G.R. No.
101619 July 8, 1992
SANYO PHILIPPINES WORKERS UNION-PSSLU LOCAL
CHAPTER NO. 109 AND/OR ANTONIO DIAZ, PSSLU NATIONAL
PRESIDENT, petitioners,
vs.
HON. POTENCIANO S. CANIZARES, in his capacity as Labor
Arbiter, BERNARDO YAP, RENATO BAYBON, SALVADOR
SOLIBEL, ALLAN MISTERIO, EDGARDO TANGKAY, LEONARDO
DIONISIO, ARNEL SALVO, REYNALDO RICOHERMOSO, BENITO
VALENCIA, GERARDO LASALA AND ALEXANDER
ATANASIO, respondents.
This petition seeks to nullify: 1) the order of respondent Labor Arbiter
Potenciano Cañizares dated August 6, 1991 deferring the resolution of
the motion to dismiss the complaint of private respondents filed by
petitioner Sanyo Philippines Workers Union-PSSLU Local Chapter No.
109 (PSSLU, for brevity) on the ground that the labor arbiter had no
jurisdiction over said complaint and 2) the order of the same
respondent clarifying its previous order and ruling that it had jurisdiction
over the case.
The facts of the case are as follows:
PSSLU had an existing CBA (collective bargaining agreement) with
Sanyo Philippines Inc. (Sanyo, for short) effective July 1, 1989 to June
30, 1994. The same CBA contained a union security clause which
provided:
Sec. 2. All members of the union covered by this
agreement must retain their membership in good
standing in the union as condition of his/her
continued employment with the company. The
union shall have the right to demand from the
company the dismissal of the members of the
union by reason of their voluntary resignation
from membership or willful refusal to pay the
Union Dues or by reasons of their having
formed, organized, joined, affiliated, supported
and/or aided directly or indirectly another labor
organization, and the union thus hereby
guarantees and holds the company free and
harmless from any liability whatsoever that may
arise consequent to the implementation of the
provision of this article. (pp. 5-6, Rollo)
In a letter dated February 7, 1990, PSSLU, through its national
president, informed the management of Sanyo that the following
employees were notified that their membership with PSSLU were
cancelled for anti-union, activities, economic sabotage, threats,
coercion and intimidation, disloyalty and for joining another union:
Benito Valencia, Bernardo Yap, Arnel Salvo, Renato Baybon, Eduardo
Porlaje, Salvador Solibel, Conrado Sarol, Angelito Manzano, Allan
Misterio, Reynaldo Ricohermoso, Mario Ensay and Froilan Plamenco.
The same letter informed Sanyo that the same employees refused to
submit themselves to the union's grievance investigation committee (p.
53, Rollo). It appears that many of these employees were not members
of PSSLU but of another union, KAMAO.
On February 14, 1990, some officers of KAMAO, which included
Yap, Salvo, Baybon, Solibel, Valencia, Misterio and Ricohermoso,
executed a pledged of cooperation with PSSLU promising
cooperation with the latter union and among others, respecting,
accepting and honoring the CBA between Sanyo and specifically:
1. That we shall remain officers and members of
KAMAO until we finally decide to rejoin Sanyo Phil.
Workers Union-PSSLU;
2. That henceforth, we support and cooperate with
the duly elected union officers of Sanyo Phil.
Workers Union-PSSLU in any and all its activities
and programs to insure industrial peace and
harmony;
3. That we collectively accept, honor, and respect
the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into
between Sanyo Phil. Inc. and Sanyo Phil. Workers
Union-PSSLU dated February 7, 1990;
4 That we collectively promise not to engage in
any activities inside company premises contrary to
law, the CBA and existing policies;
5 That we are willing to pay our individual agency
fee in accordance with the provision of the Labor
Code, as amended;
6 That we collectively promise not to violate this
pledge of cooperation. (p. 55, Rollo)
On March 4, 1991, PSSLU through its national and local
presidents, wrote another letter to Sanyo recommending the
dismissal of the following non-union workers: Bernardo Yap, Arnel
Salvo, Renato Baybon, Reynaldo Ricohermoso, Salvador Solibel,
Benito Valencia, and Allan Misterio, allegedly because: 1) they were
engaged and were still engaging in anti-union activities; 2) they
willfully violated the pledge of cooperation with PSSLU which
they signed and executed on February 14, 1990; and 3) they
threatened and were still threatening with bodily harm and even
death the officers of the union (pp. 37-38, Rollo).
Also recommended for dismissal were the following union members
who allegedly joined, supported and sympathized with a minority union,
KAMAO: Gerardo Lasala, Legardo Tangkay, Alexander Atanacio, and
Leonardo Dionisio.
The last part of the said letter provided:
The dismissal of the above-named union members
is without prejudice to receive (sic) their
termination pay if management decide (sic) to
grant them benefits in accordance with law. The
union hereby holds the company free and
harmless from any liability that may arise
consequent to the implementation by the company
of our recommendations for the dismissal of the
above-mentioned workers.
It is however suggested that the Grievance
Machinery be convened pursuant to Section 3,
Article XV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) before their actual dismissal from the
company. (p. 38, Rollo)
Pursuant to the above letter of the union, the company sent a
memorandum to the same workers advising them that:
As per the attached letter from the local union
President SPWU and the federation President,
PSSLU, requesting management to put the herein
mentioned employees on preventive suspension,
effective immediately, preliminary to their
subsequent dismissal, please be informed that the
following employees are under preventive
suspension effective March 13, 1991 to wit:
1. Bernardo Yap
2. Renato Baybon
3. Salvador Solibel
4. Allan Misterio
5. Edgardo Tangkay
6. Leonardo Dionisio
7. Arnel Salvo
8. Reynaldo Ricohermoso
9. Benito Valencia
10. Gerardo Lasala
11. Alexander Atanacio
The above listed employees shall not be allowed
within company premises without the permission
of management.
As per request of the union's letter to
management, should the listed employees fail to
appeal the decision of the union for dismissal, then
effective March 23, 1991, said listed employees
shall be considered dismissed from the company.
(p 39, Rollo)
The company received no information on whether or not said
employees appealed to PSSLU. Hence, it considered them
dismissed as of March 23, 1991 (p. 40, Rollo).
On May 20, 1991, the dismissed employees filed a complaint (pp.
32-35, Rollo) with the NLRC for illegal dismissal. Named
respondent were PSSLU and Sanyo.
On June 20, 1991, PSSLU filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
alleging that the Labor Arbiter was without jurisdiction over the
case, relying on Article 217 (c) of P.D. 442, as amended by Section 9
of Republic Act No. 6715 which provides that cases arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining
agreements shall be disposed of by the labor arbiter by referring the
same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration.
The complainants opposed the motion to dismiss complaint on these
grounds: 1) the series of conferences before the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board had been terminated; 2) the NLRC Labor Arbiter
had jurisdiction over the case which was a termination dispute
pursuant to Article 217 (2) of the Labor Code; and 3) there was nothing
in the CBA which needs interpretation or implementation (pp. 44-
46, Rollo).
On August 7, 1991, the respondent Labor Arbiter issued the first
questioned order. It held that:
xxx xxx xxx
While there are seemingly contradictory provisions
in the aforecited article of the Labor Code, the
better interpretation will be to give effect to both,
and termination dispute being clearly spelled as
falling under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter,
the same shall be respected. The jurisdiction of
the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration
shall cover other controversies.
However, the resolution of the instant issue shall
be suspended until both parties have fully
presented their respective positions and the said
issue shall be included in the final determination of
the above-captioned case.
WHEREFORE, the instant Motions to Dismiss are
hereby held pending.
Consequently, the parties are hereby directed to
submit their position papers and supporting
documents pursuant to Section 2, Rule VII of the
Rules of the Commission on or before the hearing
on the merit of this case scheduled on August 29,
1991 at 11:00 a.m. (p. 23, Rollo)
On August 27, 1991, PSSLU filed another motion to resolve motion to
dismiss complaint with a prayer that the Labor Arbiter resolve the issue
of jurisdiction.
On September 4, 1991, the respondent Labor Arbiter issued the
second questioned order which held that it was assuming jurisdiction
over the complaint of private respondents, in effect, holding that it had
jurisdiction over the case.
On September 19, 1991, PSSLU filed this petition alleging that
public respondent Labor Arbiter cannot assume jurisdiction over
the complaint of public respondents because it had no
jurisdiction over the dispute subject of said complaint. It is their
submission that under Article 217 (c) of the Labor Code, in relation to
Article 261 thereof, as well as Policy Instruction No. 6 of the Secretary
of Labor, respondent Arbiter has no jurisdiction and authority to take
cognizance of the complaint brought by private respondents which
involves the implementation of the union security clause of the CBA.
The function of the Labor Arbiter under the same law and rule is to
refer this case to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration.
In its comment, private respondents argue that Article 217(a) 2 and 4
of the Labor Code is explicit, to wit:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the
Commission.
a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code,
the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide . . . the
following cases involving all workers, . . . :
xxx xxx xxx
2) Termination disputes,
xxx xxx xxx
4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages arising from the employer-
employee relations.
The private respondents also claimed that insofar as Salvo, Baybon,
Ricohermoso, Solibel, Valencia, Misterio and Lasala were concerned,
they joined another union, KAMAO during the freedom period which
commenced on May 1, 1989 up to June 30, 1989 or before the
effectivity of the July 1, 1989 CBA. Hence, they are not covered by the
provisions of the CBA between Sanyo and PSSLU. Private
respondents Tangkay, Atanacio and Dionisio admit that in September
1989, they resigned from KAMAO and rejoined PSSLU (pp.
66(a)-68, Rollo).
For its part, public respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, is of the view that a distinction should be made between a
case involving "interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreement or "interpretation" or "enforcement" of
company personnel policies, on the one hand and a case involving
termination, on the other hand. It argued that the case at bar does not
involve an "interpretation or implementation" of a collective bargaining
agreement or "interpretation or enforcement" of company policies but
involves a "termination." Where the dispute is just in the
interpretation, implementation or enforcement stage, it may be
referred to the grievance machinery set up in the CBA or by
voluntary arbitration. Where there was already actual
termination, i.e., violation of rights, it is already cognizable by the
Labor Arbiter.
Article 217 of the Labor Code defines the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter.
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
Commission. a) Except as otherwise provided
under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision
without extension even in the absence of
stenographic notes, the following cases involving
all workers, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement,
those cases that workers may file involving wages,
rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages arising from the employer-
employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of
this Code, including questions involving the legality
of strikes and lockouts;
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation,
Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits,
all other claims, arising from employer-employee
relations, including those of persons in domestic or
household service, involving an amount exceeding
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of
whether accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor
Arbiters.
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or
implementation of collective bargaining
agreements and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies shall be disposed of by the
Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the
 grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as
may be provided in said agreements.
It is clear from the above article that termination cases fall under the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. It should be noted however that said
article at the outset excepted from the said provision cases otherwise
provided for in other provisions of the same Code, thus the phrase
"Except as otherwise provided under this Code . . . ." Under paragraph
(c) of the same article, it is expressly provided that "cases arising from
the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining
agreements and those arising from the interpretation and enforcement
of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor
Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.
It was provided in the CBA executed between PSSLU and Sanyo that
a member's voluntary resignation from membership, willful refusal to
pay union dues and his/her forming, organizing, joining, supporting,
affiliating or aiding directly or indirectly another labor union shall be a
cause for it to demand his/her dismissal from the company. The
demand for the dismissal and the actual dismissal by the company on
any of these grounds is an enforcement of the union security clause in
the CBA. This act is authorized by law provided that enforcement
should not be characterized by arbitrariness (Manila Mandarin
Employee Union v. NLRC, G.R. No. 76989, 29 Sept. 1987, 154 SCRA
368) and always with due process (Tropical Hut Employees Union v.
Tropical Food Market, Inc., L-43495-99, Jan. 20, 1990).
The reference to a Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitrators for
the adjustment or resolution of grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of their CBA and those arising from
the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies is
mandatory. The law grants to voluntary
arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all
unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies (Art. 261,
Labor Code).
In its order of September 4, 1991, respondent Labor Arbiter explained
its decision to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, thus:
The movants failed to show (1) the provisions of
the CBA to be implemented, and (2) the grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitrator already formed
and properly named. What self-respecting judge
would refer a case from his responsibility to a
shadow? To whom really and specifically shall the
case be indorsed or referred? In brief, they could
have shown the (1) existence of the grievance
machinery and (2) its being effective.
Furthermore, the aforecited law merely directs the
"referral" cases. It does not expressly confer
jurisdiction on the grievance machinery or
voluntary arbitration panel, created or to be
created. Article 260 of the Labor Code describes
the formation of the grievance and voluntary
arbitration. All this of course shall be on voluntary
basis. Is there another meaning of voluntary
arbitration? (The herein complainant have strongly
opposed the motion to dismiss. Would they go
willingly to the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration which are installed by their opponents if
directed to do so?) (p. 26, Rollo)
The failure of the parties to the CBA to establish the grievance
machinery and its unavailability is not an excuse for the Labor Arbiter
to assume jurisdiction over disputes arising from the implementation
and enforcement of a provision in the CBA. In the existing CBA
between PSSLU and Sanyo, the procedure and mechanics of its
establishment had been clearly laid out as follows:
ARTICLE XV — GRIEVANCE MACHINERY
Sec. 1. Whenever any controversy should arise
between the company and the union as to the
interpretation or application of the provision of this
agreement, or whenever any difference shall exist
between said parties relative to the terms and
conditions of employment, an earnest effort shall
be made to settle such controversy in substantially
the following manner:
First step. (Thru Grievance) The dispute shall
initially be resolved by conference between the
management to be represented by the
Management's authorized representatives on the
one hand, and the Union to be represented by a
committee composed of the local union president
and one of the local union officer appointed by the
local union president, on the other hand within
three days from date of concurrence of grievance
action. In the absence of the local union president,
he (shall) appoint another local union officer to
take over in his behalf. Where a controversy
personally affects an employee, he shall not be
allowed to be a member of the committee
represented by the union.
Second step. (Thru Arbitrator mutually chosen)
Should such dispute remain unsettled after twenty
(20) days from the first conference or after such
period as the parties may agree upon in specified
cases, it shall be referred to an arbitrator chosen
by the consent of the company and the union. In
the event of failure to agree on the choice of
voluntary arbitrator, the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board, Department of Labor and
Employment shall be requested to choose an
Arbitrator in accordance with voluntary arbitration
procedures.
Sec. 2. The voluntary Arbitrator shall have thirty
(30) days to decide the issue presented to him and
his decision shall be final, binding and executory
upon the parties. He shall have no authority to add
or subtract from and alter any provision of this
agreement. The expenses of voluntary arbitration
including the fee of the arbitrator shall be shared
equally by the company and the union. In the
event the arbitrator chosen either by the mutual
agreement of the company and the union by (the)
way of voluntary arbitration or by the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) failed to
assume his position, died, become disabled or any
other manner failed to function and or reach a
decision, the company and the union shall by
mutual agreement choose another arbitrator; in the
event of failure to agree on the choice of a new
voluntary arbitrator, the matter shall again be
referred back to the NCMB who shall be requested
again to choose a new arbitrator as above
provided. Any grievance not elevated or processed
as above provided within the stipulated period
shall be deemed settled and terminated.
Sec. 3. It is hereby agreed that decisions of the
union relative to their members, for implementation
by the COMPANY, should be resolved for review
thru the Grievance Machinery; and management
be invited to participate in the Grievance
procedure to be undertaken by the union relative
to (the) case of the union against members. (pp.
134-135, Rollo)
All that needs to be done to set the machinery into motion is to call for
the convening thereof. If the parties to the CBA had not designated
their representatives yet, they should be ordered to do so.
The procedure introduced in RA 6715 of referring certain grievances
originally and exclusively to the grievance machinery and when not
settled at this level, to a panel of voluntary arbitrators outlined in CBA's
does not only include grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the CBA but applies as well to those arising from the
implementation of company personnel policies. No other body shall
take cognizance of these cases. The last paragraph of Article 261
enjoins other bodies from assuming jurisdiction thereof:
The commission, its Regional Offices and the
Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and
Employment shall not entertain disputes,
grievances or matters under the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or
panel of voluntary arbitrators and shall
immediately dispose and refer the same to the
grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration
provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
In the instant case, however, We hold that the Labor Arbiter and not
the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction to
hear and decide the complaints of the private respondents. While it
appears that the dismissal of the private respondents was made upon
the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause
provided in the CBA, We are of the opinion that these facts do not
come within the phrase "grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of (their) Collective Bargaining Agreement and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies," the jurisdiction of which pertains to the Grievance Machinery
or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.
Article 260 of the Labor Code on grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitrator states that "(t)he parties to a Collective Bargaining
Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual
observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish a
machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from
the interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies." It is further provided in said article that
the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective
representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is not
settled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to voluntary
arbitrators (or panel of voluntary arbitrators) designated in advance by
the parties. It need not be mentioned that the parties to a CBA are the
union and the company. Hence, only disputes involving the union and
the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary
arbitrators.
In the instant case, both the union and the company are united or have
come to an agreement regarding the dismissal of private respondents.
No grievance between them exists which could be brought to a
grievance machinery. The problem or dispute in the present case is
between the union and the company on the one hand and some union
and non-union members who were dismissed, on the other hand. The
dispute has to be settled before an impartial body. The grievance
machinery with members designated by the union and the company
cannot be expected to be impartial against the dismissed employees.
Due process demands that the dismissed workers grievances be
ventilated before an impartial body. Since there has already been an
actual termination, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. Public respondent Labor
Arbiter is directed to resolve the complaints of private respondents
immediately.
G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner,
vs.
ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES
and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATOR, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB)
and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE)
arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:
Whether or not the company has violated the
Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the
Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on
promotion.
At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their
respective Position Papers on December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S.
Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's
Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand,
failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the
Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995
no Position Paper had been filed by LDB.
On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary
Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the
Bank has not adhered to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement provision nor the
Memorandum of Agreement on promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside
the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from
enforcing the same.
In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an
impartial third person for determination on the basis of evidence and
arguments presented by such parties who have bound themselves to
accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding.
Arbitration may be classified, on the basis of the obligation on which it
is based, as either compulsory or voluntary.
Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a
dispute are compelled by the government to forego their right to
strike and are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute
through arbitration by a third party.1The essence of arbitration
remains since a resolution of a dispute is arrived at by resort to a
disinterested third party whose decision is final and binding on the
parties, but in compulsory arbitration, such a third party is normally
appointed by the government.
Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a
dispute by the parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary arbitration
clause in their collective agreement, to an impartial third person
for a final and binding resolution.2Ideally, arbitration awards are
supposed to be complied with by both parties without delay, such that
once an award has been rendered by an arbitrator, nothing is left to be
done by both parties but to comply with the same. After all, they are
presumed to have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of settlement
for that particular dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have chosen a
mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decide their case.
Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by said arbitrator's
decision.
In the Philippine context, the parties to a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) are required to include therein provisions for a
machinery for the resolution of grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the CBA or company personnel
policies.3 For this purpose, parties to a CBA shall name and designate
therein a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, or include a
procedure for their selection, preferably from those accredited by the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Article 261 of the
Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive original jurisdiction of
such voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators over (1) the
interpretation or implementation of the CBA and (2) the interpretation
or enforcement of company personnel policies. Article 262 authorizes
them, but only upon agreement of the parties, to exercise jurisdiction
over other labor disputes.
On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code
has jurisdiction over the following enumerated cases:
. . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this
Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of
the case by the parties for decision without
extension, even in the absence of stenographic
notes, the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement,
those cases that workers may file involving wages,
rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages arising from the employer-
employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of
this Code, including questions involving the legality
of strikes and lockouts;
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation,
Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits,
all other claims, arising from employer-employee
relations, including those of persons in domestic or
household service, involving an amount exceeding
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of
whether accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement.
xxx xxx xxx
It will thus be noted that the jurisdiction conferred by law on a
voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited
compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the
appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for that matter.4 The state of our present law relating to
voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator . . . shall be final and executory after ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the
parties,"5 while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter
are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or
both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards, or orders."6 Hence, while there is an express mode
of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is
silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary
arbitrator.
Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary
arbitrator is, more often than not, elevated to the Supreme Court
itself on a petition for certiorari,7 in effect equating the voluntary
arbitrator with the NLRC or the Court of Appeals. In the view of
the Court, this is illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden
upon it.
In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al.,8 on the settled premise
that the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies
must become final at some definite time, this Court ruled that the
awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence,
their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court.
In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al.,9 this Court ruled
that "a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a
quasi-judicial capacity." Under these rulings, it follows that the
voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in
law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart
from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter. 10
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902,
provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code
of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
xxx xxx xxx
Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of
voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial
agency, board or commission, still both he and the panel are
comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial
instrumentality." It may even be stated that it was to meet the very
situation presented by the quasi-judicial functions of the voluntary
arbitrators here, as well as the subsequent arbitrator/arbitral tribunal
operating under the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission,11 that the broader term "instrumentalities" was purposely
included in the above-quoted provision.
An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or
agency.12 Thus, the terms governmental "agency" or "instrumentality"
are synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which a
government acts, or by which a certain government act or function is
performed.13 The word "instrumentality," with respect to a state,
contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental
power for the performance of a state function.14 An individual person,
like an administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the
settling of an estate,15 in the same manner that a sub-agent appointed
by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the court,16and a trustee
in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the
state.17
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a
governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in
the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the
term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact
that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does
not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-
judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein. It will be noted that,
although the Employees Compensation Commission is also provided
for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the forerunner of the
present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid down the
procedure for the appealability of its decisions to the Court of Appeals
under the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by
Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.
A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in
line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No.
1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and
commissions enumerated therein.
This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original
purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the
appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities18 not
expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either
the Constitution or another statute. Nor will it run counter to the
legislative intendment that decisions of the NLRC be reviewable
directly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases within the
adjudicative competence of the voluntary arbitrator are excluded from
the jurisdiction of the NLRC or the labor arbiter.
In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is
deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the
contract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial Court
for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing
business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A
party to the controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an
award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order
confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless the
award is vacated, modified or corrected.19
In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator
with that of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a petition
for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of Appeals must be
deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. As a
matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of
Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court
of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 121227. August 17, 1998]
VICENTE SAN JOSE, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and OCEAN TERMINAL
SERVICES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul a
Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated April 20,
1995 in NLRC-NCR-CA-No. 00671-94 which reversed, on jurisdictional
ground, a Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated January 19, 1994 in NLRC-
NCR Case No. 00-03-02101-93 a case for a money claim -
underpayment of retirement benefit. Records do not show that
petitioner presented a Motion for Reconsideration of subject Decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission, which motion is, generally
required before the filing of Petition for Certiorari.
While the rule prescribing the requisite motion for reconsideration
is not absolute and recognizes some exceptions, there is no showing
that the case at bar constitutes an exception. Nevertheless, we gave due
course to the petition to enable the Court to reiterate and clarify the
jurisdictional boundaries between Labor Arbiters and Voluntary
Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators over money claims, and to
render substantial and speedy justice to subject aged stevedore retiree
who first presented his claim for retirement benefit in April 1991, or seven
years ago.
Labor law practitioners and all lawyers, for that matter, should be
fully conversant with the requirements for the institution
of certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
For instance, it is necessary that a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission must first be
resorted to. The ruling in Corazon Jamer v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 112630, September 5, 1997, comes to the fore
and should be well understood and observed. An ordinary allegation ...
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law (Rule 65, Sec. 1, Revised Rules of Court) is
not a foolproof substitute for a Motion for Reconsideration, absence of
which can be fatal to a Petition for Certiorari. Petitioner cannot and
should not rely on the liberality of the Court simply because he is a
working man.
 In the Jamer case, this court said:
... This premature action of petitioners constitutes a fatal infirmity as
ruled in a long line of decisions, most recently is the case of Building
Care Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission
The filing of such motion is intended to afford public respondent an
opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way
of a re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the
case. Petitioners inaction or negligence under the circumstances is
tantamount to a deprivation of the right and opportunity of the
respondent commission to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly
committed or to vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed...
Likewise, a motion for reconsideration is an adequate remedy;
hence certiorari proceedings, as in this case, will not prosper.
As stated in the Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR-Case
No. 00-03-0201-93, dated January 19, 1994, the facts of this case are
undisputed. The Labor Arbiter reported, thus:
Complainant, in his position paper (Record, pages 11 to 14) states that
he was hired sometime in July 1980 as a stevedore continuously until
he was advised in April 1991 to retire from service considering that he
already reached 65 years old (sic); that accordingly, he did apply for
retirement and was paid P3,156.39 for retirement pay... (Rollo, pp. 15,
26-27, 58-59).
Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-03-02101-93,
January 9, 1994 (Rollo, pp. 15017, at pp. 16-17).
The Labor Arbiter decided the case solely on the merits of the
complaint. Nowhere in the Decision is made mention of or
reference to the issue of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter (Rollo, pp.
15-17). But the issue of jurisdiction is the bedrock of the Petition
because, as earlier intimated, the Decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission, hereinbelow quoted, reversed the Labor
Arbiters Decision on the issue of jurisdiction. Reads subject
Decision of the Labor Arbiter:
Respondents, in their Reply to complainants position paper,
allege (Record, pages 18 to 21) that complainants latest basic salary
was P120.34 per day; that he only worked on rotation basis and not
seven days a week due to numerous stevedores who can not all be
given assignments at the same time; that all stevedores only for paid
every time they were assigned or actually performed stevedoring; that
the computation used in arriving at the amount of P3,156.30 was the
same computation applied to the other stevedores; that the use of
divisor 303 is not applicable because complainant performed
stevedoring job only on call, so while he was connected with the
company for the past 11 years, he did not actually render 11 years of
service; that the burden of proving that complainants latest salary
was P200.00 rests upon him; that he already voluntarily signed a
waiver of quitclaim; that if indeed respondent took advantage of his
illiteracy into signing his quitclaim, he would have immediately filed this
complaint but nay, for it took him two (2) years to do so.
The issue therefore is whether or not complainant is entitled to the
claimed differential of separation pay.
We find for the complainant. He is entitled to differential.
We cannot sustain a computation of length of service based on the
ECC contribution records. Likewise, the allegation that complainant
rendered service for only five days a month for the past 11 years is
statistically improbable, aside from the fact that the best evidence
thereof are complainants daily time records which respondent
are (sic) duty bound to keep and make available anytime in case of
this.
The late filing has no bearing. The prescription period is three years. It
is suffice (sic) that the filing falls within the period.
Whether or not complainant worked on rotation basis is a burden which
lies upon the employer. The presumption is that the normal working
period is eight (8) hours a day and six (6) days a week, or 26 days a
month, unless proven otherwise.
Also, the burden of proving the amount of salaries paid to employees
rests upon the employer not on the employee. It can be easily proven
by payrolls, vouchers, etc. which the employers are likewise duty
bound to keep and present. There being non, we have to sustain
complainants assertion that his latest salary rate was P200 a day
or P5,200 a month. Therefore, his retrenchment pay differential
is P25,443.70 broken down as follows:
P200 x 26 days = P5,200 x 11 years
2
= (P2,600 x 11 years) - P3,156.30
= P28,600 - P3,156.30
= P25,443.70
The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC-
NCR-CA No. 06701-94, April 20, 1995 (Rollo, pp. 18-21).
The National Labor Relations Commission reversed on
jurisdictional ground the aforesaid Decision of the Labor Arbiter; ruling,
as follows:
... His claim for separation pay differential is based on the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between his union and the respondent
company, the pertinent portion of which reads:
xxx ANY UNION member shall be compulsory retired (sic) by the
company upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years, unless otherwise
extended by the company for justifiable reason. He shall be paid his
retirement pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year
of service, a fraction of at least six months being considered as
one (1) whole year.
xxx The company agrees that in case of casual employees and/or
workers who work on rotation basis the criterion for determining their
retirement pay shall be 303 rotation calls or work days as equivalent to
one (1) year and shall be paid their retirement pay equivalent to one
half (1/2) month for every year of service.
xxx
Since the instant case arises from interpretation or implementation of a
collective bargaining agreement, the Labor Arbiter should have
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction in accordance with Article 217 (c) of
the Labor Code, which reads: (Underscoring supplied)
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter and the Commission.
xxx
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company procedure/policies shall be disposed of by the
Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitrator as may be provided in said agreements.
Petitioner contends that:
I. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE APPEAL
DESPITE THE FACT 4 (SIC) THAT IT WAS FILED OUT OF
TIME AND THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT A SURETY BOND
WAS POSTED.
II. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION N SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF
XXX DATED 19 JANUARY 1994 AND DISMISSING THE
CASE ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION
WHEN THE ISSUE DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY PROVISION
OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT.
(Rollo, pp. 7-8)
The Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Comment) sent in on
December 6, 1995 by the Office of the Solicitor General support the
second issue, re: jurisdiction raised by the Petitioner (Rollo, pp. 26-
33, at pp. 38-32).
Labor Arbiter Decision
Labor Arbiters should exert all efforts to cite statutory provisions
and/or judicial decision to buttress their dispositions. An Arbiter cannot
rely on simplistic statements, generalizations, and assumptions. These
are not substitutes for reasoned judgment. Had the Labor Arbiter exerted
more research efforts, support for the Decision could have been found
in pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, its Implementing Rules, and
germane decisions of the Supreme Court. As this Court said in Juan
Saballa, et al. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 102472-84, August 22, 1996:
xxx This Court has previously held that judges and arbiters should
draw up their decisions and resolutions with due care, and make
certain that they truly and accurately reflect their conclusions and their
final dispositions. A decision should faithfully comply with Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts of the case and the law on which it is based. If such decision
had to be completely overturned or set aside, upon the modified
decision, such resolution or decision should likewise state the factual
and legal foundation relied upon. The reason for this is obvious: aside
from being required by the Constitution, the court should be able to
justify such a sudden change of course; it must be able to convincingly
explain the taking back of its solemn conclusions and pronouncements
in the earlier decision. The same thing goes for the findings of fact
made by the NLRC, as it is a settled rule that such findings are entitled
to great respect and even finality when supported by substantial
evidence; otherwise, they shall be struck down for being whimsical and
capricious and arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. It is a
requirement of due process and fair play that the parties to a litigation
be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual
and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. A decision
that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which
it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and
is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint
the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. xxx
This is not an admonition but rather, advice and a critique to stress
that both have obligations to the Courts and students of the
law. Decisions of the Labor Arbiters, the National Labor Relations
Commission, and the Supreme Court serve not only to adjudicate
disputes, but also as an educational tool to practitioners, executives,
labor leaders and law students. They all have a keen interest in methods
of analysis and the reasoning processes employed in labor dispute
adjudication and resolution. In fact, decisions rise or fall on the basis of
the analysis and reasoning processes of decision makers or
adjudicators.
On the issues raised by the Petitioner, we rule:
I. Timeliness of Appeal And Filing of Appeal Bond
The Court rules that the appeal of the respondent corporation was
interposed within the reglementary period, in accordance with the Rules
of the National Labor Relations Commission, and an appeal bond was
duly posted. We adopt the following Comment dated August 14, 1996,
submitted by the National Labor Relations Commission, to wit:
xxx While it is true that private respondent company received a copy of
the decision dated January 19, 1994 of the Labor Arbiter xxx and filed
its appeal on February 14, 1994, it is undisputed that the tenth day
within which to file an appeal fell on a Saturday, the last day to perfect
an appeal shall be the next working day.
Thus, the amendments to the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
Resolution No. 11-01-91 which took effect on January 14, 1992,
provides in part:
xxx
1. Rule VI, Sections 1 and 6 are hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 1. Period of Appeal Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor
Arbiter ... shall be final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter xxx
... If the 10th day ... falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a Holiday, the last
day to perfect the decision shall be the next working day.(Underscoring
supplied)
Hence, it is crystal clear that the appeal was filed within the prescriptive
period to perfect an appeal. Likewise, the petitioners contention that
private respondent did not post the required surety bond, deserves
scant consideration, for the simple reason that a surety bond was
issued by BF General Insurance Company, Inc., in the amount of P25,
443.70 (Rollo, pp. 63-64).
2. Jurisdictional Issue
The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators is clearly defined and specifically delineated in the
Labor Code. The pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, read:
A. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter and the Commission. -- (a)
Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiter shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties
for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic
notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that
workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other
terms and conditions of employment;
4. claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages
arising from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and,
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security,
Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from
employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or
household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement.
xxx
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company procedure/policies shall be disposed of by the
Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitrator so maybe provided in said agreement.
B. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators
Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all
unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to
in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a
Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in
character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall
be resolved as grievances under the collective bargaining
agreement. For purposes of this Article, gross violations of Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to
comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.
The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of
the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes,
grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of
the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall
immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or
Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. The Voluntary Arbitrator
or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall
also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor
practices and bargaining deadlocks.
The aforecited provisions of law cannot be read in isolation or
separately. They must be read as a whole and each Article of the Code
reconciled one with the other. An analysis of the provisions of Articles
217, 261, and 262 indicates, that:
1. The jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and Voluntary
Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators over the
cases enumerated in Articles 217, 261 and 262, can
possibly include money claims in one form or another.
2. The cases where the Labor Arbiters have original and
exclusive jurisdiction are enumerated in Article 217, and
that of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators in Article 261.
3. The original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters is
qualified by an exception as indicated in the introductory
sentence of Article 217 (a), to wit:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters ... (a) Except as otherwise
provided under this Code the Labor Arbiter shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide ... the following cases
involving all workers...
The phrase Except as otherwise provided under this Code refers
to the following exceptions:
A. Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters ...
xxx
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company procedure/policies shall be disposed of by the
Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitrator as may be provided in said agreement.
B. Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. - The Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the
parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including
unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.
