Public Corporation and Local Governments
private corporations, such as powers
A. Public Corporation
1.Concept
Organized for the government of a portion of
the State
Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals v. COA, GR 169752, September 25,
2007
PSPCA was incorporated as juridical entity by
virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on year 1905.
At that time, both the Corporation Law and the
Constitution of SEC was not yet existing.
When COA was to perform an audit, they
refused on ground that it is a private entity.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner may be subject to the COA
audit?
HELD: NO.
The test to determine whether a corporation is
a GOCC or private in nature are as follow:
● Is it created by its own charter for the
exercise of a public function or by
incorporation under the general
corporation law?
○ GOCC - with special charter
○ Private - with general charter
In this case, this charter test will not apply
since it was only introduced by 1935
Constitution. All statutes are to be construed
as having prospective operation, unless the
purpose and intention of the legislature to give
retrospective application is expressly declared
or is necessarily implied from the language
used.
IT IS A PRIVATE ENTITY
● Not subject to control or supervision
by any agency unlike GOCC
● No government representative sits on
the Board of Trustees
● The successors of its members are
voluntarily and solely in accordance
with its by-laws and may exercise
those powers generally accorded to
to hold property, to sue and be sued,
to use a common seal.
● Employees are registered and
covered by SSS instead by GSIS.
● Even if impressed with public interest
(to secure the protection and welfare
of animals) does not, by that
circumstance alone, make it as public
corporation.
● It is considered as QUASI-PUBLIC
CORPORATION - which are private
corporations that render public
service, supply public wants, or
pursue other eleemosynary
objectives.
● The true criterion, therefore, to
determine whether a corporation is
public or private is found in the totality
of the relation of the corporation to the
State. If the corporation is created by
the State as the latter’s own agency
or instrumentality to help it in carrying
out its governmental functions, then
that corporation is considered public;
otherwise, it is private.
Public Corporation v. Government-owned or
controlled corporations
Public corporation broader in scope. It covers
municipal corporations and government
owned and controlled corporation.
A government-owned or controlled corporation
is a stock or a non-stock corporation, whether
performing governmental or proprietary
functions, which is directly chartered by a
special law or if organized under the general
corporation law is owned or controlled by the
government directly, or indirectly through a
parent corporation or subsidiary corporation,
to the extent of at least a majority of its
outstanding capital stock or of its outstanding
voting capital stock.
2.Classifications
a) Quasi-corporation: created by the State for a
narrow or limited purpose.
b) Municipal corporation: a body politic and
corporate constituted by the incorporation of the
inhabitants for purposes of local government.
B. Municipal Corporations
1. Elements: legal creation or incorporation,
corporate name, inhabitants and territory.
a. Legal Creation or Incorporation - law
creating or authorizing the creation or
incorporation of a municipal
corporation
b. Corporate Name - name by which the
corporation shall be known
c. Inhabitants - the people residing in the
territory of the corporation
d. Territory - the land mass where the
inhabitants reside, together with the
internal and external waters, and the
air space above the land and waters
2. Nature and functions
Section 15, Local Government Code
Every local government unit created or
recognized under this Code is a body politic
and corporate endowed with powers to be
exercised by it in conformity with law. It shall
exercise powers as a political subdivision of
the national government and as a corporate
entity representing the inhabitants of its
territory.
Torio vs. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599
A municipal corporation proper has a public
character as regards the State at large insofar
as it is its agent in the government and private
insofar as it promote local necessities and
conveniences for its own community.
Municipal corporations exist in a dual
capacity, and their functions are two-fold. In
one, they exercise the right springing from
sovereignty, and while in the performance of
duties pertaining thereto, their acts are
political and governmental.
Their officers and agents in such capacity,
though elected or appointed by them, are
public functionaries performing public service,
and as such they are officers, agents, and
servants of the State. In the other capacity,
the municipality exercise a private, proprietary
or corporate right, arising from their exercise
as legal persons and not as public agencies.
Municipal corporations are not liable for
damages for acts done in the performance of
governmental functions provided its officers
performed it in good faith and did not act
wantonly and maliciously.
However, if the acts were done in the
performance of proprietary functions, the
municipality may be held liable for the acts of
its agents under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
In this case, the holding of town fiesta is a
proprietary function. The Municipality of
Malasique, Pangasinan, was held liable for
the death of a member of a zarzuela group
when the stage collapsed, under the principle
of respondeat superior.
City of Manila vs. Intermediate Appellate court,
179 SCRA 428
The City of Manila is a political body corporate
and as such endowed with the faculties of
municipal corporations to be exercised by and
through its city government in conformity with
law, and in its proper corporate name.
It may sue and be sued.
It may contract and be contracted with.
Its powers are two-folds:
1. Public, governmental or political
2. Corporate, Private, Proprietary
Governmental Powers are those exercised in
administering the powers of the State and
promoting the public welfare and they include
the legislative, judicial, public and political.
Municipal powers on the one hand are
 exercised for the special benefit and
advantage of the community and include
those which are ministerial, private and
corporate
In this case, the operation of public cemetery
is a proprietary function of the City of Manila.
The City is liable for the tortious acts of its
employees, under the principle of respondeat
superior.
3. Requisites for creation, conversion, division,
merger or dissolution
Sections 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, Local Government
Code
Section 6. A local government unit may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries
substantially altered either by law enacted by
Congress in the case of province, city,
municipality, or any other political subdivision, or
by ordinance passed by the sangguniang
panlalawigan or sangguiniang panlungsod
concerned in the case of barangay located within
its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such
limitations and requirements prescribed in this
Code.
Section 7. As a general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level
to another level shall be based on a verifiable
indicators of viability and projected capacity to
provide services, to wit:
a. Income – it must be sufficient, based on
acceptable standards, to provide for all
essential government facilities and services
and special functions commensurate with the
size of its population, as expected of the local
government unit concerned;
b. Population – it shall be determined as the
total number of inhabitants within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government
unit concerned; and
c. Land area – it must be contiguous, unless it
comprises two or more islands or is separated
by a local government unit independent of
others; properly identified by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions; and
sufficient to provide for such basic services
and facilities to meet the requirements of the
populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be
attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF),
the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Land
Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Section 8. Division and merger of existing local
government units shall comply with the same
requirements herein prescribed for their creation:
Provided, however, That such division shall not
reduce the income, population, or land area of the
local government unit or units concerned to less
than the minimum requirements prescribed in this
Code: Provided, further, That the income
classification of the original local government unit
or units shall not fall below its current
classification prior to such division.
The income classification of local government
units shall be updated within six (6) months from
the effectivity of this Code to reflect the changes in
their financial position resulting from the increased
revenues as provided herein.
Section 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. -
A local government unit may be abolished when
its income, population, or land area has been
irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum
standards prescribed for its creation under Book III
of this Code, as certified by the national agencies
mentioned in Section 7 hereof to Congress or to
the sangguniang concerned, as the case may be.
The law or ordinance abolishing a local
government unit shall specify the province, city,
municipality, or barangay with which the local
government unit sought to be abolished will be
incorporated or merged.
Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. - No creation,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration
of boundaries of local government units shall take
effect unless approved by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the
political unit or units directly affected. Said
plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of
the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless
said law or ordinance fixes another date.
Section 10, Article X, Philippine Constitution
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or
 barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established
in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
League of Cities v. COMELEC, GR 176951,
April 12, 2011
RA 9009 amended the income requirement for
the creation of cities including the conversion
of a municipality to city from P20M to P100M.
After its adoption, Congress passed several
laws converting municipalities into cities
based on the old law (P20M income
requirement) and the new law (P100M income
requirement).
Due to this, the constitutionality of the
Cityhood laws were questioned for violation of
Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the
Constitution. The creation of LGU must follow
the criteria established in the LGC itself (which
is already repealed).
Prior to the adoption of RA 9009, the
municipalities covered by the Cityhood laws
had pending conversion bills.
ISSUE
Whether RA 9009 would apply to the pending
conversion bills in the Senate?
HELD
NO. Congress clearly intended that the LGU
covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted
from the coverage of RA 9009. Therefore, the
Cityhood laws can become component cities
of their respective provinces.
Mendenilla v. Onandia GR L-17803, June 30,
1962
Mendenilla was appointed as Chief of Police
of Municipality of Legaspi, Albay by the
Municipal Mayor. Under the new charter of
City of Legaspi (RA 2334), the President of
the PH became the appointing power in
relation to the position of Chief of Police.
Due to this, Mendenilla’s position as chief of
police was given to Onandia.
ISSUE: What legal effects had the conversion
of municipality to the city on the existing
municipal offices?
HELD:
With the creation of the City of Legaspi, the
legal personality of the municipality was
extinguished. The new city came into being as
a new legal entity or municipal corporation.
The consequent effect of said dissolution, was
the abolition of all municipal offices then
existing under the superseded municipality
except those exempted in the charter itself.
Since the repeal of the charter destroys all
offices under it, it also put an end to the
functions of the incumbents.
Municipality of San Narciso vs. Mendez, 239
SCRA 11
EO 353, creating the municipal district of San
Andres, was adjudged as unconstitutional in
the case of Pelaez vs. Auditor General. Due to
this, the municipality of San Narciso
questioned the officials’ exercise of duties and
functions.
As a defense, they contend that due to the
enactment of LGC, it converted the municipal
districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders into regular
municipalities.
ISSUE
Whether San Andres may be recognized as a
regular municipality? YES.
HELD:
The Municipality of San Andres at least
attained a status uniquely of its own closely
approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a
de facto municipal corporation.
● When Pelaez v. Auditor General was
promulgated, it was in existence for
more than six years.
● Certain governmental acts all pointed
to the State’s recognition of the
 continued existence of the
Municipality of San Andres.
○ After more than five years as
a municipal district, EO No.
174 classified the Municipality
of San Andres as a fifth class
municipality.
○ It been covered by the 10th
Municipal Circuit Court of San
Francisco-San Andres for the
province of Quezon.
Throughout its 30 years of existence, the
municipal district had exercised the powers
and authority of a duly created local
government institution, and the State had, at
various times, recognized its continued
existence.
Camid vs. Office of the President 448 SCRA 711
E.O 353, creating the municipality of Andong,
was passed. Later, in the ruling of Pelaez vs.
Auditor General, it was adjudged as
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether Andong can be recognized as
municipal corporation? NO
HELD:
Municipal corporations may exist by
prescription where it shown that the
community has claimed and exercised
corporate functions, with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the legislature, and without
interruption or objection for period long
enough to afford title by prescription.
Andong is not similarly entitled to recognition
as a de facto municipal corporation. The
Executive Order which created Andong was
expressly annulled by the Court in 1965.
Andong does not meet the requisites under
Sec. 442(d) LGC for said municipality created
by EO may receive recognition. Under said
provision, they must “have their respective set
of elective municipal officials holding office at
the time of effectivity of LGC”. In this case,
Camid admits that Andong has never elected
its municipal officers.
The legal effect of nullification of Andong was
to revert the constituent barrios of the voided
town back into their original municipalities.
a. Barangay: Section 386, Local Government
Code
Section 386. Requisites for Creation. -
(a) A barangay may be created out of a contiguous
territory which has a population of at least two
thousand (2,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office except in cities and
municipalities within Metro Manila and other
metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly
urbanized cities where such territory shall have a
certified population of at least five thousand
(5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That the creation
thereof shall not reduce the population of the
original barangay or barangays to less than the
minimum requirement prescribed herein.
To enhance the delivery of basic services in the
indigenous cultural communities, barangays may
be created in such communities by an Act of
Congress, notwithstanding the above requirement.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay
shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or
by more or less permanent natural boundaries. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
(2) or more islands.
(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a
consolidation plan for barangays, based on the
criteria prescribed in this Section, within his
territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted
to the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang
panlungsod concerned for appropriate action.
In the case of municipalities within the
Metropolitan Manila Area and other metropolitan
political subdivisions, the barangay consolidation
plan shall be prepared and approved by the
sangguniang bayan concerned.
b. Municipality: Section 442, Local Government
Code
Section 442. Requisites for Creation. -
(a) A municipality may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the
provincial treasurer, of at least Two million five
hundred thousand pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the
last two (2) consecutive years based on the 1991
constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five
thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office; and a contiguous
territory of at least fifty (50) square kilometers as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau:
Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce
the land area, population or income of the original
municipality or municipalities at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created
municipality shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not
apply where the municipality proposed to be
created is composed of one (1) or more islands.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund of the
municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds,
transfers and non-recurring income.
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the
effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective
set of elective municipal officials holding office at
the time of the effectivity of this Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
c. City: Section 450, Local Government Code
(RA 9009 increased the 20 Million pesos income
requirement to 100 Million pesos for the last two
consecutive years based on 2000 constant
prices.)
Section 450. Requisites for Creation.
(a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices (NOW:
P100M based on 2000 constant prices), and if it
has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred
(100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty
thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not
reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to
less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created
city shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds. The requirement on land area shall not
apply where the city proposed to be created is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income.
Alvarez vs. Guingona, 352 SCRA 695 (Annual
Income)
RA 7720, converting the municipality of
Santiago, Isabela into an independent
component city, was passed. Petitioners claim
that Santiago could not qualify into a
component city because its average annual
income for 2 consecutive years fall below 20M
for its conversion into a city. This is contrary to
the certification by Bureau of Local
Government Finance which indicates 20.9M
average annual income. In its computation, it
included the Internal Revenue Allotments.
ISSUE:
Whether the Internal Revenue Allotments are
to be included in the computation?
HELD: YES. The Internal Revenue Allotments
should be included in the computation of the
average annual income of the municipality for
purposes of determining whether the
municipality may be validly converted into a
city.
Annual income is defined to be “revenues and
receipts realized by provinces, cities and
municipalities from regular sources of the
Local Government Fund including the internal
revenue allotment and other shares.
Samson vs. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53 (Population
or land Area; Seat of Government)
Republic Act No. 8535, creating the City of
Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon
City, was challenged because it failed to
comply with the land requirement and failed to
specify the seat of government of the
proposed City of Novaliches.
Annual income of 13 barangays - P26M (more
than required P20M)
Population - 347K (more than required 150k)
ISSUE:
Whether land area must also be complied
with?
Whether the failure to specify the seat of
government of the proposed City of
Novaliches was fatal?
HELD:
NO. The proposed city must comply with
requirements as regards income AND
population OR land area. Other than the
income requirement, the proposed city must
have the requisite number of inhabitants OR
land area.
NO. This omission is not fatal as to the validity
of the law creating the City of Novaliches
because under Section 12 of LGC, the city
can still establish a seat of government after
its creation. Section 12 of LGC provides for
the site of government centers which can also
be the seat of the government.
d. Province: Section 461, Local Government
Code
Section 461. Requisites for Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices
and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand
(2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not
reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to
less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprise two (2) or more islands or is separated by
a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to
the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, trust funds, transfers and non-
recurring income.
C. Principles of Local Autonomy
Section 2, Article X, Philippine Constitution
Section 2. The territorial and political
subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Section 17 (e), Local Government Code
Section 17 (e), Local Government Code
(e) National agencies or offices concerned
shall devolve to local government units the
responsibility for the provision of basic
services and facilities enumerated in this
section within six (6) months after the
effectivity of this Code.
As used in this Code, the term "devolution"
refers to the act by which the national
government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform
specific functions and responsibilities.
Limbona v. Mangelin, GR 80391, February 28,
1989
Facts:
Petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was
elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao. He, together with other assembly
men in the region were invited in the House of
Representatives for a “dialogue”. He agreed to
go on the condition that there would not be a
“session”. However, there was a session and
he was unseated from his position. He now
questions the validity of his termination on the
ground that of the irregularity of the process.
Issue: W/N the court has jurisdiction in light of
the enactment of the LGC? - Yes
Held:
The case was decided considering the current
provisions of the LGC. This however does not
prejudice the existing rules at the time that the
case was filed because there was an apparent
lack of due process. In relation to the central
government, it provides that "[t]he President
shall have the power of general supervision
and control over the Autonomous Region.
Autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions
in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local
governments "more responsive and
accountable, and ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social
progress." At the same time, it relieves the
central government of the burden of managing
local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises
"general supervision" over them, but only to
"ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." He has no control over their
acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own. Decentralization of
power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of
local governments units declare to be
autonomous . In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny
and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities.
According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-
immolation," since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but
to its constituency.
Based on the decision of the Court after
examining the LGC, what is involved is
decentralization of administration and not
decentralization of power.
Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52
Facts:
Petitioner Basco questions PAGCOR’s
creation on the ground that LGUs cannot tax
the latter with respect to the regulation of
gambling in their locality. According to the
petitioner, PAGCOR’s exemption violates their
local autonomy with regard to the generation
of their own revenue.
Issue:
W/N PAGCOR’s exemption violates local
autonomy? – No.
Held:
No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987
Constitution provides: “Each local government
unit shall have the power to create its own
source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and
other charges subject to such guidelines and
limitation as the congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local government.” A
close reading of the above provision does not
violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing
powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing
power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines
and limitation as Congress may provide. It
should be stressed that “municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress”
which has the power to “create and abolish
municipal corporations” due to its “general
legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has
the power of control over Local governments.
And if Congress can grant the City of Manila
the power to tax certain matters, it can also
provide for exemptions or even take back the
power.
Further still, local governments have no power
to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government
owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of
stocks are owned by the National
Government. Otherwise, its operation might
be burdened, impeded or subjected to control
by a mere Local government.
Lina v. Pano, GR 129093, August 30, 2001
Facts:
Private respondent Tony Calvento, was
appointed agent by PCSO to install a terminal
for the operation of lotto, applied for a mayor’s
permit to operate a lotto outlet in San
Pedro,Laguna. It was denied on the ground
that an ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg.
508, Taon1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited gambling
in the province,including the operation of lotto.
With the denial of his application, private
respondent filed an action for declaratory relief
with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order. The trial court
rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent enjoining petitioners from
implementing or enforcing the subject
resolution.
Issue:
W/N the local ordinance is valid? – No
Held:
The questioned ordinance merely states the
“objection” of the council to the said game. It
is but a mere policy statement on the part of
the local council, which is not self-executing.
Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit
the operation of the lotto system in the
province of Laguna. As a policy statement
expressing the local government’s objection to
the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part
of the local government’s autonomy to air its
views which may be contrary to that of the
national government’s.However, this freedom
to exercise contrary views does not mean that
local governments may actually enact
ordinances that go against laws duly enacted
by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed
resolution in this case could not and should
not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance
prohibiting the operation of lotto.
Moreover, ordinances should not contravene
statutes as municipal governments are merely
agents of the national government. The local
councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers which have been conferred on them
by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior
to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. This being the case, these
councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to
the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. The question of whether
gambling should be permitted is for Congress
to determine, taking into account national and
local interests. Since Congress has allowed
the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO
seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant toits
legislative grant of authority, the province's
Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the
exercise of said authority by preventing
something already allowed by Congress.
Judge Dadole v. COA, GR 125350, December
3, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner RTC Judge and other MTC judges
of Mandaue City questioned the validity of
DBM resolution No. 55 limiting the allowance
of local government officials to P1,000 and
P700 pesos for City and Municipal officials
respectively. They alleged that this is a
violation of the LGUs local autonomy.
Issue:
W/N the DBM resolution is valid – No
Held:
Our Constitution6guarantees autonomy to
local government units, the exercise of local
autonomy remains subject to the power of
control by Congress and the power of
supervision by the President. Section 4 of
Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides that: The President of the Philippines
shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. This provision (Section 4 of
Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution)
has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control. In Mondano v. Silvosa, the Court
contrasted the President's power of
supervision over local government officials
with that of his power of control over executive
officials of the national government. It was
emphasized that the two terms -- supervision
and control -- differed in meaning and extent.
The Chief Executive wielded no more
authority than that of checking whether local
governments or their officials were performing
their duties as provided by the fundamental
law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with
local governments, so long as they act within
the scope of their authority. "Supervisory
power, when contrasted with control, is the
power of mere oversight over an inferior body;
it does not include any restraining authority
over such body.
Liga ng mga Barangay v. Judge Paredes, GR
130775, September 29, 2004
Facts:
DILG was appointed by the President as
interim caretaker to administer and manage
the affairs of the “Liga ng mga Barangay”. It
subsequently issued 2 memorandums which
modify or set aside the previous actions made
by the Liga in relation to violations during the
conduct of election of its officers. The Liga
contends that the DILG as an alter ego of the
President does not have the power of control
over them.
Issue:
DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the President
has power of control over the Liga ng mga
Barangay.? – No
Held:
Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that
the President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local government,
which exclude the power of control. As the
entity exercising supervision over the Liga,
the DILG’s authority is limited to seeing to it
that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay
down such rules itself nor does it have the
discretion to modify or replace the same.
Judge Leynes v. COA, GR No. 143596, Dec. 11,
2003
Facts:
Judge Leynes receives allowance from both
the local government unit and the Judiciary.
COA issued an administrative order limiting
the allowance given to government officials.
According to COA “no one should be allowed
to collect RATA from more than one source”.
This was challenged by the petitioner on the
ground that it violates the autonomy given to
local government units.
Issue:
W/N the administrative order is valid? – No
Held:
An administrative order cannot modify or
abrogate a statute. RA 7160 cannot be
repealed by a mere administrative issuance.
Moreover, the General Appropriations act
cannot repeal a special law like the LGC. In
addition, the administrative order should apply
to national funds and not to the local funds of
the LGU.
Batangas CATV v. CA and Batangas City, GR
No. 138810, September 29, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner Batangas City CATV Inc., operates
CATV within the jurisdiction of Batangas.
Through a resolution/ordinance, the
Sanggunuan Panglungsod of Batangas City
regulates the operation of the petitioner under
the general welfare clause. However, when
petitioner increased its subscription rate from
P88 to P180 per month, the Sanggunian
Panglungsod prevented the same.
Issue:
W/N the Sanggunian can regulate the
operations of Batangas City CATV? – No
Held:
The SC traced the regulation of the CATV
system in the Philippines from the issuance of
PD 1512, the creation of the NTC, issuance of
E.O 205, and E.O. 436. All of these points to
the NTC as the government agency tasked to
regulate the CATV system. The SC was
convinced that the issuance of the LGU of
Resolution No. 210 preventing the increase of
rates by the petitioner violates the limits of its
authority under the LGC. The flaws in
Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the
mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the
State’s deregulation policy over the CATV
industry which was given to the NTC through
E.O No. 2015 and 436.
CREBA v. Secretary of DAR, GR 183409, June
18, 2010
Facts:
DAR issued AO No. 01-02, as amended,
providing that the reclassification of
agricultural lands by LGUs shall be subject to
the requirements of land use conversion
procedure or that DAR’s approval or
clearance to effect reclassification. Petitioner
questioned the same on the ground that it
violates the autonomy of the LGU to reclassify
agricultural lands within its jurisdiction.
Issue:
W/N the administrative order is valid – Yes
Held:
The SC distinguished conversion from
reclassification, the former under the power of
DAR and the latter under the LGU.
Conversion is the act of changing the current
use of a piece of agricultural land into some
other use as approved by the DAR while
reclassification is the act of specifying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-
agricultural uses such as residential,
industrial, and commercial, as embodied in
the land use plan, subject to the requirements
and procedures for land use conversion. In
view thereof, a mere reclassification of an
agricultural land does not automatically allow
a landowner to change its use. He has to
undergo the process of conversion before he
is permitted to use the agricultural land for
other purposes. It is clear from the aforesaid
distinction between reclassification and
conversion that agricultural lands though
reclassified to residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses must
still undergo the process of conversion before
they can be used for the purpose to which
they are intended.
The DAR secretary simply implements the
provisions of RA 6657 and RA 8435 which
penalize illegal or premature conversion of
lands.
Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012. Challengers from various sectors of
society are questioning the constitutionality of
the said Act. One of the issues alleged is that
it violates the local autonomy of LGUs and
ARMM with respect to the delivery of basic
services and facilities.
Issue:
W/N RA 10354 violates the local autonomy of
LGUs and the ARMM – No.
Held:
Unless an LGU is particularly designated as
the implementing agency, it has no power
over a program for which funding has been
provided by the national government under
the annual general appropriations act, even if
the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. A
complete relinquishment of central
government powers on the matter of providing
basic facilities and services cannot be implied
as the Local Government Code itself weighs
against it.
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly
shows that whether it pertains to the
establishment of health care facilities, the
hiring of skilled health professionals, or the
training of barangay health workers, it will be
the national government that will provide for
the funding of its implementation. Local
autonomy is not absolute. The national
government still has the say when it comes to
national priority programs which the local
government is called upon to implement like
the RH Law.
