner, herein private
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and KENSTAR TRAVEL CORPORATION, respondents. respondent was meted out a fine of P10,000.00 by the Commission and P5,000.00 by the
Department, 6 which facts are not disputed by private respondent in its comment on the
present petition.
REGALADO, J.:

On July 9, 1991, the court a quo rendered its decision 7 ordering private respondent to pay
Our tourism industry is not only big business; it is a revenue support of the nation's economy.
petitioner P500.000.00 as moral damages, P200,000.00 as nominal damages, P300,000.00 as
It has become a matter of public interest as to call for its promotion and regulation on a
exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit. 8 On
cabinet level. We have special laws and policies for visiting tourists, but such protective
appeal, respondent court 9 deleted the award for moral and exemplary damages, and
concern has not been equally extended to Filipino tourists going abroad. Thus, with the
reduced the awards for nominal damages and attorney's fees to P30,000.00 and P10,000.00,
limited judicial relief available within the ambit of present laws, our tourists often prefer who
respectively. 10
fail to deliver on their undertakings. This case illustrates the recourse of one such tourist who
refused to forget.
Hence, the instant petition from which, after sifting through the blades of contentions
alternately thrust and parried in the exchanges of the parties, the pivotal issue that emerges
An action for damages by reason of contractual breach was filed by petitioner Lydia L.
is whether or not private respondent acted in bad faith or with gross negligence in
Geraldez against private respondent Kenstar Travel Corporation, docketed as Civil Case No.
discharging its obligations under the contract.
Q-90-4649 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80. 1 After the parties failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement, trial on the merits ensued.
Both the respondent court and the court a quo agree that private respondent failed to
comply faithfully with its commitments under the Volare 3 tour program, more particularly in
Culling from the records thereof, we find that sometime in October, 1989, Petitioner came to
not providing the members of the tour group with a European tour manger whose duty, inter
know about private respondent from numerous advertisements in newspapers of general
alia, was to explain the points of interest of and familiarize the tour group with the places
circulation regarding tours in Europe. She then contacted private respondent by phone and
they would visit in Europe, and in assigning instead a first timer Filipino tour guide, in the
the latter sent its representative, Alberto Vito Cruz, who gave her the brochure for the tour
person of Rowena Zapanta, 11 to perform that role which definitely requires experience and
and later discussed its highlights. The European tours offered were classified into four, and
knowledge of such places. It is likewise undisputed that while the group was able to pay a
petitioner chose the classification denominated as "VOLARE 3" covering a 22-day tour of
visit to the site of the UGC Leather Factory, they were brought there at a very late hour such
Europe for $2,990.00. She paid the total equivalent amount of P190,000.00 charged by
that the factory was already closed and they were unable to make purchases at supposedly
private respondent for her and her sister, Dolores.
discounted prices. 12 As to the first-class hotels, however, while the court a quo found that
the hotels were not fist-class, respondent court believed otherwise, or that, at least, there
Petitioner claimed that, during the tour, she was very uneasy and disappointed when it was substantial compliance with such a representation.
turned out that, contrary to what was stated in the brochure, there was no European tour
manager for their group of tourists, the hotels in which she and the group were bullited were
While clearly there was therefore a violation of the rights of petitioner under the
not first-class, the UGC Leather Factory which was specifically added as a highlight of the tour
aforementioned circumstances, respondent court, contrary to the findings of the trial court,
was not visited, and the Filipino lady tour guide by private respondent was a first timer, that
ruled that no malice or bad faith could be imputed to private respondent, hence there is no
is, she was performing her duties and responsibilities as such for the first time. 2
justification for the award of moral and exemplary damages. Furthermore, it held that while
petitioner is entitled to nominal damages, the amount awarded by the trial court was
In said action before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, petitioner likewise moved for unconscionable since petitioner did not suffer actual or substantial damage from the breach
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against private respondent on the ground of contract, 13 hence its reduction of such award as hereinbefore stated.
that it committed fraud in contracting an obligation, as contemplated in Section 1(d), Rule 57
of the Rules of Court, to which no opposition by the latter appears on the record. This was
After thorough and painstaking scrutiny of the case records of both the trial and appellate
courts, we are satisfactorily convinced, and so hold, that private respondent did commit

fraudulent misrepresentations amounting to bad faith, to the prejudice of petitioner and the
members of the tour group.
By providing the Volare 3 tourist group, of which petitioner was a member, with an
inexperienced and a first timer tour escort, private respondent manifested its indifference to
the convenience, satisfaction and peace of mind of its clients during the trip, despite its
express commitment to provide such facilities under the Volare 3 Tour Program which had
the grandiose slogan "Let your heart sing. 14
Evidently, an inexperienced tour escort, who admittedly had not even theretofore been to
Europe, 15 cannot effectively acquaint the tourists with the interesting areas in the cities and
places included in the program, or to promptly render necessary assistance, especially where
the latter are complete strangers thereto, like witnesses Luz Sui Haw and her husband who
went to Europe for their honeymoon. 16
We agree with petitioner that the selection of Zapanta as the group's tour guide was
deliberate and conscious choice on the part of private respondent in order to afford her an
on-the-job training and equip her with the proper opportunities so as to later qualify her as
an "experienced" tour guide and eventually be an asset of respondent corporation. 17
Unfortunately, this resulted in a virtual project experimentation with petitioner and the
members of the tour as the unwitting participants.
We are, therefore, one with respondent court in faulting private respondent's choice of
Zapanta as a qualified tour guide for the Volare 3 tour package. It brooks no argument that to
be true to its undertakings, private respondent should have selected an experienced
European tour guide, or it could have allowed Zapanta to go merely as an understudy under
the guidance, control and supervision of an experienced and competent European or Filipino
tour guide, 18 who could give her the desired training.
Moreover, a tour guide is supposed to attend to the routinary needs of the tourists, not only
when the latter ask for assistance but at the moment such need becomes apparent. In other
words, the tour guide, especially by reason of her experience in previous tours, must be able
to anticipate the possible needs and problems of the tourists instead of waiting for them to
bring it to her attention. While this is stating the obvious, it is her duty to see to it that basic
personal necessities such as soap, towels and other daily amenities are provided by the
hotels. It is also expected of her to see to it that the tourists are provided with sanitary
surroundings and to actively arrange for medical attention in case of accidents, as what befell
petitioner's sister and wherein the siblings had to practically fend for themselves since, after
merely calling for an ambulance, Zapanta left with the other tour participants. 19
Zapanta fell far short of the performance expected by the tour group, her testimony in open
court being revelatory of her inexperience even on the basic function of a tour guide, to wit:
20
Q Now, are you aware that there were times that the tourists under the "Volare 3" were not
provided with soap and towels?
A They did not tell me that but I was able to ask them later on but then nobody is
complaining. 20 . . . .
The inability of the group to visit the leather factory is likewise reflective of the neglect and
ineptness of Zapanta in attentively following the itinerary of the day. This incompetence
must necessarily be traced to the lack of due diligence on the part of private respondent in
the selection of its employees. It is true that among the thirty-two destinations, which
included twenty-three cities and special visits to nine tourist spots, this was the only place
that was not visited. 21 It must be noted, however, that the visit to the UGC Leather Factory
was one of the highlights 22 of the Volare 3 program which even had to be specifically
inserted in the itinerary, hence it was incumbent upon the organizers of the tour to take
special efforts to ensure the same. Besides, petitioner did expect much from the visit to that
factory since it was represented by private respondent that quality leather goods could be
bought there at lower prices. 23
Private respondent represents Zapanta's act of making daily overseas calls to Manila as an
exercise of prudence and diligence on the latter's part as a tour guide. 24 It further claims that
these calls were needed so that it could monitor the progress of the tour and respond to any
problem immediately. 25 We are not persuaded. The truth of the matter is that Zapanta, as
an inexperienced trainee-on-the-job, was required to make these calls to private respondent
for the latter to gauge her ability in coping with her first assignment and to provide
instructions to her. 26
Clearly, therefore, private respondent's choice of Zapanta as the tour guide is a manifest
disregard of its specific assurances to the tour group, resulting in agitation and anxiety on
their part, and which deliberate omission is contrary to the elementary rules of good faith
and fair play. It is extremely doubtful if any group of Filipino tourists would knowingly agree
to be used in effect as guinea pigs in an employees' training program of a travel agency, to be
conducted in unfamiliar European countries with their diverse cultures, lifestyles and
languages.
On the matter of the European tour manager, private respondent's advertisement in its tour
contract declares and represents as follows:
FILIPINO TOUR ESCORT!
He will accompany you throughout Europe. He speaks your language, shares your culture and
feels your excitement.
He won't be alone because you will also be accompanied by a . . .

EUROPEAN TOUR MANAGER!
You get the best of both worlds. Having done so may tours in the past with people like you,
he knows your sentiments, too. So knowledgeable about Europe, there is hardly a question
he can't answer. 27
Private respondent contends that the term "European Tour Manager" does not refer to an
individual but to an organization, allegedly the Kuoni Travel of Switzerland which supposedly
prepared the itinerary for its "Volare Europe Tour," negotiated with all the hotels in Europe,
selected tourist spots and historical places to visit, and appointed experienced local tour
guides for the tour group. 28
We regret this unseemly quibbling which perforce cannot be allowed to pass judicial muster.
A cursory reading of said advertisement will readily reveal the express representation that
the contemplated European tour manager is a natural person, and not a juridical one as
private respondent asserts. A corporate entity could not possibly accompany the members of
the tour group to places in Europe; neither can it answer questions from the tourists during
the tour. Of course, it is absurd that if a tourist would want to know how he could possibly go
to the nearest store or supermarket, he would still have to call Kuoni Travel of Switzerland.
Furthermore, both lower courts observed, and we uphold their observations, that indeed
private respondent had the obligation to provide the tour group not only with a European
tour manger, but also with local European tour guides. The latter, parenthetically, were
likewise never made available. 29 Zapanta claims that she was accompanied by a European
local tour guide in most of the major cities in Europe. We entertain serious doubts on, and
accordingly reject, this pretension for she could not even remember the name of said
European tour guide. 30 If such a guide really existed, it is incredible why she could not even
identify the former when she testified a year later, despite the length of their sojourn and
the duration of their association.
As to why the word "he" was used in the aforequoted advertisement, private respondent
maintains that the pronoun "he" also includes the word "it," as where it is used as a
"nominative case form in general statements (as in statutes) to include females, fictitious
persons (as corporations)." 31 We are constrained to reject this submission as patently
strained and untenable. As already demonstrated, it is incredible that the word "he" was
used by private respondent to denote an artificial or corporate being. From its
advertisement, it is beyond cavil that the import of the word "he" is a natural and not a
juridical person. There is no need for further interpretation when the wordings are clear. The
meaning that will determine the legal effect of a contract is that which is arrived at by
objective standards; one is bound, not by what he subjectively intends, but by what he leads
others reasonably to think he intends. 32
21
In an obvious but hopeless attempt to arrive at a possible justification, private respondent
further contends that it explained the concept of a European tour manager to its clients at
the pre-departure briefing, which petitioner did not attend. 33 Significantly, however, private
respondent failed to present even one member of the tour group to substantiate its claim. It
is a basic rule of evidence that a party must prove his own affirmative allegations. 34 Besides,
if it was really its intention to provide a juridical European tour manager, it could not have
kept on promising its tourists during the tour that a European tour manager would come, 35
supposedly to join and assist them.
Veering to another line of defense, private respondent seeks sanctuary in the delimitation of
its responsibility as printed on the face of its brochure on the Volare 3 program, to wit:
RESPONSIBILITIES: KENSTAR TRAVEL CORPORATION, YOUR TRAVEL AGENT, THEIR
EMPLOYEES OR SUB-AGENTS SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE ONLY FOR BOOKING AND
MAKING ARRANGEMENTS AS YOUR AGENTS. Kenstar Travel Corporation, your
travel Agent, their employees or sub-agents assume no responsibility or liability
arising out of or in connection with the services or lack of services, of any train,
vessel, other conveyance or station whatsoever in the performance of their duty to
the passengers or guests, neither will they be responsible for any act, error or
omission, or of any damages, injury, loss, accident, delay or irregularity which may
be occasioned by reason (of) or any defect in . . . lodging place or any facilities . . . .
(Emphasis by private respondent.) 36
While, generally, the terms of a contract result from the mutual formulation thereof by the
parties thereto, it is of common knowledge that there are certain contracts almost all the
provisions of which have been drafted by only one party, usually a corporation. Such
contracts are called contracts of adhesion, because the only participation of the party is the
affixing of his signature or his "adhesion" thereto. 37 In situations like these, when a party
imposes upon another a ready-made form of contract, 38 and the other is reduced to the
alternative of taking it or leaving it, giving no room for negotiation and depriving the latter of
the opportunity to bargain on equal footing, a contract of adhesion results. While it is true
that an adhesion contract is not necessarily void, it must nevertheless be construed strictly
against the one who drafted the same. 39 This is especially true where the stipulations are
printed in fine letters and are hardly legible as is the case of the tour contract 40 involved in
the present controversy.
Yet, even assuming arguendo that the contractual limitation aforequoted is enforceable,
private respondent still cannot be exculpated for the reason that responsibility arising from
fraudulent acts, as in the instant case, cannot be stipulated against by reason of public policy.
Consequently, for the foregoing reasons, private respondent cannot rely on its defense of
"substantial compliance" with the contract.
Private respondent submits likewise that the tour was satisfactory, considering that only
petitioner, out of eighteen participants in the Volare 3 Tour Program, actually complained. 41
We cannot accept this argument. Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court declares that the

rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, a
statutory adaptation of the first branch of the hornbook rule of res inter alios acta 42 which
we do not have to belabor here.
Besides, it is a commonly known fact that there are tourists who, although the tour was far
from what the tour operator undertook under the contract, choose to remain silent and
forego recourse to a suit just to avoid the expenses, hassle and rancor of litigation, and not
because the tour was in accord with was promised. One does not relish adding to the bitter
memory of a misadventure the unpleasantness of another extended confrontation.
Furthermore, contrary to private respondent's assertion, not only petitioner but two other
members of the tour group, Luz Sui Haw and Ercilla Ampil, confirmed petitioner's complaints
when they testified as witnesses for her as plaintiff in the court below. 43
Private respondent likewise committed a grave misrepresentation when it assured in its
Volare 3 tour package that the hotels it had chosen would provide the tourists complete
amenities and were conveniently located along the way for the daily itineraries. 44 It turned
out that some of the hotels were not sufficiently equipped with even the basic facilities and
were at a distance from the cities covered by the projected tour. Petitioner testified on her
disgust with the conditions and locations of the hotels, thus:
Q And that these bathrooms ha(ve) bath tub(s) and hot and cold shower(s)?
A Not all, sir.
Q Did they also provide soap and towels?
A Not all, sir, some (had) no toilet paper. 45
Q Which one?
A The 2 stars, the 3 stars and some 4 stars (sic) hotels.
Q What I am saying . . .
A You are asking a question? I am answering you. 2 stars, 3 stars and some 4 stars (sic)
hotels, no soap, toilet paper and (the) bowl
stinks. . . .
Q And that except for the fact that some of these four star hotels were outside the city they
provided you with the comfort?
A Not all, sir.
22
Q Can you mention some which did not provide you that comfort?
A For example, if Ramada Hotel Venezia is in Quezon City, our hotel is in Meycauayan. And if
Florence or Ferenze is in manila, our hotel is in Muntinlupa. 46
A One more hotel, sir, in Barcelona, Hotel Saint Jacques is also outside the city. Suppose
Barcelona is in Quezon City, our hotel is in Marilao. We looked for this hotel inside the city of
Barcelona for three (3) hours. We wasted our time looking for almost all the hotels and
places where to eat. That is the kind of tour that you have. 47
Luz Sui Haw, who availed of the Volare 3 tour package with her husband for their
honeymoon, shared the sentiments of petitioner and testified as follows:
Q . . . Will you kindly tell us why the hotels where you stayed are not considered first class
hotels?
A Because the hotels where we went, sir, (are) far from the City and the materials used are
not first class and at times there were no towels and soap. And the two (2) hotels in Nevers
and Florence the conditions (are) very worse (sic). 48
Q Considering that you are honeymooners together with your husband, what (were) your
feelings when you found out that the condition were not fulfilled by the defendant?
A I would like to be very honest. I got sick when I reached Florence and half of my body got
itch (sic). I think for a honeymooner I would like to emphasize that we should enjoy that day
of our life and it seems my feet kept on itching because of the condition of the hotel. And I
was so dissatisfied because the European Tour Manager was not around there (were)
beautiful promises. They kept on telling us that a European Tour Manager will come over;
until our Paris tour was ended there was no European tour manager. 49
Q You will file an action against the defendant because there was a disruption of your
happiness, in your honeymoon, is that correct?
A That is one of my causes of (sic) coming up here. Secondly, i was very dissatisfied (with) the
condition. Thirdly, that Volare 89 it says it will let your heart sing. That is not true. There was
no European tour (manager) and the highlights of the tour (were) very poor. The hotels were
worse (sic) hotels. 50
Q All the conditions of the hotels as you . . .
A Not all but as stated in the brochure that it is first class hotel. The first class hotels state
that all things are beautiful and it is neat and clean with complete amenities and I
encountered the Luxembourg hotel which is quite very dilapidated because of the flooring
 23

when you step on the side "kumikiring" and the cabinets (are) antiques and as A Yes, sir.
honeymooners we don't want to be disturbed or seen. 51
Q Hotel Pullman Nice neither is not a first class hotel?
Q None of these are first class hotels?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Hotel Prinz Eugen and Austrotel are not first class hotels?
Q So, for example Ramada Hotel Venezia which according to Miss Geraldez is first class hotel
is not first class hotel? A Yes, sir. 52

A Yes, sir. Private respondent cannot escape responsibility by seeking refuge under the listing of first-
class hotels in publications like the "Official Hotel and Resort Guide" and Worldwide Hotel
Q You share the opinion of Miss Geraldez? Guide." 53 Kuoni Travel, its tour operator, 54 which prepared the hotel listings, is a European-
based travel agency 55 and, as such, could have easily verified the matter of first-class
A Yes, sir. accommodations. Nor can it logically claim that the first-class hotels in Europe may not
necessarily be the first-class hotels here in the Philippines. 56 It is reasonable for petitioner to
assume that the promised first-class hotels are equivalent to what are considered first-class
Q The same is true with Grand Hotel Palatino which is not a first class hotel?
hotels in Manila. Even assuming arguendo that there is indeed a difference in classifications,
it cannot be gainsaid that a first-class hotel could at the very least provide basic necessities
A Yes, sir. and sanitary accommodations. We are accordingly not at all impressed by private
respondent's attempts to trivialize the complaints thereon by petitioner and her companions.
Q And Hotel Delta Florence is not first class hotel?
In a last ditch effort to justify its choice of the hotels, private respondent contends that it
A That is how I got my itch, sir. Seven (7) days of itch. merely provided such "first class" hotels which are commensurate to the tourists budget, or
which were, under the given circumstances, the "best for their money." It postulated that it
Q How about Hotel Saint-Jacquez, Paris? could not have offered better hostelry when the consideration paid for hotel
accommodations by the tour participants was only so much, 57 and the tour price of
$2,990.00 covers a European tour for 22 days inclusive of lower room rates and meals. 58 this
A It is far from the city. It is not first class hotel. is implausible, self-serving and borders on sophistry.

Q So with Hotel Le Prieure Du Coeur de Jesus neither a first class hotel? The fact that the tourists were to pay a supposedly lower amount, such that private
respondent allegedly retained hardly enough as reasonable profit, 59 does not justify a
A Yes, sir. substandard form of service in return. It was private respondent, in the first place, which
fixed the charges for the package tour and determined the services that could be availed of
Q Hotel De Nevers is not a first class hotel? corresponding to such price. Hence, it cannot now be heard to complain that it only made a
putative marginal profit out of the transaction. if it could not provide the tour participants
with first-class lodgings on the basis of the amount that they paid, it could and should have
A Yes, sir.
instead increased the price to enable it to arrange for the promised first-class
accommodations.
Q Hotel Roc Blanc Andorra is not a first class hotel?
On the foregoing considerations, respondent court erred in deleting the award for moral and
A Yes, sir. exemplary damages. Moral damages may be awarded in breaches of contract where the
obligor acted fraudulently or in bad faith. 60 From the facts earlier narrated, private
Q Saint Just Hotel, Barcelona is not a first class hotel?

respondent can be faulted with fraud in the inducement, which is employed by a party to a
contract in securing the consent of the other.
This fraud or dolo which is present or employed at the time of birth or perfection of a
contract may either be dolo causante or dolo incidente. The first, or causal fraud referred to
in Article 1338, are those deceptions or misrepresentations of a serious character employed
by one party and without which the other party would not have entered into the contract.
Dolo incidente, or incidental fraud which is referred to in Article 1344, are those which are
not serious in character and without which the other party would still have entered into the
contract. 61 Dolo causante determines or is the essential cause of the consent, while dolo
incidente refers only to some particular or accident of the
obligations. 62 The effects of dolo causante are the nullity of the contract and the
indemnification of damages, 63 and dolo incidente also obliges the person employing it to pay
damages. 64
In either case, whether private respondent has committed dolo causante or dolo incidente by
making misrepresentations in its contracts with petitioner and other members of the tour
group, which deceptions became patent in the light of after-events when, contrary to its
representations, it employed an inexperienced tour guide, housed the tourist group in
substandard hotels, and reneged on its promise of a European tour manager and the visit to
the leather factory, it is indubitably liable for damages to petitioner.
In the belief that an experienced tour escort and a European tour manager would accompany
them, with the concomitant reassuring and comforting thought of having security and
assistance readily at hand, petitioner was induced to join the Volare 3 tourists, instead of
travelling alone 65 She likewise suffered serious anxiety and distress when the group was
unable to visit the leather factory and when she did not receive first-class accommodations in
their lodgings which were misrepresented as first-class hotels. These, to our mind, justify the
award for moral damages, which are in the category of an award designed to compensate
the claimant for that injury which she had suffered, and not as a penalty on the wrongdoer,
66 we believe that an award of P100,000.00 is sufficient and reasonable.
When moral damages are awarded, especially for fraudulent conduct, exemplary damages
may also be decreed. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
According to the code Commission, exemplary damages are required by public policy, for
wanton acts must be suppressed. 67 An award, therefore, of P50,000.00 is called for to deter
travel agencies from resorting to advertisements and enticements with the intention of
realizing considerable profit at the expense of the public, without ensuring compliance with
their express commitments. While, under the present state of the law, extraordinary
diligence is not required in travel or tour contracts, such as that in the case at bar, the travel
agency acting as tour operator must nevertheless be held to strict accounting for contracted
services, considering the public interest in tourism, whether in the local or in the
international scene. Consequently, we have to likewise reject the theory of private
24
respondent that the promise it made in the tour brochure may be regarded only as
"commendatory trade talk." 68
With regard to the honorarium for counsel as an item of damages, since we are awarding
moral and exemplary damages, 69 and considering the legal importance of the instant
litigation and the efforts of counsel evident from the records of three levels of the judicial
hierarchy, we favorably consider the amount of P20,000.00 therefor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
SET ASIDE, and another one rendered, ordering private respondent Kenstar Travel
Corporation to pay petitioner Lydia L. Geraldez the sums of P100,000.00 by way of moral
damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, with
costs against private respondent. The award for nominal damages is hereby deleted.
FACTS:
Petitioner Geraldez filed an action for damages by reason of contractual breach against
respondent Kenstar Travel Corp. Petitioner booked the Volare 3 tour with Kenstar. The tour
covered a 22-day tour of Europe for $2,990.00 which she paid the total equivalent amount of
P190,000.00 charged by private respondent for her and her sister, Dolores. At the tour,
petitioner claimed that what was alleged in the brochure was not what they experienced.
There was no European tour manager as stated in the brochure, the hotels where they
stayed in which were advertised as first class were not, the UGC leather factory which was
specifically included as a highlight of the tour was not visited and The Filipino tour guide
provided by Kenstar was a first timer thus inexperienced. The Quezon City RTC rendered a
decision ordering respondent Kenstar to pay moral, nominal, and exemplary damages
totalling P1,000,000 and P50,000 attorney’s fees. On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals
deleted the award for moral and exemplary damages and reduced the nominal damages and
attorney’s fees to P30,000 and P10,000 respectively.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Kenstar acted in bad faith or with gross negligence in discharging its
obligations in the contract? (2)Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in removing the
moral and exemplary damages
HELD:
(1) Yes, Kenstar acted in bad faith and with gross negligence in discharging its obligation.
 25

Kenstar’s choice of the tour guide is a manifest disregard of its specific assurances to the tour
group, and which deliberate omission is contrary to the rules of good faith and fair play.
Providing the Volare 3 group with an inexperienced first timer as a tour guide, Kenstar
manifested indifference to the satisfaction, convenience and peace of mind to its clients. The
election of the tour guide was a deliberate and conscious choice on the part of Kenstar in
order to afford her on-the job-training making the tour group her unknowing guinea pigs,
furthermore the inability to visit the UGC leather factory is reflective of the ineptness and
neglect of the tour guide. The failure of Kenstar to provide a European Tour Manager
although it specifically advertised and promised to do so is also a contractual breach. Kenstar
expressly stated in its advertisement that a European Tour Manager would be present.

Kenstar’s contention that the European Tour Manager does not refer to a natural person but
a juridical personality does not hold because a corporate entity could not possibly
accompany the tour group. Lastly Kenstar committed grave misrepresentation when it
assured in its tour package that the hotels provided would provide complete amenities and
would be conveniently located along the way for the daily itineraries. Testimonies by
petitioner and private respondent show that the hotels were unsanitary and sometimes did
not even provide towels and soap. Further testimonies claim that the hotels were also
located in locations far from the city making it difficult to go to. The fact that Kenstar could
only book them in such hotels because of budget constraints is not the fault of the tour
group. Kenstar should not have promised such accommodations if they couldn’t afford it.

Kenstar should have increased the price to ensure accommodations. (2) Yes, the Court of
Appeals erred in removing the moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages may be
awarded in breaches of contract where the obligor acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Kenstar
can be faulted with fraud in the inducement which is employed by a party in securing the
consent of the other. This fraud or dolo which is present or employed at the time of birth or
perfection of the contract may either be dolo causante or dolo incidente. The first, or causal
fraud referred to in Article 1338 are those deceptions or misrepresentations of a serious
character employed by one party and without which the other party would not have entered
into the contract, Dolo incidente, or incidental fraud which is referred to in Article 1344, are
those which are not serious in character and without which the other party would still have
entered into the contract. In either case, whether Kenstar has committed dolo causante or
dolo incidente, it is liable for damages both moral and exemplary.
 26

FIRST DIVISION 3) 1/3 to an unidentified party.

G.R. No. 112443 January 25, 2002 Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jayme’s house, which his
family occupied since 1945.
TERESITA P. BORDALBA, petitioner,
vs. Sometime in July 1964, Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, petitioner’s mother, filed with the
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF NICANOR JAYME, namely, CANDIDA FLORES, EMANNUEL Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch IV, an amended application for the registration5 of the
JAYME, DINA JAYME DEJORAS, EVELIA JAYME, and GESILA JAYME; AND HEIRS OF lot described with the following boundaries:
ASUNCION JAYME-BACLAY, namely, ANGELO JAYME-BACLAY, CARMEN JAYME-DACLAN and
ELNORA JAYME BACLAY, respondents. N - Fruelana Jayme & Road

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: S - Felicitas de Latonio

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the E - Agustin de Jayme
October 20, 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, which affirmed
with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch 28, in Civil
W - Porfirio Jayme, Lot No. 1 and Vivencio Abellana
Case No. MAN-386.

Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally a part of
The instant controversy stemmed from Lot No. 1242 (Lot No. 799-C) with an area of 1,853
a land owned by her late parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de
square meters and located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City. The subject lot is part of a parcel of
Jayme; and that 1/3 of said land was adjudicated to her in an extra-judicial partition. She
land situated on the corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in Mandaue City, and originally
further stated that a portion of the lot for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor
owned by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme. In 1947, an
Jayme with her permission.
extra-judicial partition,3 written in the Spanish language was executed, describing said parcel
of land as –
Consequently, Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay filed their opposition6 contending
that said application included the 1/3 portion inherited by them in the 1947 extra-judicial
2. otra parcela de terreno urbano en el barrio de Look, Mandawe, Cebu, que linda
partition. The case was, however, dismissed for lack of interest of the parties.
al N. con la Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme; al E. linda con propiodades de
Fernando Antigua; al S. linda con propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme, y al O.
linda con la Calle Plaridel. La propiodad descrita esta avaluada, con todas sus Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands of Cebu City an application 7 dated
mejoras, en la cantidad de MIL Y CINCUENTA PESOS ----------------------------------------- January 10, 1979, seeking the issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot subject of the
------- P1,050.00.4 aborted application of her mother, Elena Jayme, now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C),
described as follows:
and disposing, inter alia, the same parcel of land as follows:
North: Froilan Jayme and Road
1) 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of
private respondent Candida Flores and the father of private respondents East: Agustin Jayme
Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild
Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose heirs are private respondents Agelio Baclay, Elnora South: Alfredo Alivio and Spouses Hilario Gandecila
Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;
West: Hilario Gandecila Porferio Jayme and Heirs of Vevencio Abellanosa8
2) 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P.
Bordalba; and On April 16, 1980, petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-571 (FP) over said lot.9 Thereafter, petitioner caused the

subdivision and titling of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), into 6 lots,10 as well as the disposition of two
parcels thereof, thus:
1) Lot No. 1242-A with an area of 581 square meters covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 22771 (FP) in the name of spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and
Rita Capala, to whom petitioner sold said lot;
2) Lot No. 1242-B with an area of 420 square meters covered by TCT No. 22772 in
the name of Teresita P. Bordalba, and which the latter mortgaged with the Rural
Bank of Mandaue;
3) Lot No. 1242-C with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22773 in the
name of Teresita P. Bordalba;
4) Lot No. 1242-D with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22774 in the
name of Teresita Bordalba;
5) Lot No. 1242-E with an area of 216 square meters covered by TCT 22775 in the
name of Teresita P. Bordalba;
6) Lot No. 1242-F with an area of 216 square meters and covered by TCT No. 22776
in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba.
Upon learning of the issuance in favor of petitioner of the aforesaid Free Patent and Original
Certificate of Title over Lot No. 1242, as well as the conveyances made by petitioner involving
the lot subject of the controversy, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City, Branch 28, the instant complaint against petitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses
Genaro U. Cabahug, and Rita Capala, Rural Bank of Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau
of Lands.
In the said complaint, private respondents prayed that Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT
No. 0-571 (FP), as well as TCT Nos. 22771-22776 be declared void and ordered cancelled.
Private respondents also prayed that they be adjudged owners of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), and
that spouses Genaro V. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue be
declared buyers and mortgagee in bad faith, respectively. In addition, they asked the court to
award them actual, compensatory, and moral damages plus attorney’s fees in the amount of
P20,000.00.
Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was acquired by her through
purchase from her mother,11 who was in possession of the lot in the concept of an owner
since 1947. In her answer, petitioner traced her mother’s ownership of the lot partly from
the 1947 deed of extra-judicial partition presented by private respondents,12 and claimed
that Nicanor Jayme, and Candida Flores occupied a portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) by mere
tolerance of her mother. On cross-examination, petitioner admitted that the properties of
27
the late Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme were partitioned by their heirs in
1947, but claimed that she was not aware of the existence of said Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition. She, however, identified one of the signatures in the said Deed to be the signature
of her mother.13
On May 28, 1990, the trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining
Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), declared said patent and title void and
ordered its cancellation. However, it declared that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita
Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue are purchasers and mortgagee in good faith,
respectively; and consequently upheld as valid the sale of Lot No. 1242-A covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 22771 (FP) to spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, and the
mortgage of Lot No. 1242-B covered by TCT No. 22772 in favor of the Rural Bank of
Mandaue. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Decision is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiffs by:
1) declaring Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 as well as the Original Certificate of Title
No. 0-57 (FP) and all subsequent certificates of title as a result of the subdivision of
Lot No. 1242 except TCT NO. 22771 (FP) as null and void and ordering the Register
of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel them;
2) declaring spouses defendants Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as buyers in
good faith and are the legal and rightful owners of Lot No. 1242-A as described in
TCT No. 22771 (FP);
3) declaring the Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. as mortgagee in good faith and the
mortgage lien in its favor be carried over to and be annotated in the new certificate
of title to be issued under the names of the plaintiffs;
4) declaring the plaintiffs as the legal and rightful owners of Lot 1242 and ordering
the issuance of the certificate of title in their names;
5) dismissing the claims of the defendant spouses Cabahug and Capala and the
defendant Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. for lack of merit;
6) ordering the defendant Teresita Bordalba to pay plaintiffs the following
amounts:
(a) P5,000.00 as actual and litigation expenses;
(b) P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and,

7) ordering defendant Bordalba to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.14
Both petitioner Teresita Bordalba and private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that since private
respondents are entitled only to 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), petitioner should be
ordered to reconvey 1/3 of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) to private respondents. The decretal portion
of the respondent court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is MODIFIED to order the reconveyance of
one-third of the subject land in favor of the plaintiff-appellees in lieu of the
cancellation of the Certificates of Title issued and their declaration as the owners of
Lot No. 1242 in its entirety. The rest is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.15
Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents
which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been
admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead man’s statute. Likewise, petitioner
questions the right of private respondents to inherit from the late Nicanor Jayme and
Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as well as the identity between the disputed lot and the parcel of
land adjudicated in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.
The contentions are without merit. It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
upholding those of the trial court are binding upon this Court. While there are exceptions to
this rule, petitioner has not convinced us that this case falls under one of them.16
The Court sees no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court that petitioner
resorted to fraud and misrepresentation in obtaining a free patent and title over the lot
under scrutiny. The Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that misrepresentation tainted
petitioner’s application, insofar as her declaration that the land applied for was not occupied
or claimed by any other person. Her declaration is belied by the extra-judicial partition which
she acknowledged, her mother’s aborted attempt to have the lot registered, private
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest’s opposition thereto, and by the occupancy of a
portion of the said lot by Nicanor Jayme and his family since 1945.
It is a settled rule that the Land Registration Act protects only holders of title in good faith,
and does not permit its provision to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or as a
means to enrich oneself at the expense of others.17
As to the alleged violation of the dead man’s statute,18 suffice it to state that said rule finds
no application in the present case. The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the
28
mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than
through personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the
deceased to the witness.19
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present
case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents,
and not on dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies
were properly admitted by the trial court.
Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs of
Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to dispute their
heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides,
in order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary.20
Anent the issue of identity, the disparity in the boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) vis-à-vis
the boundaries of the lot referred to in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition can be
explained by the fact that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is only a portion of the entire parcel of land
described in the Deed, a 1/3 pro-indiviso portion of which was adjudicated each to, first,
petitioner’s mother, second, to the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, and
third, to an unidentified party. Logically therefore, their boundaries will not be similar. At any
rate, the records show that the parcel of land adjudicated to the predecessors-in-interest of
the parties herein was the lot found on the corner of Plaridel and Mabini Streets in Looc,
Mandaue City. As admitted further by both parties, Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the land
allotted to their predecessors-in-interest in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.
Moreover, petitioner’s mother acknowledged in her application for registration of Lot No.
1242 that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition was the source of her claim over the lot sought
to be registered. She further admitted that the lot now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was
part of the parcel of land inherited by her and her co-heirs, to the extent of 1/3 share each.
Under Section 31, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules on Evidence, where one derives title to
property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title,
in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.
Considering that Lot No.1242 (799-C) is part of the parcel of land over which private
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest is entitled to 1/3 pro-indiviso share, which was
disregarded by petitioner when she secured a Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title in
her name, to the exclusion of private respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in upholding the right of private respondents
as co-owners, and ordering the petitioner to reconvey 1/3 of the lot in question to them.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Court is unable to determine what part of Lot
No. 1242 (799-C) is within the boundaries of the parcel of land inherited in the 1947 Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition by the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein. This is so
because private respondents did not show the extent of the said land mentioned in the 1947
 29

Deed of Extra-judicial Partition in relation to Lot No. 1242 (799-C). While they presented the
boundaries of the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed, to wit:
North: Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme
East: Propiodades de Fernando Antigua
South: Propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme
West: Calle Plaridel
they did not, however, show where these boundaries are found in relation to the boundaries
of Lot No. 1242 (799-C). Absent a fixed boundary of the parcel of land adjudicated in the
Deed, which they claim Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is a part of, the Court cannot determine the
extent to which the lot now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is included. Admittedly, the north
boundary of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) (Property of Froilan Jaime and Mabini Street) is similar to
the north boundary of the land mentioned in the Deed. With only one reference point,
however, the south, east and west boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) cannot be established
with certainty to be within the parcel of land described in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.
FACTS:
A land known as Lot No. 1242 (Lot No. 799-C) with an area of 1,853 square meters and
located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City, is the subject of the controversy. This lot is part of a
parcel of land situated on the corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in Mandaue City, and
originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme.In 1947,
an extra-judicial partition:
1)1/3 in favor of -(a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private
respondent Candida Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and
Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose heirs are
private respondents Angelo Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;
2)1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P. Bordalba;
and
3)1/3 to an unidentified party.

Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jayme’s house, which his
In Beo v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that in order that an action for recovery of
family occupied since 1945.
possession may prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action must fully prove
not only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed by describing the
location, area and boundaries thereof. So that when the record does not show that the land Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally a part of
subject matter of the action has been exactly determined, the action cannot prosper, a land owned by her late parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de
inasmuch as the plaintiff's ownership rights in the land claimed do not appear satisfactorily Jayme; and that 1/3 of said land was adjudicated to her in an extra-judicial partition.She
and conclusively proven at the trial. further stated that a portion of the lot for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor
Jayme with her permission.
In the present case, while it is true that private respondents were not able to show the
extent of their 1/3 pro indiviso right over Lot No. 1242 (799-C), they have nevertheless
Nicanor opposed stating that the land sought to be registered also covers the land
established their claim over the said lot. Hence, in line with our ruling in the case of Laluan v.
adjudicated to him by way of extra judicial partition.
Malpaya,22 the prudent recourse would be to remand the case to the lower court for a new
trial.
Petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and Original Certificate of
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the October 20, 1992 Decision of the Court of Title No. 0-571 (FP) over said lot.
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, and the May 28, 1990 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386, insofar as it relates to the
Private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, the
recognition of the 1/3 share of private respondents over Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is AFFIRMED.
instant complaintagainst petitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses Genaro U. Cabahug, and Rita
The case is remanded to the trial court in order to determine what part of Lot No. 1242 (799-
Capala, Rural Bank of Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
C) is included in the parcel of land adjudicated in the 1947 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition to
the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein.
Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was acquired by her through
SO ORDERED. purchase from her mother who was in possession since 1947.
 30

the trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free Patent No.
(VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), declared said patent and title void and ordered its
cancellation. However, it declared that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as
the Rural Bank of Mandaue are purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively; and
consequently upheld as valid the sale.

Appealed to CA. affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.It ruled that since
private respondents are entitled only to 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), petitioner
should be ordered to reconvey 1/3 of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) to private respondents.

RULING:

Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs of
Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay.Other than their bare allegations todispute their
heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations.Besides,
in order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary.

Considering that Lot No.1242 (799-C) is part of the parcel of land over which private
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest is entitled to 1/3 pro-indiviso share, which was
disregarded by petitioner when she secured a Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title in
her name, to the exclusion of private respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in upholding the right of private respondents
as co-owners, and ordering the petitioner to reconvey 1/3 of the lot in question to them.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44060 July 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, alias "BENBEN", defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Bienvenido Paragsa, alias "Benben", appealed to the Court of Appeals the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu (Judge Agapito Hontanosas, presiding), the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused Bienvenido
Paragsa of the crime of Rape as charged in the Information beyond reasonable
doubt and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum
to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
the maximum and to indemnify the complaining witness in the amount of
P8,000.00 (People vs. Rogato Rivera, 58, O.G. and People vs. Chan et al., CA No.
03545-GR, August 11, 1967) with all legal accessories and to pay the costs. Being a
detention prisoner, he is entitled to the full credit of his preventive imprisonment
from the time of his confinement up to the date of the promulgation of this
judgment.
(pp. 10-19, rollo).
Because the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed by the Court of Appeals on the
accused, this case is now before US for review pursuant to Section 34, Republic Act No. 296,
as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The evidence for the prosecution consists of the testimony of Mirasol Magallanes, the
alleged rape victim, her aunt-in-law, Mrs. Lita Parochel, and Dr. Luis L. Gandiongco of the
Bantayan Emergency Hospital, Bantayan, Cebu, who examined the offended party and
submitted Exhibit A embodying his findings thereon,
Substantially, the records show that in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, Mirasol, who was then
a little over twelve and a half (12½) years old (Exhibit B, p. 7, rec.), was alone in her parents'
house in Sitio Tabagac of Barrio Bunacan, Municipality of Madridejos, Cebu, cooking hog
feed. Her parents were away at the time — her father was in Cadiz, while her mother was in
Sagay, both in Negros Occidental (p. 16, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972) while the rest of the family were
with Mirasol's grandmother in Barrio Codia; also in Madridejos, Cebu. Mirasol was a 6th
grade student of the Bunacan Elementary School (p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971). Upon instruction
31
of her mother, she did not go to school that afternoon so that she could look after the pigs
and cook their feed. Thus, she was alone in the ground floor of their house cooking hog feed
when the accused, Bienvenido Paragsa, armed with a hunting knife, entered the house and
closed the door after him. Approaching from behind, he placed his left arm around Mirasol's
neck, encircled her abdomen with his right arm, at the same time pointing the hunting knife
with s right hand at her breast, and threatened her not to shout otherwise she would be
killed. Thereafter, the accused pushed her to a bamboo bed nearby, rolled up her dress and,
with his two hands, removed her panties. The accused then placed his hunting knife on the
bed by Mirasol's side, opened the zipper of his pants while kneeling on the bed, opened
Mirasol's thighs, picked up the hunting knife again, placed himself on top of Mirasol, inserted
his erect penis into her sexual organ and then made four push and pull movement until he
ejaculated (pp. 7, 10-11, 12, 13, 14, t.s.n., Ibid). In the process, Mirasol's dress and panties
were not torn, since, because of fear, she allowed the accused to roll up her dress and pull
her panties without any resistance whatsoever. During the intercourse, the accused was not
holding the hunting knife. After the accused had discharged, he ran to the storeroom of the
house upstairs because he heard Mrs. Lita Parochel, wife of the younger brother of Mirasol's
father, calling from outside the gate of the house, asking Mirasol to open the gate. Mirasol
did not answer because she was then in the act of putting on her panties (p. 14, t.s.n., Ibid; p.
10, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972). After she had put on her panties, she opened the gate and saw her
aunt Lita, who asked her what the accused did to her, but she did not answer because she
was afraid as the accused was still inside the house. She also did not tell her aunt Lita that
the accused had sexual intercourse with her under threats and against her will. Her aunt Lita
then walked away.
Thereafter, the accused reappeared in the room and told Mirasol that if she would tell her
aunt Lita what he did, he would kill her (pp. 13-14, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971). After the incident,
Mirasol went to Barrio Codia later in the afternoon of the same day and joined her brother
and sister and grandmother. She did not reveal to any of them what transpired between her
and the accused in Tabagac.
Mirasol's father returned from Cadiz, Negros Occidental that same day; but Mirasol did not
also reveal the incident to him because she was afraid her father might punish her. Her
mother returned home on July 16, 1971 from Sagay, Negros Occidental; but Mirasol did not
also tell her mother about what happened to her on July 13 in Tabagac It was her aunt Lita
who revealed the matter to Mirasol's mother, who thereupon confronted her daughter.
Mirasol had to reveal the incident of July 13 to her mother only when her mother asked her
about it; because, according to her, she wanted to take revenge on the accused (p. 15, Dec.
3, 1971). Three days after her return from Sagay, Negros Occidental — on July 19, 1971 —
Mirasol's mother brought her to the Bantayan Emergency Hospital in Bantayan, Cebu, where
she was examined by Dr. Luis L. Gandiongco, who submitted his findings as follows:
Abrasion of inguinal region
Abrasion, left thigh, medial side

INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Discharges sticky, milky in color, found at the anterior fornix but
negative for spermatozoa (Exh. A, p. 8, rec.; p. 2, t.s.n., Nov. 16, 1971).
Mrs. Lita Parochel, the aunt-in-law of Mirasol, testified that she is the wife of the younger
brother of Mirasol's father. Her house is fifty (50) meters away from the house of her
brother-in-law, Ruperto Magallanes. In the afternoon of July 13, 1971, she went to the house
of her brother-in-law in Tabagac Arriving there, she saw, through the gate which was made
of split bamboos, the accused running away when she shouted to Mirasol, who was then in
the act of putting on her panties, to open the gate (p. 10, t.s.n., Jan. 15, 1972). Mirasol
opened the gate after she had put on her panties. Entering the house, Mrs. Parochel asked
Mirasol what the accused did to her, but Mirasol did not answer. So, she hid and from her
hiding place she saw the accused emerge from his hiding place and run away, passing
through the gate of the fence. Thereupon, she told Mirasol to go home to barrio Codia
because she was also going there (p. 15, t.s.n., Ibid).
Mrs. Parochel met Mirasol's father at about 4:00 o'clock the same afternoon but she did not
talk to him about what she saw earlier in Tabagak However, she revealed the incident to her
husband (p. 17, t.s.n., Ibid).
When Mirasol's mother returned from Sagay, Negros Occidental, Mrs. Parochel had a
conversation with her regarding the person of the accused and thereafter Mirasol's mother
filed the corresponding complaint against the accused (p. 18, t.s.n., Ibid).
Incidentally, in support of the complaint of Bernandina Magallanes, mother of Mirasol, Mrs.
Parochel executed an affidavit which she subscribed and swore to before the municipal judge
of Madridejos, Cebu, on July 30, 1971, wherein she stated, among other things:
1. That at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, I went to
the house of Ruperto Magallanes, my neighbor;
2. That when I entered their fence, I found out that one Benben Paragsa
ran from the bed where Mirasol Magallanes was sitting on while putting
on her panties;
3. That she, Mirasol Magallanes, upon my arrival, did not say anything to
me about the happening; and that I was only thinking that something had
happened (Exh. 1, p. 5, rec.).
In his typewritten brief, the appellant enumerated and discussed five errors as having been
committed by the trial court. These errors may, however, be boiled down to the issue of
credibility.
32
Appellant admits having sexual intercourse with Mirasol, the complaining witness, but he
stoutly denied that he did so by employing force or intimidation against Mirasol. He claims he
and Mirasol were sweethearts; that on the day of the incident, it was Mirasol who invited
him to the latter's house where they had sexual intercourse after kissing each other; and that
the intercourse they had that afternoon was, as a matter of fact, their third sexual
intercourse (pp. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8-9, t.s.n., March 21, 1972).
The foregoing testimony of the accused was substantially corroborated by two witnesses for
the defense, Mercado Batosbatosan and Eduardo Ducay (pp. 5, 6-7, 12, 15-16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
25, t.s.n., Feb. 1, 1972).
A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak,
unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a conviction.
Certain circumstances negate the commission by the appellant of the crime charged and
point to the conclusion that the sexual intercourse between the appellant and the
complaining witness was voluntary. Force and intimidation were not proven. Mirasol did not
offer any resistance or vocal protestation against the alleged sexual assault. She could have
easily made an outcry or resisted the appellant's advances without endangering her life. But
she did not. She was allegedly raped in her own home, not far from her neighbors and during
the daytime. If, indeed, she was raped under the circumstances narrated by her, she could
have revealed the same the very moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her
what the accused did to her upon entering the house immediately after the intercourse took
place and when the accused ran from the bed to a storeroom of the house to hide upon
seeing and/or hearing the voice of her aunt Lita. or, she could have grabbed the hunting knife
by her side when the copulation was going on, and with it she could have possibly prevented
the accused from consummating the sexual act. But she did not.
Another circumstance is that Mirasol did not reveal immediately to her parents that she was
raped. It was only after her mother arrived from Sagay, Negros Occidental, three (3) days
after the incident, and confronted her about the rape incident that her mother learned
through her aunt Lita that she eventually revealed to her mother what the accused did to her
in the afternoon of July 13, 1971.
Still another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony
of the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually
sweethearts; and that they had had two previous sexual communications before July 13,
1971, one of which happened on June 29, 1971 in the house of the accused, where Mirasol
and the accused slept together in the evening of the same day after the mother of the
accused and Mirasol had returned from the town fiesta of Bantayan, Cebu (p. 10, t.s.n.,
March 21, 1972).
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the
statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a
party can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear: (1) that he heard and
 33

understood the statement; (2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; (3) that the A last circumstance which also engenders serious doubt on the veracity of Mrs. Parochel,
statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then whose testimony the trial court summarized, runs thus:
interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts were within his knowledge;
and (5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be ... The victim did not answer the call of her aunt nor did she open the barred door.
material to the issue (IV Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1973 ed., p.
316). These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the
... She returned to the opened door and asked Mirasol what had happened. Mirasol
silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely
was very pale, trembling and in a state of shock, did not answer her inquiries ...(p.
construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion.
3, Decision; p. 64, rec.; emphasis added).

One more circumstance which engenders serious doubt on the truthfulness of Mirasol is the
The Solicitor General adopted the above factual summary made by the trial court by stating
testimony of Dr. Gandiongco that he did not notice any laceration in the walls of Mirasol's
that —
vagina, thus —

Mirasol's aunt, Lita Parochel ... found her niece in a state of shock (p. 4, Brief for
Q Doctor, you testified that according to your findings a foreign body might have inserted the
the Plaintiff-Appellee; p. 49, rec.; Emphasis supplied).
internal organ of the offended party?

A Yes, sir.
Q And as a matter of fact, in your examination there was no laceration?
A There was no laceration (p 5, t.s.n., November 16, 1971; Emphasis supplied).
Considering Mirasol's tender age, if she had no previous sexual experience, she must have
been a virgin when she was allegedly raped by the accused. Yet she did not state that she felt
some pain as the accused tried to insert his organ into her private part. Neither did she state
that she was bleeding during and after the alleged forced coition. Instead, she matter-of-
factly narrated that the accused made four push and pull movements after which the latter
ejaculated — indicating that he had an easy time doing it.
A painstaking scrutiny of the record, particularly the transcript of stenographic notes, shows
that contrary to the finding of the trial court, Mirasol answered the call of her aunt and
opened the gate of the house after she had put on her panties (p. 14, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971);
and that Mirasol only seemed to be afraid, besides trembling (p. 23, t.s.n., 1972); nowhere in
the record is any evidence of Mirasol having been in a state of shock.
If Mirasol was in fact in a state of shock —
1. How come she was able to put on her panties and thereafter open the gate of the house
when she heard her aunt Lita calling from the outside?
2. Her aunt Lita would feel so alarmed and so concerned that she would not lose any time to
bring her to a doctor or to a hospital for medical treatment or assistance;

If WE are to believe her story, certainly the doctor who examined her could have noticed the
3. Her aunt Lita would have confronted the accused who was still hiding in the closet in a
lacerations even after the lapse of three (3) days from the coition, if the intercourse on July
corner of the ground floor, or she would have gone to the nearest police authority or barrio
13, 1971 was in fact her first experience. WE believe the absence of lacerations in the walls
captain, who could have easily apprehended the accused:
of Mirasol's vagina, as testified to by Dr. Gandiongco, supra, eloquently confirms the truth of
the accused's assertion that before the incident in question, he and Mirasol had two prior
copulations. 4. Her aunt could have sought the assistance of their barriomates or neighbors; or

And still another circumstance which casts serious doubt on the credibility of the complaining
witness and her aunt Lita is the matter of the hunting knife. While it is true that on the
witness stand these two witnesses practically corroborated each other on this particular
point, the matter of the accused having a hunting knife with him on the day of the incident
was not, however, mentioned by Mrs. Parochel in her affidavit, Exhibit 1, which she executed
on July 30, 1971 — five months before she testified in court. Besides, at the trial, the
prosecution did not bother to present such "hunting knife".
5. She could have brought Mirasol to her own house which was on about 50 meters away
(pp. 7, 20, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972). But what did she do? She abandoned Mirasol "because" she
Mirasol had to feed her hogs (p. 24, Idem).
That Mirasol was pale, afraid and trembling can only be attributed to the fact that her aunt
discovered her having sexual intercourse at so young an age and that she feared that her
aunt would report the same to her parents.
 34

And if Mrs. Parochel really believed that her niece Mirasol was raped by appellant about 3
o'clock that afternoon of July 13, 1971, why did she not report the outrage to Mirasol's father
— her husband's brother — whom she met about 4 o'clock that same afternoon, just one
hour after the alleged rape?

Mrs. Parochel's close relationship to her niece-daughter of her brother-in-law — vitiates her
credibility.

Appellant cannot be legally convicted of simple seduction under Article 338 of the Revised
Penal Code, for the same is not warranted by the wording of the information, which does not
alleged deceit, although appellant testified that he promised to marry Mirasol if "something
happens to her body." Much less can simple seduction include rape.

