Personality and Individual Differences 73 (2015) 39–43

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Personality and Individual Differences

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid

Life seems different with you around: Differential shifts in cognitive

appraisal in the mere presence of others for neuroticism and impression
management
Liad Uziel ⇑
Bar-Ilan University, Israel

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: How does mere social presence affect cognitive processes? The extant literature has focused on the
Received 1 July 2014 impact of social presence on cognitive resources. The present study extends this work by focusing on
Received in revised form 9 September 2014 the positivity of cognitive appraisal. Building on recent findings it was predicted that the traits neuroti-
Accepted 16 September 2014
cism and impression management will differentially moderate the effect, such that neuroticism will be
Available online 8 October 2014
associated with a negative shift in appraisal, and impression management with a positive shift. In an
experiment, participants (N = 158) formed evaluations of life events either alone or in social presence.
Keywords:
The results supported the predictions. The findings advance the knowledge about the effect of social pres-
Social facilitation
Social presence
ence on cognition, and about the role of personality in moderating responses in public social contexts.
Neuroticism Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Impression management
Cognitive appraisal

1. Introduction Central in these models is an emphasis on cognitive resources

The impact of mere social presence on behavior (i.e., the social
facilitation effect) has captured the interest of social psychologists
since the establishment of the field as an experimental discipline
(Triplett, 1898). Early studies were quick to note that mere social
presence could bring about substantial behavioral changes.
Interest was focused on the effect of social presence on task
performance, with findings showing that social presence causes
performance improvements as well as impairments (e.g., Allport,
1924).
Theoretical accounts of performance changes in social presence
were initially guided by behavioristic models (e.g., increase in
commission of dominant responses; Zajonc, 1965). Later theories
(including contemporary models) attributed more weight to atten-
tional and cognitive changes that take place in social presence (e.g.,
Carver & Scheier, 1981; Huguet, Galvaing, Monteil, & Dumas,
1999). For example, the distraction-conflict theory (Baron, 1986)
suggested that social presence distracts one from attending the
task at hand and consumes critical cognitive resources, thus facil-
itating simple performance but impairing complex performance.
⇑ Address: Psychology Department, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 52900, Israel.
Tel.: +972 3 5318581.
E-mail address: liaduziel@gmail.com
(and their impact on task performance).
To date, little attention has been directed at exploring differ-
ences in the nature of appraisals (i.e., evaluations) taking place in
the transition from a private to a public social context. That is,
we know very little about what changes in people’s judgments
when they are in a public context, even though such changes are
(arguably) as influential in affecting behavior as the sheer avail-
ability of cognitive resources. Still, this should not come as a sur-
prise considering that mere social presence is an important, yet
ambiguous, situation (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, & Salomon,
1999; Uziel, 2007). That is, mere social presence carries different
meaning among different individuals, yielding what seems to be
weak or highly variable response when considered at the group
level (Bond & Titus, 1983). However, when individual differences
are considered, orderly responses to social presence often arise
(Uziel, 2007).
Two personality traits that were found to have a significant role
in moderating response to social presence are neuroticism and
impression management (IM; Uziel, 2010; Uziel & Baumeister,
2012). Both traits are associated with a strong motivation to gain
social acceptance and with high sensitivity to variations in social
contexts (Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, & Schreindorfer, 2013; Paulhus,
1984). That is, high scorers on both traits are highly responsive
in the transition to a public social context. However, the traits dif-
fer with regard to the availability of mental resources that are

