Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 21 (2014) 897–904

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Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jretconser

Turning dissatisfied into satisfied customers: How referral reward

programs affect the referrer's attitude and loyalty toward the
recommended service provider
Madlen Kuester n, Martin Benkenstein
Institute of Marketing and Services Research, University of Rostock, Ulmenstr. 69, 18057 Rostock, Germany

art ic l e i nf o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Referral reward programs are becoming a popular tool for acquiring new customers and bonding
Received 18 March 2014 existing ones. Yet their benefits are contentious, since such campaigns are prone to the opportunistic
Received in revised form behaviour of customers who merely want to reap the reward. This paper examines how participating in a
22 July 2014
referral campaign affects opportunistic recommenders. By conducting two experimental studies, this
Accepted 23 July 2014
Available online 26 August 2014
article shows that giving counterattitudinal referrals enhances the communicator's attitude and loyalty
toward the recommended provider. However, the positive effect depends on the reward size. While
Keywords: referral reward programs with small incentives strengthen the recommender's attitude and loyalty, no
Referral impact was found for referrals with large rewards. The results show that a stronger focus on reward
Reward
programs is worth considering, since service providers can benefit from opportunistic customers with
Attitude
regards to the bonding effect.
Loyalty
Dissonance & 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Opportunism

1. Introduction referrals can be driven by motives of self-interest (Wirtz et al.,

Buzz marketing has become an important marketing technique
to stimulate positive word-of-mouth (WOM), and thus to acquire
new customers (Rosen, 2001; Tuk et al., 2009). A recent Web
search using the keyword “member-get-member-campaign”
yielded 40,000 results, showing that referral programs are gaining
growing popularity in various service industries (Ryu and Feick,
2007; Schmitt et al., 2011; Verlegh et al., 2013).
In referral programs, existing customers are rewarded for
bringing in new customers (Biyalogorsky et al., 2001; Ryu and
Feick, 2007; Schmitt et al., 2011). In this way, incentives basically
function as an extrinsic motivator to generate WOM (Tuk et al.,
2009; Wirtz and Chew, 2002). Although previous studies con-
firmed that providing rewards increases referral likelihood (Ryu
and Feick, 2007; Wirtz and Chew, 2002) and the favourability of
the WOM generated (Wirtz and Chew, 2002), referral reward
programs are not uncontroversial (Schmitt et al., 2011; Tuk et al.,
2009). Some academics have questioned the value of incentive
referral campaigns (e.g., Trusov et al., 2009; Van den Bulte, 2010;
see also Schmitt et al., 2011), particularly because rewarded
n
Corresponding author. Tel.: þ 49 176 2444 9978; fax: þ49 381 498 4378.
E-mail addresses: madlen.kuester@uni-rostock.de (M. Kuester),
martin.benkenstein@uni-rostock.de (M. Benkenstein).
2013). In other words, such programs are prone to the opportu-
nistic behaviour of consumers (Helm, 2000; Schmitt et al., 2011;
Wirtz and Chew, 2002) who merely want to take advantage of the
provider in order to reap the provided reward (Blazevic et al.,
2013; Wirtz and Chew, 2002). Making stimulated referrals by
unsatisfied customers is not a rare phenomenon (Helm, 2000).
Experimental studies confirmed that dissatisfied customers
engage in incentivized referrals only because of the reward
(Garnefeld et al., 2009). Although scholars agree that WOM
opportunism exists, very little research has been done on self-
interested WOM behaviour. Schmitt et al. (2011) found that the
contribution margin, the retention rate, as well as the customer
lifetime value for customers acquired through a referral campaign
are higher than for non-referred customers, and that the value
differential is larger than the reward. These results indicate that
any misuse by opportunistic consumers is much less important
than the benefits stemming from newly acquired customers
(Schmitt et al., 2011). Furthermore, a few studies examined how
a reward affects receivers' responses to the recommendation.
Verlegh et al. (2013) showed that incentives adversely affect
responses when they are perceived as driven by ulterior motives.
Tuk et al. (2009) generally speculate that the reward introduces a
financial motive into the interpersonal interaction between the
referring and the receiving customer, which could harm the
sincerity of the recommendation. However, researchers have