WHEREFORE, APPELLANT BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, ALIAS "BENBEN", IS HEREBY ACQUITTED,

WITH COSTS de oficio AND HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED UNLESS HE IS
BEING DETAINED ON OTHER CHARGES.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 110290 January 25, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, WILFREDO "SONNY QUIAÑO, MANUEL "JUN" ABENOJA, JR., and
FREDDIE "BOY" CARTEL, accused. JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In five separate informations filed on 22 May 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 3, Baguio City, the accused were charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R
and 4648-R, with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 4649-R, and with attempted murder
in Criminal Cases Nos. 4650-R and 4651-R. The crimes were allegedly committed on 6
September 1986 in Baguio City and resulted in the deaths of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and Anna
Theresa Francisco and the wounding of Anthony Bayquen, Dominic Bayquen, and Danny
Ancheta.
The informations in the murder cases charged that the accused acted in conspiracy and
alleged the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the ordinary
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and price. 1
Only the appellant and Wilfredo Quiaño were arrested. However, before Quiaño could be
arraigned, he escaped on 12 July 1987 while under the custody of the Philippine
Constabulary/PNP Regional Command I at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet. 2 The cases,
which were consolidated and jointly tried, proceeded only against the appellant.
After the appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on 4 September 1987, trial on the
merits was held on various dates from 11 May 1988 until 10 January 1990.
On 30 May 1990, the trial court promulgated its decision 3 in the consolidated cases
acquitting the appellant in Criminal Case No. 4649-R (frustrated murder) and Criminal Cases
Nos. 4650-R and 4651-R (attempted murder) for insufficiency of evidence but convicting him
in the two murder cases, Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R, with treachery as the
qualifying circumstance. 4 It also ruled that the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and price had been duly established. It then sentenced the appellant as
follows:
Upon these premises, the accused Jaime Agustin is found GUILTY of two (2) counts
of murder, the prosecution having proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
each of the criminal cases aforesaid, he should be sentenced to the maximum
penalty of Death, there being two aggravating circumstances. However, since the
death penalty is not imposable at this time, the accused is sentenced to Reclusion
35
Perpetua. He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victims; Anna Theresa
Francisco the sum of sixty Three Thousand Pesos (P63,000.00) as actual damages
(Exhibits "F," "I" and "G"); and Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, the sum of Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00). With costs against the accused, Jaime Agustin.
SO ORDERED. 5
The version of the prosecution is based on the testimonies of (1) Isidoro Magpantay, a
member of the Baguio City Police Force, who identified the initial report (Exhibit "A"); (2)
Christie Napeñas, a stenographic reporter in the Office of the City Fiscal of Baguio City, who
took down the stenographic notes of City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia's investigations of accused
Wilfredo Quiaño (Exhibit "D") on 30 January 1987 and of the appellant on 10 February 1987,
and who identified her stenographic notes containing the statement of the appellant (Exhibit
"B") and the transcript of said stenographic notes (Exhibit "C"); (3) Dominic Bayquen, the
victim in Criminal Case No. 4650-R, who testified on how they were shot; (5) Eulogio
Francisco, the father of Anna Theresa Francisco, who identified her death certificate (Exhibit
"I") and testified on the list of expenses (Exhibit "G"); (6) Rogelio Mumar, a supervising
ballistics expert, who declared that the fourteen shell recovered from the scene of the crime
were not fired from any of the three armalite rifles submitted to him; (7) Atty. Reynaldo
Cajucom, who testified that he was the lawyer who assisted the appellant and accused
Wilfredo Quiaño while they were being investigated by City Fiscal Balajadia; and (8) Lilian San
Luis Bayquen, wife of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and mother of Dominic Bayquen, who testified
on what she did after Dominic informed her by telephone about the shooting incident.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts. At past 7:30 p.m. of 6
September 1986 in Baguio City, Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son,
Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa Francisco; his daughter, Dominic; and Danny
Ancheta, a family friend, were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the doctor's residence at
Trancoville at 21-D Malvar Street, Baguio City, from his driving the car. While they were
cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church, a man came out from the right
side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man approached the Brasilia, aimed
his armalite rifle through its window, and fired at the passengers. The Brasilia swerved and
hit a fence. The gunman immediately returned to the parked car which then sped away.
All those in the car were hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dr.
Bayquen's head was blown off. Dominic was bale to get out of the Brasilia to run to the
Alabanza store where she telephoned her mother and told her what had happened. Later,
she and her mother brought her father and Anthony to the hospital. 6 Danny Ancheta went
home and was then brought to the Notre Dame Hospital for treatment. 7 Anna Theresa
Francisco was brought to the funeral parlor. 8 The police later arrived at the crime scene and
conducted an investigation. they recovered some empty shells of an armalite rifle. 9
On 30 January 1987, accused Wilfredo "Sonny" Quiaño, an alleged former military agent or
"asset" who had been picked up in La Union by the police authorities, confessed during the
investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the

triggerman in the fatal shooting of Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco. He implicated
Manuel "Jun" Abenoja, Jr., allegedly a fellow military agent and the "bagman" who engaged
him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Freddie "Boy" Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a
certain "Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo
Cajucom, a representative of the Integrated bar of the Philippines (IBP). Ms. Christie
Napeñas, a stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation. 10 Thereafter, she
transcribed the notes and the transcription became the sworn statement of Wilfredo Quiaño
which he signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal
Balajadia. 11
In the morning of 10 February 1987, "Jimmy," who turned out to be appellant Jaime Agustin,
was picked up in Sto. Tomas, Pangasinan, by military personnel and brought to Baguio city. At
4:00 p.m. of that date, he was taken to the office of City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia where he
was investigated in connection with the crime. Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom assisted the appellant
during the investigation. Ms. Christie Napeñas took down stenographic notes of the
proceedings during the investigation. The stenographic notes consisted of 22 pages (Exhibit
"B"), each of which was signed afterwards by the appellant and Atty. Cajucom. Ms. Napeñas
subsequently transcribed these notes which the prosecution marked as Exhibit "C." The
appellant narrated therein his knowledge of the shooting of Dr. Bayquen and revealed the
identities of his cohorts in the crime. In a confrontation two days later, he identified Quiaño
as "Sony," the triggerman.
The defense presented the appellant and his wife, Elizabeth Agustin. The appellant, who is a
farmer and whose highest educational attainment was grad four, impugned the validity of his
extrajudicial statement. he alleged that in the morning of 10 February 1987, he went to
Carmen, Pangasinan, to buy some fertilizer and upon his return he was met by two armed
men who took him to their car where two other companions, armed with armalites, were
waiting. They then brought him out of Pangasinan. He later learned that they were on their
way to Baguio City.
Inside the car, he was asked if he knew Boy and Jun, and he answered that he did not. Along
Kennon Road, he was made to stoop down at the back seat whenever they would reach a toll
booth, and then brought out three times near the ravines and made to kneel at gunpoint in
order to force him to admit his involvement in the shooting, which he finally did out of fear.
Then he was brought to the Office of the City Fiscal of Baguio City.
While he was giving his statement at the fical's office, the armed men stayed with him and
their presence deterred him from telling the investigating fiscal that he was being
threatened. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo
Cajucom, to assist him, he, nevertheless, asked for his uncle who is a lawyer, Atty. Oliver
Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English and Tagalog
but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. Then later, at Camp Dangwa to where he was
taken, he told his wife to get in touch and talk with Atty. Tabin. Finally, he asserted that he
was promised by his captors that he would be discharged as a state witness if he cooperates,
but the plan did not push through because his co-accused, Quiaño, escaped. 12
36
Elizabeth Agustin corroborated her husband's story that he went to Carmen in the morning
of 10 February 1987 to buy some fertilizer and that he failed to return. Her efforts to locate
him proved futile until days later when she finally learned that he was detained at Camp
Dangwa. 13
The trial court admitted the appellant's extrajudicial statement and gave scant consideration
to his claim of force, intimidation, and other irregularities because of the following reasons:
(a) the presence of material improbabilities in his tale of when and how he was allegedly
taken at gunpoint from his hometown in Pangasinan; (b) it was improbable that he was made
to kneel thrice at gunpoint along Kennon Road considering the vehicles which were passing
along that road; (c) it was unbelievable that when he was in the Fiscal's Office he asked for
his uncle, Atty. Tabin if he could not go home for a period of one month; (d) no less than the
city Fiscal of Baguio City interrogated him and yet he did not tell the fiscal that he was being
forced to give a statement; (e) the fiscal even provided him with a lawyer who conferred with
him and apprised him of his rights; (f) he signed each and every page of the stenographic
notes of his statement and this was witnessed by no less than the City Fiscal of Baguio and
the lawyer who assisted him; and (g) he disclosed in his statement that he voluntarily gave it
because of his ill feeling against his co-accused who did not give him any money.
The trial court then concluded that "[t]here was conspiracy and the accused was a direct
participant in the crime," and that while he tried to minimize his culpability, his "extrajudicial
confession" shows that "he was in on the plan," and even "expected to be paid, to be
rewarded monetarily"; and that he "decided to give a statement only when he was not given
the money." Since the proof of corpus delicti required in Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court was established by the prosecution's evidence, it found his conviction for murder
inevitable.
The appellant filed a notice of appeal. In this brief, he imputes upon the trial court the
commission of this lone error:
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONSIDERING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION AS ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM. 14
The appellant insists that his extrajudicial confession was taken in violation of his rights under
Section 11, Article III of the constitution. He argues that the lawyer who assisted him, Atty.
Reynaldo Cajucom, was not of his own choice but was foisted upon him by the city Fiscal.
Worse, the said lawyer is a law partner of the private prosecutor, Atty. Arthur Galace, and
conferred with him in English and Tagalog although he understood only Ilocano. Moreover,
when Atty. Cajucom briefly conferred with him and when the city Fiscal interrogated him, his
military escorts were present.
He stresses that the lawyer "who assists the suspect under custodial interrogation should be
of the latter's choice, not one foisted on him by the police investigator or other parties," 15
and that where there are serious doubts on the voluntariness of the extrajudicial confession,

the doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. 16 He then concludes that his
extrajudicial confession is inadmissible and his conviction cannot stand, there being no other
evidence linking him to the crimes charged.
In its brief, 17 the appellee, reiterating the reasons of the trial court in upholding the validity
of the confession, prays for the affirmance of the appealed decision.
After a careful study of the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R and a
painstaking evaluation of the evidence, we find this appeal to be impressed with merit.
Indeed, the extrajudicial admission — not extrajudicial confession — of the appellant, which
is the only evidence of the prosecution linking him to the commission of the crime charged, is
wholly inadmissible because it was taken in violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution. We also see in these cases a blatant disregard of the appellant's right under
Section 2 of Article III when he was unlawfully arrested.
Before we go any further, it should be pointed out that, contrary to the pronouncement of
the trial court and the characterization given by the appellant himself, the assailed
extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission.
We take this opportunity to once more distinguish one from the other. Sections 26 and 33,
rule 30 of the Rules of
Court 18 clearly show such a distinction.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the criminal intent
to commit the offense with which he is charged. 19 Wharton 20 defines a confession as
follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case,
of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused,
direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with
proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, and admission is something
less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance
which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to
establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
We have examined the assailed extrajudicial statement of the appellant, and we are satisfied
that nothing therein indicates that he expressly acknowledged his guilt; he merely admitted
some facts or circumstances which in themselves are insufficient to authorize a conviction
and which can only tend to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. Nevertheless, when what is
involved is the issue of admissibly in evidence under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution,
the distinction is irrelevant because Paragraph 3 thereof expressly refers to both confession
and admission. Thus:
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
37
The first two paragraphs of Section 12 read:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
These first and second paragraphs are taken from Section 20, Article IV (Bill of Rights) of the
1973 Constitution which read:
Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
The first two paragraphs of Section 12, Article III of the present Constitution have broadened
the aforesaid Section 20 in these respects: (1) the right to counsel means not just any
counsel, but a "competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice"; (2) the
right to remain silent and to counsel can only be waived in writing and in the presence of
counsel; and (3) the rule on inadmissibility expressly includes admissions, not just
confessions.
In Morales vs. Enrile, 21 this Court, applying Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
laid down the duties of an investigator during custodial investigation and ruled that the
waiver of the right to counsel would not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and
to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The
person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or
anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or
by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to
it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it
be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not
 38

be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory of inculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
We reiterated the above ruling in People vs. Galit, 22 People vs. Lumayok, 23 People vs.
Albofera, 24 People vs. Marquez, 25 People vs. Penillos, 26 and People vs. Basay, 27 among other
cases.
Since we cannot even reads or decipher the stenographic notes in the yellow pads, we
cannot expect the appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to read
or decipher its contents. We have to rely solely on the transcript and presume its accuracy. A
perusal of the transcript convinces us that the appellant was not given a fair deal and was
deprived of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Firstly, he was not
fully and properly informed of his rights. The transcript (Exhibit "C") shows the following
preliminary questions of the City Fiscal and the answers of the appellant:

The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates "the 01. QUESTION — Mr. Jaime Agustin, I am informing you that
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory you are under investigation in connection
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." 28 It is not enough for the investigator to with the death of Dr. Nap Bayquen of which
merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the you are one of the principal suspects. I am
1973 Constitution or Section 12, Article III of the present Constitution; the former must also informing you of your constitutional rights
explain the effects of such provision in practical terms, e.g., what the person under before you give any statement. First, you
investigation may or may not do, and in language the subject fairly understands. The right to have the right to remain silent meaning, you
be informed carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain, may give a statement or you may not give
and contemplates effective communication which results in the subject understanding what any statement. If you will not give a
is conveyed. Since it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of statement, you will not be forced to do so,
explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence, and do you understand this right?
other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing the investigation.
ANSWER — I understand, sir.
In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed of such
right; he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be told that he can 02. Q — If you will give a statement, you have the
ask for counsel if he so desires or that one will be provided him at his request. If he decides right to be assisted by a lawyer of your own
not to retain counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and, therefore, choice, if you cannot afford to secure the
chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, must be made services of a lawyer the government will
with the assistance of counsel. That counsel must be a lawyer. 29 provide a lawyer for you, do you understand
this right?
The waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 30
Consequently, even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made without A — I understand, sir.
the assistance off counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion
or even if it had been voluntarily given. 31 03. Q — Now, do you want to be assisted by a
lawyer?
The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, 32 contained in twenty-two pages of yellow pad,
does, indeed, appear to be signed by him and Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. what we find in these A — Yes, sir.
yellow pads are stenographic notes. these were transcribed by the stenographer who took
down the stenographic notes, but for reasons not explained in the records, the transcript of
04. Q — I am now informing you that a lawyer in the
the notes (Exhibit "C"), which consists of twelve pages, 33 was not signed by the appellant
person of Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom is now
since it does not indicate any jurat. On the other hand, the same stenographic reporter, who
present in this investigation room, do you
took down the stenographic notes when accused Wilfredo Quiaño was being investigated by
wish to avail of his assistance in connection
City Fiscal Balajadia, transcribed the notes, and the transcription 34 was subscribed and sworn
with this investigation?
to by the accused before City Fiscal Balajadia and also signed by Atty. Cajucom, who
represented the accused in the investigation.
A — I want, sir.
 39

05. Q — I am also informing you that whatever you appears in the transcript and no other independent evidence was offered to prove its
say in this investigation can be used as existence.
evidence in your favor and it can also be
used as evidence against you in any criminal Secondly, Atty. Cajucom can hardly be said to have been voluntarily and intelligently
or civil case, do you understand that? "accepted" by the appellant as his counsel to assist him in the investigation. Atty. Cajucom's
presence in the Office of the City fiscal at the time the appellant was brought there for
A — Yes, sir, I understand. investigation is unclear to us. At least two possibilities may explain it: it was a mere
coincidence in the sense that he happened to be attending to some professional matter, or
06. Q — After informing you of your constitutional he was earlier called by the City Fiscal for the purpose of giving free legal aid to the appellant.
rights, are you now willing to give a These possibilities are not remote but whether it was one or the other, it is clear to us that
statement? Atty. Cajucom was in fact foisted upon the appellant, for as shown in the above-quoted
portion of Exhibit "C," the city fiscal immediately suggested the availability of Atty. Cajucom
without first distinctly asking the appellant if he had a counsel of his own choice and if he had
A — Yes, sir, I agree.
one, whether he could hire such counsel; and if he could not, whether he would simply
exercise his right to remain silent and to counsel. In short, after the appellant said that he
Investigator — Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, the witness or wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal, through suggestive language, immediately
respondent Jaime Agustin has chosen you to informed him that Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him.
give him assistance in this investigation, are
you willing to assist him?
While it is true that in custodial investigations the party to be investigated has the final
choice of counsel and may reject the counsel chosen for him by the investigator and ask for
Answer — I am willing, fiscal, to assist the witness. another one, 35 the circumstances obtaining in the custodial interrogation of the appellant
left him no freedom to intelligently and freely do so. For as earlier stated, he was not even
Investigator — Have you appraised [sic] him of his asked if he had a lawyer of his own choice and whether he could afford to hire such lawyer;
constitutional rights? on the other hand, the city Fiscal clearly suggested the availability of Atty. Cajucom. then too,
present at that time were Capt. Antonio Ayat and Sgt. Roberto Rambac, military officers of
Answer — Yes, fiscal. RUC I, who brought him to the City Fiscal's Office for investigation in the afternoon of the day
when he was unlawfully arrested in Sto. Tomas, Pangasinan. Along Kennon road, on the way
to Baguio City, he was coerced and threatened with death if he would not admit knowing
Investigator — Do you know after examining him whether "Jun" and "Sonny" and hi participation in the crime. This testimony was unrebutted by the
or not he is giving a free and voluntary prosecution. The presence of the military officers and the continuing fear that if he did not
statement of his own volition without any cooperate, something would happen to him, was like a Damocles sword which vitiated his
intimidation or force exerted on him? free will.

A — As stated by him, fiscal, he is willing to give
a free and voluntary statement in relation to
what really happened.
It is at once observed that the appellant was not explicitly told of his right to have a
competent and independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had in mind any
such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could not,
whether he would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not
categorically informed that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and that
this waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. He had, in fact, waived his
right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written waiver of such right
Why it was the City Fiscal who had to conduct the custodial investigation is beyond us.
Nothing in the records shows that at that time the criminal cases against the culprits had
already been filed with the City Fiscal's Office for preliminary investigation and had,
therefore, ceased to be a police matter. If they had been so filed, then the City Fiscal should
have followed the usual course of procedure in preliminary investigations. It appears,
however, from the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 46648-R that it was
Assistant City Fiscal Octavio M. Banta who conducted the preliminary investigation and who
prepared, signed, and certified the informations. city Fiscal Balajadia merely approved them
and administered the jurat in the certification. the conclusion then is inevitable that he did
not conduct the preliminary investigation.
 40

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant voluntarily agreed to be assisted
by Atty. Cajucom, we doubt it very much if he was an independent counsel. While we wish to
give him the benefit of the doubt because he is an officer of the court upon whose shoulders
lies the responsibility to see to it that protection be accorded the appellant and that no
injustice be committed to him, 36 and, moreover, he generally has in his favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties, 37 there are special circumstances
in these cases which convince us that he was unable to assist the appellant in a satisfactory
manner. For one, he admitted on cross-examination that at that time, and even until the
time he took the witness stand, he was an associate of the private prosecutor, Atty. Arthur
Galace, in these and the companion cases. Thus:
Q — Did you explain the constitutional rights of the accused to
caution him of the consequences of his statement?
A — I explained to him that he has the right to remain silent, to
confront in person the witnesses against him and that he has
the right to choose a counsel to assist him in the hearing of
the case which was being investigated then.
Q — And what was his reply regarding the consequences of this
statement?

Q Mr. Witness, at the time you assisted the accused you belonged to the office of Atty.
A — He told me that he is willing to give a truthful statement and
Galace, you were an associate at the time when you assisted the accused?
in order to shed light. 41

A I was represented [sic] then as IBP Legal Aid.

It appears to us that Atty. Cajucom did not actually impress upon the appellant that he was
one of the accused; rather, Atty. Cajucom made the appellant believe that he was only a
Q The question is not answered, we are only requesting him if he was an associate of Atty. witness. Thus:
Galace up to the present?
Q [by the prosecutor]
A Yes. 38
— But, nevertheless, you gave the precautionary measure
Then we have misgivings on whether Atty. Cajucom was in fact understood by the appellant entitled to any witness?
when the former informed the appellant of his constitutional rights in English and Tagalog
considering that the appellant, a fourth grader and a farmer, could only understand Ilocano.
A — Yes, sir.
Thus:

Q — Why do you say that it was given voluntarily?

ATTY. TABIN:

A — Before presenting him to the investigation we were given

So in other words when you appraised [sic] him of his constitutional rights using English
time to talk personally without any other people and that
Language and Tagalog Dialect you did not have any Ilocano dialect Interpreter. . . .
was the time that I explained to him all his rights and
consequences pertaining to him as witness to this case. 42
WITNESS:
On cross-examination, Atty. Cajucom also declared:
As far as I can remember, I explained it in Tagalog and English. 39
ATTY. TABIN:
And when asked whether he was sure if the appellant understood him, Atty. Cajucom merely
answered:
That is why I am requesting him how he explained in that language, Your Honor.

A At least I put everything as far as I could give to him to appraise [sic] him of his
WITNESS:
constitutional rights. 40

I told him that this is a grave case which he would be giving some narrations as a witness and
Then too, even if he were fully understood by the appellant, we are not satisfied that his
his involvement would mean the most grievous offense and if found guilty will bring him for
explanations were adequate. On direct examination, he gave the following answers:

some years in jail and I told him that I could help him if he will be presenting the truth and
narrate is the truth. This is in combination, English and Tagalog, and most of the time, I made
it in Tagalog. 43
Moreover, considering that the appellant is familiar only with Ilocano, the Court has serious
doubts about his ability to understand Atty. Cajucom's explanation of his constitutional rights
since Atty. Cajucom did so in English and Tagalog.
Finally, Atty. Cajucom knew, as admitted by him on cross-examination, that the appellant
was picked up on 10 February 1987 by military men in Pangasinan without a warrant for his
arrest. 44 Since the crimes with which the appellant was charged were allegedly committed
on 6 September 1986 or more than five months earlier, no arrest without a warrant could
have been legally and validly effected. a warrantless arrest should comply with the conditions
prescribed in Section 5, rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Said section provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
None of these exceptional circumstances were present at the time the appellant was
arrested on 10 February 1987. The prosecution did not even insinuate that the crimes were
committed in the presence of the arresting officers (for otherwise they could have arrested
the appellant on 6 September 1986 yet) or that the appellant was a prisoner who had
escaped from his place of detention; or that the crimes had just been committed for they
were in fact committed more than five months earlier. Atty. Cajucom knew or ought to have
known that the arrest was unlawful. If he were then truly moved by his duty to fully assist the
appellant, he should have forthwith taken the appropriate measures for the immediate
release of the appellant instead of allowing the City Fiscal to investigate him. Needless to say,
the conduct of Atty. Cajucom under the circumstances only strengthen our belief that the
appellant had all the cards stacked against him.
Thus, we do not hesitate to declare the appellant's extrajudicial statement inadmissible in
evidence because it was obtained in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution.
41
since it is the only evidence which links him to the crimes of which he was convicted, he must
then be acquitted.
His acquittal must not write finis to these murder cases. These crimes must be solved and the
triggerman and the mastermind apprehended. We see in these cases the failure of the
Government to exert the necessary efforts to bring the guilty parties to the bar of justice.
Until now, the accused, who were implicated by the triggerman as having ordered for a price
the murder of Dr. Bayquen, remain at large and the records do not show any diligent effort
to effect their arrest. The triggerman escaped while in the custody of the PC/INP at Camp
Dangwa. The City Prosecutor's Office of Baguio City should then use all the resources at its
command, in coordination with the law-enforcement agencies of the Government, such as
the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police, to immediately arrest
the other accused.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, branch 3, Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 4647-R and Criminal Case No.
4648-R, and ACQUITTING appellant JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN. His immediate release from
confinement is hereby ORDERED unless for some other lawful cause his continued detention
is warranted.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
Quiaño, the gunman who killed the victims, confessed during the investigation conducted by
Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He implicated
Abenoja, Jr., who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided the
armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by
Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation as
transcribed with the sworn statement of Quiaño was signed, with the assistance of Atty.
Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia.
The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was investigated and was afforded the
privileges like that of Quiaño. Agustin’s defense interpose that he was forced to admit
involvement at gunpoint at Kennon Road. He further declared that although he was given a
lawyer, Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked for his
uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in
English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. The promise that he
would be discharged as a witness did not push through since Quiaño escaped. However the
RTC convicted him, since conspiracy was established, hence this appeal.
 42

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant’s extrajudicial statements are admissible as although he was given a lawyer, Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor), he
evidence to warrant conviction. nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him
from only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands.
Held: The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did not push through since Quijano
escaped. However the RTC convicted him, since conspiracy was established. Hence the
appeal.
No. The statement of the accused is inadmissible as evidence in court. Despite asking for his
uncle to represent him he was provided with an impartial counsel who is an associate of the
Issue: Whether or Not accused-appellant’s extrajudicial statements admissible as evidence.
private prosecutor. It also appears that some of the transcripts of the notes of the
proceeding that show the extrajudicial statement made by the accused were not signed by
Held:
him. By making his statements the accused voluntarily waived his right to remain silent but
that was not put in writing either.
No. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. In a confession, there is an
acknowledgment of guilt of the accused, while an admission is a statement direct or implied
It would be in violation of the mandate of custodial investigation to admit the statement of of facts pertinent to the issue. The rule on inadmissibility, however expressly includes
the accused when the process undertaken is one bereft of meeting the standard
admissions, not just confessions.The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in
requirements of the due process that should be accorded to the accused in custodial
investigation, hence he should be acquitted. twenty-two pages appear to be signed by him and Atty. Cajucom but for reasons not
explained in the records, the transcript of the notes which consists of twelve pages was not
signed by the appellant. Since the court cannot even read or decipher the stenographic notes
Facts:
it cannot be expected that appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade,
to read or decipher its contents. The appellant, therefore was deprived of his rights under
Dr. Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son, Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa;
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Firstly, he was not fully and properly informed of
his daughter, Dominic; and Danny, a family friend, were on their way aboard their Brasilia to
his rights. The appellant was not explicitly told of his right to have a competent and
the doctor's residence at Malvar Street, Baguio City. While they were cruising along Malvar
independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had in mind any such counsel and,
Street and nearing the Baptist church, a man came out from the right side of a car parked
if so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could not, whether he would
about two meters to the church. The man approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle
agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not categorically informed that he
through its window, and fired at the passengers. The Brasilia swerved and hit a fence. The
could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and that this waiver must be in writing
gunman immediately returned to the parked car which then sped away. All those in the car
and in the presence of his counsel. He had, in fact, waived his right to remain silent by
were hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dominic was bale to get out of
agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written waiver of such right appears in the transcript and
the Brasilia to run to the Alabanza store where she telephoned her mother. Later, she and
no other independent evidence was offered to prove its existence. In short, after the
her mother brought her father and Anthony to the hospital. Danny went home and was then
appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal, through suggestive
brought to the Hospital for treatment.
language, immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him. Moreso said
Accused Quiaño, an alleged former military agent who had been picked up by the police counsel is not independent since he is an associate of the private prosecutor.
authorities, confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo
Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja, Jr., who engaged
him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy."
During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom.
Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation as transcribed with the sworn
statement of Quiaño was signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before
City Fiscal Balajadia. The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was investigated and
was afforded the privileges like that of Quijano. Agustin’s defense interpose that he was
forced to admit involvement at gunpoint in the Kennon Road. He further declared that
 43

FIRST DIVISION under the business name Hurricane Commercial, Inc. For P34,887.66, Manalo, Jr. installed a
water pump at Ramos residence at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Katipunan Avenue,
BOSTON BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, (formerly BANK OF COMMERCE), Quezon City. Manalo, Jr. then proposed to XEI, through Ramos, to purchase a lot in the
Xavierville subdivision, and offered as part of the downpayment the P34,887.66 Ramos owed
him. XEI, through Ramos, agreed. In a letter dated February 8, 1972, Ramos requested
Petitioner,
Manalo, Jr. to choose which lots he wanted to buy so that the price of the lots and the terms
of payment could be fixed and incorporated in the conditional sale. Manalo, Jr. met with
- versus - Ramos and informed him that he and his wife Perla had chosen Lots 1 and 2 of Block 2 with a
total area of 1,740.3 square meters.
PERLA P. MANALO and CARLOS
In a letter dated August 22, 1972 to Perla Manalo, Ramos confirmed the reservation of the
MANALO, JR., lots. He also pegged the price of the lots at P200.00 per square meter, or a total of
P348,060.00, with a 20% down payment of the purchase price amounting to P69,612.00 less
Respondents. February 9, 2006 the P34,887.66 owing from Ramos, payable on or before December 31, 1972; the
corresponding Contract of Conditional Sale would then be signed on or before the same
date, but if the selling operations of XEI resumed after December 31, 1972, the balance of
x--------------------------------------------------x the downpayment would fall due then, and the spouses would sign the aforesaid contract
within five (5) days from receipt of the notice of resumption of such selling operations. It was
DECISION also stated in the letter that, in the meantime, the spouses may introduce improvements
thereon subject to the rules and regulations imposed by XEI in the subdivision. Perla Manalo
CALLEJO, SR., J.: conformed to the letter agreement.