Parenthetically, the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter under Article 217 (c), for money claims is limited only to those
arising from statutes or contracts other than a Collective Bargaining
Agreement. The Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators
will have original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims arising
from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and, those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies, under Article 261.
4. The jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators is provided for in Arts. 261 and 262
of the Labor Code as indicated above.
1. A close reading of Article 261 indicates that the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators is limited only to:
... unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies... Accordingly, violations of a collective bargaining agreement,
except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated
as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. xxx.
2. Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators,
however, can exercise jurisdiction over any and all disputes between an
employer and a union and/or individual worker as provided for in Article
262.
Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. - The voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, upon agreement of the
parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including
unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.
It must be emphasized that the jurisdiction of the Voluntary
Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators under Article 262 must be
voluntarily conferred upon by both labor and management. The labor
disputes referred to in the same Article 262 can include all those
disputes mentioned in Article 217 over which the Labor Arbiter has
original and exclusive jurisdiction.
As shown in the above contextual and wholistic analysis of Articles
217, 261, and 262 of the Labor Code, the National Labor Relations
Commission correctly ruled that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction to
hear and decide petitioners money-claim underpayment of
retirement benefits, as the controversy between the parties involved
an issue arising from the interpretation or implementation of a provision
of the collective bargaining agreement. The Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel
of Voluntary Arbitrators has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
controversy under Article 261 of the Labor Code, and not the Labor
Arbiter.
3. Merits of the Case
The Court will not remand the case to the Voluntary Arbitrator
or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators for hearing. This case has
dragged on far too long - eight (8) years. Any further delay would
be a denial of speedy justice to an aged retired stevedore. There is
further the possibility that any Decision by the Voluntary Arbitrator or
Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators will be appealed to the Court of Appeals,
and finally to this Court. Hence, the Court will rule on the merits of the
case.
We adopt as our own the retirement benefit computation formula
of the Labor Arbiter, and the reasons therefor as stated in the decision
abovequoted.
The simple statement of the Labor Arbiter that we cannot sustain
a computation of length of service based on ECC contribution records,
was not amply explained by the Labor Arbiter; however, there is legal
and factual basis for the same. It is unrealistic to expect a lowly
stevedore to know what reports his employer submits to the Employees
Compensation Commission under Book IV, Health, Safety and Welfare
Benefits, Title II, Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund,
of the Labor Code, simply because the insurance fund is solely funded
by the employer and the rate of employers contribution varies according
to time and actuarial computations. (See Articles 183-184; Labor
Code). The worker has no ready access to this employers record. In fact,
it is farthest from his mind to inquire into the amount of employers
contribution, much less whether the employer remits the
contributions. The worker is at all times entitled to benefits upon the
occurrence of the defined contingency even when the employer fails to
remit the contributions. (See Article 196 (b), Labor Code).
All employers are likewise required to keep an employment record
of all their employees, namely: payrolls; and time records. (See Book III,
Rule X, specifically Secs. 6,7,8, 1 and 12, Omnibus Rules -
Implementing the Labor Code).
The respondent-employer was afforded the opportunity to show
proof of the petitioners length of service and pay records. In both
instances, the respondent-employer failed. By its own folly, it must
therefore suffer the consequences of such failure. (South Motorists
Enterprises v. Tosoc, 181 SCRA 386, [1990]) From the very beginning -
by the provision of the retirement provision of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, i.e., the length of service as requirement for retirement, and
salary as a basis for benefit computation - the employer was forewarned
of the need for accurate record keeping. This is precisely the basis of
retirement, and the computation of benefits based on years of service
and monthly wage.
To recapitulate; the Court hereby rules -
1. That the National Labor Relations Commission correctly
ruled that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the
case, because the case involved an issue arising from
the interpretation or implementation of a Collective
Bargaining Agreement;
2. That the appeal to the National Labor Relations
Commission was filed within the reglementary period
and that the appeal bond was filed; and
3. That we adopt the computation formula for the retirement
benefits by the Labor Arbiter, and the basis thereof. The
respondent must therefore pay the petitioner the
additional amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Four
Hundred Forty-Three and Seventy
Centavos P25,443.70) Pesos.
In view of the long delay in the disposition of the case, this decision
is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 145800. January 22, 2003]
CENTRAL PANGASINAN ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
INC., petitioner, vs. GERONIMA MACARAEG and
MARIBETH DE VERA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Central
Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. challenges the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55128 affirming the decision of the
voluntary arbitrator in NCMB-RBI-PM-VA-5-03-99 ordering the
reinstatement of respondents to petitioners employ and payment of their
backwages.
Petitioner is an electric cooperative duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws. Respondent Geronima Macaraeg and Maribeth
de Vera are employees of petitioner at its office in Area V, Bayambang,
Pangasinan. Respondent de Vera was employed as teller whose
primary duty was to accept payments from petitioners consumers in
Bayambang and remit her collections to the cashier, herein co-
respondent Geronima Macaraeg. Respondent Macaraegs duty was to
deposit the daily collections of the office to petitioners account at the
Rural Bank of Central Pangasinan in Bayambang.
From January 1998 to January 1999, respondent de Vera
accommodated and encashed the crossed checks of her sister, Evelyn
Joy Estrada. Evelyn issued two hundred eleven (211) crossed checks
amounting to P6,945,128.95 payable to petitioner cooperative despite
the absence of any transaction or any outstanding obligation with
petitioner. In turn, respondent de Vera, with the knowledge and consent
of respondent Macaraeg, paid the full value of these checks from the
cash collections of petitioner. At the end of the day, respondents
credited the checks as part of their collection and deposited the same
together with their cash collection to the account of petitioner at the Rural
Bank of Central Pangasinan.
Sometime in January 1999, petitioner, through its Finance
Department, noticed that several checks payable to petitioner from the
collections in the Area V office were returned due to insufficiency of
funds.
On January 19, 1999, Josefina Mandapat, Sandra Frias and
Marites Radac, petitioners Finance Manager, Chief Accountant and
Legal Assistant, respectively, confronted respondents with their
discovery. Respondent de Vera admitted that the checks were issued by
her sister and that she encashed them from the money collected from
petitioners customers.
On January 21, 1999, Mrs. Josefina Mandapat submitted a
memorandum to petitioners General Manager, Salvador M. de Guzman,
detailing their findings about the bounced checks. On February 2, 1999,
she submitted an addendum to her memorandum.
On February 4, 1999, petitioner, through de Guzman, issued a
memorandum to respondents placing them under preventive
suspension and requiring them to explain in writing within forty-eight (48)
hours why they misappropriated cooperative funds. In the same
communication, a hearing was set on February 13, 1999 at 9:30 a.m. at
the Board Room of petitioner before Atty. Teodoro Fernandez.
In their respective Answers/Explanations, respondents denied
having misappropriated the funds of petitioner cooperative. They alleged
that: (1) the checks that bounced were redeposited with the Rural Bank
of Central Pangasinan; (2) the amount representing the face value of the
checks had been used by petitioner as of December 15, 1998; (3) there
was never any shortage in the cooperative money or funds in their
possession; and (4) they never violated any policy of the cooperative
and on the contrary, they have been very religious in remitting the funds
and money of petitioner.[1]
At the scheduled hearing on February 13, 1999, respondents, with
assistance of counsel, appeared before Atty. Teodoro
Fernandez. Respondent de Vera testified and admitted that she
encashed the checks of Evelyn Joy Estrada because the latter is her
older sister and that she has a soft spot for her; that Mrs. Estrada owns
a sash factory and that she merely wanted to help her sister meet her
business obligations; that sometime in November 1998, Mrs. Marites
Radoc, Chief Accountant of petitioner, called her attention to one check
which bounced thrice; that this check was eventually replaced by her
sister with cash; that despite the bouncing of some other checks, all
checks were eventually funded and paid to petitioner, hence, petitioner
incurred no losses in its collections; that she has worked for petitioner
for nineteen (19) years and this is the first time she has been charged
administratively by petitioner.
Respondent Macaraeg admitted that she knew of the
accommodations given by respondent de Vera to her sister; that she
allowed her subordinate to do it because respondent de Vera is
her kumare, and that she knew that Mrs. Estradas checks were
sufficiently funded. She worked for petitioner for twenty-two (22) years
and has never had an administrative charge.
Mrs. Josefina Mandapat, Finance Manager of petitioner, testified
as petitioners witness. She stated that she prepared a report on the
findings of their accountant regarding the encashment of Evelyn Joy
Estradas checks, and that the encashment of said checks is prohibited
under an office memorandum.
On March 10, 1999, Atty. Fernandez submitted his findings to the
General Manager of petitioner. On March 19, 1999, on the basis of said
findings and recommendation, the General Manager issued to
respondents separate notices of termination, effective April 9, 1999, for
serious misconduct, and breach of trust and confidence reposed on
them by management.[2]
Respondents, with the help of the President and representative of
the Union, Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative (CENPELCO)
Employees Association-Tupas Local Chapter No. R01-0012, questioned
their dismissal before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB). They claimed that their dismissal was without just cause and
in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which
requires that the case should first be brought before a grievance
committee. Eventually, the parties agreed to submit the case to a
voluntary arbitrator for arbitration.
On August 12, 1999, the voluntary arbitrator rendered a decision
in favor of respondents, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned arbitrator
finds and so holds:
(1) That the parties failed to comply with the provisions of the
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE of the Collective Bargaining Agreement;
(2) Reinstate immediately upon receipt of the Decision complainants
GERONIMA MACARAEG and MARIBETH DE VERA to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights;
(3) Pay complainants their backwages to be reckoned from the time
their employment has been [sic] illegally terminated up to their actual
reinstatement based on their last salary.
Parties are hereby enjoined to be faithful with their commitment to
abide by this Decision which under their Collective Bargaining
Agreement is final, executory and not subject to appeal.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals via a petition for
review. On August 17, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
dismissing the petition and affirming the decision of the voluntary
arbitrator. Hence, the present course of action.
Petitioner claims that:
(1) The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
finding that the procedure leading to the termination of respondents
Maribeth de Vera and Geronima Macaraeg was in violation of the
provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) particularly
Steps 1-4, Article XIII of the said Agreement.
(2) The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
holding that petitioner illegally terminated the services of herein private
respondents.[4]
The petition is impressed with merit.
At the outset, we hold that the first issue raised in the petition
pertaining to the alleged violation of the CBA grievance procedure is
moot and academic. The parties active participation in the voluntary
arbitration proceedings, and their failure to insist that the case be
remanded to the grievance machinery, shows a clear intention on their
part to have the issue of respondents illegal dismissal directly resolved
by the voluntary arbitrator. We therefore find it unnecessary to rule on
the matter in light of their preference to bring the illegal dismissal dispute
to voluntary arbitration without passing through the grievance
machinery.
This leads us to the next issue of whether respondents were
validly dismissed. To constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two
requisites must be met, namely: (1) it must be for a just or authorized
cause, and (2) the employee must be afforded due process. [5]
We hold that there exist a valid reason to dismiss both
employees. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code allows an employer to
dismiss employees for willful breach of trust or loss of
confidence.[6] Proof beyond reasonable doubt of their misconduct is not
required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for the same or that
the employer has reasonable ground to believe that they are responsible
for the misconduct and their participation therein rendered them
unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of their position.[7]
To be sure, the acts of the respondents were clearly inimical to the
financial interest of the petitioner. During the investigation, they admitted
accommodating Evelyn Joy Estrada by encashing her checks from its
funds. They did so without petitioners knowledge, much less its
permission. These inimical acts lasted for more than a year, and
probably would have continued had it not been discovered in time. All
along, they were aware that these acts were prohibited by the Coop
Checks Policy.[8] Clearly, there was willful breach of trust on the
respondents part, as they took advantage of their highly sensitive
positions to violate their duties.
Moreover, the acts of the respondents caused damage to the
petitioner. During those times the checks were illegally encashed,
petitioner was not able to fully utilize the collections, primarily in servicing
its debts. In her memorandum[9] dated January 21, 1999, Finance
Manager Josefina Mandapat reported how petitioner is prejudiced, thus:
Though the checks were funded, it constitutes a violation of Coop
Policy. Checks that are covered even by local clearing only take three
days to be converted to cash and when returned another three (3) days
to retry clearing. The cooperative is deprived of the privilege to
maximize use of its collections primarily in servicing its debts
considering the state of calamity and even at the moment wherein
we worry every time if we can payoff (sic) our NAPOCOR power
bill.[10]
It is not material that they did not misappropriate any amount of
money, nor incur any shortage relative to the funds in their
possession.[11] The basic premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of
confidence is that the employees concerned hold positions of trust. The
betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offence for which an employee
is penalized.[12] In the case at bar, the respondents held positions of
utmost trust and confidence. As teller[13] and cashier,[14] respectively,
they are expected to possess a high degree of fidelity. They are
entrusted with a considerable amount of cash. Respondent de Vera
accepted payments from petitioners consumers while respondent
Macaraeg received remittances for deposit at petitioners bank. They did
not live up to their duties and obligations.
Nor is there any doubt that petitioner observed procedural due
process in dismissing the respondents. In separate memoranda dated
February 4, 1999 and signed by the General Manager ( de Guzman),
the respondents were both appraised of the particular acts or omissions
constituting the charges against them. They gave their own
answer/explanation to the charges. They participated in the investigation
conducted at petitioners board room on February 13, 1999 at 11:30
a.m. They were represented by counsel during the investigation. Finally,
notices were sent to them on March 19, 1999, informing them of the
basis of their termination. In fine, private respondents were given due
process before they were dismissed. Time and again, we have stressed
that due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. [15]
We are aware that the respondents Macaraeg and de Vera have
been employed with the petitioner for 22 and 19 years of continuous
service, respectively, and this is the first time that either of them has
been administratively charged. Nonetheless, it is our considered view
that their dismissal is justified considering the breach of trust they have
committed.Well to emphasize, the longer an employee stays in the
service of the company, the greater is his responsibility for knowledge
and compliance with the norms of conduct and the code of discipline in
the company. [16] Considering that they have mishandled the funds of the
cooperative and the danger they have posed to its members, their
reinstatement is neither sound in reason nor just in principle. It is
irreconcilable with trust and confidence that has been irretrievably
lost.[17]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55128 (affirming
the decision of the voluntary arbitrator in NCMB-RBI-PM-VA-5-03-99)
are reversed and set aside.
SO ORDERED
[G. R. No. 138094. May 29, 2003]
MARILOU GUANZON APALISOK, petitioner, vs. RADIO
PHILIPPINES NETWORK RADIO STATION DYKC and
STATION MANAGER GEORGE SUAZO, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 assailing the Court of Appeals Decision[1] of October 30, 1998 and
Resolution[2] of February 26, 1999.
On May 15, 1995, Marilou Gaunzon Apalisok (petitioner), then
Production Chief of Radio Philippines Network (RPN) Station DYKC,
received a Memorandum[3] from Branches Operations Manager Gilito
Datoc asking her to submit a written explanation why no disciplinary
action should be taken against her for performance of acts hostile to
RPN, and arrogant, disrespectful and defiant behavior towards her
superior Station Manager George Suazo.
Complying, petitioner submitted on May 16, 1995 her Answer[4] to
the memorandum.
On May 31, 1995, petitioner received another memorandum from
the Administrative Manager of RPN, informing her of the termination of
her services effective the close of regular office hours of June 15, 1995.
By letter of June 5, 1995, petitioner informed RPN, by letter of
June 5, 1995, of her decision to waive her right to resolve her case
through the grievance machinery of RPN as provided for in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and to lodge her case before the proper
government forum. She thereafter filed a complaint against RPN DYKC
and Suazo (respondents) for illegal dismissal before the National labor
Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch of Region 7 which
referred it to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.
By Submission Agreement[5] dated June 20, 1995 signed by their
respective counsels, petitioner and respondents agreed to submit for
voluntary arbitration the issue of whether petitioners dismissal was valid
and to abide by the decision of the voluntary arbitrator.
In her position paper[6] submitted before the voluntary arbitrator,
petitioner prayed that her dismissal be declared invalid and that she be
awarded separation pay, backwages and other benefits granted to her
by the Labor Code since reinstatement is no longer feasible due to
strained relations. She also prayed that she be awarded P2,000,000.00
for moral damages and P500,000.00 for exemplary damages.
Respondents on the other hand prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint, arguing that the voluntary arbitrator had no jurisdiction over
the case and, assuming that he had, the complaint is dismissible for lack
of merit as petitioner was not illegally dismissed.[7]
On October 18, 1995, the voluntary arbitrator rendered an
Award[8] in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this Voluntary Arbitrator
rules that the dismissal of complainant was invalid.
However, considering the impracticality of reinstatement because of
proven strained relation between the parties, respondents, instead
shall pay complainant the amount of FOUR HUNDRED ELEVEN
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX PESOS & SEVENTY-SIX
CENTAVOS (P411,126.76) itemized as follows:
In summary, the total award is hereunder itemized:
1. SEPARATION PAY (P14,600.00
divide by 30 days multiplied by
15 days per year of service x 19
years) ......................................... P138,700.95
2. BACKWAGES (P14,600 X 6
months) ................................ P 88,817.00
3. MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES .................................. P100,000.00
4. SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVES
(P14,600 divide by 30 days =
P486.67 x 5 days = P2,433.35 x
19 years ........................................ P 46,233.65
5. ATTORNEYS FEES (10%) .... P 37,375.16
All other claims are hereby denied.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents motion for reconsideration[9] of the Award having
been denied by the voluntary arbitrator by Order of November 21, 1995,
they filed a petition for certiorari before this Court, docketed as G. R. No.
122841.
By Resolution[10] of December 13, 1995, the Third Division of this
Court referred G. R. No. 122841 to the Court of Appeals, following the
case of Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development
Bank Employees, et al.[11] holding that decisions or awards of a voluntary
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators in labor cases are reviewable by the
Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, finding that the option of petitioner not to
subject the dispute to the grievance machinery provided for in the CBA
was tantamount to relinquishing her right to avail of the aid of a voluntary
arbitrator in settling the dispute which likewise converted an unresolved
grievance into a resolved one, held that the voluntary arbitrator did not
have jurisdiction over petitioners complaint and accordingly nullified and
set aside, by Decision of October 30, 1998, the voluntary arbitration
award.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[12] of the Court of Appeals
Decision having been denied by Resolution[13] of February 26, 1999, the
present petition was filed which raises the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Voluntary Arbitrator had jurisdiction over
petitioners complaint, and
2. Whether or not respondents are guilty of estoppel.[14]
Petitioner, citing Article 262 of the Labor Code of the Philippines,
as amended which reads:
ARTICLE 262. JURISDICTION OVER OTHER LABOR
DISPUTES. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall hear and decide
all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and
bargaining deadlocks. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
contends that her option not to subject the dispute to the grievance
machinery of RPN did not amount to her relinquishing of her right to avail
of voluntary arbitration as a mode of settling it for she and respondents
in fact agreed to have the dispute settled by a voluntary arbitrator when
they freely executed the above-said Submission Agreement. She thus
concludes that the voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction over the
controversy.[15]
Petitioner contends in any event that even assuming that the
voluntary arbitrator had no jurisdiction over the case, it would not be in
keeping with settled jurisprudence to allow a losing party to question the
authority of the voluntary arbitrator after it had freely submitted itself to
its authority.[16]
The petition is impressed with merit.
The above-quoted Article 262 of the Labor Code provides
that upon agreement of the parties, the voluntary arbitrator can hear
and decide all other labor disputes.
Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, voluntary
arbitration as a mode of settling the dispute was not forced upon
respondents. Both parties indeed agreed to submit the issue of validity
of the dismissal of petitioner to the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator
by the Submission Agreement duly signed by their respective counsels.
As the voluntary arbitrator had jurisdiction over the parties
controversy, discussion of the second issue is no longer necessary.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision of October 30, 1998
is hereby SET ASIDE and the voluntary arbitration Award of October 18,
1995 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 143013-14 December 18, 2000
TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW and
individual union members DANILO G. MADARA and ROMEO L.
MANAYAO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, as
Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TEMIC TELEFUNKEN
MICROELECTRONICS, (PHILS.), INC., respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
dated December 23, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 54227 and 54665 and
its Resolution2 dated April 19, 2000, denying herein petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration.
The assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals granted the
petition of private respondent TEMIC TELEFUNKEN
MICROELECTRONICS, (Phils.), INC., (Company, for brevity) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 54227 reversing and setting aside the Secretary of
Labor’s: (1) Decision dated May 28, 1999; and (2) Resolution dated
July 16, 1999, insofar as the Company was directed to pay backwages
and grant financial assistance to the striking workers.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 54665, on the other hand, the petition of
TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW
(Union, for brevity) and individual union members DANILO G.
MADARA and ROMEO L. MANAYAO was dismissed on a finding that
the Secretary of Labor did not abuse his discretion nor acted in excess
of his jurisdiction when he declared illegal the strike staged by the
Union, its officers and members on September 14, 1995, and that as a
result thereof, those who participated therein have lost their
employment status.
The petition is not meritorious, and the same should be as it is hereby
dismissed.
The facts as borne by the records are as follows:
The labor dispute started on August 25, 1995 when the Company and
the Union reached a deadlock in their negotiations for a new collective
bargaining agreement. On August 28, 1995, the Union filed a Notice of
Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
On September 8, 1995,3 the then Acting Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment, Jose S. Brillantes, intervened and assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Art. 263, par. (g), 4 of the Labor
Code, as amended. Thus, the Order5 of the said Acting Secretary of
Labor enjoined any strike or lockout, whether actual or intended,
between the parties. His Notice of the Assumption Order6 was
personally served on the representatives of the Company, namely, on
Atty. Allan Montaño, counsel of the Union-FFW, on September 9, 1995
at 1:25 p.m. and twice on Ms. Liza Dimaano, Union President, first on
September 8, 1995 at 7:15 p.m. and again on September 11, 1995 at
9:30 a.m. but both union representatives refused to acknowledge
receipt thereof.
Despite the assumption Order, the Union struck on September 14,
1995. Two (2) days later, the Acting Secretary of Labor issued an
Order7 directing the striking workers to return to work within twenty-four
(24) hours and for the Company to admit them back to work under the
terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. Notice8 of the Return-
to-Work Order9 dated September 16, 1995 of the Acting Secretary of
Labor was sent to the striking Union members but still some of them
refused to heed the order and continued with their picket. The
Federation of Free Workers (FFW) received and acknowledged receipt
of the said Return to Work Order on September 18, 1995. On
September 23, 1995, violence erupted in the picket lines. The service
bus ferrying non-striking workers was stoned, causing injuries to its
passengers. Thereafter, complaints for threats, defamation, illegal
detention and physical injuries were filed against the strikers.
On October 2, 1995, the Company issued letters of termination for
cause to the workers who did not report back to work despite the
Notice of Assumption and Return-to-Work Orders issued by the Acting
Secretary Jose S. Brillantes of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE).
On October 27, 1995, the Acting Secretary of Labor issued another
Order10 directing the Company to reinstate all striking workers "except
the Union Officers, shop stewards, and those with pending criminal
charges, x x x" while the resolution of the legality of the strike was
pending. This exclusion Order was reaffirmed with some modifications
in an Order11 dated November 24, 1995.
On December 5, 1995, the Union filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 122743, questioning the exclusions
made in the aforesaid Orders.
On June 27, 1996, while the said petition in G.R. No. 122743 was
pending, then Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing* issued a
Writ of Execution12 for the physical reinstatement of the remaining
striking workers who were not reinstated as contained in the thirty-two
(32) page list13 attached to the aforesaid writ.
Accordingly, on July 3, 1996, the Company filed a Motion to Quash,
Recall or Suspend the Writ of Execution14 issued by Secretary
Quisumbing. This motion was denied15 by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE, for brevity) for lack of merit and, in the same
Order, the DOLE directed the issuance of an Alias Writ to enforce the
actual and physical reinstatement of the workers, or in case the same
was not feasible, to effect payroll reinstatement. On November 21,
1996, the Company’s motion for reconsideration was also denied. 16
On December 9, 1996, the Company filed with this Court a petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 127215, questioning the denial of
its motion for reconsideration and the Alias Writ issued by the DOLE to
enforce the actual and physical reinstatement or the payroll
reinstatement of the workers (including the Original Writ of Execution of
June 27, 1996).
After we consolidated17 the petitions for certiorari of the Company and
the Union in G.R. Nos. 122743 and 127215, respectively, we rendered
a Decision therein on December 12, 1997. The Company’s petition
for certiorari in G.R. No. 127215 was dismissed for lack of merit. In
G.R. No. 122743, we granted the Union’s petition and ordered the
reinstatement of all striking workers without exception. We also
directed the Secretary of Labor and Employment to determine with
dispatch the legality of the strike as well as the liability of the individual
strikers, if any.
After receipt of our said Decision in G.R. Nos. 122743 and 127215, the
DOLE issued an Alias Writ of Execution on August 26, 1998.
Thereafter, the Company moved to quash the Alias Writ which was,
however, denied18 by the DOLE. The motion for reconsideration filed by
the Company was similarly denied.19 Aggrieved by the preceding
rulings of the DOLE, the Company elevated this case to this Court via
another petition for certioraridocketed as G.R. No. 135788.
On December 7, 1998, we resolved20 to dismiss the said petition in
G.R. No. 135788 for (a) failing to state the place of service by
registered mail on the adverse party; (b) failing to submit a certification
duly executed by the president of the petitioning Company or by its
representative which shows its authority to represent and act on behalf
of the Company; and (c) for lack of the requisite certificate of non-
forum shopping. We denied this petition with finality on our March 15,
1999 Resolution21 where we held that the Secretary of Labor did not
abuse his discretion in denying the Company’s motion to quash the
execution of our Decision dated December 12, 1997.
In compliance with our order to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment "to determine with dispatch the legality of the strike,"
marathon hearings were conducted22 at the DOLE Office with Atty. Lita
V. Aglibut as hearing officer. On September 22, 1998, both the Union
and the Company complied with the order to submit their respective
position papers. The Company adduced evidence and submitted its
case for decision. The Union did not adduce evidence. Instead, the
Union manifested that it would file a motion to dismiss for failure of the
Company to prove its case with the request that it be allowed to
present evidence should its motion be denied.
During the subsequent hearings23 conducted by the hearing officer of
DOLE, the Union insisted that a ruling should first be made on the
Demurrer to Evidence it previously filed notwithstanding repeated
reminders by the Hearing Officer that the technical rules of evidence
and procedure do not apply to proceedings before DOLE. Thereafter,
an exchange of pleadings, reiterating their respective positions, ensued
between the Company and the Union.
On May 19, 1999, the Union filed a motion before the DOLE praying for
the issuance of another Alias Writ of Execution in connection with our
March 15, 1999 Resolution in G.R. No. 135788. The Union contended
that this Resolution has declared the dismissals of the striking workers
as illegal and therefore a writ should be issued for the physical
reinstatement of the workers with full backwages and other benefits
reckoned from June 27, 1996.
On May 28, 1999, the Secretary of Labor and Employment resolved
the matter in a Decision.24 The Secretary of Labor declared therein that
in hearings and resolutions of labor disputes, before the DOLE, his
Office is not governed by the strict and technical rules of evidence and
procedure observed in the regular courts of law, and that it will resolve
the issues based on the pleadings, the documentary evidence and
other records of the case. The dispositive portion of the said Decision
dated May 28, 1999 reads:
"WHEREFORE, PREMISED ON THE FOREGOING, this Office
hereby:
a. Declares the strike conducted by the Telefunken Semiconductors
Employees Union-FFW on 14 September 1995 as illegal for having
been waged in open, willful and knowing defiance of the assumption
order dated 8 September 1995 and the subsequent return-to-work
order dated 16 September 1995 and consequently, the striking workers
are declared to have lost their employment status;
b. Directs the payment of backwages and other benefits to the striking
workers corresponding to the temporary reinstatement periods (1) from
27 June 1996 to 28 October 1996, (2) from 21 November 1998 up to
the date of this Decision;
c. Directs the Telefunken Micro-Electronics (Phils.), Inc. to grant
financial assistance equivalent to one (1) month for every year of
service to the striking workers conformably with its grant of the same
benefit to other strikers as manifested by the Company to the Supreme
Court on 20 November 1997.
In this connection, the Bureau of Working Conditions, this Department,
is hereby directed to compute the total award herein made and to
submit its report of computation to this Office within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED."25
Dissatisfied, both the Company and the Union together with individual
union members Nancy Busa and Arnel Badua, filed motions for
reconsideration of the said Decision of the Secretary of Labor. On July
16, 1999,26 the Secretary of Labor denied the said motions.
The Company and the Union filed their respective petitions for
certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 54227 and 54665 with the
Court of Appeals and these were later on consolidated. On December
23, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, the COMPANY’s Petition in CA-G.R. No. SP 54227 is
GRANTED. The Secretary of Labor’s Decision dated 28 May 1999 and
his Resolution dated 16 July 1999 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE in
so far as they direct the company to pay backwages and grant financial
assistance to the striking workers. The said Decision and Resolution
are AFFIRMED in all other respects. The Union’s Petitions in CA-G.R.
SP No. 546654 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED."
On January 24, 2000, only the Union sought reconsideration27 of the
said Decision of the appellate court. However, it was denied for lack of
merit by the Court of Appeals on April 19, 2000 in its Resolution.28
In the petition at bench, petitioners Union, Madara and Manayao
submits the following assignment of errors, to wit:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED:
I
…IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT
SECRETARY OF LABOR IN FINDING THE STRIKE STAGE
BY THE UNION ILLEGAL WHICH WAS FEEBLY BASED
ON THE COMPANY’S POSITION PAPER AND THE
MATERIALS AND PICTORIALS ATTACHED THERETO
WHICH ARE BEREFT OF PROBATIVE VALUE BECAUSE
THEY ARE PATENTLY INADMISSIBLE AND
INCOMPETENT.
II
….IN SUSTAINING THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY’S
DECISION EFFECTING THE WHOLESALE TERMINATION
OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE STRIKING TEMIC WORKERS
WITHOUT ANY DETERMINATION OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL
LIABILITY, IF ANY, AS ORDERED BY THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ILLEGAL
ACTS COMMITTED BY THE STRIKERS ATTENDANT TO
THE STRIKE.
III
….IN RULING THAT "THE SOLE OFFICE OF THE WRIT
OF CERTIORARI IS THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF
JURISDICTION INCLUDING THE COMMISSION OF
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION," DOES NOT INCLUDE CORRECTION OF
HEREIN PUBLIC RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF
LABOR’S EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE AND
FACTUAL FINDINGS THEREON.
IV
….IN RULING IN A MANNER ABSOLUTE "THAT
TECHNICAL RULES OF EVIDENCE PREVAILING IN THE
COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY HAVE NO ROOM IN
ADMINISTRATIVE AND/OR QUASI-JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS."
V
….IN UPHOLDING THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF
LABOR’S RULING THAT THE NON-APPLICATION OF
TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE IN PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
BARS THE PETITIONERS FROM ADDUCING EVIDENCE
AFTER THE DENIAL OF THE UNION'S DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE.
VI
….IN NEGATING THE PETITIONERS’ VESTED RIGHT TO
BACKWAGES.
The petition has no merit.
As to the first and second assigned errors, herein petitioners contend
that according to the Constitution29 and jurisprudence,30 strikes enjoy
the presumption of legality and the burden of proving otherwise rests
upon the respondent Company; that the case should not have been
decided on the basis of the position paper method because in several
instances31 this Court has looked with disfavor on the position paper
method in disposing labor cases; that due to the transcendental issues
involved, a hearing should have been conducted to avoid the
impression of denial of due process considering the dearth of evidence
submitted by respondent Company; and that the pieces of evidence
submitted by respondent Company are wanting in probative value.
Herein petitioners also argue that for a union officer to lose his
employment status it must be proved that he knowingly participated in
an illegal strike; and that in the case of an ordinary member, it must not
only be demonstrated that he actually participated in the illegal strike
but also that he has committed illegal acts during the strike and which
respondent Company allegedly failed to prove.
We do not agree. Despite petitioners’ vain attempt to structure the case
to show, on its surface, a question of law, nevertheless, the case
essentially involves a question of fact. The issues raised basically boils
down to a determination of whether or not the position paper and the
pieces of evidence adduced by the Company before the DOLE are
sufficient in probative value to overthrow the constitutional presumption
of the legality of the strike. As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General in his Comment,32 "it . . . .(the first and second assigned
errors) essentially involve questions of fact." It calls for a "re-evaluation
of facts and a re-examination of the evidence."
We take this occasion to emphasize that the office of a petition for
review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court requires that it
shall raise only questions of law.33 The factual findings by quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the Department of Labor and Employment, when
supported by substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect in view
of their expertise in their respective fields.34 Judicial review of labor
cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence on
which the labor official’s findings rest.35 It is not our function to assess
and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary,
adduced by the parties to an appeal, particularly where the findings of
both the trial court (here, the DOLE Secretary) and the appellate court
on the matter coincide,36 as in this case at bar. The Rule limits that
function of the Court to the review or revision of errors of law and not to
a second analysis of the evidence.37 Here, petitioners would have us
re-calibrate all over again the factual basis and the probative value of
the pieces of evidence submitted by the Company to the DOLE,
contrary to the provisions of Rule 45. Thus, absent any showing of
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and unless lack of any
basis for the conclusions made by the appellate court be amply
demonstrated, we may not disturb such factual findings.
Although we have ruled against the reliability of position papers in
disposing of labor cases, in the cases of Batongbacal v. Associated
Bank38 and Progress Homes v. NLRC,39 this was due to certain patent
matters that should have been tried by the administrative agency
concerned, such as certain factual circumstances which, however, are
unavailing in the case at bar.
In Batongbacal, we withheld judgment on the case due to the absence
of a definitive factual determination of the status of petitioner therein as
an assistant vice-president of therein respondent Bank. It has not been
established by the Labor Arbiter whether the petitioner therein was a
managerial or a rank-and-file employee, noting that there are different
causes of termination for both the managerial and rank-and-file
employees. Thus, the need to remand the case was necessary.
In Progress Homes, on the other hand, we found that despite the
absence of any evidence to establish and support therein private
respondents’ claim that the petitioners therein were their immediate
employers, the Labor Arbiter forthwith concluded the illegal dismissal of
the private respondents. Also, there was the apparent failure of the
Labor Arbiter to justify why the private petitioner therein should be held
solidarily liable with Progress Homes. There was a clear absence of
evidence to show that petitioner therein had engaged the services of
private respondents therein and that petitioner therein had acted
maliciously and in bad faith in terminating the services of private
respondents.
The herein petitioners dismally failed to show that there really existed
certain issues which would necessitate the remand of this case at bar,
or that the appellate court misapprehended certain facts when it
dismissed their petition for certiorari.
The need to determine the individual liabilities of the striking workers,
the union officers and members alike, was correctly dispensed with by
the Secretary of Labor after he gave sufficient opportunity to the
striking workers to cease and desist from continuing with their picket.
Ensconced in the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, is the
rule that:
Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
xxx xxx xxx
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely
to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption per
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the
assumption or certification order. If one had already taken place at
the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked
out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer
shall immediately resume operations and re-admit all workers under
the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or
lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission
may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the
compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may
issue to enforce the same. (Emphasis Ours)
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear from the foregoing legal provision that the moment the
Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an
industry indispensable to national interest, such assumption shall have
the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending
strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue
another order directing them to return to work. The mere issuance of
an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries
with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is
not expressly stated in the assumption order.40 However, petitioners
refused to acknowledge this directive of the Secretary of Labor on
September 8, 1995 thereby necessitating the issuance of another
order expressly directing the striking workers to cease and desist from
their actual strike, and to immediately return to work but which directive
the herein petitioners opted to ignore. In this connection, Article 264(a)
of the Labor Code clearly provides that:
Article 264. Prohibited Activities.
(a) x x x
No strike or lock out shall be declared after the assumption of
jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or
submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or
during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike
or lockout.
x x x. Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike
and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have
lost his employment status: Provided, that mere participation of a
worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment even if a replacement had been hired by
the employer during such lawful strike. (Emphasis Ours)
The rationale of this prohibition is that once jurisdiction over the labor
dispute has been properly acquired by the competent authority, that
jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the
coercive processes of a strike.41 We have held in a number of cases
that defiance to the assumption and return-to-work orders of the
Secretary of Labor after he has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground
for loss of the employment status of any striking union officer or
member.42
Furthermore, the claim of petitioners that the assumption and return-to-
work Orders issued by the Secretary of Labor were allegedly
inadequately served upon them is untenable in the light of what have
already been clearly established in this case, to wit:
x x x, the reports of the DOLE process server, shows that the Notice of
Order of 8 September 1995 was actually served on the Union
President. The latter, however, refused to acknowledge receipt of the
same on two separate occasions (on 8 September 1995 at 7:15 p.m.
and on 11 September 1995 at 9:30 a.m.). The Union’s counsel of
record, Atty. Allan Montano, similarly refused to acknowledge receipt of
the 8 September 1995 Order on 9 September 1995 at 1:25 p.m.
Records also show that the Order of 16 September 1995 was
served at the strike area with copies left with the striking workers,
per the process server’s return, although a certain Virgie
Cardenas also refused to acknowledge receipt. The Federation of
Free Workers officially received a copy as acknowledged by a
certain Lourdes at 3:40 p.m. of 18 September 1995.
The foregoing clearly negate the Union’s contention of inadequate
service of the Orders dated 8 and 16 September 1995 of Acting
Secretary Brillantes. Furthermore, the DOLE process server’s
discharge of his function is an official act carrying the presumption of
regularity in its performance which the Union has not disproved, much
less disputed with clear and convincing evidence.
Likewise, it would be stretching the limits of credibility if We were to
believe that the Union was unaware of the said Orders during all the
conciliation conferences conducted by the NCMB-DOLE. Specifically,
in the conciliation meetings after the issuance of the Order of 8
September 1995 to settle the unresolved CBA issues and after the
issuance of the Order of 16 September 1995 to establish the
mechanics for a smooth implementation of this Office’s return-to-work
directive, the Union – with its officers and members in attendance –
never questioned the propriety or adequacy by which these Orders
were served upon them.
We are not unaware of the difficulty of serving assumption and return-
to-work orders on striking unions and their members who invariably
view the DOLE’s process servers with suspicion and hostility. The
refusal to receive such orders and other processes is, as described by
the Supreme Court in an analogous case, "an apparent attempt to
frustrate the ends of justice." (Navale, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 253
SCRA 705)
Such being the case, We cannot allow the Union to thwart the efficacy
of the assumption and return to work orders, issued in the national
interest, through the simple expediency of refusing to acknowledge
receipt thereof.
Having thus resolved the threshold issue as hereinabove
discussed, it necessarily follows that the strike of the Union
cannot be viewed as anything but illegal for having been staged in
open and knowing defiance of the assumption and return-to-work
orders. The necessary consequence thereof are also detailed by
the Supreme Court in its various rulings. In Marcopper Mining
Corp. v. Brillantes (254 SCRA 595), the High Tribunal stated in no
uncertain terms that -
"by staging a strike after the assumption of jurisdiction or