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jretconser.2014.07.005
0969-6989/& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
898 M. Kuester, M. Benkenstein / Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 21 (2014) 897–904
neglected analysing the impact of giving counterattitudinal refer-
rals on the referring customer. Recent research into the attitude-
congruent WOM context has shown that participating in a referral
program increases the communicator's attitudinal and behavioural
loyalty to the provider (Garnefeld et al., 2013). By contrast, the
effect of articulating positive WOM that does not reflect the
referrer's attitude toward the provider has received no research
attention thus far. This study therefore aims to bridge this gap in
the literature by examining the effects of articulating opportunistic
referrals on the recommender's attitude and loyalty. In this regard,
this paper responds specifically to Garnefeld et al.'s (2013) call for
research into further investigations of the bonding effect of
attitude-discrepant WOM behaviours on the referring customer.
The lack of research into the sender-related impact of recom-
mendations is an obvious shortcoming in the WOM literature (Ryu
and Feick, 2007; Tax et al., 1993). Only a few studies have explored
the effects of referrals on the recommender (Eggert et al., 2007;
Garnefeld et al., 2011, 2013). By showing that positive referrals are
not only effective for gaining but also for bonding customers, these
studies added a new perspective on the consequences of WOM
communication (Garnefeld et al., 2011). Thus, referral reward
programs can also be regarded as an instrument for retaining
existing customers (Jin and Huang, 2013; Reinartz et al., 2004; Ryu
and Feick, 2007). We broaden this view by investigating the effects
of opportunistic referrals on the recommender's attitude and
loyalty. We further examine their boundary conditions; more
specifically, the size of the reward is investigated as a moderator.
Owing to the growing use of referral reward programs, a better
understanding of their impact on customer retention is of great
interest for service marketing management, both for scholars and
practitioners. By rewarding WOM, service providers invest both in
acquiring and in retaining satisfied customers (Ryu and Feick,
2007). However, dissatisfied customers who are driven by the
reward are also attracted. Referral campaigns are very cost
effective (Schmitt et al., 2011; Xiao et al., 2011), and the spending
on those programs has increased considerably (Blazevic et al.,
2013). Therefore, the uncertainty that surrounds the payback of
customer referral programs due to opportunistic participants is
frustrating for managers aiming to prevent wasteful expenses and
to boost their return on marketing investment (Schmitt et al.,
2011). For a deeper insight into the effectiveness of customer
referral programs, companies need to understand how the parti-
cipation in a campaign affects opportunistic customers, and
whether providers might even benefit from a bonding effect. By
exploring the effects of campaigns with both small and large
rewards, we provide further guidance on how to design referral
reward programs.
2. Theoretical background and research hypotheses
2.1. Communicator's attitude
Individuals who advocate a specific position are driven to be
consistent with their articulated position (Cialdini, 1971, 2009;
Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Garnefeld et al., 2013). That binding
to a position results from the public commitment implied by the
subjects' behaviour (Kiesler, 1971; Nyer and Dellande, 2010). Public
commitment occurs when an individual's position is known or
made public to other people (Gopinath and Nyer, 2009). Research
provides empirical evidence that persons who make public com-
mitments align their attitudes and future behaviours with their
commitments (e.g., Cioffi and Garner, 1996; Garnefeld et al., 2011;
Greenwald et al., 1987; Katzev and Pardini, 1987; Nyer and
Dellande, 2010; Pallak and Cummings, 1976; Wang and Katzev,
1990). By generating WOM, the customer takes a public stand on
the evaluation of a service provider (Davidow, 2003; Garnefeld
et al., 2013; Nyer and Gopinath, 2005). Participating in a referral
reward program thus constitutes a public commitment that should
have consistency effects (Blazevic et al., 2013; Garnefeld et al.,
2013). Pursuant to Cialdini (2009), dissonance theory and self-
perception theory are eligible theoretical frameworks for explain-
ing these consistency effects. As shown by Garnefeld et al. (2011),
self-perception theory is suitable for attitude-congruent WOM
behaviour, whereas dissonance theory provides an accurate
approach for the effects of attitude-incongruent commitments.
We draw on Festinger's (1957) dissonance theory to derive our
hypothesis because we focus on the impact of attitude-discrepant
referrals on the recommender's attitude and behaviour.
Pursuant to dissonance theory, individuals strive to implement
their cognitive system in a state of psychological consistency (Frey
and Gaska, 2001). Cognitions are elements of knowledge that
individuals have about their attitudes, beliefs, values, and beha-
viour (Cooper and Carlsmith, 2001; Olson and Stone, 2005).
Festinger (1957) asserts that an inconsistency between two rele-
vant cognitions generates a psychological discomfort, which he
conceptualized as an aversive state similar to hunger or frustra-
tion. That unpleasant tension that Festinger termed “dissonance”
would motivate people to reduce this inconsistency by changing
one cognitive element (Cooper and Carlsmith, 2001; Olson and
Stone, 2005).
Several early studies confirmed that engaging in counterattitu-
dinal behaviour evokes cognitive dissonance and thus a state of
aversive arousal (e.g., Elkin and Leippe, 1986; Fazio et al., 1977;
Kiesler and Pallak, 1976; Losch and Cacioppo, 1990; Zanna and
Cooper, 1974; Zanna et al., 1976). By giving attitude-incongruent
referrals, customers should experience a psychological discomfort
because the behavioural cognition – “I recommended my service
provider” – and the attitudinal cognition – “I don't like my service
provider” – are dissonant. Due to this public advocating, the
recommender has committed him- or herself to his or her
behaviour. Brehm and Cohen (1962) postulates that a commitment
to a dissonant cognition makes it resistant to change, and the
recommender is thus tied to his or her referral. Owing to this
commitment to the counterattitudinal behaviour, there should be
no possibility for the participant of the referral program to reverse
or renege on his or her behaviour, or to distort its meaning.
Attitude change should therefore remain the only viable option for
eliminating dissonance (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). Accordingly, it
is expected that referrers would change their attitude toward the
recommended service provider in order to reduce the inconsis-
tency between attitude and behaviour. From this discussion, the
following hypothesis is advanced:
H1. Articulating a counterattitudinal referral within a referral
reward program has a positive effect on the recommender's
attitude toward the service provider.
2.2. Communicator's loyalty
A public disclosure of an attitudinal position strongly influ-
ences subsequent behaviour (Cialdini, 2009); in other words,
individuals are more likely to choose actions congruent with one's
public commitments (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). Eagly and
Chaiken (1995) states that commitment drives people into a state