D. Intergovernmental Relation
Consultation Regarding Programs and Projects
Section 2 © LGC
It is likewise the policy of the State to require
all national agencies and offices to conduct
periodic consultations with appropriate local
government units, non-governmental and
people's organizations, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or
program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions.
Section 26 LGC Duty of National Government
Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological
Balance. - It shall be the duty of every national
agency or government-owned or -controlled
corporation authorizing or involved in the
planning and implementation of any project or
program that may cause pollution, climatic
change, depletion of non-renewable
resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or
forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant
species, to consult with the local government
units, nongovernmental organizations, and
other sectors concerned and explain the goals
and objectives of project or program, its
impact upon the people and the community in
terms of environmental or ecological balance,
and the measures that will be undertaken to
prevent or minimize the adverse effects
thereof.
Lina vs. Pano, 364 SCRA 76
Facts:
Private respondent Tony Calvento, was
appointed agent by PCSO to install a terminal
for the operation of lotto, applied for a mayor’s
permit to operate a lotto outlet in San
Pedro,Laguna. It was denied on the ground
that an ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg.
508, Taon1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited gambling
in the province,including the operation of lotto.
With the denial of his application, private
respondent filed an action for declaratory relief
with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order. The trial court
rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent enjoining petitioners from
implementing or enforcing the subject
resolution.
Issue:
W/N consultation is necessary? – No
Held:
The provision on consultation apply only to
national programs and/or projects which are to
be implemented in a particular local
community. Lotto is neither a program nor a
project of the national government, but of a
charitable institution, the PCSO. Though
sanctioned by the national government, it is
far fetched to say that lotto falls within the
contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the
Local Government Code.
Province of Rizal vs. Executive Secretary, 477
SCRA 436
Facts:
In light of the waste management crisis in
Metro Manila, the government issued
Proclamation No. 635 authorizing the use of
land fill located in San Mateo Rizal. Petitioners
opposed the same on the ground that no
consultations were made and that it affects
the nearby watershed located in the area.
Issue:
W/N Consultations are necessary – Yes.
Held:
Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is
the policy of the state- "to require all national
agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultation with appropriate local
government units, non-governmental and
people's organization, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or
program is implemented in their respective
jurisdiction." Likewise Section 27 requires
prior consultations before a program shall be
implemented by government authorities ans
the prior approval of the Sanggunian is
obtained." Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr. v.
Paño, Section 2 (c), requiring consultations
with the appropriate local government units,
should apply to national government projects
affecting the environmental or ecological
balance of the particular community
implementing the project. Briefly stated, under
the Local Government Code, two requisites
must be met before a national project that
affects the environmental and ecological
balance of local communities can be
implemented: (1) prior consultation with the
affected local communities, and (2)prior
approval of the project by the appropriate
sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory
requirements, the project’s implementation is
illegal.
E. Power of Local Government Units
1. Police Power (general welfare clause)
a. Registration of tricycle and licensing of drivers
LTO vs. City of Butuan, 322 SCRA 805
Facts:
Relying on the fiscal autonomy granted to
LGU's by the Constittuion and the provisons of
the Local Government Code, the
Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of
Butuan enacted an ordinance "Regulating the
Operation of Tricycles-for-Hire, providing
mechanism for the issuance of Franchise,
Registration and Permit, and Imposing
Penalties for Violations thereof and for other
Purposes." The ordinance provided for,
among other things, the payment of franchise
fees for the grant of the franchise of tricycles-
for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle,
and fees for the issuance of a permit for the
driving thereof.
Petitioner LTO explains that one of the
functions of the national government that,
indeed, has been transferred to local
government units is the franchising authority
over tricycles-for-hire of the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board ("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the
authority of LTO to register all motor vehicles
and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to
drive such vehicles.
The RTC and CA ruled that the power to
give registration and license for driving
tricycles has been devolved to LGU's.
Issue:
Whether or not, the registration of tricycles
was given to LGU's, hence the ordinance is a
valid exercise of police power.
Ruling:
No, based on the-"Guidelines to Implement
the Devolution of LTFRBs Franchising
Authority over Tricycles-For-Hire to Local
Government units pursuant to the Local
Government Code"- the newly delegated
powers to LGU's pertain to the franchising and
regulatory powers exercised by the LTFRB
and not to the functions of the LTO relative to
the registration of motor vehicles and
issuance of licenses for the driving thereof.
Corollarily, the exercised of a police power
must be through a valid delegation. In this
case the police power of registering tricycles
was not delegated to the LGU’s, but remained
in the LTO.
Clearly unaffected by the Local
Government Code are the powers of LTO
under R.A. No.4136 requiring the registration
of all kinds of motor vehicles "used or
operated on or upon any public highway" in
the country.
The Commissioner of Land Transportation
and his deputies are empowered at anytime to
examine and inspect such motor vehicles to
determine whether said vehicles are
registered, or are unsightly, unsafe,
improperly marked or equipped, or otherwise
unfit to be operated on because of possible
excessive damage to highways, bridges and
other infrastructures. The LTO is additionally
charged with being the central repository and
custodian of all records of all motor vehicles.
Adds the Court, the reliance made by
respondents on the broad taxing power of
local government units, specifically under
Section 133 of the Local Government Code, is
tangential.
Police power and taxation, along with
eminent domain, are inherent powers of
sovereignty which the State might share with
local government units by delegation given
under a constitutional or a statutory fiat. All
these inherent powers are for a public
purpose and legislative in nature but the
similarities just about end there. The basic aim
of police power is public good and welfare.
Taxation, in its case, focuses on the power of
government to raise revenue in order to
support its existence and carry out its
legitimate objectives. Although correlative to
each other in many respects, the grant of one
does not necessarily carry with it the grant of
the other. The two powers are, by tradition
and jurisprudence, separate and distinct
powers, varying in their respective concepts,
character, scopes and limitations.
To construe the tax provisions of Section
133 (1) of the LGC indistinctively would result
in the repeal to that extent of LTO's regulatory
power which evidently has not been intended.
If it were otherwise, the law could have just
said so in Section 447 and 458 of Book III of
the Local Government Code in the same
manner that the specific devolution of
LTFRB's power on franchising of tricycles has
been provided. Repeal by implication is not
favored.
The power over tricycles granted under
Section 458(a)(3)(VI) of the Local Government
Code to LGUs is the power to regulate their
operation and to grant franchises for the
operation thereof. The exclusionary clause
contained in the tax provisions of Section 133
(1) of the Local Government Code must not
be held to have had the effect of withdrawing
the express power of LTO to cause the
registration of all motor vehicles and the
issuance of licenses for the driving thereof.
These functions of the LTO are essentially
regulatory in nature, exercised pursuant to the
police power of the State, whose basic
objectives are to achieve road safety by
insuring the road worthiness of these motor
vehicles and the competence of drivers
prescribed by R. A. 4136. Not insignificant is
the rule that a statute must not be construed
in isolation but must be taken in harmony with
the extant body of laws.
LGUs indubitably now have the power to
regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and
to grant franchises for the operation thereof,
and not to issue registration.
Ergo, the ordinance being repugnant to a
statute is void and ultra vires.
b. Regulation of Public Utilities
Batangas CATV, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 439
SCRA 326
FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210
granting petitioner a permit to construct,
install, and operate a CATV system in
Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution
provides that petitioner is authorized to charge
its subscribers the maximum rates specified
therein, “provided, however, that any increase
of rates shall be subject to the approval of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner
increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to
P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent
Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to
cancel its permit unless it secures the
approval of respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7,
Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging
that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has
no authority to regulate the subscriber rates
charged by CATV operators because under
Executive Order No. 205, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has
the sole authority to regulate the CATV
operation in the Philippines.
ISSUE :
may a local government unit (LGU) regulate
the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators within its territorial jurisdiction?
HELD: No.
xxx
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in
light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the
NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV
operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
xxx
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation
maybe regulated by LGUs under the general
welfare clause. This is primarily because the
CATV system commits the indiscretion of
crossing public properties. (It uses public
properties in order to reach subscribers.) The
physical realities of constructing CATV system
– the use of public streets, rights of ways, the
founding of structures, and the parceling of
large regions – allow an LGU a certain degree
of regulation over CATV operators.
xxx
But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power
under the general welfare clause, we cannot
sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced
that respondents strayed from the well
recognized limits of its power. The flaws in
Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the
mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the
State’s deregulation policy over the CATV
industry.
LGUs must recognize that technical matters
concerning CATV operation are within the
exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.
AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties
Corporation, 506 SCRA 625
DOCTRINE: Private and public nuisance;
definition – The term “nuisance” is so
comprehensive that it has been applied to
almost all ways which have interfered with the
rights of the citizens, either in person,
property, the enjoyment of property, or his
comfort; A private nuisance is one which
violates only private rights and produces
damage to but one or a few persons while a
nuisance is public when it interferes with the
exercise of public right by directly encroaching
on public property or by causing a common
injury, an unreasonable interference with the
right common to the general public. In this
case, the noise generated by an
airconditioning system is considered a private
nuisance.
Noise emanating from air-con units not
nuisance per se – Noise becomes actionable
only when it passes the limits of reasonable
adjustment to the conditions of the locality and
of the needs of the maker to the needs of the
listener; Injury to a particular person in a
peculiar position or of especially sensitive
characteristics will not render the noise an
actionable nuisance. Whether or not the noise
is a nuisance is an issue to be resolved by the
courts.
Test to determine noise as a nuisance – The
test is whether rights of property, of health or
of comfort are so injuriously affected by the
noise in question that the sufferer is subjected
to a loss [i.e. Actual Physical Discomfort]which
goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed
upon him by the condition of living, or of
holding property, in a particular locality in fact
devoted to uses which involve the emission of
noise although ordinary care is taken to
confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the
vicinity of property of another owner who,
though creating a noise, is acting with
reasonable regard for the rights of those
affected by it.
Action to abate private nuisance; incapable of
pecuniary estiation – an action to abate
private nuisance, even wehere the plaintiff
asks for damages is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation
FACTS: AC enterprises (Petitioner) is a
corporation owns a 10-storey building in
Makati City. Frabelle (Respondent) is a
condominium corporation who's condominium
development is located behind petitioner.
Respondent complained of the 'unbearable”
noise emanating from the blower of the air-
conditioning units of petitioner.
ISSUES:
(1) Is it a nuisance as to be resolved only by
the courts in the due course of proceedings or
a nuisance per se?
(2) Is an action for abatement of a private
nuisance, more specifically noise generated
by the blower of an air-conditioning system,
even if the plaintiff prays for damages, one
incapable of pecuniary estimation?
(3) What is the determining factor when noise
alone is the cause of complaint?
HELD:
(1) It is a nuisance to be resolved only by the
courts in the due course of proceedings; the
noise is not a nuisance per se. Noise
becomes actionable only whenn it passes the
limits of reasonable adjustment to the
conditions of the locality and of the needs of
the maker to the needs of the listener. Injury
to a particular person in a peculiar position or
of especially sensitive characteristics will not
render the house an actionable nuisance–– in
the conditions, of present living, noise seems
inseparable from the conduct of many
necessary occupations.
(2) Yes, the action is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation because the basic issue
is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money.
(3) The determining factor is not its intensity or
volume; it is that the noise is of such character
as to produce actual physical discomfort and
annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities
rendering adjacent property less comfortable
and valuable.
2. Eminent Domain
1. Necessity of Ordinance
Municipality of Paranaque vs. V.M Realty
Corporation, 292 SCRA 678
Facts:
Under a city council resolution, the
Municipality of Parañaque filed on September
20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation
against Private Respondent V.M. Realty
Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000
square meters. The city previously negotiated
for the sale of the property but VM didn’t
accept.
The trial court issued an Order dated February
4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take
possession of the subject property upon
deposit with its clerk of court of an amount
equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market
value based on its current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint
failed to state a cause of action because it
was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to
an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the
Local Government Code); and (b) the cause
of action, if any, was barred by a prior
judgment or res judicata. Petitioner claimed
that res judicata was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The
petitioner’s MFR was denied. The CA
affirmed.
Issues:
1. WON a resolution duly approved by the
municipal council has the same force and
effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an
expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
2. WON the principle of res judicata as a
ground for dismissal of case is not applicable
when public interest is primarily involved.
Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that a resolution
approved by the municipal council for the
purpose of initiating an expropriation case
“substantially complies with the requirements
of the law” because the terms “ordinance” and
“resolution” are synonymous for “the purpose
of bestowing authority [on] the local
government unit through its chief executive to
initiate the expropriation proceedings in court
in the exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited
Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, which provides: “If the
LGU fails to acquire a private property for
public use, purpose, or welfare through
purchase, the LGU may expropriate said
property through a resolution of the
Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to
initiate expropriation proceedings.”
Court-No. The power of eminent domain is
lodged in the legislative branch of
government, which may delegate the exercise
thereof to LGUs, other public entities and
public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise
the power to expropriate private property only
when authorized by Congress and subject to
the latter’s control and restraints, imposed
“through the law conferring the power or in
other legislations.
Sec 19, RA 7160
A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare
for the benefit of the poor and the landless,
upon payment of just compensation, pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws.
Thus, the following essential requisites must
concur before an LGU can exercise the power
of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local
legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise
the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised
for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as
required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was
not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive
sought to exercise the power of eminent
domain pursuant to a resolution of the
municipal council. Thus, there was no
compliance with the first requisite that the
mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
We are not convinced by petitioner’s
insistence that the terms “resolution” and
“ordinance” are synonymous. A municipal
ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a
declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific matter. An
ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to
exercise eminent domain through a mere
resolution, it would have simply adopted the
language of the previous Local Government
Code. But Congress did not. In a clear
divergence from the previous Local
Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160
categorically requires that the local chief
executive act pursuant to an ordinance.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain
necessarily involves a derogation of a
fundamental or private right of the people.[35]
Accordingly, the manifest change in the
legislative language -- from “resolution” under
BP 337 to “ordinance” under RA 7160 --
demands a strict construction.
When the legislature interferes with that right
and, for greater public purposes, appropriates
the land of an individual without his consent,
the plain meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the
Implementing Rules, which requires only a
resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise
eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the clear
letter of the law is controlling and cannot be
amended by a mere administrative rule issued
for its implementation.
Strictly speaking, the power of eminent
domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not
eminent but “inferior” domain, since it must
conform to the limits imposed by the
delegation, and thus partakes only of a share
in eminent domain.
2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals
and the trial court, all the requisites for the
application of res judicata are present in this
case. There is a previous final judgment on
the merits in a prior expropriation case
involving identical interests, subject matter
and cause of action, which has been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the
principle of res judicata, which finds
application in generally all cases and
proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State
or its agent to expropriate private property.
Eminent Domain can reach every form of
property which the State might need for public
use whenever they need it.
While the principle of res judicata does not
denigrate the right of the State to exercise
eminent domain, it does apply to specific
issues decided in a previous case.
In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that
the power of the State or its agent to exercise
eminent domain is not diminished by the mere
fact that a prior final judgment over the
property to be expropriated has become the
law of the case as to the parties. The State or
its authorized agent may still subsequently
exercise its right to expropriate the same
property, once all legal requirements are
complied with.
2. Prior Offer to buy
Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc.
v. Municipality of Pasig, 466 SCRA 235
FACTS: Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court’s decision of declaring respondent
municipality (now city) as having the right to
expropriate petitioner’s property for the
construction of an access road. Petitioner
argues that there was no valid and definite
offer made before a complaint for eminent
domain was filed as the law requires (Art. 35,
Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code). Respondent
contends that a letter to purchase was offered
to the previous owners and the same was not
accepted.
ISSUE: Whether or not a letter to purchase is
sufficient enough as a definite and valid offer
to expropriate.
HELD: No. Failure to prove compliance with
the mandatory requirement of a valid and
definite offer will result in the dismissal of the
complaint. The purpose of the mandatory
requirement to be first made to the owner is to
encourage settlements and voluntary
acquisition of property needed for public
purposes in order to avoid the expense and
delay of a court of action.
3. Socialized Housing
Filstream International, Inc. vs. Court
Appeals, 284 SCRA 716
Facts: Filstream filed ejectment suit before
MTC against occupants on the grounds of
termination of contact and non-payment of
rentals. MTC decided in favor of Filstream.
This was appealed in RTC and CA and both
upheld existing decision. During the pendency
of ejectment proceedings, City of Manila
approved Ordinance 7813 authorizing Mayor
Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation,
expropriation, purchase, or other legal means
certain parcels of land that covers properties
of Filstream. City of Manila filed complaint for
eminent domain to expropriate Filstream
properties. Filstream filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint for eminent domain as well as a
motion to quash the writ of possession on the
ground of no valid cause of action, the petition
does not satisfy the requirements of public
use and maneuver to circumvent the
ejectment suit, violation of the constitutional
guarantee against non-impairment, price
offered was too low violating just
compensation. RTC denied the petition and
declared the property condemned in favor of
City of Manila.
Issue: Whether or not Filstream was deprived
of due process on the ground of non-
compliance with priority in expropriation?
Decision: There is no dispute as to the
existence of a final and executory judgment in
favor of petitioner Filstream ordering the
ejectment of private respondents from the
properties.
The City of Manila has an undeniable right to
exercise its power of eminent domain within
its jurisdiction specifically in pursuit of its
urban land reform and housing program.
Very clear from the provisions are the
limitations with respect to the order of priority
in acquiring private lands and in resorting to
expropriation proceedings as a means to
acquire the same. Private lands rank last in
the order of priority for purposes of socialized
housing. In the same vein, expropriation
proceedings are to be resorted to only when
of the other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted. Compliance with these conditions
must be deemed mandatory because these
are the only safeguards in securing the right of
owners of private property to due process
when their property is expropriated for public
use.
RA 7279 Uran Development Housing Act of
1992
Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land. —
Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired
in the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of
its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas for
Priority Development, Zonal Improvement
sites, and Slum Improvement and
Resettlement Program sites which have not
yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and
Services or BLISS sites which have not yet
been acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more
practicable and advantageous to the
beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this
section shall not apply. The local government
units shall give budgetary priority to on-site
development of government lands.
4. Deposit of Compensation
Knecht, Inc. vs. Municipality of Cainta, 495
SCRA 514
Facts: Rose Packing Co., Inc. sold three
parcels of land situated in Cainta, Rizal to
United Cigarette Corporation (UCC). On June
22, 1990, the Municipality of Cainta filed a
complaint for expropriation against PCIB
(mortgagee bank) and Rose Packing. The
expropriation complaint was based on
Sangguniang Bayan (SB) Resolution No. 89-
020 which sought to purchase the land as the
site of the municipal administration compound
and SB resolution No. 89-021 which called for
the condemnation of said land if the
negotiation for its voluntary sale failed. The
negotiation did fail, hence, the complaint for
expropriation. On June 16, 1992, the trial
court issued an order directing the
Municipality of Cainta to deposit 10% of the
provisional value of the property. A writ of
possession was subsequently issued to
respondent municipality.
Held: The exercise of the power of eminent
domain by a local government unit is now
governed by Section 19 of Republic Act 7160.
For properties under expropriation, the law
now requires the deposit of an amount
equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair
market value of the property based on its
current tax declaration. In the present case,
there is no valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain.
5. Conversion to Non- Agricultural Use
Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals,
222 SCRA 173
Facts: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
petitioner passed a resolution in 1988
authorizing the provincial governor to
purchase or expropriate private property
contiguous to the provincial capitol for the
purpose of establishing a pilot farm for non-
food and non-traditional agricultural crops and
housing project for the government
employees.
The land sought to be expropriated
belongs to the San Joaquins, which at the
time the complaint is filed, the governing law
was BP 337 which authorizes expropriation by
mere resolution of the municipal council.
The Court of Appeals suspended the
expropriation proceedings and requires
petitioner to submit the requisite approval of
the DAR to convert the classification of the
property from agricultural to non-agricultural.
Hence, the present petition.
Held: The power of eminent domain cannot be
restricted by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL or RA 6657) particularly Section
65 which requires the approval of the DAR
before a parcel of land can be reclassified.
CARL does not intimate in the least that
LGU's must first secure the approval of DAR
before petitioner can institute the necessary
proceedings.
The authority of DAR to approve or
disapprove conversions of agricultural land
cannot extend to the exercise of eminent
domain, otherwise DAR will have the authority
to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a
public use or not. Ordinarily, it is the municipal
council that determines whether the use of the
property sought to be expropriated is for
public use, the same being an expression of
legislative policy. The courts will intervene
only when no real or substantial relation is
established between the undertaking and
public use.
Under the new concept, public use
means public advantage, convenience or
benefit, which tends to contribute to the
general welfare and prosperity of the whole
community. In the present case, the
expropriation for the establishment of pilot
development center is for a public purpose.
Limitations on the exercise of the
delegated power must be clearly expressed,
either in the law conferring the power or in
other legislations.
3. Taxing power
Section 5, Article X, Philippine Constitution
Local Government Code
LTO v. City of Butuan, 322 SCRA 805
insuring the road worthiness of these motor
vehicles and the competence of drivers
Adds the Court, the reliance made by prescribed by R. A. 4136. Not insignificant is
respondents on the broad taxing power of the rule that a statute must not be construed
local government units, specifically under in isolation but must be taken in harmony with
Section 133 of the Local Government Code, is the extant body of laws.
tangential.
LGUs indubitably now have the power to
Police power and taxation, along with regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and
eminent domain, are inherent powers of to grant franchises for the operation thereof,
sovereignty which the State might share with and not to issue registration.
local government units by delegation given
under a constitutional or a statutory fiat. All
these inherent powers are for a public
Lina v. Pano, 364 SCRA 76 (2001)
purpose and legislative in nature but the
similarities just about end there. The basic aim
of police power is public good and welfare.
Taxation, in its case, focuses on the power of
Facts:
government to raise revenue in order to
Private respondent Tony Calvento, was
support its existence and carry out its
appointed agent by PCSO to install a terminal
legitimate objectives. Although correlative to
for the operation of lotto, applied for a mayor’s
each other in many respects, the grant of one
permit to operate a lotto outlet in San
does not necessarily carry with it the grant of
Pedro,Laguna. It was denied on the ground
the other. The two powers are, by tradition
that an ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg.
and jurisprudence, separate and distinct
508, Taon1995 of the Sangguniang
powers, varying in their respective concepts,
Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited gambling
character, scopes and limitations.
in the province,including the operation of lotto.
With the denial of his application, private
To construe the tax provisions of Section
respondent filed an action for declaratory relief
133 (1) of the LGC indistinctively would result
with prayer for preliminary injunction and
in the repeal to that extent of LTO's regulatory
temporary restraining order. The trial court
power which evidently has not been intended.
rendered judgment in favor of private
If it were otherwise, the law could have just
respondent enjoining petitioners from
said so in Section 447 and 458 of Book III of
implementing or enforcing the subject
the Local Government Code in the same
resolution.
manner that the specific devolution of
LTFRB's power on franchising of tricycles has
Issue:
been provided. Repeal by implication is not
whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the
favored.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the
denial of a mayor’s permit based thereon are
The power over tricycles granted under
valid
Section 458(a)(3)(VI) of the Local Government
Code to LGUs is the power to regulate their
Held:
operation and to grant franchises for the
No. The questioned ordinance merely states
operation thereof. The exclusionary clause
the “objection” of the council to the said game.
contained in the tax provisions of Section 133
It is but a mere policy statement on the part of
(1) of the Local Government Code must not
the local council, which is not self-executing.
be held to have had the effect of withdrawing
Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit
the express power of LTO to cause the
the operation of the lotto system in the
registration of all motor vehicles and the
province of Laguna. As a policy statement
issuance of licenses for the driving thereof.
expressing the local government’s objection to
These functions of the LTO are essentially
the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part
regulatory in nature, exercised pursuant to the
of the local government’s autonomy to air its
police power of the State, whose basic
views which may be contrary to that of the
objectives are to achieve road safety by
national government’s.However, this freedom
to exercise contrary views does not mean that
local governments may actually enact
ordinances that go against laws duly enacted
by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed
resolution in this case could not and should
not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance
prohibiting the operation of lotto.
Moreover, ordinances should not contravene
statutes as municipal governments are merely
agents of the national government. The local
councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers which have been conferred on them
by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior
to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. This being the case, these
councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to
the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. The question of whether
gambling should be permitted is for Congress
to determine, taking into account national and
local interests. Since Congress has allowed
the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO
seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant toits
legislative grant of authority, the province's
Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the
exercise of said authority by preventing
something already allowed by Congress.
Petron v. Mayor, GR No. 158881, April 16, 2008
While local government units are authorized to
burden all such other class of goods with
“taxes, fees and charges,” excepting excise
taxes, a specific prohibition is imposed barring
the levying of any other type of taxes with
respect to petroleum products.