certification for arbitration, workers forfeited their right to; be
readmitted to work, having abandoned their employment, and so
could be validly replaced."
Again, in Allied Banking Corporation v. NLRC (258 SCRA 724), the
Supreme Court ruled that:
"xxx. However, private respondents failed to take into consideration the
cases recently decided by this Court which emphasized on the strict
adherence to the rule that defiance of the return-to-work order of the
Secretary of Labor would constitute a valid ground for dismissal. The
respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed
to immediately comply with the return-to-work order, are clearly spelled
out in Article 264 of the Labor Code which provides that any
declaration of a strike or lock out after the Secretary of Labor and
Employment has assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is
considered an illegal act. Therefore, any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work order may as
a result thereof be considered to have lost his employment status."
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, We have no alternative but to
confirm the loss of employment status of all those who participated in
the strike in defiance of the assumption order dated 8 September 1995
and did not report back to work as directed in the Order of 16
September 1995.43
To cast doubt on the regularity of the aforesaid service of the two
Orders issued by the Secretary of Labor, petitioners cite Section 1,
Rule IX of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment which provides
that:
Section 1. Hours and Days When Writ Shall Be Served. – Writ of
Execution shall be served at any day, except Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays, between the hours of eight in the morning and five in the
afternoon. x x x
However, the above-cited rule is not applicable to the case at bar
inasmuch as Sections 144 and 4,45 Rule III of the same NLRC Manual
provide that such "Execution shall issue only upon a judgment or order
that finally disposes of an action or proceeding." The assumption and
return-to-work Orders issued by the Secretary of Labor in the case at
bar are not the kind of orders contemplated in the immediately cited
rule of the NLRC because such Orders of the Secretary of Labor did
not yet finally dispose of the labor dispute. As pointed out by the
Secretary of Labor in his Decision, petitioners cannot now feign
ignorance of his official intervention, to wit:
The admissibility of the evidence presented by the Company, however,
has been questioned. The Union’s arguments are less than convincing.
The numerous publications of the subject DOLE Orders in various
newspapers, tabloids, radio and television cannot be considered
hearsay and subject to authentication considering that the subject
thereof were the lawful Orders of a competent government authority. In
the case of the announcements posted on the Union’s bulletin board,
pictures of which were presented by the Company in evidence, suffice
it for us to state that the bulletin board belonged to the Union. Since the
veracity of the contents of the announcements on the bulletin board
were never denied by the Union except to claim that these were "self-
serving, unverified/unverifiable and thus utterly inadmissible," We
cannot but admit the same for the purpose for which it was
presented.46
As regards the third assigned error, petitioners contend that a
resolution of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
should include the correction of the Secretary of Labor’s evaluation of
the evidence and factual findings thereon pursuant to the doctrine laid
down in Meralco v. The Honorable Secretary of Labor Leonardo A.
Quisumbing.47 That contention is misplaced. In that case, we ruled
that:
"The extent of judicial review over the Secretary of Labor’s arbitral
award is not limited to a determination of grave abuse in the manner of
the secretary’s exercise of his statutory powers. This Court is entitled
to, and must – in the exercise of its judicial power – review the
substance of the Secretary’s award when grave abuse of discretion is
alleged to exist in the award, i.e., in the appreciation of and the
conclusions the Secretary drew from the evidence presented."
However, this Court’s "review (of) the substance" does not mean a re-
calibration of the evidence presented before the DOLE but only a
determination of whether the Secretary of Labor’s award passed the
test of reasonableness when he arrived at his conclusions made
thereon. Thus, we declared in Meralco, that:
"In this case we believe that the more appropriate and available
standard and one does not require a constitutional interpretation—is
simply the standard of reasonableness. In layman’s terms,
reasonableness implies the absence of arbitrariness; in legal parlance,
this translates into the exercise of proper discretion and to the
observance of due process. Thus, the question we have to answer in
deciding this case is whether the Secretary’s actions have been
reasonable in light of the parties positions and the evidence they
presented."48
Thus, notwithstanding any allegation of grave abuse of discretion,
unless it can be amply demonstrated that the Secretary of Labor’s
arbitral award did not pass the test of reasonableness, his conclusions
thereon shall not be disturbed, as in the case at bar.
The main thrust of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is only the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. However, for this Court to properly exercise the power of
judicial review over a decision of an administrative agency, such as the
DOLE, it must first be shown that the tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has indeed acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.49 In
the absence of any showing of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, judicial review may not be
had over an administrative agency’s decision. We have gone over the
records of the case at bar and we see no cogent basis to hold that the
Secretary of Labor has abused his discretion.
In the fourth and fifth assignment of errors, petitioners would have us
believe that the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision ruled in a
manner absolute that prevailing technical rules of evidence in the
courts of law and equity have no room in administrative and/or quasi-
judicial proceedings; and that the non-application of technical rules of
procedure in proceedings before the Office of the Secretary of Labor
should not have barred herein petitioners from adducing evidence after
their demurrer to evidence was denied.
We do not agree. That declaration of the Court of Appeals should be
taken in the context of the whole paragraph and the law and the
jurisprudence cited in the assailed portion of its decision. We do not
sanction the piecemeal interpretation of a decision to advance ones
case. To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific
portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to but the decision must
be considered in its entirety.50 The portion of the Court of Appeals
assailed Decision reads, to wit:
x x x, it cannot be gainsaid that technical rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law and equity have no room in administrative and/or quasi-
judicial proceedings (Lawin Security Services, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 273 SCRA 132; Valderama v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 256 SCRA 466; De Ysasi III v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 231 SCRA 173). In fact, Article 221 of the
Labor Code expressly mandates that in proceedings before "the
(National Labor Relations) Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters,
the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be
controlling x x x." This provision is also applicable to proceedings
before the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment which,
under the said Code, is empowered to hear and resolve matters arising
from the exercise of its plenary power to issue assumption or (sic)
jurisdiction and return-to-work orders, all in keeping with the national
interest (Article 263(g) and Article 264 of the Labor Code)."51
The contention of petitioners that they should have been allowed to
present evidence when their demurrer to evidence was denied by the
Secretary of Labor, is untenable. The record shows that in the hearing
of September 22, 1998 attended by the parties, Atty. Lita V. Aglibut,
Hearing Officer, of the public respondent’s office, who presided over
the hearing directed the parties to submit their respective position
papers together with the affidavits and documentary evidence
within ten (10) days.52 While the Company submitted its position
paper together with supporting evidence and rested its case for
resolution, herein petitioners, however, submitted only its position
paper but without attaching thereto any supporting documentary
evidence. Petitioners chose to rely on the Rules of Court by filing a
demurrer to evidence in the hope of a favorable decision and
disregarded our resolution in G.R. No. 127215 ordering the Secretary
of Labor to determine with dispatch the legality of the strike. On the
other hand, the petitioners argued merely on the presumption that the
strike was legal. The fact that the Hearing Officer of DOLE admitted
their demurrer to evidence is not a valid excuse for herein petitioners
not to comply with her said directive for the petitioners to submit their
position paper and to attach thereto affidavits and documentary
evidence within ten (10) days. Petitioners’ non-compliance with that
directive by failing or refusing to attach affidavits and supporting
evidence to their position paper should not be ascribed as the fault of
the Secretary of Labor when he denied their demurrer to evidence and
forthwith rendered decision on the illegality of the strike. Petitioners
have only themselves to blame for having defied the order of the said
Hearing Officer of DOLE to submit position papers with supporting
evidence. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his
position paper cannot claim to have been denied due process. 53 The
requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties to a labor
case are given the opportunity to submit position papers wherein they
are supposed to attach all the documents that would prove their claim
in the event it will be decided that no further hearing should be
conducted or that hearing was not necessary.54
The grant of plenary powers to the Secretary of Labor under Art.
263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended, makes it incumbent for him to
bring about soonest, a fair and just solution to the differences between
the employer and the employees so that the damage such labor
dispute might cause upon the national interest may be minimized as
much as possible, if not totally averted, by avoiding stoppage of work
or any lagging of the activities of the industry or the possibility of these
contingencies which might cause detriment to such national
interest.55 Accordingly, he may adopt the most reasonable and
expeditious way of writing finis to the labor dispute. Otherwise, the
result would be absurd and contrary to the grant of plenary powers to
him by the Labor Code over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest.
And finally, with respect to petitioners’ claim of backwages, we find that
the ratiocination of the appellate court in its assailed Decision is in
accord with law and settled jurisprudence, to wit:
"On the issue of the award of backwages and financial assistance to
the striking workers, the well-entrenched doctrine is that it is only when
there is a finding of illegal dismissal that backwages are granted (St.
Theresa’s School of Novaliches Foundation vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 289 SCRA 111; Industrial Timber Corporation-
Stanply Operations vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 253
SCRA 623; Jackson Building Condominium Corporation, 246 SCRA
329), and financial assistance or separation pay allowed (Mabeza v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 271 SCRA 670; Capili v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 270 SCRA 688; Aurora Land
Projects Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 266
SCRA 48).
Since, as correctly found by the Secretary of Labor, the strikers
were not illegally dismissed, the COMPANY is under no obligation
to pay backwages to them. It is simply inconsistent, nay, absurd,
to award backwages when there is no finding of illegal dismissal
(Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation, 286 SCRA 245).
xxx when the record shows that the striking workers did not
comply with lawful orders for them to return to work during said
periods of time. In fact, the Secretary of Labor observed that while
"it was obligatory on the part of both parties to restore, in the
meantime, the status quo obtaining in the workplace", the same
"was not possible considering the strikers had defied the return-
to-work Order of this Office" (p. 8, Ibid). With such blatant
disregard by the strikers of official edicts ordering their
"temporary reinstatement", there is no basis to award them
backwages corresponding to said time frames. Otherwise, they
will recover something they have not or could not have earned by
their willful defiance of the return-to-work order, a patently
incongruous and unjust situation (Santos v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 154 SCRA 166).
The same view holds with respect to the award of financial assistance
or separation pay.1âwphi1The assumption for granting financial
assistance or separation pay, which is, that there is an illegally
dismissed employee and that illegally dismissed employee would
otherwise have been entitled to reinstatement, is not present in the
case at bench. Here, the striking workers have been validly
dismissed. "Where the employee’s dismissal was for a just case, it
would be neither fair nor just to allow the employee to recover
something he has not earned or could not have earned. This being so,
there can be no award of backwages, for it must be pointed out that
while backwages are granted on the basis of equity for earnings which
a worker or employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal, where
private respondent’s dismissal is for just cause, as is (sic) the case
herein, there is no factual or legal basis to order the payment of
backwages; otherwise, private respondent would be unjustly enriching
herself at the expense of petitioners." (Cathedral School of Technology
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 214 SCRA
551). Consequently, granting financial assistance to the strikers is
clearly a "specious Inconsistency" supra. We are of course aware that
financial assistance may be allowed as a measure of social justice in
exceptional circumstances and as an equitable concession. We are
likewise mindful that financial assistance is allowed only in those
instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other
than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character
(Zenco Sales, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 234 SCRA
689). However, the attendant facts show that such exceptional
circumstances do not obtain in the instant cases to warrant the grant of
financial assistance to the striking workers. To our mind, the strikers’
open and willful defiance of the assumption order dated September 16,
1995 constitute serious misconduct as well as reflective of their moral
character, hence, granting financial assistance to them is not and
cannot be justified (Philippines Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 282 SCRA 536, citing Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, 164
SCRA 671)."56
In fine, there is no reversible error in the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The appealed Decision
dated December 23, 1999 and the Resolution dated April 19, 2000 of
public respondent Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SYNOPSIS
On February 18, 1995, after notice, the PASVIL/Pascual Liner,
Inc., Workers Union - NAFLU staged a strike against PASVIL/ Pascual
Liner, Inc. for unfair labor practices. On February 21, 1995, upon petition
of PASVIL, Secretary of Labor and Employment Ma. Nieves R. Confesor
assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and certified the same to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory
arbitration. She also directed striking workers to return to work within
twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the Order. Notwithstanding receipt
thereof, Secretary Confesor found that the Union continued to picket and
barricade PASVILs premises thereby preventing the workers wanting to
report back to work from entering the premises. On February 24, 1995,
Secretary Confessor reiterated her return-to-work order. Subsequently,
conciliation conferences were held before the NLRC and the parties
were directed to submit their Position Paper which they also
complied. On August 21, 1995, PASVIL moved for the early resolution
of the case on the ground that the strike was still ongoing, thus causing
it vast revenue losses. However, on October 25, 1995, the Union moved
for a formal trial on the merits. Later, the NLRC rendered a decision
wherein it denied the abovestated motion of the Union on the belief that
it was mere dilatory move and on the consideration that the evidence
submitted allow it to reach a conclusion, and further ruled that the
ongoing strike is illegal and as a consequence, the Union Officers who
acted as leaders thereof lost their employment status. Hence, the Union
questioned the jurisdiction of the NLRC as well as the decision itself.
The Court ruled that when the Secretary of Labor and Employment
certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, the
latter was concomitantly empowered to resolve all question and
controversies arising therefrom, including cases otherwise belonging
originally and exclusively to the Labor Arbiter. Clearly, what was certified
to the NLRC was the entire labor dispute including the strike which was
then ongoing. It was thus necessary for the NLRC to rule on the matter.
The Court expressed in no uncertain terms that the moment a
worker defies a return-to-work order he is deemed to have abandoned
his job. It is already in itself knowingly participating in an illegal act. The
present case is one instance when, sadly, the law cannot interpose its
hand to protect the employees from the consequences of their
misbehavior.
The petition was DISMISSED.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; LABOR
RELATIONS; STRIKE; RECOGNIZED AND PROTECTED BY
LABOR LAWS WHEN WAGED ON ACCOUNT OF LABOR
DISPUTE. - THE RIGHT TO STRIKE is one of the rights
recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument
of labor for its protection against management exploitation.By
virtue of this right the workers are able to press their demands for
better terms and conditions of employment with more energy and
persuasiveness, poising the threat to strike as their reaction to
their employers intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful
weapon of the working class. But precisely, if not because of this,
it must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blows
up in the workers own hands. Simply put, a strike is recognized
and protected by our labor laws only when waged on account of a
labor dispute. In the absence thereof, the employees who engage
themselves in work stoppage commit an illegal strike and should
face the consequences thereof.
2. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC);
EMPOWERED TO RESOLVE ALL QUESTIONS AND ISSUES
INVOLVING LABOR DISPUTE THAT WAS CERTIFIED TO
THEM BY SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT.
- When the Secretary of Labor and Employment certifies the labor
dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration the latter is
concomitantly empowered to resolve all questions and
controversies arising therefrom including cases otherwise
belonging originally and exclusively to the Labor Arbiter.
3. ID.; ID.; SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT;
JURISDICTION; LIMITED TO ISSUES INVOLVED IN DISPUTES
SUBMITTED TO HIM FOR RESOLUTION IN CERTIFICATION
AND ASSUMPTION CASES. - In Philippine Airlines we ruled that
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in
assumption and/or certification cases is limited to the issues that
are involved in the disputes or to those submitted to him for
resolution. Since the legality or illegality of the strike was never
submitted to him for resolution he was thus found to have
exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained the employer from
taking disciplinary action against the employees who staged an
illegal strike. The Philippine Airlines case finds no application to
the present case because, as distinguished therefrom and as
properly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the
certification by Secretary Confesor to the NLRC of the issues
sought to be settled involved the strike of petitioners.
4. ID.; RULES OF PROCEDURE OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION; PERIOD TO DECIDE CASE; THIRTY
CALENDAR DAYS FROM TIME IT IS SUBMITTED FOR
DECISION. - The purpose of the rule requiring the issuance of an
order submitting the case for decision is to provide a period from
which to reckon the time frame within which to decide the
case. We discern this purpose from a reading of Rule V, Sec. 5,
par. (a), of the same rules which commands the Labor Arbiter to
render his decision within thirty (30) calendar days, without
extension, after submission of the case for decision.
5. ID.; ID.; NOT SERIOUSLY VIOLATED WHEN RULING TO MOTION
FOR FORMAL TRIAL WAS INCORPORATED IN DECISION. -
We find that the NLRC did not commit a serious violation of its own
rules when it incorporated its ruling on petitioners motion for formal
trial in its decision.
6. ID.; ID.; ALL SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS SHOULD BE
ATTACHED TO POSITION PAPERS. - Petitioners theory - that
had the NLRC issued a separate ruling on their motion they could
have rectified whatever deficiencies there might have been in their
evidence - is outrightly fallacious. Rule V, Sec. 3, of the same
Rules is specific - Sec. 3. Submission of Position
Papers/Memorandum. - xxxx These verified position papers shall
x x x be accompanied by all supporting documents including the
affidavits of their respective witnesses which shall take the place
of the latters testimony. The parties shall thereafter not be allowed
to allege facts, or present evidence to prove facts, not referred to
and any cause or causes of action not included in the complaint
or position papers, affidavits and other documents x x x (italics
supplied). We deduce from petitioners theory that only upon a
denial of their motion will the occasion arise for them to augment
their evidence. Here lies the fallacy. The opportune time to do so
was when they submitted their position papers. They should have
attached thereto all the documents that would have proved their
claim.
7. ID.; ID.; FORMAL HEARING OR TRIAL IS DISCRETIONARY TO
LABOR ARBITER. - In PMI Colleges v. NLRC we made it clear
that - x x x The absence of a formal hearing or trial before the
Labor Arbiter is no cause for petitioner to impute grave abuse of
discretion. Whether to conduct one or not depends on the sole
discretion of the Labor Arbiter, taking into account the position
papers and supporting documents submitted by the parties on
every issue presented. If the Labor Arbiter, in his judgment, is
confident that he can rely on the documents before him, he cannot
be faulted for not conducting a formal trial anymore, unless it
would appear that, in view of the particular circumstances of a
case, the documents, without more, are really
insufficient. Applying the ruling to the present case and dwelling
on the more important consideration of the NLRC in not granting
petitioners motion for a formal trial, i.e., the existence of sufficient
evidence allowing it to reach a conclusion, we fully agree in the
denial of petitioners motion. PASVILs evidence adequately
proved that it was not guilty of unfair labor practice; consequently,
there was no legitimate reason for petitioners to hold a strike and
thereafter defy the return-to-work order of Secretary Confesor.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; FACTUAL FINDINGS
OF NLRC ARE ENTITLED TO RESPECT. -Factual findings of the
NLRC are entitled to respect and finality in the absence of proof,
as herein, that they were arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously.
9. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR RELATIONS;
STRIKE; PETITIONERS CANNOT USE GOOD FAITH AS
DEFENSE; CASE AT BAR. - Good faith is still a valid defense
against the claim of illegality of a strike. However, petitioners
cannot find refuge in Peoples Industrial & Commercial Employees
and Workers Organization (FFW) because, on the basis of
PASVILs letters to its individual employees and the ocular
inspection by the NCMB-NCR, we do not find even a semblance
of good faith on the part of petitioners.23 The NLRC was correct
in dismissing the charge of unfair labor practice against PASVIL
and in declaring the strike illegal. Article 264, par. (a), of the Labor
Code provides the sanction of loss of employment status for any
union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike. The
NLRC found that petitioners led the illegal strike against
PASVIL. This is not disputed by petitioners. We thus sustain the
NLRCs declaration that petitioners lost their employment status
with PASVIL.
10. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; UNLESS FOR
COGENT REASONS COURT WILL NOT ALTER, MODIFY OR
REVERSE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT. - Unless there are cogent reasons, and we
do not find any, this Court will not alter, modify or reverse the
factual findings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
because by reason of her official position she is considered to
have acquired expertise as her jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters.
11. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; LABOR
RELATIONS; WORKERS WHO DEFY RETURN-TO-WORK
ORDER DEEMED TO HAVE ABANDONED JOB. - Under the
same Art. 264, par. (a), St. Scholasticas College expressed in no
uncertain terms that from the moment a worker defies a return-to-
work order he is deemed to have abandoned his job. It is already
in itself knowingly participating in an illegal act. The present case
is one instance when, sadly, the law cannot interpose its hand to
protect the employees from the consequences of their
misbehavior.
[G.R. No. 124823. July 28, 1999]
PASVIL/PASCUAL LINER, INC., WORKERS UNION - NAFLU, and
DONATO BUGTONG, PEDRO FERNANDO, RODANTE
AMBAS, RODOLFO PASCUAL, FELIZARDO GASPAR,
CONRADO CLEMENTE, PONCIANO GABRIEL SR.,
ROBERTO ESPEJON, MARCELO MOJAR JR., ARNULFO
GERMAN, JOSE OGAO, ARNEL FORTALEZA, MERLITO
DELA CRUZ, ROMMEL BUENAVENTE, MANUEL
TRINIDAD, JOSELITO MENDIOLA, PEDRO OCIONES,
GUILLERMO NARANJO and FREDENILL
LAZO, petitioners vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and PASVIL/PASCUAL LINER,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
THE RIGHT TO STRIKE is one of the rights recognized and
guaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument of labor for its protection
against management exploitation. By virtue of this right the workers are
able to press their demands for better terms and conditions of
employment with more energy and persuasiveness, poising the threat to
strike as their reaction to their employer's intransigence. The strike is
indeed a powerful weapon of the working class. But precisely, if not
because of this, it must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive,
lest it blows up in the workers' own hands.[1] Simply put, a strike is
recognized and protected by our labor laws only when waged on account
of a labor dispute. In the absence thereof, the employees who engage
themselves in work stoppage commit an illegal strike and should face
the consequences thereof.
On 3 August 1994 petitioner PASVIL/Pascual Liner, Inc., Workers
Union - NAFLU (UNION for short)[2] filed a notice of strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board - National Capital Region
(NCMB-NCR for short) against private respondent PASVIL/Pascual
Liner, Inc., (PASVIL for short) for unfair labor practices consisting in
union busting, discrimination and discouraging union membership.[3] On
24 January 1995 the NCMB-NCR notified UNION President Donato
Bugtong thus -
During the conciliation meetings conducted by this Office, it was clearly
established that the real issues raised are the dismissal of the Union
President (referring to Bugtong himself) which is pending adjudication
before Labor Arbiter Melquiades Del Rosario of the NLRC-NCR, and
the certification election case which is pending resolution before the
Office of the Secretary. The issues raised are therefore not proper
subjects of a Notice of Strike but are appropriate for Preventive
Mediation.[4]
 A series of conciliation conferences was thereafter conducted by
the NCMB-NCR which failed however to amicably settle the dispute. As
a consequence, on 18 February 1995 petitioner UNION staged a
strike. Further efforts to effect settlement achieved nothing and the strike
continued.
On 21 February 1995, upon petition of private respondent
PASVIL, then Secretary of Labor and Employment Ma. Nieves R.
Confesor, pursuant to Art. 263, par. (g), of the Labor Code, assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute and certified it to public respondent National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory
arbitration. Secretary Confesor justified her direct intervention
The Company is engaged in the transportation business and has in its
employ more or less 900 workers. It services the needs of thousands
of commuters in Metro Manila mostly students, professionals,
government and private employees, as well as traders and
merchants. A prolonged work stoppage, therefore, at the Company
would not only cause unnecessary inconvenience and adverse effects
to the riding public but also to the livelihood of its direct employees not
to mention their families and those indirectly dependent upon the
continued operation of the Company.
At this critical time when efforts of the present administration is (sic)
seriously focused on sustaining the economic gains already achieved
and putting in place the much needed social reforms, it is the utmost
concern of this Office to avert unnecessary work stoppages that might
result into untold dire consequences.[5]
Secretary Confesor directed all striking workers to return to work
within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt thereof and for PASVIL to
accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment
prevailing before the strike. Furthermore, she directed the parties to
cease and desist from committing acts that would prejudice the other
party or exacerbate the situation. The directive was published in Daily
Balita[6] and Bulgar.[7]
Notwithstanding receipt of the aforementioned order, Secretary
Confesor found that petitioner UNION continued to picket and barricade
PASVIL's premises thereby preventing the workers wanting to report
back to work from entering the premises. On 24 February 1995 she
reiterated her directive in the previous return-to-work order and
deputized the Station Commander of the Novaliches Police Station to
assist in the orderly and peaceful enforcement of her order including the
removal of all forms of obstruction and barricades to ensure free ingress
to or egress from the premises of PASVIL.[8]
The conciliation conferences were then scheduled by the NLRC
on 28 March and 19 April 1995 but only representatives of PASVIL
appeared. On this account, an order was issued on 12 May 1995
directing the parties to submit their Position Papers. The parties
complied.
On 21 August 1995 PASVIL moved for the early resolution of the
case on the ground that the strike was still ongoing thus causing it vast
revenue losses. A hearing was set for 29 August 1995 to determine
whether a formal hearing on the merits was necessary or whether
PASVIL's motion should be granted. However, both parties failed to
appear so a second hearing was set on 11 October 1995. On this date,
the parties were asked if they wished to have the case submitted for
resolution. Petitioner UNION, through Board Member Ponciano Gabriel
Sr., requested and was granted up to 23 October 1995 to notify the
NLRC regarding its intention with respect to the proceedings. On the
deadline, petitioner UNION moved for a formal trial on the merits. A
hearing on the motion was set on 6 November 1995. However, only
PASVIL's counsel attended the hearing and was given until 15
November 1995 to comment on the motion. In the comment
subsequently filed, PASVIL alleged that all questions raised by petitioner
UNION had been traversed by the documents already submitted in
evidence. Another hearing was scheduled for 7 December 1995. Again,
only PASVIL appeared.
On the belief that petitioner UNION's motion for a formal trial on
the merits was a mere dilatory move and on the consideration that the
evidence on hand would sufficiently allow it to reach a conclusion, the
NLRC denied the motion for a formal trial and proceeded to resolve the
legality of petitioner UNION's purposes for staging the strike, i.e., that
twenty-four (24) airconditioned buses were surreptitiously removed from
the company premises to deprive UNION officers and members of their
jobs, and that Bugtong was arbitrarily dismissed from employment due
to Union activities. PASVIL countered that the buses were sold to E & J
Transport and Mayami Transit the proceeds of which were applied to the
payment of interest on its principal obligations and that Bugtong was
dismissed due to gross and habitual neglect of duty/willful disobedience.
On 15 January 1996 the NLRC declared the still-ongoing strike
illegal and consequently deemed the UNION officers who acted as
leaders thereof, petitioners herein, to have lost their employment status,
namely, President Donato Bugtong, Vice President Pedro Fernando,
Secretary Rodante Ambas, Treasurer Rodolfo Pascual, Auditor
Felizardo Gaspar, Spokesman Conrado Clemente and Board Members
Ponciano Gabriel Sr., Roberto Espejon, Marcelo Mojar Jr., Arnulfo
German, Jose Ogao, Arnel Fortaleza, Merlito Dela Cruz, Rommel
Buenavente, Manuel Trinidad, Joselito Mendiola, Pedro Ociones,
Guillermo Naranjo and Fredenill Lazo. However, the charge of unfair
labor practice was dismissed for lack of merit.[9]
In support of its ruling, the NLRC ratiocinated that although
PASVIL did not prove that the sale of the buses actually materialized
there was evidence showing that even without those buses there was a
sufficient number of buses remaining for the employees to continue
working and that PASVIL even exhorted its drivers and dispatchers to
accept their respective assignments and operate the buses.[10] Yet
petitioners did not explain why they failed to man the remaining
buses. The NLRC also found that petitioners did not specify the wage
benefits they were entitled to that were not granted by PASVIL nor did
they clarify the particular working conditions existing at their workplace
which they could not tolerate. At any rate, the NLRC opined that the
issue of underpayment or non-payment of wage benefits should have
been addressed to the Labor Arbiter, whereas that of poor working
conditions should have been brought to the attention of the Department
of Labor and Employment or, if related to the condition of the buses
themselves, to the Department of Transportation and Communication
which had the authority to suspend or cancel the franchise of PASVIL.
With regard to the dismissal from employment of petitioner
Bugtong, the NLRC found that as previously ruled by the NCMB-NCR,
a complaint therefor has been filed before Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol
D. Del Rosario who on 25 May 1995 held that the totality of infractions
committed by Bugtong justified his dismissal.[11] Still another rationale for
the NLRC's ruling against petitioners was its finding that the strikers did
not comply with Secretary Confesor's directive for them to return to
work. To sum up, the NLRC ruled that there was no legitimate reason
for petitioners to strike. On 31 January 1996 reconsideration was
denied.
Did the NLRC act with grave abuse of discretion in: (a) ruling on
the illegality of the strike thus violating the doctrine laid down
in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment[12] that
the Labor Secretary's authority to resolve a labor dispute over which he
has assumed jurisdiction encompasses only the issues involved therein,
not the legality or illegality of the strike; (b) refusing to hold a formal trial;
(c) holding that PASVIL was not guilty of unfair labor practice; and, (d)
declaring the strike illegal and considering petitioners to have lost their
employment status?
Petitioners allege that on the basis of Art. 217 of the Labor Code
which explicitly provides that Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the legality of
strikes and lock-outs, the NLRC was not clothed with authority to decide
on the legality of the strike. Moreover, they stress that the dispute did
not involve any complaint for illegal strike but for unfair labor practice
such that in Philippine Airlines involving the same factual milieu this
Court held that the Secretary of Labor and Employment acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction when he ruled on the legality of the strike.
There is no grave abuse of discretion. Article 217 of the Labor
Code categorically provides that Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the legality of
strikes and lock-outs. But the opening phrase of the law is as categorical
in mentioning an exception thereto. Thus -
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. -
(a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties
for decision without extension, the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural x x x x 5. Cases
arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including
questions on the legality of strikes and lock-outs x x x x (underscoring
supplied).
An exception to the original and exclusive jurisdiction lodged in the
Labor Arbiters is found in Art. 263, par. (g), of the same Code -
Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. - x x x x (g) When, in his
opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike
or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the
effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or
lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has
already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all
striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and
the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the
Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to
ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he
may issue to enforce the same x x x x
In 1992 we clarified this point in International Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment[13] thus -
x x x [T]he Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the
Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same
accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the
said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and
controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the Labor
Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction (underscoring supplied).
In the same manner, when the Secretary of Labor and
Employment certifies the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration the latter is concomitantly empowered to resolve all questions
and controversies arising therefrom including cases otherwise belonging
originally and exclusively to the Labor Arbiter.
In Philippine Airlines we ruled that the jurisdiction of the Secretary
of Labor and Employment in assumption and/or certification cases is
limited to the issues that are involved in the disputes or to those
submitted to him for resolution. Since the legality or illegality of the strike
was never submitted to him for resolution he was thus found to have
exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained the employer from taking
disciplinary action against the employees who staged an illegal
strike. The Philippine Airlines case finds no application to the present
case because, as distinguished therefrom and as properly observed by
the Office of the Solicitor General, the certification by Secretary Confesor
to the NLRC of the issues sought to be settled involved the strike of
petitioners. The certification stated -
On 3 August 1994, the PASVIL/Pascual Liner, Inc. Workers Union -
NAFLU, hereinafter referred to as the Union, filed a Notice of Strike
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board - National Capital
Region (NCMB-NCR) against PASVIL/Pascual Liner, Inc., hereinafter
referred to as the Company, on grounds of unfair labor practice
acts. Series of conciliation conferences conducted by the Board failed
to arrive at an amicable settlement on the alleged specific acts
committed by the Company.
On 18 February 1995, the Union struck. Further efforts to effect
settlement yielded negative results. In the meantime, the strike
continues with no settlement in sight.[14]
Clearly, what was certified to the NLRC was the entire labor
dispute including the strike which was then ongoing. It was thus
necessary for the NLRC to rule on the matter. In St. Scholastica's
College v. Torres[15] where petitioner questioned the assumption by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment of jurisdiction to decide on
termination disputes, likewise maintaining that such jurisdiction was
vested instead in the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Art. 217 of the Labor
Code and invoking Philippine Airlines, we emphasized that -
Before the Secretary of Labor and Employment may take cognizance
of an issue which is merely incidental to the labor dispute, therefore,
the same must be involved in the labor dispute itself, or otherwise
submitted to him for resolution. If it was not, as was the case in PAL v.
Secretary of Labor and Employment, supra, and he nevertheless acted
on it, that assumption of jurisdiction is tantamount to a grave abuse of
discretion. Otherwise, the ruling in International Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, supra, will apply.
Petitioners assert that since the NLRC did not act as an appellate
body in resolving the dispute it should have been guided by Rule V, Sec.
5, par. (b), of its New Rules of Procedure mandating that -
Sec. 5. Period to Decide Case x x x x (b) If the Labor Arbiter finds no
necessity of further hearing after the parties have submitted their
position papers and supporting documents, he shall issue an Order to
that effect and shall inform the parties, stating the reasons therefor x x
xx
Petitioners advance that conformably therewith the NLRC should
have issued a separate ruling on their motion for formal trial, instead of
having merely incorporated its ruling in its assailed decision, so that they
could have supplied or completed whatever deficiencies there might be
in their evidence. They add that there were factual issues which could
not be resolved by documentary evidence, i.e., blockade of the free
ingress to and egress from the company premises and non-compliance
with the return-to-work order.
We are not persuaded. The purpose of the rule requiring the
issuance of an order submitting the case for decision is to provide a
period from which to reckon the time frame within which to decide the
case. We discern this purpose from a reading of Rule V, Sec. 5, par. (a),
of the same rules which commands the Labor Arbiter to render his
decision within thirty (30) calendar days, without extension, after
submission of the case for decision. We find that the NLRC did not
commit a serious violation of its own rules when it incorporated its ruling
on petitioners' motion for formal trial in its decision. Determining the
reckoning period to decide the case was no longer necessary since, after
all, the NLRC had already prepared a decision. It was enough that it
acted on the motion in its decision stating the following as reasons for
denial -
Considering the fact, however, that the Union's counsel has not
bothered to appear at any of the previous hearings called by this
Office, which number at least five, We sincerely doubt his sincerity in
wanting to proceed with a formal trial of this case.
Indeed, his (sic) counsel's seeming hide-and-seek attitude tends to
make Us believe this request for a trial on the merits is merely a
dilatory tactic resorted to, to delay the resolution of this certified case.
Besides, after painstakingly reviewing the documents and supporting
proofs on record, we are convinced that there is sufficient evidence to
allow Us to reach a conclusion in this case x x x x[16]
Petitioners' theory - that had the NLRC issued a separate ruling
on their motion they could have rectified whatever deficiencies there
might have been in their evidence - is outrightly fallacious. Rule V, Sec.
3, of the same Rules is specific -
Sec. 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. - x x x x These
verified position papers shall x x x be accompanied by all supporting
documents including the affidavits of their respective witnesses which
shall take the place of the latter's testimony. The parties shall thereafter
not be allowed to allege facts, or present evidence to prove facts, not
referred to and any cause or causes of action not included in the
complaint or position papers, affidavits and other documents x x x x
(underscoring supplied).
We deduce from petitioners' theory that only upon a denial of their
motion will the occasion arise for them to augment their evidence. Here
lies the fallacy. The opportune time to do so was when they submitted
their position papers. They should have attached thereto all the
documents that would have proved their claim.[17] In PMI Colleges v.
NLRC[18] we made it clear that -
x x x x The absence of a formal hearing or trial before the Labor Arbiter
is no cause for petitioner to impute grave abuse of discretion. Whether
to conduct one or not depends on the sole discretion of the Labor
Arbiter, taking into account the position papers and supporting
documents submitted by the parties on every issue presented. If the
Labor Arbiter, in his judgment, is confident that he can rely on the
documents before him, he cannot be faulted for not conducting a
formal trial anymore, unless it would appear that, in view of the
particular circumstances of a case, the documents, without more, are
really insufficient.
Applying the ruling to the present case and dwelling on the more
important consideration of the NLRC in not granting petitioners' motion
for a formal trial, i.e., the existence of sufficient evidence allowing it to
reach a conclusion, we fully agree in the denial of petitioners'
motion. PASVIL's evidence adequately proved that it was not guilty of
unfair labor practice; consequently, there was no legitimate reason for
petitioners to hold a strike and thereafter defy the return-to-work order
of Secretary Confesor.
Petitioners maintain that PASVIL committed unfair labor practice
when it surreptitiously pulled out twenty-four (24) buses from its garage,
then manned by active UNION members, thereby substantially affecting
their jobs. In the alternative, they argue that, citing People's Industrial
and Commercial Employees and Workers Organization (FFW) v.
People's Industrial and Commercial Corporation,[19] a strike may be
considered legal where the union believed that the company committed
unfair labor practices and the circumstances warranted such belief in
good faith although subsequently such allegations are found to be
untrue. They insist also that, as averred in their affidavit, they wanted to
comply with the return-to-work order of Secretary Confesor but that the
bus company refused to reinstate them.
Factual findings of the NLRC are entitled to respect and finality in
the absence of proof, as herein, that they were arrived at arbitrarily or
capriciously.[20] Although PASVIL failed to prove that the sale of the
buses pushed through, we agree with the NLRC that there is evidence
showing that a sufficient number of units remained for the employees to
continue working. PASVIL, in its letter of 2 August 1994, exhorted its
drivers and dispatchers individually to accept their respective
assignments and operate the buses thus -
Ikaw ay sinasabihan na magpa-schedule sa Dispatcher upang
maibiyahe ang bus.
Maraming bus ang kumpanya kaya marami ang nakahilera lang sa
ready line. Wala namang sira ang mga bus kaya kailangang maibiyahe
ang mga ito.[21]
Moreover, the NCMB-NCR conducted on 7 September 1994 an
ocular inspection of PASVIL's facilities and determined that there were
thirty-seven (37) buses "ready for trip" but that these remained
unmanned.[22] Petitioners did not bother to explain why they failed to
operate the remaining buses.
Good faith is still a valid defense against the claim of illegality of a
strike. However, petitioners cannot find refuge in People's Industrial &
Commercial Employees and Workers Organization (FFW) because, on
the basis of PASVIL's letters to its individual employees and the ocular
inspection by the NCMB-NCR, we do not find even a semblance of good
faith on the part of petitioners.[23]The NLRC was correct in dismissing the
charge of unfair labor practice against PASVIL and in declaring the strike
illegal. Article 264, par. (a), of the Labor Code provides the sanction of
loss of employment status for any union officer who knowingly
participates in an illegal strike. The NLRC found that petitioners led the
illegal strike against PASVIL. This is not disputed by petitioners. We thus
sustain the NLRC's declaration that petitioners lost their employment
status with PASVIL.
Petitioners lay the blame on PASVIL's alleged refusal to accept
them back to its fold for their failure to comply with the directive of
Secretary Confesor to return to work. They invite our attention to an
averment in their affidavit -
28. Na ang ilan sa mga manggagawa naman na gusto sanang bumalik
din at sumunod sa Return to Work Order ngunit ayaw talagang
pabalikin ng manedsment (sic) at ni ayaw papasukin sa loob ng garahe
ay ang mga sumusunod x x x x[24]
As thus worded, it is unclear as to which orders of Secretary
Confesor petitioners allegedly displayed willingness to obey. Exploring
the other averments in their affidavit we note that they actually referred
to the first order of Secretary Confesor. We took into account their
previous averments -
23. Na nagsimula kaming mag-strike noong Pebrero 18, 1995 ngunit
noong Pebrero 21, 1995 ay nagbaba ng return to work order ang
Secretary of Labor na nagsasaad na ang aming strike ay doon na lang
didinggin sa NLRC para sa Compulsory Arbitration at inaatasan
kaming bumalik sa aming trabaho;
Inc., is AFFIRMED. The resolution of 30 January 1996 denying
reconsideration is likewise AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127598 February 22, 2000
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. SECRETARY OF LABOR LEONARDO QUISUMBING and
MERALCO EMPLOYEES and WORKERS ASSOCIATION
(MEWA), respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In the Decision promulgated on January 27, 1999, the Court disposed
of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of
public respondent Secretary of Labor dated August 19, 1996
and December 28, 1996 are set aside to the extent set forth
above. The parties are directed to execute a Collective
Bargaining Agreement incorporating the terms and
conditions contained in the unaffected portions of the
Secretary of Labor's orders of August 19, 1996 and
December 28, 1996, and the modifications set forth above.
The retirement fund issue is remanded to the Secretary of
Labor for reception of evidence and determination of the
legal personality of the MERALCO retirement fund.1
The modifications of the public respondent's resolutions include the
following:

24. Na tumalima naman ang mga miyembro ng unyon sa Order ng January 27, 1999 Secretary's
DOLE Secretary at bumalik na nga kami sa aming mga trabaho ngunit decision resolution
himdi kami lahat ng (sic) kanilang tinanggap x x x x[25]
P1,900.00 for
Wages - P2,200.00
1995-96
Yet it is hard to believe that such was the situation. If this were so
and that they wanted to resume their jobs but PASVIL did not
reciprocate, a second recourse to Secretary Confesor would not have modified to one
X'mas bonus - 2 months
been undertaken by PASVIL. This second recourse paved the way for month
Secretary Confesor to arrive at the finding that -
remanded to the
Retirees - granted
Secretary
Notwithstanding due receipt of the (21 February 1995) Order, the
Union continues to picket and barricade the premises of the Company,
thereby preventing those workers who would want to report back to Loan to
- denied granted
work from entering the Company x x x x[26] coops

GHSIP, HMP
Secretary Confesor thus reiterated her previous return-to-work
and
order. Pitted against the aforementioned finding, petitioners' averments
Housing granted up to
cannot be sustained. Unless there are cogent reasons, and we do not
loans - P60,000.00 granted
find any, this Court will not alter, modify or reverse the factual findings of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment because by reason of her
official position she is considered to have acquired expertise as her Signing
- denied granted
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters.[27] bonus

