Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
Presidential decrees and executive acts previously published not in the official gazette should not be devoid of legal
character.
Concurring, Melencio, J
There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it should be published.
Separate, Plana, J
The law is not precise regarding due process of the notice of laws. Law does not provide that publication in the Official
Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws.
Separate, Teehankee, J
Rule of law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal protection to all similarly
circumstanced and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. Fair play and justice. If there is no
publication then there is no Art 3 “ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith”
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
(a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the sanggunian panlungsod or sangguniang bayan shall forward to the
sangguniang panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development
plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after the receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall
examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt
examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the
documents, inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of his comments or recommendations, which may be considered
by the sangguniang panlalawigan in making its decision.
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Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
(c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in
part. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal
authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such
an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
FACTS: The parties, Kasilag and Emiliana Rodriguez, entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land
acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest.
One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated
interest as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and Kasilag entered into another verbal
contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect the
interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce
improvements thereon.
Respondents, Rafaela Rodriguez, et. al., children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a civil case to
recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted by the way of homestead to Emiliana
Ambrosio.
The CA held that petitioner acted in Bad Faith in taking possession of the land because he knew that the contract he made with
Emiliana Ambrosio was an absolute sale, and that the latter could not sell the land because it is prohibited by Sec. 116 of Act
2874.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in Good Faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in
the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated.
HELD: The petitioner’s ignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the basis of Good Faith.
RATIO: Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of Good Faith but excusable ignorance may be such
basis (if it based upon ignorance of a fact). In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded
belief that he was not violating rhe prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in
consenting to receive the fruits, he did not know that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract
of antichresis and that the latter, as alien, was prohibited by Sec. 116.
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
HELD: No
RATIO: No vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases
pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure,
except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to
convict than what us required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be
unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.
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Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
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Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
licenses issued under petitioner’s name alone does not tantamount to conjugal property.
With regard to the house and lot in Barrio, San Isidro:
a. The certificate title stating that “Eusebio married to Teresita” is no proof that the property was acquired during the
marriage. It is merely descriptive of a civil status.
Also, Eusebio was found that he is not suffering from serious illness. Only handicapped by a leg injury in a bicycle
accident and was aggravated when petitioner pushed him to the ground during a quarrel.
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Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
cases for annulment of marriages pursuant to psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned,
Santos.
It constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds
itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine of the case may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance
therewith.
DOCTRINE:
The interpretation made upon the cases by a competent court has the force of law.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
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Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
D.M. Consunji, Inc. v Court of Appeals (CA) AUTHOR: Magsino, Patricia Marie C.
TOPIC: Waiver of Rights (NCC Art. 6) Note: There is a discussion on res ipsa loquitur in this case re:
PONENTE: Kapunan, J negligence of Consunji. Please read that JUST IN CASE! :)
Around 1:30PM (November 2, 1990), Jose Juego – a construction worker at DM Consunji Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance
Tower, Pasig City to his death. Juego was crushed to death when the platform he was on fell, the falling was due to the removal
or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a
safety lock. PO3 Rogelio Villanueva investigated and filed a report on November 25, 1990.
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow – Maria, filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against DM Consunji.
Consunji raised the defense that Maria had previously availed of the death benefits provided for under the Labor Code and is
now precluded from claiming damages from them under the Civil Code.
After trial, RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow – Maria Juego. RTC ordered DM Consunji to pay Php 644, 000.00 in
total. On appeal by DM Consunji, CA affirmed the RTC decision.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any
action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of
election acts as a bar. The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election.
Waiver, though, is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. To make an intelligent waiver, the person must know that
such right exists. Maria Juego was not aware of her rights and remedies. Her election to claim from the State Insurance Fund
(Labor Code) does not constitute a waiver on her part to claim from DM Consunji.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
In February 1991, 7 freshmen law students of Ateneo Law School (ALS) signified their intention to join Aquila Legis. Among them
was Leonardo “Lenny” Villa. On the night of Feb 8, 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of Aquila at the lobby of
the ALS and were brought to Rufo’s for dinner. After dinner, they were brought to the house of Musngi, who briefed them on
what to expect at the initiation rites. They were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any
time. The initiation rites were to last 3 days. After the briefing, they were brought to Almeda Compound in Caloocan City.
At the Almeda Compound they were subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites like, the Indian Run, Bicol Express,
Rounds, and Auxie’s Privilege Round. The neophytes survived day 1. On the morning of day 2, the neophytes were made to
present comic plays and play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s
principles. When they gave a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms and legs. In the afternoon, the neophytes were
again subjected to the same hazing they endured on day 1. After a few hours, day 2 officially ended. After a while, accused
Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal demanded that the rites be reopened, the head of the initiation initially refused but at the
insistence of Dizon and Villareal, it was reopened. The neophytes were subjected to paddling and additional rounds of physical
pain.
Lenny Villa received several paddle blows and one was so strong that it sent him sprawling to the ground. The other neophytes
heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty of breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no
longer walk. He had to be carried to the carport where they slept.
After an hour of sleep, Lenny’s shivering and mumblings woke the neophytes. Villareal and Dizon initially dismissed this as
Lenny just over reacting. Later they realized that Lenny was really feeling cold, some Aquilans started to help him. They
removed his clothes and helped him into a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed
him to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
26 were accused including Villareal, on Nov. 8, 1993 the trial court rendered judgment holding the 26 accused guilty of the
crime of homicide. Accused Villareal petitioned for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 on the grounds that the CA made 2
reversible errors: first, denial of due process and second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently,
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Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011 and filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011.
ISSUE(S): WON criminal liability and civil liability is extinguished by death of the accused
RATIO: According to RPC 89(1), death of accused extinguishes the criminal liability for personal penalties (imprisonment). On
the other hand criminal liability for pecuniary penalties (fines and costs) is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final
judgment. Villareal died pending judgment of his case so his liability is extinguished. His civil liability arising directly from the
delict complained of is also extinguished.
His petition is dismissed and the criminal case against him is closed and terminated.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Art. 2305 (1) the civil status of persons – re: death of Villareal
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
Dizon filed a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 on the grounds that the CA made 2 reversible errors; (1) he was
denied due process, and (2) denied due proves when CA didn’t apply to him the same ‘ratio decidendi’ which served as the
basis of acquittal of the other accused. For his first argument, the trial court ruled that Dizon waived his right to present
evidence on an earlier date, since one of his co-accused no longer presented separate evidence during trial.
Dizon was set to present his evidence on five different set dates. Sept 8, 15, 22, and Oct. 5, 12, 1993. The order stated that the
accused should be ready at all times, and that the failure on their part to present evidence will be construed a waiver of their
right to present evidence. On Aug. 19, 1993; Dizon’s co-accused stated that he would no longer present evidence. Due to this
and pursuant to the order that they ‘should be ready at all times’ Dizon was asked to present his evidence on the next trial, Aug.
25, 1993. Dizon’s counsel was unable to present their evidence and this was construed as Dizon waiving his right to present
evidence.
HELD: No. Trial court erred in holding that Dizon waived his right to present evidence
RATIO: The Constitution guarantees that the accused may present evidence in his defense (Art II, Sec. 14(2)). In the case of
Crisostomo v Sandiganbayan, the court stressed that while constitutional rights may be waived, the waiver must be clear and it
must be coupled with the actual intention of relinquishing the right. The trial court should not have deemed the failure of Dizon
to present evidence at the earlier date to be a waiver of his right. Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later.
Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates is a clear denial of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
An invalid waiver of right does not presume to vacate the finding of guilt in the criminal case. The SC does not see any material
inadequacy or any procedural irregularity that would prejudice the prosecution or defense resulting from the invalid waiver.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
FACTS:
- August 28, 1998 – American petitioner (P) and Filipino respondent (R) were married. A year later, respondent gave birth
to a daughter (D, on whose behalf P filed this case).
- After three years, R wanted to return to her job as a GRO and go out with her friends. When P was out of the country, R
often went out with her friends, leaving D with the househelp.
- December 7, 2001 – despite being admonished by P, R left with D without notifying P, and telling the househelp that she
was going to Basilan.
- P filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Makati Family Court, but it was dismissed because the child was allegedly in
Basilan. When P went there, he could not find them and was issued a certification that R was not residing there.
- P then got R’s cell phone bills showing calls from Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila, etc., so he filed another petition for
habeas corpus, but this time with the CA (writs of habeas corpus issued by them are enforceable anywhere in the
country).
- The CA denied the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They ruled that RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave
family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, thus impliedly repealing RA 7902 (An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and BP 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
- Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE(S):
WON The CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in light of RA 8369, which
grants exclusive original jurisdiction to family courts.
HELD:
Petition Granted; Petition for habeas corpus reinstated and remanded to the CA.
RATIO:
- Nothing in RA 8369 revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors.
- The CA’s reasoning will leave individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. This
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Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
lack of recourse could not have been the intent behind RA 8369.
- The SolGen cited Floresca v. Philex Mining Corp. as another case wherein the word “exclusive” did not prevent resorting
to another jurisdiction, applying and giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice. What is controlling is
the spirit and intent, not the letter of the law.
- In this case, heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts, even
though the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases, under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act.
- Under statutory construction, implied repeals are not favored. RA 8369 reveals no manifest intent to revoke the CA’s
jurisdiction; the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092, and BP 129 are not absolutely incompatible.
- Any uncertainty has been settled by AM No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors.
- Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not unreasonable (thus, not a ground for
dismissing the petition) because enforceable anywhere in the country, like a warrant of arrest.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
- “Implied repeals are not favored.”
- Interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi (every statute must be so interpreted and brought into
accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence).
- In implied repeals, the two laws must be absolutely incompatible.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
FACTS:
- Allegedly contravening §15, Art. VII, which is the ban on Midnight Appointments, Pres. Arroyo appointed many people to
gov’t offices.
- This included an attempt to appoint a new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as then-CJ Puno was retiring on May 17,
2010.
- March 17, 2010 - Despite many protests, attempts to prevent the nomination process, and cases filed against the JBC
and the president, the Court rendered a decision: a) dismissing the cases against it; and b) directed the JBC to begin the
nomination and selection process for the next Chief Justice and other vacancies in the judiciary.
- 12 different parties then filed individual motions for reconsideration.
ISSUE(S):
1. WON the Court erred in overturning the decision in In re: Appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta (298 SCRA 408,
November 9, 1998).
- In Valenzuela, the appointments of Valenzuela and Villarta to the Judiciary were not allowed because §4(1) and 9, Art.
8 were still limited by the ban under §15, Art. VII
2. WON §15, Art. VII of the Constitution included a ban on presidential appointments to the judiciary.
3. WON the exceptions under §15, Art. VII apply to appointments in the judiciary
HELD: Motions for Reconsideration DENIED for lack of merit and for already having been resolved in the March 17, 2010
decision.
RATIO:
1. While petitioners invoke stare decisis as basis for not overturning Valenzuela, the Court is not necessarily controlled by
precedent. The Court may reverse such a decision en banc if deemed fit, as it did in the March 17, 2010 decision.
2. The deliberations cited by Justice Carpio-Morales regarding the Con Com’s intention to include Judiciary appointments in
the ban only referred to §13, Art. VII, which only deals with nepotism (i.e. appointing relatives to high gov’t positions).
3. While the petitioners claim that the Court failed to apply principles of statutory construction in interpreting §15, Art. VII,
they too fail to apply principles of statutory construction. They are interpolating words into the provision because there is
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Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
no express ban on appointments to the judiciary.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
Brion, J. regarding the Valenzuela case –
Valenzuela was not actually overturned because it only dealt with appointments to the Judiciary below the Supreme Court.
(The rest of Justice Brion’s Opinion, and Justice Carpio-Morales’ dissent are not relevant to the topic, but it might be helpful to
read them, nonetheless.)
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Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
RATIO: The interpretation of a law by the Supreme Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was originally passed.
“Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a
pre-existing one.”
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The interpretation of a law by the Supreme Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was originally passed
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters (Padua) inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in ‘the name of their
deceased parents.
Celestino Padua transferred his undivided share by way of absolute sale. A year later, Eustaquia Padua also sold her
share.