In accordance to the New Navotas Revenue
Code or Ordinance 92-03, petitioner Petron
Corporation was assessed a total tax of
P6,259,087.62. Petron filed a letter protest
arguing that it is exempt from paying local
business taxes as provided by Article 232 (h)
of the Implementing Rules of the Local
Government Code.
The letter-protest was denied. A Complaint for
Cancellation of Assessment was filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon.
The RTC dismissed the Complaint and
required Petron to pay the assessed tax. A
Motion for Reconsideration was filed but it
was later denied by the court. Hence, the filing
of this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a local government unit is
empowered under the Local Government
Code (LGC) to impose business taxes on
persons or entities engaged in the sale of
petroleum
HELD:
Petition GRANTED.
Section 133(h) of the LGC reads as follows:
Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing
Powers of Local Government Units. - Unless
otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the
taxing powers of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and Barangays shall not extend
to the levy of the following:
xxx
(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under
the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, and taxes, fees or charges on
petroleum products;
Evidently, Section 133 prescribes the
limitations on the capacity of local government
units to exercise their taxing powers otherwise
granted to them under the LGC. Apparently,
paragraph (h) of the Section mentions two
kinds of taxes which cannot be imposed by
local government units, namely: “excise taxes
on articles enumerated under the National
Internal Revenue Code [(NIRC)], as
amended;” and “taxes, fees or charges on
petroleum products.”
The power of a municipality to impose
business taxes is provided for in Section 143
of the LGC. Under the provision, a
municipality is authorized to impose business
taxes on a whole host of business activities.
Suffice it to say, unless there is another
provision of law which states otherwise,
Section 143, broad in scope as it is, would
undoubtedly cover the business of selling
diesel fuels, or any other petroleum product
for that matter.

Section 133(h) provides two kinds of taxes
which cannot be imposed by local government
units: “excise taxes on articles enumerated”
under the NIRC, as amended; and “taxes,
fees or charges on petroleum products.”
There is no doubt that among the excise taxes
on articles enumerated under the NIRC are
those levied on petroleum products, per
Section 148 of the NIRC.
The power of a municipality to impose
business taxes derives from Section 143 of
the Code that specifically enumerates several
types of business on which it may impose
taxes, including manufacturers, wholesalers,
distributors, dealers of any article of
commerce of whatever nature; those engaged
in the export or commerce of essential
commodities; retailers; contractors and other
independent contractors; banks and financial
institutions; and peddlers engaged in the sale
of any merchandise or article of commerce.
This obviously broad power is further
supplemented by paragraph (h) of Section
143 which authorizes the sanggunian to
impose taxes on any other businesses not
otherwise specified under Section 143 which
the sanggunian concerned may deem proper
to tax.
This ability of local government units to
impose business or other local taxes is
ultimately rooted in the 1987 Constitution.
Section 5, Article X assures that “[e]ach local
government unit shall have the power to
create its own sources of revenues and to levy
taxes, fees and charges,” though the power is
“subject to such guidelines and limitations as
the Congress may provide.” There is no doubt
that following the 1987 Constitution and the
Code, the fiscal autonomy of local government
units has received greater affirmation than
ever. Previous decisions that have been
skeptical of the viability, if not the wisdom of
reposing fiscal autonomy to local government
units have fallen by the wayside.
Section 5(a) of the Code states that “[a]ny
provision on a power of a local government
unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor,
and in case of doubt, any question thereon
shall be resolved in favor of devolution of
powers and of the lower local government
unit.” But somewhat conversely, Section 5(b)
then proceeds to assert that “[i]n case of
doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure
shall be construed strictly against the local
government unit enacting it, and liberally in
favor of the taxpayer.” And this latter
qualification has to be respected as a
constitutionally authorized limitation which
Congress has seen fit to provide. Evidently,
local fiscal autonomy should not necessarily
translate into abject deference to the power of
local government units to impose taxes.
Section 133(h) states that local government
units “shall not extend to the levy of xxx taxes,
fees or charges on petroleum products.”
Respondents assert that the phrase “taxes,
fees or charges on petroleum products”
pertains to the imposition of direct or excise
taxes on petroleum products, and not
business taxes. If the phrase actually pertains
to excise taxes, then it would be an exercise
in utter redundancy, since the preceding
phrase already prohibits the imposition of
excise taxes on articles already subject to
such taxes under the NIRC, such as
petroleum products. There would be no sense
on the part of the legislature to twice
emphasize in the same sentence that excise
taxes on petroleum products are beyond the
pale of local government taxation.
The Court concedes that a tax on a business
is distinct from a tax on the article itself, or for
that matter, that a business tax is distinct from
an excise tax. However, such distinction is
immaterial insofar as the latter part of Section
133(h) is concerned, for the phrase “taxes,
fees or charges on petroleum products” does
not qualify the kind of taxes, fees or charges
that could withstand the absolute prohibition
imposed by the provision. It would have been
a different matter had Congress, in crafting
Section 133(h), barred “excise taxes” or
“direct taxes,” or any category of taxes only,
for then it would be understood that only such
specified taxes on petroleum products could
not be imposed under the prohibition. The
absence of such a qualification leads to the
conclusion that all sorts of taxes on petroleum
products, including business taxes, are
prohibited by Section 133(h). Where the law
does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish.
The language of Section 133(h) makes plain
that the prohibition with respect to petroleum
products extends not only to excise taxes
thereon, but all “taxes, fees and charges.” The
earlier reference in paragraph (h) to excise
taxes comprehends a wider range of subjects
of taxation: all articles already covered by
excise taxation under the NIRC, such as
alcohol products, tobacco products, mineral
products, automobiles, and such non-
essential goods as jewelry, goods made of
precious metals, perfumes, and yachts and
other vessels intended for pleasure or sports.
In contrast, the later reference to “taxes, fees
and charges” pertains only to one class of
articles of the many subjects of excise taxes,
specifically, “petroleum products”. While local
government units are authorized to burden all
such other class of goods with “taxes, fees
and charges,” excepting excise taxes, a
specific prohibition is imposed barring the
levying of any other type of taxes with respect
to petroleum products.
Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium, GR No.
154993, October 25, 2005
Facts: In 1998, BA Lepanto Condominium
Corporation (Lepanto) received a tax
assessment in the amount of P1.6 million from
Luz Yamane, the City Treasurer of Makati, for
business taxes. Lepanto protested the
assessment as it averred that Lepanto, as a
corporation, is not organized for profit; that it
merely exists for the maintenance of the
condominium. Yamane denied the protest.
Lepanto then appealed the denial to the RTC
of Makati. RTC Makati affirmed the decision of
Yamane. Lepanto then filed a petition for
review under Rule 42 with the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the
RTC.
Yamane now filed a petition for review under
Rule 45 with the Supreme Court. Yamane
avers that a.) Lepanto is liable for local
taxation because its act of maintaining the
condominium is an activity for profit because
the end result of such activity is the
betterment of the market value of the
condominium which makes it easier to sell it;
that Lepanto is earning profit from fees
collected from condominium unit owners; and
that b.) Lepanto’s petition for review of the
decision of the RTC to the CA is erroneous
because when the RTC decided on the appeal
brought to it by Lepanto, the RTC was
exercising its original jurisdiction and not its
appellate jurisdiction; that as such, what
Lepanto should have done is to file an
ordinary appeal under Rule 41.
ISSUE: Whether or not a RTC deciding an
appeal from the decision of a city treasurer on
tax protests is exercising original jurisdiction.
Whether or not a condominium corporation
organized solely for the maintenance of a
condominium is liable for local taxation.
HELD:
1. Yes. Although the LGC (Section 195)
provides that the remedy of the taxpayer
whose protest is denied by the local treasurer
is “to appeal with the court of competent
jurisdiction” or in this case the RTC
(considering the amount of tax liability is P1.6
million), such appeal when decided by the
RTC is still in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction and not its appellate jurisdiction.
This is because appellate jurisdiction is
defined as the authority of a court higher in
rank to re-examine the final order or judgment
of a lower court which tried the case now
elevated for judicial review. Here, the City
Treasurer is not a lower court.
The Supreme Court however clarifies that this
ruling is only applicable to similar cases
before the passage of Republic Act 9282
(effective April 2004). Under RA 9282, the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), not CA,
exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
review on appeal decisions, orders or
resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in
local tax cases whether originally decided or
resolved by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate jurisdiction.
2. No. Lepanto was not organized for
profit. The fees it was collecting from the
condominium unit owners redound to the
owners themselves because the fees
collected are being used for the maintenance
of the condo. Further, it appears that the
assessment issued by Yamane did not state
the legal basis for the tax being imposed on
Lepanto – it merely states that Makati is
authorized to collect business taxes under the
Local Government Code (LGC) but no other
reference specific reference to specific laws
were cited.
Philippine Petroleum v. Municipality of Pililla, GR
No. 90773, June 3, 1991
Facts: Philippine Petroleum Corporation is a
business enterprise engaged in the
manufacture of lubricated oil base stocks
which is a petroleum product, with its refinery
plant situated at Malaya, Pilillia Rizal,
conducting its business activities within the
territorial jurisdiction of municipality of Pilillia,
Rizal and is in continuous operation up to the
present. PPC owns and maintains an oil
refinery including 49 storage tanks for its
petroleum products in Malaya, Pililla, Rizal.
Under section 142 of NIRC of 1939,
manufactured oils and other fuels are subject
to specific tax. Respondent municipality of
Pilillia, Rizal through municipal council
resolution no. 25-s-1974 enacted municipal
tax ordinance no. 1-s-1974 otherwise known
as “The Pililla Tax Code Of 1974” on June 14,
1974 which took effect on July 1, 1974.
Sections 9 and 10 of the said ordinance
imposed a tax on business, except for those
which fixed taxes are provided in the local tax
code on manufacturers, importers, or
producers of any article of commerce of
whatever kind or nature, including brewers,
distiller, rectifiers, repackers and
compounders of liquors distilled spirits and/or
wines in accordance with the schedule found
in the local tax code, as well as mayor’s
permit sanitary inspection fee and storage
permit fee for flammable, combustible or
explosive substances, while section 139 of the
disputed ordinance imposed surcharges and
interests on unpaid taxes, fees or charges.
Enforcing the provisions of the above
mentioned ordinance, the respondent filed a
complaint on April 4, 1986 docketed as civil
case no. 057-T against PPC for the collection
of the business tax from 1979 to 1986;
storage permit fees from 1975 to 1986;
mayor’s permit fee and sanitary permit
inspection fees from 1975 to 1984. PPC,
however, have already paid the last named
fees starting 1985.
Issue: Whether or not the Municipality may
validly impose taxes on petitioner’s business.
Held: No. While section 2 of PD 436 prohibits
the imposition of local taxes on petroleum
products, said decree did not amend sections
19 and 19 (a) of PD 231 as amended by PD
426, wherein the municipality is granted the
right to levy taxes on business of
manufacturers, importers, producers of any
article of commerce of whatever kind or
nature. A tax on business is distinct from a tax
on the article itself. Thus, if the imposition of
tax on business of manufacturers, etc. in
petroleum products contravenes a declared
national policy, it should have been expressly
stated in PD No. 436.
The exercise by local governments of the
power to tax is ordained by the present
constitution. To allow the continuous effectivity
of the prohibition set forth in PC no. 26-73
would be tantamount to restricting their power
to tax by mere administrative issuances.
Under section 5, article X of the 1987
constitution, only guidelines and limitations
that may be established by congress can
define and limit such power of local
governments.
The storage permit fee being imposed by
Pilillia’s tax ordinance is a fee for the
installation and keeping in storage of any
flammable, combustible or explosive
substances. In as much as said storage
makes use of tanks owned not by the
Municipality of Pilillia but by petitioner PPC,
same is obviously not a charge for any service
rendered by the municipality as what is
envisioned in section 37 of the same code.
Acebedo Optical v. CA, GR 100152, March 21,
2000
Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the
City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit, to
which Mayor Camilo Cabili issued subject to
the following conditions: (1) that petitioner
cannot put up an optical clinic but only a
commercial store and (2) that it cannot
examine or prescribe reading and optical
glasses for patients, because these are
functions of optical clinics.
The Samahan ng Optometrist sa
Pilipinas (SOPI) lodged a complaint against
petitioner, alleging that Acebedo had violated
the conditions of the permit.
Held: The authority of City Mayor to issue or
grant licenses and business permits is beyond
cavil. It is provided by law. However,
distinction must be made between the grant of
a license or permit to do business and the
issuance of a license to engage in the practice
of a particular profession. The first is granted
by the local authorities while the second is
issued by the Board or Commission tasked to
regulate the particular profession. The first
authorizes the person, natural or juridical, to
engage in business or some form of
commercial activity. A professional license on
the other hand is the grant of authority to a
natural person to engage in the practice or
exercise of his/her profession.
In the present case, what is sought by
petitioner from the respondent City Mayor is a
permit to engage in the business of running an
optical shop, and the city mayor cannot,
through the issuance of such permit, regulate
the practice of profession. Such a function is
within the exclusive domain of the
Professional Regulation Commission and the
Board of Examiners in Optometry.
The contention that business permit is
a contract and therefore the petitioner is
estopped from questioning the same is
untenable. A license or permit is but a special
privilege, it is not in any way vested, absolute
or permanent.
The fact that a party acquiesced in the
special conditions imposed by the City Mayor
in the subject business permit does not
preclude it from challenging the said
imposition, which is ultra vires or beyond the
ambit of the authority of the City Mayor. The
doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give
effect to an act which is otherwise null and
void or ultra vires.
PLDT v. City of Davao, GR 143867, March 25,
2003
Facts:
PLDT paid a franchise tax equal to three
percent (3%) of its gross receipts. The
franchise tax was paid “in lieu of all taxes on
this franchise or earnings thereof” pursuant to
RA 7082. The exemption from “all taxes on
this franchise or earnings thereof” was
subsequently withdrawn by RA 7160 (LGC),
which at the same time gave local government
units the power to tax businesses enjoying a
franchise on the basis of income received or
earned by them within their territorial
jurisdiction. The LGC took effect on January 1,
1992.
The City of Davao enacted Ordinance No.
519, Series of 1992, which in pertinent part
provides: Notwithstanding any exemption
granted by law or other special laws, there is
hereby imposed a tax on businesses enjoying
a franchise, a rate of seventy-five percent
(75%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual
receipts for the preceding calendar year”.
In 1995, the Congress enacted RA 7925, or
the Public Telecommunication Policy of the
Philippines, Sec. 23 of which provides that
any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or
immunity granted under existing franchises, or
may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto
become part of previously granted
telecommunications franchises and shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to
the grantees of such franchises.
Subsequently, Congress granted in favor of
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation
(Globe) and Smart Information Technologies,
Inc. (Smart) franchises which contained “in
leiu of all taxes” provisos.
In January 1999, when PLDT applied for a
mayor’s permit to operate its Davao Metro
exchange, it was required to pay the local
franchise tax
Issue:
Whether or not by virtue of RA 7925, Sec. 23,
PLDT is again entitled to the exemption from
payment of the local franchise tax in view of
the grant of tax exemption to Globe and Smart
.
Held:
Petitioner contends that because their existing
franchises contain “in lieu of all taxes”
clauses, the same grant of tax exemption
must be deemed to have become ipso facto
part of its previously granted
telecommunications franchise. But the rule is
that tax exemptions should be granted only by
a clear and unequivocal provision of law
“expressed in a language too plain to be
mistaken” and assuming for the nonce that the
charters of Globe and of Smart grant tax
exemptions, then this runabout way of
granting tax exemption to PLDT is not a direct,
“clear and unequivocal” way of communicating
the legislative intent.
Nor does the term “exemption” in Sec. 23 of
RA 7925 mean tax exemption. The term refers
to exemption from regulations and
requirements imposed by the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
Tax exemptions should be granted only by
clear and unequivocal provision of law on the
basis of language too plain to be mistaken.
John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim,
GR No. 119775, October 24, 2003
Facts:
The case involves the law which designated a
portion of the area covered by the former
camp John Hay as the John Hay special
economic zone (SEZ). Petitioners are
contending that the tax exemptions granted to
Subic SEZ should also apply to John Hay
SEZ.
Issue:
Whether or not the tax exemptions and other
financial incentives granted to the Subic SEZ
are applicable to the John Hay SEZ.
Held:
No.
It is the legislative branch which has the
inherent power not only to select the subjects
of taxation but also grant exemptions.
Paragraph 4, Section 28 of Article VI of the
Constitution is crystal clear: "No law granting
tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members
of the Congress."
Hence, it is only the legislature, as limited by
the provisions of the Constitution, which has
full power to exempt any person or
corporation or class of property from taxation.
The Constitution may itself provide for specific
tax exemptions or local governments may
pass ordinances providing for exemption from
local taxes, but otherwise, it is only the
legislative branch which has the power to
grant tax exemptions, its power to exempt
being as broad as its power to tax.
The beneficiaries of the tax exemptions and
other incentives in Section 12 of RA 7227 are
clearly the business enterprises located within
the Subic SEZ.
Manila Electric v. Province of Laguna, GR No.
131359, May 5, 1999
Facts:
Certain municipalities of the province of
Laguna granted franchise in favor of petitioner
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) for the
supply of electricity. Pursuant to the provisions
of the Local Government Code of 1991,
franchise tax ordinance was enacted.
MERALCO paid the tax under protest.
MERALCO assailed the trial courts ruling
contending that the franchise tax ordinance is
violative of the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the franchise tax ordinance is
violative of the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution.
Held:
No.
The petition was dismissed by the Supreme
Court. Truly, tax exemptions of this kind may
not be revoked without impairing the
obligations of contracts. These contractual
tax exemptions, however, are not to be
confused with tax exemptions granted under
franchises. A franchise partakes of the nature
of a grant which is beyond the purview of the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
While the Court has referred to tax
exemptions contained in special franchises as
being in the nature of contracts and a part of
the inducement for carrying on the franchise,
these exemptions are far from being strictly
contractual in nature.
Batangas Power v. Batangas City, GR No.
152675, April 28, 2004
Facts:
To attract investors in power generation,
National Power Corporation (NPC) assumed
the payment of investors’ taxes in the Build
Operate and Transfer (BOT) Agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not NPCs tax exemption privileges
under its Charter were withdrawn by Section
193 of the Local Government Code (LGC).
Held:
Yes.
Court recognized the removal of the blanket
exclusion of government instrumentalities
from local taxation as one of the most
significant provisions of the 1991 LGC.
Specifically, we stressed that Section 193 of
the LGC, an express and general repeal of all
statutes granting exemptions from local taxes,
withdrew the sweeping tax privileges
previously enjoyed by the NPC under its
Charter.
Smart Communications v. City of Davao, GR
No. 155491, September 16, 2008
Facts:
Smart contends that its telecenter in Davao
City is exempt from payment of franchise tax
to the City.
Issue:
Whether or not Smart is liable to pay the
franchise tax imposed by the City of Davao.
Held:
Tax exemptions are never presumed and are
strictly construed against the taxpayer and
liberally in favor of the taxing authority. They
can only be given force when the grant is
clear and categorical. The surrender of the
power to tax, when claimed, must be clearly
shown by a language that will admit of no
reasonable construction consistent with the
reservation of the power. If the intention of the
legislature is open to doubt, then the intention
of the legislature must be resolved in favor of
the State.
The "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Smart's
franchise refers only to taxes, other than
income tax, imposed under the National
Internal Revenue Code. The "in lieu of all
taxes" clause does not apply to local taxes.
The proviso in the first paragraph of Section 9
of Smart's franchise states that the grantee
shall "continue to be liable for income taxes
payable under Title II of the National Internal
Revenue Code." Also, the second paragraph
of Section 9 speaks of tax returns filed and
taxes paid to the "Commissioner of Internal
Revenue or his duly authorized representative
in accordance with the National Internal
Revenue Code."
4. Closure and Opening of Roads
Cebu oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. vs.
Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481
Facts:
In 1968, a terminal portion of a street in Cebu
was excluded in the city’s development plan
hence the council declared it as abandoned. ,
The City Council of Cebu passed a resolution
authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the
land through a public bidding. Cebu Oxygen &
Acetylene Co., Inc. was the highest bidder .
Cebu Oxygen applied for the land’s
registration before CFI Cebu but the provincial
fiscal opposed it. It was ruled that the road is
part of the public domain hence beyond the
commerce of man.
Issue:
Whether or not the city council may sell the
property
Held:
Yes. Under Cebu’s Charter (RA 3857), the city
council “may close any city road, street or
alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square.
Such power to vacate a street or alley is
discretionary. And the discretion will not
ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by
the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or
fraud or collusion.
Property thus withdrawn from public servitude
may be used or conveyed for any purpose for
which other real property belonging to the City
may be lawfully used or conveyed.” Since that
portion of the city street subject of Cebu
Oxygen’s application for registration of title
was withdrawn from public use, it follows that
such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial
property which can be the object of an
ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly
provides that “Property of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State.”
5. Legislative Power
A. Procedure
1. Quorum
Zamora vs. Caballero, 419 SCRA 384
Facts:
Manuel Zamora, a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela
Valley, filed before the RTC a petition to
invalidate the acts executed and resolutions
issued by the Sanggunian lack of quorum.
Zamora, the petitioner, argued that the
Sanggunian, during its February 26 session,
conducted official business without a quorum
since only 7 out of the 14 members were
present. Respondents argued that Board
Member Sotto was in the United States during
such sessions and that the actual number of
Board Members in the country was only 13
which, they claimed, should be the basis for
the determination of a quorum.
Issues:
Whether or not Sanggunian Members who are
abroad should be included in the counting of
the entire Sangguniang body.
Held:
Yes.
Section 53 (a) of the LGC states that : “A
majority of all members of the Sanggunian
who have been elected and qualified shall
constitute a quorum to transact official
business.” Quorum is defined as the “number
of members of a body which, when legally
assembled, will enable the body to transact its
proper business or that number which makes
a lawful body and gives it power to pass upon
a law or ordinance or do any valid act.” When
required to constitute a quorum, “majority”
means the number greater than half or more
than half of the total.
As further stated, it requires the majority of
ALL members of the Sanggunian. Quorum
should, thus, be based on the total number of
members regardless of whether or not a
member is said to be abroad.
Therefore, in cases where decisions have
been made during sessions deemed to have
not met the required quorum, such sessions
and decisions shall be considered void.
Casino vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 449
Facts:
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City
enacted Resolution No. 49, Code Ordinance,
Series of 1984, which classified certain areas
of the city as residential zones, declaring,
among others, the site of cockpit as such.
Sec 6.44. of the said resolution states
that changes in the zoning ordinance shall be
treated as an amendment provided that any
amendment to the zoning ordinance or
provision thereof shall be carried out through
a resolution of three fourths vote of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod.
Resolution No. 378, was then enacted which
reclassified Block 125 as within the
recreational zone, thus allegedly amending
Resolution No. 49. Nine (9) members of the
said sangguniang panlungsod, participated,
with four (4) members voting for the
amendment, while four (4) voted against, and
with one (1) abstention. The vice-mayor, as
presiding officer, broke the deadlock by voting
for the amendment.
Issue:
Whether or not the three fourths vote is
merely a formal requirement
Held:
No.
Section 6.44 of said ordinance regarding
amendments thereto is a specific and
particular provision for said ordinance and
explicitly provides for a different number of
votes. Where there is in the same statute a
particular enactment and also a general one
which in its most comprehensive sense would
include what is embraced in the former, the
particular enactment must be operative, and
the general statement must be taken to affect
only such cases within its language as are not
within the provisions of the particular
enactment.
2. Three Readings
Malonzo vs. Zamora, 323 SCRA 875
Facts:
In 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of
Caloocan City authorized through an
ordinance, the Mayor to initiate expropriation
proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 26 of the
Maysilo Estate registered in the name of CLT
Realty Development Corporation. Because of
a territorial dispute between Caloocan City
and the Municipality of Malabon, CLT Realty
filed an action for interpleader praying for an
order for the two local government units to
litigate their conflicting claims over the right to
collect real estate taxes from them.
In 1997, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, under
the stewardship of incumbent Mayor Malonzo,
enacted an ordinance increasing the
appropriated amount for the subject property
supposed to be expropriated. However, after
failing to conclude the voluntary sale, a suit of
eminent domain was filed by the city
government.
In the meantime, the Vice Mayor requested for
the renovation of the councilors office and
salaries for the city government personnel.
The City Treasurer issued a certification on
the availability of funds. The City Council,
acting favorably on Mayor Malonzos
endorsement, appropriated the amount of
P39,343,028.00 and passed Ordinance No.