A stronger proof that petitioners and other UNION members defied 40 days (typo
the return-to-work order of Secretary Confesor is the letter of petitioner Union leave - 30 days
error)
Bugtong himself to the Social Security System of 3 August 1995
certifying that "employees of PASVIL/PASCUAL LINER, INC. is (sic) on
High - not apply to those members of a
strike effective last February 18, 1995 up to the present."[28] This
voltage/pole who are team
certification effectively binds petitioners and relegates to insignificance
not exposed to
their pretension to the contrary.
the risk
Under the same Art. 264, par. (a), St. Scholastica's
College expressed in no uncertain terms that from the moment a worker Collectors - no need for cash
defies a return-to-work order he is deemed to have abandoned his job. It bond, no
is already in itself knowingly participating in an illegal act. The present need to reduce
case is one instance when, sadly, the law cannot interpose its hand to quota and MAPL
protect the employees from the consequences of their misbehavior. [29]
exclude
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of public CBU - confidential include
respondent National Labor Relations Commission of 15 January 1996 employees
declaring illegal the strike staged by petitioners PASVIL/Pascual Liner,
Inc., Workers Union - NAFLU and its officers and members on 18
February 1995 against respondent PASVIL/Pascual Liner, Inc.; Union maintenance of
- closed shop
declaring petitioners Donato Bugtong, Pedro Fernando, Rodante security membership
Ambas, Rodolfo Pascual, Felizardo Gaspar, Conrado Clemente,
Ponciano Gabriel Sr., Roberto Espejon, Marcelo Mojar Jr., Arnulfo Contracting no need to consult
- consult first
German, Jose Ogao, Arnel Fortaleza, Merlito dela Cruz, Rommel out union
Buenavente, Manuel Trinidad, Joselito Mendiola, Pedro Ociones,
Guillermo Naranjo and Fredenill Lazo as having lost their employment existing terms and
status as a consequence; and, dismissing the charge of unfair labor All benefits - all terms
conditions
practice against private respondent company PASVIL/Pascual Liner,