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in The spouses Manalo took possession of the property on September 2, 1972, constructed a
CA-G.R. CV No. 47458 affirming, on appeal, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of house thereon, and installed a fence around the perimeter of the lots.
Quezon City, Branch 98, in Civil Case No. Q-89-3905.
In the meantime, many of the lot buyers refused to pay their monthly installments until they
The Antecedents were assured that they would be issued Torrens titles over the lots they had purchased. The
spouses Manalo were notified of the resumption of the selling operations of XEI. However,
they did not pay the balance of the downpayment on the lots because Ramos failed to
The Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) was the owner of parcels of land in Quezon City, known as
prepare a contract of conditional sale and transmit the same to Manalo for their signature.
the Xavierville Estate Subdivision, with an area of 42 hectares. XEI caused the subdivision of
On August 14, 1973, Perla Manalo went to the XEI office and requested that the payment of
the property into residential lots, which was then offered for sale to individual lot buyers.
the amount representing the balance of the downpayment be deferred, which, however, XEI
rejected. On August 10,
On September 8, 1967, XEI, through its General Manager, Antonio Ramos, as vendor, and The
Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM), as vendee, executed a Deed of Sale of Real Estate over some
1973, XEI furnished her with a statement of their account as of July 31, 1973, showing that
residential lots in the subdivision, including Lot 1, Block 2, with an area of 907.5 square
they had a balance of P34,724.34 on the downpayment of the two lots after deducting the
meters, and Lot 2, Block 2, with an area of 832.80 square meters. The transaction was subject
account of Ramos, plus P3,819.68 interest thereon from September 1, 1972 to July 31, 1973,
to the approval of the Board of Directors of OBM, and was covered by real estate mortgages
and that the interests on the unpaid balance of the purchase price of P278,448.00 from
in favor of the Philippine National Bank as security for its account amounting to
September 1, 1972 to July 31, 1973 amounted to P30,629.28. The spouses were informed
P5,187,000.00, and the Central Bank of the Philippines as security for advances amounting to
that they were being billed for said unpaid interests.
P22,185,193.74. Nevertheless, XEI continued selling the residential lots in the subdivision as
agent of OBM.
On January 25, 1974, the spouses Manalo received another statement of account from XEI,
inclusive of interests on the purchase price of the lots. In a letter dated April 6, 1974 to XEI,
Sometime in 1972, then XEI president Emerito Ramos, Jr. contracted the services of Engr.
Manalo, Jr. stated they had not yet received the notice of resumption of Leis selling
Carlos Manalo, Jr. who was in business of drilling deep water wells and installing pumps
operations, and that there had been no arrangement on the payment of interests; hence,

they should not be charged with interest on the balance of the downpayment on the
property. Further, they demanded that a deed of conditional sale over the two lots be
transmitted to them for their signatures. However, XEI ignored the demands. Consequently,
the spouses refused to pay the balance of the downpayment of the purchase price.
Sometime in June 1976, Manalo, Jr. constructed a business sign in the sidewalk near his
house. In a letter dated June 17, 1976, XEI informed Manalo, Jr. that business signs were not
allowed along the sidewalk. It demanded that he remove the same, on the ground, among
others, that the sidewalk was not part of the land which he had purchased on installment
basis from XEI. Manalo, Jr. did not respond. XEI reiterated its demand on September 15,
1977.
Subsequently, XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM, including the receivables for lots
already contracted and those yet to be sold. On December 8, 1977, OBM warned Manalo,
Jr., that putting up of a business sign is specifically prohibited by their contract of conditional
sale and that his failure to comply with its demand would impel it to avail of the remedies as
provided in their contract of conditional sale.
Meanwhile, on December 5, 1979, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-265822 over Lot 1, Block 2, and TCT No. T-265823 over Lot 2, Block 2, in favor of
the OBM. The lien in favor of the Central Bank of the Philippines was annotated at the dorsal
portion of said title, which was later cancelled on August 4, 1980.
Subsequently, the Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) acquired the Xavierville Estate from
OBM. CBM wrote Edilberto Ng, the president of Xavierville Homeowners Association that, as
of January 31, 1983, Manalo, Jr. was one of the lot buyers in the subdivision. CBM reiterated
in its letter to Ng that, as of January 24, 1984, Manalo was a homeowner in the subdivision.
In a letter dated August 5, 1986, the CBM requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-going
construction on the property since it (CBM) was the owner of the lot and she had no
permission for such construction. She agreed to have a conference meeting with CBM
officers where she informed them that her husband had a contract with OBM, through XEI,
to purchase the property. When asked to prove her claim, she promised to send the
documents to CBM. However, she failed to do so. On September 5, 1986, CBM reiterated its
demand that it be furnished with the documents promised, but Perla Manalo did not
respond.
On July 27, 1987, CBM filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the spouses with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 51618. CBM
claimed that the spouses had been unlawfully occupying the property without its consent
and that despite its demands, they refused to vacate the property. The latter alleged that
they, as vendors, and XEI, as vendee, had a contract of sale over the lots which had not yet
been rescinded.
44
While the case was pending, the spouses Manalo wrote CBM to offer an amicable
settlement, promising to abide by the purchase price of the property (P313,172.34), per
agreement with XEI, through Ramos. However, on July 28, 1988, CBM wrote the spouses,
through counsel, proposing that the price of P1,500.00 per square meter of the property was
a reasonable starting point for negotiation of the settlement. The spouses rejected the
counter proposal, emphasizing that they would abide by their original agreement with XEI.
CBM moved to withdraw its complaint because of the issues raised.
In the meantime, the CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines. After CBM filed
its complaint against the spouses Manalo, the latter filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against the bank before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City on October 31, 1989.
The plaintiffs alleged therein that they had always been ready, able and willing to pay the
installments on the lots sold to them by the defendants remote predecessor-in-interest, as
might be or stipulated in the contract of sale, but no contract was forthcoming; they
constructed their house worth P2,000,000.00 on the property in good faith; Manalo, Jr.,
informed the defendant, through its counsel, on October 15, 1988 that he would abide by
the terms and conditions of his original agreement with the defendants predecessor-in-
interest; during the hearing of the ejectment case on October 16, 1988, they offered to pay
P313,172.34 representing the balance on the purchase price of said lots; such tender of
payment was rejected, so that the subject lots could be sold at considerably higher prices to
third parties.
Plaintiffs further alleged that upon payment of the P313,172.34, they were entitled to the
execution and delivery of a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject lots, sufficient in form
and substance to transfer title thereto free and clear of any and all liens and encumbrances
of whatever kind and nature. The plaintiffs prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be
rendered in their favor, to wit:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due hearing:
(a) The defendant should be ordered to execute and deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale over
subject lots in favor of the plaintiffs after payment of the sum of P313,172.34, sufficient in
form and substance to transfer to them titles thereto free and clear of any and all liens and
encumbrances of whatever kind or nature;
(b) The defendant should be held liable for moral and exemplary damages in the amounts of
P300,000.00 and P30,000.00, respectively, for not promptly executing and delivering to
plaintiff the necessary Contract of Sale, notwithstanding repeated demands therefor and for
having been constrained to engage the services of undersigned counsel for which they
agreed to pay attorneys fees in the sum of P50,000.00 to enforce their rights in the premises
and appearance fee of P500.00;

(c) And for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
In its Answer to the complaint, the defendant interposed the following affirmative defenses:
(a) plaintiffs had no cause of action against it because the August 22, 1972 letter agreement
between XEI and the plaintiffs was not binding on it; and (b) it had no record of any contract
to sell executed by it or its predecessor, or of any statement of accounts from its
predecessors, or records of payments of the plaintiffs or of any documents which entitled
them to the possession of the lots. The defendant, likewise, interposed counterclaims for
damages and attorneys fees and prayed for the eviction of the plaintiffs from the property.
Meanwhile, in a letter dated January 25, 1993, plaintiffs, through counsel, proposed an
amicable settlement of the case by paying P942,648.70, representing the balance of the
purchase price of the two lots based on the current market value. However, the defendant
rejected the same and insisted that for the smaller lot, they pay P4,500,000.00, the current
market value of the property. The defendant insisted that it owned the property since there
was no contract or agreement between it and the plaintiffs relative thereto.
During the trial, the plaintiffs adduced in evidence the separate Contracts of Conditional Sale
executed between XEI and Alberto Soller; Alfredo Aguila, and Dra. Elena Santos-Roque to
prove that XEI continued selling residential lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM after the
latter had acquired the said lots.
For its part, defendant presented in evidence the letter dated August 22, 1972, where XEI
proposed to sell the two lots subject to two suspensive conditions: the payment of the
balance of the downpayment of the property, and the execution of the corresponding
contract of conditional sale. Since plaintiffs failed to pay, OBM consequently refused to
execute the corresponding contract of conditional sale and forfeited the P34,877.66
downpayment for the two lots, but did not notify them of said forfeiture. It alleged that
OBM considered the lots unsold because the titles thereto bore no annotation that they had
been sold under a contract of conditional sale, and the plaintiffs were not notified of XEIs
resumption of its selling operations.
On May 2, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant
(a) Ordering the latter to execute and deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 1 and 2, Block
2 of the Xavierville Estate Subdivision after payment of the sum of P942,978.70 sufficient in
form and substance to transfer to them titles thereto free from any and all liens and
encumbrances of whatever kind and nature.
45
(b) Ordering the defendant to pay moral and exemplary damages in the amount of
P150,000.00; and
(c) To pay attorneys fees in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court ruled that under the August 22, 1972 letter agreement of XEI and the
plaintiffs, the parties had a complete contract to sell over the lots, and that they had already
partially consummated the same. It declared that the failure of the defendant to notify the
plaintiffs of the resumption of its selling operations and to execute a deed of conditional sale
did not prevent the defendants obligation to convey titles to the lots from acquiring binding
effect. Consequently, the plaintiffs had a cause of action to compel the defendant to execute
a deed of sale over the lots in their favor.
Boston Bank appealed the decision to the CA, alleging that the lower court erred in (a) not
concluding that the letter of XEI to the spouses Manalo, was at most a mere contract to sell
subject to suspensive conditions, i.e., the payment of the balance of the downpayment on
the property and the execution of a deed of conditional sale (which were not complied with);
and (b) in awarding moral and exemplary damages to the spouses Manalo despite the
absence of testimony providing facts to justify such awards.
On September 30, 2002, the CA rendered a decision affirming that of the RTC with
modification. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that (a) the figure
P942,978.70 appearing [in] par. (a) of the dispositive portion thereof is changed to
P313,172.34 plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from September 1, 1972
until fully paid and (b) the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees in
favor of plaintiffs-appellees is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
The appellate court sustained the ruling of the RTC that the appellant and the appellees had
executed a Contract to Sell over the two lots but declared that the balance of the purchase
price of the property amounting to P278,448.00 was payable in fixed amounts, inclusive of
pre-computed interests, from delivery of the possession of the property to the appellees on a
monthly basis for 120 months, based on the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in
favor of other lot buyers. The CA also declared that, while XEI must have resumed its selling
operations before the end of 1972 and the downpayment on the property remained unpaid
as of December 31, 1972, absent a written notice of cancellation of the contract to sell from
the bank or notarial demand therefor as required by Republic Act No. 6552, the spouses had,
at the very least, a 60-day grace period from January 1, 1973 within which to pay the same.

Boston Bank filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision alleging that there was no
perfected contract to sell the two lots, as there was no agreement between XEI and the
respondents on the manner of payment as well as the other terms and conditions of the sale.
It further averred that its claim for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lots in its
Memorandum dated February 28, 1994 filed before the trial court constituted a judicial
demand for rescission that satisfied the requirements of the New Civil Code. However, the
appellate court denied the motion.
Boston Bank, now petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the
CA rulings. It maintains that, as held by the CA, the records do not reflect any schedule of
payment of the 80% balance of the purchase price, or P278,448.00. Petitioner insists that
unless the parties had agreed on the manner of payment of the principal amount, including
the other terms and conditions of the contract, there would be no existing contract of sale or
contract to sell. Petitioner avers that the letter agreement to respondent spouses dated
August 22, 1972 merely confirmed their reservation for the purchase of Lot Nos. 1 and 2,
consisting of 1,740.3 square meters, more or less, at the price of P200.00 per square meter
(or P348,060.00), the amount of the downpayment thereon and the application of the
P34,887.00 due from Ramos as part of such downpayment.
Petitioner asserts that there is no factual basis for the CA ruling that the terms and conditions
relating to the payment of the balance of the purchase price of the property (as agreed upon
by XEI and other lot buyers in the same subdivision) were also applicable to the contract
entered into between the petitioner and the respondents. It insists that such a ruling is
contrary to law, as it is tantamount to compelling the parties to agree to something that was
not even discussed, thus, violating their freedom to contract. Besides, the situation of the
respondents cannot be equated with those of the other lot buyers, as, for one thing, the
respondents made a partial payment on the downpayment for the two lots even before the
execution of any contract of conditional sale.
Petitioner posits that, even on the assumption that there was a perfected contract to sell
between the parties, nevertheless, it cannot be compelled to convey the property to the
respondents because the latter failed to pay the balance of the downpayment of the
property, as well as the balance of 80% of the purchase price, thus resulting in the extinction
of its obligation to convey title to the lots to the respondents.
Another egregious error of the CA, petitioner avers, is the application of Republic Act No.
6552. It insists that such law applies only to a perfected agreement or perfected contract to
sell, not in this case where the downpayment on the purchase price of the property was not
completely paid, and no installment payments were made by the buyers.
Petitioner also faults the CA for declaring that petitioner failed to serve a notice on the
respondents of cancellation or rescission of the contract to sell, or notarial demand therefor.
Petitioner insists that its August 5, 1986 letter requiring respondents to vacate the property
and its complaint for ejectment in Civil Case No. 51618 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court
amounted to the requisite demand for a rescission of the contract to sell. Moreover, the
46
action of the respondents below was barred by laches because despite demands, they failed
to pay the balance of the purchase price of the lots (let alone the downpayment) for a
considerable number of years.
For their part, respondents assert that as long as there is a meeting of the minds of the
parties to a contract of sale as to the price, the contract is valid despite the parties failure to
agree on the manner of payment. In such a situation, the balance of the purchase price
would be payable on demand, conformably to Article 1169 of the New Civil Code. They insist
that the law does not require a party to agree on the manner of payment of the purchase
price as a prerequisite to a valid contract to sell. The respondents cite the ruling of this Court
in Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals to support their submission.
They argue that even if the manner and timeline for the payment of the balance of the
purchase price of the property is an essential requisite of a contract to sell, nevertheless, as
shown by their letter agreement of August 22, 1972 with the OBM, through XEI and the other
letters to them, an agreement was reached as to the manner of payment of the balance of
the purchase price. They point out that such letters referred to the terms of the terms of the
deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in favor of the other lot buyers in the subdivision,
which contained uniform terms of 120 equal monthly installments (excluding the
downpayment, but inclusive of pre-computed interests). The respondents assert that XEI was
a real estate broker and knew that the contracts involving residential lots in the subdivision
contained uniform terms as to the manner and timeline of the payment of the purchase price
of said lots.
Respondents further posit that the terms and conditions to be incorporated in the
corresponding contract of conditional sale to be executed by the parties would be the same
as those contained in the contracts of conditional sale executed by lot buyers in the
subdivision. After all, they maintain, the contents of the corresponding contract of
conditional sale referred to in the August 22, 1972 letter agreement envisaged those
contained in the contracts of conditional sale that XEI and other lot buyers executed.
Respondents cite the ruling of this Court in Mitsui Bussan Kaisha v. Manila E.R.R. & L. Co.
The respondents aver that the issues raised by the petitioner are factual, inappropriate in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. They assert that
petitioner adopted a theory in litigating the case in the trial court, but changed the same on
appeal before the CA, and again in this Court. They argue that the petitioner is estopped
from adopting a new theory contrary to those it had adopted in the trial and appellate
courts. Moreover, the existence of a contract of conditional sale was admitted in the letters
of XEI and OBM. They aver that they became owners of the lots upon delivery to them by XEI.
The issues for resolution are the following:
(1) whether the factual issues raised by the petitioner are proper;

(2) whether petitioner or its predecessors-in-interest, the XEI or the OBM, as seller, and the
respondents, as buyers, forged a perfect contract to sell over the property;
(3) whether petitioner is estopped from contending that no such contract was forged by the
parties; and
(4) whether respondents has a cause of action against the petitioner for specific
performance.
The rule is that before this Court, only legal issues may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari. The reason is that this Court is not a trier of facts, and is not to review and
calibrate the evidence on record. Moreover, the findings of facts of the trial court, as
affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court unless the case falls
under any of the following exceptions:
(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those
of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.
We have reviewed the records and we find that, indeed, the ruling of the appellate court
dismissing petitioners appeal is contrary to law and is not supported by evidence. A careful
examination of the factual backdrop of the case, as well as the antecedental proceedings
constrains us to hold that petitioner is not barred from asserting that XEI or OBM, on one
hand, and the respondents, on the other, failed to forge a perfected contract to sell the
subject lots.
It must be stressed that the Court may consider an issue not raised during the trial when
there is plain error. Although a factual issue was not raised in the trial court, such issue may
still be considered and resolved by the Court in the interest of substantial justice, if it finds
that to do so is necessary to arrive at a just decision, or when an issue is closely related to an
issue raised in the trial court and the Court of Appeals and is necessary for a just and
complete resolution of the case. When the trial court decides a case in favor of a party on
certain grounds, the Court may base its decision upon some other points, which the trial
court or appellate court ignored or erroneously decided in favor of a party.
47
In this case, the issue of whether XEI had agreed to allow the respondents to pay the
purchase price of the property was raised by the parties. The trial court ruled that the parties
had perfected a contract to sell, as against petitioners claim that no such contract existed.
However, in resolving the issue of whether the petitioner was obliged to sell the property to
the respondents, while the CA declared that XEI or OBM and the respondents failed to agree
on the schedule of payment of the balance of the purchase price of the property, it ruled that
XEI and the respondents had forged a contract to sell; hence, petitioner is entitled to
ventilate the issue before this Court.
We agree with petitioners contention that, for a perfected contract of sale or contract to sell
to exist in law, there must be an agreement of the parties, not only on the price of the
property sold, but also on the manner the price is to be paid by the vendee.
Under Article 1458 of the New Civil Code, in a contract of sale, whether absolute or
conditional, one of the contracting parties obliges himself to transfer the ownership of and
deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its
equivalent. A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds
upon the thing which is the object of the contract and the price. From the averment of
perfection, the parties are bound, not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated, but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in
keeping with good faith, usage and law. On the other hand, when the contract of sale or to
sell is not perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding
juridical relation between the parties.
A definite agreement as to the price is an essential element of a binding agreement to sell
personal or real property because it seriously affects the rights and obligations of the parties.
Price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale.
The fixing of the price can never be left to the decision of one of the contracting parties. But
a price fixed by one of the contracting parties, if accepted by the other, gives rise to a
perfected sale.
It is not enough for the parties to agree on the price of the property. The parties must also
agree on the manner of payment of the price of the property to give rise to a binding and
enforceable contract of sale or contract to sell. This is so because the agreement as to the
manner of payment goes into the price, such that a disagreement on the manner of payment
is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price.
In a contract to sell property by installments, it is not enough that the parties agree on the
price as well as the amount of downpayment. The parties must, likewise, agree on the
manner of payment of the balance of the purchase price and on the other terms and
conditions relative to the sale. Even if the buyer makes a downpayment or portion thereof,
such payment cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and
sale between the parties. Indeed, this Court ruled in Velasco v. Court of Appeals that:
 48

It is not difficult to glean from the aforequoted averments that the petitioners themselves Sincerely yours, XAVIERVILLE ESTATE, INC.
admit that they and the respondent still had to meet and agree on how and when the down-
payment and the installment payments were to be paid. Such being the situation, it cannot, (Signed)
therefore, be said that a definite and firm sales agreement between the parties had been
perfected over the lot in question. Indeed, this Court has already ruled before that a definite
EMERITO B. RAMOS, JR.
agreement on the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element in the
formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. The fact, therefore, that the
petitioners delivered to the respondent the sum of P10,000.00 as part of the downpayment President
that they had to pay cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the perfection of any
purchase and sale agreement between the parties herein under article 1482 of the New Civil CONFORME:
Code, as the petitioners themselves admit that some essential matter the terms of payment
still had to be mutually covenanted. (Signed)

We agree with the contention of the petitioner that, as held by the CA, there is no showing, CARLOS T. MANALO, JR.
in the records, of the schedule of payment of the balance of the purchase price on the
property amounting to P278,448.00. We have meticulously reviewed the records, including
Ramos February 8, 1972 and August 22, 1972 letters to respondents, and find that said Hurricane Rotary Well Drilling
parties confined themselves to agreeing on the price of the property (P348,060.00), the 20%
downpayment of the purchase price (P69,612.00), and credited respondents for the The August 22, 1972 letter agreement of XEI and the respondents reads:
P34,887.00 owing from Ramos as part of the 20% downpayment. The timeline for the
payment of the balance of the downpayment (P34,724.34) was also agreed upon, that is, on Mrs. Perla P. Manalo
or before XEI resumed its selling operations, on or before December 31, 1972, or within five
(5) days from written notice of such resumption of selling operations. The parties had also
1548 Rizal Avenue Extension
agreed to incorporate all the terms and conditions relating to the sale, inclusive of the terms
of payment of the balance of the purchase price and the other substantial terms and
conditions in the corresponding contract of conditional sale, to be later signed by the parties, Caloocan City
simultaneously with respondents settlement of the balance of the downpayment.
Dear Mrs. Manalo:
The February 8, 1972 letter of XEI reads:
This is to confirm your reservation of Lot Nos. 1 and 2; Block 2 of our consolidation-
Mr. Carlos T. Manalo, Jr. subdivision plan as amended, consisting of 1,740.3 square meters more or less, at the price
of P200.00 per square meter or a total price of P348,060.00.
Hurricane Rotary Well Drilling
It is agreed that as soon as we resume selling operations, you must pay a down payment of
20% of the purchase price of the said lots and sign the corresponding Contract of Conditional
Rizal Avenue Ext.,Caloocan City
Sale, on or before December 31, 1972, provided, however, that if we resume selling after
December 31, 1972, then you must pay the aforementioned down payment and sign the
Dear Mr. Manalo: aforesaid contract within five (5) days from your receipt of our notice of resumption of selling
operations.
We agree with your verbal offer to exchange the proceeds of your contract with us to form
as a down payment for a lot in our Xavierville Estate Subdivision. In the meanwhile, you may introduce such improvements on the said lots as you may desire,
subject to the rules and regulations of the subdivision.
Please let us know your choice lot so that we can fix the price and terms of payment in our
conditional sale. If the above terms and conditions are acceptable to you, please signify your conformity by
signing on the space herein below provided.

Thank you.
Very truly yours,
XAVIERVILLE ESTATE, INC. CONFORME:
By:
(Signed) (Signed)
EMERITO B. RAMOS, JR. PERLA P. MANALO
President Buyer
Based on these two letters, the determination of the terms of payment of the P278,448.00
had yet to be agreed upon on or before December 31, 1972, or even afterwards, when the
parties sign the corresponding contract of conditional sale.
Jurisprudence is that if a material element of a contemplated contract is left for future
negotiations, the same is too indefinite to be enforceable. And when an essential element of
a contract is reserved for future agreement of the parties, no legal obligation arises until such
future agreement is concluded.
So long as an essential element entering into the proposed obligation of either of the parties
remains to be determined by an agreement which they are to make, the contract is
incomplete and unenforceable. The reason is that such a contract is lacking in the necessary
qualities of definiteness, certainty and mutuality.
There is no evidence on record to prove that XEI or OBM and the respondents had agreed,
after December 31, 1972, on the terms of payment of the balance of the purchase price of
the property and the other substantial terms and conditions relative to the sale. Indeed, the
parties are in agreement that there had been no contract of conditional sale ever executed
by XEI, OBM or petitioner, as vendor, and the respondents, as vendees.
The ruling of this Court in Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals has no bearing in this case
because the issue of the manner of payment of the purchase price of the property was not
raised therein.
We reject the submission of respondents that they and Ramos had intended to incorporate
the terms of payment contained in the three contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI
and other lot buyers in the corresponding contract of conditional sale, which would later be
signed by them. We have meticulously reviewed the respondents complaint and find no
such allegation therein. Indeed, respondents merely alleged in their complaint that they
49
were bound to pay the balance of the purchase price of the property in installments. When
respondent Manalo, Jr. testified, he was never asked, on direct examination or even on
cross-examination, whether the terms of payment of the balance of the purchase price of the
lots under the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers would form
part of the corresponding contract of conditional sale to be signed by them simultaneously
with the payment of the balance of the downpayment on the purchase price.
We note that, in its letter to the respondents dated June 17, 1976, or almost three years
from the execution by the parties of their August 22, 1972 letter agreement, XEI stated, in
part, that respondents had purchased the property on installment basis. However, in the
said letter, XEI failed to state a specific amount for each installment, and whether such
payments were to be made monthly, semi-annually, or annually. Also, respondents, as
plaintiffs below, failed to adduce a shred of evidence to prove that they were obliged to pay
the P278,448.00 monthly, semi-annually or annually. The allegation that the payment of the
P278,448.00 was to be paid in installments is, thus, vague and indefinite. Case law is that, for
a contract to be enforceable, its terms must be certain and explicit, not vague or indefinite.
There is no factual and legal basis for the CA ruling that, based on the terms of payment of
the balance of the purchase price of the lots under the contracts of conditional sale executed
by XEI and the other lot buyers, respondents were obliged to pay the P278,448.00 with pre-
computed interest of 12% per annum in 120-month installments. As gleaned from the ruling
of the appellate court, it failed to justify its use of the terms of payment under the three
contracts of conditional sale as basis for such ruling, to wit:
On the other hand, the records do not disclose the schedule of payment of the purchase
price, net of the downpayment. Considering, however, the Contracts of Conditional Sale
(Exhs. N, O and P) entered into by XEI with other lot buyers, it would appear that the
subdivision lots sold by XEI, under contracts to sell, were payable in 120 equal monthly
installments (exclusive of the downpayment but including pre-computed interests)
commencing on delivery of the lot to the buyer.
By its ruling, the CA unilaterally supplied an essential element to the letter agreement of XEI
and the respondents. Courts should not undertake to make a contract for the parties, nor can
it enforce one, the terms of which are in doubt. Indeed, the Court emphasized in Chua v.
Court of Appeals that it is not the province of a court to alter a contract by construction or to
make a new contract for the parties; its duty is confined to the interpretation of the one
which they have made for themselves, without regard to its wisdom or folly, as the court
cannot supply material stipulations or read into contract words which it does not contain.
Respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to allege in their complaint that the terms of
payment of the P278,448.00 to be incorporated in the corresponding contract of conditional
sale were those contained in the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and Soller,
Aguila and Roque. They likewise failed to prove such allegation in this Court.