0254, S1998. A certain Eduardo Tibor filed an
administrative complaint against petitioners
before the Office of the President (OP) due to
the passage of the said ordinance. Petitioners
herein filed a motion to refer the case to the
Department of Budget and Management. This
motion remained unresolved by the OP. Later,
Teotimo de Guzman Gajudo filed an action for
the nullity of the ordinance before the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan.
Petitioner again filed with the OP a
manifestation that the determination of the
validity of the said ordinance was a prejudicial
question. Likewise, the motion was not acted
upon. Without resolving the two motions of the
petitioners, the OP rendered the assailed
judgment meting upon them the penalty of
suspension for a period of three months,
which is immediately executory upon the
receipt of the decision. Without moving for
reconsideration, petitioners filed before the
Supreme Court the instant Petition for
Certiorari.
Held:
Moreover, the circumstances that preceded
the enactment of Ordinance No. 0254, S.
1998 are irregular, to say the least. First, there
was undue haste in conducting the three (3)
readings in one session day, especially so
when said session day was in the first day of
the regular session preceding the elections.
Although this is not prohibited by law,
separate readings were contrived to give local
legislators, or national legislators for that
matter, ample time for cool reflection and
circumspection before a bill is passed into law.
Second, no new rules have been adopted by
the Sanggunian and no new committees have
yet been formed at the time of the enactment
of the ordinance, so it is difficult to imagine
how petitioners could have passed the
ordinance in an orderly, mature and
deliberative manner. The argument that if no
new rules were adopted by the new council,
the old ones could have been availed of is
unconvincing considering that petitioners did
not ever bother to show what the old rules
were.
B. Approval by Local Chief Executive
De los Reyes vs. Sandiganbayan, 281 SCRA
631
Facts:
Petitioner was a mayor who was charged with
the crime of falsification of a public document.
He contends that as local chief executive, he
has neither the official custody of nor the duty
to prepare said resolution
Issue:
Whether or not the singing of ordinance or
resolution by local chief executive affixes his
signature, is purely a ministerial act
Held:
No.
Contrary to petitioners belief, the grant of the
veto power confers authority beyond the
simple mechanical act of signing an ordinance
or resolution, as a requisite to its
enforceability. Such power accords the local
chief executive the discretion to sustain a
resolution or ordinance in the first instance or
to veto it and return it with his objections to the
Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider
the same. The Sanggunian concerned,
however, may override the veto by a two-
thirds (2/3) vote of all its members thereby
making the ordinance or resolution effective
for all legal intents and purposes.
C. Review
Moday vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 586
Facts:
The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed a
resolution authorizing the Municipal Mayor to
Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a Lot
owned by Moday .
The resolution was approved by then
Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and
transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
for its approval.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said
Resolution and returned it with the comment
that “expropriation is unnecessary considering
that there are still available lots in Bunawan
for the establishment of the government
center.”
Issue:
Whether or not the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan has the authority to disapprove
a resolution of municipality to expropriate
private property
Held:
No.
Eminent domain, the power which the
Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the
instant case, is a fundamental State power
that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is
government’s right to appropriate, in the
nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
private property for public use or purpose.
Inherently possessed by the national
legislature the power of eminent domain may
be validly delegated to local governments,
other public entities and public utilities. For the
taking of private property by the government
to be valid, the taking must be for public use
and there must be just compensation
The power of the sangguniang panlalawigan
to review ordinances, resolutions and
executive orders promulgated by the
municipal mayor; declaration of invalidity must
be on the sole ground that it is beyond the
power of the sanggunian bayan or mayor to
issue the resolution, ordinance or order under
review.
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was
without the authority to disapprove Municipal
Resolution No. 43-89.
D. Power to Investigate
Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative vs.
Sangguniang Panlungsod, 155 SCRA 421
Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of
Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation
in connection with pending legislation related
to the operations of public utilities. Invited in
the hearing were the heads of NORECO II
(Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.)
NORECO II is alleged to have installed
inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres
and Umbac refused to appear before the SP
and they alleged that the power to
investigate, and to order the improvement of,
alleged inefficient power lines to conform to
standards is lodged exclusively with the
National Electrification Administration (NEA)
Issue:
Whether or not SP has the power to
investigate a suspected violation by an
electric cooperative of the conditions of its
electric franchise
Held:
No.
The power to inquire into the efficiency of the
service supplied by electric cooperatives is
within the franchising powers of the NEA.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete
may, therefore, enact ordinances to regulate
the installation and maintenance of electric
power lines, e.g. prohibit the use of inefficient
power lines, in order to protect the city
residents from the hazards these may pose. In
aid of this ordinance making power, said body
or any of its committees may conduct
investigations similar to, but not the same as,
the legislative investigations conducted by the
national legislature. As already discussed, the
difference lies in the lack of subpoena power
and of the power to punish for contempt on
the part of the local legislative bodies. They
may only invite resource persons who are
willing to supply information which may be
relevant to the proposed ordinance.
There is no express provision either in the
1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337)
granting local legislative bodies, the power to
subpoena witnesses and the power to punish
non-members for contempt. Absent a
constitutional or legal provision for the
exercise of these powers, the only possible
justification for the issuance of a subpoena
and for the punishment of non-members for
contumacious behavior would be for said
power to be deemed implied in the statutory
grant of delegated legislative power. But, the
contempt power and the subpoena power
partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be
implied in the grant of legislative power.
E. Validity of Ordinances and Resolutions
1. Validity Ordinances and Resolutions
a municipal ordinance
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
(5) must be general and consistent with public
policy, and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
a. Zoning
Ortigas and Co., Limited partnership vs. Feati
Bank and Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533
FACTS:
Ortigas sold lots to two private individuals.
These private individuals then sold the lots to
one person named Chavez. The TCT of the
properties stipulated that the land is to be
used for residential purposes only. Then Feati
bank acquired the property from Chavez.
Feati is now buidling a bank. This was being
challenged as the TCT stipulated otherwise.
Feati argued that Resolution No, 27 provides
that in the area where they are building the
bank is declared to be an industrial area.
ISSUE: WON Resolution No, 27 is valid
HELD: YES
Resolution prevails over contract stipulations
(TCT)
Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy
Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations for the Municipality
Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied

power of the municipality should be “liberally
construed in it’s favour”, “to give more power
to the local government in promoting
economic conditions, social welfare, and
material progress in the community”.
Although non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute
since it has to be reconciled with the
legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the
power to promote health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was
obviously passed in exercise of police power
to safeguard health, safety, peace and order
and the general welfare of the people in the
locality
Velasco vs. Blas, 115 SCRA 540
FACTS:
Resolution No. 3 authorized Blas to build a
cinema house. However it was being built next
to a medical clinic. Therefore, the Resolution
prohibited use of loudspeakers outside of the
cinema. Any violation would result to a
revocation of the permit.
Then Dr. Velasco challenged, so Resolution
No. 68 was enacted, declaring Resolution No.
3 void because it is in clear contravention of
Sec. 3 of RA 1224 (regulation of nightclubs,
cabarets, dancing schools - not built within
200 m of public schools, churches and
hospitals)
ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 68 is valid
HELD: NO
Resolution No. 68 of the Provincial Board of
Cavite is null and void because it is beyond
the powers granted to the board
the only power granted to the provincial board
by Sec. 2233 of the same Code is to declare a
municipal council issuance void on the sole
ground that it is beyond the power of the
municipal council to issue.
the only ground upon which a provincial board
may declare any municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order invalid is when such
resolution, ordinance, or order is "beyond the
powers conferred upon the council or
president making the same."
Absolutely no other ground is recognized by
the law.
Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157
FACTS:
There is a disturbance caused by the abaca
manufacturing machine which affected the
peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due
to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust
emitted by the machine
Resolution No. 29 was passed by the
Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966
declaring the warehouse owned and operated
by petitioner a public nuisance
petitioner contends that said ordinance is
unconstitutional, contrary to the due process
and equal protection clause of the Constitution
and null and void for not having been passed
in accordance with law
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid
HELD: YES
Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed
by the Municipal Council of Virac in the
exercise of its police power.
municipal corporations are agencies of the
State for the promotion and maintenance of
local self-government and as such are
endowed with the police powers in order to
effectively accomplish and carry out the
declared objects of their creation
Its authority emanates from the general
welfare clause under the Administrative Code
a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene
the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy, and (6) must not
be unreasonable.
Delfino vs. St. James Hospital, Inc., 501 SCRA
97
FACTS:
St. James is a hospital. It expanded its
building structure into a four-storey building,
but then, an ordinance was enacted because
it’s a non-conforming structure already and
violates the Zoning Ordinance
St. James argues that it has complied with the
1981 zoning ordinance
But respondents provided that the 1981
zoning ordinance has already been repealed.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid
HELD: YES
The enactment of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance
effectively repealed the 1981 Zoning
Ordinance.
The complete title of said Ordinance, "An
Ordinance Adopting a Comprehensive Zoning
Regulation for the Municipality of Santa Rosa,
Laguna and Providing for the Administration,
Enforcement and Amendment Thereof. And
for the Repeal of all Ordinances in Conflict
Therewith," as well as the Repealing
10
Clause of the same Ordinance which states
that "all other ordinances, rules or regulations
that are in conflict with the provisions of this
11
ordinance are hereby repealed," clearly
express the intent of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Santa Rosa, Laguna, to repeal any
enactment that is inconsistent with the new
Ordinance
A perusal of the two pieces of legislation will
reveal that both Ordinances were enacted to
guide, control, and regulate the future growth
and development of the Municipality of Santa
Rosa, Laguna, in accordance with the
municipality's development plan, as well as to
promote the general welfare of the residents
of the community by regulating the location
and use of all buildings and land within the
municipality
Since it is presumed that the Sangguniang
Bayan knew of the existence of the older
Ordinance, by enacting the later law
embracing the complete subject matter of the
1981 Zoning Ordinance, it must be concluded
that the legislative body had intended to
repeal the former Ordinance.
b. Foodstuff
Javellana vs. Kintanar, 115 SCRA 627
FACTS:
Glicerio Javellana is the owner of a market
(building and lot) in Crossing Bago, Bago City,
which consists of store spaces and of
permanent and movable stalls all leased to
vendors
Then the government refused to accept his
payment of fees for the business permit
because the Treasurer said that an Ordinance
was enacted prohibiting the operation of a
market which is not owned by the government
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid
HELD: YES
The enactment of these ordinances by the
City Council of the City of Bago is clearly
authorized under Section 15 of the said City
Charter
authorizes said Board 'to regulate and fix the
amount of the license fees for peddlers, and
the keeping, preservation and sale of meat,
poultry, fish, game, butter, cheese, lard,
vegetables, bread, and other provisions;
(b) Paragraph (cc) which authorizes said
Board 'to provide for the establishment,
maintenance and regulation, and to fix the
fees for the use of public markets;
Also, a scrutiny of the charter provision win
readily show that by public market is meant
one that is intended to serve the public in
general. This is the only conclusion which can
be drawn when it used the word "Public" to
modify the word 1 "market" for if the meaning
sought to be conveyed is the ownership
thereof then the phrase "by any, person,
entity, association, or corporation other than
the city" win serve no useful purpose
c. Massage Parlors
Velasco vs. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568
FACTS:
The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It
shall be prohibited for any operator of any
barber shop to conduct the business of
massaging customers or other persons in any
adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop,
or in any room or rooms within the same
building where the barber shop is located as
long as the operator of the barber shop and
the rooms where massaging is conducted is
the same person."
The petitioners assail the provision as it has
deprived them of their livelihood
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid – YES
HELD: it is a police power measure
e objectives behind its enactment are:" (1) To
be able to impose payment of the license fee
for engaging in the business of massage clinic
under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by
Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure
than the ordinance regulating the business of
barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall
possible immorality which might grow out of
the construction of separate rooms for
massage of customers."
d. Moratorium on Fishing
Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154
FACTS:
the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto
Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside
Puerto Princesa City
Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a
resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering,
possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a
several species of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming
from Palawan waters
ISSUE: WON the ordinances are valid
HELD: YES
There is absolutely no showing that any of the
petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or
marginal fisherman.
one of the devolved powers of the LCG on
devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws
in municipal waters including the conservation
of mangroves
This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery
laws within the municipal waters
In light of the principles of decentralization and
devolution enshrined in the LGC and the
powers granted therein to LGUs which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police
power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.
e. Allowances for Judges
Dadole vs. COA, 393 SCRA 262
FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular
No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued
notices of disallowances to RTC and MTC
Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of
P1000 and P700 in provinces and cities and
municipalities, respectively) authorized by said
circular. The additional monthly allowances of
the judges shall be reduced to P1000 each.
They were also asked to reimbursed the
amount they received in excess of P1000 from
the last six months.
ISSUE: WON the Budget Circular is valid
HELD: NO
Although the Constitution guarantees
autonomy to local government units, the
exercise of local autonomy remains subject to
the power of control by Congress and the
power of supervision by the President.
Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The
President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local governments. x
x x" The said provision has been interpreted to
exclude the power of control.
The members of the Cabinet and other
executive officials are merely alter egos of the
President. As such, they are subject to the
power of control of the President
f. Adjustment of Salaries
DBM vs. City Government of Cebu, 518 SCRA
300
FACTS:
Respondent City Government of Cebu,
through an appropriation ordinance, granted
additional allowances to the judges and fiscals
of the city in an amount more than P1,000 per
month
Then, it was passed and approved Ordinance
No. 1468, which provided appropriations for
the salary adjustments of department heads
and assistant department heads.
ISSUE: WON the Ordinance is valid
HELD: YES
it was merely an appropriations bill
Court notes that Ordinance No. 1468,
approved on August 9, 1993, merely provided
for appropriations for the salary adjustments
of department heads and assistant
department heads to conform with the
correct position titles under Joint
Commission Circular Nos. 37 and 39 which
took effect on July 1, 1989
g. Lease of Stalls in Public Market
Lucero vs. City Government of Pasig, 508 SCRA
23
FACTS:
Petitioners were granted lease contracts to
3 Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho challenged the
occupy and operate stalls in the public
market of Pasig by virtue of Municipal
Ordinance No. 25, series of 1983.
Sometime in 1993, the municipal government
of Pasig renovated the market facilities and
constructed annex buildings to the old public
market.
Pursuant to the new ordinance, municipal
officials urged all stall occupants to fill up and
submit the necessary application forms. The
application form contained the terms and
conditions for the occupation and operation of
the stalls
iSSUE: WON the Ordinance is VALID
HELD: Yes
t was within the ambit of the Sanggunian’s
authority in the exercise of police power to
regulate the enjoyment of the privilege to
lease the market stalls. The enactment of the
Municipal Ordinance No. 56, series of 1993
repealing Municipal Ordinance No. 25, series
of 1983 (the basis of petitioners’ lease) was a
valid exercise of such governmental authority
to regulate the possession and use of the
public market and its facilities.
The operation of a market stall by virtue of a
license is always subject to the police power
18
of the city government. An application for
this privilege may be granted or refused for
reasons of public policy and sound public
administration
2. Void Ordinances
a. Working Permits
Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA
270
FACTS:
4
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537
prohibits aliens from being employed or to
engage or participate in any position or
occupation or business enumerated therein,
whether permanent, temporary or casual,
without first securing an employment permit
from the Mayor of Manila
ordinance for being discriminatory and it is an
invalid exercise of police power
ISSUE: WON the Ordinance is valid
HELD: NO
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any
criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the
exercise of his discretion.
It has been held that where an ordinance of a
municipality fails to state any policy or to set
up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's
action, expresses no purpose to be attained
by requiring a permit, enumerates no
conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely
lacks standard, thus conferring upon the
Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
grant or deny the issuance of building permits,
such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined
and unlimited delegation of power to allow or
prevent an activity per se lawful.
b. Traffic Regulation
Primicias vs. Municipality of Urdaneta, 83 SCRA
462
FACTS:
Juan Augusta B. Primacias plaintiff appellee,
was driving his car within the jurisdiction of
Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta's
Municipal Police asked him to stop.
He was told, upon stopping, that he had
violated Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of
1964, "and more particularly, for overtaking a
truck." The policeman then asked for plaintiff's
license which he surrendered, and a
temporary operator's permit was issued to
him.
Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in
the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against
Primicias for violation of Ordinance No. 3,
Series of 1964
Thereafter, accused filed a motion to declare
the ordinance void
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid
HELD: YES
An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is,
among others, that is "must not contravene . .
7 SCRA 182
. the statute," for it is a "fundamental
principle that municipal ordinances are inferior
in status and subordinate to the laws of the
8 entity or corporation engaged in the business of
state." Following this general rule, whenever
there is a conflict between an ordinance and a
statute, the ordinance "must give way.
Moreover, while the law did not contain any
classification, it is thus important for the
Municipal to add details esp when it comes to
the classification of vehicles
c. Disposition of Public Land
Baguio Citizens Action, Inc. vs. City Council, 121
SCRA 368
FACTS:
Ordinance 386 passed by the City Council of
Baguio City. Said ordinance considered all
squatters of public land who are duly
registered as such at the time of the
promulgation of the ordinance as bona fide
occupants of their respective lots.- Petitioners
filed a petition for declaratory relief, praying for
a judgment declaring the Ordinance as invalid
and illegal ab initio
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid
HELD: NO
The Ordinance in question is a patent nullity. It
considered all squatters of public land in the
City of Baguio as bona-fide occupants of their
respective lots. No amount of acquiescence
on the part of the city officials will elevate
squatting from being an unlawful act into
lawful. The land occupied by the squatters are
portions of water sheds, reservations,
scattered portions of the public domain within
the Baguio townsite. Certainly, there is more
reason then to void the actions taken by the
City of Baguio through the questioned
ordinance.
d. Admission Fee to Movie Houses
Balacuit vs. CFI of Agusan Del Norte, 163
FACTS The city of Butuan passed Ordinance
No. 640 wherein any person, group of persons,
selling admission tickets to any movie or other
public exhibitions, games, contests, or other
performances are PENALIZED if they require
children between 7-12YO to pay full payment for
ticket. Price must be only ½ of the price.
ISSUE WON ordinance is valid? NO.
HELD The operation of theatres,
cinematographs and other places of public
exhibition are subject to regulation by the
municipal council in the exercise of delegated
police power by the local government. However,
while a business may be regulated, such
regulation must be within the bounds of
reason—must be reasonable and cannot be
oppressive amounting to an arbitrary
interference with the business or calling subject
of regulation. In this case, the lack of safeguard
measures against abuse to determine age of
child and the unjust burden upon theatre to bear
the loss of earning and penalty of the reduction
of price from children between 7-12YO is
unreasonable.
e. Prohibitions of Legalized Gambling
Magtojos vs Pryce Properties Corporation,
234 SCRA 255
FACTS PAGCOR decided to expand operation
in CDO in 1992 and leased a portion of a
building from Pryce Corporation, to which
renovations were made. Sangguniang
Panlunsod then enacted Ordinance No. 3353 to
prohibit the issuance of a business permit and
cancel existing business permit of
establishments for using and allowing the use
for operation of the casino. Later Passed
Ordinance No. 3375-93 which prohibited the
operation of casino as a whole, pursuant to
powers given to LGUs under Section 458 of the
LGC where it states, “enact ordinances to
prevent, suppress and impose appropriate
penalties for…establishment and maintenance
of houses of ill repute, gambling and other
prohibited games of chance”.
ISSUE WON the Ordinances were valid? NO.
HELD Gambling is not illegal per se since there
is no categorical prohibition under the
Constitution nor the mention of such. Thus, it is
up to Congress to determine which to prohibit
and allow. They prohibited jueteng and monte
but permit lotteries, cockfighting and horse-
racing. Thus, in reading Section 458 of the LGC,
the word “gambling” must be referred to as
illegal gambling because it must be read in
relation to “and other prohibited games of
chance”.
Here: The Ordinance contravenes PD 1869
(creation of PAGCOR) and public policy since it
prevents PAGCOR from exercising powers
conferred on it to operate a casino in CDO.
Ordinances should not contravene a statute
since municipal governments (LGU) are only
agents of national government (Congress); a
delegate cannot be superior to the principal.
Enacting ordinances are expressly vested upon
LGUs through the General Welfare Clause
(sec16) and under its powers, duties, and
functions under sec458 of the LGC. However,
To Test the validity of an ordinance, it must:
1. Not contravene constitution (or
statute)
2. Not be unfair or oppressive
3. Not be partial or discriminatory
4. Not prohibit or regulate trade
5. It is general and consistent with
public policy
6. Must not be unreasonable
f. Allowances of Auditors
Villarena vs. COA, 408 SCRA 455
FACTS Villarena was the City auditor in
Marikina. The city enacted Ordinances for the
budget which included allowances and benefits
granted to COA personnel assigned to Marikina,
including Villarena. Under Sec18 RA 6758, to
preserve the integrity and independence of
COA, its officials and employees are prohibited
from receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses,
allowances or other emoluments from any govt
entity, local government unit, and govt-owned
and controlled corporations. Additionally, under
COA Memorandum No 89-584, receipt of such
allowances and other forms of fringe benefits by
auditing personnel shall be considered illegal.
Thus, COA found Villarena guilty of neglect of
duty, simple misconduct and violation of Rules.
Villarena argued, such receipt was valid
pursuant to the ordinance pursuant to LGU
power under Sec 447 of LGC to enact
ordinances “when the finances of the municipal
govt allow, provide for addtl allowances and
other benefits to judges, prosecutors…and other
national govt officials stationed in the
municipality”.
ISSUE WON Ordinance passing allowances
was valid? NO.
HELD Local legislative bodies may provide for
additional allowances and other benefits to
national government officials stations or
assigned to their municipality or city. This is,
however, subject to RA 6758, removal of extra
emoluments specifically prohibiting COA officials
from receiving such. So in order to perform their
constitutional mandate, COA need officials that
will be free from unwarranted influences and the
removal of temptation and enticement of extra
emoluments under RA 6758 was placed to
ensure this.
NOTE: Villarena stated the repeal clause of the
LGC (paragraph 7 of Section 534), however
there was no mention of RA 6758 and implied
repeals are not lightly presumed. In case of
conflict, the courts must harmonize and not
uphold one over the other.
g. Regulation of Cable Television Industry
Zoomzat, Inc. vs. People, 451 SCRA 226
FACTS memebrs of the Sangguniang
Panlungson of Gingoog City were charged for
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for passing
Resolution No 261 in allowing the Zoomzat to
install and operate a cable TV system and
passed Ordinance No. 19 granting franchise to
Spacelink Cable TV to operate cable tv for 10
years since such right must be don’t by NTC.
Sanggunian contends that LGC also grants the
city councils to grant permits, licenses and
franchises in aid of local govt unit regulatory or
revenue raising powers.
ISSUE WON LGUs have power to grant
franchise to cable television operators? NO
HELD to be liable under RA 3019, Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, one must be an officer or
employee of offices or govt corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits
under concessions. Under EO 205, only the
NTC can grant such certificates of authority to
cable television operators and issue the
necessary implementing rules and regulations
and under EO 436, NTC is vested with such
regulation and supervisions of the cable
television industry. Thus, members cannot be
guilty of violation of Anti Graft since they have
no power to grant franchise and cannot be held
liable.
Although under the General Welfare Clause of
the LGC, it goes to show that LGUs can regulate
the operation of cable televisions BUT it must
only do so when it encroaches public
properties, such as public street, rights of ways,
founding of structures and parceling or large
regions. Beyond such act of REGULATION such
as the grant of franchise is ultra vires. No right
nor privilege was granted to Spacelink by virtue
of the void ordinance.
HERE: Since there was no commencement of
operations and the Resolution 261 but merely
expressed willingness to allow petitioner to
install and operate cable television and not grant
a franchise entirely, it is valid. However,
Ordinance No. 19 in specifically stating the grant
of the franchise is invalid.
h. Prohibiting Entertainment Establishments
City of Manila vs. Laguio, 455 SCRA 308
FACTS Zoning Ordinance was passed that
forbids the running of the enumerated
businesses such as sauna parlors, karaoke
bars, beerhouses, nightclubs, day clubs,
superclubs, discotheques, motels, inns in the
Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3, instructs
the owners/operators to wind up business
operations or transfer outside area or convert
business into those that are allowed.
ISSUE WON Ordinance is valid? NO.
HELD LGC empowers legislative bodies to
enact ordinances, approve resolution and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of
province/city/municipality and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the
proper exercise of corporate powers of the
province/city/municipality. However, such police
power is still subordinate to constitutional
limitations and must be reasonable and for the
public good where there is a relation between
the purposes of the police measure and the
means employed. Otherwise, it will be an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
Here, the ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive since it permanently restricts the use
of property that cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose “Winding up” business is
tantamount to closure, a deprivation or property
and confiscation, which when not noxious,
cannot be removed without compensation.
i. Appropriation for Private Purposes
Albon vs. Fernando, 494 SCRA 141
FACTS City of Marikina undertook a public
works project to widen, clear and repair existing
sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision,
pursuant to Ordinance No. 59. Taxpayers suit
was filed by Albon claiming unlawful to use govt
equipment and use of public funds for such
sidewalks within the subdivision since they were
private property. City claims it is empowered
under LGC to exercise such powers necessary,
appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective
provisions of the basic services and facilities.