of defence motivation. Defence motivation leads to selective
cognitive processing of information that is inconsistent with one's
public commitments (Gopinath and Nyer, 2009; Pomerantz et al.,
1995). According to dissonance theory, people desire to avoid
increases in dissonance by evading dissonant information (Frey
and Gaska, 2001; Olson and Stone, 2005). Individuals are therefore
more resistant to the communication efforts of other service
 M. Kuester, M. Benkenstein / Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 21 (2014) 897–904
providers (Gopinath and Nyer, 2009), and thus behave consistent
with their commitments (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). If a
customer recommends a service provider but then switches firm,
the customer would perceive that action as inconsistent with his
or her public commitment (Garnefeld et al., 2013) and experience
a psychological discomfort. Participating in a referral reward
program should therefore increase the intention to stay with the
recommended service provider. Hence, we hypothesize:
H2. Articulating a counterattitudinal referral within a referral
reward program has a positive effect on the recommender's
loyalty toward the service provider.
2.3. The moderating effect of reward size
Festinger's (1957) theory predicts that the magnitude of dis-
sonance depends on the incentive used to induce a person to
advocate a counterattitudinal position (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993).
According to dissonance theory, the greater the inducement
provided for an attitude-discrepant behaviour, the less the resul-
tant dissonance (Carlsmith et al., 1966; Stone and Fernandez,
2008). Having participated in a referral program with a large
reward, the size of the incentive would provide a sufficient
justification for the attitude-incongruent referral, and thus add a
significant consonant cognition to the element representing the
counterattitudinal behaviour (Cooper and Carlsmith, 2001; Eagly
and Chaiken, 1993). As a result, the recommender should experi-
ence only little dissonance in large-rewarded campaigns. There-
fore, customers would not need to change their attitude and their
loyalty toward the service provider in the direction of the
articulated position. By contrast, referring customers who receive
a small reward for participating in a referral reward program
should perceive this small incentive as an insufficient rationale for
their counterattitudinal advocacy, and experience a psychological
discomfort due to the articulation of a counterattitudinal referral.
Hence, in the case of small-rewarded referrals, communicators
would become motivated to reduce the dissonance arousal by
increasing their attitude and loyalty. Based on these considera-
tions, we derive the following hypothesis:
H3. The positive effects of articulating a counterattitudinal referral
within a referral reward program on the recommender's attitude
and loyalty toward the service provider are moderated by the size
of the reward: the positive effects only arise in a referral reward
program with small rewards.
3. Methodology
3.1. Overview
We conducted two experimental studies with a between-
subjects design to test our hypotheses. Study 1 investigated the
effects of articulating a counterattitudinal referral on the commu-
nicator's attitude and loyalty toward the service provider (H1 and
H2). In a follow-up study, we replicated the effects from the first
experiment, and further tested the moderating impact of the reward
size (H3). In our experiments, we used a scenario approach to
manipulate a counterattitudinal referral (see Fig. A1 in the appendix
for a scenario description). Presenting participants with a descrip-
tion of a fictitious situation and asking them to picture themselves in
that situation is a widely used technique in the marketing field
(Wirtz and Chew, 2002). In WOM research, this method has been
successfully applied in a number of studies (e.g., Garnefeld et al.,
2011, 2013; Laczniak et al., 2001; Söderlund and Rosengren, 2007;
Wang, 2011; Wirtz and Chew, 2002). A statutory health insurance
service which provides conventional coverage and entitles
899
customers to receive various benefits to maintain and restore their
health was chosen as the research context because referral reward
programs are well-established in the insurance industry. Further,
participants should be familiar with statutory health insurance, as
they are basically obligated to take out such insurance.
3.2. Study 1
3.2.1. Research design and participants
We experimentally created two groups: a treatment group
which articulated a counterattitudinal referral, and a control group
which did not. Before we manipulated giving a counterattitudinal
referral, we manipulated a negative attitude toward a service
provider by exposing both the treatment and the control group to
a situation in which they have a negative business relationship with
a health insurance provider (attitudinal scenario). To manipulate
articulating a recommendation, we followed Eggert et al.'s (2007)
approach in the attitude-congruent WOM context, and presented
the treatment group with a further description of a situation in
which they recommend the service provider (referral scenario).
We pretested the attitudinal scenario with 18 students to
ascertain the effectiveness of the manipulation of a negative
attitude. Pretest respondents were further questioned on the
referral scenario. In particular, they were asked to summarize
the scenario description, and to comment if they had problems
understanding the simulated situation. Pretest feedback showed
that participants were able to project themselves well into the
described situations.
For data collection, a total of 110 questionnaires were distrib-
uted to students at a northern European University. Respondents
did not receive any compensation for their participation in the
study. Students were randomly assigned to one of the two groups.
11 questionnaires were excluded due to incomplete data, resulting
in 99 acceptable response sets for analysis.
3.2.2. Experimental procedure
Firstly, all participants received a written scenario comprising a
description of the subject's business relationship with the fictitious
statutory health insurance company “Health-Plus” (see Fig. A1). In
the scenario, the relationship was described in negative terms in
order to induce an adverse attitude toward the provider. That
negative attitude was created by references to the unpleasant
bilateral contact with the provider, and additional fees which have
to be paid for the insurance coverage. Students were instructed to
read the description carefully, and try to project themselves into the
hypothetical situation. Subsequently, the participants rated their
attitudes toward the service provider on a bipolar three-item scale
ranging from 1 (“very negative, very unfavourable, very bad”) to 7
(“very positive, very favourable, very good”) (Laczniak et al., 2001;
Simmons and Becker-Olsen, 2006). This was so that we could test
the manipulation of the negative attitude, and also determine
whether both groups produced similar attitudes. Before the students
received a second questionnaire packet containing the referral
scenario and several rating questions, we collected the attitudinal
scenario, including students' responses, as we needed to examine
the impact on the communicator's attitude. We thus avoided
participants just copying the pretest scores from the first scenario.
In the second questionnaire packet, only the treatment group
received a scenario that described them giving a referral, while the
control group was just asked to answer the questions. In the