The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase price of
lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute evidence that
XEI also agreed to give the respondents the same mode and timeline of payment of the
P278,448.00.
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at another
time, although such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or
the intent of the parties.
Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but
it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like.
However, respondents failed to allege and prove, in the trial court, that, as a matter of
business usage, habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the
balance of the purchase price in installments of 120 months of fixed amounts with pre-
computed interests, and that XEI and the respondents had intended to adopt such terms of
payment relative to the sale of the two lots in question. Indeed, respondents adduced in
evidence the three contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers merely
to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision as sales agent of OBM after it
acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct on the part of XEI to
require all lot buyers in the subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase price of said lots in
120 months. It further failed to prive that the trial court admitted the said deeds as part of
the testimony of respondent Manalo, Jr.
Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. Courts must
contend with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or pattern of
conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform
response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather,
conduct that is semi-automatic in nature. The offering party must allege and prove specific,
repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit. The examples offered in evidence
to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must be numerous enough to base on inference of
systematic conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently
similar circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion.
In determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key
criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. After all, habit means a course
of behavior of a person regularly represented in like circumstances. It is only when examples
offered to establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference of
systematic conduct that examples are admissible. The key criteria are adequacy of sampling
and uniformity of response or ratio of reaction to situations.
50
There are cases where the course of dealings to be followed is defined by the usage of a
particular trade or market or profession. As expostulated by Justice Benjamin Cardozo of the
United States Supreme Court: Life casts the moulds of conduct, which will someday become
fixed as law. Law preserves the moulds which have taken form and shape from life. Usage
furnishes a standard for the measurement of many of the rights and acts of men. It is also
well-settled that parties who contract on a subject matter concerning which known usage
prevail, incorporate such usage by implication into their agreement, if nothing is said to be
contrary.
However, the respondents inexplicably failed to adduce sufficient competent evidence to
prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct of XEI to justify the use of the terms of payment in
the contracts of the other lot buyers, and thus grant respondents the right to pay the
P278,448.00 in 120 months, presumably because of respondents belief that the manner of
payment of the said amount is not an essential element of a contract to sell. There is no
evidence that XEI or OBM and all the lot buyers in the subdivision, including lot buyers who
pay part of the downpayment of the property purchased by them in the form of service, had
executed contracts of conditional sale containing uniform terms and conditions. Moreover,
under the terms of the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and three lot buyers in
the subdivision, XEI agreed to grant 120 months within which to pay the balance of the
purchase price to two of them, but granted one 180 months to do so. There is no evidence
on record that XEI granted the same right to buyers of two or more lots.
Irrefragably, under Article 1469 of the New Civil Code, the price of the property sold may be
considered certain if it be so with reference to another thing certain. It is sufficient if it can be
determined by the stipulations of the contract made by the parties thereto or by reference
to an agreement incorporated in the contract of sale or contract to sell or if it is capable of
being ascertained with certainty in said contract; or if the contract contains express or
implied provisions by which it may be rendered certain; or if it provides some method or
criterion by which it can be definitely ascertained. As this Court held in Villaraza v. Court of
Appeals, the price is considered certain if, by its terms, the contract furnishes a basis or
measure for ascertaining the amount agreed upon.
We have carefully reviewed the August 22, 1972 letter agreement of the parties and find no
direct or implied reference to the manner and schedule of payment of the balance of the
purchase price of the lots covered by the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI and that
of the other lot buyers as basis for or mode of determination of the schedule of the payment
by the respondents of the P278,448.00.
The ruling of this Court in Mitsui Bussan Kaisha v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company
is not applicable in this case because the basic price fixed in the contract was P9.45 per long
ton, but it was stipulated that the price was subject to modification in proportion to
variations in calories and ash content, and not otherwise. In this case, the parties did not fix
in their letters-agreement, any method or mode of determining the terms of payment of the
balance of the purchase price of the property amounting to P278,448.00.

It bears stressing that the respondents failed and refused to pay the balance of the
downpayment and of the purchase price of the property amounting to P278,448.00 despite
notice to them of the resumption by XEI of its selling operations. The respondents enjoyed
possession of the property without paying a centavo. On the other hand, XEI and OBM failed
and refused to transmit a contract of conditional sale to the respondents. The respondents
could have at least consigned the balance of the downpayment after notice of the
resumption of the selling operations of XEI and filed an action to compel XEI or OBM to
transmit to them the said contract; however, they failed to do so.
As a consequence, respondents and XEI (or OBM for that matter) failed to forge a perfected
contract to sell the two lots; hence, respondents have no cause of action for specific
performance against petitioner. Republic Act No. 6552 applies only to a perfected contract to
sell and not to a contract with no binding and enforceable effect.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47458 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 98 is ordered to dismiss the complaint. Costs against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
1. Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) sold to The Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM)some residential
lots in Xavierville subdivision. Nevertheless, XEI continued selling the residential lots in the
subdivision as agent of OBM.2. Carlos Manalo, Jr. proposed to XEI, through its President
Emerito Ramos(Ramos), that he will purchase two lots in the Xavierville subdivision and
offered as part of the downpayment the P34,887.66 Ramos owed him. XEI, through Ramos,
agreed.3. In a letter dated August 22, 1972 to Perla Manalo (Carlos’ wife), Ramos confirmed
the reservation of the lots. In the letter he also pegged the price of the lots at P348,060 with
a 20% down payment of the purchase price amounting to P69,612.00 (less the P34,887.66
owing from Ramos), payable as soon as XEI resumes its selling operations; the corresponding
Contract of Conditional Sale would then be signed on or before the same date. Perla Manalo
conformed to the letter agreement.4. Thereafter, the spouses constructed a house on the
property. The spouses were notified of XEI’s resumption of selling operations.
However, they did not pay the balance of the down payment because XEI failed to prepare a
contract of conditional sale and transmit the same to them. XEI also billed them for unpaid
interests which they also refused to pay. XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM.5.
Subsequently, Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM.
CBM requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-going construction on the property since it
(CBM) was the owner of the lot and she had no permission for such construction. Perla
informed them that her husband had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to purchase the
51
property. She promised to send CBM the documents. However, she failed to do so. Thus,
CBM filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the spouses. But later on, CBM moved to
withdraw its complaint because of the issues raised. In the meantime, CBM was renamed the
Boston Bank of the Philippines.6. Then, the spouses filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against the bank before the RTC. The spouses alleged that they
had always been ready and willing to pay the installments on the lots sold to them but no
contract was forthcoming. The spouses further alleged that upon their partial payment of the
down payment, they were entitled to the execution and delivery of a Deed of Absolute Sale
covering the subject lots. During the trial, the spouses adduced in evidence the separate
Contracts of Conditional Sale executed between XEI and 3 other buyers to prove that XEI
continued selling residential lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM after the latter had
acquired the said lots.
RTC :
The trial court ordered the petitioner (Boston Bank) to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of the spouses upon the payment of the spouses of the balance of the purchase price.
It ruled that under the August 22, 1972letter agreement of XEI and the spouses, the parties
had a "complete contract to sell" over the lots, and that they had already partially
consummated the same.
CA:
The Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of the RTC, but declared that the balance of the
purchase price of the property was payable in fixed amounts on a monthly basis for 120
months, based on the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in favor of other lot buyers.
Boston Bank filed a Motion for the Reconsideration of the decision alleging that there was no
perfected contract to sell the two lots, as there was no agreement between XEI and the
respondents on the manner of payment as well as the other terms and conditions of the sale.
Boston Bank also asserts that there is no factual basis for the CA ruling that the terms and
conditions relating to the payment of the balance of the purchase price of the property(as
agreed upon by XEI and other lot buyers in the same subdivision) were also applicable to the
contract entered into between the petitioner and the respondents. CA denied the MR.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the factual issues raised by the petitioner are proper
2.) Whether or not there was a perfected contract to sell the property
3.) Whether or not the CA correctly held that the terms of the deeds of conditional sale
executed by XEI in favor of the other lot buyers in the subdivision, which contained uniform

terms of 120 equal monthly installments, constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to give the
Manalo spouses the same mode and timeline of payment. (Evidence, Disputable
Presumptions, Habits and Customs Rule 130, Section 34)
HELD:
1.) YES. The rule is that before this Court, only legal issues may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari. The reason is that this Court is not a trier of facts, and is not to review
and calibrate the evidence on record. Moreover, the findings of facts of the trial court, as
affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court unless the case falls
under any of the following exceptions.
1. A careful examination of the factual backdrop of the case, as well as the antecedental
proceedings constrains us to hold that petitioner is not barred from asserting that XEI or
OBM, on one hand, and the respondents, on the other, failed to forge a perfected contract to
sell the subject lots.2.) NO. In a contract to sell property by installments, it is not enough that
the parties agree on the price as well as the amount of down payment. The parties must,
likewise, agree on the manner of payment of the balance of the purchase price and on the
other terms and conditions relative to the sale. Even if the buyer makes a down payment or
portion thereof, such payment cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the perfection of
any purchase and sale between the parties. A contract of sale is perfected at the moment
there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and the
price. The agreement as to the manner of payment goes into the price, such that a
disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price. We
have meticulously reviewed the records, including Ramos’ February 8, 1972 and August 22,
1972 letters to respondents and find that said parties confined themselves to agreeing on the
price of the property (P348,060.00), the 20% down payment of the purchase price
(P69,612.00), and credited respondents for the P34,887.00
(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
52
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. We have reviewed the records and
we find that, indeed, the ruling of the appellate court dismissing petitioner’s appeal is
contrary to law and is not supported by evidence.
Owing from Ramos as part of the 20% down payment. Based on these two letters, the
determination of the terms of payment of the P278,448.00 had yet to be agreed upon on or
before December 31, 1972, or even afterwards, when the parties sign the contract of
conditional sale. So long as an essential element entering into the proposed obligation of
either of the parties remains to be determined by an agreement which they are to make, the
contract is incomplete and unenforceable.
3.) NO. The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase
price of lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute
evidence that XEI also agreed to give the respondents the same mode and timeline of
payment. Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at
another time, although such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of
conduct or the intent of the parties. Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be
proved like any other facts. The offering party must establish the degree of specificity and
frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given
manner but rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature. The offering party must allege
and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit. The examples
offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must be numerous enough to base
on inference of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does not present the kind of
sufficiently similar circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion. In
determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key
criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. It is only when examples
offered to establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference of
systematic conduct that examples are admissible. Respondents failed to allege and prove
that, as a matter of business usage, habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the
right to pay the balance of the purchase price in installments of 120 months of fixed amounts
with pre-computed interests, and that XEI and the respondents had intended to adopt such
 53

terms of payment relative to the sale of the two lots in question. Indeed, respondents
adduced in evidence the three contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot
buyers merely to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision as sales agent of
OBM after it acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct on the part of
XEI to require all lot buyers in the subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase price of said
lots in 120 months.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 116305 July 2, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ENDRIQUITO REYNALDO alias QUITO, defendant-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated October 29, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo. Sixth Judicial Region 25 in Criminal Case No. 31084 finding accused Endriquito
Reynaldo alias "Quito" guilty of the crime of Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to indemnify the complainant Anacyl Barrera in the sum of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and to pay costs. 1
2
On the basis of a complaint dated May 29, 1987 filed by the victim Anacyl Barrera, an
Information dated October 23, 1987, 3 was filed against accused-appellant, as follows:
That on or about May 28, 1987, in the Municipality of Miagao, Iloilo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
the use of a knife and by means of force and intimidation did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge
with Anacyl Barrera, a girl 16 years of age, against her will and/or consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 4
The trial court summarized the testimony of sixteen-year old Anacyl Barrera as follows:
She knows the accused, Endriquito Reynaldo already before May 28, 1987, as the wife of her
uncle is the sister of the wife of the accused. Accused had been living in Barangay Bambana,
Miag-ao, Iloilo, for a long time already. She knows the accused for about 7 years before May
28, 1987.
On the evening of May 28, 1987, she was inside their house at Barangay Bambanan, Miag-ao,
Iloilo. She was together with her two brothers, eleven and eight years old, and a nine year
old sister. She was then fifteen years old going sixteen.
54
At about 10:30 that evening, while her brothers and her sister were already asleep, she was
awakened because a knife was pointed at her. They were then sleeping at the sala of the
house. Aside from the knife pointed at her, she felt her breast being mashed. While the knife
was being pointed at her and her breast being mashed, she was told that if she makes any
noise or if she told anybody they would all be killed including her aunt. She recognized the
person to be the accused, Endriquito Reynaldo, as she was familiar with his voice and his two
hands which were hairy. After having mashed her breast, still pointing the knife at her, he
dragged her to their room and ordered her to take off her clothes. He was pointing the knife
at the right side of her body somewhere on the right waistline. When she was inside the
bedroom and was ordered to take off her clothes, she was very much frightened and did not
seem to know what to do. She was lying down when she was told to take off her clothes.
Then the accused laid on top of her while pointing the knife at her. He was then naked. While
he was on top of her he inserted his penis inside her vagina. She lost track of what was
happening and she become unconscious. When she regained her consciousness the accused
was gone. She noticed a whitish and sticky substance at the side of her vagina. She felt her
body aching including her breast, stomach and vagina. She went to sleep after that. The
following morning she washed her clothes, took a bath and cleaned the house.
At about 12:00 o'clock while they were having lunch, her aunt Josefina Nobleza, who was
looking after them since their parents were in Manila came over. She was crying and her aunt
asked her what it was about and she told her aunt about what happened to her and the
person responsible for it, naming the accused, Endriquito Reynaldo. After she informed her
aunt about it, her aunt went to the Police that May 29, 1987, while she went to her
grandmother's place as she had a very bad headache from her failure to sleep the night
before. Her aunt returned from the Poblacion with policemen and arrested the accused who
was living with her sister a house away. The accused was brought to town while she was
brought to the hospital for medical examination and later brought home.
She filed a complaint in connection with the said incident against the accused in the
Municipality of Miag-ao specifically with the Municipal Court (Exh. "A" and "A-1"). She gave a
written statement when investigated (Exh. "B" and "B-1" and Exh. "B-2").
Three days after the incident her parents from Manila arrived as they were notified. She told
them of the incident and informed them that it was the accused who raped her. She was
examined at the Guimbal General Hospital, Gimbal, Iloilo.
On cross-examination, complainant testified that the accused is single as it is the wife of
Bernardo Mondana who is the sister of the wife of her uncle. Their house at Barangay
Bambanan is one story, a one-room bamboo and nipa house surrounded by a bamboo pole.
Before they went to sleep that night she inspected all the doors and windows and they were
locked and they slept on the sala with her brothers and sisters. She was on the outer-most
portion near the door, also near her brothers and sisters. They were under a mosquito net.
She was able to identify the accused because she touched his hand and his face when she
was told to take off her clothes. The room where she was brought was very near the place
where they slept and she did not resist because the accused was constantly pointing the

knife about a foot long at her. She was inside the room when she was required to take off her
clothes without resistance as the four of them would be killed.
He laid on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina which was able to penetrate
her. She felt pain in her vagina at the inner part and she lost consciousness because of pain.
When she regained consciousness accused was seated by the side telling her not to tell
anybody or else he would kill all four of them. The following morning she felt the pains on
the inner part of her thighs and on both sides of her vagina. She, her sister sad two brothers
were the only occupants of the house. Her aunt Josefina Nobleza looked after them who
usually comes in the morning. On that morning of May 29, 1987 she came over but she
stayed for a short time only. She did not inform her aunt of what happened to her that
morning neither her brothers and sister. Her aunt came back about lunch time because her
brother informed her aunt about it. Her aunt changed clothes and went to the Poblacion. She
later came back with four policemen who went around the house to find out the damaged
portion. Her aunt informed them of the identity of the rapist to be the accused, Endriquito
Reynaldo, so that the accused was arrested because she had already told the policemen
when she went to the Poblacion. She was investigated by the Policemen and confirmed the
statement of her aunt that it was Endriquito Reynaldo who raped her. 5
Dr. Alberto G. Gatusang conducted the physical examination of the complainant on May 29,
1987 and made the following findings:
Internal Examination
= No laceration or hematomas noted at the vaginal opening.
= Presence of whitish discharge at the vaginal canal.
= Admits 1 finger inside the vaginal canal with resistance.
REMARKS: Vaginal smear for presence of sperm =
(-) negative findings. 6
Dr. Gatusang testified in court that the fact that the vagina of the victim bore no lacerations
or hematomas did not discount the possibility of the rape having occurred. The whitish
discharge found on the victim's vaginal canal may either be semen or the victim's natural
discharge. The fact that the victim complained of pain and her vaginal canal offered
resistance when a finger was inserted into it could mean that there was partial or full
penetration of the labia minora. 7 Dr. Gatusang further testified that the absence of sperm in
the victim's vaginal canal may be due to the victim's having cleaned herself after the incident
or the possibility that ejaculation happened outside the vaginal canal. 8
55
Appellant denied having committed the crime and interposed the defense of alibi. He alleged
that at the time of the incident, he was with a certain Rogelio Norada at the latter's house in
Barangay Kirayan, and slept there for the night, leaving only the following morning to peddle
fish in Barangay Tikdalan. 9 He arrived at his house at two o'clock in the afternoon, where he
was later arrested by policemen bearing a warrant. 10
The defense also presented Rogelio Norada to corroborate appellant's alibi.
In a Decision dated October 29, 1991, the trial court convicted appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, ENDRIQUITO REYNALDO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape defined and punished under Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided for by law. Accused is hereby
ordered to indemnify the complainant Anacyl Barrera the sum of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) and to pay costs. Accused is credited in full of the
period while undergoing preventive imprisonment provided he agrees in writing to
conform with prison regulations regarding convicted prisoners laid down by prison
authorities. 11
In the instant appeal, appellant contends that:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE IDENTITY OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 12
Appellant points to alleged contradictions in the testimony of the complainant regarding her
identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Appellant asserts that while
the complainant testified on direct examination and cross-examination that she was able to
identify her attacker by his voice and seeing his hairy arms as well as the beard on his face,
on further cross-examination, the complainant testified that she was able to recognize her
assailant as she touched his hand and his face.
Complainant testified on direct examination as follows:
Q Because you were awakened at that time, did you recognize the man?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was that man?
A Enriquito Reynaldo. 13
 56

Q You said Endriquito Reynaldo. The one whom you identified a fe(w) moments ago? Q And, that is your only identification of the rapist?

A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir, and because there was a light I was able to see him." (Emphasis supplied.) 15

Q Can you again point to where he is inside the courtroom? On further cross-examination, the complainant testified, thus;

A (Witness pointing again to the same person inside the Courtroom who upon being asked Q And, were you able to identify that the accused was the one who pointed that knife?
identify [sic] himself as Enriquito Reynaldo.)
A Because he told me to take off my clothes at the same time pointing the knife at me. I was
Q Because that was already ten o'clock in the evening, can you tell the Court how were you able to recognize him because I touched his hand and his face.
able to identify him?
Q And that was the only identity you make that the accused was the one who executed the
A Through his voice. act?

Q You are familiar with his voice? A Yes, sir. (Emphasis supplied.) 16

A Yes, sir.
Q Aside from his voice, (by) what other means were you able to identify him?
A Through his two hands which were hairy. (Emphasis supplied.) 14
On cross-examination, the complainant made the same identification as follows:
We agree with the Solicitor General that the alleged contradictions in the testimony of the
complainant pointed to by appellant are "more imaginary than real" 17 and do not detract
from the credibility and trustworthiness of the complainant's positive identification of
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. As discussed by the Solicitor General:
. . . The testimony of private complainant as to how she was able to identify appellant on that
fateful evening of May 28, 1987 must be taken according to the particular stage or sequence
of the incident to which it relates.

Q And you testified that on May 28, 1987 at around 10:30 in the evening, somebody
When private complainant claimed on direct examination that she was able to identify
awakened you and pointed a knife at you?
appellant through his voice and hairy hands, she was referring to the initial stage of the
incident when she was awakened because of the knife that was pointed at her body by
A Yes, sir. somebody whom she was able to recognize at that time through his voice and hairy hands
(TSN, December 2, 1988, pp. 5-6).
Q Because of that, you did not shout?
Her testimony on cross-examination that she was able to recognize appellant only because
A I did not shout because a knife was pointed at me. she was able to recognize appellant only because she was already asked by appellant to
remove her clothes with the knife pointed at her (pp. 9-10, TSN, Ibid.). On the other hand,
Q And, you were able to identify the rapist by his beard in the face? her testimony that she was able to see appellant because of the light is uncertain as to the
particular stage of the incident to which it pertains.

A Yes, sir, and because of his voice also.

But even assuming that there were some contradictions in the manner by which private
complainant had been able to recognize appellant, they do not detract from her positive
Q And, likewise, because of his hairy arms? identification of appellant as the person who raped her since they all point to the fact that
private complainant was able to recognize the person who raped her that fateful evening. 18
A Yes, sir.

Appellant further faults the identification made by the victim on the ground that the victim's
basis of identifying her attacker is the fact that she touched the latter's hairy hand and
bearded face. 19
It is not necessary that the witness's knowledge of the fact to which he testifies should have
been obtained in any particular manner, and he may testify to what he hears, feels, tastes,
smells, or sees. 20
Thus, identification by the sound of the voice of the person identified has been held
sufficient, and it is an acceptable means of identification where it is established that the
witness and the accused had known each other personally and closely for a number of years.
21 Here, the complainant testified that she had known appellant for seven years prior to the
incident because he lived only a house away from theirs. 22 Appellant himself admitted
having known the complainant by name in the three to four years that he had stayed in
Barangay Bambanan. 23 As observed by the trial court, the complainant and appellant "were
familiar with each other since they lived together in the same barangay [and] . . . the house
of the complainant is barely ten armslength away from the house where the accused lived."
24 Indeed, people in rural communities generally know each other both by face and by name,
25 and may be expected to know each other's distinct and particular features and
characteristics.
We have consistently held that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness
stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate
magistrates, can weigh the testimony of a witness in the light of his demeanor, conduct and
attitude as he testified, and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate
between the true and the false. 26 In the instant case, the trial court considered the
testimony of the complainant, the sole witness to the crime, as worthy of faith thus:
The Court has meticulously examined and scrutinized the testimonial
evidence presented as well as the observations of the demeanor of the
complainant and the accused while they were giving their testimony in
Court. The testimony of the complainant was straightforward, natural
and candid which are earmarks of truth. It leaves not a scintilla of doubt
regarding the veracity of her statements. It was clear, logical and
conclusive. 27
We find no reason to disturb such conclusion. Indeed, it is highly inconceivable that a young
barrio lass like the complainant, who is inexperienced with the ways of the world, would
fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination of her private parts, subject
herself to public trial and tarnish her family's honor and reputation unless she was motivated
by a potent desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her. 28 Furthermore, as
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the spontaneity of the complainant's reactions
subsequent to the crime — she had unflinchingly named and pointed out appellant, then
roaming in the vicinity of her house, as the offender, when her aunt asked her why she was
crying at around noon of the day following the incident 29 — as well as the failure of
57
appellant to impute upon her an improper motive to accuse him of the crime bolster her
credibility. 30
In the Light of the victim's positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime,
appellant's defense of alibi must fail. We note besides that the defense failed to prove
physical impossibility of appellant being at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. Defense witness Rogelio Norada testified that Barangay Kirayan Norte where
appellant claimed he was at the night of May 28, 1987, was a mere ten kilometers away 31
from Barangay Bambanan, and access between the two barangays was easy with transport
such as jeepneys, trucks, tricycles and even trisicads. 32
The trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape. Article 335 (1) of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines provides that carnal
knowledge of a woman may be committed when force or intimidation is used. The act of
holding a knife by itself is strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and
threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring a woman to submission. 33
The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not necessarily negate the
commission of rape. 34 Neither is the existence of lacerations on the victim's sexual organ
indispensable. 35 What is essential is that there be penetration of the sexual organ no matter
how slight. 36
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, when the crime of rape is committed with the
use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court
having found neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attendant to the commission
of the crime, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. 37 And in conformity with
jurisprudence, the civil indemnity to be awarded to the offended party shall be increased to
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). 38
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 29, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Sixth
Judicial Region, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 31084 finding appellant Endriquito Reynaldo
alias "Quito" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape is hereby AFFIRMED, with
the sole modification that the civil indemnity awarded the victim, Anacyl Barrera, is increased
to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 88539 October 26, 1993
KUE CUISON, doing business under the firm name and style"KUE CUISON PAPER SUPPLY,"
petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, VALIANT INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES, respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This petition for review assails the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals ordering
petitioner to pay private respondent, among others, the sum of P297,482.30 with interest.
Said decision reversed the appealed decision of the trial court rendered in favor of petitioner.
The case involves an action for a sum of money filed by respondent against petitioner
anchored on the following antecedent facts:
Petitioner Kue Cuison is a sole proprietorship engaged in the purchase and sale of newsprint,
bond paper and scrap, with places of business at Baesa, Quezon City, and Sto. Cristo,
Binondo, Manila. Private respondent Valiant Investment Associates, on the other hand, is a
partnership duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with business
address at Kalookan City.
From December 4, 1979 to February 15, 1980, private respondent delivered various kinds of
paper products amounting to P297,487.30 to a certain Lilian Tan of LT Trading. The deliveries
were made by respondent pursuant to orders allegedly placed by Tiu Huy Tiac who was then
employed in the Binondo office of petitioner. It was likewise pursuant to Tiac's instructions
that the merchandise was delivered to Lilian Tan. Upon delivery, Lilian Tan paid for the
merchandise by issuing several checks payable to cash at the specific request of Tiu Huy Tiac.
In turn, Tiac issued nine (9) postdated checks to private respondent as payment for the paper
products. Unfortunately, sad checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank.
Thereafter, private respondent made several demands upon petitioner to pay for the
merchandise in question, claiming that Tiu Huy Tiac was duly authorized by petitioner as the
manager of his Binondo office, to enter into the questioned transactions with private
respondent and Lilian Tan. Petitioner denied any involvement in the transaction entered into
by Tiu Huy Tiac and refused to pay private respondent the amount corresponding to the
selling price of the subject merchandise.
Left with no recourse, private respondent filed an action against petitioner for the collection
of P297,487.30 representing the price of the merchandise. After due hearing, the trial court
dismissed the complaint against petitioner for lack of merit. On appeal, however, the
58
decision of the trial court was modified, but was in effect reversed by the Court of Appeals,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellant
Kue Cuison is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Valiant Investment
Associates the sum of P297,487.30 with 12% interest from the filing of the
complaint until the amount is fully paid, plus the sum of 7% of the total amount
due as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs. In all other respects, the decision
appealed from is affirmed. (Rollo, p. 55)
In this petition, petitioner contends that:
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING TIU HUY TIAC AGENT OF DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT CONTRARY TO THE UNDISPUTED/ESTABLISHED FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT LIABLE FOR
AN OBLIGATION UNDISPUTEDLY BELONGING TO TIU HUY TIAC.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE WELL-FOUNDED DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT, (Rollo, p, 19)
The issue here is really quite simple — whether or not Tiu Huy Tiac possessed the required
authority from petitioner sufficient to hold the latter liable for the disputed transaction.
This petition ought to have been denied outright, forin the final analysis, it raises a factual
issue. It is elementary that in petitions for review under Rule 45, this Court only passes upon
questions of law. An exception thereto occurs where the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are at variance with the trial court, in which case the Court reviews the evidence in
order to arrive at the correct findings based on the records.
As to the merits of the case, it is a well-established rule that one who clothes another with
apparent authority as his agent and holds him out to the public as such cannot be permitted
to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of innocent third
parties dealing with such person in good faith and in the honest belief that he is what he
appears to be (Macke, et al, v. Camps, 7 Phil. 553 (1907]; Philippine National Bank. v Court of
Appeals, 94 SCRA 357 [1979]). From the facts and the evidence on record, there is no doubt
that this rule obtains. The petition must therefore fail.
It is evident from the records that by his own acts and admission, petitioner held out Tiu Huy
Tiac to the public as the manager of his store in Sto. Cristo, Binondo, Manila. More
particularly, petitioner explicitly introduced Tiu Huy Tiac to Bernardino Villanueva,
respondent's manager, as his (petitioner's) branch manager as testified to by Bernardino
Villanueva. Secondly, Lilian Tan, who has been doing business with petitioner for quite a