Additionally, PD 1216 declares that roads, alleys
and sidewalks in a residential subdivision are for
public use and beyond commerce of man,
mandating owners to set aside open spaces
which shall be devoted exclusively for use of
general public.
ISSUE WON LGU may validly use public funds
to undertake widening, repair and improvement
of sidewalks of a privately-owned subdivision?
NO; RTC ordered to see if donated and if
public has full and unimpeded access to and
use of the roads and sidewalks.
HELD Under subdivision laws, lots allotted by
subdivision developers as road lots include
roads, sidewalks, alleys and planting strips.
Ownership therefore of sidewalks in a public
subdivision belongs to the subdivision until it is
transferred to the government by donation or
acquired through expropriation. According to PD
1216, the subdivision is relieved of responsibility
of maintaining road lots and open space only
upon securing a certificate of completion and
executing a deed of donation of these road lots
and open spaces to the LGU. The use of LGU
funds for widening the privately-owned
sidewalks is unlawful as it directly contravenes
Section 335 of RA 7160, wherein only
construction, improvement and repair of
infrastructure facilities owned by the LGU may
be bankrolled with the Local Govt funds.
j. Zoning
Parayno vs. Javellanos, 495 SCRA 85
FACTS SB Calasiao Pangasinan passed
Resolution No. 50 recommending the closure or
transfer of the locations of the gasoline station
of Petitioner claiming that it was less than 100
meters from the nearest public school and
church, violating Art 6 of the Official Zoning
Code of Calasiao. Petitioner claims that her
gasoline FILLING station is NOT covered under
Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code since it
was not a gasoline SERVICE station as
contemplated under the section prohibiting
gasoline service stations within 100m from any
public or private school, public library,
playground and hospital based on straightline
method.
ISSUE WON Resolution is valid? NO.
HELD “Gasoline SERVICE station” does not
necessarily include “gasoline FILLING station”.
Service station includes supply of gasoline oil,
grease, batteries, tires and car accessories
while the other only services automobile and
other motor vehicles with gasoline and oil only.
Here, although it has the power under the
general welfare clause to take actions to enact
measures to promote health and general welfare
of its constituents, should still be within limits of
constitution. There was no record that the
municipality measured the distance
notwithstanding the fact that such distance was
crucial in determining whether there was an
actual violation of section 44. Thus, abatement
of a nuisance without judicial proceedings when
it is NOT a nuisance per se, violating
Constitutional Due process. A gas station is
NOT a nuisance per se or one affecting the
immediate safety of persons and property.
3. Initiative and Referendum
Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, 37
SCRA 279
FACTS SB of Morong Bataan agreed in the
inclusion of Morong as part of Subic Special
Economic Zone in accordance with RA 7227.
Petitioners resorted to power of initiative under
Local Govt code and started to collect
signatures to repeal the resolution. COMELEC
denied petition claiming a resolution is not
subject to any local initiative.
ISSUE WON resolution can be subject of an
initiative? YES
HELD Constitution includes not only ordinances
but also resolutions as appropriate subjects of a
local initiative. Under Art 6, “whereby the people
can directly propose and enact laws or approve
or reject any act or law or part thereof” shows
that the word “ACT” includes a resolution. When
the Local Govt Code was passed, it did not
change the scope of local initiative or limit
coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone.
Section 120 Ch2 Title 9 of book 1 merely
defines the concept of local initiative as a legal
process where registered voters of a local govt
may directly propose, enact or amend any
ordinance. It does NOT deal with the subjects or
matters that can be taken up in a local initiative
since Section 124 includes the word “any
proposition or ordinance” upon the limitation
which shows the broad inclusion of resolutions
as well.
Malonzo v. COMELEC, 269 SCRA 380 (1997)
FACTS Mayor Malonzo elected as Mayor of
Caloocan City. However, after a year, the
punong brgys and SB members and SK
chairmen met and deliberated upon the approval
of Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No
01-96 that calls for the initiation of a recall
proceeding against the Mayor. Mayor contends
that the recall proceedings were infirm because
it was convened by the LIGA ng mga Brgy and
not the required members of the PRA.
ISSUE WON the Liga in meeting for Recall met
and voted in accordance with the law that
mandates it should be a Preparatory Recall
Assembly and not a liga? YES. The same
personalities under the liga were those
needed for a PRA.
HELD Liga ng mga barangay is DISTINCT form
the Preparatory Recall Assembly. Liga is an
organization of all barangays. The Preparatory
Recall Assembly is an organization of barangay
captains and kagawads. However, in this case,
the representatives of the LIGA were the SAME
MEMBERS needed for the Preparatory Recall
Assembly, convening as a PRA and not as a
Liga. Thus, the meeting and the voting of the
resolution calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo
was VALID.
Malonzo v. Zamora – 323 SCRA 875
FACTS City passed Ordinance No. 0254 to
appropriate P39M to fund expropriation of Lot 26
of Maysilo Estate, which was found to be a
realigned portion of the P50 denominated by law
for “expropriation of Properties”, classified under
the Current Operating Expenses in the Annual
Budget of Caloocan City. Additionally, that
Ordinance was passed without funds actually
available nor compliance with the requirement
under section 50 LGC that house rules be
adopted or updated and there was undue haste
in such passage.
ISSUE WON Ordinance is valid? Yes.
HELD Nothing showing that Ordinance No 0246
of the P39M is actually part of the P50M under
the “expropriation of properties” under the
Current Operating expenditures. Moreover, it
shows that the P39M is under ordinance series
1997 while the P50M is under ordinance series
of 1998. Even more so, such ordinance under
the 1998 series did not even specify specific
properties for expropriation.
Additionally, it showed that Sanggunian took up
the matter of adopting a set of house rules in a
general meeting to which it enacted Ordinance
0254. Although this was after such passage of
the earlier expropriation ordinance, There is no
requirement that the completion of the updating
or adoption of the internal rules of procedure
before the Sanggunian could act on any matter
like the enactment of an ordinance. Lastly, there
is No prohibition that the rule on the three
readings of an ordinance be done in just one
session day. The urgency of the passage was
due to the salaries of the city employees funded
by the ordinance that even such councilors who
objected took advantage of such benefits.
6. Corporate powers
a) To sue and be sued
1. Powers of Governors and Mayors
City of Caloocan vs. Court of Appeals, 489
SCRA 45
FACTS Sanggunian of Caloocan passed
Ordinance No. 068 authorizing Mayor to
negotiate and enter into a contract of sale of the
patrimonial property of the city. Deed of
Absolute Sale with Gotesco over property for
P136M signed. COA initially disapproved this
Deed of Sale but instead ordered that the price
should be at P182M. Mayor then disagreed with
the sale and refused to sign the documents or
accept the payments. Mayor filed civil case for
annulment of sale. Gotesco claims petition is
defective because it was instituted by a non-
party, the mayor, and not the city of Caloocan.
ISSUE WON the institution of the civil suit to
recover land of the city by the Mayor was
proper? YES
HELD The Mayor has the authority to file suits
for the recovery of the funds and property on
behalf of the city even without prior authorization
from the Sanggunian.There is nowhere in the
enumerated powers and duties of the
Sanggunian that requires such prior
authorization in favor of the mayor before filing a
suit on behalf of the city.
2. Representation by Counsel
a. Prohibitions against Hiring of Private Lawyers
Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 728
FACTS Municipality of Hagonoy Bulacan,
through a law firm of Cruz Durian & Academia
sued Marcianos for the recovery of its 74-
Hectare fishpond to which the municipality will
pay attorneys fees to the firm. The municipal
attorney then entered appearance as counsel for
municipality stating that the firm will be under
control of the officials. Marcianos moved for the
disqualification of the law firm.
ISSUE WON the law firm can represent the suit
brought by municipality? NO.
HELD While a public prosecutor is allowed in
criminal cases, the same is not allowed in CIVIL
cases where the MUNICIPALITY is the plaintiff.
Section 1683 of Revised Admin Code and
Section 3 of Local Autonomy Law is clear: only
the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney
can represent a municipality in its lawsuits. This
is mandatory. Even if there was a collaborating
with the private law firm and the municipal
attorney and fiscal, such is still in contravention
of Section 1683. The municipal attorney is the
head of the legal division or office of a
municipality and “shall act as legal counsel of
the municipality and perform such duties and
exercise such powers as may be assigned to
him by the council”. He is paid out of the
municipal funds and can represent the
municipality without the collaboration of the
fiscal, clearly showing that the municipality
should not be burdened with the expenses of
hiring a private lawyer. The only exception to
hiring a private lawyer is when the provincial
fiscal is disqualified to represent it.
b. Sanctioned Hiring of Private Lawyer
Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 147 SCRA 447
FACTS While Governor Espina was in Manila,
Vice Governor and 3 members of the Provincial
Board enacted Resolution No 188 donating to
the City of Cebu 210 province-owned lots all
located in the City of Cebu which would later on
be sold by the City to raise funds for public
improvement projects as well as authorizing the
VG to sign the deed of donation. Governor
returned and denounced the Resolution as
illegal and immoral since almost all patrimonial
property of the City was donated. Gov filed case
to declare donation declared illegal and
employed the services of Atty. Garcia in filing
and prosecuting the case in his behalf and in
behalf of the Province of Cebu. Provincial Board
ISSUE WON Governor allowed to hire private
lawyer? YES for this case falls within the
exception
HELD Although Section 1683 of the Revised
Admin Code is clear that only the municipal
attorney and fiscal can represent the
municipality, the municipality’s authority to
employ a private lawyer is expressly limited
only to situations where the provincial fiscal
is disqualified to represent it. In this case,
however, since the Governor, in behalf of the
Province of Cebu, seeks redress against the
very members of the Provincial Board, can hire
a private counsel since the Provincial Fiscal had
been directed by the Board already to appear on
behalf of the Board in the case, leaving the
Governor no choice but to seek other
representation.
Inciong vs. Domingo, 211 SCRA 139
FACTS PHILSUCOM failed to pay real estate
taxes due on its sugar refinery in Brgy. Caloocan
Batangas so the Provincial Treasurer schedule
the sale of the refinery at a public auction.
PHILSUCOM filed petition for prohibition against
the Provincial Treasurer. The Brgy then hired
Atty. Inciong and filed a motion for intervention
claiming it is an indispensable party as it has
10% share in the property tax. An Amnesty
Compromise Agreement was entered by the PT
and Philsucom. Atty Inciong filed case for
payment of attorneys fees against Province of
Batangas and RTC rendered judgment in favor
of Atty. Inciong and the decision became final.
COA disallowed payment since hiring of private
attorney had no approval by SB required by the
law nor was there ay appropriation for such.
ISSUE WON COA erred in disallowing the
payment? YES.
HELD The employment of Barangay Coloocan
of petitioner as its counsel even if allegedly
unauthorized by SB is binding as it took no
prompt measure to repudiate the employment.
Thus, there should be no disallowance in the
payment to Atty Inciong as this has become final
and executory. Lastly, the COA Circular in
disallowing payment cannot dimish the
substantive right of recovery of attorney’s fees
under a final and executory Decision.
Alinsug vs. Regional trial court, 225 SCRA
553
FACTS Alinsug was a regular employee of the
municipal government of Escalante, Negros
Occidental and appointed as Clerk III in the
Office of Municipal Planning and development
Coordinator. She was then detailed to work
under the newly elected Office of the Mayor.
When she absented herself from work to attend
to family matters with only the permission of the
personnel officer and NOT the Mayor, the Mayor
suspended her for one month on the grounds of
simple misconduct. She filed a petition for
injunction with damagers and prayer for tro and
prelim injunction against mayor and municipal
treasurer. Mayor filed an answer through private
lawyer SM Lezama. Alinsug questioned
authority of private lawyer when it should be the
municipal officer instead. However, Mayor
claimed that the municipality of Escalante has
no legal officer and that the case was based on
moral damages, thus, hiring a private counsel
was justified.
ISSUE WON the hiring of the private lawyer was
justified? YES.
HELD The law allows a private counsel to be
hired by a municipality only when the
municipality is an adverse party in a case
involving the provincial government or another
municipality or city within the province since the
provincial fiscal would be disqualified to serve
and represent it. In this case, although the
Mayor was sued in his official capacity, he was
also held to have exceeded his authority
together with a complaint that contains other
allegations and a prayer for moral damages. The
allegations in the complaint show that there
were certain acts beyond official capacity:
political vendetta, vengeance unleashed on her
for her family not voting him, political
harassment, grave abuse of discretion. Thus,
such a case must be satisfied by them in their
private capacity and may hire a private lawyer.
c. Representation of Mayor by City Fiscal
Mabutol vs. Maza, 105 SCRA 564
FACTS Mabutol sought disbarment based on
gross ignorance of the law of Atty Maza as City
Fiscal of San Jose City is charged in an admin
case for removal as such based on his
representation as counsel for Mayor Pascual.
Mayor, in his private capacity, charged Mabutol
for libel, charged his wife for violation of
Ordinance (operating pharmacy business
without permit), and constructing fence and
repairing a warehouse without building permit.
ISSUE WON the city fiscal can represent the
Mayor in his private capacity? YES.
HELD A city fiscal is not prohibited from acting
as counsel of the City Mayor even when sued in
his private capacity if such arose out of the
performance of his official duties.
2. Compromises
Osmena vs. COA, 238 SCRA 463
FACTS In an incident where the son of the de
la Cerna spouses was stabbed and died, the
spouses sued the Cebu City Medical Center for
damages for the gross negligence,
irresponsibility and incompetence of the 5
physicians of the public hospital, naming City of
Cebu as part of the defendants since they
operate, maintain, and manage the hospital. The
parties decided to enter into a compromise
agreement including provision for payment of
sum of P30,000 to which the sanggunian ratified
the agreement. COA disallowed the payment,
claiming such was not within the powers of the
Sanggunian. The giving away of funds in form of
financial assistance to a family has no causal
relation to the general welfare clause.
ISSUE WON the juridical compromise is
conclusive and binding on all parties, including
the City of Cebu? YES
HELD A compromise is a bilateral act or
transaction that is expressly acknowledged as a
juridical agreement by the civil code. The code
allows juridical persons to compromise as long
is it is in conformity with the requisites necessary
to alienate their property. When the compromise
of a civil suit has a city that is involved as a party
is a legitimate transaction, and is even
encouraged by law.
b) To acquire and sell property
City of Angeles vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA
90
FACTS Under the Deed of Donation to the City
of Angeles of 51 parcels of land under the
condition that it will be solely utilized for the site
of Angeles City Sports Center and that no
commercial building, market or anything similar
shall be constructed, a substantial breach will
revoke such Donation. However, public officials
started to construct the drug rehabilitation center
on the portion of the donated land to which a
complaint was filed with the RTC seeking
revocation of the donation.
ISSUE WON can revoke the donation by
violation? NO, both in violation
HELD PD 957 is clear that the subdivision
owner/developer has to donate the open space
for parks and playgrounds a certain percentage
of the area; it is no longer optional to donate
such to the homeowners association with
consent of the city or municipality. Such
donation can be imposed with a condition not
contrary to customs, law, morals public order or
good conduct. Here, such condition was to make
the park non-buildable- The public officials
violated the condition. Also, the petitioners
likewise violated the required percentage to be
donated as open space (less). Therefore, both
being at fault, neither one can recover what he
has given by virtue of the contract
(Article1412NCC). Thus, the construction of the
drug rehabilitation center on the land is not
allowed and as a violation thereof, there can be
no recovery of damages. There is no liability
among public officers concerned because they
were sued only in their official capacity and
cannot be made personally liable even if they
are in bad faith. Must separately try them in
personal capacity.
GSIS vs. Province of Tarlac, 417 SCRA 60
FACTS Sang. Panlalawigan of Tarlac passed
REsolution which authorized and approved the
conversion of the Urquico Memorial Athletic
Field into a Government Center and donation of
different portions of the land to other
government agencies for purposes of
constructing their buildings. GSIS was one of
those that decided to put up their site on the
land; Notice of Construction was issued by the
Governor Cojangco and MOA entered into by
both parties. When a new Governor, Gov. Yap
was elected, he wrote GSIS demanding
payment of P33M, representing balance of value
of lot donated, claiming earlier MOA was unfair.
When denied by GSIS, Governor filed for nullity
of the donation and MOA because of failure to
appraise valuation by local commitee on awards
before the transfer.
ISSUE WON new Governor can declare contract
entered into by old Governor and GSIS null?
NO. No prohibition requiring appraisal before
sale.
HELD A transfer of real property by a local
government unit to an instrumentality of the
government without first securing an appraised
valuation from the local committee on awards
does not appear as one of the void contracts
under the civil code nor is it mentioned
under the LGC. There was a perfected contract
here entered into with the province and former
governor-therefore, new governor Yap cannot
revoke or renounce with consent of the other
party.
c) To enter into contracts
(i) Requisites
● The LGU has the express, implied or
inherent power to enter into the
particular contract;
● The contract is entered into by the
proper department, board, committee,
officer or agent;
○ Unless otherwise provided by
the Code, no contract may be
entered into by the local chief
executive on behalf of the local
government unit without prior
authorization by the sanggunian
concerned.
● The contract must comply with certain
substantive requirements; and
● The contract must comply with the
formal requirements of written contracts.
(ii) Ultra vires contracts
● When a contract is entered into without
compliance with the first and the third
requisites (express, implied or inherent
power to enter into the particular
contract & substantive requirements).
● Null and void.
● Cannot be ratified or validated.
○ Ratification of defective
municipal contracts is possible
only when there is non-
compliance with the second
and/or the fourth requirements
(contract is entered into by the
proper department, board,
committee, officer or agent &
formal requirements of written
contracts).
○ Ratification may either be
express or implied.
1. Lease of properties for public use
Villanueva vs. Castaneda Jr., 154 SCRA 142
Facts: Petitioners were owners of stalls in a
talipapa located in a land owned by the
municipal government of San Fernando,
Pampanga. They were said be lessees of the
land through a municipal council resolution
dated since 1961. However, the municipal
subsequently issued a new resolution revoking
the right previously granted to the vendor for the
area will be made as a parking space for the
town plaza and subsequently demolished the
market stalls.
Issue: WON the resolution in 1961 conferred
contractual rights to the stall owners making
them lawful lessees of the land.
Held: No. There is no question that the place
occupied by the petitioners and from which they
are sought to be evicted is a public plaza as
early as 1951. It is elementary that a public
plaza is beyond the commerce of man, lease
thereon is null and void. Applying this well
settled doctrine, the Court ruled that the
petitioners had no right in the first place to
occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist
in remaining there now on the strength of their
alleged lease contracts. Likewise, the mayor has
the duty to clear the area and restore it as a
parking place and public plaza. The problems
caused by the usurpation of the place by the
petitioners are covered by the police power as
delegated to the municipality under the general
welfare clause. Hence, police power was validly
exercised in this case. Even assuming a valid
lease of the property in dispute, the resolution
could have effectively terminated the agreement
for it is settled that the police power cannot be
surrendered or bargained away through the
medium of a contract.
Doctrine: A public plaza is beyond the
commerce of man, and cannot be the subject of
lease or other contractual undertaking. And,
even assuming the existence of a valid lease of
the public plaza or part thereof, the municipal
resolution effectively terminated the agreement,
for it is settled that the police power cannot be
surrendered or bargained away through the
medium of a contract.
Dacanay vs. Asistio, 208 SCRA 404
Facts: In 1979, the Metropolitan Manila
Commission enacted an ordinance designating
certain city and municipal streets, roads and
open spaces as sites for flea markets. One of
those streets was the "Heroes del '96" where the
petitioner lives. Upon application of certain
vendors, the city mayor and city engineer,
issued them licenses to conduct vending
activities on said street. After a few years, Mayor
Martinez caused the demolition of the said flea
markets on Heroes del '96, V. Hence, the stall
owners filed a case against such action. The
RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the
streets are of public dominion, hence outside the
commerce of man. Thereafter, there was a
change in the city administration and current
mayor (Asistio) did not pursue the action of the
previous mayor and left the flea markets in the
streets as is. Thus, Petitioner,being a resident of
Heroes del '96 filed a petition for mandamus to
remove the stalls in their street.
Issue: WON public streets be leased or licensed
to market stallholders by virtue of a city
ordinance or resolution of Metropolitan Manila
Commission?
Held: No. There is no doubt that the disputed
areas from which the private respondents’
market stalls are public streets. A public street is
property for public use hence outside the
commerce of man. Being outside the commerce
of man, it may not be the subject of lease or
other contract. The Executive Order issued by
Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of
Heroes del ‘96 Street as a vending area for
stallholders who were granted licenses by the
city government contravenes the general law
that reserves city streets and roads for public
use. Such leases or licenses are null and void
for being contrary to law. The right of the public
to use the city streets may not be bargained
away through contract. The interests of a few
should not prevail over the good of the greater
number in the community whose health, peace,
safety, good order and general welfare, the
respondent city officials are under legal
obligation to protect.
Doctrine: Public streets or thoroughfares are
property for public use, outside the commerce of
man, and may not be the subject of lease or
other contracts.
Macasiano vs. Diolino, 212 SCRA 464
Facts: The municipality of Paranaque passed
an ordinance authorizing the closure of some
streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque for the
establishment of a flea market thereon.
Thereafter, Mayor Ferrer was authorized to
enter into a contract to any service cooperative
for the establishment, operation, maintenance
and management of flea market and/or vending
areas. Because of this purpose, respondent
Palanyag entered into an agreement with the
municipality of Paranaque with the obligation to
remit dues to the treasury. Consequently,
market stalls were put up by respondent
Palanyag on the said streets. However, the PNP
Superintendent of Metropolitan Traffic
Command ordered the destruction and
confiscation of the stalls and were returned to
Palanyag. Petitioner then sent a letter to
Palanyag giving the latter 10 days to discontinue
the flea market otherwise the market stalls shall
be dismantled.
Issue: WON the ordinance issued by the
municipality of Paranaque authorizing the lease
and use of public streets or thoroughfares as
sites for flea market is valid?
Held: No. Roads and streets which are available
to the public in general and ordinarily used for
vehicular traffic are still considered public
property devoted to public use The said streets
in the case are local roads used for public
service and are therefore considered public
properties of respondent municipality. Properties
of the local government which are devoted to
public service are deemed public and are under
the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local
governments have no authority whatsoever to
control or regulate the use of public properties
unless specific authority is vested upon them by
Congress. These basic principles have the effect
of limiting such authority of the province, city or
municipality to close a public street or
thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil Code lays
down the basic principle that properties of public
dominion devoted to public use and made
available to the public in general are outside the
commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or
leased by the local government unit to private
persons. Aside from the requirement of due
process which should be complied with before
closing a road, street or park, the closure should
be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road
or other public property from public use when
circumstances show that such property is no
longer intended or necessary for public use or
public service. When it is already withdrawn
from public use, the property then becomes
patrimonial property of the local government unit
concerned. It is only then that the respondent
municipality can “use or convey them for any
purpose for which other real property belonging
to the local unit concerned might be lawfully
used or conveyed” in accordance with the last
sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 337,
known as Local Government Code.
Doctrine: The closure of the streets in Baclaran
(Paranaque) was held invalid for non-
compliance with MMA Ordinance No. 2, and
because provincial roads and city streets are
property for public use under Art. 424, Civil
Code, hence under the absolute control of
Congress. They are outside the commerce of
man, and cannot be disposed of to private
persons.
2. Certificate of availability of public funds
Osmena vs. Commission on Audit, 230 SCRA
585
Facts: In 1985 the City of Cebu decided to
construct a modern abattoir. For this project, the
City Treasurer, Ricardo Pestaño, issued a
certificate of availability of funds (5,419,180php)
specifically for the construction of the abbatoir
(slaughterhouse). After a public bidding, HFCCI
was awarded to do the construction of the
abattoir. Thus, the City of Cebu entered into a
contract with HFCCI wherein the cost was
indicated to be 8,368,920php. In 1986, Osmeña,
then Officer-In-Charge of the City of Cebu,
ordered the suspension of the project and
review of the contract by the COA. HFCCI
claimed the amount of 2,142,964.29php as the
value of the work accomplished. Unable to
collect the said amount after so many demands
HFCCI instituted a civil action. According to the
City of Cebu, while admitting having entered into
a contract with HFCCI, alleged that the contract
it entered into was null and void as declared by
the Commission on Audit in its 2nd Indorsement
dated September 4, 1986. Therefore whatever
amount is due to HFCCI is to the sole liability of
the officer or officers who entered into the said
contract. Nevertheless, the City of Cebu entered
into a compromise agreement to the effect that
as a full and final settlement to the claim of
HFCCI. However, the COA declared that the
compromise agreement is also void. Petitioner
argues that the decision of COA invalidating the
contract between the City of Cebu and HFCCI
was void since it was already executed and
fulfilled. Petitioner further stresses that COA has
no authority to declare a contract already
executed void.