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the
said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence and built a
semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
One of the co-heirs sought to redeem the land sold 14 years after the sale. Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the
ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there
was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.
Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
Respondents assail that they were not notified of the sale and invokes Art. 1088 NCCwhich provides: "Should any of the
heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the
rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month
from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
ISSUE: Was Art. 1088 correctly interpreted?
HELD: Yes. Even if there was no written notice, knowledge of the respondents is undeniable.
RATIO:
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. The
respondents live on the same lot. They also live in the same house with the co-heirs who sold their share of the land.
There is no doubt either that the 30 day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and
the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The Court's deviation from the strict letters of Art. 1088 NCC on giving of written notice to co-heirs of
the sale of an heir's share is not being abandoned. The ruling here should be deemed an exception due to peculiar
circumstances of this case. Law and justice are inseparable. Laws must be applied in consonance with justice.
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DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
FACTS:
Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant (used
for the transportation of fodder wherein two horses are attached), came from the opposite direction, while their
carromata went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of merely passing by,
the horses ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut upon
her head.
The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually a
good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver
some forage at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the defendant’s employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the
front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by
the driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses since
he was thrown upon the ground.
ISSUE: Is the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, liable for the
negligence of the driver?
HELD: No.
RATIO:
The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this
case. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have not been destructive and which are approved
by the society are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as unreasonable or imprudent.
The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could not
easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to
render the cochero negligent because of such circumstances.
The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time to deliver products through horse-
drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left
during the accident. It has been practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause of accidents or injuries
the judgment is therefore reversed.
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Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo
DLSU College of Law – Batch 5, OG05
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The practice is customary.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
FACTS:
Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent’s
paid in 1997. He alleged that the company suffered loses, therefore making them not liable to pay their income taxes.
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit
commenced on that date. According to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of
judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731
days after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish
between a regular year and a leap year. Even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April
14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is
clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed.
ISSUE:
Should the counting of the 2-year prescriptive period for filing claim of refund be governed by the Civil Code?
HELD:
No. Counting of 2-year period for filing claim for refund is no longer in accordance with Article 13 of the Civil Code but under
Sec. 31 of EO 227 - The Administrative Code of 1987.
RATIO:
As between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987, which
states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the
legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori (more recent law prevails over an inconsistent law).
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In the case at bar, there are 24 calendar months in 2 years. For a Final Corporate ITR filed on Apr 14, 1998, the counting should
start from Apr 15, 1998 and end on Apr 14, 2000. The procedure is 1st month -Apr 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998 …. 24th month -
Mar 15, 2000 to Apr 14, 2000.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Sec. 31 of the Administrative Code, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal
periods.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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ISSUE:
WON Philippine law applies to the will of the deceased
HELD: NO
SC stated that Congress has already amended NCC17 and even provided Art. 1039 to support NCC16 par. 2
a. Art. 1039 - Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent."
b. Art. 16 – Par. 1 - Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
Par. 2 - However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of Texas and was domiciled in Texas. Hence, Philippine law should not govern the estate
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rather it should be Texas law, which did not provide legitimes or no compulsory heirs.
If it were to apply Philippine law and ignore Texas law, such distribution of the properties is void and illegal.
DOCTRINE: NCC16 Par. 2 (Nationality Principle)
ISSUE(S): WON the complaint be dismissed on the ground of Forum Non Conveniens
HELD:
RATIO:
- On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the
court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the
rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum.
- As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Rouzie upon filinf of the complaint. On
the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of Raytheon was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.
- That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut
does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the
civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law
which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only
when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial
court.
- Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to
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determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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ISSUE(S): WON marriage was under Civil Code or Code of Muslim Personal Laws
WON RTC has jurisdiction
HELD: Marriage was under Civil Code.
RTC has jurisdiction.
Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
RATIO:
As alleged in the complaint. Tamano and Estrellita were married under the Civil Code. It was never mentioned in the
motion to dismiss that they were married under Muslim laws.
Assuming they were also married under Muslim laws, it will still be under the general original jurisdiction of RTC. The
Code of Muslim Personal Laws does not provide a situation where parties were married both under civil law and muslim
law. Consequently, Shari’a courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages
celebrated both under civil and Muslim laws.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The deficiency of special laws shall be supplied by the provisions of the Civil code (NCC 18).
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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ISSUE(S): WON Lazo, who voluntarily procured an abortion for Nita, may recover damages (on behalf of the aborted fetus) from
Geluz, who performed the abortion.
HELD: No, he may not. Decisions of the CFI and CA reversed; copy furnished to DOJ and Board of Medical Examiners for possible
action against Geluz.
RATIO:
Art. 2206 of the Civil Code does not apply to the unborn fetus, who is not endowed with personality.
o An action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains to the one injured. Because the fetus has
no juridical personality based on Arts. 40-41 of the Civil Code, it has no cause of action, let alone one that may
accrue to its parents.
Because the aborted fetus is already dead when it is separated from its mother’s womb, it doesn’t even have provisional
personality based on Art. 40, because the requirement is that it be “born alive”.
While the recourse of the parents could have been moral damages (2217) or exemplary damages (2230), their acts and
demeanor served as no basis for such because they themselves caused and consented to the abortions.
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FACTS:
Pedro Fragrante, a Filipino citizen, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in
San Juan, Rizal. Fragrante dies while his application was still pending.
At the time of his death, his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.
The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to the intestate estate of the deceased through
authorizing the said intestate estate with its special or judicial administrator, appointed by the Court, to maintain and
operate the plant.
Limjoco (petitioner) argues that the intestate estate of Fragrante cannot be substituted as applicant for the deceased
and is a contravention of law.
ISSUE: Is the intestate estate of Fragrante a juridical person?
HELD: YES. Therefore, the issuance of certificate of public convenience to the intestate estate of the deceased is valid.
RATIO:
Fragrante was a Filipino citizen and continued to be such until his death. His estate was able to financially maintain and operate.
His right to prosecute the application to its final conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. There
would be grave injustice for failure to recognize the said estate as a person for the quashing of the proceedings for no other
reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to his investment.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The estate obtains a personality of its own which can also be sued. The judicial administrator will take
in charge in representing the estate.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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Feb. 6, 1954 – Battle for Liberation of Manila, spouses; Joaquin Navarro Sr., Angela Joaquin de Navarro, 3 daughters;
Pilar, Concepcion, Natividad, and son Joaquin Navarro Jr, and his wife Adela Conde, and friend Lopez sought refuge at
the ground floor of the German club
Building was packed with refugees, shells exploding around and the club was set on fire. Japanese started to shoot
people inside, especially those trying to escape – 3 daughters were hit and fell to the ground
Navarro Sr. and Navarro Jr. decided to abandon the club, they could not convince Angela Joaquin. As they came out
Joaquin Jr. was shot in the head and dropped immediately
Minutes later the German Club collapsed, trapping people inside – including presumably, Angela
Facts are from Lopez’s sworn testimony
Court of Appeals states the order of death as (1) Three daughters, (2) Angela Joaquin de Navarro, (3) Joaquin Navarro,
Jr. and (4) Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
ISSUE(S):
WON mother died before son (vice versa)
HELD:
NO. Mother did not die before son. CA decision reversed to reflect that Joaquin Navarro Jr died first then the mother.
RATIO:
The son died first. Facts and evidence derived from Lopez’s testimony proves this much.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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ISSUE:
WON the donation was valid.
HELD: YES.
BPI showed as evidence that as early as 1948, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia but SC stated it was insufficient.
According to the scientific studies mentioned, a person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his
competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to
show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his
mental faculties.
Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at the time he gave consent to the donation. He
was only declared incompetent or incapable to give consent to contracts in Dec. 22, 1953 by the RTC of Pangasinan.
DOCTRINE: Incompetency must be evidenced with substantial proof
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HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
Such sale was still valid since it was executed by minors, who have passed the ages of puberty and adolescence, and near the
adult age, and that the minors pretended that they had already reached their minority. These minors cannot be permitted
afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
“If he who is a minor (1) deceitfully says or sets forth in an instrument that he is over twenty-five years of age, and this
assertion is believed by another person who takes him to be of about that age, (2) in an action at law he should be deemed to
be of the age he asserted, and should not (3) afterwards be released from liability on the plea that he was not of said age when
he assumed the obligation. The reason for this is that the law helps the deceived and not the deceivers.”
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ISSUE(S): WON Monreal should also serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua
HELD: No. Decision affirmed but penalty for Monreal was modified to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as the minimum
period, to 14 years, 8 months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period.
RATIO:
Monreal was proven to be a minor, when they committed the crime, based on affidavits, police blotter, and court minutes
even when his birth certificate was not presented to the trial.
Pursuant to Art. 68 (2) of the RPC: when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than
the prescribed law is imposed.
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years and has already served his sentence. Therefore, he should be immediately
released.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Sec. 7 Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006: Minors shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is
proven to be 18 years old or older.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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FACTS:
Evaristo Vaquilar was convicted of parricide for killing his wife and his daughter.
His appeal was based on testimony by several witnesses who claimed that he was insane during and before the
commission of the crimes:
o Before the act, he had pains in his stomach and head
o His eyes were big and red; he would not have killed his wife and kids if he were not crazy
o He looked like a madman; cut everyone at random regardless of who it was
o He looked sad; crazy because he cut his sister
o And more!
Health officer did not notice whether defendant was suffering from mental derangement or not.
RATIO:
Insanity is different from extreme passion or the failure to use reason or good judgment because of anger.
“Crazy” is not synonymous with “insane”.
It is not unnatural for a murderer to strike promiscuously when he is caught in the act.
His conduct in jail showed reflection and remorse.
“Those who have not lost control of their reason by mental unsoundness are bound to control their tempers and restrain
their passions, and are liable to the law if they do not.”
The presumption is that the person is sane. The burden of proof when alleging insanity as a defense falls upon the
defense who alleges it. It requires positive evidence that criminal intent was not present because of the insanity, and
that the offense was a direct result of that insanity; enough to overcome the presumption of sanity.
FACTS:
Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos
was running for his third term.
Cardino filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate
of candidacy of Jalosjos. It was alleged that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy
when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor. Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed
his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión
mayor by the RTC Cebu and have not served his sentence.
Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino countered that the RTC
revoked Jalosjos’ probation. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order declaring that Jalosjos had
duly complied with the order of probation.
Jalosjos further stated that during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against him
on the same grounds.
COMELEC First Division ruled in favor of Cardino and found that Jalosjos’ certificate of compliance of probation was
fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Therefore, he is not eligible to run.
ISSUE: Did COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it disqualified Jalosjos
to run as Mayor?
HELD: No.
RATIO:
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is
eligible to run for public office is a false material representation is a ground for disqualification. Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate
of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time.
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The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification, both would constitute ineligibilities to be elected or hold
public office.
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Oct. 31, 2012 – Joseph Socorro Tan filed before COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the
Ceriticate of Candicacy of petitioner – Regina Ongsiako Reyes on the ground that it contained material
misrepresentations
Among which were that she stated (1) she was not a permanent resident of another country when in fact, she is a
permanent resident or an immigrant of the USA and (2) that she is a Filipino citizen, but in fact she is an American
citizen
March 27, 2013 – cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner
April 8, 2013 – Reyes filed for Motion for Reconsideration stating that she was a Filipino citizen
May 14, 2013 – COMELEC denied her motion
May 18, 2013 – Reyes was declared the winner of the 2013 election
June 5, 2013 – COMELEC issued a Certificate of Finality declaring their Resolution (May 14 decision) final and executory,
on the same day Reyes took her oath of office
Reyes has yet to assume office at the time because her term officially starts at noon of June 30, 2013
Reyes assails through a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
resolution of the COMELEC ordering the cancellation of Reyes
ISSUE(S):
WON Reyes is a Filipino citizen
HELD:
NO. Reyes is not a Fililpino citizen.
Petition is dismissed and May 14 decision is upheld.
RATIO:
Tan submitted to Bureau of Immigration evidence showing that Reyes is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of
a balikbayan. For Reyes to reacquire her citizenship, she must take an oath of allegiance, and make a personal sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship (RA 9225). Reyes did none of these requirements, and as it stands she remains to be
an American citizen. This makes her ineligible to run and hold any elective public office in the PHL.