referral scenario, students were asked to imagine meeting a friend
at a coffee bar, who mentions a desire for a new health insurance
provider (see Fig. A1). We also asked them to imagine that they
had recently received a flyer about a member-get-member-
campaign from their insurance company, “Health-Plus”, with the
900 M. Kuester, M. Benkenstein / Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 21 (2014) 897–904
request to recommend the provider to friends. The participants
were informed that they would receive a monetary reward for
every new customer they successfully acquired. In order to
increase the realism and the imaginativeness of the scenario, the
description was accompanied by a picture depicting two persons
sitting in a café. To manipulate participation in a referral reward
program, the students of the treatment group were then asked to
articulate their referrals in a speech bubble. The picture
(Söderlund and Rosengren, 2007), as well as the text box
(Garnefeld et al., 2011, 2013), should enhance the vividness and
tangibility of the described situations.
Both groups responded to some questions regarding the
dependent variables using established scales adapted to our
research context. For measuring participant's attitudes, we used
the same seven-point scale as within the attitudinal scenario.
Based on the study of Ganesh et al. (2000), we measured loyalty
using four items (on a scale of 1 ¼“strongly disagree” to
7 ¼“strongly agree”). Finally, all participants were asked to rate
how well they could project themselves into the situation on a
seven-point scale (1 ¼“the situation was very easy to picture” to
7 ¼“the situation was very difficult to picture”). A complete list of
the items used to measure the subjects’ attitude and loyalty is
provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. The scales for measuring the
participants' attitude and loyalty performed well on the tests
conducted to assess the quality of the instruments (see Table A1).
3.2.3. Manipulation and realism checks
We confirmed that the attitudinal scenario induced a negative
attitude toward “Health-Plus” (M(99) ¼1.77). As intended, no
significant differences were found between the control and the
treatment group (t(99) ¼  .91, p ¼.37, MCG ¼1.69, MTG ¼1.84). The
realism check was also successful and showed a mean of 3.60.
Thus, participants could imagine experiencing the presented
situation. Both groups perceived the realism of the scenarios
similarly (t(99) ¼  .37, p¼ .71, MCG ¼3.54, MTG ¼ 3.65). Further, we
ensured that participants in the referral group filled out the speech
bubble and gave positive referrals. All students articulated their
referral by writing such statements such as “I can recommend you
my insurance provider” or “Switch to my firm. If you sign up, I
would get a reward. I would invite you for coffee next time”.
3.2.4. Findings
Due to the correlation among the dependent variables (r ¼.51,
p o.001), we conducted a multivariate analysis of covariance
(MANCOVA) to test the hypothesized effects of articulating a
counterattitudinal referral on the recommender's attitude (H1)
and loyalty (H2). The pretest score of participants' attitudes
toward the service provider was included as a covariate in the
model. Table 1 presents the results of the analysis. In support of
H1, we confirmed a significant positive effect on the communica-
tor's attitude (F(1,99)¼ 21.82, p o.001, partial η2 ¼.19, MCG ¼1.95,
MTG ¼ 2.76). As further hypothesized (H2), results indicate that
articulating a counterattitudinal referral has a significant positive
effect on the recommender's loyalty (F(1,99) ¼12.69, p o.001,
partial η2 ¼.12, MCG ¼2.25, MTG ¼ 3.06).
Table 1
MANCOVA results for attitude and loyalty (Study 1).
Mean value Mean value F-value p-value
control group treatment
(n¼ 50) group (n¼ 49)
Attitude 1.95 2.76 21.82 .000
Loyalty 2.25 3.06 12.69 .001
3.3. Study 2
3.3.1. Research design and participants
In the follow-up experiment, we extended the experimental
design from Study 1 to two different levels of reward size (small
and large). The referral scenario of the first study was slightly
adapted (see Fig. A1). An amount of €10 was chosen as a small
reward, and €100 as a large reward. These reward sizes are
common in referral campaigns of European health insurance
providers, and present the actual range of incentives offered for
participation in health insurance referral campaigns. We pretested
different reward sizes to ascertain whether the sizes are perceived
as realistic and that they correspond with the assumption of
dissonance theory. The selected amounts emerged as meeting
the requirements.
We thus created three experimental conditions in Study 2.
While the control group was only exposed to the attitudinal
scenario, the participants assigned to the treatment conditions
also received a description about recommending their service
provider for either a small or a large reward. Study participants
were recruited from business courses at the same northern
European University as in Study 1. A total of 120 students took
part in the experiment, and were randomly allocated to one of the
three experimental conditions. The sample distribution across the
three experimental cells ranged from 39 to 41 respondents.
Students did not receive any compensation for their participation.
3.3.2. Experimental procedure
As with the procedure in Study 1, each participant first read the
scenario for manipulating a negative attitude, and then rated their
attitudes toward the service provider “Health-Plus”. After collect-
ing the scenario and the response sets, the students received the
second questionnaire packet comprising the referral scenarios, as
well as numerous questions relating to the dependent variables
and manipulation checks. Participants in the small reward group
were informed that they would receive a reward of €10 if they
successfully recommended the provider. In the large reward
group, subjects read that “Health-Plus” would reward a referral
with €100. As in Study 1, the participants assigned to the control
group did not receive the referral scenario.
Again, all groups completed a questionnaire. In Study 2, we
used the same construct measures for attitude and loyalty as in
Study 1. Besides the realism check from Study 1, we also included a
check for the manipulation of reward size and the magnitude of
dissonance. To test the reward size manipulation, we used two
seven-point semantic differential items developed by Ryu and
Feick (2007): 1 ¼“very small amount, very unattractive amount”
and 7 ¼ “very high amount, very attractive amount”. For checking
the magnitude of dissonance, we asked participants from the
reward conditions whether the articulation of the referral made
them feel uncomfortable (on a scale 1 ¼“very uncomfortable” to
7¼ “not uncomfortable at all”; Fazio et al., 1977). The tests for
reliability and validity of our measures led to reasonable results for
all instruments (see Table A1).
3.3.3. Manipulation and realism checks
Again, we ensured that the attitudinal scenario produced a
negative attitude toward “Health-Plus” (M(120)¼ 2.05). All groups
had similar levels of attitude (F(2,120) ¼.32, p ¼ .73, MCG ¼ 2.02,
Partial η2 M10€ ¼1.99, M100€ ¼2.13). Also, we carried out manipulation checks
for reward size and the magnitude of dissonance in both referral
groups. As intended, participants perceived the value of the large
reward to be significantly greater than the value of the small
.19
.12
reward (t(81) ¼  8.94, po .001, M10€ ¼2.61, M100€ ¼5.01). Corre-
sponding with our theoretical framework, the students in the