Dec. 28, 1996- from Dec. 1,
Retroactivity -
Dec. 27, 199(9) 1995
Dissatisfied with the Decision, some alleged members of private
respondent union (Union for brevity) filed a motion for intervention and
a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision. A separate
intervention was likewise made by the supervisor's union (FLAMES 2) of
petitioner corporation alleging that it has bona fide legal interest in the
outcome of the case.3 The Court required the "proper parties" to file a
comment to the three motions for reconsideration but the Solicitor-
General asked that he be excused from filing the comment because
the "petition filed in the instant case was granted" by the
Court.4 Consequently, petitioner filed its own consolidated comment.
An "Appeal Seeking Immediate Reconsideration" was also filed by the
alleged newly elected president of the Union.5 Other subsequent
pleadings were filed by the parties and intervenors.
The issues raised in the motions for reconsideration had already been
passed upon by the Court in the January 27, 1999 decision. No new
arguments were presented for consideration of the Court. Nonetheless,
certain matters will be considered herein, particularly those involving
the amount of wages and the retroactivity of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) arbitral awards.
Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of P2,200.00 per month as
ordered by the Secretary is allowed, it would simply pass the cost
covering such increase to the consumers through an increase in the
rate of electricity. This is a non sequitur. The Court cannot be
threatened with such a misleading argument. An increase in the prices
of electric current needs the approval of the appropriate regulatory
government agency and does not automatically result from a mere
increase in the wages of petitioner's employees. Besides, this
argument presupposes that petitioner is capable of meeting a wage
increase. The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to
support its position regarding the wage issue cannot be an accurate
basis and conclusive determinant of the rate of wage increase. Section
45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides:
Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of
matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation
contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published
compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any
relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for
use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally
used and relied upon by them therein.
Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a
periodical, may be admitted only "if that compilation is published for
use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and
relied upon by them therein." As correctly held in our Decision dated
January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account and
not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion
which carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no
sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did anybody
testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely
on news items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no evidence
was presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a person
in touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy
and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are
not admissible.6 In the same manner, newspapers containing stock
quotations are not admissible in evidence when the source of the
reports is available.7 With more reason, mere analyses or projections
of such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the
report in this case can be easily made available considering that the
same is necessary for compliance with certain governmental
requirements.
Nonetheless, by petitioner's own allegations, its actual total net income
for 1996 was P5.1 billion.8 An estimate by the All Asia financial analyst
stated that petitioner's net operating income for the same year was
about P5.7 billion, a figure which the Union relies on to support its
claim. Assuming without admitting the truth thereof, the figure is higher
than the P4.171 billion allegedly suggested by petitioner as its
projected net operating income. The P5.7 billion which was the
Secretary's basis for granting the P2,200.00 is higher than the actual
net income of P5.1 billion admitted by petitioner. It would be proper
then to increase this Court's award of P1,900.00 to P2,000.00 for the
two years of the CBA award. For 1992, the agreed CBA wage increase
for rank-and-file was P1,400.00 and was reduced to P1,350.00; for
1993; further reduced to P1,150.00 for 1994. For supervisory
employees, the agreed wage increase for the years 1992-1994 are
P1,742.50, P1,682.50 and P1,442.50, respectively. Based on the
foregoing figures, the P2,000.00 increase for the two-year period
awarded to the rank-and-file is much higher than the highest increase
granted to supervisory employees.9 As mentioned in the January 27,
1999 Decision, the Court does "not seek to enumerate in this decision
the factors that should affect wage determination" because collective
bargaining disputes particularly those affecting the national interest and
public service "requires due consideration and proper balancing of the
interests of the parties to the dispute and of those who might be
affected by the dispute."10 The Court takes judicial notice that the new
amounts granted herein are significantly higher than the weighted
average salary currently enjoyed by other rank-and-file employees
within the community. It should be noted that the relations between
labor and capital is impressed with public interest which must yield to
the common good.11Neither party should act oppressively against the
other or impair the interest or convenience of the public.12 Besides,
matters of salary increases are part of management prerogative. 13
On the retroactivity of the CBA arbitral award, it is well to recall that this
petition had its origin in the renegotiation of the parties' 1992-1997
CBA insofar as the last two-year period thereof is concerned. When the
Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and granted the arbitral
awards, there was no question that these arbitral awards were to be
given retroactive effect. However, the parties dispute the reckoning
period when retroaction shall commence. Petitioner claims that the
award should retroact only from such time that the Secretary of Labor
rendered the award, invoking the 1995 decision in Pier 8 case14 where
the Court, citing Union of Filipino Employees v. NLRC,15 said:
The assailed resolution which incorporated the CBA to be
signed by the parties was promulgated on June 5, 1989, the
expiry date of the past CBA. Based on the provision of
Section 253-A, its retroactivity should be agreed upon by the
parties. But since no agreement to that effect was made,
public respondent did not abuse its discretion in giving the
said CBA a prospective effect. The action of the public
respondent is within the ambit of its authority vested by
existing law.
On the other hand, the Union argues that the award should retroact to
such time granted by the Secretary, citing the 1993 decision of St.
Luke's.16
Finally, the effectivity of the Order of January 28, 1991, must
retroact to the date of the expiration of the previous CBA,
contrary to the position of petitioner. Under the
circumstances of the case, Article 253-A cannot be properly
applied to herein case. As correctly stated by public
respondent in his assailed Order of April 12, 1991 dismissing
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration —
Anent the alleged lack of basis for the retroactivity
provisions awarded; we would stress that the
provision of law invoked by the Hospital, Article
253-A of the Labor Code, speaks of agreements
by and between the parties, and not arbitral
awards . . .
Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law
prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards
issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of
the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public respondent
is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to
determine the effectivity thereof.
In the 1997 case of Mindanao Terminal,17 the Court applied the St.
Luke's doctrine and ruled that:
In St. Luke's Medical Center v. Torres, a deadlock also
developed during the CBA negotiations between
management and the union. The Secretary of Labor
assumed jurisdiction and ordered the retroaction of the CBA
to the date of expiration of the previous CBA. As in this case,
it was alleged that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused its
discretion in making his award retroactive. In dismissing this
contention this Court held:
Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of
law prohibiting retroactive of the effectivity of
arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor
pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such
as herein involved, public respondent is deemed
vested with plenary and discretionary powers to
determine the effectivity thereof.
The Court in the January 27, 1999 Decision, stated that the CBA shall
be "effective for a period of 2 years counted from December 28, 1996
up to December 27, 1999." Parenthetically, this actually covers a three-
year period. Labor laws are silent as to when an arbitral award in a
labor dispute where the Secretary had assumed jurisdiction by virtue of
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code shall retroact. In general, a CBA
negotiated within six months after the expiration of the existing CBA
retroacts to the day immediately following such date and if agreed
thereafter, the effectivity depends on the agreement of the
parties.18 On the other hand, the law is silent as to the retroactivity of a
CBA arbitral award or that granted not by virtue of the mutual
agreement of the parties but by intervention of the government.
Despite the silence of the law, the Court rules herein that CBA arbitral
awards granted after six months from the expiration of the last CBA
shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both employer and the
employees or their union. Absent such an agreement as to
retroactivity, the award shall retroact to the first day after the six-month
period following the expiration of the last day of the CBA should there
be one. In the absence of a CBA, the Secretary's determination of the
date of retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over arbitral
awards shall control.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is PARTIALLY
GRANTED and the assailed Decision is MODIFIED as follows: (1) the
arbitral award shall retroact from December 1, 1995 to November 30,
1997; and (2) the award of wage is increased from the original amount
of One Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P1,900.00) to Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000.00) for the years 1995 and 1996. This Resolution is
subject to the monetary advances granted by petitioner to its rank-and-
file employees during the pendency of this case assuming such
advances had actually been distributed to them. The assailed Decision
is AFFIRMED in all other respects.1âwphi1.nêt

