G.R. No.
188056 January 8, 2013 ISSUES:
SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R.
DACUDAO, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioners initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos
Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City on
February 6, 2009.
Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special
Panel of the DOJ.3
Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court
via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent
Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182
forwarding the complaint filed against Delos Angeles, et.al. to the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Davao City. They claim that DO No. 182 violated their right
to due process, their right to the equal protection of the laws, and their right to
the speedy disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an
obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with
retroactive effect.
Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of DOJ
Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 exempting from the coverage of DO No.
No. 182 all the cases for syndicated estafa already filed and pending in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ
Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violated their right to equal protection
under the Constitution.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Secretary
of Justice, maintains the validity of DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated
March 2, 2009, and prays that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of
merit.
The following issues are now to be resolved, to wit:
1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus directly to the Court?
2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing DO No. 182?
3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violate
petitioners’ constitutionally guaranteed rights?
HELD:
No.
The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does
not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of
cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-
judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the
finding of probable cause in any case
But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial
body quickly endsthere. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of
government other than a court of law or a legislative office that affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making; it performs
adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights
of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect as the
judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a
public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable
cause in order to file a criminal information against a person properly charged
with the offense, or whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public
prosecutor’s orders or resolutions.
Thirdly, there is no question that DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of
its validity.
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement
and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law
and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature
of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute
itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality
in an appropriate case by a competent court.
Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO No. 182
constituted obstruction of justice. This ground of the petition, being
unsubstantiated, was unfounded.
Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the Secretary of
Justice to assume jurisdiction over matters involving the investigation of
crimes and the prosecution of offenders is fully sanctioned by law. Towards
that end, the Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over all
the regional, provincial, and city prosecutors of the country; has broad
discretion in the discharge of the DOJ’s functions; and administers the DOJ
and its adjunct offices and agencies by promulgating rules and regulations to
carry out their objectives, policies and functions.
G.R. No. 81385 February 21, 1989
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER AND CONRADO S. REYES in their official
capacity as FISCAL AGENTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION,
BRANCH 48, MANILA, PRESIDED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE
DEMETRIO M. BATARIO, JR., M.B. OLIVARES, AUGUSTO VILLANUEVA,
ARACELLI LINSANGAN, LUISA LINSANGAN, ALEJANDRO MARAMAG,
MANUEL SALAK, TURNITA SORIANO, LINO SISON DOMINGO FLORES,
MILAGROS HIZON and CARIDAD ORPIADA, respondents.
FACTS:
On December 17, 1987, private respondents filed a complaint for injunction
and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila against petitioners and Winston Marbella, Gaston Ortigas, Robeto
Federis, Manuel C. Villa-Real, Emanuel Soriano, Jack Arroyo and Benjamin
Tulio.
On December 18, 1987, an order was issued by the trial court setting the
petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for bearing on
January 4, 1988 at 1:30 in the afternoon. A temporary restraining order was
issued enjoining petitioner Reyes from holding the special stockholders
meeting scheduled for December 21, 1987 and enjoining all the other
petitioners including Olaguer from sitting and acting as members of the board
and/or corporate officers of PJI until further orders of the court.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/ or a writ of preliminary
injunction wherein the main issue is
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action.
HELD:
The petition is impressed with merit. There is no dispute that the PJI is now
under sequestration by the PCGG and that Civil Case No. 0035 was filed in
the Sandiganbayan wherein the PJI is listed as among the corporations
involved in the unexplained wealth case against former President Marcos,
Romualdez and many others.
In the exercise of its functions, the PCGG is a co-equal body with the regional
trial courts and co-equal bodies have no power to control the other. 5 The
regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals have no jurisdiction over the
PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders
and Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, may not
interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the
PCGG. 6By the same token, the regional trial courts have no jurisdiction over
the acts of fiscal agents of the
Petitioners Olaguer and Reyes appear to be fiscal agents of the PCGG. There
can be no doubt, therefore, that the subject matter of the action (the PJI its
properties and assets) falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners, as fiscal agents of the PCGG, cannot be sued in such capacity
before the ordinary courts. The tribunal for such purpose is the
Sandiganbayan.