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DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
ISSUE:
WON the sale is valid
HELD: YES.
In petitioner’s allegations, he stated that the authority of the afore-named agents to sell the shares of stock was limited
to the following conditions:
1. In the event of the petitioner's “absence” and “incapacity”; and
2. For the limited purpose of applying the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of petitioner's subsisting obligations
with the companies adverted to in the SPA.
He wanted to apply a strict definition of “absence” and “incapacity” wherein "a person disappears from his domicile, his
whereabouts being unknown, without leaving an agent to administer his property," pursuant to NCC381 and NCC38:
a. ART 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent
to administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a
person to represent him in all that may be necessary.
b. ART. 38 Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere
restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person, from certain obligations, as when the
latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
If we apply NCC381 and NCC38, it would negate the effect of the SPA by creating absurd, if not impossible, legal
situations.
Petitioner did not give evidence that he was in debt with Businessday at the time he had executed the SPA. Nor could he
have considered incurring any debts since he admitted that, at the time of its execution, he was concerned about his
possible arrest, death and disappearance.
Petitioner alleges that the purported sale between himself and Locsin of the disputed shares is void since it contravenes
Article 1491 of the Civil Code, which provides that:
a. ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or
through the mediation of another: x x x x
2. Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them, unless the consent of the
principal has been given; x x x.
However, NCC1491 is not absolute due to CA’s ruling.
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Sometime in 2003: ASB Realty commenced an action in the MTC for unlawful detainer against Umale. ASB Realty alleged that it
entered into a lease contract with Umale for the period June 1, 1999-May 31, 2000. Their agreement was for Umale to conduct a
pay-parking business on the property and pay a monthly rent of P60,720.00. Upon the contract's expiration on continued
occupying the premises and paying rentals.
June 2003: ASB Realty served on Umale a Notice of Termination of Lease and Demand to Vacate and Pay. ASB Realty stated that
it was terminating the lease effective midnight of June 30, 2003.Umale failed to comply with ASB Realty's demands and
continued in possession of the subject premises, even constructing commercial establishments thereon.
ISSUE(S): Can a corporate officer of ASB Realty (duly authorized by the Board of Directors) file suit to recover an unlawfully
detained corporate property despite the fact that the corporation had already been placed under rehabilitation?
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
- What petitioners argue is that the corporate officer of ASB Realty is incapacitated to file this suit to recover a corporate
property because ASB Realty has a duly-appointed rehabilitation receiver. Allegedly, this rehabilitation receiver is the
only one that can file the instant suit.
- Corporations, such as ASB Realty, are juridical entities that exist by operation of law. As a creature of law, the powers
and attributes of a corporation are those set out, expressly or impliedly, in the law.
- Corporate Rehabilitation’s concept of preserving the corporation’s business as a going concern while it is undergoing
rehabilitation is called debtor-in-possession or debtor-in-place.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Corporate rehabilitation is defined as “the restoration of the debtor to as position of successful operation and solvency, if it is
shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of
payments projected in the plan more if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated”
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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FACTS:
Petitioner Lupo Atienza alleges Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Respondent Judge Francisco
Brillantes, Jr.
December 1991 – Atienza found Brillantes sleeping in his bed, and was told that Brillantes was cohabiting with his baby
mama, Yolanda De Castro, even though Brillantes was allegedy married to a Zenaida Ongkiko.
Brillantes claims that he is not married to Ongkiko, because, despite having two marriage ceremonies (Nueva Ecija, April
1965; and Manila, June 1965), they didn’t have a marriage license in either one. Ongkiko abandoned Brillantes 19 years
ago.
Brillantes married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles on December 4, 1991, supposedly believing that he was single
because his first marriage/s had no license/s.
Brillantes also claims that his remarriage did not require a judicial declaration of nullity because the first marriage was
not governed by the Family Code.
ISSUE(S): WON Brillantes acted immorally by getting remarried without a judicial declaration of nullity.
HELD: Yes, his acts were immoral. Dismissed from legal service.
RATIO:
Art. 40 of the Family Code applies to marriages entered into after its effectivity regardless of when prior marriages took
place.
Art. 256 of the FC gives the FC retroactive effect as long as vested rights are not impaired. This is especially true fir Art.
40 of the FC because it is a rule of procedure.
Brillantes cannot invoke good faith because he was already a lawyer, thus aware of the laws, when he twice got
“married” in 1965.
Brillantes’ cohabitation with De Castro took place when he was already in the judiciary.
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DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S): N/A
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FACTS:
Parties were legally married and have been living together for a month in their conjugal dwelling.
The wife (petitioner) was maltreated after refusing the demands of her husband (respondent) to perform lascivious and
unchaste acts on his genitals.
She left the conjugal dwelling.
CFI ruled in favor of respondent and stated that petitioner could not compel her husband to support her except in the
conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent as Art. 149
provides that the person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be
fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to the same.
ISSUE: Can the wife compel her husband to give her support outside the conjugal home?
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
Art. 149 of the Civil Code is “not absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a preexisting or preferential right in each
of these cases which was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to support.
The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away
from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts.
In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of
the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal
home.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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HELD:
NO. Constract is not valid, it is VOID.
Court upheld IBP-CBD decision suspending Omaña for 1 year from her law practice, and 2 years from notary public
RATIO:
Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is VOID.
Referring to NCC 221 (can’t be found on NCC now, so I’ll put this here)
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(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of annulment of maariage
(4) Any simulated alienation of property with intent to deprive the compulsory heirs of their legitime
The extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is VOID.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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ISSUE:
WON Soledad can recover moral damages
HELD: NO.
Our Congress eliminated Art. 56-65 due to the history of breach of promise to marry suits in the US and England has
shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous man. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Balm suits in many of the American States.
CA also erred in stating that F.H. committed seduction as contemplated in Art. 337 and 338 of RPC.
SC stated that petitioner is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is 10 years younger than Soledad, who
was around 36 years old, but, also because, the RTC found that, Soledad "surrendered herself" to F.H. because she was
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"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they
had the benefit of clergy."
ISSUE(S): WON Lupo and his third wife were legally married
HELD: Yes
RATIO: Lupo communicated to his son by his third wife that they were able to get married before a Justice of Peace of Taguig,
Rizal on 1930. The court held that the laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as huband and wofe, have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
-
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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RATIO:
The “sham” marriage theory of Justice Villaluz was too incredible to deserve serious consideration.
Regardless of the intention of Villaluz in saying “I do” with Mijares before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid
marriage were present. His consent was freely given.
For the sake of argument that the annulment of his first marriage has not yet attained finality, it only makes his marriage
with Mijares voidable and did not necessarily render it void.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
When a marriage satisfies all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage, it is, therefore, undoubtedly a valid
marriage.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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FACTS:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, born male, is transsexual. He “became” a woman via hormone treatment, breast
augmentation in the US, and sex reassignment surgery in Thailand (where else?).
Later, she (see what I did there?) got engaged to Richard Edel, an American. Silverio then sought to change her name
and sex in her birth certificate to “Mely” and “female”, respectively.
The RTC of Manila decided in favor of Silverio, ordering the civil registrar to change the entries.
Afterwards, the OSG (/Republic) filed a petition to the CA, claiming that there was no law allowing the change of entries
in the birth certificate due to sex alteration. The CA ruled in favor of the Republic, saying that the RTC’s decision lacked
legal basis.
Silverio then came to the SC, citing Arts. 407-413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court, and RA
9048.
ISSUE(S): WON Silverio can have her name and sex in her birth certificate changed to fit her sex alteration.
HELD: No, she may not. Petition denied.
RATIO:
Based on RA 9048, which covers clerical and typographical errors, the petition fails because:
o The remedy was administrative, not yet judicial. It should have been filed with the local civil registrar at the Office
of the Civil Registrar where the birth certificate in question is kept.
o Silverio was not prejudiced by the use of her original name because sex reassignment does not make her a “real”
woman. (Blame Corona for this crap)
o The change of sex in the birth cert. is not merely clerical.
There is no legal basis for the correction of entries
o Entries under Art. 412 of the Civil Code, which are correctable under Rule 108, are provided for in Arts. 407 and
408 of the Civil Code; but they do not cover corrections due to sex reassignment.
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o Art. 407 authorizes the entry of acts, events, and judicial decrees into the civil register, which may alter legal
capacity, status, and nationality. Sex reassignment is not one of them.
o Art. 413 provides that special laws shall govern matters pertaining to civil status. There is no special law
governing sex reassignment and its effects.
The sex of a person is determined at birth, and is immutable in the absence of any errors.
Courts must apply the law, not amend it; and since the Family Code says “man and woman”, and a sex-reassigned
woman is not a woman, she cannot be given the status that would allow her to violate that. It is in the hands of the
legislature to enact a law governing sex alterations.
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FACTS:
March 1, 1987 - Roderick Recio, a Filipino citizen, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen. They lived
together in Australia.
May 18, 1989 - An Australian family court issued a decree of divorce.
June 26, 1992 - Recio obtained Australian citizenship.
January 12, 1994 - Recio and Grace Garcia, a Filipino citizen, got married. They lived together in Australia.
October 22, 1995 - They lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
May 16, 1996 - Their conjugal assets were divided in accordance with the Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
March 3, 1998 - Garcia filed a Complaint for Nullity of Marriage on the grounds of bigamy. She claimed that Recio was
incapacitated to marry her because of his prior marriage to Editha Samson.
July 7, 1998 - Recio obtained a divorce decree from a Sydney family court. He then filed a motion to dismiss. OSG agreed.
RTC decided that the marriage was dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized
in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Was the divorce between Recio and Samson valid?
HELD:
The case was remanded to RTC to determine his legal capacity to marry Garcia.
RATIO:
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Art. 26 of the Family Code allow the Filipino to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. To
be admitted as evidence, the divorce decree must be proven as a public record of a foreign country by (1) an official
publication, or (2) a certified true copy (attestation). If the record is not kept in the Philippines, it must be authenticated
and certified by a diplomatic or consular officer in a Philippine embassy/consulate in the foreign country.
The divorce decree between Recio and Samson appeared authentic but compliance with the rules on evidence was not
demonstrated.
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The divorce obtained by Recio to Samson was restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry.
The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. Recio did not submit a
certificate of legal capacity as required in Art. 21 of the Family Code.
1953 – Aurora and Fernando married, a month later Fernando filed an action for annulment of their marriage on the
ground that his consent to the marriage was obtained through force and intimidation
The action was then dismissed, and the validity of the marriage was upheld. Aurora’s counterclaim was then granted.
While the amount for the counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando admitted that several months prior to their
wedding, he had a pre-marital relationship with his close relative
Aurora alleges that this non-divulgement of Fernando’s pre-marital relationship constituted in fraud to obtain her consent
to marry
Aurora now prays for the annulment of their marriage on this ground (non-divulgement as fraud), and moral damages
ISSUE(S):
WON non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of
marriage.
HELD:
NO. This is not considered fraud, and therefore a ground for annulment of marriage.
Appealed decision is upheld.
RATIO:
The FRAUD being discussed in this case does not include non-disclosure of a pre-marital relationship. NCC only admits to (1)
misrepresentation as to identity, (2) non-disclosure of previous conviction of a crime, and (3) concealment by wife of the fact
that at the time of marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband (NCC 86). It is clear that non-disclosure of a
pre-marital relationship does not fall in any of those stated. Further, the last paragraph of Art. 86 states that ‘no other
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misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune, or chastity shall constitute fraud as will give grounds for action for
the annulment of marriage.’
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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a. He was a security guard in a bank and it only follows that it is reasonable to assume that he knew the rudiments of
self-defense or at least to keep himself out of harm’s way;
b. He never sought the assistance of security personnel in U.E. nor the police regarding the alleged threats; and
c. Neither did he inform the judge who performed their marriage about his alleged predicament.