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.09.023
0191-8869/Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
40 L. Uziel / Personality and Individual Differences 73 (2015) 39–43
required to successfully adapt to public social contexts (Vohs,
Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005). Whereas neuroticism is associated
with a shortage of self-control resources, IM is associated with
sufficient resources (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004; Uziel,
2014; Uziel & Baumeister, 2012).
Equipped with a different set of self-control resources, neuroti-
cism and IM predispose individuals to react to public social con-
texts in contrasting ways. This assertion has been supported in
recent studies, which have documented differential effect for pub-
lic social settings on performance in tasks that require self-control
resources (e.g., persistence) and creative performance (Uziel, 2010;
Uziel & Baumeister, 2012). Specifically, it has been found that for
neurotic individuals, even a relatively short duration in a public
social setting is sufficient to deplete self-control resources and
impair performance. That is, neurotic individuals are highly moti-
vated in public social contexts, but their self-regulatory resources
are insufficient to maintain an adequate level of performance.
There are reasons to expect that the negative impact of public
social context on neurotics’ performance will expand to cognitive
appraisal processes. For example, self-control theory (Carver &
Scheier, 1981) suggests that a sense of not meeting desired stan-
dards is associated with a more pessimist outlook. Moreover,
recent findings have revealed a direct link between the availability
of self-regulatory resources and an inclination to hold a positive
view of life (e.g., Fischer, Greitemeyer, & Frey, 2007; Solberg Nes,
Carlson, Crofford, de Leeuw, & Segerstrom, 2011). Neurotics’ lack
of sufficient self-control resources in public settings could there-
fore bring them to construe reality in a more negativistic way. In
addition, past research has shown that neuroticism is associated
with a negative associative network (Uziel, 2006). Negativity could
therefore constitute a dominant response among neurotics, and
this tendency is expected to strengthen in the public setting
(Zajonc, 1965).
In contrast, for IM, research has found that high scorers experi-
ence a restoration of self-control resources in public social contexts
(Uziel & Baumeister, 2012). Moreover, individuals high in IM have
displayed a positive shift in the valence of their spontaneous reac-
tions in public contexts (Uziel, 2010). Considering the availability
of self-control resources among high IM individuals in public con-
texts, it is reasonable to predict that a positive shift will also show
in their conscious appraisal of stimuli. That is, stimuli (e.g., external
events) will appear more positive and rewarding to them (e.g.,
Fischer et al., 2007).
The extent to which social presence affects cognitive appraisal
has not been studied before. In order to explore whether social
presence carries a systematic effect on appraisal processes, we
have asked participants to assign their objective evaluations of
everyday events from diverse life domains (cf. Uziel, 2006). If the
predictions hold true, the findings will imply that mere social pres-
ence carries a substantial impact on people’s responses beyond its
known impact on task performance and on cognitive resources.
That is, cognitive appraisal of external reality might also be sub-
jected to change by a fairly minor shift in social context.
We have also explored if differences in appraisal are related to
affective responses. However, based on previous findings we did
not expect shifts in self-reported affect across social contexts
(Uziel, 2010; Uziel & Baumeister, 2012).
2. Method
2.1. Participants and procedure
Participants (N = 158, 86 females, Mage = 24.29, SD = 2.96) were
psychology students. They arrived at the lab individually for an
experiment on personality and cognitive processes. Upon arriving,
all participants signed a consent form and completed personality
questionnaires measuring neuroticism and IM. Next, all participants
were randomly assigned to a private or a public social context. For
the public social context group (N = 79) an observer entered the
room and sat behind the participant, who was told that the obser-
ver will be in the room in the coming minutes. In the private social
context group (N = 79), participants remained alone in the room.
All participants were then asked to complete an affect question-
naire, followed by the cognitive appraisal task (Events Evaluation
Questionnaire; EEQ). Participants proceeded to complete a demo-
graphic questionnaire before being debriefed, compensated, and
dismissed.
2.2. Tools
2.2.1. Personality
The EPQ-R short scale (Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985) was
used to measure neuroticism (e.g., ‘‘Does your mood often go up
and down?’’; a = .86) and IM (using the Lie scale, e.g., ‘‘Do you
always practice what you preach?’’; a = .72). Participants marked
their level of agreement with each sentence (1 = strongly disagree;
2 = disagree; 3 = agree; 4 = strongly agree). The Likert-type format
was preferred over a dichotomous format, because of its improved
psychometric properties and successful application in previous
studies (e.g., Uziel, 2010).
2.2.2. Affect
Momentary affect was measured with the Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), which
consists of 20 items depicting positive feelings (e.g., ‘‘enthusiastic’’;
a = .84) and negative feelings (e.g., ‘‘distressed’’; a = .89).
Participants described their state ‘‘right now’’ on a 1 (very slightly
or not at all) to 5 (extremely) scale.
2.2.3. Cognitive appraisal
Participants completed the Events Evaluation Questionnaire
(EEQ), as a measure of cognitive appraisal of everyday events
(Uziel, 2006). The EEQ is comprised of 18 short descriptions
(reflecting the less extreme items from the 30 descriptions that
appeared in Uziel, 2006) of everyday positive (e.g., ‘‘attending an
interesting talk’’), neutral (e.g., ‘‘receiving a letter from an
unknown person’’), and negative (e.g., ‘‘causing a light car acci-
dent’’) events representing myriad life domains (i.e., academic,
financial, occupational, social). All events were phrased as general
occurrences with no reference to the participant’s personal experi-
ences. That is, the participants were asked to evaluate the events
(not to estimate their personal emotional reaction to them) so as
to emphasize an analytic approach to the task. The participants
were asked to evaluate each event on two separate scales: positiv-
ity and negativity, each ranging from 0 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).
Both scales showed good reliabilities (a = .76 for the positivity
scale, and a = .72 for the negativity scale). To gain participants’
Overall Evaluation of events, negative scores were deducted from
positive scores for each event and then averaged across events.
Table 1 presents the items of the EEQ.
3. Results
Descriptive statistics across conditions (Table 2) show that neu-
roticism had a positive correlation with negative affect but not
with positive affect. In addition, neuroticism had a negative corre-
lation with the overall evaluation of events. For IM, no significant
correlations were found with either affect or cognitive appraisal
variables across conditions. Lastly, positive and negative affect
were not correlated with event evaluation ratings.
 L. Uziel / Personality and Individual Differences 73 (2015) 39–43 41