Issue: WON the COA has the power to
invalidate the contract between the City of Cebu
and HFCCI.
Held: Yes. The Commission on Audit has the
power, authority and duty to examine, audit and
settle all accounts pertaining to revenue and
receipts of and expenditures or uses of funds
and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities. The
Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. 1445)
further provides that no contract involving the
expenditure of public funds shall be entered into
unless there is an appropriation therefor and the
proper accounting official of the agency
concerned shall have certified to the officer
entering into the obligation that funds have been
duly appropriated for the purpose and the
amount necessary to cover the proposed
contract for the current fiscal year is available for
expenditure on account thereof. Any contract
entered into contrary to the foregoing
requirements shall be VOID. Clearly then, the
contract entered into by the former Mayor
Duterte was void from the very beginning since
the agreed cost for the project (P8,368,920.00)
was way beyond the appropriated amount
(P5,419,180.00) as certified by the City
Treasurer. Hence, the contract was properly
declared void and unenforceable in COA’s 2nd
Indorsement, dated September 4, 1986.
Doctrine: The contract was properly declared
void and unenforceable in COA’s 2nd
Indorsement. No contract involving the
expenditures of public funds shall be entered
into unless there is an appropriation therefor and
a certification that the amount necessary to
cover the proposed contract for the current fiscal
year is available for expenditure on account
thereof.
City of Quezon vs. Lexber, Inc., 354 SCRA
493
Facts: In 1990, a Tri-Partite MOA was drawn
between petitioner (represented by its then
Mayor Simon), respondent Lexber, Inc. and the
then Municipality of Antipolo, whereby a 26,010
square meter parcel of land located in Antipolo
was to be used as a garbage dumping site by
petitioner and other Metro Manila cities or
municipalities authorized by the latter, for a 5-
year period commencing in January 1991. Part
of the agreement was that the landowner,
represented by respondent Lexber, shall be
hired as the exclusive supplier of manpower,
heavy equipment and engineering services for
the dumpsite and shall also have the right of first
refusal for contracting such services.
Respondent Lexber alleged that petitioner
immediately commenced dumping garbage on
the landfill site continuously from December
1991 until May 1992. Thereafter, petitioner
ceased to dump garbage on the said site for
reasons not made known to respondent Lexber.
Consequently, even while the dumpsite
remained unused, respondent Lexber claimed it
was entitled to payment for its services.
Petitioner, this time acting through Mayor
Mathay denied any liability under the contract on
the ground that the same was invalid and
unenforceable. According to Mayor Mathay, the
subject contract was signed only by Mayor
Simon and had neither the approval nor
ratification of the City Council, and it lacked the
required budget appropriation pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known
as the Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Issue: WON the subject contract is null and
void.
Held: No. PD 1445 does not provide that the
absence of an appropriation ordinance ipso fact
makes a contract entered into by a local
government unit null and void. Public funds may
be disbursed not only pursuant to an
appropriation law, but also in pursuance of other
specific statutory authority. In this case, BP 337,
the law which was then in force, empowered the
Mayor to represent the city in its business
transactions and sign all warrants drawn on the
city treasury and all bonds, contracts and
obligations of the city. While the Mayor has no
power to appropriate funds to support the
contracts, neither does BP 337 prohibit him from
entering into contracts unless and until funds are
appropriated therefor. By entering into the two
contracts, Mayor Simon did not usurp the city
council’s power to provide for the proper
disposal of garbage and to appropriate funds
therefor. The execution of contracts to address
such a need is his statutory duty, just as it is the
city council's duty to provide for such service.
There is no provision in the law that prohibits the
city mayor from entering into contracts for the
public welfare unless and until there is a prior
authority from the city council. Furthermore,
public bidding may have been dispensed with,
not only because “time is of the essence” but in
recognition of the reality that offering property to
be used as a dumpsite is not an attractive nor
lucrative option for property owners.
Doctrine: Public funds may be disbursed not
only pursuant to an appropriation law, but also in
pursuance of other specific statutory authority.
While the Local Government Code of 1991 now
requires that the mayor’s representation of the
city in its business transactions must be “upon
authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or
pursuant to law or ordinance,” no such prior
authority was required under the Local
Government Code of 1983.
3. Conveyance of real property
City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA
13
Facts: Before bowing out of office the lameduck
provincial administration of Camarines Sur in
1959 passed Resolution No. 1103 authorizing
Provincial Governor Trivino to execute a deed of
sale without consideration in favor of the City of
Naga of two parcels of land with improvements,
belonging to the province. Pursuant to said
resolution Provincial Governor Trivino executed
two deeds of sale: one conveying the title and
possession of a parcel containing 80,000 square
meters on which the Camarines Sur High School
complex (classroom buildings, library building,
grandstand, etc.) are erected; and 4 parcel of
land containing 19,044 square meters which is
devoted to horticulture, farming, gardening and
to the study of poultry and pig-raising. The
consideration for each sale is one peso which
has never been paid. Private Respondent Hon.
Apolonio G. Maleniza, as taxpayer and
governor-elect of Camarines Sur filed a
complaint against the Province of Camarines
Sur and the City of Naga. The complaint prays
for the annulment of the two conveyances in
favor of defendant City of Naga of real
properties belonging to defendant Province of
Camarines Sur.
Issue: WON the conveyances of land in favor of
Naga City is void.
Held: Yes. Section 2068 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that: “When the
government of a province is a party to a deed or
instrument conveying the title of real property,
such deed or instrument shall be executed on
behalf of the said Government by the Provincial
Governor, upon resolution of the provincial
board, and with the approval of the President.”
Without the needed Presidential approval, it is
evident that the conveyances were void. Note
that up to now, said approval has not been
obtained. The respondent Court cannot likewise
be faulted for awarding damages to the City of
Naga, for the improvements it had introduced on
the premises. To eliminate this award would
certainly be less than fair. The damages can be
set off against the rentals to be paid by the City.
Doctrine: Conveyances by the former Provincial
Board of Camarines Sur of parcels of land to the
City of Naga are void as the required
Presidential approval was not obtained.
7. Operation of Public Utilities
A. Operation of Public Utility by LGU
Olongapo Electric Light and Power
Corporation vs. National Power Corporation,
149 SCRA 153
Facts: In 1960, Petitioner was granted a
legislative franchise to install operate and
maintain an electric light, heat and power
system in the municipality of Olongapo, it wrote
to the NPC offering to buy electric power. In
1961, the Municipal Council of Olongapo passed
Resolution No. 52, permitting the Petitioner to
make use of or avail of its legislative franchise
with the municipality of Olongapo. In view
thereof, the Petitioner submitted a power
distribution plan which was approved by the
District Engineer of Zambales and the Municipal
Council of Olongapo. The Petitioner then started
negotiations with the individual members of the
Municipal Council of Olongapo for the lease and
eventual purchase of the municipality's
distribution lines, and the Municipal Council,
authorized the disposal of the existing electric
distribution system to private parties through a
public auction sale. The municipal officials also
agreed to lease to the Petitioner the said electric
distribution system for a period of one (1) year at
a monthly rental of P5,000.00. However, before
the lease contract could be formalized, the
municipal mayor was replaced, Resolution No.
58 was approved wherein it was resolved that
the Municipality of Olongapo would maintain and
operate the electric and power system. Copies
of the resolutions were sent to the appellant for
its information. On 4 January 1963, the NPC and
the Municipality of Olongapo executed a
contract for the purchase and sale of electric
power and energy. Petitioner filed a complaint to
declare the contract between NPC and
Olongapo null and void for it was executed
against the provisions of mandatory and
prohibitory laws, more particularly Section 18 of
the Public Service Law, which provides that it
shall be unlawful for any municipality, province
or other department of the Government of the
Philippines to engage in any public service
business without having first secured from the
Commission a certificate of public convenience
and necessity as provided for in this Act.
Issue: WON Petitioner has a cause of action
against respondent.
Held: None. What section 18 of the Public
Service Law prohibits is the act of engaging in a
public service business without first securing a
certificate of public convenience. The law does
not declare as unlawful the act of buying electric
power and energy by a public utility operator.
Said operator would only come under the penal
and sanction of the law from the moment it sells
or disposes of the power to its customers,
because it would then be engaging in the public
service business. Consequently, the execution
of the contract did not by itself constitute a
violation of the provisions of Section 18 of the
Public Service Law as it was merely a contract
for the sale of electric power and energy.
Accordingly, the amendment of the Public
Service Act by Republic Act No. 2677, placed
public services operated by government entities
and government owned or controlled
corporations under the jurisdiction of the Public
Service Commission, with the qualification,
however, that they are not required to secure
certificate of public convenience before
commencing operations. Furthermore, petitioner
was not a party to the contract nor an assignee
or representative of the parties thereto. Neither
was it directly affected by the execution of the
contract because the NPC was ready and in a
position to supply the plaintiff and the
Municipality of Olongapo the specific quantity of
power contracted by each.

Doctrine: Public services owned or operated by
government entities or government owned or
controlled corporation shall be regulated by the
Commission in the same way as privately owned
public services, but certificates of public
convenience or certificates of public
convenience and necessity shall not be required
of such entities, or corporations.
B. Operation of Ferry by Private Party
Municipality of Echague vs. Abellera, 146
SCRA 180
Facts: Since 1936, petitioner municipality had
been operating a municipal ferry service
'traversing the Cagayan River to and from the
Barangays Soyung-Malitao and Barangays
Embarcadero-Dammang East and West, all
within the municipality of Echague, Isabela. In
this regard, petitioner either operated the ferry
service itself, or annually leased the operation of
the same to the highest bidder. On November
16, 1977, private respondent Ballad furnished
petitioner a copy of a Decision by the Board of
Transportation granting respondent a Certificate
of Public Convenience to operate a two-motor
boat service for the regular and public
transportation of passengers and freight within
Echague, Isabela. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on the grounds of lack of notice
and deprivation of the opportunity to be heard by
respondent Board and that the award of said
Certificate of Public Convenience to respondent
Ballad was approved without favorable
indorsement by resolution of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Echague, Isabela of Ballad's
application.
Issue: WON the Board of Transportation has
the power to acquire or establish municipal
ferries.
Held: None. The provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code which grant to the
municipal council or Sangguniang Bayan the
power to acquire or establish municipal ferries,
are different and should be distinguished from
the authority of the Board of Transportation to
issue a Certificate of Public Convenience. While
the establishment of a municipal ferry is first
given to a municipality, ferry service will
nevertheless be subject to the supervision and
control of the Board of Transportation. The
winner in a public bidding conducted by the
municipal council obtains the privilege to operate
the ferry service, but he has to apply for a
Certificate of Public Convenience from the
Board of Transportation which then has the duty
to regulate the operation, route, rates to be
charged, as well as specify the kind of
equipment to be used for the comfort,
convenience and safety of the public using the
ferry. The grant of supervision and authority by
Administrative Code to municipalities or
municipal councils over public utilities such as
municipal ferries, markets, etc. is specific, and
undoubtedly was "intended to provide an
additional source of revenue to municipal
corporations for their maintenance and
operation" On the other hand, the authority
conferred on the respondent Board of
Transportation was intended principally to insure
and safeguard the convenience, comfort and
safety of the public.
Doctrine: Where a ferry operation lies entirely
within a municipality, prior approval of the
municipal government is necessary; but once
approved, the operator must thereafter apply
with BOT for a certificate of public convenience
and he shall be subject also to BOT supervision.
8. Licensing of Cockpits
Canet vs. Decena, 420 SCRA 388
Facts: Decena was the mayor of Bula,
Camarines Sur. In 1998, Canet, by virtue of a
council resolution, was allowed to operate a
cockpit in Bula. The following year, the
Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance 001
entitled “An Ordinance Regulating the Operation
of Cockpits and Other Related Game-Fowl
Activities in the Municipality of Bula, Camarines
Sur and Providing Penalties for any Violation to
(sic) the Provisions Thereof.” However, Decena
denied to sign the ordinance because it does not
contain rules and regulations as well as a
separability clause. When Canet applied for a
mayor’s permit for the operation of his cockpit.
Decena denied Canet’s application on the
ground that under the Local Government Code
of 1991, the authority to give licenses for the
establishment, operation and maintenance of
cockpits as well as the regulation of cockfighting
and commercial breeding of gamecocks is
vested in the Sangguniang Bayan. Therefore,
she cannot issue the said permit inasmuch as
there was no ordinance passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the same.
Canet claims that he should be given a permit
based on the 1998 resolution allowing him to
operate a cockpit as by virtue of local municipal
tax ordinances which generally provide for the
issuance of a mayor’s permit for the operation of
businesses.
Issue: WON Mayor Decena can be compelled
to issue a permit sans a municipal ordinance.
Held: No. It was Ordinance No. 001, S. 1999
which provided for the collection of application
filing fees, ocular inspection fees, mayor’s permit
fees, filing fees for the institution of complaints,
entrance fees and special derby assessments
for the operation of cockpits. This Ordinance,
however, was withdrawn by the Sangguniang
Bayan. Hence, there being in effect no
ordinance allowing the operation of a cockpit,
Resolution No. 049, S. 1998, authorizing
petitioner to establish, operate and maintain a
cockpit in Bula, Camarines Sur cannot be
implemented. Suffice it to state in this regard
that to compel respondent to issue the mayor’s
permit would not only be a violation of the
explicit provisions of Section 447 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, but would also be an
undue encroachment on respondent’s
administrative prerogatives. It should,
furthermore, be borne in mind that cockfighting
although authorized by law is still a form of
gambling. Gambling is essentially antagonistic to
the aims of enhancing national productivity and
self-reliance. As has been previously said, a
statute which authorizes a gambling activity or
business should be strictly construed, and every
reasonable doubt resolved so as to limit rather
than expand the powers and rights claimed by
franchise holders under its authority.
Doctrine: To compel a mayor to issue a mayor’s
permit for a cockpit, in the absence of ordinance
allowing the operation of a cockpit, would not
only be a violation of the explicit provisions of
Section 447 of the Local Government Code of
1991, but would also be an undue
encroachment on the mayor’s administrative
prerogatives.
Tan vs. Perena, 452 SCRA 53
Facts: In 1974, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
449, otherwise known as the Cockfighting Law
of 1974, was enacted. The decree provided for
limits on the number of cockpits that may be
established in cities and municipalities (1 per
250K population). However, with the enactment
of the LGC in 1991, the municipal sangguniang
bayan were empowered to authorize and license
the establishment, operation and maintenance
of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and
commercial breeding of gamecocks. In 1993, the
Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of
Daanbantayan, Cebu Province, enacted
Municipal Ordinance which provides that there
may not be more than 3 cockpits in the province.
Thereafter, petitioner Tan applied with the
Municipal Gamefowl Commission for the
issuance of a permit/license to establish and
operate a cockpit in Sitio Combado, Bagay, in
Daanbantayan. At the time of his application,
there was already another cockpit in operation in
Daanbantayan, operated by respondent Perea.
Nevertheless, mayor’s permit were issued which
allowed Tan to establish/operate/conduct the
business of a cockpit for 1 year. Perea alleged
that there was no lawful basis for the
establishment of a second cockpit. She claimed
that Tan conducted his cockpit fights not in
Combado, but in Malingin, at a site less than five
kilometers away from her own cockpit. She
insisted that the unlawful operation of Tans
cockpit has caused injury to her own legitimate
business. Petitioners asserted that under the
Local Government Code of 1991, the
sangguniang bayan of each municipality now
had the power and authority to grant franchises
and enact ordinances authorizing the
establishment, licensing, operation and
maintenance of cockpits.
Issue: WON the Local Government Code has
rendered the Cockfighting Law inoperative.
Held: No. While the Local Government Code
expressly repealed several laws, the
Cockfighting Law was not among them; As laws
are presumed to be passed with deliberation
and with knowledge of all existing ones on the
subject, it is logical to conclude that in passing a
statute it is not intended to interfere with or
abrogate a former law relating to the same
subject matter, unless the repugnancy between
the two is not only irreconcilable but also clear
and convincing as a result of the language used,
or unless the latter Act fully embraces the
subject matter of the earlier one. The qualifying
phrase “any law to the contrary notwithstanding”
in Section 447 (a)(3)(v) of the Local Government
Code serves notice that it is the sangguniang
bayan concerned alone which has the power to
authorize and license the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cockpits, and
regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding
of gamecocks within its territorial jurisdiction.
While the sanggunian retains the power to
authorize and license the establishment,
operation, and maintenance of cockpits, its
discretion is limited in that it cannot authorize
more than one cockpit per city or municipality,
unless such cities or municipalities have a
population of over one hundred thousand, in
which case two cockpits may be established.
Furthermore, a municipal ordinance must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute,
otherwise it is void. Ordinance No. 7
unmistakably contravenes the Cockfighting Law
in allowing three cockpits in Daanbantayan.
Thus, no rights can be asserted by the
petitioners arising from the Ordinance.
Doctrine: While the sanggunian retains the
power to authorize and license the
establishment, operation, and maintenance of
cockpits, its discretion is limited in that it cannot
authorize more than one cockpit per city or
municipality, unless such cities or municipalities
have a population of over one hundred
thousand, in which case two cockpits may be
established.
F. Liability of LGUs
1. Liability for Quasi-Delicts
Under Article 2189, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be liable for damages for
the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or
supervision.
It is not even necessary for the defective road
or street to belong to the province, city or
municipality for liability to attach. The article
only requires that either control or supervision
is exercised over the defective road or street.
Municipal of Dagupan vs. Court of Appeals,
466 SCRA 78 (Correct case: Municipality of
San Juan v CA)
Facts:
● MWSS and Kwong Cheung of K.C.
Waterworks System Construction
entered into a contract for water
services connections in San Juan.
● On the rainy night of May 31, 1988,
while Priscilla Chan was driving her
car along with Assistant Prosecutor
Laura Biglang-awa, the left front
wheel of the car fell on a manhole
which was earlier excavated by K.C.
The said excavation occurred on
Santolan Road, a national road within
the territorial jurisdiction of San Juan.
● As a result, Assistant Prosecutor
Biglang-awa suffered a fractured
humerus of the right arm.
● Because of the incident, Biglang-awa
filed a complaint with the RTC against
the MWSS, Municipality of San Juan,
some municipal officials, and later on,
impleaded K.C.
● RTC ruled in favor Biglang-awa
holding MWSS and Municipality of
San Juan jointly and severally liable.
Issue:W/N the Municipality of San Juan can
be held liable for the injury of Biglang-awa?

Held/Ratio: YES
● For liability to arise under Article 2189
of the Civil Code, ownership of the
roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings and other public works, is
not a controlling factor, it being
sufficient that a province, city or
municipality has control or supervision
thereof.
● Petitioner municipality exercises the
power of control, or, at the very least,
supervision over all excavations for
the laying of gas, water, sewer and
other pipes within its territory. The
municipality’s liability for injuries
caused by its failure to regulate the
drilling and excavation of the ground
for the laying of gas, water, sewer,
and other pipes, attaches regardless
of whether the drilling or excavation is
made on a national or municipal road,
for as long as the same is within its
territorial jurisdiction.
Quezon City Government vs. Dacara, 460
SCRA 243; and
Facts:
● On February 1988, Fulgencio Dacara,
Jr., while driving a Toyota Corolla
sedan, rammed into a pile of earth
diggings found at Matahimik St.,
Quezon City, which was then being
repaired by the Quezon City
Government.
● As a result, Dacara sustained injuries
and the car suffered extensive
damages.
● Because of this, Dacara filed a
complaint for damages against the
Quezon City Government and a
certain Engr. Tiamzon.
● RTC ruled in favor of Dacara.
● CA affirmed.
Issue:W/N Quezon City can be held liable for
damages?
Held/Ratio: YES
● The accident of February 28, 1988
which caused almost the life and limb
of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car
turned turtle was the existence of a
pile of earth from a digging done
relative to the base failure at
Matahimik Street nary a lighting
device or a reflectorized barricade or
sign perhaps which could have served
as an adequate warning to motorist
especially during the thick of the night
where darkness is pervasive. None
was ever presented to stress the point
that sufficient and adequate
precautionary signs were placed at
Matahimik Street
● The provisions of Article 2189 of the
New Civil Code capsulizes the
responsibility of the city government
relative to the maintenance of roads
and bridges since it exercises the
control and supervision over the
same. Failure of the defendant to
comply with the statutory provision
found in the subject-article is
tantamount to negligence per se
which renders the City government
liable.
Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382
Facts:
● Florentina Guilatco, a court interpreter
of CFI-Dagupan, while trying to board
a tricycle along Perez Blvd. (a
national road within the control and
supervision of Dagupan City),
accidentally fell on an open manhole
which caused her to fracture her right
leg.
● Guilatco filed a complaint for
damages against the City of
Dagupan.
● CFI ruled in favor of Guilatco.
● CA reversed for failure of Guilatco to
prove that the City of Dagupan had
control or supervision over Perez
Blvd. where the manhole was located.
Issue:W/N the City of Dagupan can be held
liable?
Held/Ratio: YES
● The liability of public corporations for
damages arising from injuries suffered
by pedestrians from the defective
condition of roads is expressed in the
Civil Code
 ● Under Article 2189, provinces, cities
and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of
the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control
or supervision.
● It is not even necessary for the
defective road or street to belong to
the province, city or municipality for
liability to attach. The article only
requires that either control or
supervision is exercised over the
defective road or street.
● In the case at bar, this control or
supervision is provided for in the
charter of Dagupan and is exercised
through the City Engineer
● The express provision in the charter
holding the city not liable for damages
or injuries sustained by persons or
property due to the failure of any city
officer to enforce the provisions of the
charter, cannot be used to exempt the
city, as in the case at bar.
● The charter only lays down general
rules regulating the liability of the city.
On the other hand article 2189 applies
in particular to the liability arising from
"defective streets, public buildings and
other public works."
City of Manila vs. Teotico, 22 SCRA 267
Facts:
● Genaro Teotico, fell on a uncovered
manhole along P.Burgos Ave., City of
Manila, as he was about to board a
jeepney. As a result, his eyeglasses
broke which caused him to sustain a
lacerated left upper eyelid among
others.
● Because of this, Teotico filed a
complaint for damages against the
City of Manila, its mayor, its city
engineer, city health officer, city
treasurer, and chief of police.
● CFI ruled to dismiss the complaint.
● CA affirmed except in so far as City of
Manila is concerned. The City of
Manila was ordered to pay damages
to Teotico.
Issue:W/N the City of Manila can be held
liable for damages?
Held/Ratio: YES
On the Applicable Law
● According to the Charter of Manila
(R.A. 409), the city shall not be held
liable for any damages or injuries
caused by the negligence of the
Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any
other city officer(paraphrased).
● On the other hand, Article 2189 of the
New Civil Code provides that:
Provinces, cities and municipalities
shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of defective
conditions of road, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public
works under their control or
supervision.
● Insofar as its territorial application is
concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a
special law and the Civil Code a
general legislation; but, as regards the
subject-matter of the provisions,
Section 4 of Republic Act 409
establishes a general rule regulating
the liability of the City of Manila for:
"damages or injury to persons or
property arising from the failure of"
city officers "to enforce the provisions
of" said Act "or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence" of the
city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other
officers while enforcing or attempting
to enforce said provisions." Upon the
other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil
Code constitutes a particular
prescription making "provinces, cities
and municipalities . . . liable for
damages for the death of, or injury
suffered by any person by reason" —
specifically — "of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other-public
works under their control or
supervision."
● Since the present action is based
upon the alleged defective condition
of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive
thereon.
On Liability
 ● Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it
is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the
defective roads or streets belong to
the province, city or municipality from
which responsibility is exacted. What
said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality have
either "control or supervision" over
said street or road. Even if P. Burgos
Avenue were, therefore, a national
highway, this circumstance would not
necessarily detract from its "control or
supervision" by the City of Manila,
under Republic Act 409.
Jimenez vs. City of Manila, 150 SCRA 510
Facts:
● Bernardino Jimenez along with some
other went to the public market of Sta.
Ana which was then flooded ankle-
deep due to rainwater. After buying
bagoong, Jimenez fell on an
uncovered manhole which cannot be
seen because of the flood. As a
result, a 4-inch nail pierced his leg
which caused him to be hospitalized.