while, also testified that she knew Tiu Huy Tiac to be the manager of petitioner's Sto. Cristo,
Binondo branch. This general perception of Tiu Huy Tiac as the manager of petitioner's Sto.
Cristo store is even made manifest by the fact that Tiu Huy Tiac is known in the community to
be the "kinakapatid" (godbrother) of petitioner. In fact, even petitioner admitted his close
relationship with Tiu Huy Tiac when he said that they are "like brothers" (Rollo, p. 54). There
was thus no reason for anybody especially those transacting business with petitioner to even
doubt the authority of Tiu Huy Tiac as his manager in the Sto. Cristo Binondo branch.
In a futile attempt to discredit Villanueva, petitioner alleges that the former's testimony is
clearly self-serving inasmuch as Villanueva worked for private respondent as its manager.
We disagree, The argument that Villanueva's testimony is self-serving and therefore
inadmissible on the lame excuse of his employment with private respondent utterly
misconstrues the nature of "'self-serving evidence" and the specific ground for its exclusion.
As pointed out by this Court in Co v. Court of Appeals et, al., (99 SCRA 321 [1980]):
Self-serving evidence is evidence made by a party out of court at one time; it does
not include a party's testimony as a witness in court. It is excluded on the same
ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack of opportunity for cross-
examination by the adverse party, and on the consideration that its admission
would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. On theother hand, a
party's testimony in court is sworn and affords the other party the opportunity for
cross-examination (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner cites Villanueva's failure, despite his commitment to do so on cross-examination,
to produce the very first invoice of the transaction between petitioner and private
respondent as another ground to discredit Villanueva's testimony. Such failure, proves that
Villanueva was not only bluffing when he pretended that he can produce the invoice, but
that Villanueva was likewise prevaricating when he insisted that such prior transactions
actually took place. Petitioner is mistaken. In fact, it was petitioner's counsel himself who
withdrew the reservation to have Villanueva produce the document in court. As aptly
observed by the Court of Appeals in its decision:
. . . However, during the hearing on March 3, 1981, Villanueva failed to present the
document adverted to because defendant-appellant's counsel withdrew his
reservation to have the former (Villanueva) produce the document or invoice, thus
prompting plaintiff-appellant to rest its case that same day (t.s.n., pp. 39-40, Sess.
of March 3, 1981). Now, defendant-appellant assails the credibility of Villanueva for
having allegedly failed to produce even one single document to show that plaintiff-
appellant have had transactions before, when in fact said failure of Villanueva to
produce said document is a direct off-shoot of the action of defendant-appellant's
counsel who withdrew his reservation for the production of the document or
invoice and which led plaintiff-appellant to rest its case that very day. (Rollo, p.52)
59
In the same manner, petitioner assails the credibility of Lilian Tan by alleging that Tan was
part of an intricate plot to defraud him. However, petitioner failed to substantiate or prove
that the subject transaction was designed to defraud him. Ironically, it was even the
testimony of petitioner's daughter and assistant manager Imelda Kue Cuison which
confirmed the credibility of Tan as a witness. On the witness stand, Imelda testified that she
knew for a fact that prior to the transaction in question, Tan regularly transacted business
with her father (petitioner herein), thereby corroborating Tan's testimony to the same effect.
As correctly found by the respondent court, there was no logical explanation for Tan to
impute liability upon petitioner. Rather, the testimony of Imelda Kue Cuison only served to
add credence to Tan's testimony as regards the transaction, the liability for which petitioner
wishes to be absolved.
But of even greater weight than any of these testimonies, is petitioner's categorical
admission on the witness stand that Tiu Huy Tiac was the manager of his store in Sto. Cristo,
Binondo, to wit:
Court:
Q And who was managing the store in Sto. Cristo?
A At first it was Mr. Ang, then later Mr. Tiu Huy Tiac but I cannot remember the exact year.
Q So, Mr. Tiu Huy Tiac took over the management,.
A Not that was because every afternoon, I was there, sir.
Q But in the morning, who takes charge?
A Tiu Huy Tiac takes charge of management and if there (sic) orders for newsprint or bond
papers they are always referred to the compound in Baesa, sir. (t.s.n., p. 16, Session of
January 20, 1981, CA decision, Rollo, p. 50, emphasis supplied).
Such admission, spontaneous no doubt, and standing alone, is sufficient to negate all the
denials made by petitioner regarding the capacity of Tiu Huy Tiac to enter into the
transaction in question. Furthermore, consistent with and as an obvious indication of the fact
that Tiu Huy Tiac was the manager of the Sto. Cristo branch, three (3) months after Tiu Huy
Tiac left petitioner's employ, petitioner even sent, communications to its customers notifying
them that Tiu Huy Tiac is no longer connected with petitioner's business. Such undertaking
spoke unmistakenly of Tiu Huy Tiac's valuable position as petitioner's manager than any
uttered disclaimer. More than anything else, this act taken together with the declaration of
petitioner in open court amount to admissions under Rule 130 Section 22 of the Rules of
Court, to wit : "The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given
in evidence against him." For well-settled is the rule that "a man's acts, conduct, and
declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is

fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. If a
man's extrajudicial admissions are admissible against him, there seems to be no reason why
his admissions made in open court, under oath, should not be accepted against him." (U.S.
vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583 [1912];).
Moreover, petitioner's unexplained delay in disowning the transactions entered into by Tiu
Huy Tiac despite several attempts made by respondent to collect the amount from him,
proved all the more that petitioner was aware of the questioned commission was
tantamount to an admission by silence under Rule 130 Section 23 of the Rules of Court, thus:
"Any act or declaration made in the presence of and within the observation of a party who
does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or
comment if not true, may be given in evidence against him."
All of these point to the fact that at the time of the transaction Tiu Huy Tiac was admittedly
the manager of petitioner's store in Sto. Cristo, Binondo. Consequently, the transaction in
question as well as the concomitant obligation is valid and binding upon petitioner.
By his representations, petitioner is now estopped from disclaiming liability for the
transaction entered by Tiu Huy Tiac on his behalf. It matters not whether the representations
are intentional or merely negligent so long as innocent, third persons relied upon such
representations in good faith and for value As held in the case of Manila Remnant Co. Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, (191 SCRA 622 [1990]):
More in point, we find that by the principle of estoppel, Manila Remnant is deemed to have
allowed its agent to act as though it had plenary powers. Article 1911 of the Civil Code
provides:
"Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal issolidarily liable
with the agent if the former allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers."
(Emphasis supplied).
The above-quoted article is new. It is intended to protect the rights of innocent persons. In
such a situation, both the principal and the agent may be considered as joint tortfeasors
whose liability is joint and solidary.
Authority by estoppel has arisen in the instant case because by its negligence, the principal,
Manila Remnant, has permitted its agent, A.U. Valencia and Co., to exercise powers not
granted to it. That the principal might not have had actual knowledge of theagent's misdeed
is of no moment.
Tiu Huy Tiac, therefore, by petitioner's own representations and manifestations, became an
agent of petitioner by estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon
the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon (Article 1431, Civil Code of the Philippines). A party cannot be allowed to go back on
60
his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who, in good faith,
relied upon them (Philippine National Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 189 SCRA
680 [1990]).
Taken in this light,. petitioner is liable for the transaction entered into by Tiu Huy Tiac on his
behalf. Thus, even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable
with the agent if the former allowed the latter to fact as though he had full powers (Article
1911 Civil Code), as in the case at bar.
Finally, although it may appear that Tiu Huy Tiac defrauded his principal (petitioner) in not
turning over the proceeds of the transaction to the latter, such fact cannot in any way relieve
nor exonerate petitioner of his liability to private respondent. For it is an equitable maxim
that as between two innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be
done should be the one to bear the resulting loss (Francisco vs. Government Service
Insurance System, 7 SCRA 577 [1963]).
Inasmuch as the fundamental issue of the capacity or incapacity of the purported agent Tiu
Huy Tiac, has already been resolved, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the other
peripheral issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition in hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Kue Cuison is a sole proprietorship engaged in the purchase and sale of newsprint, bond
paper and scrap.
Valiant Investment Associates delivered various kinds of paper products to a certain Tan. The
deliveries were made by Valiant pursuant to orders allegedly placed by Tiac who was then
employed in the Binondo office of petitioner. Upon delivery, Tan paid for the merchandise by
issuing several checks payable to cash at the specific request of Tiac. In turn, Tiac issued nine
(9) postdated checks to Valiant as payment for the paper products. Unfortunately, sad checks
were later dishonored by the drawee bank.
Thereafter, Valiant made several demands upon petitioner to pay for the merchandise in
question, claiming that Tiac was duly authorized by petitioner as the manager of his Binondo
office, to enter into the questioned transactions with Valiant and Tan. Petitioner denied any
involvement in the transaction entered into by Tiac and refused to pay Valiant.
 61

Left with no recourse, private respondent filed an action against petitioner for the collection
of sum of money representing the price of the merchandise. After due hearing, the trial court
dismissed the complaint against petitioner for lack of merit. On appeal, however, the
decision of the trial court was modified, but was in effect reversed by the CA. CA ordered
petitioner to pay Valiant with the sum plus interest, AF and costs.
ISSUE: WON Tiac possessed the required authority from petitioner sufficient to hold the
latter liable for the disputed transaction
HELD:
YES. As to the merits of the case, it is a well-established rule that one who clothes another
with apparent authority as his agent and holds him out to the public as such cannot be
permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the prejudice of
innocent third parties dealing with such person in good faith and in the honest belief that he
is what he appears to be It matters not whether the representations are intentional or
merely negligent so long as innocent, third persons relied upon such representations in good
faith and for value. Article 1911 of the Civil Code provides:
Tiac, therefore, by petitioner’s own representations and manifestations, became an agent of
petitioner by estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon
(Article 1431, Civil Code of the Philippines). A party cannot be allowed to go back on his own
acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who, in good faith, relied upon
them. Taken in this light,. petitioner is liable for the transaction entered into by Tiac on his
behalf. Thus, even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable
with the agent if the former allowed the latter to fact as though he had full powers (Article
1911 Civil Code), as in the case at bar.
Finally, although it may appear that Tiac defrauded his principal (petitioner) in not turning
over the proceeds of the transaction to the latter, such fact cannot in any way relieve nor
exonerate petitioner of his liability to private respondent. For it is an equitable maxim that as
between two innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done
should be the one to bear the resulting loss.

“Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable with the
agent if the former allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers.”

The above-quoted article is new. It is intended to protect the rights of innocent persons. In
such a situation, both the principal and the agent may be considered as joint tortfeasors
whose liability is joint and solidary.

It is evident from the records that by his own acts and admission, petitioner held out Tiac to
the public as the manager of his store in Binondo. More particularly, petitioner explicitly
introduced to Villanueva, Valiant’s manager, as his (petitioner’s) branch manager as testified
to by Villanueva. Secondly, Tan, who has been doing business with petitioner for quite a
while, also testified that she knew Tiac to be the manager of the Binondo branch. Even
petitioner admitted his close relationship with Tiu Huy Tiac when he said that they are “like
brothers” There was thus no reason for anybody especially those transacting business with
petitioner to even doubt the authority of Tiac as his manager in the Binondo branch.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 155080 February 5, 2004
SOLEDAD CALICDAN, represented by her guardian GUADALUPE CASTILLO, petitioner
vs.
SILVERiO CENDAÑA, substituted by his legal heir CELSA CENDAÑA-ALARAS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the April 4, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67266,1 which set aside the November 12, 1996 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 in Civil Case No. D-10270.2
The instant controversy involves a 760 square meter parcel of unregistered land located in
Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The land was formerly owned by Sixto Calicdan, who died
intestate on November 4, 1941. He was survived by his wife, Fermina, and three children,
namely, petitioner Soledad, Jose and Benigno, all surnamed Calicdan.3
On August 25, 1947, Fermina executed a deed of donation inter vivos whereby she conveyed
the land to respondent Silverio Cendaña,4 who immediately entered into possession of the
land, built a fence around the land and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon
sometime in 1949, where he resided until his death in 1998.5
On June 29, 1992, petitioner, through her legal guardian Guadalupe Castillo, filed a complaint
for "Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages" against the respondent, alleging that
the donation was void; that respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the
land; and that she merely tolerated respondent’s possession of the land as well as the
construction of his house thereon.6
In his "Answer with Motion to Dismiss", respondent alleged, by way of affirmative defenses,
that the land was donated to him by Fermina in 1947; and that he had been publicly,
peacefully, continuously, and adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45 years.
Moreover, he argued that the complaint was barred by prior judgment in the special
proceedings for the "Inventory of Properties of Incompetent Soledad Calicdan", where the
court decreed the exclusion of the land from the inventory of properties of the petitioner. 7
On November 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:
62
1. Ordering defendant Silverio Cendaña to vacate the land in question and
surrender ownership and possession of the same to plaintiff; and
2. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P20,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P10,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees and other litigation
expenses, plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal by the respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and
declared that the donation was valid. Furthermore, it held that petitioner lost her ownership
of the property by prescription.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following issues:
(1) whether or not the donation inter vivos is valid; and
(2) whether or not petitioner lost ownership of the land by prescription.
As a rule, our jurisdiction in cases brought from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review
and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. This is because its
findings of fact are deemed conclusive and we are not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all
over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.9
The rule, however, admits of the following exceptions:
(1) when the findings are grounded on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(4) when the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are conflicting;
(5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, has gone beyond the issues of
the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the appellate court is premised on a misapprehension of
facts or when it has failed to consider certain relevant facts which, if properly taken
into account, will justify a different conclusion;

(7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
upon which they are based; and
(8) when findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record.10
In the case at bar, the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are
conflicting; thus, we are constrained to review the findings of facts.
The trial court found the donation of the land void because Fermina was not the owner
thereof, considering that it was inherited by Sixto from his parents. Thus, the land was not
part of the conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan, because under the
Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable when Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a
right of usufruct only over the estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently, respondent,
who derived his rights from Fermina, only acquired the right of usufruct as it was the only
right which the latter could convey.
After a review of the evidence on record, we find that the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the
donation was valid was not supported by convincing proof. Respondent himself admitted
during the cross examination that he had no personal knowledge of whether Sixto Calicdan in
fact purchased the subject land from Felomino Bautista. Pertinent portions of his testimony
read:
Q. And Sixto Calicdan inherited this property from his parents?
A. No, sir.
Q. What do you mean by no?
A. To my knowledge and information, Sixto Calicdan bought the property from his
cousin, I think Flaviano or Felomino Bautista.
Q. So, in other words, you have no personal knowledge about how Sixto Calicdan
acquired this property?
A. I think it was by purchase.
Q. According to information, so you have no actual personal knowledge how Sixto
Calicadan acquired this property?
A. Yes, because when the property was bought by my uncle, I was not yet born, so
information only.
63
Q. So when you were born, you came to know already that Sixto Calicdan is the
owner of this property?
A. Yes, thru the son of Felomino Bautista who is now, I think, in Baguio.
Q. You have not seen any document to show that Sixto Calicdan purchased the
property from one Felomino Bautista?
A. None, sir.11
In People v. Guittap,12 we held that:
Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own
perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as
"evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others." The
hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told
him, whether orally or in writing. In Sanvicente v. People, we held that when evidence is
based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight
for being patently hearsay. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is
inadmissible as evidence.
The Court of Appeals thus erred in ruling based on respondent’s bare hearsay testimony as
evidence of the donation made by Fermina.
Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, we find that respondent has become the
rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable
property. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by
law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten
years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property
are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years without need
of title or of good faith.13
The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom
he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.14 For
purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession
of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership
or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.15

Assuming arguendo that ordinary acquisitive prescription is unavailing in the case at bar as it
demands that the possession be "in good faith and with just title," 16 and there is no evidence
on record to prove respondent’s "good faith", nevertheless, his adverse possession of the
land for more than 45 years aptly shows that he has met the requirements for extraordinary
acquisitive prescription to set in.
The records show that the subject land is an unregistered land. When the petitioner filed the
instant case on June 29, 1992, respondent was in possession of the land for 45 years counted
from the time of the donation in 1947. This is more than the required 30 years of
uninterrupted adverse possession without just title and good faith. Such possession was
public, adverse and in the concept of an owner. Respondent fenced the land and built his
house in 1949, with the help of Guadalupe’s father as his contractor. His act of cultivating
and reaping the fruits of the land was manifest and visible to all. He declared the land for
taxation purposes and religiously paid the realty taxes thereon.17 Together with his actual
possession of the land, these tax declarations constitute strong evidence of ownership of the
land occupied by him. As we said in the case of Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano
Santiago:18
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one’s
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Moreover, the deed of donation inter vivos, albeit void for having been executed by one who
was not the owner of the property donated, may still be used to show the exclusive and
adverse character of respondent’s possession. Thus, in Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. Court
of Appeals,19 we held:
Even assuming that the donation propter nuptias is void for failure to comply with formal
requisites, it could still constitute a legal basis for adverse possession. With clear and
convincing evidence of possession, a private document of donation may serve as basis for a
claim of ownership. In Pensader v. Pensader we ruled that while the verbal donation under
which the defendant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lands in
question is not effective as a transfer of title, still it is a circumstance which may explain the
adverse and exclusive character of the possession. (Underscoring ours)
In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. D-10270 before
the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44, and declared respondent the rightful
owner of the subject property, not on the basis of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, which is
hereby declared void, but on extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
64
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 4, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 67266, which ordered the dismissal of Civil
Case No. D-10270 before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
FACTS:
The land in question was formerly owned by Sixto Calicdan, who died intestate and was
survived by his wife, Fermina, and three children, namely, petitioner Soledad, Jose and
Benigno, all surnamed Calicdan.
Fermina executed a deed of donation inter vivos whereby she conveyed the land to
respondent Silverio Cendaña, who immediately entered into possession of the land, built a
fence around the land and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon, where he
resided until his death.
Petitioner, through her legal guardian Guadalupe Castillo, filed a complaint for “Recovery of
Ownership, Possession and Damages” against the respondent, alleging that the donation was
void; that respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the land; and that
she merely tolerated respondent’s possession of the land as well as the construction of his
house thereon.
Respondent alleged, by way of affirmative defenses, that the land was donated to him by
Fermina; and that he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in possession
of the land for a period of 45 years.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. On Appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision holding that
the donation was valid.
ISSUE: Whether the donation in favor of respondent was valid?
HELD:
NO. As correctly held by the the trial court, the donation of the land was void because
Fermina was not the owner thereof, considering that it was inherited by Sixto from his
parents. Thus, the land was not part of the conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and
Fermina Calicdan, because under the Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable when Sixto died
in 1941, the surviving spouse had a right of usufruct only over the estate of the deceased
spouse.
However, notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, the Court found that respondent
has become the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
 65

THIRD DIVISION with a gun fire two more times at the fallen man. She boarded a jeep after the last two shots
were fired. While boarding, she heard someone say binaril na ni Jojo si Palencia.
[G.R. No. 127573. May 12, 1999]
On February 5, 1996, she went to the branch office of P.L.D.T. in Malabon to pay for the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE SILVESTRE y CRUZ, accused- telephone bill of her employer. While there, she overheard that no one was willing to testify
appellant. about the shooting. She informed one of the employees that she was a witness to the
incident, and was brought to the manager who asked her to testify as one of the witnesses in
DECISION
the case. On the same day, she was accompanied by a certain Jun, an employee of the
P.L.D.T., to the police station to give her statement.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
At the police station, she identified the only person presented to her for purposes of
identification as the assailant. She was later informed that this person was Jojo Bungo. In
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon, Branch court, Torres also identified the accused Jojo Bungo, whose real name is Jose Silvestre, as the
72, dated August 7, 1996, finding the accusedappellant Jose Silvestre y Cruz alias Jojo Bungo assailant.[5]
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 16579-MN.
The parties dispensed with the presentation of Dr. Alberto Bondoc by making admissions
The accused, Jose Silvestre y Cruz alias Jojo Bungo, was charged with the crime of murder in concerning the manner and nature of his testimony, to wit:
an information[2] that reads:
1. that he is duly qualified and competent as a physician and medico-legal officer who had
That on or about the 18th day of January, 1996, in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro conducted an autopsy examination;
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
2. that he conducted the actual autopsy on the cadaver of the victim in this case by the name
accused, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation while armed with
of Luisito Palencia to be marked as Exhibit B;
a gun, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one LUISITO PALENCIA y
TOBIAS hitting him four (4) times on the different parts of his body, as a consequence said
3. that in the course of the autopsy examination the witness prepared a sketch of the human
LUISITO PALENCIA y TOBIAS, sustained injuries which directly caused his death.
body showing the locations and number of gunshot wounds sustained by the victim marked
as Exhibit C;
On April 24, 1996, accused-appellant was arraigned whereupon he entered a plea of not
guilty to the crime charged.[3]
4. that in the course of its examination he extracted a slug embedded on the said victim
which cannot be traced to any gun because there was no ballistic examination; and,
The prosecution presented three witnesses: the victims widow, Marina Palencia; an
eyewitness to the shooting, Felicitas Torres; and the arresting officer, SPO2 Benjamin
5. that the final report containing the findings and conclusions particularly with respect to
Querubin.
the fact and cause of death was prepared, thereby dispensing with the actual presentation of
Dr. Bondoc as a prosecution witness.[6]
Marina Palencia testified that she was the widow of the victim, Luisito Palencia; that they
have three children: Harry, 18; Regine, 16; and Carmille, 11; and that when he was alive, he
The prosecutions last witness was SPO2 Benjamin Querubin who testified that on February 5,
was employed as an installer and repairman of P.L.D.T. earning P14,877.00 a month. As a
1996, Jojo Bungo was arrested outside his residence at Bagong Bantay, Quezon City after a
consequence of the death of her husband, she had incurred actual expenses in the amount of
six-hour stakeout. At the time of arrest, a .38 snub nose paltik revolver was recovered from
P66,500.00.[4] Felicitas Torres testified that on 11:45 a.m. of January 18, 1996, she bought
Silvestre after he was frisked. He also identified Jojo Bungo in court.
bread from the Concepcion Bakery in Malabon, Metro Manila. While waiting for a ride in
front of the said bakery, she observed a man and a woman talking with each other. She then
heard two shots fired. When she turned her head, she saw a man on the ground face down
and beside him, a man holding a gun. She sought cover for a short while, then saw the man

On cross-examination, Querubin testified that there was a witness who gave her statement
regarding the crime committed on January 18, 1996 but that she did not cooperate and even
failed to subscribe to her statement.[7]
The defense presented SPO2 Angelito Balacaa, the investigating officer, who testified[8] that
he was the officer who took the statement of Felicitas Torres. On cross-examination, he
stated that there was no line-up made when Torres identified the accused because when
Torres statement was taken, she readily mentioned the name of the suspect. When he
presented the suspect to Felicitas, the latter identified him as the one who shot Luisito
Palencia.
The defense next called SPO1 Crizaldo Castillo who did not appear despite his being
subpoenaed. Castillo was supposed to testify on a statement made by a certain Bernadette
Matias, a witness to the shooting, who was not presented at the trial. His testimony was
dispensed with when the prosecution admitted the existence and the contents of her written
statement after the Court persuaded both parties to stipulate on his testimony.[9]
The defense rested its case and made its offer of evidence as follows:
I will no longer present the accused. I am offering Exh. 1, 1-A and 1-A-1 a statement taken by
SPO1 Castillo immediately after the incident took the statement of witness Bernadette
Matias on 18 of January, 1996 at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon and in that affidavit statement
the witness stated that the suspect that she does know the name of the suspect and he is 55
between 120 to 130 ang bigat and kulot ang mabuhok, maiksi ang buhok, brushed up,
likewise Exh. 1-A-1 the word kayumanggi on Question No. 7 answer of the witness is to prove
the person whom the eyewitness saw who shot the victim was a kayumanggi likewise
offering this affidavit as part of his testimony of the witness.[10]
The prosecution objected to the purpose for which the exhibit was offered since the affidavit
was not presented for identification; and the Court admitted it only as proof of its existence
and contents.
On August 7, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose
Silvestre y Cruz @ Jojo Bungo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
he is hereby accordingly sentenced to the prison term of reclusion perpetua.
Accused Silvestre is also ordered to pay Mrs. Marina Palencia, the following amounts: (1)
P66,500.00 for the actual expenses spent in connection with the death and burial of Luisito;
66
(2) P50,000.00 for the loss of Luisitos life; (3) P100,000.00 by way of moral damages for the
pain and anguish suffered by the victims family due to the untimely death of Luisito and an
additional amount equivalent to three (3) years salary computed at the rate of P14,877.00 a
month corresponding to Luisitos monthly salary by way of lost income.
Costs against accused Silvestre.
SO ORDERED.
Malabon, Metro Manila, August 7, 1996.[11]
Hence, this appeal where accused assigns the following errors:
I. THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED WAS NOT ESTABLISHED BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OR PROSECUTION EVIDENCE HAS NOT OVER-COME ACCUSED CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED WHEN IT CONVICTED THE ACCUSED SOLELY BASED ON THE
LONE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTIONS PRINCIPAL WITNESS WHO IS NOT CREDIBLE AND
POSITIVE.
III. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN TREATING JUDICIAL ADMISSION OF THE PARTIES
AS HEARSAY IN CHARACTER.
IV. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AND TREACHERY
FOR WANT OF EVIDENCE.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SENTENCING ACCUSED OF A PRISON TERM OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA.
VI. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING PAYMENT OF ACTUAL, MORAL DAMAGES, LOST
OF INCOME ABSENCE OF PROOF IN SUPPORT THEREOF OR FORMALLY OFFERED IN
EVIDENCE.[12]
The accused-appellant argues that the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt on the basis of the lone testimony of Felicitas Torres. According to the
accused-appellant, Torres testified that she did not actually witness the accused shooting the
victim because she merely heard two shots fired and sought cover for a short while, and
hence it was doubtful whether she saw the man with a gun shooting at the fallen man two
more times. As it was a startling or frightful experience for a woman, it was not probable that
she was brave enough to witness the shooting which was merely five arms length away from
her; and that the prosecution witness merely speculated on the identity of the perpetrator
from what she heard i.e., binaril na ni Jojo si Palencia.[13]
 67

Moreover, accused-appellant claims that there was an inconsistency between the sworn pertains to a trivial matter as there was no inconsistency with respect to the fact of the
statement of Torres and her testimony in Court. In her sworn statement, she had stated that shooting.
xxx nakita ko ang isang lalaki na natumba at isa pang lalaki na nakatayo sa harapan noong
natumba xxx[14] while in her direct testimony, she testified that: xxx I saw a man slumped The appellee also argues that there is no law requiring a police line-up as a requisite for
head face down xxx besides that man slumped on the ground a man with a gun.[15] He also proper identification. Moreover, accused was not entitled to have counsel present at the
avers that the identification made by Torres was not positive and was a suggested time he was identified since he was not subjected to any investigation or interrogation.[17]
identification since no police line-up was conducted when she identified him at the police
As regards the affidavit of Bernadette Matias, the same is hearsay as she was not presented
station.[16]
as witness. Finally, the appellee contends that the presence of treachery as shown by the
In addition, appellant argues that the lower court erred in treating the statement of sudden and unexpected assault upon the defenseless victim qualified the crime to murder.
Bernadette Matias as hearsay despite the fact that the prosecution admitted the existence
The first issue to be resolved is whether Felicitas Torres, the lone witness to the killing was a
and contents of her statement. He claims that he vigorously tried to secure subpoenas ad
credible witness. We have carefully gone over the records and find nothing in her account of
testificandum for the witnesses, Bernadette Matias and SPO1 Crizaldo Castillo but the trial
the events that shows that her testimony suffers from incredibility. Felicitas Torres testified
court opted instead to have the parties stipulate on their testimonies. It is alleged that the
as follows:
trial courts insistence that the parties stipulate on Matias declaration led him to believe that
it was not necessary to present her to testify under oath as the contents thereof were
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY FISCAL ACUA:
already admitted.
Q. Now, at 11:45 in the morning of January 18, 1996, do you remember where you were?
Lastly, the accused-appellant contends that the lower court erred in appreciating the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, and in the absence of these A. I was then near Concepcion Bakery.
circumstances, the crime is not murder but simple homicide. He finally argues that the lower
court erred in awarding actual and moral damages despite the absence of proof of the Q. Will you please tell us in what municipality is this Concepcion Bakery located?
factual basis therefor, and despite the absence of a formal offer of evidence.
A. Malabon, Metro Manila.
The appellee, on the other hand, posits that the guilt of the accused has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Q. Now, what were you doing at that time?