Table 1
Means (SDs) of the events in the events evaluation questionnaire (sorted by overall evaluation).

Event Positivity Negativity Overall evaluation

1 Attending an interesting talk 6.28 (1.13) 1.18 (1.46) 5.10 (2.19)
2 Marriage of a relative 6.17 (1.17) 1.46 (1.68) 4.71 (2.34)
3 Getting promoted 6.29 (.78) 2.06 (1.48) 4.23 (1.78)
4 Going out with friends 5.96 (1.25) 1.79 (1.41) 4.17 (2.26)
5 Getting a grade in an important exam 5.25 (1.35) 2.94 (1.75) 2.31 (2.37)
6 Taking place of an event that was foreseen 4.51 (1.59) 3.11 (1.63) 1.40 (2.17)
7 Moving to a new home 4.85 (1.49) 3.64 (1.52) 1.21 (2.17)
8 Receiving a letter from an unknown person 4.06 (1.79) 2.86 (1.85) 1.20 (2.71)
9 Being called to a meeting with the manager 4.35 (1.52) 3.87 (1.67) 0.48 (2.09)
10 Having a blind date 4.01 (1.66) 3.54 (1.72) 0.47 (2.78)
11 Investing in stocks 3.81 (1.73) 4.04 (1.68) 0.23 (2.38)
12 Getting negative feedback for performing a task 3.23 (1.91) 4.60 (1.75) 1.37 (3.34)
13 Bidding farewell to school mates 2.59 (1.45) 4.72 (1.49) 2.13 (2.20)
14 Losing 50NIS (New Israeli Shekel) 1.49 (1.90) 4.09 (2.09) 2.60 (3.27)
15 Getting laid off 2.20 (1.52) 5.48 (1.46) 3.28 (2.44)
16 Embarrassing slip of the tongue 1.67 (1.47) 5.19 (1.56) 3.52 (2.54)
17 Get reprimanded by the manager 1.77 (1.47) 5.35 (1.40) 3.58 (2.34)
18 Causing a light car accident 1.30 (1.71) 5.53 (1.84) 4.23 (2.91)

Note. N = 158.

Table 2
Means (SDs) and zero-order correlations among the variables in the study.

Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Neuroticism 2.37 (.46) –
2 IM 2.33 (.34) .21** –
3 Positivity evaluation 3.88 (.67) .15 .03 –
4 Negativity evaluation 3.64 (.68) .15 .11 .21** –
5 Overall evaluation 0.24 (.85) .24** .06 .62** .63** –
6 Positive affect 2.58 (.64) .13 .11 .14 .10 .11 –
7 Negative affect 1.46 (.57) .36** .10 .13 .06 .15 .05

Note. N = 158; IM = Impression management.