● Because of this, Jimenez filed a
complaint for damages against the
City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated
Corporation (the administrator of the
Sta. Ana public market).
● CFI dismissed the complaint.
● IAC modified the decision by holding
Asiatic Integrated Corporation liable
but absolving the City of Manila.
Issue:W/N the City of Manila can be held
liable for damages?
Held/Ratio: YES
● Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it
is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach, that the
defective public works belong to the
province, city or municipality from
which responsibility is exacted. What
said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality has
either "control or supervision" over the
public building in question.
● In the case at bar, there is no
question that the Sta. Ana Public
Market, despite the Management and
Operating Contract between
respondent City and Asiatic Integrated
Corporation remained under the
control of the former.
● Petitioner had the right to assume that
there were no openings in the middle
of the passageways and if any, that
they were adequately covered. Had
the opening been covered, petitioner
could not have fallen into it. Thus the
negligence of the City of Manila is the
proximate cause of the injury suffered,
the City is therefore liable for the
injury suffered by the petitioner
2. Execution
General Rule: Public funds are not subject to
levy and execution, unless otherwise provided
for by statute.
Exception: when there is a corresponding
appropriation as required by law. Otherwise
stated, the rule on the immunity of public
funds from seizure or garnishment does not
apply where the funds sought to be levied
under execution are already allocated by law
specifically for the satisfaction of the money
judgment against the government. In such a
case, the monetary judgment may be legally
enforced by judicial processes.
Remedy of Claimant: Where a municipality
fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to
effect payment of a final money judgment
rendered against it, the claimant may avail of
the remedy of mandamus in order to compel
the enactment and approval of the necessary
appropriation ordinance, and the
corresponding disbursement of municipal
funds therefor.
Municipality of San Miguel vs. Fernandez,
130 SCRA 56
Facts:
● In a different civil case, judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
against the Municipality of San
Miguel. Said decision became final
and executory for failure of the
 Municipality to perfect an appeal
within the prescribed period.
● Because of this, the plaintiffs filed a
motion for issuance of writ of
execution.
● Municipality of San Miguel filed a
motion to quash alleging that the
property or funds of the municipality
are public funds exempt from
execution.
● Respondent Judge Fernandez
dismissed the motion to quash. In
addition, the respondent ordered the
Provincial Treasurer to comply with
the order for lack of funds of the
municipality.
Issue:W/N the properties and funds of the
province and the municipality are exempt from
execution?
Held/Ratio: YES
● Public funds are not subject to levy
and execution.
● They are held in trust for the people,
intended and used for the
accomplishment of the purposes for
which municipal corporations are
created, and that to subject said
properties and public funds to
execution would materially impede,
even defeat and in some instances
destroy said purpose.
● All the funds of petitioner municipality
in the possession of the Municipal
Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as
those in the possession of the
Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan, are
also public funds and as such they
are exempt from execution.
● There must be a corresponding
appropriation in the form of an
ordinance duly passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan before any
money of the municipality may be
paid out.
● In the case at bar, it has not been
shown that the Sangguniang Bayan
has passed an ordinance to this
effect.
Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals,
190 SCRA 206
Facts:
● The case is a result of the
expropriation proceeding initiated by
the Municipality of Makati against
private respondents Admiral Finance
Creditors Consortium, Inc., Home
Building System & Realty
Corporation, Arceli Jo involving a
parcel of land located at Mayapis St.,
San Antonio Village, Makati.
● During the expropriation proceedings,
the petitioner Makati opened an
account with PNB Buendia pursuant
to the requirements of the law on
expropriations. The RTC, in a
decision, fixed the appraised value of
the subject property and ordered the
petitioner pay the respondents.
● After becoming final and executory,
the respondents moved for issuance
of a writ of execution. Eventually, a
Notice of Garnishment was issued to
PNB Buendia. However, petitioner
Makati opposed and filed a motion to
lift the garnishment.
● RTC denied the motion to lift the
garnishment.
● CA affirmed
● On appeal to the SC, petitioner
belatedly alleges and claims that
there are 2 accounts with PNB (1 for
the expropriation containing
P99,743.94; 1 for its statutory
obligations and other purposes of the
municipal government).
Issue:W/N the PNB accounts can be
garnished?
Held/Ratio: YES, but only the 1st account.
● Admitting that the PNB Account No.
S/A 265-537154-3 (1st account) was
specifically opened for expropriation
proceedings it had initiated over the
subject property, petitioner poses no
objection to the garnishment or the
levy under execution of the funds
deposited therein amounting to
P99,743.94. However, the funds
garnished by respondent sheriff in
excess of P99,743.94, which are
public funds earmarked for the
municipal government's other
statutory obligations, are exempted
from execution without the proper
 appropriation required under the law.
● Public funds are not subject to levy
and execution, unless otherwise
provided for by statute. The properties
of a municipality, whether real or
personal, which are necessary for
public use cannot be attached and
sold at execution sale to satisfy a
money judgment against the
municipality. Municipal revenues
derived from taxes, licenses and
market fees, and which are intended
primarily and exclusively for the
purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions
of the municipality, are exempt from
execution
● Absent a showing that the municipal
council of Makati has passed an
ordinance appropriating from its public
funds an amount corresponding to the
balance due under the RTC decision
dated June 4, 1987, less the sum of
P99,743.94 deposited in Account No.
S/A 265-537154-3 (1st account), no
levy under execution may be validly
effected on the public funds of
petitioner deposited in Account No.
S/A 263-530850-7 (2nd account)
● Remedy of Respondent: Where a
municipality fails or refuses, without
justifiable reason, to effect payment of
a final money judgment rendered
against it, the claimant may avail of
the remedy of mandamus in order to
compel the enactment and approval
of the necessary appropriation
ordinance, and the corresponding
disbursement of municipal funds
therefor.
● The State's power of eminent domain
should be exercised within the bounds
of fair play and justice. In the case at
bar, considering that valuable
property has been taken, the
compensation to be paid fixed and the
municipality is in full possession and
utilizing the property for public
purpose, for three (3) years, the Court
finds that the municipality has had
more than reasonable time to pay full
compensation.
Pasay City Government vs. Court of First
Instance of Manila, 132 SCRA 156
Facts:
● Respondent V.D. Isip, Sons &
Associates entered into a contract
with the City of Pasay for the
construction of a new Pasay City Hall.
● Respondent was able to accomplish
various stages of the construction
worth P1,713,096 out of the
P4,914,500.80. Pasay City was able
to pay only P1,100,000.
● For failure to pay the balance of
P613,096, the respondent filed a
complaint for specific performance
with damages against the City of
Pasay.
● Later on, a Compromise Agreement
was entered into by the parties
wherein the respondents will put up a
new performance bond and the
petitioner Pasay City will pay the
balance of P613,096 within a period
of 90 days after approval of the
compromise agreement.
● Eventually, a writ of execution was
issued by the CFI and a Notice of
Garnishment was served upon PNB
for the garnishment of the account of
Pasay City.
● Later on, a supplemental complaint
was filed by respondent V.D. Isip for
rescission and damages against City
of Pasay.
Issue:W/N the City of Pasay may be ordered
to pay the balance of P613,096?
Held/Ratio: YES
● As a general rule, "all government
funds deposited with the Philippine
National Bank by any agency or
instrumentality of the government,
whether by way of general or special
deposit, remain government funds
and may not be subject to
garnishment or levy.” But, inasmuch
as an ordinance has already been
enacted expressly appropriating the
amount of P613,096.00 of payment to
the respondent-appellee, then the
herein case is covered by the
exception to the general rule.
● Nowhere in the Contract and
Agreement nor in the Compromise
Agreement could be found the fact
that payment by the petitioners-
 appellants of the amount of
P613,096.00 was dependent upon the
submission by the respondent-
appellee of the performance bond. It
cannot be argued that reciprocal
obligation was created in the
Compromise Agreement, for the
obligation to pay on the part of the
petitioners-appellants was established
several years ago when the
respondent-appellee finished some of
the stages of construction. And, this
argument is already moot and
academic, for the amount of
P613,096.00 has already been
collected through execution and
garnishment upon the funds of Pasay
City with the Philippine National Bank.
City of Caloocan vs. Allarde, 410 SCRA 432
Facts:
● In 1972, Marcial Samson, the Mayor
of Caloocan City, abolished the
position of Assistant City
Administrator and 17 others. This led
to a complaint filed by the affected
employees. In a decision of the court,
the City of Caloocan was ordered
reinstate the employees and to pay
backwages.
● In 1986, only the balance of the
backwages of Delfina Hernandez
Santiago was unpaid. Because of this,
in 1987, the City of Caloocan
appropriated funds for the payment of
unpaid wages. However, later on,
they refused to release the money to
Santiago.
● Santiago filed a motion for writ of
execution for the release of the funds
which was granted by Judge Allarde
of the RTC of Caloocan.
● After several appeals by the City of
Caloocan against the writ of
execution, in 1992, the Sheriff levied
and sold at a public auction one of the
motor vehicles of the City of Caloocan
and proceeds were turned over to
Santiago as payment for the unpaid
wages (balance left: P439,378). Three
more vehicles were ordered to be
levied and sold at public auction.
● On October 1992, the City Council
passed an ordinance appropriating
the amount claimed by Santiago.
However, the City Mayor refused to
sign the check.
● Because of this, Judge Allarde issued
an order to garnish the funds of the
City of Caloocan with the PNB
corresponding to the claim of
Santiago. After 21 years, the claim of
Santiago was fully satisfied.
Issue:W/N the funds of City of Caloocan may
be subject to garnishment?
Held/Ratio: YES
● All government funds deposited in the
PNB or any other official depositary of
the Philippine Government by any of
its agencies or instrumentalities,
whether by general or special deposit,
remain government funds and may
not be subject to garnishment or levy,
in the absence of a corresponding
appropriation as required by law
● Although the liability of the state has
been judicially ascertained, the state
is at liberty to determine for itself
whether to pay the judgment or not,
and execution cannot issue on a
judgment against the state. Such
statutes do not authorize a seizure of
state property to satisfy judgments
recovered, and only convey an
implication that the legislature will
recognize such judgment as final and
make provision for the satisfaction
thereof
● The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted
by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects,
as appropriated by law
● However, the rule is not absolute and
admits of a well-defined exception,
that is, when there is a corresponding
appropriation as required by law.
Otherwise stated, the rule on the
immunity of public funds from seizure
or garnishment does not apply where
the funds sought to be levied under
execution are already allocated by law
specifically for the satisfaction of the
money judgment against the
government. In such a case, the
 monetary judgment may be legally
enforced by judicial processes.
● In the instant case, the City Council of
Caloocan already approved and
passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of
1992, allocating the amount of
P439,377.14 for respondent
Santiago’s back salaries plus interest.
Thus this case fell squarely within the
exception. For all intents and
purposes, Ordinance No. 0134,
Series of 1992, was the
"corresponding appropriation as
required by law." The sum indicated in
the ordinance for Santiago were
deemed automatically segregated
from the other budgetary allocations
of the City of Caloocan and
earmarked solely for the City’s
monetary obligation to her. The
judgment of the trial court could then
be validly enforced against such
funds.
G. Settlement of Boundary Disputes
Applicable Law: Sec. 118 and 119 of the
LGC
Settlement of Disputes:
● Between 2 or more barangays in the
same city or municipality – the territorial jurisdiction of respondent
Sanggunian Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan concerned
● Between 2 or more municipalities in
the same province – Sangguniang
Panlalawigan concerned
● Between municipalities or component
cities of different provinces – Jointly
referred for settlement to the
Sanggunians of the provinces
concerned
● Between a component city or
municipality on the one hand and a
highly urbanized city on the other; OR
between 2 or more highly urbanized
cities – Jointly referred for settlement
to the Sanggunians of the parties
● If no amicable settlement was
reached within 60 days from the date
the dispute was referred to, the
Sanggunian shall issue a certificate to
that effect and proceed to formally try
the issue which shall be decided
within 60 days from the date of
certification. (Sec. 118)
Appeals: RTC having jurisdiction over the
area in dispute; to be decided within 1 year
from the filing thereof. (Sec. 119)
Between two parties not belonging to the
enumeration in Sec. 118: RTC has exclusive
original jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 19(c), BP
129. (See: Municipality of Kananga v.
Madrona)
Municipality of Sta. Fe vs. Municipality of
Aritao, 533 SCRA 586
Facts:
● In 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta.
Fe filed a case with the RTC of Nueva
Vizcaya for the determination of
boundary dispute involving barangays
of Batinan and Canabuan.
● Trial ensued. However, realizing an
error on the part of the RTC, it
suspended the proceedings and
referred the matter to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, the
proper authority to decide the matter.
● The Sangguniang Panlalawigan
issued Resolution No. 64 stating that
the barangays in question are within
Municipality of Aritao and enjoining
the petitioner from exercising
jurisdiction over the barangays in
question. In addition, it also endorsed
the dispute to the RTC for further
proceedings.
● Back in the RTC, in 1992, the
respondent Municipality of Aritao filed
a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction alleging that at the time of
the filing of the motion, the jurisdiction
to determine boundary disputes falls
on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
based on the applicable laws at that
time.
● RTC granted the motion to dismiss.
● CA affirmed.
Issue:W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the
settlement of boundary disputes of LGUs?
Held/Ratio: NO, Sangguniang Panlalawigan
has jurisdiction
Legislative History
● Oct. 1, 1917; Act No. 2711 or the
Revised Administrative Code –
“Provincial Boards of the provinces in
which such municipalities are
situated”
● Jun 17, 1970; RA 6128 was approved
amending the RAC – “CFI of the
Province where the municipalities
concerned are situated”
● Feb 10, 1983; BP 337 or the Local
Government Code of 1983 –
“SangguniangPanlalawigan of the
province where the municipalities
concerned are situated”
● January 1, 1992; RA 7160 or the
Local Government Code of 1991 –
“…sangguniang panlalawigan
concerned.”
Doctrines
● Since the effectivity of R.A. No. 6128,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has
been the primary tribunal responsible
in the amicable settlement of
boundary disputes between or among
two or more municipalities located in
the same province. With the LGC of
1991, however, a major change has
been introduced – that in the event
the Sanggunian fails to effect a
settlement, it shall not only issue a
certification to that effect but must
also formally hear and decide the
case within the reglementary period.
● Unlike R.A. No. 6128 and B.P. 337,
the LGC of 1991 grants an expanded
role on the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan concerned in resolving
cases of municipal boundary disputes.
Aside from having the function of
bringing the contending parties
together and intervening or assisting
in the amicable settlement of the
case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
is now specifically vested with original
jurisdiction to actually hear and decide
the dispute in accordance with the
procedures laid down in the law and
its implementing rules and
regulations.
● This situation, in effect, reverts to the
old rule under the RAC, prior to its
amendment by R.A. No. 6128, under
which the provincial boards were
empowered to investigate, hear the
parties and eventually decide the
case on the basis thereof.
● On the other hand, under the LGC of
1991, the trial court loses its power to
try, at the first instance, cases of
municipal boundary disputes. Only in
the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction can the proper RTC
decide the case, on appeal, should
any party aggrieved by the decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
elevate the same.
Application
● The trial court had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the complaint when it
was filed on October 16, 1980 since
the prevailing law then was Section
2167 of the RAC, as amended by
Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 6128, which
granted the Court of First Instance
(now RTC) the jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of municipal boundary
disputes. However, at the time of the
filing of the motion to dismiss in 1992,
the RTC no longer has jurisdiction.
● Indeed, the RTC acted accordingly
because at the time of the filing of the
motion to dismiss its want of
jurisdiction was evident. It was duty-
bound to take judicial notice of the
parameters of its jurisdiction.
NHA vs. Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems, 505 SCRA 38
Facts:
● Since 1968, there has been an
existing boundary dispute between
the Municipality of San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan and the City of
Caloocan. Because of this, 2
Resolutions were passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan ng San Jose del
Monte delineating the official
boundaries of the municipality and the
City of Caloocan.
● As a result, the DENR conducted a
relocation survey. In the DENR
Comprehensive Report, it was stated
 that the 2 Resolutions issued by the disputes.
Sangguniang Bayan ng San Jose del ● Thus, instead of assuming jurisdiction
Monte contradict the delineation over the case, the COSLAP should
embodied in Tala Estate, the property have referred respondents’ complaint
allocated by the government mainly to the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
for housing and resettlement site Caloocan City and the Sangguniang
under the NHA, pursuant to Bayan of San Jose del Monte. Their
Presidential Proclamation No. 843 decision may be appealed to the
issued by former President Marcos. proper Regional Trial Court.
● This prompted the Municipality of San
Jose del Monte, along with some
residents, to file a complaint with the Municipality of Kamango vs. Madrona, 402
Commission on Settlement of Land SCRA 330
Problems against the NHA.
Facts:
● The Commission ruled that the correct
● A boundary dispute arose between
boundary lines are those contained in
the Municipality of Kananga and the
the twin resolutions issued by the
City of Ormoc. By agreement, the
Sanggunian.
parties submitted the issue to
● NHA filed a petition for certiorari with
amicable settlement by a joint session
the CA assailing the lack of
of the SangguniangPanlungsod of
jurisdiction of the Commission
Ormoc City and the Sangguniang
● CA dismissed the petition for being
Bayan of Kananga on October 31,
filed out of time
1997.
● No amicable settlement was reached.
Issue:W/N the Commission on Settlement of
Instead, the members of the joint
Land Problemshas jurisdiction to settle the
session issued Resolution No. 97-01
boundary dispute between the municipality of
which states that the parties have
San Jose del Monte and the City of
agreed to elevate the matter to the
Caloocan?
proper court.
● Petitioner Municipality of Kananga
Held/Ratio: NO
filed a motion to dismiss.
● The Commission is an administrative
● RTC denied the motion to dismiss
body established and created under
EO 561 as a means of providing a
Issue:W/N the RTC may exercise original
mechanism for the expeditious
jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary
settlement of land problems to avoid
dispute between a municipality and an
social unrest. Its objective is to settle
independent component city?
land conflicts among small settlers,
landowners and members of cultural
Held/Ratio: YES
minorities.
● There is no question that Kananga is
● In acting on a land dispute, the
a municipality constituted under
COSLAP may either assume
Republic Act No. 542. By virtue of
jurisdiction if the matter falls under
Section 442(d) of the LGC, it
paragraph 2(a) to (e) or refer the
continued to exist and operate as
matter to an agency having
such.
appropriate jurisdiction.
● However, Ormoc is not a highly
● There is no provision in Executive
urbanized, but an independent
Order No. 561 that COSLAP has
component, city created under
jurisdiction over boundary dispute
Republic Act No. 179. Ormoc is
between two local government units.
deemed an independent component
Under Republic Act No. 7160 or the
city, because its charter prohibits its
Local Government Code, the
voters from voting for provincial
respective legislative councils of the
elective officials. It is a city
contending local government units
independent of the province. In fact, it
have jurisdiction over their boundary

is considered a component, not a
highly urbanized, city of Leyte in
Region VIII by both Batas
PambansaBlg. 643 and the Omnibus
Election Code.
● Section 118 of the LGC applies to a
situation in which a component city or
a municipality seeks to settle a
boundary dispute with a highly
urbanized city, not with
independent component city. While
Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is
an independent component city.
Clearly then, the procedure referred to
in Section 118 does not apply to
them.
● Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC
finds no application to the instant
case, the general rules governing
jurisdiction should then be used. The
applicable provision is found in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
● Since there is no law providing for the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court or
agency over the settlement of
boundary disputes between
municipality and an independent
component city of the same province,
respondent court committed no grave
abuse of discretion in denying the
Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have
general jurisdiction to adjudicate all
controversies except those expressly
withheld from their plenary powers.
They have the power not only to take
judicial cognizance of a case
instituted for judicial action for the first
time, but also to do so to the
exclusion of all other courts at that
stage. Indeed, the power is not only
original, but also exclusive.
H. Qualifications, Disqualifications
Prohibitions of Elective Officials
I. Qualifications (S39 RA7160; Nachura p.746)
1. Citizen of the Philippines
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727
FACTS:
At the time of his candidacy, Frivaldo was not
yet a Filipino citizen because his repatriation
application is yet to be approved. His
qualification is questioned, hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether the citizenship requirement
is met
HELD: Yes
an LGC does not specify a particular date when the
candidate must possess Filipino citizenship. It is
required to ensure that no alien shall govern our
people. An official begins to govern only upon
proclamation and the day his term begins. In this
case, Frivaldo took his oath before he governed,
and therefore qualified to be proclaimed.
Moreover, Sec 39 speaks of qualification of
elective officials, not candidates, and repatriation
retroacts to the date of filing of application.
2. Registered voter in the Brgy.,
municipality, city, or province, or in the
a case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, panglungsod, or bayan,
the district where he intends to be
elected
3. A resident therein for at least one year
immediately preceding the election
4. Able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect
5. Must be at least 23yo on election day
(for Governor, Vice Gov, Sangguniang
panlalawigan, mayor, vice mayor,
sangguniang panglungsod of highly
urbanized cities); 21yo (for mayor or
vice mayor of independent component
cities, component cities, or
municipalities); 18yo (sangguniang
panglungsod or bayan, punong
barangay, sangguniang barangay); at
and
least 15 but not more than 21 for
sangguniang kabataan.
2. Residence
a. Absence
Caasi vs. Court of appeals, 191 SCRA 229
Facts: Private respondent Merito Miguel was
elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan during the local elections of January
18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was
sought by herein petitioner, Mateo Caasi, on the
ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code private respondent was not
qualified because he is a green card holder,
hence, a permanent resident of the United
States of America, not of Bolinao.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a green card is proof that the
holder is a permanent resident of the United
States.
2. Whether respondent Miguel had waived his
status as a permanent resident of or immigrant
to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on
January 18, 1988.
Held: The Supreme Court held that Miguel’s
application for immigrant status and permanent
residence in the U.S. and his possession of a
green card attesting to such status are
conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident
of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the
Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status
should be as indubitable as his application for it.
Absent clear evidence that he made an
irrevocable waiver of that status or that he
surrendered his green card to the appropriate
U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of
Bolinao in the local election on January 18,
1988, the Court’s conclusion is that he was
disqualified to run for said public office, hence,
his election thereto was null and void.
Abella vs. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253
1. Silvestre de la Cruz filed a petition for
disqualification against Larrazabal for
alleged false statements in COC
regarding her residence.
2. TRO was issued by SC against
Larrazabal from being proclaimed
governor in the event that she obtains
the winning margin of votes. (Since
COMELEC was not yet fully constituted
that time)
3. Abella filed objections to COMELEC
charging Larrazabal with falsification
and misrepresentation in her residency.
4. COMELEC lifted TRO upon motion of
Larrazabal.
5. Feb 14, 1991, Comelec 2nd Division,
disqualified L. (Held: Affirmed)
6. July 18, 1991, Comelec en banc denied
L’s petition declaring decision void. –
STILL DISQUALIFIED. (Held: Affirmed)
7. COMELEC, in the same decision
disallowed Abella’s proclamation as
governor.
8. Hence, the petitions.
9. August 1, 1991 On petition by
Larrazabal for the issuance of TRO to
COMELEC, SC: CEASE AND DESIST
from enforcing decision. (Held: Lifted,
disqualification enforced)
10. Vice Gov took oath as governor thru
COMELEC resolution, Court further
resolved that Petilla (Vice Gov) should
DESIST from assuming position.
11. Position of petitioners against L:
respondent is neither a resident nor a
registered voter of Kananga, Leyte as
she claimed, but a resident of Ormoc
City, a component city but independent
of the province.
12. L: she is a resident of Kananga, Leyte.
She had intent to return (animus
revertendi) to Kananga even if she
physically transferred to Ormoc.
13. SC: There is no evidence to prove that
the petitioner temporarily left her
residence in Kananga, Leyte to pursue
any calling, profession or business.
COMELEC relied on provisions of the
Family Code.
ISSUE:
Who is the rightful governor of the province of
Leyte?
● 1. Petitioner Adelina Larrazabal who
obtained the highest number of votes
(declared winner but subsequently
disqualified by COMELEC)
● 2. Petitioner Benjamin Abella (2nd
highest but not proclaimed as gov after
disqualification of Larrazabal)
● 3. Leopoldo E. Petilla, Vice Gov of
Leyte.
HELD:
 ● Article X of the Constitution is explicit
that aside from highly-urbanized cities,
component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials are
independent of the province.
● connotes 2 prohibitions. One, from
running for, and the second, for voting
for any provincial elective official.
● Resolution of COMELEC AFFIRMED.
TRO issued against it was lifted. Costs
against petitioners.
● With regard to Abella, Larrazabal was
voted for, and election proceeded. Net
effect was that Abella lost, and
repudiated by the electorate.