First, Felicitas Torres positively identified the accused as the man who shot Luisito Palencia as A. Buying bread, sir.
she had witnessed the shooting in broad daylight, while she was merely five (5) arms length
Q. Were you able to buy bread?
away from the accused.
A. Yes, sir.
Second, Felicitas testimony is consistent with the findings of the autopsy report which shows
that the victim sustained four (4) gunshot wounds. Q. After buying bread what did you do, if any?

Third, the defense did not show any improper motive on the part of Torres to falsely impute A. I waited for a tricycle to go home.
the murder against the appellant. It was not shown that she knew the victims family nor the
accused prior to the incident. Q. And you said you were waiting for a tricycle in going home when you said going home you
are referring to Hulo, Malabon?
Fourth, as regards the alleged contradictory statements of Felicitas, the prosecution argues
that from the viewpoint of a stunned witness, the appellant could well be standing beside or A. Yes, sir.
in front of the victim. Assuming her statements were in fact inconsistent, such inconsistency
 68

Q. While you were waiting what happened while you were waiting for a ride? A. Witness pointing to the person, step down and approached the person whom she pointed
to and when asked to stand and asked his name, he answered Jose Silvestre.
A. I noticed something, sir.
Q. Now, after firing two more shots at the man whom you saw pasubsob, what then did the
Q. What was that you noticed? accused do if any?

A. I noticed a man and a woman talking with each other. A. I do not know anymore because I boarded a jeep after he fired the last two shots.

Q. How far were you more or less from this man and woman who was conversing with each Q. Now, while you were boarding that vehicle that you take home did you hear anything on
other? that occasion?

A. More or less five arms length. A. There was a commotion and then I heard binaril na ni Jojo si Palencia.

Q. Now, what happened after that, if any? Q. When did you come to know the complete name of Palencia?

A. I heard two shots then I turned my head. A. When I went to PLDT office.

Q. Now, when you turned your head after hearing two shots, what did you see if any? Q. When was that?

A. And then I saw a man slumped head face down. A. February 5, 1996.

Q. What else did you see? Q. Do you recall what happened when you went to the PLDT before that which place of PLDT
did you go on February 5?
A. Then I saw besides that man slumped on the ground a man with a gun.
A. Malabon office, sir.
Q. What then did you do if any after that?
Q. Now, do you remember what happened when you went at PLDT branch in Malabon?
A. I sought cover for a short while.
A. I heard that no one wanted to testify for Palencia.
Q. What happened after seeking cover?
Q. From whom did you hear this?
A. Then I saw that man with a gun shot the man two times more.
A. From the PLDT personnel.
Q. Now who was this man whom you saw fired twice more the man who was slumped face
down. Q. So, what then did you do, if any?

A. I do not know him personally but I recognized him. A. I approached one of them.

Q. Now, if you see this man were you be able to identify him? Q. For what purpose did you approach this PLDT employee?

A. Yes, sir. A. I told him about the killing incident that I witnessed.

Q. Now, look around and point him to us if he is inside the Court room?

Q. What did this PLDT employee do, if any?
A. He brought me to the office of PLDT at the second floor.
Q. What happened at the second floor of PLDT office at Malabon?
A. I said I will testify.
Q. What then happened after that?
A. The complainant was called as she is a resident of Bulacan.
Q. Now, did the complainant arrive?
A. In the afternoon, sir.
Q. Now, after the arrival, by the way, who was that person who arrived?
A. Mrs. Palencia, sir.
Q. After Mrs. Palencia arrived what happened, if any?
A. The PLDT employee told her that I will be the one to testify in their favor.
Q. After that what happened?
A. Then after that we proceeded to the Malabon police station.
Q. What happened at the headquarters of Malabon?
A. My statement was taken down.[18]
Felicitas Torres categorically stated that she saw the accused Jose Silvestre whom she
identified in Court, shoot at the fallen man two times after hearing two gunshots. While she
did not see the accused-appellant actually fire the first two shots, she turned her head upon
hearing the two gunshots and saw a man slumped on the ground and a man with a gun
beside him. After seeking cover for a short while, she saw the man with the gun shoot the
fallen man two more times moments after the first two shots were fired. This leads to no
other logical conclusion than that the accused-appellant was the one who fired them.[19]
Her testimony is corroborated by the autopsy report[20] prepared by Dr. Alberto Bondoc, the
findings of which are:
FINDINGS:
69
1 Abrasions/Contusions: forehead, left.
2 Lacerated Wound: eyebrow, left, 22 mm.
3 Stabbed Wounds:
3.1 angle of mandible, left, 9 mm., directed superiorly, posteriorly and medially.
3.2 back, level of L2, PVL, left, 11 mm., directed anteriorly, superiorly and slightly laterally,
non-penetrating.
4 Gunshot Wounds:
4.1 POE: back, level of L2, PVL, right, 8 x 10 mm., directed anteriorly, superiorly and medially,
puncturing the right lobe of the liver from inferior to superior, puncturing the diaphragm,
and lacerating the heart from the posterior wall of the right ventricle to the anterior wall of
the left atrium, and puncturing the anterior chest wall;
POX: none. A metallic slug, 9 x 18 mm. was recovered from the subcutaneous tissues of the
anterior chest wall, along the 2nd ICS, MCL, left.
4.2 POE: nape, level of C5, right, 8 x 8 mm., directed anteriorly, inferiorly and slightly
medially, fracturing T1;
POX: none. The slug embedded within the spinal canal.
4.3 POE: abdomen, AAL, just above the anterior iliac spine, right, 10 x 12 mm., directed
posteriorly, inferiorly and medially;
POX: none. The slug was embedded deep within the muscle tissues of the right thigh.
4.4 POE: abdomen, MAL, just above the iliac crest, left, 10 x 12 mm., directed posteriorly,
inferiorly and medially;
POX: none. The slug was embedded deep within the muscle tissues of the left thigh.
5. Hemopericardium, massive.
6. Hemoperitoneum, moderate.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Hemorrhagic Shock due to Multiple
Gunshot Wounds, Back and Nape.
 70

The autopsy report shows that the victim sustained four (4) gunshot wounds. This tallies with S: Siya nga ho ang nakita kong bumaril kay Tito Palencia. (Affiant pointing to the suspect Jojo
the testimony of Torres whose account of the events reveals that a total of four shots was Bungo whose real identity is JOSE SILVESTRE Y CRUZ, 40 yrs. old, married, jobless, and res at
fired. 240 C. Arellano St., Baritan, Malabon, Metro-Manila.)

This Court has ruled on countless occasions that the trial court is in the best position to While on cross-examination, Torres testified that:
determine facts and to assess the credibility of witnesses as it is in a unique position to
observe the witnesses deportment while testifying which opportunity the appellate court is Q. Now when you were already at the police station of Malabon with the employee of PLDT
denied on appeal; this Court will respect the findings and conclusions of the trial court in the name of Jun whom did you talk to?
provided that they are supported by substantial evidence on record.[21] We find no cogent
A. Jun asked them who is the investigator because I was going to give a statement.
reason to disturb the trial courts appreciation of the evidence and find no basis in the record
to rule that Felicitas Torres testimony was not credible.
Q. Then where were you when Jun asked about the investigator?
With regard to appellants argument that there was an inconsistency between Torres sworn
A. I was at the lobby, sir.
statement and her testimony in court, we agree with appellee that the alleged inconsistency
pertains to a trivial matter. While she stated in her sworn statement that the accused was in Q. You were left by Jun at the lobby of the police station?
front of (sa harapan) the victim she thereafter testified that the gunman was beside the
victim. This statement refers only to how the accused stood in relation to the victim and is A. Yes, sir.
not sufficient to weaken her positive assertion that she saw the accused shoot the victim two
times after hearing two shots previously fired. This Court has repeatedly ruled that Q. And Jun went somewhere else inside the police station.
inconsistencies between the sworn statements and direct testimony given in open court do
A. Yes, sir.
not necessarily discredit the witness since affidavits are oftentimes incomplete and are
generally inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court.[22] Q. So, at the time Jojo the alleged assailant was not still around?

In addition, the appellant has failed to show any improper motive on the part of Torres to A. Yes, sir.
falsely impute such a terrible crime to him. Torres did not know either the appellant or the
victim prior to the shooting on January 18, 1996.[23] The testimony of a single witness, when Q. When Jun the police investigator came out they were already or Jun was already with
credible and trustworthy, is sufficient to convict[24] and must be given full faith and them?
credence when no reason to falsely testify is shown.[25]
A. I gave the statement first.
As regards the lack of a police line-up when Torres identified Jose Silvestre as the assailant,
we agree with appellee that there is no law which requires a police line-up as essential to a Q. Now, while you are giving your statement to the police investigator who was with you?
proper identification provided that the identification was not suggested to the witness by the
police.[26] In the present case, there is no showing that the identification made by Torres in A. No one because I was told to enter the room alone.
the police station was suggested to her. In her sworn statement,[27] Torres stated that:
COURT:
Question # 22.
Q. Now Jojo Bungo was eventually presented to you, is that not correct?
T: Inihaharap ko ngayon sa iyo ang taong ito, ano ang masasabi mo sa kanya? (This
A. Yes, sir.
investigator confronting affiant with the suspect who is presently under detention at the
Malabon Municipal Jail.) Q. Did you point him the assailant face to face?
 71

A. Yes, sir. WITNESS:

Q. And what was his reaction as being pointed to you as the assailant? A. No, because I saw him when he shot the victim.

A Nothing. ATTY. SIRUELO:

Q. Did he not deny the accusation against him?
A. He did not, sir.
ATTY. SIRUELO:
Q. Now, when he was presented for your identification he was alone?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you were told that this was Jojo Bungo?
Yes, sir.[28]
There is nothing in the testimony of Torres nor in her sworn statement that would show that
the police suggested that the suspect to be presented to her was Jojo Bungo. The police
merely asked what she could say about the person presented to her, and she spontaneously
answered that he was the one who shot Luisito Palencia. She was only informed that the
person presented was Jojo Bungo after she had already pointed him out. She could not have
been mistaken in her identification of the gunman as she was only five arms length away
from them when the shooting occurred. During her cross-examination, she explained how
she was able to see the face of the gunman as follows:
Q. xxx when you arrived there at the headquarters you were already confronted with the
suspect Jojo?
Q. You testified that during those dates that you saw the assailant at the actual place of
incident thru his back only, is that not correct?
FISCAL ACUA:
That is misleading.
COURT:
Let us put this way.
Q. On direct examination you said you saw a person who turned out to be Jojo Bungo
shooting at the victim who was already lying on the ground face down. On direct
examination you said that when you again saw the assailant Jojo for the first time his back
was turned to you. Now, the question is: how then did you see his face or recognize him as
you claim?
A. Because he was turning his head from side to side.[29]
Appellant also argues that the court a quo erred in treating the judicial admission of the
statement of Bernadette Matias made by the prosecution as hearsay. The records show that
the prosecution only admitted the existence and contents of the supposed statement made
by Bernadette Matias as shown by the following excerpt from the transcript:
Atty. Siruelo:

A. Yes, sir. My next witness is SPO1 Crizaldo Castillo he was subpoenaed, Your Honor.

Q. And that was only the first time that you saw his face? Court:

FISCAL ACUA: Can we not have stipulation or admissions concerning the testimony of Castillo as
corroborative only of that of Balacaa?
Misleading.
Atty.:
COURT:
No, Your Honor, very material on our defense on the conflicting testimony of the witness.
Witness may answer.
Court:

Do you have a copy thereof?
Atty.:
I am referring to the witness, Bernadette Matias. I have a statement of the other witness.
Court:
Then show it to the Fiscal and probably the Fiscal can admit it.
Fiscal:
The reason why we did not present the witness because she was afraid in fact that was
sworn to.
Court:
The existence and contents you can admit it Fiscal?
Fiscal:
Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
So we can dispense with the testimony of Castillo.[30]
The appellees admission only referred to the fact that the statement was made by Matias. In
People vs. Gaddi,[31] it was ruled that when testimony is presented to establish not the truth
but the tenor of the statement or the fact that the statement was made, it is not hearsay.[32]
The lower court was therefore correct in admitting only the existence and contents and not
the truth or veracity of the unsworn statement of Matias as an independently relevant
statement[33] This statement cannot be used to establish the veracity of it; it would be
hearsay as Matias was not presented in Court.
Appellant cannot fault the prosecution for the failure to present Bernadette Matias. The
prosecution has discretion to decide on who to call as witness during trial and its failure to do
so did not give rise to the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced[34] since the evidence was at the disposal of both parties.[35] If the defense
believed that the testimony of Bernadette Matias was important to its case, it should have
insisted on presenting her as a witness, or as the appellee points out, made a tender of
excluded evidence of the witness in question under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of
72
Court. The same may be said of Joanna Santiago, another supposed witness to the shooting,
who was also not presented during trial.
The next issue to settle is whether treachery and evident premeditation can be appreciated
to qualify the crime into murder. In finding the presence of treachery and evident
premeditation, the court a quo ruled that:
A person being shot at while standing in a public place and talking to a woman must have
been shot with evident premeditation and treachery because he was unaware of the
impending attack which prevented him from putting up a defense that will repel the attack
that will also place the attacker under some sort of risk by reason of said defense. After
having fallen to the ground head first, said persons being shot two times more would have
been indicative of the treacherous plan to kill him.[36]
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to
insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.[37] For treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, two elements
must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution is deliberately or
consciously adopted.[38]
We find the evidence of the prosecution insufficient to prove treachery as a qualifying
circumstance. The fact that Torres saw the accused-appellant shoot the victim while he was
already on the ground does not mean that that was the only assault made by the accused-
appellant on the victim.[39] When Torres saw the accused-appellant shoot the victim, she
had already heard two shots fired. The autopsy report shows that the victim also sustained
two unexplained stab wounds. Given these facts, Torres cannot be considered as having
testified as to how the incident began since she saw the incident already in progress.[40]
Treachery cannot be considered when the witness did not see the commencement of the
assault.[41]
Moreover, treachery cannot be appreciated when no particulars are known with respect to
the manner by which the aggression was made or how the act began or developed[42] or
when the evidence lacks any details showing the manner of attack, its suddenness or
unexpectedness, the relative positions of the victim and his assailant, and the victims
defenselessness.[43]
Lastly, although the fatal wounds were found at the back of the victim, this does not, of itself,
compel a finding of treachery.[44] We disagree with the Regional Trial Courts ratiocination
that a person who, after falling to the ground head first, was shot two more times indicates
 73

the treacherous plan to kill him as it does not prove the suddenness of the attack which
prevented the victim from defending himself or retaliating. The conclusion is speculative and
based on a presumption not on the evidence. It is a basic precept that treachery must be
proven as indubitably as the killing itself and it cannot be deduced from mere presumption or
sheer speculation.[45]
The court a quo also appreciated evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance. For
evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be proved:
1.) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime;
2.) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and
3.) sufficient time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon
the consequences of his act.[46]
Neither are we convinced that evident premeditation was proven. The records are bereft of
evidence of any of the above requisites of evident premeditation. There is absolutely no
proof of the time the accused decided to commit the crime. There is no showing how the
accused, Jose Silvestre, planned the killing of the victim, Luisito Palencia. Neither is there any
showing of how much time elapsed before he executed his plan. Absent all these, evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated.[47]
Since both treachery and evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime
into murder, the accused-appellant can only be convicted of the crime of homicide.[48]
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. Since there are no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the present case,
the penalty that should be imposed on the accused-appellant is reclusion temporal in its
medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused-appellant is
sentenced to prision mayor, as the minimum, and reclusion temporal in its medium period,
as the maximum.[49]
such amount for expenses if they are supported by receipts.[50] In the absence thereof, no
award for actual damages can be granted.
We affirm the award of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of Luisitos life as this is in accord
with prevailing jurisprudence.[51] However, the award of moral damages must be reduced
from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00[52] as the purpose of this award is not to enrich the heirs of
the victim but to compensate them for the injuries to their feelings.[53]
We must also modify the award for loss of earning capacity. The absence of documentary
evidence to substantiate the widows claim for the loss will not preclude recovery for said
amount.[54] Marina Palencia testified that her deceased husband earned P14,877.00 per
month as a P.L.D.T. repairman and installer.[55] It was also established that at the time of his
death, the victim was forty-four (44) years old.[56] Loss of earning capacity is computed
based on the following formula:[57]
Net Earning Capacity (x) = life expectancy [2/3(80-age at death)] x Gross Annual Income (GAI)
- living expenses (50% of GAI) x = 2(80-44) 3x 178,524.00 -89,262.00 x = 24 x 89,262.00
Net Earning Capacity = P 2,142,288.00
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED, and the
accused-appellant is found GUILTY OF HOMICIDE and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.[58] Accused-appellant is further
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the following: (1). death indemnity P50,000.00, (2).
moral damages P50,000.00, (3). loss of earning capacity P2,142,288.00.
SO ORDERED.

The last issue to be resolved is whether the heirs of Luisito Palencia are entitled to actual and
moral damages and loss of income which would have been earned had it not been for the
victims untimely death.

We cannot sustain the award of P66,500.00 as actual damages in favor of the heirs of Luisito
Palencia. The records show that the prosecution failed to substantiate the bare assertion of
the widow, Marina Palencia, with other corroborative evidence. The Court can only grant
 74

EN BANC conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, we believe that the question propounded to
the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the
G.R. No. L-20986 August 14, 1965 understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to
show that the persons named really and actually conspired with Puesca and later took part in
the commission of the offense.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICENTE N. CUSI JR., Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Davao, On the other hand, the fact which the prosecuting officer intended to establish would seem
ARCADIO PUESCA alias Big Boy, WALTER APA, JOSE GUSTILO alias Peping, FILOMENO to be relevant to explain why the police force of the place where the offense was committed
MACALINAO, JR. alias White, RICARDO DAIRO alias Carding, and MAGNO MONTANO alias subsequently questioned and investigated the persons allegedly named by Puesca.
Edol, respondents.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the writ is granted. The writ of preliminary injunction issued
DIZON, J.: heretofore is hereby set aside.

In Criminal Case No. 6813 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Arcadio Puesca, Walter
Apa, Jose Gustilo, Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were charged
with robbery in band with homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty. During the trial, and
while Sgt. Lucio Bano of the Police Force of Digos, Davao was testifying as a prosecution
witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by the accused Arcadio Puesca,
he said that the latter, aside from admitting his participation in the commission of the
offense charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to to commit the offense,
mentioning the name of each and everyone of them. Following up this testimony, the
prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention in court the names of Puesca's alleged co-
conspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the
ground that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients were
concerned. The respondent judge resolved the objection directing the witness to answer the
question but without mentioning or giving the names of the accused who had interposed the
objection. In other words, the witness was allowed to answer the question and name his co-
conspirators except those who had raised the objection. The prosecuting officer's motion for
reconsideration of this ruling was denied. Hence the present petition for certiorari praying
that the abovementioned ruling of the respondent judge be declared erroneous and for a
further order directing said respondent judge to allow witness Bano to answer the question
in full.

The question involved herein is purely one of evidence. There is no question that hearsay
evidence, if timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while the testimony of a witness
regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts
asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing
the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or
the tenor of such statement (People vs. Lew Yon, 97 Cal. 224; VI Wigmore 177-8).

In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer, as manifested by him in the
discussions below, is nothing more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had
mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of those who conspired with him to commit the offense
charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or the answer to be given by Sgt. Bano
would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 146853 February 13, 2006
SALVADOR COMILANG, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO BURCENA and MARIANO BURCENA, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Decision1
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the dated October 16, 2000
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 53794 which affirmed in toto the Decision
dated March 28, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Narvacan, Ilocos Sur (RTC) and
the CA Resolution dated December 19, 2000 which denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On April 29, 1985, Francisco Burcena and Mariano Burcena (respondents), together with
their mother, Dominga Reclusado Vda. de Burcena (Dominga), filed a complaint for
annulment of document with damages against Salvador Comilang (petitioner). The complaint
alleges that: respondents are the owners of a 918-square meter parcel of land located in
Manueva, Santa, Ilocos Sur and the house with a floor area of 32 square meters built
thereon; respondents acquired the subject property through their earnings while working
abroad; the subject property was declared for taxation purposes in Dominga’s name as
administrator thereof; on or about March 12, 1984, petitioner caused the execution of a
Deed of Donation2 over said property by taking advantage of Dominga’s blindness, old age
and physical infirmity; the said Deed of Donation is null and void because: (a) Dominga had
no right to donate the same since she is not its owner, (b) Dominga did not give her consent
and was misled to the execution of such document, (c) granting Dominga had authority to
donate, the donation is void because the property donated is the only property declared in
her name and therefore she could not have reserved for herself in full ownership sufficient
property to support herself; petitioner is in possession of the subject property, depriving
respondents of its ownership and enjoyment of its fruits.3
In his Answer dated February 24, 1986, petitioner contends that: the Deed of Donation was
freely and voluntarily executed by Dominga in consideration of her love and affection for
him; the subject property was acquired by Dominga together with her two sisters, Aniceta
Reclusado and Juana Reclusado, long before respondents went to Hawaii; Dominga erected a
house on the land long before the outbreak of World War II; Dominga financed out of her
own money the construction of the house and subsequent improvements thereof, she being
a merchant when she could still travel to Cagayan Valley; granting that respondents had been
75
sending money to Dominga, said money already belonged to her; if Dominga used said
money for improving the house, respondents have no right over the house. 4
During the pendency of the case and before she could take the witness stand, Dominga
died.5 Following pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. Witnesses for the plaintiffs were
respondents and their aunt, Margarita Burcena (Margarita); while petitioner testified on his
own behalf.
On March 28, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondents, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered declaring the parcel of land and the improvement
therein consisting of the house mentioned and described under paragraph 3 of the
complaint, owned by the plaintiffs Francisco Burcena and Mariano Burcena, but declaring the
possession of the defendant in good faith and further:
a) That the Deed of Donation, Exhibit "1" and submarkings null and void;
b) That the defendant must vacate the property and turnover the same to the
plaintiffs.
c) Without pronouncement as to moral, actual and other forms of damages as well
as non-accounting of the produce from the property by virtue of the defendant’s
possession, thereof, as well as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC held that the donation is void because Dominga could not have validly disposed of
the subject property since it was bought with the money sent by respondents while working
abroad, although declared for taxation purposes in Dominga’s name.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. In its Decision dated October 16, 2000,
the CA found no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC, as well as the
latter’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses. The CA held that the case involves an
implied trust known as purchase price resulting trust under Article 1448 of the Civil Code
where property sold is granted to one party but the price is paid for by another; that the
evidence presented by the respondents convincingly show that the subject property was
bought with money belonging to respondents but declared in Dominga’s name as
administrator thereof; and that Dominga’s act of donating the property to petitioner was
beyond her authority and capacity, done without the consent of the real owners, herein
Respondents. Thus, the CA sustained the conclusion of the RTC that the donation is void.7