It necessarily follows that the issues raised by the private respondents before
the respondent judge to the effect that petitioners are usurpers and have no
right to sit in the board of directors or act as corporate officers of the PJI are
issues which should be addressed to the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent judge is
permanently enjoined from enforcing the order of the trial court dated January
14, 1988. The restraining order issued by this Court dated February 4, 1988
enjoining petitioner Reyes and/or the corporate officers of the PJI from
holding the special stockholders meeting on February 5, 1988 or at any date
thereafter, and to preserve and maintain the status quo, is hereby lifted. The
order of the trial court dated January 14, 1988 is hereby SET ASIDE and
another order is hereby issued dismissing the complaint, without
pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
G.R. No. 141949 October 14, 2002
CEFERINO PADUA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANTIAGO RANADA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF MAKATI, RTC,
BRANCH 137,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORP.,
TOLL REGULATORY BOARD,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. 151108 October 14, 2002
EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, petitioner,
vs.
TOLL REGULATORY BOARD AND CITRA METRO MANILA TOLLWAYS
CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
On November 9, 2001, the TRB issued Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing
provisional toll rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway, effective
January 1, 2002,[1] thus:
Hence, petitioners Ceferino Padua and Eduardo Zialcita assail before this
Court the validity and legality of TRB Resolution No. 2001-89.
In his urgent motion, petitioner Padua claims that: (1) Resolution No. 2001-89
was issued without the required publication and in violation of due process;
(2) alone, TRB Executive Director Jaime S. Dumlao, Jr., could not authorize
the provisional toll rate adjustments because the TRB is a collegial body; and
(3) CITRA has no standing to apply for a toll fee increase since it is an
"investor" and not a "franchisee-operator."
Upon the other hand, on January 9, 2002, petitioner Eduardo Zialcita, as a
taxpayer and as Congressman of Parañaque City, filed the present petition for
prohibition[16] with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction against TRB and CITRA.
Petitioner Zialcita asserts that the provisional toll rate adjustments are
exorbitant and that the TRB violated its own Charter, Presidential Decree No.
1112,[17] when it promulgated Resolution No. 2001-89 without the benefit of
any public hearing. He also maintains that the TRB violated the Constitution
when it did not express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
Resolution No. 2001-89 was based. And lastly, he claims that Section 3, Rule
10 of the TRB Rules of Procedure is not sanctioned by P.D. No. 1112.
On January 11, 2002, this Court resolved to consolidate the instant petitions,
G.R. No. 141949 and G.R. No. 151108.[20]
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Resolution issued by TRB authorizing provisional toll rate
adjustments at MM Skyway is valid.
HELD:
Yes.
Petitioner Padua’s recourse in challenging the validity of TRB Resolution No.
2001-89 should have been to institute an action, separate and independent
from G.R. No. 141949.
The remedy of prohibition initiated by petitioner Zialcita in G.R. No. 151108
also suffers several infirmities. Initially, it violates the twin doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
P.D. No. 1112 explicitly provides that "the decisions of the TRB on petitions
for the increase of toll rate shall be appealable to the Office of the President
within ten (10) days from the promulgation thereof."[21]
These same provisions are incorporated in the TRB Rules of Procedure,
particularly in Section 6, Rule 5 and Section 1, Rule 12 thereof.[22]
We take cognizance of the wealth of jurisprudence on the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. In this
era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards
or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear
and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of
facts, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, is
indispensable. Between the power lodged in an administrative body and a
court, the unmistakable trend is to refer it to the former."[24]
Moreover, petitioner Zialcita’s resort to prohibition is intrinsically inappropriate.
It bears stressing that the office of this remedy is not to correct errors of
judgment but to prevent or restrain usurpation of jurisdiction or authority by
inferior tribunals and to compel them to observe the limitation of their
jurisdictions. In this case, petitioner Zialcita should have sought a review of
the assailed Resolution before the TRB.