 M. Kuester, M. Benkenstein / Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 21 (2014) 897–904
small reward group felt more uncomfortable giving a counter-
attitudinal referral than participants in the large reward group
(t(81) ¼  5.04, p o.001, M10€ ¼2.73, M100€ ¼4.58). We further
made sure that students articulated positive WOM in the speech
bubble. Similar to Study 1, participants in all three experimental
conditions indicated that they could picture themselves in the
described situation (M(120) ¼ 3.76). No significant differences
were found between the realism perceptions of all three groups
(F(2,120) ¼.04, p ¼.96, MCG ¼ 3.71, M10€ ¼3.73, M100€ ¼3.83).
3.3.4. Findings
Firstly, we tested whether the replication of the positive effect
of giving a counterattitudinal recommendation on the sender's
attitude and loyalty was successful. For this purpose, we merged
the two treatment groups into one group and used the pretest
score of participants' attitude toward the health insurance provi-
der as a covariate. Again, we found a significant effect of
giving counterattitudinal referrals on the recommenders' attitude
(F(1,120) ¼4.95, p o.05, partial η2 ¼ .04, MCG ¼2.17, MTG ¼2.48) and
loyalty (F(1,120)¼ 8.79, p o.01, partial η2 ¼.07, MCG ¼2.23,
MTG ¼ 2.77). The results thus provide further support for H1 and
H2 (see Table 2).
The moderating effect of reward size (H3) was tested conduct-
ing a separate MANCOVA with all three groups. The analysis
revealed a major effect both on attitude (F(2,120) ¼5.46, po .01,
partial η2 ¼.09, MCG ¼2.17, M10€ ¼2.59, M100€ ¼2.37) and loyalty
(F(2,120) ¼8.65, p o.001, partial η2 ¼.13, MCG ¼ 2.23, M10€ ¼3.01,
M100€ ¼ 2.51). As postulated in H3, Bonferroni tests indicated a
significant difference between the control group and the small-
rewarded treatment group in terms of their attitude (po .01) and
loyalty (po .001), whereas the attitude (p¼ 1.0) and loyalty
(p ¼.67) between the control group and the large-rewarded group
did not significantly differ. Compared with the large-rewarded
condition, articulating a counterattitudinal referral for a small
reward had a positive effect on the communicator's attitude
(p o.05) and loyalty (po.05). In line with H3, we found articulat-
ing a counterattitudinal referral had a positive effect on the
recommender's attitude and loyalty for referral programs with
small rewards, but not for campaigns with large incentives. Table 3
summarizes the results.
4. Discussion and implications
Past research has found that participating in a customer referral
program positively affects the behavioural loyalty of the recom-
mender, and that campaigns with larger rewards also strengthen
the referring customer's attitudinal loyalty (Garnefeld et al., 2013).
However, previous studies have overlooked the possible impact on
unsatisfied customers who recommend their service providers in
order to obtain the reward. The findings of this research suggest
that articulating attitude-discrepant referrals within a referral
reward campaign has a positive effect on the recommender's
attitude and loyalty toward the recommended service provider.
By providing the first empirical evidence regarding the effects of
giving a counterattitudinal referral on the referring customer, this
Table 2
MANCOVA results for attitude and loyalty (Study 2).
Mean value Mean value F-value p-value Partial η2
control group treatment
(n¼39) group (n¼ 81)
Attitude 2.17 2.48 4.95 .028
Loyalty 2.23 2.77 8.79 .004
901
study complements previous work on sender-related impacts of
natural and stimulated WOM (Eggert et al., 2007; Garnefeld et al.,
2011, 2013).
Our results support the idea of Garnefeld et al. (2013) that
participating in a referral program constitutes a public commit-
ment that evokes consistency effects. By drawing on Festinger's
(1957) dissonance theory, we confirmed the applicability of the
commitment-consistency framework for counterattitudinal refer-
rals. To retrieve inner consistency, recommenders align their
attitude and subsequent behaviour with their attitude-discrepant
referral. However, we found that the positive impact of articulating
a counterattitudinal referral depends on the size of the reward.
Our findings indicated an inverse incentive effect; in other words,
participation in a referral program has a positive effect on the
communicator's attitude and loyalty when the rewards are small,
but has no impact when the service provider offers large rewards.
The results thus suggest that larger incentives are ineffective to
improve unsatisfied customers' attitude and loyalty toward the
recommended service provider. This notable finding is in line with
Garnefeld et al.'s (2013) speculation that large rewards do not
enhance attitudes in attitude-discrepant referral behaviour. Also,
Ryu and Feick (2007) have generally asserted that a recommenda-
tion induced by a large extrinsic incentive may undermine the
positive impact of unrewarded WOM. From a dissonance theory
perspective, a large reward offers an external cause that explains
the counterattitudinal recommendation. Hence, larger induce-
ments thoroughly justify participating in a referral campaign
despite being dissatisfied. Recommenders perceive the incentive
as a sufficient motivation that has evoked their opportunistic
behaviour. As customers know that their referral was merely
driven by the large reward, they do not experience a discomfort
and do not have to align their attitude and their loyalty with their
attitude-discrepant recommendation.
In addition, making an incentivized recommendation may result
in a trade-off between the motives of self-interest and maintenance of
the relationship with the recipient of the referral (Kornish and Li,
2010; Wirtz et al., 2013). As the recommender has a personal
relationship with the receiver, rewarded referrals are not just a purely
commercial communication (Wirtz et al., 2013). They always entail a
social risk (Tuk et al., 2009), which refers to the possible negative
consequences arising from the recipient's reaction (Wangenheim and
Bayón, 2004). Customers therefore balance the value of the reward to
themselves with the potential social risk of negatively affecting the
relationship (Ryu and Feick, 2007). With opportunistic referrals, we
expect recommenders to perceive high social costs. The relationship
would probably be jeopardized if the receiver found out the ulterior
motives of the referral and the recommender's real attitude toward
the provider. However, a large incentive should be perceived as an
appropriate compensation for the potential social risk. In the case of a
large reward, the personal financial benefits thus should outbalance
the social costs. The referring customer therefore does not feel a need
to make a positive impression on the receiver by being consistent
with the articulated referral.
By showing that small-incentivized referral campaigns improve
opportunistic customers' attitude and loyalty toward the service
provider, our study recognizes the meaning of referral programs as
means for enhancing and retaining relationships with existing
customers. Our findings thereby reinforce the recent idea that
customer referral programs are not just a tool to acquire new
customers (e.g., Kornish and Li, 2010; Kumar et al., 2010; Schmitt
et al., 2011; Xiao et al., 2011), but also act as an instrument for
customer relationship management (Garnefeld et al., 2011, 2013;
Reinartz et al., 2004; Ryu and Feick, 2007). Since dissatisfied
customers evaluate the service provider in a more favourable
.04
.07
manner after participating in small-rewarded campaigns, these
programs may particularly help to increase consumers' satisfaction