SC was also not convinced that there was fraud on the part of L.V. regarding the child:
a. O.V.’s counsel stated that O.V. had sex with L.V. in a hotel “with L.V. on top” on January 1988.
b. He also was not right in saying that the child of L.V. died in Aug. 29, 1989. Because in the Civil Registrar, it was
recorded that the child died in Aug. 29, 1988.
Also, lack of cohabitation between them is not a ground for annulment (DOCTRINE).
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To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act
is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible
to a high degree.
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HELD:
1. YES. Different strokes.
2. NO.
3. NO. Heirs can bring an action to annul the sale.
RATIO:
The law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got
married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989.
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While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166 prohibited him from
selling commonly owned real property without his wife’s consent.
Still, if he sold the same without his wife’s consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the
right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale.
Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her
husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order
allowing the sale, the same would be void.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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ISSUE(S): Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
HELD: Yes. Court ruled in favor of Jalosjos.
RATIO:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the
province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have
personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every
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person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a
new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement
for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he
reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being
issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited
his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else
except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San
Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-
mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent
it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant
considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect
the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to
their manifest will.
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ISSUE(S): WON marriage may be annulled on sole testimony of husband that his wife is impotent
HELD: No
RATIO:
- The annulment of the marriage was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give
testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. The husband’s testimony
must be proven by physical examination.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Art. 45 (5): A marriage may be annulled if either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other,
and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable (impotency)
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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RATIO:
The Court scrutinized the totality of evidence presented by petitioner and found that the same was not enough to
sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her
mother’s testimonies, merely established the facts in the complaint. These testimonies though do not give us much
insight into respondent’s psychological state.
Dr. Tayag’s psychological report concluding that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
traceable to the latter’s experiences during his childhood, did not help petitioner’s cause. It must be noted that Tayag
was not able to personally examine respondent. Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s psychological state, had to rely on
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information provided by petitioner, who was hardly impartial.
The Court emphasized that the burden falls upon petitioner to prove that the respondent is “truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” Psychological
incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations.
Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to persuade us that
respondent’s failure to communicate with petitioner since leaving for Saudi Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner
after returning to the country, are grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing and/or complying
with the essential obligations of marriage.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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FACTS:
This is a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage between Syed Azzar Abbas (Syed), a Pakistani, and Gloria Goo
Abbas (Gloria), a Filipino citizen. They married at a Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.
Syed was in his mother in law’s residence in the Philippines. He was told that he will undergo a certain ceremony but he
did not know what kind. He signed a document with Gloria. He claimed that he did not know it was a marriage ceremony
until Gloria told him.
In the marriage contract, it is stated that a marriage license was issued in Carmona, Cavite. He testified that he never
went to Carmona, Cavite to acquire a marriage license nor reside in the area. Their marriage license number was
registered under the name of another couple as testified by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite.
On cross examination, Syed testified that Gloria filed bigamy cases against him and that he went to Carmona, Cavite to
check the validity of their marriage license.
Gloria testified that a certain Qualin was the one who acquired their marriage license for them.
Testimonies: Rev. Dauz (that he solemnized the marriage and there was a valid marriage certificate), Atty. Sanchez (that
he was a sponsor and he requested for Qualin to get a marriage license), Felicitas Goo (that her daughter married Syed
and asked for the help of Atty. Sanchez to secure a marriage license).
RTC – No valid marriage license was issued and declared the marriage void ab initio.
CA – It was in favor of Gloria. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to make a diligent search
of the marriage license of Gloria and Syed and there were sufficient testimonies saying that they were validly married.
Petition was reversed.
ISSUE: Was there a valid marriage license?
HELD: No. Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside. RTC ruling reinstated.
RATIO:
Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license and relied on the marriage certificate and the testimonies. She failed
to explain why the license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a place wherein no party resided.
Syed, on the other hand, went to Cavite to prove that there was no marriage license issued and a certification was issued
that indeed the license number they had belonged to another couple.
Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states that there is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been
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regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence contrary and so SC did not follow CA’s decision because of a
lack of diligent search.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-
issuance of said license.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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PONENTE: Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
December 8, 1982 – first marriage; stairs of Manila City Hall; no marriage license; arranged through a fixer.
March 26, 1983 – second marriage; church in Tondo; alleged license was from Carmona, Cavite.
Restituto claims that the marriage license during the second marriage was a sham because neither party lived in
Carmona, nor did either of them go to Carmona to get the license. Also, that the marriage license number (7054133)
does not match the license number in their marriage contract (7054033).
Rosita claims that Restituto only filed for annulment in order to evade prosecution for a concubinage charge she filed
against him.
The RTC and CA denied the petition for annulment, with the CA stating that Restituto did not present evidence to
overcome the presumption of validity of the marriage license.
RATIO:
(NOTE: Since the marriage took place before the Family Code came into effect, the old Civil Code applies.)
Under Art. 53 of the Civil Code, a marriage license is a requisite of marriage, without which, the marriage is void ab initio.
The Court cited cases wherein this was applied:
o In Republic v. CA, the marriage therein was declared void because, after due search and inability to find, the civil
registrar issued a certificate affirming that the license could not be found.
o In Cariño v. Cariño, the marriage contract bore no license number, and the civil registrar issued a certificate
stating that their office had not issued a license to the parties.
o In Sy v. CA, the marriage license was issued one year after the ceremony took place.
The law requires that the absence of a marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract or supported by
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certification from the local civil registrar. (Also for Topic #2)
In this case, the civil registrar of Carmona certified the issuance of the marriage license to the Alcantaras. Because of
this, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. Issuance of a license in a city where neither
party resides, or issuance in the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are
mere irregularities that do not affect the marriage’s validity. (Also for Topic #2)
The inconsistent license number is merely a typo.
Restituto initiated the civil marriage, therefore he cannot claim that he was not a party to it. (“He who comes to court
must come with clean hands”)
The solemnizing officer is not required to investigate whether the marriage license was issued properly or not.
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CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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FACTS:
Complainant Mayor Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte contends that Judge Hernando Domagtoy exhibited gross
misconduct as well as ineffiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First – Respondent judge solemnized a marriage despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife.
Judge Domagtoy contented that he relied on the affidavit issued by RTC Judge of Bassey, Samar that the groom
and his first wife have not seen each other for seven years. However, the certified true copy of the marriage said
that his civil status was “separated”.
Second – It is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony outside his court’s jurisdiction. He hold office in MCTC Sta.
Monica – Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized a marriage in the municipality of Dapa in his residence.
He maintains that he did not violate Art. 7, par. 1 which states that “Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the Judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction”
ISSUE:
First – Can a court solemnize another marriage of a husband who has merely separated from his wife for almost 7 years?
Second – Can a judge solemnize marriages in his residence?
HELD: No. Judge Domagtoy is suspended for 6 months and is given a stern warning.
RATIO:
First – The groom still remains married to his first wife. To contract a subsequent marriage, the spouse must institute a
summary proceeding as provide in the Code for the declaration of presumptive death.
Second – FC Art. 8 further gave exceptions that a judge may solemnize marriages not in his jurisdiction when the
contracting parties are at the point of death or in remote place. There is no pretense that the parties were at the point of
their death or in a remote place. Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction may officiate in marriages only within
said areas and not beyond.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and
registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious sect
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and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation,
likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10. (56a)
Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or
temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the
parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated
by them in a sworn statement to that effect. (57a)
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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RATIO:
The contract signed by Martinez and Tan contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married
and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage.
The document signed by Martinez, Tan and the solemnizing justice stated that they ratified under oath, before the
justice, the contents of the contract and that witnesses of the marriage were produced.
Martinez’ testimony that her consent was vitiated was contradicted by the letters she sent to Tan, evidencing that they
secretly planned the wedding.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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FACTS:
Aug. 30, 1990 – Lucio Morigo married Lucia Barrete.
Aug. 19, 1991 – Lucia was granted a divorce from Lucio in Canada, to take effect on Feb. 17, 1992.
Oct. 4, 1992 – Lucio married Maria Lumbago.
Sept. 21, 1993 – Lucio sought a judicial declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Lucia, alleging that no marriage
ceremony took place.
Oct. 19, 1993 – the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran charged Lucio with bigamy. Lucio moved for suspension because his
judicial nullification posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. The suspension was granted, then denied.
Aug. 5, 1996 – the Bohol RTC convicted Lucio of bigamy. The RTC cited Domingo v. CA and said that lack of a valid
marriage ceremony is not a defense against a charge of bigamy. They also cited Ramirez v. Gmur and said that a divorce
issued by the court in a country where neither spouse is domiciled has no jurisdiction to determine their marital status.
Oct. 23, 1997 – while Lucio’s appeal to the CA was pending, his marriage to Lucia was declared void, and it became final
and executory.
Oct. 21, 1999 – the CA affirmed the RTC’s conviction, claiming that Art. 349 of the RPC punishes the act of contracting a
second marriage before the first one is dissolved; also claiming that the divorce is against public policy, thus, ineffectual.
Lucio’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.
RATIO:
A marriage declared void ab initio is deemed to have never taken place at all, because such a declaration retroacts to
the date of the supposed marriage. Lucio’s marriage to Lucia was declared void because they merely signed a marriage
contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer. Therefore, the first element of bigamy as laid down in Bobis v.
Bobis, that the offender has been legally married, is absent.
Unlike in Mercado v. Tan, where the first marriage was solemnized twice, and the declaration of nullity was obtained after
the second marriage was celebrated.
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2. It is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or
by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore said marriage did not legitimate him.
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CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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b. Also stated in the particular case that the parties in the bigamous marriage is not expected to file an action to
declare their marriage bigamous.
ISSUE:
WON Fujiki, as the husband of the 1st marriage, can file the petition to recognize the foreign judgment. YES.
HELD:
SC states that the A.M. Sec. 2(a):
a. Not applicable if the case is bigamy.
b. Applying the A.M. is absurd because it will re-litigate the case.
c. Refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under FC35(4), bigamous marriages are void
from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law.
The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under said provision.
Fujiki only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the ROC.
Also, to effect the foreign judgment, PH courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent w/ domestic public
policy and other mandatory laws.
While PH has no divorce law, the foreign judgment is fully consistent with PH public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under FC35(4).
SC further elaborates as ruled in Juliano-Llave that the prior spouse (like Fujiki) “is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all,
it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse.”
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In 1998 Escritor was widowed, lifting her legal impediment but Quilapio was still incapacitated to remarry so their
declarations remain to be valid until all legal impediment disappear
As far as the congregation is concerned, Escritor and Quilapio have not done anything immoral and they remain
members of good standing in their congregation
After considering the Report and Recommendation of Executive Judge Maceda (recommending to dismiss Escritor),
through Deputy Court of Admin (DCA) Lock concurred with the factual findings of Judge Maceda but departed form his
recommendation to dismiss Escritor
DCA Lock stresses that Escritor may still be subject to disciplinary action because although she became capacitated to
marry (with her husband dying) she still continues to live with another man
He also found her defense of freedom of religion unavailing to warrant the dismissal of the charge of immorality, he
recommended that she be found guilty and be suspended
ISSUE(S):
WON Escritor’s right to religious freedom would carve out an exemption from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for
which government employees are held administratibly liable
HELD:
Court remanded the case OCA.
Although remanded OCA still found Escritor’s defense of religious freedom unavailing
RATIO:
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to
uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has
not been afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case
is remanded to the RTC.
Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a compelling state
interest. It is the respondent’s stance that the respondent’s conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes
within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause
protects it, the Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. The Court cannot
therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the “compelling state
interest” test. The government must be heard on the issue, as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of
demonstrating the state’s compelling interest, which can override respondent’s religious belief and practice.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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b. A certification was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite;
c. The certification is precise that it specifically identified the parties’ name to whom the marriage license was issued
further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to them.
d. Also, issuance of the license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for
publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.
Petitioner also asserts the number in the marriage license was 7054133. While in the marriage contract, the number was
7054033. SC says it’s only typographical error.
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FACTS:
1976 – Vincent Mercado married Ma. Thelma Oliva, both civilly and in a church.
1991 – Mercado married Ma. Consuelo Tan, both civilly and religiously, without a judicial declaration of nullity for his first
marriage.
Oct. 5, 1992 – Tan filed a complaint for bigamy against Mercado.