For another, it is not true that it was TRB Executive Director Dumlao, Jr. alone
who issued Resolution No. 2001-89. The Resolution itself contains the
signature of the four TRB Directors, namely, Simeon A. Datumanong,
Emmanuel P. Bonoan, Ruben S. Reinoso, Jr. and Mario K. Espinosa.[31]
Petitioner Padua would argue that while these Directors signed the
Resolution, none of them personally attended the hearing. This argument is
misplaced. Under our jurisprudence, an administrative agency may employ
other persons, such as a hearing officer, examiner or investigator, to receive
evidence, conduct hearing and make reports, on the basis of which the
agency shall render its decision. Such a procedure is a practical
necessity.[32]
Be that as it may, we must stress that the TRB’s authority to grant provisional
toll rate adjustments does not require the conduct of a hearing. Pertinent laws
and jurisprudence support this conclusion.
The practice is not something peculiar. We have ruled in a number of cases
that an administrative agency may be empowered to approve provisionally,
when demanded by urgent public need, rates of public utilities without a
hearing. The reason is easily discerned from the fact that provisional rates are
by their nature temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity with the
definitive rates approved after final hearing.[36]
At this point, let it be stressed that we are not passing upon the
reasonableness of the provisional toll rate adjustments. As we have earlier
mentioned, this matter is best addressed to the TRB.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Padua’s "Urgent Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order to Stop Arbitrary Toll Fee Increases" is DENIED and petitioner Zialcita’s
"Petition for Prohibition" is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 131255 May 20, 1998
HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON, in his capacity as the Governor of
the Province of Nueva Ecija, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN D. TORRES, the DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, represented by SECRETARY
ROBERT Z. BARBERS and UNDERSECRETARY MANUEL R. SANCHEZ,
MR. OSCAR C. TINIO, in his capacity as Provincial Vice-Governor of
Nueva Ecija, and MR. LORETO P. PANGILINAN, MR. CRISPULO S.
ESGUERRA, MS. SOLITA C. SANTOS, MR. VICENTE C. PALILIO, and
MR. NAPOLEON G. INTERIOR, in their capacity as Provincial Board
Members of Nueva Ecija, respondents.
FACTS:
On September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with the Office of the
President a letter-complaint dated September 13, 1997 charging petitioner
with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. The petitioner's act of barging
in and intimidating private respondents was a serious insult to the integrity
and independence of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan;
The parties entered into an agreement whereby petitioner promised to
maintain peace and order in the province while private respondents promised
to refrain from filing cases that would adversely affect their peaceful co-
existence.6
The peace agreement was not respected by the parties and the private
respondents reiterated their letter-complaint. Petitioner then failed to submit
its answer several times prompting the Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, then
Acting Secretary of the DILG, to issue an order declaring petitioner in default
and to have waived his right to present evidence.
Two days later, on April 24, 1997, the law firm of Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar &
Asuncion, representing petitioner, filed with the DILG an "Entry of Appearance
with Motion for Time to File Answer Ad Cautelam."
Since petitioner still failed to file his answer, he was deemed to have waived
his right to present evidence in his behalf. Undersecretary Sanchez reinstated
the order of default and directed private respondents to present their
evidence ex-parte on July 15, 1997.16
On July 11, 1997, on recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the President,
placing petitioner under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days pending
investigation of the charges against him.17
Secretary Barbers directed the Philippine National Police to assist in the
implementation of the order of preventive suspension. In petitioner's stead,
Secretary Barbers designated Vice-Governor Oscar Tinio as Acting Governor
until such time as petitioner's temporary legal incapacity shall have ceased to
exist.18
Forthwith, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court
of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension and the order of
default.19
A few days after filing the petition before this Court, petitioner filed a "Motion
for Leave to File Herein Incorporated Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction."
Petitioner alleged that subsequent to the institution of this petition, the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments rendered a resolution on the
case finding him guilty of the offenses charged.29 His finding was based on
the position papers and affidavits of witnesses submitted by the parties. The
DILG Secretary found the affidavits of complainants' witnesses to be "more
natural, reasonable and probable" than those of herein petitioner Joson's. 30
On January 8, 1998, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President,
adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary. He imposed
on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without
pay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ________
HELD:
We find merit in the petition.
Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials are
governed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, and Administrative Order
No. 23 entitled "Prescribing the Rules and Procedures on the Investigation of
Administrative Disciplinary Cases Against Elective Local Officials of
Provinces, Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and
Cities and Municipalities in Metropolitan Manila."35
In the instant case, petitioner Joson is an elective official of the province of
Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly filed with
the Office of the President. According to petitioner, however, the letter-
complaint failed to conform with the formal requirements set by the Code.