It is true that an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an SO ORDERED.

agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties because it requires
the interference and imposing power of the State thru the Secretary of
Labor when he assumes jurisdiction. However, the arbitral award can
be considered as an approximation of a collective bargaining
agreement which would otherwise have been entered into by the [G.R. No. 119293. June 10, 2003]
parties.19 The terms or periods set forth in Article 253-A pertains
explicitly to a CBA. But there is nothing that would prevent its
application by analogy to an arbitral award by the Secretary
considering the absence of an applicable law. Under Article 253-A: "(I)f
any such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
shall agree on the duration of retroactivity thereof." In other words, the RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second Division, ILAW AT
law contemplates retroactivity whether the agreement be entered into BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), respondents.
before or after the said six-month period. The agreement of the parties
need not be categorically stated for their acts may be considered in DECISION
determining the duration of retroactivity. In this connection, the Court
considers the letter of petitioner's Chairman of the Board and its AZCUNA, J.:
President addressed to their stockholders, which states that the CBA
"for the rank-and-file employees covering the period December 1, 1995
to November 30, 1997 is still with the Supreme Court,"20 as indicative Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set
of petitioner's recognition that the CBA award covers the said period. aside the decision of the Second Division of the National Labor Relations
Earlier, petitioner's negotiating panel transmitted to the Union a copy of Commission (NLRC) in Injunction Case No. 00468-94 dated November
its proposed CBA covering the same period inclusive. 21 In addition, 29, 1994,[1] and its resolution dated February 1, 1995[2] denying
petitioner does not dispute the allegation that in the past CBA arbitral petitioners motion for reconsideration.
awards, the Secretary granted retroactivity commencing from the
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and respondent Ilaw at
period immediately following the last day of the expired CBA. Thus, by
Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM), exclusive bargaining agent of petitioners
petitioner's own actions, the Court sees no reason to retroact the
daily-paid rank and file employees, executed a Collective Bargaining
subject CBA awards to a different date. The period is herein set at two
Agreement (CBA) under which they agreed to submit all disputes to
(2) years from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997.
grievance and arbitration proceedings. The CBA also included a
mutually enforceable no-strike no-lockout agreement. The pertinent
On the allegation concerning the grant of loan to a cooperative, there is provisions of the said CBA are quoted hereunder:
no merit in the union's claim that it is no different from housing loans
granted by the employer. The award of loans for housing is justified
ARTICLE IV
because it pertains to a basic necessity of life. It is part of a privilege
GRIEVANCE MACHINERY
recognized by the employer and allowed by law. In contrast, providing
Section 1. - The parties hereto agree on the principle that all disputes
seed money for the establishment of the employee's cooperative is a
between labor and management may be solved through friendly
matter in which the employer has no business interest or legal
negotiation;. . . that an open conflict in any form involves losses to the
obligation. Courts should not be utilized as a tool to compel any person
parties, and that, therefore, every effort shall be exerted to avoid such
to grant loans to another nor to force parties to undertake an obligation
an open conflict. In furtherance of the foregoing principle, the parties
without justification. On the contrary, it is the government that has the
hereto have agreed to establish a procedure for the adjustment of
obligation to render financial assistance to cooperatives and the
grievances so as to (1) provide an opportunity for discussion of any
Cooperative Code does not make it an obligation of the employer or
request or complaint and (2) establish procedure for the processing
any private individual.22
and settlement of grievances.