Nov. 13, 1992 – Mercado filed an action for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva.
March 1, 1993 – Bigamy case began.
May 6, 1993 – Mercado-Oliva marriage was declared void.
Both the RTC and the CA found Mercado guilty of bigamy, citing the requirement of a judicial declaration of nullity before
remarriage based on Art. 40 of the Family Code.
RATIO:
When the information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. The declaration that the
first marriage was void came after the information was filed, therefore the crime of bigamy was already consummated.
While jurisprudence until then was conflicting regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity, Art. 40 erases all
doubts and makes a judicial declaration of absolute nullity essential before one may remarry.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
A marriage declared void ab initio is not a defense against a charge of bigamy if such declaration came after the
bigamous marriage.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
Justice Vitug:
The necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity should only refer to cases wherein the marriage had, at least ostensibly,
taken place. Thus, marriages that are obviously void should not need such a declaration.
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(This reflects the decision in Morigo v. People, wherein the “marriage ceremony” was merely the signing of a marriage
license without the presence of a solemnizing officer; a.k.a. obviously void.)
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RATIO:
The documents submitted are public documents. In effect, as per NCC 410: The books making up the civil register and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein
contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness.
Therefore, the public documents are prima facie proof that Gangan had a prior existing marriage when she married
Iwasawa.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Marriage certificates, being a public document, are prima facie evidence that such marriage is a fact.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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RATIO:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee.
(Civil Code requires it for the administration of the estate of the absentee.)
The law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration.
Therefore, the 7 year absence should begin in 1918 when Arthur left and was never heard of, not in 1921 when the court
declared his absence.
Arthur was already more than 9 years absent when Escaño married Hortiguela. 2nd marriage is valid.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
It is not necessary that the former spouse to be judicially declared absent for a 2 nd marriage to be valid. However, it requires
that the former spouse be absent for 7 consecutive years.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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HELD:
NO.
Reappearance of absentee spouse does not render subsequent marriage void for being bigamous.
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RATIO:
Second marriage was contracted because of a presumption that former spouse (Alice Diaz) was dead. Such presumption
continues despite absentee spouse’s physical reappearance. If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an
affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of either spouse then good faith or bad faith of either spouse
can no longer be raised. Since no step was taken to nullify Bailon and Jarque’s marriage before Bailon’s death – Jarque remains
the rightful dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
Petition is DENIED!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
b. In U.S. v. Biasbas, this Court held that Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in knowing the whereabouts of his 1st
wife and also considering that the only basis of presumptive death was his admission that he only had a suspicion.
c. In Republic v. CA and Alegro, same as Nolasco and provided a criteria for determining “well-founded belief” as
contemplated in FC41 (Check requisites above).
Petitioner argues that respondent was not diligent in her search for her husband:
a. If she were diligent, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or help from other
gov’t agencies in Taiwan or PH;
b. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not; and
c. Worse, she failed to explain her omissions.
d. SC states that the OSG’s arguments are well-taken but still affirmed the CA’s decision because the RTC’s decision
is already final and executory, the appeals under the ROC is only filed in special proceedings.
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ISSUE(S): WON their marriage could be annulled under Psychological Incapacity (FC 36)
HELD: No
RATIO:
- Psychological Incapacity must be characterized by
- (a) gravity – it must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage
- (b) juridical antecedence – it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage
- (c) incurability – it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
- “Psychological incapacity” is mental and not physical incapacity; the most serious cases of personality disorders.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Psychological Incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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RATIO:
Chi Ming Tsoi defense was weak. He failed to prove his claim by evidence.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “To procreate children based on the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”
Constant nonfulfillment of this obligation destroys the integrity of the marriage.
The senseless and continuous refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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FACTS:
Respondent Roridel Molina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Reynaldo Molina. She
alleged that he showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and father because he spent more time
with his friends than with his family, he squandered his money, he lost his job, etc. After a big fight, Roridel went to
Baguio to live with her parents, and weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their children.
Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but his reason was that she
would refuse to perform her marital duties, like cooking, and her failure to manage their finances.
During the pre-trial, Roridel presented the testimony of witnesses, which included her friends, a social worker, and a
psychiatrist. Reynaldo did not present any evidence. The RTC declared the marriage void, and the CA affirmed it on
appeal.
ISSUE(S):
WON the marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo Molina is void due to psychological incapacity.
HELD:
No, there is no psychological incapacity present. Petition granted.
RATIO:
Citing Leouel Santos v. CA, the Court said that psychological incapacity “should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity”; that the law confines its meaning to personality disorders which demonstrate an insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage; that it must exist at the time of the marriage; and that it must
be characterized by a) gravity, b) juridical antecedence, and c) incurability.
In the present case, the Roridel merely showed that she and Reynaldo could not get along with each other. Difficulty,
refusal, neglect, and irreconcilable differences are not equal to psychological incapacity. What is essential is that a party
is incapable of fulfilling their marital duties.
Dr. Sison’s, the psychiatrist, evaluation only showed incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
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1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Doubt is resolved in favor of the
continuation of the marriage.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
Medically identified
Alleged in the complaint
Sufficiently proven by experts
Clearly explained in the decision
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. It is not necessarily
manifest at the time, but it must already “be there”.
4. It must be medically permanent or incurable. Its incurability may be absolute or relative in regard to the other
spouse, and it must only be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations.
5. The illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Arts. 68-71 of the Family Code, regarding the husband
and wife, and Arts. 220, 221, and 225 of the same, regarding parents and their children. These non-complied
obligations must be stated in the petition, proven by evidence, and included in the text of the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines should
be given great respect (Note: bullshit) because Art. 36 of the Family Code has its roots in Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law (a CHURCH code).
8. The prosecuting atty. or fiscal, and the Sol Gen must appear as counsel for the State. The Sol Gen must issue a
certification stating why is agrees with or opposes the petition, which will be quoted in the decision that may not be
passed without the certification.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
Padilla, J. – Concurs with the decision in this case, but disagrees with the Santos v. CA ruling, stating that psychological
incapacity was present, and such petitions must be determined case-to-case, based on their unique, specific facts.
Romero, J. – Incapacity should not be the result of mental illness; otherwise it would be insanity and governed by Art. 45 of the
Family Code. In other words, psychological incapacity is “insanity of a lesser degree”. (Long opinion, but a bit roundabout. Might
be worth a read.)
Vitug, J. – concurs, and lists his own guidelines:
The incapacity must psychological or mental, not physical, in nature.
It must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume, and discharge the basic marital obligations.
It must exist at the time the marriage is contracted, although it may only be manifested after.
It must be grave or serious, and incurable.
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HELD:
YES.
CA erred in finding Natividad psychologically incapacitated.
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RATIO:
Based on the evidence presented, there is insufficiency of factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividad’s emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility, or even her sexual promiscuity can be equated with psychological incapacity. The Court in Santos v
CA enumerated the guidelines in applying FC 36, it must be characterized by (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3)
incurability.
Petition is GRANTED!
CA decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE!
Complaint for nullity is DISMISSED!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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but any proper interested party (Like petitioners) may attack a void marriage.
Also, this action is for declaration of nullity of Pepito-Norma marriage. But it was already established above that the
Pepito-Norma marriage was already void ab initio, therefore, it only follows that such action cannot be made already
pursuant to FC40.
But SC states that for purposes other than remarriage, such as it would prejudice the successional rights of petitioners, SC
may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity so long as it is
essential to the determine the case.
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ISSUE(S): WON the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his
deceased brother
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
- Sec. 2, par. (a), of A.M. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages) states that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife.
- The A.M. being a procedural rule, prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15,
2003 and had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
- The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage
- According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the petitioner must still be party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Only the party who can demonstrate a “proper interest” can file the action
- The petitioner has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the
suit.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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RATIO:
Article 48 mandates: In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
There is no evidence that the State participated in the trial. Besides the fiscal’s manifestation that he found no collusion
between the parties, the State did not file any pleading, motion, or position paper at any stage of the proceedings.
Also, the presiding judge did not take any step to encourage the fiscal to contribute to the proceedings.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
In annulment cases, the State must intervene to prevent collusion between the parties and to ensure that evidence presented
are not fabricated or suppressed.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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FACTS:
Petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to respondent Helen Villanueva. His reason, among
others, was that his consent was obtained through fraud because he discovered that Helen was pregnant shortly after
they were married, despite not having any sexual relations with her prior to the ceremony.
Helen was served with a summons, but she failed to file a responsive pleading. Because of that, Romulo filed a motion to
declare her in default, and to set a date for his presentation of evidence. Respondent Judge Corazon Agrava declared
Helen in default, but referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila in order to determine whether or not collusion exists
between the parties. This was pursuant to Arts. 88 and 101 of the Civil Code.
The fiscal, upon receipt of a copy of the complaint, had 60 days within which to submit his report. Romulo submitted the
copy on July 3, 1962.
The Asst. City Fiscal then subpoenaed Romulo’s counsel, requiring him to bring Romulo and copies of other documents
pertaining to the annulment case on August 27, 1962. However, on August 24, 1962, petitioner’s counsel said that he
could not comply with the subpoena because it would expose his evidence.
On Oct. 29, 1962, Romulo prayed that Judge Agrava set the date for reception of his evidence because the City Fiscal’s
60-day period had elapsed without the submission of a report. On Nov. 6, 1962, Judge Agrava denied the motion
because Romulo would not submit himself for interrogation by the fiscal. On July 29, 1963, Judge Agrava dismissed the
complaint because Romulo still would not submit himself for interrogation.
ISSUE(S):
WON Romulo may compel Judge Agrava to receive his evidence without submitting himself to the City Fiscal for interrogation.
HELD:
No, the City Fiscal must file a report ensuring no collusion between the parties.
RATIO:
Arts. 88 and 101 of the Civil Code direct that, if the defendant in an annulment suit does not appear, “the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the state to prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff.”
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“When the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State
in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of marital bonds” This means that an annulment proceeding cannot be
one-sided – there must always be someone defending the existence of the marriage from the annulment.
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HELD:
(1) NO. Marriage is not null and void.
(2) NO. Nowhere in the Resolution does it state that the appeals by the OSG are no longer required.
RATIO:
(1) CA correctly ruled that the ill feelings of Arabelle against Dominic is the basis to doubt the findings of the expert witness,
that the findings were one-sided and that Dominic did not participate in the proceedings. The findings were solely based on
Arabelle’s testimony, and it does not sufficiently prove that Dominic is psychologically incapacitated.
(2) The Resolution (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) explicitly required the OSG to participate in all the stages of proceedings pertaining to
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declarations of absolute nullity of marriage and the annulment of voidable marriages. The Resolution clearly intended for the
OSG to appear as the counsel for the State to oppose petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of
marriage under FC 36. It is to ensure that only meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages based on
psychological incapacity, those characterized by (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability would succeed.
Petition is DENIED!
CA decision is AFFIRMED!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC - RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
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interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari.
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will have to wait for trial to begin to make a request since it is when those records are produced for examination at
the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.
(Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence)
2. Josielene can file motion for production of documents – but it is only for non privileged documents, the documents in
question are privileged in nature.
3. Johnny has not waived his right by giving the PhilHealth form but it is to show that he was forcibly admitted to the
hospital. The trial in this case has not yet begun therefore making this action premature.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.—The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: (c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery
or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him
or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient.
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FACTS:
Respondent Karl Wiegel sought a declaration of nullity for his marriage to petitioner Lilia Wiegel because she had a prior,
existing marriage to Eduardo Maxion.
Lilia acknowledged the marriage to Eduardo, but claimed that both of them were forced to marry each other, rendering
the marriage void.
In the pre-trial, both parties agreed that the issue to be ruled upon by respondent Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy was whether
Lilia’s first marriage was void or voidable; but Lilia contested this, asking for an opportunity to present evidence that a)
she and Eduardo were forced to marry, and b) Eduardo was already married to someone else when he married Lilia.
Judge Sempio-Diy denied the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted upon both Lilia and
Eduardo had already been agreed upon.
ISSUE(S):
WON Lilia Wiegel should be allowed to present evidence proving the existence of force in her first marriage.