We find no merit in the contention of the petitioner. The absence of the
document, page or book number of the notarial register of the subscribing
officer is insufficient to prove petitioner's claim..
Assuming, nonetheless, that the letter-complaint was unverified when
submitted to the Office of the President, the defect was not fatal. The
requirement of verification was deemed waived by the President himself when
he acted on the complaint.
In his second assigned error, petitioner questions the jurisdiction and authority
of the DILG Secretary over the case. He contends that under the law, it is the
Office of the President that has jurisdiction over the letter-complaint and that
the Court of Appeals erred in applying the alter-ego principle because the
power to discipline elective local officials lies with the President, not with the
DILG Secretary.
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local
officials is lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the
Investigating Authority.
Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the President of the
Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the Investigating
Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee.
The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating
Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the Disciplinary Authority may
designate a Special Investigating Committee.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against
elective local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over
local governments.
The power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to
see that the subordinate officers perform their duties."48 If the subordinate
officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.49 The
President's power of general supervision means no more than the power of
ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act
within the law.50 Supervision is not incompatible with discipline.51 And the
power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be
construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or
conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires.
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the
Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the
Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials.
A.O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a
Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining
Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim.
The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the
power to investigate, not the power to discipline.54
Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is
based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President.
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the DILG Secretary usurped the
power of the President when he required petitioner to answer the complaint.
Undisputably, the letter-complaint was filed with the Office of the President
but it was the DILG Secretary who ordered petitioner to answer.
Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the President did not comply with the
provisions of A.O. No. 23. The Office should have first required petitioner to
file his answer. Thereafter, the complaint and the answer should have been
referred to the Investigating Authority for further proceedings. Be that as it
may, this procedural lapse is not fatal. The filing of the answer is necessary
merely to enable the President to make a preliminary assessment of the
case.62 The President found the complaint sufficient in form and substance to
warrant its further investigation. The judgment of the President on the matter
is entitled to respect in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner should know that the formal investigation of the case is required by
law to be finished within one hundred twenty (120) days from the time of
formal notice to the respondent. The extensions petitioners requested
consumed fifty-five (55) days of this period.63 Petitioner, in fact, filed his
answer nine (9) months after the first notice. Indeed, this was more than
sufficient time for petitioner to comply with the order to file answer.
The speedy disposition of administrative complaints is required by public
service. The efficiency of officials under investigation is impaired when a case
hangs over their heads. Officials deserve to be cleared expeditiously if they
are innocent, also expeditiously if guilty, so that the business of government
will not be prejudiced.64
In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to file answer, the DILG did not err in
recommending to the Disciplining Authority his preventive suspension during
the investigation.
In sum, preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority
at any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is
strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that
the respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
Executive Secretary Torres, on behalf of the President, imposed preventive
suspension on petitioner Joson upon finding that all the requisites for the
imposition of preventive suspension had been complied with. Petitioner's
failure to file his answer despite several opportunities given him was
construed as a waiver of his right to file answer and present evidence; and as
a result of this waiver, the issues were deemed to have been joined.
AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. &
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., respondents.
FACTS:
The power of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the
First the facts. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES)
Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993, she was given a CES
eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the President
for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. 1
All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil
Service Commission2 passed Resolution No. 93-4359 abolishing the CESB
The above resolution became an impediment. to the appointment of petitioner
as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive
Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished,
petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-
4359.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent commission usurped the legislative functions
of the Congress when it abolished the CESB.
HELD:
We find merit in the petition.3
The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was
created in the Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 19744 which
adopted the Integrated Plan. Article IV, Chapter I, Part of the III of the said
Plan.
It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can
only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of
rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative
function.

In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing
the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations
Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation
of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3,
Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of
its power to abolish the CESB.

But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17
must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the
offices under the respondent Commission.

As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent

Commission's power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control
as enumerated in Section 16, supra. From its inception, the CESB was
intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to
respondent Commission. The essential autonomous character of the
CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By
said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of
respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency
to another is to attain "policy and program coordination."