**
p < .01.

The main analyses explored whether and how mere social
presence affects cognitive appraisal. The first analysis focused on
neuroticism. Overall evaluation of events was regressed on
neuroticism (centered), social context condition (dummy coded:
alone = 0, public = 1; step 1), and their interaction (step 2). The
analysis yielded no effect for the social context condition (b = .07,
SE = .13, 95% CI [ .18, .33], b = .04, t < 1, p = .58), but a main effect
for neuroticism (b = .44, SE = .14, 95% CI [ .73, .16], b = .24,
t = 3.09, p = .002). Importantly, the main effect was qualified by
a neuroticism-by-social context interaction (b = .90, SE = .28,
95% CI [ 1.45, .35], b = .34, t = 3.24, p = .001; DR2 = .06).
1
Public
Alone
Overall Evaluation
Probing the interaction – see Fig. 1 – revealed that neuroticism
had no association with overall evaluation in the alone condition
(b = .02, SE = .19, b = .01, t < 1, p = .91), but a strong negative
association with overall evaluation in the public social context con-
dition (b = .92, SE = .20, b = .48, t = 4.54, p < .001).1 Controlling
for affect and IM in the regression analysis had no impact on the
conclusion. That is, as expected, neuroticism was associated with a
negative shift in cognitive appraisal due merely to being in a public
social context.
Another set of analyses sought to explore the source of the dif-
ference in overall cognitive evaluation among neurotics between
the two conditions. That is, to explore whether the difference
stems from an increase in attribution of negativity to events or
from a decrease in attribution of positivity. To that aim, separate
regression analyses were held for each dimension of events evalu-
ation. Focusing first on negativity evaluation, it was regressed on
neuroticism and social context condition (step 1), and their inter-
action (step 2). The analysis yielded no effect for the social context

condition (b = .09, SE = .11, 95% CI [ .31, .12], b = .07, t < 1,

p = .39), but a main effect for neuroticism (b = .23, SE = .12, 95% CI
[.00, .46], b = .15, t = 1.94, p = .05). The main effect was not qualified
by a neuroticism-by-social context interaction (b = .29, SE = .23,
95% CI [ .17, .75], b = .14, t = 1.25, p = .21; DR2 = .01). In order to
learn about the trends in the data, simple slope analysis followed.