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration8 but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution
dated December 19, 2000.9
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following assigned
errors:
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred:
1. IN DECLARING IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION xxx THAT "xxx implied trust arises
over the subject property xxx"; xxx; AND/OR
2. IN DECIDING THE INSTANT CASE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND/OR
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT; AND/OR
3. IN MISAPPRECIATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH
GREATLY AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE OR REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NARVACAN, ILOCOS SUR, BRANCH 22.10
Petitioner assails the CA’s application of the principle of implied trust to nullify the Deed of
Donation executed in his favor. He asserts that the existence of an implied trust between
respondents and Dominga in relation to the subject property was never treated by the RTC
nor was it brought in issue on appeal before the CA. Petitioner further argues that
Margarita’s statement on the witness stand that Dominga told her that the respondents sent
her money to buy the subject property, should not have been given weight or credence by
the RTC and the CA because it is hearsay and has no probative value.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the CA has the judicial prerogative to rule on
matters not assigned as errors in an appeal if indispensable or necessary to the just
resolution of the case. As to Margarita’s testimony, respondents submit that it is not hearsay
since Margarita merely stated what Dominga said.
The petition is bereft of merit.1avvphil.net
Once a court acquires jurisdiction over a case, it has wide discretion to look upon matters
which, although not raised as an issue, would give life and meaning to the law. Indeed, the
Rules of Court recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to consider
errors not assigned. Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 8 Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein
will be considered, unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or
dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass
upon plain errors and clerical errors.
76
Thus, an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not
assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal
but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned
as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and
complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the
trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the
parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent.11
In this case, since the petitioner directly brought in issue on appeal in his Appellant’s Brief
the declaration of the RTC that Dominga could not have validly disposed of the subject
property because respondents are the real owners of the subject property since it was
bought with money sent by them, it was well-within the CA’s authority to review and
evaluate the propriety of such ruling. In holding that an implied trust exists between
respondents and Dominga in relation to the subject property and therefore Dominga had no
right to donate the same to petitioner, the CA merely clarified the RTC’s findings.
Article 1448 of the Civil Code on implied trust provides:
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to
one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of
the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However, if the
person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying
the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a
gift in favor of the child. (Emphasis supplied)
The trust created under the first sentence of Article 1448 is sometimes referred to as a
purchase money resulting trust, the elements of which are: (a) an actual payment of money,
property or services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable consideration; and (b) such
consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust.12
Respondents have shown that the two elements are present in the instant case. Dominga
was merely a trustee of the respondents in relation to the subject property. Therefore,
Dominga could not have validly donated the subject property to petitioner, as expressly
provided in Article 736 of the Civil Code, thus:
Art. 736. Guardians and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them.
Truly, nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him. 13
Anent Margarita’s testimony that Dominga told her that the respondents sent her (Dominga)
money to buy the subject property, it cannot be categorized as hearsay evidence. Margarita’s

testimony was not presented to prove the truth thereof, but only to establish the fact that
Dominga narrated to Margarita the source of the funds used in the purchase of the subject
property.14 What was sought to be admitted in evidence, and what was actually admitted in
evidence, was the fact that the statement was made by Dominga to Margarita, not
necessarily that the matters stated by her were true. The said utterance is in the nature of an
independently relevant statement which may be admitted in evidence as such, but not
necessarily to prove the truth thereof.15
Thus, while it is true that the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another
person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly
hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is
merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement.
Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when the fact that it has been made is
relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of
fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the
existence of such a fact.16 For this reason, the statement attributed to Dominga regarding the
source of the funds used to purchase the subject property related to the court by Margarita
is admissible if only to establish the fact that such statement was made and the tenor
thereof.
Besides, the testimony of Margarita is not the main basis for the RTC’s decision. In fact, her
testimony is not indispensable. It merely serves to corroborate the testimonies of the
respondents on the source of the funds used in purchasing the subject property. The
testimonies of all three witnesses for the plaintiffs were found to be convincing and credible
by the RTC. This Court will not alter the findings of the RTC on the credibility of witnesses,
principally because trial courts have vastly superior advantages in ascertaining the truth and
in detecting falsehood as they have the opportunity to observe the manner and demeanor of
witnesses while testifying.17
All told, the CA did not commit any reversible error in rendering the assailed Decision dated
October 16, 2000 and the Resolution dated December 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53794. The
factual determinations of the CA therein are binding and conclusive upon this Court as no
compelling reasons exist necessitating a re-examination or reversal of the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS
Respondents, together with their mother, Dominga, filed a complaint for
annulment of document with damages against petitioner. The complaint alleges that:
respondents are the owners of a parcel of land located in Ilocos Sur and the house built
thereon; respondents acquired the subject property through their earnings while working
77
abroad; the subject property was declared for taxation purposes in Dominga’s name as
administrator thereof; petitioner caused the execution of a Deed of Donation over said
property by taking advantage of Dominga’s blindness, old age and physical infirmity; the said
Deed of Donation is null and void because: (a) Dominga had no right to donate the same
since she is not its owner, (b) Dominga did not give her consent and was misled to the
execution of such document, (c) granting Dominga had authority to donate, the donation is
void because the property donated is the only property declared in her name and therefore
she could not have reserved for herself in full ownership sufficient property to support
herself; petitioner is in possession of the subject property, depriving respondents of its
ownership and enjoyment of its fruits.
ISSUE
Whether or not implied trust arise dove the subject property
RULING
In holding that an implied trust exists between respondents and Dominga in
relation to the subject property and therefore Dominga had no right to donate the same to
petitioner, the CA merely clarified the RTC’s findings.
Article 1448 of the Civil Code on implied trust provides:
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to
one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of
the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However, if the
person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying
the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a
gift in favor of the child.
The trust created under the first sentence of Article 1448 is sometimes referred to
as a purchase money resulting trust, the elements of which are: (a) an actual payment of
money, property or services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable consideration; and (b)
such consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting
trust. Respondents have shown that the two elements are present in the instant case.
Dominga was merely a trustee of the respondents in relation to the subject property.
Therefore, Dominga could not have validly donated the subject property to petitioner, as
expressly provided in Article 736 of the Civil Code, thus:
Art. 736. Guardians and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them.
Truly, nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 117487 December 12, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bar involves the imposition of the death penalty. With all our frailties, we are
asked to play the role of an infallible God by exercising the divine right to give or take away
life. We cannot err in the exercise of our judgment for our error will be irrevocable. Worse,
our error can result in the worst of crimes — murder by the judiciary.
The records reveal that appellant Arnel Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide 1 in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 12th day of June 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force, violence and intimidation to wit:
by then and there pinning down one KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA, a minor, four years of
age, choking her with his right hand, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with
her and as a result thereof she suffered asphyxia by strangulation fractured cervical
vertebra and lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings causing profuse
hemorrhages and other injuries which are necessarily fatal and which were the
direct cause of her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On June 29, 1994, appellant was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of
the PAO, Department of Justice. Appellant pleaded guilty.
After appellant's plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its evidence.
It also set the case for reception of evidence for the appellant, if he so desired. 2
The prosecution evidence shows that in the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla,
father of the four year old victim Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor with Ramil Rodriguez and
Remus Gaddi in his (Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Appellant
joined them but every now and then would take leave and return. Appellant was living in his
uncle's house some five (5) arm's length from Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m.,
Penecilla's group stopped drinking and left.
78
Luisa Rebada also lives in the Penecilla neighborhood, about one and a half (1-1/2) arm's
length from the house of appellant. At about 5:30 p.m. of that day, she saw the victim at the
window of appellant's house. She offered to buy her "yemas" but appellant closed the
window. Soon she heard the victim crying. She approached appellant's house and peeped
through an opening between its floor and door. The sight shocked her appellant was naked,
on top of the victim, his left hand choking her neck. She retreated to her house in fright. She
gathered her children together and informed her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, then in her
house, about what she saw. Lagrana was also overcome with fear and hastily left.
Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at 8 o'clock in the evening. He did not find Khazie
Mae. He and his wife searched for her until 1 o'clock in the morning. Their effort was
fruitless. Rebada was aware that the Penecillas were looking for their daughter but did not
tell them what she knew. Instead, Relada called out appellant from her window and asked
him the time Khazie Mae left his house. Appellant replied he was drunk and did not know.
As the sun started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went down from his house to
answer the call of nature. He discovered the lifeless body of Khazie Mae under his house. Her
parents were informed and so was the police. At 9:00 a.m., Rebada suffered a change of
heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife Julie Ann, that appellant committed the
crime. Forthwith, appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally
confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal
confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from
appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained
pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution.
The body of Khazie Mae was autopsied by Dr. Tito Doromal, a medico-legal officer. His
autopsy report reveals the following injuries sustained by the victim:
HEAD & NECK/THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:
1) Contusion , purple in color, 11 x 11.3 cm., in dia., from left and right anterior neck, down
to the medial portion of the left and right infraclavicular area.
2) Contusion, bluish purple, 5.5 x 6.3 cm., in dia., antero-lateral left chest wall.
3) Contusion, bluish in color, 3 in nos., 1, 0.5 & 1.1 cm., in dia., right antero- inferior chest
wall.
4) Contusion, purple in color, 4 x 3.2 cm., in dia., left sub-costal arch.
5) Contusion, purple in color, 4.5 x 5 cm., in dia., supero-lateral, left iliac crest.
ON OPENING THE SKULL 7 THORACO-ABDOMINAL CAVITIES:

a) Fractured, 2nd cervical vertebra.
b) Fractured, crecoid cartilage.
c) Both lungs, expanded with multiple petechial hemorrhages.
d) Other internal organs, congested.
EXTREMITIES:
1) Confluent abrasion, 3 x 2.6 cm., in dia., posterior aspect, lower 3rd, left forearm.
2) Old wound, 2 x 1.5 cm., in dia., posterior middle 3rd, left forearm.
3) Old wound, 1.5 x 1 cm., in dia., antero-lateral aspect, middle 3rd, right forearm.
VAGINAL FINDINGS/ANAL FINDINGS:
a) Lacerated wound, from the fourchette up to the dome of the rectum..
b) Hematoma, from the fourchette up to the rectum.
c) Lacerated wound, lateral wall of the vagina up to the level of the promontory of the
sacrum with a length of 8 centimeters.
d) A cylinder with a diameter of 2 cms., easily passes the vaginal and anal openings.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
A) ASPHYXIA BY STRANGULATION.
B) FRACTURED, 2nd CERVICAL VERTEBRA.
C) HEMORRHAGE, 2nd DEGREE TO LACERATED VAGINAL & RECTAL OPENINGS.
Appellant adopted the autopsy report of Dr. Doromal as his documentary evidence to prove
that the proximate cause of Khazie Mae's death was asphyxia by strangulation.
On July 20, 1994, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death, viz:
79
WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused, Arnel Alicando, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the Crime of Rape with Homicide
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
paragraphs 6 and 7 (No. 4) Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659. Arnel
Alicando is hereby sentenced to suffer a (sic) penalty of death and to
indemnify the heirs of the offended party, Khazie Mae D. Penecilla, the
sum of P50,000.00.
The death sentence shall be executed by putting the person under
sentence to death by electrocution (electric chair). As soon as facilities
are provided by the Bureau of Prisons, the method of carrying out his
sentence shall be changed by gas poisoning (sic).
Here ends Khazie Mae's quest for justice. Her tormentor must suffer for
the grievous offense he had committed. He deserves no mercy.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
The case is before us on automatic review considering the death penalty imposed by the trial
court. A new counsel, Atty. Joel Tiongco, took the cudgel for appellant. In his Brief, appellant
assails the decision of the trial court as a travesty of justice.
We find that the Decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to death is shot full of
errors, both substantive and procedural. The conviction is on an amalgam of inadmissible and
incredible evidence and supported by scoliotic logic.
First. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge failed to follow section
(1) (a) — of Rule 116 on arraignment. Said section provides:
Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. —
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information has
been filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be made in open court by the judge or
clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of
witnesses, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him and asking him whether
he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecutor may, however, call at the trial witnesses other
than those named in the complaint or information.
The reading of the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or
dialect known to him is a new requirement imposed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. It implements the constitutional right of an appellant ". . . to be
 80

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." 3 The new rule consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the
also responds to the reality that the Philippines is a country divided by dialects and precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
Pilipino as a national language is still in the process of evolution. 4 Judicial notice
can be taken of the fact that many Filipinos have limited understanding either of The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of
the Pilipino or English language, our official languages for purposes of conducting a "searching inquiry." In the hearing of June 28, 1994, the transcripts
communication and instruction. 5 The importance of reading the complaint or reveal the following: 8
information to the appellant in the language or dialect known to him cannot thus
be understated.
Note (After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty.)

In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was
Court Question (sic) of the court to the accused.
read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is
written in the English language. It is unbeknown whether the appellant knows the English
language. Neither is it known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any Q Considering that this is a crime and under the amended law is a heinous crime, because of
showing that the Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own your plea of guilty without the consent or even against the discretion of the court, the court
dialect before his plea of guilt. The scanty transcript during his arraignment, reads: 6 will give you a mandatory death penalty because of the crime charged, do you understand?

Prosecutor Edwin Fama — Appearing as public prosecutor Accused Yes, Your Honor.

Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera — For the accused, Your Honor. Ready for Q Did you enter a plea of guilty on your own voluntary will or without any force or
arraignment. intimidation from any one or whatever?

Interpreter — (Reading the information to the accused for arraignment Accused None, Your Honor.
and pre-trial.)
Q Are you sure?
Note: (After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads
guilty) Accused Yes, Your Honor.

One need not draw a picture to show that the arraignment of the appellant is a Q Or maybe because you were manhandled or maltreated by anyone and that will just be the
nullity. It violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional consideration for you to plead guilty?
right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law. 7 Accused No, Your Honor.
It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was
regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable
presumption. We cannot assume. We must be sure. Court Were you not manhandled, please let us see your body?

Second. The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void. The trial court Note (Accused raised his prison uniform or shirt and showed to the court his body from waist
violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said section up.)
provides:
Accused No, Your Honor.
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.—
Court You were not maltreated in the jail?
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the Accused No, Your Honor.

Court Please let us see whether you have bruises so that you will be examined by a physician
to the order of the court?
Accused No, Your Honor.
Court If you will plead guilty, that plea of guilty has no use because there will be a mandatory
death penalty, do you still insist on your plea of guilty?
Accused Yes, Your Honor.
Court If you plead guilty to the crime charged there will be some effects on your civil rights
hut not until the decision will be affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Accused Yes, Your Honor.
Note (See Order dated June 28, 1994 attached to the records of this case.)
In the next hearing on July 11, 1994, the following verbal exchange transpired, viz: 9
Fiscal Fama: Appearing as the public prosecutor, ready, Your Honor.
Our first witness is Dr. Tito Doromal, Your Honor.
Atty. Antiquiera: For the accused, Your Honor.
Court Before the court will proceed with the reception of evidence by the prosecution Arnel
Alicando, please come here. (at this juncture, Arnel Alicando, come near to the court)
The court is warning you again that this is reception of evidence by the prosecution after you
plead guilty to the crime charged at, do you understand?
A Yes.
Q Do you still affirm and confirm to your plea of guilty of rape with homicide?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you still insist that your plea of guilty is voluntary without force, intimidation or
whatsoever?
A Yes.
81
Q The court is warning you that after reception of evidence, the imposable penalty is
mandatory death?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Despite of that, you still insist on your plea of guilty?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Court Okey, proceed.
Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is not a new rule for it merely
incorporated the decision of this Court in People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 10 and reiterated in an
unbroken line of cases. 11 The bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt must be based
on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court must be
focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of
the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea. The records do not reveal any information
about the personality profile of the appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and
educational background of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial court. The questions
were framed in English yet there is no inkling that appellant has a nodding acquaintance of
English. It will be noted too that the trial court did not bother to explain to the appellant the
essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide.
A cursory examination of the questions of the trial court to establish the voluntariness of
appellant's plea of guilt will show their utter insufficiency. The trial court simply inquired if
appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was
arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was medically
examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late
body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone.
Regretfully, it even turned a blind eye on the following damning entry on the June 13, 1994
Record of Events of the Iloilo PNP (Exh. "M") showing that after his arrest, the appellant was
mobbed by inmates while in jail and had suffered hematoma, viz:
c-0262-94
INFORMATION
2:50 PM, — P02 Salvador Pastoloro, Jr., PNP assigned at 327th PNP MFC,
informed this office thru SPO1 W. Garcera alleging that at about 9:00 AM
this date when the suspect ARNEL ALICANDO Y BRIONES, 24 yrs. old,
residence of Rizal, Palapala Zone I, CP, been arrested and mobbed by the
 82

irrate residents of Zone II Rizal, Palapala, GP, in connection of the Rape Q Mr. Witness, when for the first time did you see Arnel Alicando?
with Homicide case wherein the victim KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA Y DRILON,
4 yrs, old, residence of same place who was discovered dead under the A June 13, 1994, when I arrested him.
house thereat. Suspect when turned over to this office and put on lock up
cell was also mobbed by the angry inmates thus causing upon him
Q Previous to that you have never seen him?
hematoma contusion on different parts of his body.

A Yes, sir.
Likewise, the trial court's effort to determine whether appellant had full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea is fatally flawed. It warned the appellant he would get the
mandatory death penalty without explaining the meaning of "mandatory" It did not inform Q When for the first time did you start investigating Arnel Alicando?
the appellant of the indemnity he has to pay for the death of the victim. It cautioned
appellant there ". . . will be some effects on your civil rights" without telling the appellant A After I finished investigating the body of the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla.
what those "effects" are and what "civil rights" of his are involved.
Q And that was also after you were informed that Arnel Alicando was a suspect in the raping
Appellant's plea of guilt is void and the trial court erred in using it to sentence him to death. of Khazie Mae Penecilla?
We stress that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses
cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. Section 3 of Rule 116 requires that after a free and A Yes, sir
intelligent plea of guilt, the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. This rule
modifies prior jurisprudence that a plea of guilt even in capital offenses is sufficient to sustain Atty. Antiquiera:
a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof. The change is salutary
for it enhances one of the goals of the criminal process which is to minimize erroneous Q And who was that person who informed you of the suspect?
conviction. We share the stance that "it is a fundamental value determination of our system
that it is far worse to convict an innocent person than let a guilty man go free. 12 A Luisa Rebada.

Third. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant, Q Mrs. Rebada who is the witness in this case?
were inadmissible, yet, were considered by the trial court in convicting the appellant.
A Yes, sir.
Thus, the trial court gave full faith and credit to the physical evidence presented by the
prosecution. To quote its Decision, 13 viz:
Q And you started investigating Arnel Alicando in the morning of June 13, 1994?

Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a
A Yes, sir.
pillow with bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused colored
white with bloodstains on its bottom. These physical evidence are evidence of the
highest order. They strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the Q How long did you interrogate Arnel Alicando in the morning of June 13, 1994?
victim was raped.
A I cannot remember the length of time I investigated him.
These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City
PNP as a result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime Q Did it take you the whole morning of June 13, 1994 in interrogating and investigating Arnel
without the benefit of counsel. PO3 Tan admitted under cross-examination, viz: 16 Alicando?

CROSS-EXAMINATION A Yes, sir.

BY ATTY. ANTIQUIERA:
Q And the investigation you conducted continued in the afternoon of the same date?
 83

A Yes, sir. A After the witness identified him.

Q The following day, June 14, 1994, you still investigated and interrogated Arnel Alicando. Q What constitutional rights did you inform Alicando of?

A Yes, sir.
Q And when did you stop, finally, investigating and interrogating Arnel Alicando?
A After I finished recovering all the exhibits in relation to this case.
A The right to remain silent, and right to get his lawyer and I have interpreted in Visayan
language.
Q And during your investigation for almost two (2) days the accused was never represented
by counsel, is that correct?

Q What date did you stop your investigation? A Yes, sir.

A June 14, 1994, when I finished recovering the white T-shirt and pair of earring. Atty. Antiquiera:

Atty. Antiquiera: Q Are you aware of the law that enjoins a public officer to inform the person of his
constitutional rights?
Q You testified in this case, Mr. Witness, you never informed the court that you apprised the
accused of his constitutional rights, is that correct? A Yes, sir.

A I apprised him. That is all, Your Honor.

Q My question is, during your testimony before this court under the direct examination of It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible
the prosecution you never informed the court that you apprised the accused of his evidence uncounselled confession or admission. Section 12 paragraphs (1) and (3)
constitutional rights? of Article III of the Constitution provides:

Pros. Fama: Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
I did not ask him that question. How will he answer?
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
Court:
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding
Sustained. section shall be inadmissible against him.

Atty. Antiquiera: In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all important
confession of the appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing showing that
Q When did you inform, the date when you informed Alicando of his Constitutional rights? appellant waived his right to silence and to have competent and independent counsel
despite the blatant violation of appellant's constitutional right, the trial court allowed his
A On June 13. uncounselled confession to flow into the records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to
death.

Q On what hour did you inform him?

It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also
evidence derived therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were
 84

evidence derived from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from the A Yes, sir.
appellant. Again, the testimony of PO3 Tan makes this all clear, viz: 17
Q In what particular place did you recover those things?
Q Did the accused Arnel Alicando accompany you to the place of the incident?
A Inside the room where he raped the child.
A Yes, sir.
Q Whose house is that?
Q When you arrived at the place of the incident what did you do?
A The house of Imelda Alicando.
A He pointed to the fish basin.
Q The wife of Romeo Alicando?
Q Can you identify this fish basin which you said pointed to you by Arnel Alicando?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q In what particular place is that situated?
Q Please point?
A Inside the room where the accused was sleeping at Rizal-Palapala.
A (Witness pointing to the fish basin already marked as Exhibit "H".)
Pros. Fama:
Q Did you ask the accused what he did with this fish basin?
Q You mean to say inside that room the victim was raped by the accused?
A I asked the accused what he did with the fish basin and he answered that he used the fish
basin to cover Khazie Mae Penecilla when she was already dead. A Yes, sir.

Pros. Fama: Q Can you point that pillow which you said you recovered inside the room of Imelda
Alicando?
Q You mean to say to conceal the crime?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q And the mat?
Q What else aside from this fish basin, what else did you recover?
A (Witness taking out from the fish basin the mat and pillow.)
A At around 7 o'clock in the evening he further pointed to us the old mat and the pillow
wherein he layed the victim Khazie Mae Penecilla Q Did you find something on the pillow?

Q You mean to say that you returned back to the scene of the incident that time? A The pillow have bloodstain in the middle.

A It was already night time and it was only Kagawad Rodolfo Ignacio, my companion, who . . This was already marked as Exhibit "J", Your Honor and the mat as Exhibit "I".
went to the place of the incident.
Q Aside from this what did you recover from the place of incident?
Q You mean to say you were verbally instructed by the accused?

A On June 14, 1994, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning the accused Arnel Alicando further
informed me that he kept the gold earring of the victim and her clothes inside the room of
the house of Imelda Alicando.
Q Where?
A I saw the clothes of Khazie Mae Penecilla inside the room where the rape took place
hanged on the clothes line. And I found the pair of earring at the bamboo post of the fence.
Court:
Q Where is that bamboo post of the fence situated?
A Around the fence of Imelda Alicando situated at the from gate on the right side.
Pros. Fama:
Q You mean to say you returned back on June 14, you recovered the items accompanied by
the accused?
A No more, I only followed his direction.
Q He made verbal direction to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you please show us the white t-shirt?
A (Witness taking out a white t-shirt from the fish basin.)
Q Please examine that white t-shirt?
A The t-shirt have a bloodstain.
We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We
have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the
poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated
case of Nardone v. United States. 18 According to this rule, once the primary source
(the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (the " fruit " ) derived from it is also inadmissible. 19 Stated otherwise,
illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit
85
of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence,
but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence
illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because
the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
20 We applied this exclusionary rule in the recent case of People vs. Salanga, et al.,
21 a ponencia of Mr. Justice Regalado. Salanga was the appellant in the rape and
killing of a 15-year old barrio lass. He was, however, illegally arrested. Soldiers took
him into custody. They gave him a body search which yielded a lady's underwear.
The underwear was later identified as that of the victim. We acquitted Salanga.
Among other reasons , we ruled that "the underwear allegedly taken from the
appellant is inadmissible in evidence, being a so-called "fruit of the poisonous tree."
22
But even assuming arguendo that the pillow and the t-shirt were admissible evidence, still,
the trial court erred in holding that they "strongly corroborated the testimony of Luisa
Rebada that the victim was raped." For one, there was no basis for the trial court to conclude
that the stains on the pillow and t-shirt were human bloodstains. The pillow and the t-shirt
were not examined by any expert. To hold that they were human bloodstains is guesswork.
For another, there was no testimony that the stains were caused by either the blood of the
appellant or the victim. In addition, there was no testimony that the t-shirt was the one worn
by the appellant when he allegedly committed the crime. It must also be noted that it is not
unnatural for appellant to have bloodstains on his shirt. He is a butcher by occupation.
Romeo Penecilla himself, the father of the victim, testified he knows the appellant "because
he used to accompany me during butchering of animals." 23
The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to
counsel before making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution.
It is also the burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is
not tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged by clear and
convincing evidence. Indeed, par. 1 of Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution provides
only one mode of waiver — the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. In
the case at bar, the records show that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge this burden.
It matters not that in the course of the hearing, the appellant failed to make a timely
objection to the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack of
objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof that rested on the prosecution.
There is no and there ought not to be any disagreement on basic principles. The Court should
be concerned with the heinousness of the crime at bar and its despicable perpetration
against a 4-year old girl, an impersonation of innocence itself. The Court should also be
concerned with the multiplication of malevolence in our midst for there is no right to be evil,
and there are no ifs and buts about the imposition of the death penalty as long as it remains
unchallenged as part of the laws of our land. These concerns are permanent, norms hewn in
stone, and they transcend the transitoriness of time.

Be that as it may, our commitment to the criminal justice system is not only to convict and
punish violators of our laws. We are equally committed to the ideal that the process of
detection, apprehension, conviction and incarceration of criminals should be accomplished
with fairness, and without impinging on the dignity of the individual. In a death penalty case,
the Court cannot rush to judgment even when a lowlife is involved for an erroneous
conviction will leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice.
In sum, the Court cannot send the appellant to die in the electric chair on the basis of the
procedural irregularities committed by, and the inadmissible evidence considered by the trial
court. In Binabay vs. People, et al., 24 ponencia of Mr. Chief Justice R. Concepcion, this Court
held that no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. Since in the case at
bar, the arraignment of the appellant is void, his judgment of conviction is also void. In
fairness to the appellant, and in justice to the victim, the case has to be remanded to the trial
court. for further proceedings. There is no philosophy of punishment that allows the State to
kill without any semblance of fairness and justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. 43663, convicting accused Arnel
Alicando of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
Accused was convicted with a crime of rape with homicide of a 4 year old girl. He was
arrested and during the interrogation he made a confession of the crime without the
assistance of a counsel. By virtue of his uncounseled confession the police came to know
where to find the evidences consisting of the victim’s personal things like clothes stained
with blood which was admitted to court as evidences. The victim pleaded guilty during the
arraignment and was convicted with the death penalty. The case was forwarded to the SC for
automatic review.
Issue: Whether or not due process during the custodial investigation was accorded to the
accused.
Held:
Due process was not observed in the conduct of custodial investigation for the accused. He
was not informed of his right to a counsel upon making his extrajudicial confession and the
information against him was written in a language he could not understand and was not
explained to him. This is in violation of section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the
constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
86
against him. The lower court also violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of
guilt of the appellant without conducting a search inquiry on the voluntariness and full
understanding of the accused of the consequences of his plea. Moreover the evidences
admitted by the court that warranted his convicted were inadmissible because they were
due to an invalid custodial investigation that did not provide the accused with due process of
the law. Thus the SC annulled the decision of the imposition of the death penalty and
remanded the case back to the lower for further proceeding.
Facts:
Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a
minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand. The incident happened after
appellant drank liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago found the victim’s body and the
parents and police were informed. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five arm's
length from Penecilla's house. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan.
He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his
uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and
recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri
mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the
prosecution. He was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO.
Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC convicted him. Hence an automatic review for the
imposition of death penalty.
Issue: Whether or Not the death penalty proper.
Held:
No. The records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the
language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the
English language. It is unknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is
it known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the
Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his
plea of guilt. The RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the
constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law. It is urged
that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted. When
life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. There could be no
presumption. The court must be sure.
 87

The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the
appellant. Said section requires that the court shall conduct a searching inquiry the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks
of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how
and where he was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his
interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as
if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone.

Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a pillow
with bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused colored white with
bloodstains on its bottom. These physical evidence are evidence of the highest order. They
strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped.These are
inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a
result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the
benefit of counsel.