902 M. Kuester, M. Benkenstein / Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 21 (2014) 897–904
Table 3
MANCOVA results for the moderating effect of reward size.
Mean value control Mean value small Mean value large
group (n ¼39) reward group reward group
(n ¼41) (n ¼40)
Attitude 2.17 2.59 2.37
Loyalty 2.23 3.01 2.51
with the provider. Marketing managers are therefore encouraged
to use member-get-member-campaigns as a supplementary
instrument to deal with unsatisfied customers. However, providers
should be aware that targeting member-get-member-programs to
unsatisfied customers might undermine the additional goal to
attract new customers. First, receivers' responses to the referral
might be adversely affected. If the recipient found out that the
referral was merely motivated by the reward, the referred custo-
mer would question the sincerity of the recommender and
possibly not subscribe to the provider. According to the findings
of Verlegh et al. (2013), rewarding both the recommender and the
receiver can eliminate this negative effect. Second, the relationship
between the newly acquired customer and the provider would be
harmed if the receiver detected the ulterior motives after signing
up for a contract. Further studies should address this issue in order
to clarify the possible trade-off between the goals of enhancing
customers' satisfaction and acquiring new customers. Besides
actively using referral campaigns to increase customers' satisfac-
tion, firms can take advantage of opportunistic referral behaviour
in general. As opportunism is a prevalent accompaniment of
referral reward campaigns, providers can also indirectly profit
from the favourable side effects of self-interested behaviour on the
recommender's attitude and loyalty.
The findings of this study may further help managers design
referral reward programs. As the positive effects on dissatisfied
customers only arise in a customer referral program with smaller
rewards, service firms would be well advised to launch member-get-
member-campaigns with small rewards. This implication corresponds
to the findings of Ryu and Feick (2007) concerning new customer
acquisition. Their study showed that small rewards are sufficient to
increase referral likelihood, and that an increase in reward size does
not lead to a rise in likelihood. According to the findings of Garnefeld
et al. (2013), only larger rewards strengthen both the communicators'
attitude and behavioural loyalty when customers recommend satis-
factory service providers. However, their study revealed that small
rewards are adequate to increase senders' loyalty. By offering small
rewards, service providers cannot do anything wrong: they may gain
new customers, enhance satisfied clients' loyalty, and strengthen
unsatisfied customers' attitude and loyalty.
Finally, our research contributes to debilitate prior scepticism
about referral campaigns. Several authors doubt the benefits of
stimulated referrals (e.g., Trusov et al., 2009; Van den Bulte, 2010).
Referral reward programs are deemed to be very cost effective
(Schmitt et al., 2011; Xiao et al., 2011) and prone to the opportu-
nistic behaviour of customers (Schmitt et al., 2011; Wirtz and
Chew, 2002). By demonstrating that small-rewarded counteratti-
tudinal referrals strengthen referring customers' attitude and
loyalty, we show that referral campaigns can pay off; not only in
terms of newly acquired customers, but also in terms of the
referring customers, even when those programs are abused by
unsatisfied customers. Our results thus support the reasoning of
Schmitt et al. (2011) that the benefits of referral reward programs
outbalance the harmful side effects such as the abuse by oppor-
tunistic customers. Since firms can even profit from self-interested
customers with regards to the bonding effect, a stronger focus on
referral reward programs is worth considering.
F-value p-value Partial η2 Bonferroni test (p-value)
Control vs. Small Control vs. Large Small vs. Large
5.46 .005 .09 .006 1.000 .054
8.65 .000 .13 .000 .673 .017
5. Limitations and further research
As with any other study that focuses exclusively on a singly
service context and uses student samples, limitations persist
regarding the generalizability of the results. A homogeneous
student population makes the situational variance controllable,
and minimizes the likelihood of making a Type II error (Calder
et al., 1981); however, it may also result in a drift toward stronger
effects than would be found in the general population (Brown and
Stayman, 1992). In order to confirm the robustness of the findings,
further research should replicate this study in different service
settings with non-student subjects.
wIn our experiments, participants were asked to project
themselves into a fictitious situation. A few authors assume low
external validity for scenario-based experiments (e.g., Aronson
et al., 1990). However, the realism check showed that subjects
could imagine the scenarios. But for higher external validity, the
results should be validated in field experiments with real referrals.
Based on existent referral campaigns in the health insurance
industry, we operationalized the size for small and large rewards
with €10 and €100 respectively. The sizes of referral rewards may
vary in different service industries. Additional research is therefore
necessary to provide the adequate sizes of smaller rewards for
different types of services. We further argue that referral reward
programs can be a tool to enhance unsatisfied customers' attitude
and loyalty. However, we are not familiar with what reward sizes
actually evoke the opportunistic referral behaviour of customers.
In order to complete the findings, future research should investi-
gate if smaller rewards are sufficient to provoke opportunism. We
presume that smaller rewards will contribute to reduce opportu-
nistic WOM behaviour. Regarding the impact of incentives on
unsatisfied customers, we expect an opposing effect: while custo-
mers' willingness to recommend an unsatisfactory service provi-
der may decline along with smaller referral rewards, the positive
effects of articulating a counterattitudinal referral only arise in
referral reward programs with smaller rewards. Thus, further
analyses should focus on this optimizing issue in order to find
the optimal reward size for unsatisfied customers. In this context,
research could pay specific attention to the tie strength between
the communicator and the recipient. Opportunistic WOM beha-
viour was found to occur more frequently in communications to
weak ties (Wangenheim, 2003). According to Ryu and Feick
(2007), rewards increase referral likelihood more for weak than
for strong ties. In the same vein, we assume that opportunism in
referral reward programs is more likely to become an issue in
weak tie relationships because the recommender may be less
concerned about the negative impact on the personal relationship
with the recipient.
In practice, many firms use non-financial incentives, such as credit
and gifts, to encourage their customers to provide referrals (Kornish
and Li, 2010; Wirtz and Chew, 2002). In some of these programs, the
recommender even has to make an extra payment to receive the non-
financial reward. Service providers might provide large non-monetary
rewards to enhance unsatisfied customers' willingness to participate
in the referral campaign. We surmise that the referrers' additional
payment may induce cognitive dissonance irrespective of the large
 M. Kuester, M. Benkenstein / Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 21 (2014) 897–904 903