HELD:
No, Judge Sempio-Diy’s Orders affirmed. Marriage between the Wiegels (hehe) VOID.
RATIO:
Even if Lilia is allowed to present evidence, the presence of force would only render her marriage to Eduardo voidable,
not void. When she married Karl, her marriage to Eduardo was still valid and subsisting.
If Lilia was able to prove that Eduardo was already married before he married her, she would still need a judicial
declaration of nullity for that marriage before she could validly marry Karl.
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ISSUE(S): WON judicial declaration of nullity was necessary for the purpose of remarriage
HELD: YES!
Judicial declaration is necessary
RATIO:
As a lawyer, Jordan should have known that for purposes determining whether a person is legally free to contract a 2 nd marriage,
a judicial declaration that the 1st marriage was null and void is ESSENTIAL! For failing to get judicial declaration and
subsequently contracting a 2nd marriage, Terre committed a gross immoral conduct – unbecoming of a member of the bar.
Terre is DISBARRED!
Name STRIKE OUT of roll!
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ISSUE(S): WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Art. 147 of FC
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
- In Valdes v. RTC, a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by either 147 or 148.
- Art. 45 refers to voidable marriages and the marriages are governed wither by ACP or CPG
- Petitoner’s marriage was declared void under Art. 36 and not under Arts. 40 or 45. The liquidation of properties owned in
common of the spouses are governed by the rules on co-ownership and should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil
Code.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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ISSUE(S): WON the incident on custody, support and property relations must be resolved simultaneously with the incident on
declaration of nullity.
HELD: No. SC dismissed the petition.
RATIO:
Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the resolution of the incident on custody, support and property relations. She only deferred
its resolution and went ahead resolving the declaration of nullity first.
SC agreed with the lower court’s ruling that it is more prudent to rule first on the incident of psychological incapacity. If
the court finds it meritorious to declare their marriage void, then the parties shall proceed to comply with FC Art. 50
(partition of conjugal properties, custody, etc.) and FC Art 51. (computation of the previous) before a final judgment has
been decreed.
As for AM No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19: it allows the reception of evidence on custody, support, etc., after the trial court
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grants the petition on declaration of nullity.
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ISSUE(S): WON in case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippine, and the
former wife desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name under Rule 104
of the Rules of Court.
HELD: No
RATIO:
- The petition to resume the use of her maiden name filed before the Shari’a District Court is unnecessary since the law
requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce in
accordance with Muslim laws.
- The requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of
the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname.
- Petition for confirmation of change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course
and summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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RATIO:
NCC Art. 370 states that: “A married woman may use:
(1) her maiden first name and surname, and add her husband’s surname or;
(2) her maiden first name and her husband’s surname or;
(3) her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as “Mrs.”
The provision indicates that the wife’s use of her husband’s surname is optional not obligatory.
When Josephine married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status.
She was not required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law
requires it.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The use of husband’s surname during the marriage (Art. 370), after the marriage (Art. 371; use of surname after annulment),
and after the death of the husband (Art. 373; use of surname upon death of husband) is permissive and not obligatory.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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FACTS:
Petitioner Virginia Remo is married to a Francisco Rallonza. In her passport, her entries were: “Rallonza” for her surname,
“Maria Virginia” for her given name, and “Remo” for her middle name.
Virginia’s passport was expiring, so she was having it renewed. However, she also requested from the Philippine DFA
office in Chicago to revert to her maiden surname in the passport, i.e. Remo.
The request was denied by (in order) : DFA office in Chicago, main DFA office in the Philippines, the Office of the
President of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals.
Virginia cited both Yasin v. Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court and Art. 370 of the Civil Code in her petitions. Art. 370
of the Civil Code states that a married woman may use her full maiden name + husband’s surname; her first name +
husband’s surname; or her husband’s full name with something like “Mrs.” at the beginning; or, she may simply continue
using her full maiden name, period.
ISSUE(S):
WON Virginia Remo may revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport, even though she previously used her
husband’s surname.
HELD: No, she may not. Petition DENIED.
RATIO:
§5(d) of RA 8239 (The Philippine Passport Act of 1996) provides the only instances when a (formerly married) woman
may revert to the use of her maiden name, and these are:
o divorce
o annulment of marriage
o declaration of nullity of marriage
o death of the husband
Said provision is not in conflict with Art. 370 of the Civil Code.
Unlike in Yasin, where the woman was divorced, Virginia’s marriage is still subsisting. Also, Virginia requested to use her
maiden name in a replacement passport, while in Yasin, it was a request to use her maiden name in general, again.
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If Virginia used her maiden name in her passport from the start, there would be no problem. However, since she already
used her husband’s surname, she cannot revert to the use of her maiden name without meeting the requirements of RA
8239.
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HELD: YES!
RATIO:
Under FC 130, if the marriage is terminated by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be LIQUIDATED in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. Any disposition (alienation) without liquidation shall be VOID!
Protacio and Marta were married prior to the affectivity of the FC so their property regime is CPG, following the death of Marta in
1987—the CPG was dissolved and implied co-ownership ensued. Under CC 493, co-owners may alienate but only limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership, if it turns out that the property
alienated really would pertain to the share of the surviving spouse then it is VALID!
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Petition is DENIED!
RTC decision is AFFIRMED!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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ISSUE(S): WON Jordan Terre’s second marriage with Helina Malicdem is bigamous
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
- Jordan Terre’s marriage with Dorothy Terre was still subsisting when he contracted his second marriage with Helina
Malicdem. He neither initiated nor obtained any judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage when he contracted his
second marriage.
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RATIO:
The evidence presented by Katipunan was doubtful and unsettled.
Every presumption goes in favor of the validity of the marriage. The causes should be established clearly, unequivocally,
and convincingly.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Insanity of one of the spouses occurring after the celebration of the marriage cannot constitute a cause of nullity.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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FACTS:
Petitioner Nilo Oropesa filed a petition for guardianship over his father’s, respondent General Cirilo Oropesa, properties.
Nilo claims that his father is not fit to manage his own properties because, after two strokes in 2003 or even before that,
his judgment and memory are impaired.
A social worker was sent by the court to assess Gen. Cirilo, but he refused to see her, so her report contained no findings
on him. Gen. Cirilo then filed an Opposition.
Nilo presented testimonial evidence from himself, his sister, and Gen. Cirilo’s former nurse, and some documentary
evidence, but he did not file a written formal offer of evidence. Gen. Cirilo then filed an Omnibus Motion to:
1. declare Nilo to have waived the presentation of his evidence,
2. to expunge Nilo’s documents from the record, and
3. to grant leave to Gen. Cirilo to file demurrer for evidence.
The Omnibus Motion was granted, and Gen. Cirilo filed his Demurrer, which was also granted. The CA dismissed Nilo’s
appeal.
ISSUE(S):
WON Gen. Cirilo is considered incompetent, as defined under §2, Rule 92 of the RoC, who must be placed under
guardianship.
HELD: No, he is not. Petition DENIED.
RATIO:
Guardianship is a relationship between a guardian and a ward, whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own
affairs. The court may appoint a guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
o §2, Rule 91 of the RoC defines and enumerates who are incompetent persons, which includes “persons not being
of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes” who cannot take care of
themselves and manage their property without outside aid.
“Finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive, and definite evidence.”
o The only medical document presented by Nilo failed to prove incompetence, and actually showed that Gen. Cirilo
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was sharp, alert, and able.
o The testimonies were given by Nilo, his sister (both of whom claimed interest in their father’s properties), and
Gen. Cirilo’s former nurse (who admitted to acting under their direction). There was no expert medical testimony.
Because the CA affirmed the factual findings of the trial court, the SC adopted those findings and found the grant of the
demurrer to be proper. (A “demurrer to evidence” is an objection by one party in an action when he believes that the
evidence presented by the other party is insufficient and does not entitle that party to the relief sought.)
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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HELD:
NO.
RATIO:
Court finds that other than Lucita’s self serving declarations, she failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married,
Mario was suffering from a psychological defect. It was not sufficiently proved that Mario was really incapable of fulfilling his
duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature.
CA decision is AFFIRMED.
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CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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RATIO:
SC was not persuaded that the danger to Villanueva’s person is so overwhelming that his consent was vitiated, given
that he was a security guard during that time; that he is knowledgeable of self defense or at least, to keep himself out of
harm’s way.
It is even doubtful that the threats exist because he never reported it to the police, or to the solemnizing officer during
the wedding; that in fact, it took him 4 years to act on it.
Instead of proving that he was tricked into marrying his wife, he resorted to undermining the credibility of Lilia.
Villanueva was not able to convincingly prove that his consent was vitiated.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Allegations (vitiated consent) must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Case focused on moral damages and exemplary damages where: there must be evidence that there was in fact moral damage
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for it to be awarded. There was none in the case.
Case also ruled: “lack of cohabitation is not a ground for annulment of marriage”. (Off topic, though.)
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FACTS:
This is a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage by Veronica Alcazar. She was married to respondent Rey
Alcazar.
When they went back to Manila after the wedding, Rey did not live with Veronica. He left for Saudi Arabia to work.
The couple did not communicate the whole time Rey was abroad despite numerous attempts by Veronica to call him. She
only learned he was coming home to the Philippines from a co-teacher about a year and a half after Rey left for Riyadh.
Veronica further averred in her Complaint that when Rey arrived in the Philippines, he did not go home to Veronica in
Manila; instead, he proceeded to his parents’ house in Occidental Mindoro. She asserted that from the time Rey arrived
in the Philippines, he never contacted her.
Thus, Veronica concluded that Rey was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient
cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code).
There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between Veronica and Rey. RTC of Malolos City dismissed the
Complaint, a decision later affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE(S):
WON Rey is psychologically incapacitated.
HELD: No, he is not. Petition DENIED.
RATIO:
It is important to note that the initial Complaint filed by Veronica was for ANNULMENT of marriage (voidable) based on
Art. 45(5) of the Family Code – physical incapacity.
o Said article refers to “lack of power to copulate”. It is a permanent inability to have sex with each other, caused
by a physical defect, an illness, or even fear arising from psychophysical conditions in either or both parties.
o Veronica admitted to having intercourse with Rey after their wedding, and before he left. It appears that he was
not physically incapable, hence, there was no ground for annulling the marriage. This is why the initial complaint
was dismissed.
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(For further discussion on Psychological Incapacity, please see PAM’S DIGEST on this case.)
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Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision affirming the RTC decision declaring marriage of Fringer and Albios as
void ab initio
Oct. 22, 2004 – Daniel Lee Fringer (American citizen) and Liberty Albios got married
Dec. 6, 2006 – Albios filed with RTC a petition for declaration of nullity other marriage with Fringer
She alleges that after the marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligation, she describes that
their marriage was a marriage made in jest – so null and void
Apr. 25, 2008 – RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, RTC was of the view that the parties only married for
convenience
Albios stated that she married Fringer to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2000
OSG filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied this, the OSG then filed an appeal to the CA
CA affirmed the RTC ruling and found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking
ISSUE(S):
WON marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2000 is void ab initio on
ground of lack of consent
HELD:
NO. This does not render the marriage void ab initio
RATIO:
Under FC 2, consent is an essential requisite of a marriage. For consent to be valid, it must be freely given, made in presence of
solemnizing officer, must be real and not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vices of consent. It must also be conscious and
intelligent; parties must be capable of understanding the nature and consequences of their acts.
Albios and Fringer freely gave their consent, it was not vitiated, it was also conscious and intelligent, as they understood the
nature of it. They willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage with the intention to enter into a real and valid marriage,
which is required to accomplish Albios’ goal of acquiring American citizenship. Consent was not lacking, so marriage is valid.
Petition is GRANTED!
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CA decision is ANNULLED!
Civil case is DISMISSED!
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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a. When Diana was pregnant, she wanted Tadeo to leave the conjugal home to be from his marital authority and
influences. This prompted Tadeo to live in their condo in GH w/c resulted to a separation de facto;
b. She came from a rich family and was a disorganized housekeeper;
c. Always out of the house for she was always w/ her friend to play tennis;
d. Frequent quarrels and refusing to talk to Tadeo; and
e. That she was already P.I. to comply w/ the marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage up to the
present. This was based on the psychological examination conducted upon them.