1
A complementary perspective on this interaction revealed that among low
-0.5 neuroticism individuals ( 1 SD) being in a public (vs. alone) social context was
Low N (-1SD) High N (+1SD) associated with a more positive overall evaluation (b = .49, SE = .18, t = 2.69, p = .008).
In contrast, among high neuroticism individuals (+1 SD), being in a public (vs. alone)
Fig. 1. Interaction between neuroticism and social context in predicting the social context was (marginally significantly) associated with a more negative overall
positivity of cognitive appraisal (overall evaluation). N = Neuroticism. evaluation (b = .35, SE = .18, t = 1.90, p = .059).
42 L. Uziel / Personality and Individual Differences 73 (2015) 39–43
The analysis showed that neuroticism had no association with
negativity evaluation in the alone condition (b = .09, SE = .16,
b = .06, t < 1, p = .57), and that neuroticism had a significant
association with negativity evaluation in the public social context
condition (b = .38, SE = .17, b = .26, t = 2.24, p = .03).
An additional analysis focused on positivity judgment. The
analysis yielded no effect for the social context condition
(b = .02, SE = .11, 95% CI [ .23, .19], b = .01, t < 1, p = .84), and a
marginally-significant effect for neuroticism (b = .22, SE = .15,
95% CI [ .44, .01], b = .15, t = 1.88, p = .06). There was also a
neuroticism-by-social context interaction (b = .61, SE = .23, 95%
CI [ 1.06, .16], b = .29, t = 2.69, p = .008; DR2 = .04). Simple
slope analysis revealed that neuroticism had no association with
positivity evaluation in the alone condition (b = .07, SE = .16,
b = .05, t < 1, p = .66), and that neuroticism had a significant
association with positivity evaluation in the public social context
condition (b = .54, SE = .17, b = .37, t = 3.27, p = .001).
Taken together, in a public social context neuroticism was asso-
ciated with a tendency to emphasize negative aspects of events
and to deemphasize positive aspects. As a result, compared to their
cognitive appraisal while alone, neurotics showed a strong overall
negative bias in their appraisal while in the presence of other
people.
A second group of analyses focused on IM. Overall evaluation
was regressed on IM (centered), social context condition (dummy
coded: alone = 0, public = 1; step 1), and their interaction (step
2). The analysis yielded no effect for the social context condition
(b = .06, SE = .14, 95% CI [ .21, .33], b = .04, t < 1, p = .64), or for
IM (b = .16, SE = .20, 95% CI [ .23, .56], b = .07, t < 1, p = .42). There
was only an IM-by-social context interaction (b = 1.11, SE = .39,
95% CI [.33, 1.89], b = .29, t = 2.78, p = .006; DR2 = .05). Probing
the interaction – see Fig. 2 – revealed that IM had no association
with overall evaluation in the alone condition (b = .29, SE = .25,
b = .13, t = 1.17, p = .24), and that IM had a significant positive
association with overall evaluation in the public social context con-
dition (b = .81, SE = .30, b = .29, t = 2.67, p = .008).2 Controlling for
affect and neuroticism in the analysis had a no impact on the conclu-
sion. That is, IM was associated with the expected positive shift in
cognitive appraisal in the transition from an alone to a public social
context.
In order to explore the source of the difference in overall
cognitive appraisal for IM, negativity judgments and positivity
judgments were analyzed separately. Focusing first on negativity
evaluation, it was regressed on IM and social context condition
(step 1), and their interaction (step 2). The analysis yielded no
effect for the social context condition (b = .09, SE = .11, 95% CI
[ .31, .12], b = .07, t < 1, p = .39), or for IM (b = .23, SE = .16,
95% CI [ .54, .09], b = .12, t = 1.44, p = .15). The interaction
was also not significant (b = .39, SE = .32, 95% CI [ 1.02, .24],
b = .13, t = 1.22, p = .22; DR2 = .01). Simple slope analysis was
conducted to learn about trends in the data. It revealed that IM
had no association with negativity evaluation in the alone condi-
tion (b = .06, SE = .21, b = .03, t < 1, p = .75), but that IM had a
marginally-significant negative association with negativity evalua-
tion in the public social context condition (b = .46, SE = .25,
b = .22, t = 1.86, p = .06).
Another analysis explored positivity judgment. The analysis
yielded no effect for the social context condition (b = .03,
SE = .11, 95% CI [ .24, .18], b = .02, t < 1, p = .79), or for IM
2
A complementary perspective on this interaction revealed that among low IM
individuals ( 1 SD) being in a public (vs. alone) social context was not significantly
associated with a change in overall evaluation (b = .31, SE = .19, t = 1.65, p = .10). In
contrast, among high IM individuals (+1 SD), being in a public (vs. alone) social
context was associated with a more positive overall evaluation (b = .45, SE = .19,
t = 2.34, p = .02).
1
Public
Alone
Overall Evaluation
-0.5
Low IM (-1SD) High IM (+1SD)
Fig. 2. Interaction between IM and social context in predicting the positivity of
cognitive appraisal (overall evaluation). IM = Impression management.
(b = .07, SE = .16, 95% CI [ .38, .25], b = .03, t < 1, p = .68). There
was, however, an IM-by-social context interaction (b = .71, SE = .32,
95% CI [.09, 1.33], b = .24, t = 2.26, p = .03; DR2 = .03). Simple slope
analysis revealed that IM had a marginally-significant negative
association with positivity evaluation in the alone condition
(b = .36, SE = .20, b = .20, t = 1.78, p = .08), and a nonsignificant
(positive) association in the public social context (b = .35, SE = .24,
b = .17, t = 1.45, p = .14).
Taken together, these analyses show that being in a public
social context was associated for IM with a tendency to rate nega-
tive aspects of events lower and positive aspects higher. As a result,
compared to their overall cognitive appraisal while alone, high IM
individuals showed a strong overall positive bias in their appraisal
while in the presence of other people.
Auxiliary analyses explored differences in self-reported (posi-
tive and negative) affect in the transition from an alone to a public
social context. The analyses revealed no significant main effect for
the social context condition (ts < 1, ps > .42), and no significant
interaction between the social context condition and either neurot-
icism or IM (ts < 1.40, ps > .16). That is, changes in cognitive apprai-