reward. Hence, articulating a counterattitudinal referral might have a
positive effect on the recommender's attitude and loyalty even within
referral reward programs with larger non-financial rewards. For a
better understanding about the impact of member-get-member-
campaigns, follow-up studies using non-monetary incentives with
extra payment would be useful.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Yvonne Strelow for her
research assistance.
Appendix
Study 1
1. Manipulation of a negative attitude
Please imagine that you switched to the statutory health
insurance provider “Health-Plus” three years ago. Since your
signing with “Health-Plus”, most contact has been rather
displeasing (signing up without personal consulting service,
no information about additional services, no subsidized health
courses, etc.). Also, you had to pay an additional fee for your
insurance coverage..
2. Manipulation of a referral
Imagine meeting a friend at a coffee bar. The friend tells you that
she or he is looking for a new health insurance provider. While you
talk about health insurance, you remember that you recently
received a flyer from your insurance provider, “Health-Plus”, with
a request to recommend it to friends. If participating in the
member-get-member-campaign, you would receive a monetary
reward for every successfully acquired customer as a thank you.
Thereupon, you recommend your health insurance provider
“Health-Plus” to the friend.
Please articulate your referral in the speech bubble!
courses, etc.). Also, you had to pay an additional fee for your
insurance coverage.
2. Manipulation of a referral
a. Small reward
Imagine meeting a friend at a coffee bar. The friend tells you
that she or he is looking for a new health insurance
provider. While you talk about health insurance, you
remember that you recently received a flyer from your
insurance provider, “Health-Plus”, with a request to recom-
mend it to friends. If participating in the member-get-
member-campaign, you would receive a reward of €10 for
every successfully acquired customer as a thank you. There-
upon, you recommend your health insurance provider
“Health-Plus” to the friend.
Please articulate your referral in the speech bubble!
b. Large reward
Imagine meeting a friend at a coffee bar. The friend tells you
that she or he is looking for a new health insurance
provider. While you talk about health insurance, you
remember that you recently received a flyer from your
insurance provider, “Health-Plus”, with a request to recom-
mend it to friends. If participating in the member-get-
member-campaign, you would receive a reward of €100
for every successfully acquired customer as a thank you.
Thereupon, you recommend your health insurance provider
“Health-Plus” to the friend.
Please articulate your referral in the speech bubble!
I am looking for a
new health insurance
provider !