Anent the 40-day union leave, the Court finds that the same is a
xxx xxx xxx
typographical error. In order to avoid any confusion, it is herein
declared that the union leave is only thirty (30) days as granted by the
Secretary of Labor and affirmed in the Decision of this Court. ARTICLE V
ARBITRATION
Section 1. Any and all disputes, disagreements and controversies of
The added requirement of consultation imposed by the Secretary in
any kind between the COMPANY and the UNION and/or the workers
cases of contracting out for six (6) months or more has been rejected
involving or relating to wages, hours of work, conditions of employment
by the Court. Suffice it to say that the employer is allowed to contract
and/or employer-employee relations arising during the effectivity of this
out services for six months or more. However, a line must be drawn
Agreement or any renewal thereof, shall be settled by arbitration
between management prerogatives regarding business operations per
through a Committee in accordance with the procedure established in
se and those which affect the rights of employees, and in treating the
this Article. No dispute, disagreement or controversy which may be
latter, the employer should see to it that its employees are at least
submitted to the grievance procedure in Article IV shall be presented
properly informed of its decision or modes of action in order to attain a
for arbitration until all the steps of the grievance procedure are
harmonious labor-management relationship and enlighten the workers
exhausted.
concerning their rights.23 Hiring of workers is within the employer's
inherent freedom to regulate and is a valid exercise of its management
prerogative subject only to special laws and agreements on the matter xxx xxx xxx
and the fair standards of justice.24 The management cannot be denied
the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of
what units are essential for its operation. It has the ultimate ARTICLE VI
STRIKES AND WORK STOPPAGES
determination of whether services should be performed by its
personnel or contracted to outside agencies. While there should be Section 1. The UNION agrees that there shall be no strikes, walkouts,
mutual consultation, eventually deference is to be paid to what stoppage or slowdown of work, boycotts, secondary boycotts, refusal
to handle any merchandise, picketing, sit-down strikes of any kind,
management decides.25 Contracting out of services is an exercise of
business judgment or management prerogative.26 Absent proof that sympathetic or general strikes, or any other interference with any of the
management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will operations of the COMPANY during the term of this Agreement.
not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer. 27 As
mentioned in the January 27, 1999 Decision, the law already Section 2. The COMPANY agrees that there shall be no lockout during
sufficiently regulates this matter.28 Jurisprudence also provides the term of this Agreement so long as the procedure outlined in Article
adequate limitations, such that the employer must be motivated by IV hereof is followed by the UNION.[3]
good faith and the contracting out should not be resorted to circumvent
the law or must not have been the result of malicious or arbitrary
actions.29These are matters that may be categorically determined only On April 11, 1994, IBM, through its vice-president Alfredo
when an actual suit on the matter arises. Colomeda, filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) a notice of strike, docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-04-180-94,
against petitioner for allegedly committing: (1) illegal dismissal of union
members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting out of
jobs being performed by union members, (5) labor-only contracting, (6)
harassment of union officers and members, (7) non-recognition of duly-
elected union officers, and (8) other acts of unfair labor practice.[4]
The next day, IBM filed another notice of strike, this time through
its president Edilberto Galvez, raising similar grounds: (1) illegal transfer,
(2) labor-only contracting, (3) violation of CBA, (4) dismissal of union
officers and members, and (5) other acts of unfair labor practice. This
was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-04-182-94.[5]
The Galvez group subsequently requested the NCMB to
consolidate its notice of strike with that of the Colomeda group, [6] to
which the latter opposed, alleging Galvezs lack of authority in filing the
same.[7]
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of
Strike with Motion to Dismiss, on the grounds that the notices raised
non-strikeable issues and that they affected four corporations which are
separate and distinct from each other.[8]
After several conciliation meetings, NCMB Director Reynaldo
Ubaldo found that the real issues involved are non-strikeable. Hence on
May 2, 1994, he issued separate letter-orders to both union groups,
converting their notices of strike into preventive mediation. The said
letter-orders, in part, read:
During the conciliation meetings, it was clearly established that the real
issues involved are illegal dismissal, labor only contracting and internal
union disputes, which affect not only the interest of the San Miguel
Corporation but also the interests of the MAGNOLIA-NESTLE
CORPORATION, the SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC., and the SAN
MIGUEL JUICES, INC.
Considering that San Miguel Corporation is the only impleaded
employer-respondent, and considering further that the aforesaid
companies are separate and distinct corporate entities, we deemed it
wise to reduce and treat your Notice of Strike as Preventive Mediation
case for the four (4) different companies in order to evolve voluntary
settlement of the disputes. . . .[9] (Emphasis supplied)
On May 16, 1994, while separate preventive mediation
conferences were ongoing, the Colomeda group filed with the NCMB a
notice of holding a strike vote. Petitioner opposed by filing a
Manifestation and Motion to Declare Notice of Strike Vote
Illegal,[10] invoking the case of PAL v. Drilon,[11] which held that no strike
could be legally declared during the pendency of preventive mediation.
NCMB Director Ubaldo in response issued another letter to the
Colomeda Group reiterating the conversion of the notice of strike into a
case of preventive mediation and emphasizing the findings that the
grounds raised center only on an intra-union conflict, which is not
strikeable, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
A perusal of the records of the case clearly shows that the basic point
to be resolved entails the question of as to who between the two (2)
groups shall represent the workers for collective bargaining purposes,
which has been the subject of a Petition for Interpleader case pending
resolution before the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Similarly, the other issues raised which have been discussed by the
parties at the plant level, are ancillary issues to the main question, that
is, the union leadership...[12] (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, on May 23, 1994, the Galvez group filed its second
notice of strike against petitioner, docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-05-263-
94. Additional grounds were set forth therein, including discrimination,
coercion of employees, illegal lockout and illegal closure. [13] The NCMB
however found these grounds to be mere amplifications of those alleged
in the first notice that the group filed. It therefore ordered the
consolidation of the second notice with the preceding one that was
earlier reduced to preventive mediation.[14] On the same date, the group
likewise notified the NCMB of its intention to hold a strike vote on May
27, 1994.
On May 27, 1994, the Colomeda group notified the NCMB of the
results of their strike vote, which favored the holding of a strike. [15] In
reply, NCMB issued a letter again advising them that by virtue of the PAL
v. Drilon ruling, their notice of strike is deemed not to have been filed,
consequently invalidating any subsequent strike for lack of compliance
with the notice requirement.[16] Despite this and the pendency of the
preventive mediation proceedings, on June 4, 1994, IBM went on strike.
The strike paralyzed the operations of petitioner, causing it losses
allegedly worth P29.98 million in daily lost production.[17]
Two days after the declaration of strike, or on June 6, 1994,
petitioner filed with public respondent NLRC an amended Petition for
Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order,
Free Ingress and Egress Order and Deputization Order. [18] After due
hearing and ocular inspection, the NLRC on June 13, 1994 resolved to
issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing free ingress to and
egress from petitioners plants, without prejudice to the unions right to
peaceful picketing and continuous hearings on the injunction case.[19]
To minimize further damage to itself, petitioner on June 16, 1994,
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the respondent-
union, calling for a lifting of the picket lines and resumption of work in
exchange of good faith talks between the management and the labor
management committees. The MOA, signed in the presence of
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) officials, expressly stated
that cases filed in relation to their dispute will continue and will not be
affected in any manner whatsoever by the agreement.[20] The picket
lines ended and work was then resumed.
Respondent thereafter moved to reconsider the issuance of the
TRO, and sought to dismiss the injunction case in view of the cessation
of its picketing activities as a result of the signed MOA. It argued that the
case had become moot and academic there being no more prohibited
activities to restrain, be they actual or threatened.[21] Petitioner, however,
opposed and submitted copies of flyers being circulated by IBM, as proof
of the unions alleged threat to revive the strike.[22] The NLRC did not rule
on the opposition to the TRO and allowed it to lapse.
On November 29, 1994, the NLRC issued the challenged
decision, denying the petition for injunction for lack of factual basis. It
found that the circumstances at the time did not constitute or no longer
constituted an actual or threatened commission of unlawful acts. [23] It
likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution
dated February 1, 1995.[24]
Hence, this petition.
Aggrieved by public respondents denial of a permanent injunction,
petitioner contends that:
A.
THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED
TO ENFORCE, BY INJUNCTION, THE PARTIES RECIPROCAL
OBLIGATIONS TO SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION AND NOT TO
STRIKE.
B.
THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN WITHHOLDING
INJUNCTION WHICH IS THE ONLY IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE
SUBSTITUTE FOR THE DISASTROUS ECONOMIC WARFARE
THAT ARBITRATION IS DESIGNED TO AVOID.
C.
THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING
THE TRO TO LAPSE WITHOUT RESOLVING THE PRAYER FOR
INJUNCTION, DENYING INJUNCTION WITHOUT EXPRESSING THE
FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED AND ISSUING ITS
DENIAL FIVE MONTHS AFTER THE LAPSE OF THE TRO.[25]
We find for the petitioner.
Article 254 of the Labor Code provides that no temporary or
permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or
growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other
entity except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of the Labor
Code. Under the first exception, Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code
expressly confers upon the NLRC the power to enjoin or restrain actual
and threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts, or
to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which,
if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable
damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such
party x x x. The second exception, on the other hand, is when the labor
organization or the employer engages in any of the prohibited activities
enumerated in Article 264.
Pursuant to Article 218 (e), the coercive measure of injunction may
also be used to restrain an actual or threatened unlawful strike. In the
case of San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC,[26] where the same issue of
NLRCs duty to enjoin an unlawful strike was raised, we ruled that the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the petition
for injunction to restrain the union from declaring a strike based on non-
strikeable grounds. Further, in IBM v. NLRC,[27] we held that it is the legal
duty and obligation of the NLRC to enjoin a partial strike staged in
violation of the law. Failure promptly to issue an injunction by the public
respondent was likewise held therein to be an abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, petitioner sought a permanent injunction to
enjoin the respondents strike. A strike is considered as the most effective
weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms
and conditions of their employment. However, to be valid, a strike must
be pursued within legal bounds.[28] One of the procedural requisites that
Article 263 of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules prescribe is
the filing of a valid notice of strike with the NCMB. Imposed for the
purpose of encouraging the voluntary settlement of disputes, [29] this
requirement has been held to be mandatory, the lack of which shall
render a strike illegal.[30]
 In the present case, NCMB converted IBMs notices into preventive
mediation as it found that the real issues raised are non-strikeable. Such
order is in pursuance of the NCMBs duty to exert all efforts at mediation
and conciliation to enable the parties to settle the dispute
amicably,[31] and in line with the state policy of favoring voluntary modes
of settling labor disputes.[32] In accordance with the Implementing Rules
of the Labor Code, the said conversion has the effect of dismissing the
notices of strike filed by respondent.[33] A case in point is PAL v.
Drilon,[34] where we declared a strike illegal for lack of a valid notice of
strike, in view of the NCMBs conversion of the notice therein into a
preventive mediation case. We ruled, thus:
The NCMB had declared the notice of strike as appropriate for
preventive mediation. The effect of that declaration (which PALEA did
not ask to be reconsidered or set aside) was to drop the case from the
docket of notice of strikes, as provided in Rule 41 of the NCMB
Rules, as if there was no notice of strike. During the pendency of
preventive mediation proceedings no strike could be legally
declared... The strike which the union mounted, while preventive
mediation proceedings were ongoing, was aptly described by the
petitioner as an ambush. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, therefore, applying the aforecited ruling to the case at bar,
when the NCMB ordered the preventive mediation on May 2, 1994,
respondent had thereupon lost the notices of strike it had filed.
Subsequently, however, it still defiantly proceeded with the strike while
mediation was ongoing, and notwithstanding the letter-advisories of
NCMB warning it of its lack of notice of strike. In the case of NUWHRAIN
v. NLRC,[35] where the petitioner-union therein similarly defied a
prohibition by the NCMB, we said:
Petitioners should have complied with the prohibition to strike ordered
by the NCMB when the latter dismissed the notices of strike after
finding that the alleged acts of discrimination of the hotel were not ULP,
hence not strikeable. The refusal of the petitioners to heed said
proscription of the NCMB is reflective of bad faith.
Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant violation of
the Implementing Rules, which explicitly oblige the parties to bargain
collectively in good faith and prohibit them from impeding or disrupting
the proceedings.[36]
by the union for not complying with the grievance procedure provided
in the collective bargaining agreement. . . (Citations omitted)
As in the abovecited case, petitioner herein evinced its willingness to
negotiate with the union by seeking for an order from the NLRC to
compel observance of the grievance and arbitration proceedings.
Respondent however resorted to force without exhausting all available
means within its reach. Such infringement of the aforecited CBA
provisions constitutes further justification for the issuance of an
injunction against the strike. As we said long ago: Strikes held in violation
of the terms contained in a collective bargaining agreement are illegal
especially when they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses. These
agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have
to be achieved.[41]
As to petitioners allegation of violation of the no-strike provision in
the CBA, jurisprudence has enunciated that such clauses only bar
strikes which are economic in nature, but not strikes grounded on unfair
labor practices.[42] The notices filed in the case at bar alleged unfair labor
practices, the initial determination of which would entail fact-finding that
is best left for the labor arbiters. Nevertheless, our finding herein of the
invalidity of the notices of strike dispenses with the need to discuss this
issue.
We cannot sanction the respondent-unions brazen disregard of
legal requirements imposed purposely to carry out the state policy of
promoting voluntary modes of settling disputes. The states commitment
to enforce mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace is
affirmed by no less than our Constitution.[43] Trade unionism and strikes
are legitimate weapons of labor granted by our statutes. But misuse of
these instruments can be the subject of judicial intervention to forestall
grave injury to a business enterprise.[44]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
decision and resolution of the NLRC in Injunction Case No. 00468-94
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner and private respondent are
hereby directed to submit the issues raised in the dismissed notices of
strike to grievance procedure and proceed with arbitration proceedings
as prescribed in their CBA, if necessary. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

The NCMB having no coercive powers of injunction, petitioner

sought recourse from the public respondent. The NLRC issued a TRO
only for free ingress to and egress from petitioners plants, but did not
enjoin the unlawful strike itself. It ignored the fatal lack of notice of strike,
and five months after came out with a decision summarily rejecting
petitioners cited jurisprudence in this wise:

Complainants scholarly and impressive arguments, formidably

supported by a long line of jurisprudence cannot however be
appropriately considered in the favorable resolution of the instant case
for the complainant. The cited jurisprudence do not squarely cover and
apply in this case, as they are not similarly situated and the remedy
sought for were different.[37]

Unfortunately, the NLRC decision stated no reason to substantiate the

above conclusion.

Public respondent, in its decision, moreover ruled that there was

a lack of factual basis in issuing the injunction. Contrary to the NLRCs
finding, we find that at the time the injunction was being sought, there
existed a threat to revive the unlawful strike as evidenced by the flyers
then being circulated by the IBM-NCR Council which led the union.
These flyers categorically declared: Ipaalala nyo sa management na
hindi iniaatras ang ating Notice of Strike (NOS) at anumang oras ay
pwede nating muling itirik ang picket line.[38] These flyers were not
denied by respondent, and were dated June 19, 1994, just a day after
the unions manifestation with the NLRC that there existed no threat of
commission of prohibited activities.

Moreover, it bears stressing that Article 264(a) of the Labor

Code[39] explicitly states that a declaration of strike without first having
filed the required notice is a prohibited activity, which may be prevented
through an injunction in accordance with Article 254. Clearly, public
respondent should have granted the injunctive relief to prevent the grave
damage brought about by the unlawful strike.

Also noteworthy is public respondents disregard of petitioners

argument pointing out the unions failure to observe the CBA provisions
on grievance and arbitration. In the case of San Miguel Corp. v.
NLRC,[40] we ruled that the union therein violated the mandatory
provisions of the CBA when it filed a notice of strike without availing of
the remedies prescribed therein. Thus we held:

x x x For failing to exhaust all steps in the grievance machinery and

arbitration proceedings provided in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, the notice of strike should have been dismissed by the
NLRC and private respondent union ordered to proceed with the
grievance and arbitration proceedings. In the case of Liberal Labor
Union vs. Phil. Can Co., the court declared as illegal the strike staged