sal associated with neuroticism and IM in a public social context did
not stem from conscious shifts in emotional experience.
4. Discussion
Do people change their behavior in social presence? Extensive
theoretical work and a large number of empirical findings confirm
that people display myriad behavioral changes in the presence of
other people (Bond & Titus, 1983). Whereas early studies empha-
sized behavioristic accounts for the effect (Zajonc, 1965), later
approaches focused on cognitive processes and the availability of
cognitive resources (e.g., Baron, 1986). Notwithstanding, research
on the social facilitation effect has generally ignored individual dif-
ferences, and studies have not addressed differences in cognitive
appraisal processes. The present experiment sought to address
these two relatively neglected aspects in the study of the social
facilitation effect.
The current study suggested that changes in cognitive appraisal
in social presence are strongly related to individual differences,
because the meaning attributed to social presence depends on one’s
personality (Uziel, 2007). The outcome of the meaning-making pro-
cess (e.g., whether social presence is perceived as a threat or a chal-
lenge) sets the tone for the response in the public social context
(Blascovich et al., 1999). Building on the extant literature, two traits
were explored as moderators of the response to social presence.
Specifically, research has shown that neuroticism leads individuals
 L. Uziel / Personality and Individual Differences 73 (2015) 39–43
to experience performance impairments and self-regulatory failure
in social presence. In contrast, research associated IM with perfor-
mance improvement and restoration of self-regulatory resources
in public settings (Uziel, 2010; Uziel & Baumeister, 2012).
The present findings indicate that the effect of mere social pres-
ence on cognitive appraisal is substantial, but it only shows when
considered in interaction with personality traits. That is, individu-
als do differ in the manner with which they construe reality alone
and in social presence, but the nature of the difference depends on
each individual’s resources in entering the social context. Neurotic
individuals have responded to being in the mere presence of others
with a negative shift in their general appraisal of everyday events.
That is, neurotic individuals do not only experience a reduction in
self-regulatory resources in social presence – as documented in
past studies (Uziel & Baumeister, 2012) – but they also tend to con-
strue reality in a more negative fashion in public contexts.
In contrast, IM predisposes individuals to respond in an adap-
tive way to the presence of other people (Uziel, 2010). The present
findings add on past results by showing that IM is associated with
an optimistic shift in cognitive appraisal in social presence. That is,
high IM individuals perceive external events in a more rewarding
way when other people observe them. These findings agree with
existing studies that have explored the role of self-regulatory
resources on people’s sense of optimism (Fischer et al., 2007).
The findings do not directly address the question of whether the
positive shift for IM is merely a self-presentational strategy
(appearing optimistic is socially desirable; cf. Uziel, 2010) or an
authentic shift in appraisal, but noting that a similar shift did not
happen in self-reported affect indicates that the latter alternative
is the more likely one.
Interestingly, more nuanced analyses, which sought to track the
source of the differences in overall evaluation by exploring its com-
ponents separately (i.e., negativity and positivity judgments),
revealed that for both traits the difference was fairly symmetrical.
That is, for both traits, there was a difference in both negativity and
positivity judgments. This finding is consistent with a suggestion
that both traits are associated with high responsivity to changes
in social contexts. The strong responsiveness appears to orches-
trate a cascade of cognitive and behavioral changes, which are
guided by the trait’s general approach to public social contexts.
Alongside the differences in cognitive appraisal, little difference
was found in self-reported emotional reactions. Based on previous
studies with a similar design (e.g., Uziel, 2010), this outcome is no
surprise. It appears that mere social presence does not induce
conscious changes in affect, at least not as an initial response to
the situation. Moreover, previous studies have reported that affect
does not mediate personality–cognition association (Uziel, 2006).
Here too, there is little reason to suspect that response bias was
involved in directing participants’ willingness to expose (negative)
feelings in the public social context, because, for example, neurot-
icism was associated with negative affect in both conditions. It
might be the case that the ambiguous nature of the situation
affects psychological processes other than emotional response
(e.g. self-regulatory resources, which are not associated with
changes in affect; e.g., Vohs et al., 2005). Still, the possibility that
affective responses occur at a nonconscious level or unfold
relatively slowly in a public setting cannot be ruled-out.
Two limitations of the present experiment could be addressed
by future studies. First, the present study was focused on a mini-
mal public social context manipulation. No interaction was held
between the observer and the participants. Future studies could
43
address changes in appraisal in the context of more elaborate
social interactions. Second, although the results are consistent with
past findings about the availability of self-control resources in
public social contexts, the present study did not include a direct
measure of self-control resources to establish this idea.
In conclusion, the present study is among the first to document
systematic differences in cognitive appraisal induced by mere
social presence. As such, the findings expand the boundaries of
the social facilitation effect and advance the state of knowledge
about the role of neuroticism and impression management in
moderating responses in public social contexts.
Acknowledgment
This research was supported by a grant (Grant No. 70/11) from
the Israel Science Foundation.
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