Study 2

1. Manipulation of a negative attitude

Please imagine that you switched to the statutory health
insurance provider “Health-Plus” three years ago. Since your
signing with “Health-Plus”, most contact has been rather
displeasing (signing up without personal consulting service, Fig. A1. Manipulations for Studies 1 and 2. (The image has been downloaded from
no information about additional services, no subsidized health http://office.microsoft.com/de-de/images/?CTT ¼ 6&ver¼ 14&app ¼powerpnt.exe.)

Table A1
Measures and validation.

Construct and items Factor loading Explained Item-to-total Cronbach's α

variance (%) correlation

Study Study Study Study Study Study Study Study

1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2

Attitude 84.6 81.3 .91 .89

“Health-Plus” is very negative/very positive. .94 .93 .86 .82
“Health-Plus” is very unfavourable/very favourable. .93 .89 .83 .75
“Health-Plus” is very bad/very good. .89 .89 .76 .75

Loyalty 55.5 57.1 .71 .74

I am likely to be insured at “Health-Plus” in a year. .73 .72 .46 .49
I am likely to make negative comments about “Health-Plus” to my friends and family.a .62 .77 .40 .55
If my health insurance provider “Health-Plus” were to raise my premium, I would still continue to be .83 .83 .62 .65
a customer.
If a competing health insurance provider were to offer a lower premium, I would switch.a .78 .70 .57 .48

a
Items were reverse scaled.
904 M. Kuester, M. Benkenstein / Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 21 (2014) 897–904
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