But Diana relies on Santos v. CA (definition of P.I.) and Republic v. Molina (guidelines). She contends that it falls short to
follow the guidelines and it failed to allege the P.I.’s:
a. Root cause:
b. If it existed at the of the celebration of their marriage; and
c. If it was permanent and incurable.
However, SC states the A.M. Sec. 2 (Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages). Such rules says that “expert opinion need not be alleged” in the petition and that there is also no need to
allege the P.I.’s root cause. What is needed is to allege the physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity
w/c Tadeo did in the 2nd petition.
On forum shopping, the 1st petition’s dismissal did not amount to litis pendentia or res judicata:
a. No litis pendentia for the dismissal happened before service of answer or any pleading; and
b. No res judicata because the dismissal was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal “w/o prejudice.”
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HELD/RATIO:
FC Art. 102 (4) provides: “Net profits earned” - “shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.”
For the purpose of dissolution and liquidation, the definition of Art 102 (4) shall govern; both for ACP (Art. 102) and CPG
(Art. 129)
ACP Art 102:
(1) Find the market value of the properties at the time of the community’s dissolution.
(2) Total market value of all the properties - Debts and obligations of the absolute community = Net assets or net
remainder of the properties of the absolute community
(3) Net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute community - market value of the properties at the time
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of marriage = Net profits earned
(4) Net profits earned ÷ 2
CPG Art. 129:
(1) Conjugal properties + Reimbursements for benefits received by a spouse from the
conjugal partnership – Reimbursements to spouse/s for benefits received by conjugal partnership = Total assets of conjugal
partnership
(2) Total assets of conjugal partnership - Debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership = Net profits earned
(3) Net profits earned ÷ 2
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Net profits earned shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
Note: The definition was not used in computing for CPG. There was no computation of market value, etc. They strictly used Art.
129, and only provided Art 102 (4) as the definition of “net profits earned” to clarify the dispositive portion of RTC.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision and resolution affirming DFA decision denying Maria Virginia Remo’s
request to revert to the use of her maiden name in her replacement passport
Remo’s (married Filipino citizen) Philippine passport was then expiring on Oct. 27, 2000
Remo being then married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the ff. entries appear on her passport; Rallonza (surname), Maria
Virgina (given name), Remo (middle name)
Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, and while her marriage was still subsisting, she requested to revert to
her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport (DFA Chicago), this was denied
Petitioner then wrote to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siason, this was also denied
She then filed an appeal with the Office of the President but it was dismissed, ruling that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport
Act) only cites 4 instances where a married woman may revert to her maiden name; (1) divorce, (2) annulment, (3)
declaration of nullity of marriage, and (4) death of husband
Remo then moved for reconsideration before the CA but this was also denied, hence the present petition
ISSUE(S):
WON Remo (who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport) can revert to the use of her maiden name in
replacement passport
HELD:
NO. Remo may not revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport.
RATIO:
RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act) cites only 4 instances where a married woman may revert to the use of her maiden name in
the passport. These are; (1) divorce, (2) annulment, (3) declaration of nullity of marriage, and (4) death of husband. Clearly
Remo does not fall within any of the categories, so her petition must fail.
Truthfully, Remo could have used her maiden name in the passport but she chose to use her husband’s surname in her expired
passport. Once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert back to the use of
her maiden name anymore.
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Petition is DENIED!
CA Decision and Resolution is AFFIRMED!
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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c. In Lukban v. Republic, petitioner Lourdes Lukban filed a petition in 1956 for a declaration of presumption of death of
her husband, Francisco because he was already missing for more than 20 yrs. after a quarrel on Dec. 27, 1933;
d. In Gue v. Republic, petitioner Angelina Gue’s husband, William, left Manila to go to Shanghai and after 11 yrs.,
nothing was heard from him despite effort to find him, hence, prompted her to file a petition for a declaration of the
presumption of death of Willian Gue pursuant to CC390.
In both cases mentioned ([c] and [d]), the Szatraw ruling was reiterated. These marriages, like the Angelita-Sofio and
Angelita-Virgilio marriages, were all celebrated under the old CC.
With all that said, proof of “well-founded belief” is not required with regard to Angelita’s case. She could not have been
expected to comply with this requirement since the FC was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. So
Sofio was presumed dead since October 1982 and therefore making Angelita’s marriage to Virgilio legal and valid.
TAKE NOTE:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with
any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
a. The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
b. The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven
years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so
contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.”
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened.
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Philippine law.
Her marriage to Tenchavez was never declared null and void, as well. Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are
not entitled to recognition as valid; (1) for she was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was obtained, and; (2)
for her previous union to Tenchavez is still existent and undissolved.
Her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the
standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of
adultery".
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Foreign divorce decree obtained by a Filipino citizen is not recognized under the Philippine law.
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Pilapil and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German, were married in Germany sometime in 1979.
They lived in Manila and had a child one year later.
In 1983, Erich initiated divorce proceedings in Germany. Around the same time, Imelda filed for legal separation in
Manila. In January 1986, the divorce in Germany was granted. The divorce was validly recognized here.
June 27, 1986 – in Manila, Erich filed two complaints for adultery against Imelda – one for an affair with a William Chia
beginning in 1982, and the other for an affair with Jesus/James Chua in 1983.
o Initially dismissed, the cases were each raffled to two different RTC branches: Imelda’s and Chia’s to respondent
Judge Ibay-Somera’s branch, and Imelda’s and Chua’s to Judge Cruz.
Imelda and Chua filed petitions with the Secretary of Justice to have the cases dismissed. The SoJ, through the Chief
State Prosecutor, directed the respondent City Fiscal Luis Victor to defer proceedings if the accused were not yet
arraigned, and to elevate the records to his office for review. Pursuant to this, Imelda filed a motion in both cases to defer
her arraignment and suspend further proceedings.
Judge Cruz suspended proceedings, but Judge Ibay-Somera only reset the date of the arraignment. Imelda moved to
defer and suspend again, and to quash Judge Ibay-Somera’s order for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Ibay-Somera then denied
the motion, and ordered the arraignment of Imelda and Chua.
Chia pleaded not guilty, while Imelda refused to be arraigned. After being fined and detained for contempt, Imelda also
pleaded not guilty. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking to annul
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the denial of her motion to quash.
ISSUE(S):
WON Judge Ibay-Somera/the RTC has the jurisdiction to proceed with the case.
o WON Erich Geiling is an “offended spouse” (under Art. 344 of the RPC) who may file a case of adultery against
Imelda, despite his German divorce.
HELD: No, there is no jurisdiction because Erich has no standing due to his valid divorce. Petition GRANTED, denial of quash
SET ASIDE, complaint in criminal case DISMISSED, TRO made permanent.
RATIO:
The requirement that adultery may only be prosecuted upon a sworn written complaint by the offended spouse is a
jurisdictional issue, not merely a formal one. In other words, the RTC will have jurisdiction if Erich is an “offended spouse”
under Art. 344 of the RPC.
o Erich is not an “offended spouse” under the aforesaid provision because he was validly divorced from Imelda
when he initiated proceedings. The accusing spouse must be married AT THE TIME of the filing of the complaint.
o The State may not prosecute because adultery is considered a “private crime”, meaning only the offended party
may initiate.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
Paras, J.: Regardless of whether or not the divorce is recognized as valid in the Philippines, the act of obtaining a divorce
disqualifies the obtainer from being the offended party in crimes such as adultery.
“…in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others.” (Note: WTF, man?)
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HELD:
NO. FC 26 (2) does not extend to aliens.
RATIO:
FC 26 (2) only offers remedy to Filipino spouses. No court of this jurisdiction can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse
as their own national law governs them. However, this conclusion is still insufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition. Pursuant
to Sec. 48 of Rule 39 of ROC, for a foreign divorce judgment to be recognized – its authenticity must first be proven by facts and
alien spouse’s applicable national law.
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Sec. 24 of Rule 132 of ROC must also be taken into account; this requires proof of either (1) official publications, or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. Records showed that Gerbert attached a copy of the divorce
decree and the required certificate proving the authenticity but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.
SC deems it proper to remand the case to RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with Canadian divorce law.
Petition is GRANTED!
RTC Decision is REVERSED!
Case is REMANDED to RTC!
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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b. Aside from Elisera’s evidence as defense (a), Florentino and Elisera declared in the MOA that the lot is conjugal and
when he executed the deed of sale, he declared his capacity to sell as “co-owner”.
2. SC states that said sale w/o the wife’s consent, prior to the effectivity of the FC (Aug. 3, 1988) is not void, but merely
voidable pursuant to CC166 (w/o consent, voidable) and CC173 (prescription of 10 yrs.).
a. When Villanueva sps. contend (b), SC stated that the rationale for the annulment of the whole transaction is the
same (Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares citing Bucoy v. Paulino, et al.)
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MC Art. 13 (1) provides that the code applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein
only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any
part of the Philippines.”
BUT SC already ruled in Tamano v Ortiz (complaint of Llave against the jurisdiction of RTC in the instant case) that
“Article 13 of MC does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.
Therefore, MC cannot apply to the first marriage since it was celebrated under both civil and Muslim rites; and that
Zorayda and Tamano did not register their mutual desire to have their marriage be covered under MC.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The law in effect at the time of the marriage is the law that governs the personal status of the spouses.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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RATIO:
Not guilty of immorality (homosexuality) - The fact that respondent got married and had children is not proof
against his claim of homosexuality. As pointed out by the investigating judge, it is possible that respondent was only
suppressing or hiding his true sexuality.
Not guilty of dishonesty (changing the owner of the deed) – It was alleged that the title was kept by respondent in his
drawer. He then executed an affidavit of loss. Alistair also testified that his father was the owner of the land even if the
title was in his name which is why the deed should be in Eliseo’s possession.
Guilty of simple misconduct (for originally registering the land under the name of Alistair) - The action was clearly
intended to defraud a possible judgment-obligee.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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RATIO:
It does not violate the double jeopardy clause:
After the last act of adultery had been committed as charged in the 1st complaint, the defendants again committed
adulterous acts not included in the 1st complaint and for which the 2nd complaint was filed.
If the two adulterous acts will be deemed as one continuous act, should Zapata and Bondoc be acquitted, the second act
will remain unpunished.
Should they be acquitted for the first complaint, the same defense from the 1st complaint is no longer available for the
2nd complaint since Bondoc is now sure that Zapata is married when they had sex for the 2 nd time.
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DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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Petition for certiorari to annul a decision of Court of First Instance in declaring a decree of Legal Separation to Enrico
Pacete and Concepcion (Conchita) Analis & declaring marriage of Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion null and void ab
initio
Oct. 29, 1979 – Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Pacete and Clarita, as well
as for the legal separation between her and Pacete and for the accounting and separation of property
Apr. 30, 1938 – Pacete and Alanis married and had 1 child
1948 – Pacete married Clarita de la Concepcion
Aug. 1, 1979 – Alanis learned of the 2nd marriage
Alanis avers that during her marriage to Pacete, he acquired several properties (lands, fishponds, motor vehicles) which
he fraudulently placed in his name, Clarita’s, their children’s and other dummies
Pacete ignored her efforts for settlements and reconciliation is impossible since Pacete evidently preferred to continue
living with Clarita
Nov. 15, 1979 – Pacete and Clarita were served with summons, they filed for extension 3 times
1. 20 days from Nov. 30, 1979 – GRANTED!
2. 30 days from Dec. 20, 1979 – GRANTED ONLY FOR 20 DAYS!
3. 15 days from expiration of 30 day period previously requested – DENIED!
3 extension was denied on ground that defendants filed after the original period given, as 2 nd extension had expired
rd
HELD:
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YES! CFI gravely abused its discretion
RATIO:
Under normal circumstances, petition would have been dismissed because the proper remedy was to appeal form judgment by
default or to file for a petition for relief from judgment. This rule is not inflexible, a petition for certiorari may be allowed when;
(1) default order is improperly declared, (2) even when properly declared, is attended by grave abuse of discretion.
The default order was not legally sanctioned, FC 58 and 60 mandates for the intervention of the state and to provide for a
‘cooling off period’ of 6 months before a decree of legal separation may be tried; court will also take steps to reconcile the
parties. Rule 18, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court also provides that if the defendants fail to answer, the court will investigate for
possible collusion.
Other remedies prayed for, will not excuse anyone from compliance with provisions mentioned/procedures
Petition is GRANTED!
Mar. 17, 1980 decision is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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Petition denied. The wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband, prohibiting the latter from alienating or
encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action.
RATIO:
The wife may acquire another and separate domicile where the husband has given cause for divorce. In one case it was
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held that if the wife is justified in leaving the husband because his conduct has been such as to entitle her to a divorce,
and she really does leave him and go into another state for the purpose of there permanently residing, she acquires a
domicile in the latter state. Diego’s unlawful act of evicting her is considered consenting to Narcisa’s leaving; therefore
her acquiring of a new domicile is really justified and an exception.
The right of the husband under the law which makes him the sole administrator of the property of the conjugal
partnership is curtailed during the pendency of the action, insofar as alienating or encumbering the conjugal property is
concerned; which is only just and proper, in order to protect the interests of the wife
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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RATIO:
“It is true that there was no formal designation of administrator, but the designation was implicit when the lower court
denied Sabalones of his share in the conjugal properties. Thus, disqualifying him as well to be an administrator.”
There is enough evidence to raise doubts that entrusting the properties to Sabalones may result to the detriment of his
wife and children.
The Supreme Court agrees that it would be prudent not to allow him in the meantime to participate in its management;
given that he harassed the tenants and that he issued a quit claim regarding a conjugal property in US in favor of
Curameng.
Therefore, injuctive relief is proper to protect Remedios and their children.
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FACTS:
Petitioner Teodoro Lerma and Respondent Concepcion Diaz are married.
August 22, 1969 – Lerma filed a complaint for adultery against Diaz and a Teodoro Ramirez.
November 18, 1969 – Diaz filed a complaint against Lerma for legal separation, with an urgent petition for support
pendente lite (PL) for her and the youngest son, who was in her custody; her grounds were concubinage and attempt
against her life.
In opposition to the PL, Lerma used the adultery charge against Diaz as his defense; but the judge granted the
application for PL, then modified it later, lowering the amount.
Lerma then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prelim. injunction to annul the grant of PL
because they were issued with GAD. The CA complied, and later granted Lerma the opportunity to present evidence (to
the lower court, not CA) in support of his defense against the application for PL.
Diaz moved to reconsider this decision because Lerma did not ask for permission to present evidence to the lower court.
The CA sided with her, and dismissed Lerma’s petition.
January 23, 1974 – Lerma filed an urgent motion for prelim. injunction and/or restraining order because during the
pendency of Lerma’s appeal until Dec. 5, 1973, Diaz never sought enforcement of the orders granting PL, and only
sought enforcement now because Lerma filed a second adultery complaint against her. Diaz and Ramirez were convicted
of adultery (first case) by the CFI on Sept. 26, 1972, though it was then brought up to the CA.
Diaz argued that an order granting PL, though interlocutory, is immediately executed, even if appealed, unless enjoined.
ISSUE(S):
1. (Procedural) WON Petitioner should be allowed to present evidence of Diaz’ adultery in the lower court in support of his
defense.
2. (Substantive) WON adultery is a good defense against claims for support pendente lite.
HELD: Petition GRANTED.
RATIO:
1. Moot.
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§5, Rule 61 of the Revised RoC provides for the procedural law regarding PL. It says that the court will determine
provisionally the pertinent facts, and will render an order based on equity and justice, looking at the necessities of
the applicant, and the means of the intended supporter.
In this case, it became moot because Diaz was convicted of adultery by the CFI, and this conviction was never denied
by the respondent (petition with the CA is not a denial, in itself, of conviction).
2. Yes it is.
The CA cited Art. 292 of the Civil Code, saying that adultery is only a defense if the support is coming from the
husband’s personal funds, and not from the CPG. This is wrong. Art. 292 is not the source of the legal right to support
– it only states where it shall come from.
Art. 292 also contemplates pendency of a court action and a prima facie showing that the action will prosper. If the
action is groundless, mere filing will not set Art. 292 in operation. This is the same as §5, Rule 61 mentioned above,
because in that rule, the court will determine the “probable outcome” of the case.
Lerma should not need to support Diaz because she is the guilty spouse, at least provisionally. This
means that she cannot claim legal separation; and because she cannot claim legal separation, it would
be unjust to order Lerma to pay PL simply because Diaz filed the legal separation complaint.
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DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
ISSUE(S):
WON Schneckenburger should be acquitted of the crime of concubinage in view of the agreement between him and Cartagera
HELD:
YES! Agreement serves as consent, so Schneckenburger should be acquitted!
RATIO:
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The Court believes that Schneckenburger should be acquitted of the crime of concubinage in view of the agreement that he and
Cartagera executed. Although it is illegal for the purpose it was executed, it still constitutes as valid consent under RPC 344, and
under FC 56 (2). The Court holds that the consent of Cartagera prior to the 2nd marriage of Schneckenburger serves as a bar
against her proecuting Schneckenburger for concubinage.
Concubinage and Bigamy does not constitute the same crime, so no double jeopardy!
Judgment is REVERSED!
Schneckenburger is ACQUITTED!
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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RATIO:
Abandonment as a ground for legal separation under Art. 55 (10) should be without a justifiable cause.
Lucita left the conjugal dwelling because of William’s repeated physical violence and grossly abusive misconduct against
Lucita.
These allegations were proven in trial from testimonies and evidence presented by Lucita. William did not attempt to
disprove the allegations and only presented a general denial of the accusations.
Therefore, Lucita’s abandonment was justified. William has no ground for legal separation against Lucita.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Abandonment with justifiable cause is not a ground for legal separation.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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ISSUE(S): WON Antonio’s death renders the case moot and academic
How to resolve the division of properties?
HELD: No. But the petition was dismissed (not denied, I guess because they still rendered a resolution on the division of the
conjugal property) for lack of merit. Although, SC affirmed that January 1973 decision is final and executory. (Hence, the lack of
merit.)
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RATIO:
Legal problems do not cease simply because one of the parties dies. SC “felt bound” to resolve on how to divide the
conjugal properties.
The rules on dissolution and liquidation under NCC (this was 1981) would be applied effective January 1973, when the
decree of legal separation became final.
Then, the properties that may be allocated to Antonio as a result of the liquidation of the conjugal assets, shall be
distributed in accordance with the laws of intestate succession.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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prevent Erlinda from visiting him.
2. No, she may not be.
With full mental capacity and right of choice, Atty. P may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, he would be deprived of his right to privacy.
The CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights (under penalty of contempt in case of violation) in a
petition for habeas corpus when Erlinda never even asked for such rights. The CA also missed the fact that the case
did not involve the right of a parent to visit a child, but the right of a wife to visit her husband.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus. It is a matter beyond judicial authority and left to the man and woman’s free
choice.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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Sept. 9, 2008 – the CA dismissed her appeal on ground that granting her appeal would disturb the RTC decision of May
16 which has long become final and executory
Calderon filed several motions for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA, hence this appeal
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether Mar. 7 & May 4 Orders on the matter of support pendente lite are interlocutory or final
2. WON RTC was correct to reduce Roxas’ support pendente lite from 40k to 30k
HELD:
1. Mar. 7 & May 4 Orders are Interlocutory
2. Yes, the court was correct to grant his motion to reduce his support pendente lite.
RATIO:
1. Since Mar. 7 & May 4 Orders were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage – the orders are INTERLOCUTORY!
A distinction between Interlocutory and Final judgment must be made;
- INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS are those that do not dispose the case, this indicates that other things still remain to be
done by the court
- FINAL JUDGMENTS are those that dispose of the case, and leaves nothing more to be done by the court
The assailed orders are only incidental to the main action (declaration of nullity of marriage), the fact that a few years after the
original action was filed, both Roxas and Calderon filed for different remedies emphasize the provisional nature of the order
granting the support pendente lite. Under Sec. 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, no appeal may be made
against an interlocutory order. Since Calderon chose the wrong remedy, the CA correctly dismissed her case.
2. Yes, the court was correct to grant Roxas’ motion to reduce the support pendente lite. As evidenced by the
documents, receipts, billings he presented – it is clear that Roxas has been duly providing the support
pendente lite to his minor children. (REFER TO DOCTRINE FOR FURTHER EXPLANATION)
The reduction of the support pendent lite is also evidenced by the fact that: Roxas has no other source of income
other than his salary as city councilor; there was no proof that Calderon is not grantfully employed since she is
also a medical doctor; and that Calderon failed to prove that Roxas was in arrears of his support payments, in
fact, Roxas overpaid his child support.
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ISSUE(S): WON VAWC violates the equal protection clause and due process clause, making the statute unconstitutional.
HELD: No. Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
On equal protection clause:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
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inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality
in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; (1) that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; (2) that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; (3) and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence
committed against women and children.
SC held that the standard is satisfied; that the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
On due process:
A writ of preliminary attachment, just like a TPO, which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in
which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property.
In the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her
tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented.
It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence
and threats to their personal safety and security.
When the TPO is issued ex parte (decided without the presence of the other party), the court shall likewise order
that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from
service. Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of
the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service.
The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
RA 9262 (VAWC) complied with the guidelines of valid classification as per the equal protection clause; and does not violate the
right to due process as it provides procedures on submission of an opposition by the defendant to the petition.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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FACTS:
Private respondent Irish Sagud and petitioner Rustan Ang were classmates in college and became on-off sweethearts
towards the end of 2004. When Irish later learned that Rustan had a live-in partner (current wife) whom he impregnated,
she broke up with him.
Before getting married to wifey, Rustan tried to convince Irish to elope with him, saying that he did not love wifey. Irish
told him to take responsibility, and changed her number, but Rustan found it somehow. He would text her, but she would
ask him to leave her alone.
Rustan then sent Irish an MMS “picture of a naked woman with spread legs” with Irish’s face superimposed on it. He
threatened that he could easily make more, similar pictures, and spread it on “chatrum” in Tarlac.
Irish went to the vice mayor (why?!) and was referred to the police. They began an entrapment operation, and Rustan
was caught, and his cell phone and SIM cards were taken. While being questioned at the police station, Rustan
shouted at Irish, “Malandi ka kasi!”
Rustan presented an alternate version of the facts, which included the allegation that Irish asked to meet him to get his
help in identifying a prankster, among other things. He pretended to be Irish and contacted the prankster through his cell
phone, but the prankster sent the lewd photos, which Rustan then forwarded to Irish (hence, the photos coming from his
number).
The RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible because it was spontaneous and because she cried (Seriously. They
cited the crying as proof of credibility, complete with an explanation why they did.), and found Rustan guilty of violating
§5(h) of R.A. 9262 (Anti-VAWC). The CA affirmed this decision.
ISSUE(S):
WON Rustan sent Irish the photos, which caused anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her, in violation of
§5(h) of R.A. 9262.
HELD: Yes he did. Petition DENIED; CA decision AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
The elements of the crime are present:
o Rustan and Irish had a “sexual or dating relationship” (§3(e) and (f))
o One act of sending an offensive picture is “an act or series of acts” that constitutes violence. (§3(a))
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Rustan says that his items were seized without a warrant, but these items weren’t actually used as evidence (e.g.,
Rustan admitted to owning the phone seen in a photograph, not the actual phone, presented by the prosecution). Also,
the bulk of the prosecution’s evidence really was just Irish’s testimony.
Rustan also claims that the lewd photo sent to Irish is an “electronic document” that requires an “electronic signature”
for authentication, as provided under §1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC) However, because
he only brought this up with the SC and not with the lower courts, his right to object to evidence was deemed waived. In
addition, the A.M. mentioned only applies to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Read R.A. 9262
“Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former
sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity
borne out of human nature and experience.” –RTC (verbatim)
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”
Cycles of self defense arising from battered wife syndrome: First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be
proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final
acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of
an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the
time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused,
based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could
satisfy the requisites of self-defense.
Requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
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