● In the Firvaldo (governorship of
Sorsogon) and Labo(mayor in Baguio)
cases, this is exactly the reason why the
candidates obtaining second highest
number of votes were not allowed to
assume the positions.
Coquilla vs. COMELEC, 385 SCRA 607
FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in
Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided
there until 1965, when he was subsequently
naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US
Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and
took out a residence certificate, although he
continued making several trips to the United
States.
Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under
R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a
citizen of the Philippines.
On November 21, 2000, he applied for
registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern
Samar which was approved in 2001. On
February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of
candidacy stating that he had been a resident of
Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.
Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for
re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate
of candidacy on the ground that his statement as
to the two year residency in Oras was a material
misrepresentation as he only resided therein for
6 months after his oath as a citizen.
Before the COMELEC could render a decision,
elections commenced and Coquilla was
proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001,
COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and
ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate
of candidacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of
Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the
elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he
represented in his COC.
RULING:
No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for “two years” at the time he
filed such certificate is not true. The question is
whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering
the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for
this reason. Petitioner made a false
representation of a material fact in his certificate
of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate
liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is
involved is a false statement concerning a
candidate’s qualification for an office for which
he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a
misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully
justified.
Michelena vs. Boado, 475 SCRA 290
Facts:
1. Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the
position of mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La
Union during the May 10, 2004 Synchronized
National and Local Elections.
2. Boado sought Dumpit-Michelena’s
disqualification and the denial or cancellation of
her COC on the ground of material
misrepresentation under Sections 74 and78of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.Boado, et al. alleged
that Dumpit-Michelena, the daughter of
Congressman Tomas Dumpit, Sr. of the
SecondDistrict of La Union, is not a resident of
Agoo, La Union.
3. Boado, et al. claimed that Dumpit-Michelena
is a resident and was a registered voter of
Naguilian, La Union and that Dumpit-Michelena
only transferred her registration as voter to San
Julian West, Agoo, La Union on October 24,
2003.Dumpit-Michelena countered that she
already acquired a new domicile in San Julian
West when she purchased from her father,
Congressman Dumpit, a residential lot on April
19, 2003.
4. She even designated a caretaker of her
residential house. Dumpit-Michelena presented
the affidavits and certifications of her neighbors
in San Julian West to prove that she actually
resides in the area. COMELEC rules in favor of
Boado et al. The COMELEC En Banc denied in
its ruling the motion for reconsideration filed by
Dumpit-Michelena.
Issues:
WON Dumpit-Michelena satisfied the residency
requirement under the Local Government Code
of 1991.
Held:
Dumpit-Michelena failed to prove that she has
complied with the residency requirement. The
concept of residence in determining a
candidate’s qualification is already a settled
matter. For election purposes,residence is used
synonymously with domicile.
Torayno vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574
Facts: Vicente Emano was provincial governor
of Misamis Oriental for three terms until 1995
election and his certificate of candidacy showed
that his residence was in Tagoloan, Misamis
Oriental. On 14 June 1997, while still governor
he executed a voter registration record in
Cagayan de Oro City which is geographically
located in Misamis Oriental, claiming 20 years of
residence. He filed candidacy for mayor in the
said city and stated that his residence for the
preceding two years and five months was in the
same city. Rogelio Torayno Sr filed petition for
disqualification of Emano fo failing to meet the
residency requirement. Emano won the mayoral
post and proclaimed winner. Torayno filed for
annulment of election of Emano. COMELEC
upheld its decision.
Issue: Whether or not Emano failed the
constitutional residency requirement?
Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC
resolution affirmed. Emano was the
overwhelming choice of the people of Cagayan
de Oro. The court find it apt to reiterate the
principle that the manifest will of the people as
expressed through the ballot be given the fullest
effect. Emano was actually and physically
residing in CDO while discharging his duties as
governor and even paid his community tax
certificate in the same. The residency
requirement intends to prevent the possibility of
a “stranger unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of the community from seeing an elective
office to serve that community.”
Papandayan vs. COMELEC, 381 SCRA 133
Facts: In the May 14, 2001 elections, 3
candidates ran for the position of mayor of
Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, namely: petitioner
Papandayan Jr., respondent Balt, who was the
incumbent mayor seeking reelection, and
Bantuas. Respondent Balt sought the
disqualification of petitioner alleging that
petitioner was not a resident of Barangay
Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a
permanent resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.
Petitioner claimed that he was a resident of
Tangcal, Tubaran; that in 1990, he transferred
his domicile from Bayang to Tangcal and stayed
there with his wife, a native of Tangcal; that he
managed an agricultural land in Tubaran; and
that he filed in 1998 his COC for the position of
municipal mayor of Tubaran, which he later
withdraw.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in declaring him
disqualified in a resolution, on the ground that he
is not a resident of Tubaran.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified to
run as an elective official.
Held: No.
The petitioner has duly proven that, although he
was formerly a resident of Bayang, he later
transferred residence to Tangcal, Tubaran as
shown by his actual and physical presence
therein for 10 years prior to the May 14, 2001
elections.
Par. 39, Chapter 1, Title 2 of the Local
Government Code (RA 7160) provides that an
elective official must be a “…resident therein
(barangay, municipality, city or province) for at
least 1 year immediately preceding the day of
the election…”
Domicile and residence are synonymous. The
term residence as used in election law, imports
not only an intention to reside in a fixed place
but also personal presence in that place, couple
with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which when absent for business, pleasure, or
for like reasons, one intends to return.
Requisites in order to acquire a new domicile by
choice are: there must concur (1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an
intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile. There must be
animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi.
Gayo vs. Verceles, 452 SCRA 504
FACTS:
1. 1997 Verceles migrated to USA with
family but she retained her Filipino
citizenship
2. 1993 returned to the Philippines for
good
3. 1995 registered herself as a voter of La
Union and filed her income tax returns
4. Between 1993-1997, would travel to
USA to visit her children
5. 1997 effectively abandoned her status
as lawful resident of USA for the May
1998 elections
6. January 1998 surrendered her alien
registration
7. May 1998 elections was elected mayor
8. 2001 ran for re-election and won
ISSUE
1. WON Vercenes was able to meet residency
requirement for municipal mayor in the May
2001 elections
2. WON LGC impliedly repealed Sec 68 of the
OEC by the fact that LGC does not provide
waiver for status as permanent residents abroad
which is provided under Sec 68 of OEC
RULING
1. YES.
- Sec. 39 of the LGC of 1991 require residence
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election for local elective officials
- Abandoned status as permanent resident of
USA; surrender of green card; decision to
relocate to the Philippines; elected mayor in
1998. Thus, animus manendi (intent to remain)
in the Philippines and animus non revertendi
(without intent to return) in USA prior 2001
elections were established.
2. NO.
- Sec 40(f) LGC 1991: “Disqualified: Permanent
residents in a foreign country or those who have
acquired the right to reside abroad xxx”
- Sec 65 (e) OEC, BP 881 (1985) provides for
an exception of the disqualification “xxx unless
said person has waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country In accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws”
- Both provisions are in pari materia – they
relate to the same subject matter an thus should
be construed together and each legislative intent
is to be interpreted
- OEC is a catchphrase or a conditional cause
on how a permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country could fall outside the coverage of
prohibition
- Legislature found the inclusion of how to fall
outside the prohibition in OEC is unnecessary,
hence the deletion.
- Thus the absence of that conditional clause in
Sec. 40(f) of the LGC 1991 may be supplied by
Sec. 68 (e) of the OEC
II. Disqualification
S40, RA 7160: The following are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
1. Sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one year or
more of imprisonment, within two years
after serving such sentence
2. Those removed from office as a result of
an administrative case
3. Those convicted by final judgment for
violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic
4. Those with dual citizenship
5. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-
political cases here or abroad
6. Permanent residents in a foreign
country or those who have acquired the
right to reside abroad and continue to
avail of the same right after the
effectivity of the Code
7. The insane or feeble-minded
1. Conviction of offenses involving moral
turpitude
a. Ground
De la Torre vs. COMELEC, 258 SCRA 483
Facts:
Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991) provides that a prior
conviction of a crime becomes a ground for
disqualification from running for any elective
local position – i.e. “when the conviction is for an
offense involving moral turpitude.”
Citing above as ground, the COMELEC in a
resolution, declared petitioner disqualified from
running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti,
Laguna. COMELEC held that petitioner was
found guilty by the MTC for violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law, an offense whose nature involves
moral turpitude.
Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the
Local Government Code does not apply to his
case inasmuch as the probation granted him by
the MTC which suspended the execution of the
judgment of conviction and all other legal
consequences flowing therefrom, rendered
inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. However, he
admits all the elements of the crime of fencing.
Issue: WON the petitioner applicant is
disqualified for the coming elections due to a
crime involving moral turpitude.
Held: Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
From the definition of fencing in Sec. 2 of PD
1612, an element of the crime of fencing may be
gleaned that “the accused knows or should have
known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual
knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that
property received as stolen displays the same
degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful
property as that which animated the robbery or
theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of
moral turpitude. And although the participation of
each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point
in time and in degree, both the “fence” and the
actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft
invaded one’s peaceful dominion for gain – thus
deliberately reneging the process “private
duties” they owe their “fellowmen” in a manner
“contrary to accepted and customary rule of right
and duty, justice, honesty and good morals.”
In determining whether a criminal act involves
moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of
the general principle that crimes mala in se
involve moral turpitude while crimes mala
prohibita do not. However, SC admitted that it
cannot always be ascertained whether moral
turpitude does or does not exist by merely
classifying as crime as mala in se or as mala
prohibita. Whether or not a crime involves moral
turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the circumstance
Moreno vs. COMELEC, 498 SCRA 547
FACTS: Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition
to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong
Barangay on the ground that the latter was
convicted by final judgment of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention. The Comelec en banc
granted her petition and disqualified Moreno.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition
states no cause of action because he was
already granted probation. Allegedly, following
the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of
the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the
accessory penalties, was thereby suspended.
Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the
Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final
discharge of the probation shall operate to
restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as
a result of his conviction and to fully discharge
his liability for any fine imposed.
However, the Comelec en banc assails Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code which
provides that those sentenced by final judgment
for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence, are disqualified from running for any
elective local position. Since Moreno was
released from probation on December 20, 2000,
disqualification shall commence on this date and
end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation
to Moreno merely suspended the execution of
his sentence but did not affect his
disqualification from running for an elective local
office.
On his petition, Moreno argues that the
disqualification under the Local Government
Code applies only to those who have served
their sentence and not to probationers because
the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence.
The Probation Law should allegedly be read as
an exception to the Local Government Code
because it is a special law which applies only to
probationers. Further, even assuming that he is
disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong
Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied
pardon of his previous misconduct.
ISSUE: Does Moreno’s probation grant him the
right to run in public office?
HELD: Yes. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law
provides that "[t]he final discharge of the
probationer shall operate to restore to him all
civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction and to fully discharge his liability for
any fine imposed as to the offense for which
probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno
was finally discharged upon the court's finding
that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of
his probation, his case was deemed terminated
and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result
of his conviction were restored to him, including
the right to run for public office.
It is important to note that the disqualification
under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, a penalty which also
covers probationable offenses. In spite of this,
the provision does not specifically disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective
office.
Probation Law should be construed as an
exception to the Local Government Code. While
the Local Government Code is a later law which
sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications
of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a
special legislation which applies only to
probationers. It is a canon of statutory
construction that a later statute, general in its
terms and not expressly repealing a prior special
statute, will ordinarily not affect the special
provisions of such earlier statute.
b. Duration
Magno vs. COMELEC, 390 SCRA 495
Facts: Carlos Montes filed a petition for the
disqualification of Nestor Magno as mayoralty
candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the
May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that the
latter was previously convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery.
COMELEC granted the petition and declared
Magno disqualified from running for the position
of mayor since direct bribery is a crime involving
moral turpitude, citing Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code which disqualifies any
person convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude from being a local elective official.
According to COMELEC, inasmuch as Magno
completed the service of his sentence on March
5, 1998 when was discharged from probation,
his five-year disqualification will end only on
March 5, 2003. COMELEC denied the motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Magno argued that direct bribery is not a crime
involving moral turpitude. Likewise, he claims
that Section 40 of RA 7160 (LGC), is the law
applicable to the case, not the Omnibus Election
Code as claimed by the COMELEC.
Magno insists that he had already served his
sentence as of March 5, 1998 when he was
discharged from probation. Such being the case,
the two-year disqualification period imposed by
Section 40 of the Local Government Code
expired on March 5, 2000. Thus, he was
qualified to run in the 2001 elections.
Issue: Whether Magno is qualified
Held: YES
Both the OEC and LGC disqualifies those
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
from being a local elective official, the difference
being the prohibitive period after such
conviction. Under the OEC, the prohibitive
period is perpetual, while the LGC merely
disqualifies for two (2) years after serving the
sentence. Given that bribery is a crime involving
moral turpitude, The issue is which of the two
laws would prevail.
With LGC being the latter law, being enacted in
1992 while OEC was enacted in 1985, the
conflict must be resolved in favor of the latter
law. Hence, when Magno served his sentence,
he was only disqualified for two years.
2. Fugitive from justice
Rodriguez vs. Commission on elections, 259
SCRA 296
Facts: In 1992, petitioner Rodriguez and
respondent Marquez ran for Governor of
Quezon Province. Rodriguez won. Marquez
challenged Rodriguez’ victory via a Quo
Warranto on the ground that there is a charge
pending against him at the Los Angeles
Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims,
grand theft, etc. Thus, he is a fugitive from
justice.
COMELEC dismissed the case. Upon certiorari
to the Supreme Court, it was held that:
Fugitive from justice includes not only those
who flee after conviction to avoid punishment,
but also those who after being charged, flee
to avoid prosecution. The case was remanded
to the COMELEC to determine WON Rodriguez
is a fugitive from justice.
In 1995, Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for
Governor. Marquez filed a Petition for
Disqualification against Rodriquez on the same
ground that he is a fugitive from justice.
COMELEC then consolidated both cases and
found Rodriguez guilty based on the
authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest at LA
Court and of the felony complaint.
Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to
suspend his proclamation, the Provincial Board
of Canvassers proclaimed him.
Upon motion of Marquez, the COMELEC
nullified the proclamation. Rodriguez filed a
petition for certiorari.
Issue: Is Rodriguez a fugitive from justice as
defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ
Decision?
Held: No.
A fugitive from justice is defined as “not only
those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution.” This
indicates that the intent to evade is the
compelling factor that makes a person leave a
particular jurisdiction, and there can only be
intent to evade prosecution or punishment when
the fleeing person knows of an already instituted
indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of
conviction. Intent to evade on the part of a
candidate must therefore be established by
proof that there has already been a conviction or
at least, a charge has already been filed, at the
time of flight. This cannot be applied in the case
of Rodriguez. Rodriguez arrived in the
Philippines on June 25, 1985, five months
before the filing of the felony complaint in the
Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and
of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that
same foreign court. It was clearly impossible for
Rodriguez to have known about such felony
complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left
the US, as there was in fact no complaint and
arrest warrant — much less conviction — to
speak of yet at such time.
Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this
definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the
Quezon Province gubernatorial post.
III. Prohibitions
1.Prohibited business and pecuniary interest
(Sec. 89, RA 7160): It shall be unlawful for
any local government official or employee,
directly or indirectly, to:
a. Engage in any business transaction with
the local government unit in which he is an
official or employee or over which he has the
power of supervision, or with any of its
authorized boards, officials, agents, or
attorneys, whereby money is to be paid, or
property or any other thing of value is to be
transferred, directly or indirectly, out of the
resources of the local government unit to such
person or firm;
b. To hold such interests in any cockpit or
other games licensed by the local government
unit;
c. Purchase any real estate or other property
forfeited in favor of the local government unit
for unpaid taxes or assessment, or by virtue of
a legal process at the instance of the local
government unit;
d. Be a surety contracting or doing business
with the local government unit for which a
surety is required; and
e. Possess or use any public property of the
local government unit for private purposes.
f. The prohibitions prescribed in RA 6713
also apply.
2.Practice of profession (Sec. 9C, RA 7160).
a. All governors, city and municipal mayors
are prohibited from practicing their profession
or engaging in any occupation other than the
exercise of their functions as local chief
executives.
b. Sanggunian members may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools, except during session hours,
Provided, that those who are also members of
the Bar shall not (i) appear as counsel before
any court in any civil case wherein the local
government unit or any office, agency or
instrumental of the government is the adverse
party; (ii) appear as counsel in any criminal
case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office; (iii)
collect any fee for their appearance in
administrative proceedings involving the
government unit for which he is an official; and
(iv) use property and personnel of the
government except when the sanggunian
member concerned is defending the interest
of the government.
c. Doctors of medicine may practice their
profession even during official hours of work
only on occasions of emergency, provided
they do not derive monetary compensation
therefrom.
Javellana vs. DILG, 212 SCRA 475
By appearing as counsel for dismissed
employees, City Councilor Javellana violated
the prohibition against engaging in private
practice if such practice represents adverse to
the government.
Teves vs. Sandiganbayan, 447 SCRA 309
Since it is the Sangguniang Bayan that has
the authority to issue a license for the
establishment, operation, and maintenance of
cockpits, a mayor could not be found to have
intervened or taken part in its official capacity
in the issuance of a cockpit license because
he is not a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan, and if there is no finding that the
mayor is guilty, a fortfiori, there is no legal
basis to convict an alleged co-conspirator.
I. Succession of Elective Officials
A permanent vacancy arises when an elective
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is
permanently incapacitated to discharge the
functions of his office.
i) Governor or mayor à vice governor or
vice mayor shall become vice governor or vice
mayor
ii) Vice governor or vice mayor à the
highest ranking sanggunian member, or in
case of permanent disability, the second
highest ranking sanggunian member, and so
forth in according to their ranking (depends on
number of votes)
iii) Punong barangay à the highest
ranking sanggunian barangay member, or in
case of disability, the second highest
sanggunian barangay member
iv) Except:
a. Filled by appointment by the
President, through the ES in case of a
sanggunian panlalawigan or sanggunian
panglungsod of highly urbanized cities or
independent component cities
b. By governor in case of the
sanggunian panglungsod of component cities
and sangguniang bayan
By the city or municipal mayor in case of
sangguniang barangay upon recommendation
of sangguniang barangay.
1. Ranking
Victoria vs. COMELEC, 229 SCRA 269
The law is clear, according to the Local
Government Code, that the ranking in the
Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis
of the proportion of the votes obtained by
each winning candidate to the total number of
registered voters of each district. It does not
mention anything about factoring the number
of voters who actually voted. In such a case,
the Court has no recourse but to merely apply
the law.
2. Ineligibility of winner
Bautista vs. COMELEC, 414 SCRA 299
The will of the people as expressed through
the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility.
3. Appointment
Farina vs. Barba, 256 SCRA 396
In case the vacancy was created by a person
without a political party, the local chief
executive shall, upon recommendation of the
sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified
person to fill the vacancy.
Where the vacancy to be filled was that of a
member of the sangguniang bayan who did
not belong to any political party, the Supreme
Court held that neither the petitioner nor the
respondent was validly appointed. Not the
petitioner, because although he was
appointed by the governor, he was not
recommended by the sangguniang bayan.
Neither the respondent, because although he
was recommended by the sangguniang
bayan, he was not appointed by the governor.
4. Party of occupant of last vacancy
Navarro vs. Court of appeals, 355 SCRA 672
The “last vacancy” in the Sanggunian refers to
that created by the elevation of the member
formerly occupying the next higher in rank
which in turn also had become vacant by any
of the causes already enumerated, and the
term “last vacancy” is thus used in Section 45
(b) to differentiate it from the other vacancy
previously created.
The reason behind the right given to a political
party to nominate a replacement where a
permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian
is to maintain the party representation as
willed by the people in the election.
5. Temporary vacancy
Monzon vs. Petilla, 197 SCRA 251
The mode of succession provided for
permanent vacancies, under Sec. 49 in
connection with Sec. 52 of the Local
Government Code, in the office of Vice-
Governor, may likewise be observed in case
of a temporary vacancy occurring in the same
office.
The Supreme Court declared that even
granting that the President, acting through the
Secretary of Local Government, possesses no
power to appoint petitioner as Acting Vice
Governor, at the very least, the petitioner is a
de facto officer entitled to compensation.
There is no denying that the petitioner
assumed the office of Vice Governor under
color of appointment, exercised the duties
attached to said office for a long period of
time, and was acclaimed as such by the
people of Leyte. Under the principle of public
policy on which the de facto doctrine is based,
and on basic considerations of justice, it would
be iniquitous to now deny him the salary due
him for the services actually rendered.
J. Discipline of Local Officials
a) Elective officials
(i) Grounds
An elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended, or removed from office on any of
the following grounds:
1. Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines
2. Culpable violation of the Constitution
3. Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in
office, gross negligence or dereliction of duty
4. Commission of any offense involving moral
turpitude or an offense punishable by at least
prision mayor
5. Abuse of authority
6. Unauthorized absence for 15 consecutive
working days, except in case of members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod,
bayan and barangay
7. Application for, or acquisition of, foreign
citizenship or residence or the status of an
immigrant of another country
8. Such other grounds as may be provided in
this Code and other laws
(ii) Jurisdiction
· Provincial, highly urbanized city, or
independent component city --- Office of the
President
· Elective municipal officials --- Sangguniang
panlalawigan --- Office of the President
· Elective barangay officials --- Sangguniang
panlungsod or bayan. It shall be final and
executory.
(iii) Preventive suspension
Preventive suspension may be imposed by
the President, the governor, or the mayor [as
the case may be] at any time after the issues
are joined, when the evidence of guilt is
strong, and given the gravity of the offense,
there is great probability that the continuance
in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence.
This authority is concurrent with the
Ombudsman.
Any single preventive suspension (by the
President, governor, or office of the mayor)
shall not extend beyond 60 days. The
Ombudsman can preventively suspend up to
6 months (but for local officials, only 60 days).
In the event that several administrative cases
are filed against the same official, he cannot
be suspended for more than 90 days within a
single year on the same ground or grounds
existing at the time of the first suspension.
Rule: The penalty of suspension imposed
upon the respondent shall not exceed his
unexpired term, or a period of 6 months for
every administrative offense, nor shall said
penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the
respondent as long as he meets the
qualifications required for office.
(iv) Removal
The penalty of dismissal from service may be
imposed upon an erring local executive official
only by a court of law.
Under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code,
the penalty of removal from office as result of
an administrative case shall bar to the
candidacy of the respondent for any elective
local office.
(v) Administrative appeal
Decisions may, within 30 days from receipt
thereof, be appealed to:
i) Decisions of component cities,
sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang
bayan --- sangguniang panlalawigan
Sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panglungsod of highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities --- Office of the
President. This shall be final and executory.
(vi) Doctrine of Condonation
The re-election of a local official bars the
continuation of the administrative case against
him, inasmuch as the reelection of the official
is tantamount to condonation by the people of
whatever past misdeeds he may have
committed.
1. Grounds
Salalima vs. Guingona, 257 SCRA 55
An elective local official may be removed from
office on the grounds enumerated above by
order of the proper court. Assuming then that
the findings and conclusions of the OP in each
of the subject administrative cases are
correct, it committed no grave abuse of
discretion in imposing the penalty of
suspension, although the aggregate thereof
exceeded six months and the unexpired term
of the petitioners’ term of office.
2. Effect of Appeal of Finding of Commission
on Audit
Salalima vs. Guingona, 257 SCRA 55
The administrative investigation can proceed
even during the pendency of an appeal of
audit findings to the Commission of Audit.
3. Procedure
a. Preventive suspension
i. Valid Suspension
Joson vs. Torres, 290 SCRA 279
Preventive suspension may be imposed by
the disciplining authority any time:
o After the issues are joined
o When the evidence of guilt is strong
o Given the gravity of the offense, there is
great probability that the respondent, who
continues to hold office, could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence.
When the petitioner failed to file his answer
despite the many opportunities given to him,
he was deemed to have waived his right to
answer and to present evidence. At that point,
the issues were deemed joined, and it was
proper for the Executive Secretary to suspend
him, inasmuch as the Secretary found that the
evidence of guilt was strong and that
continuance in office could influence the
witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the evidence against him.
Miranda vs. Sandiganbayan, 464 SCRA 165
The remedy to an order of suspension is to
assail the validity of the order.
If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of
respect for the rule of law, they should have
assailed the validity of the order of suspension
in court instead of taking the law into their own
hands.
ii. Void suspension
Joson vs. Court of appeals, 582 SCRA 360
The requisites for a valid preventive
suspension requires that evidence of guilt
must be strong and that given the gravity of
the offense, there is great probability that the
continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence.
b. Decisions
i. Validity
Malinao vs. Reyes, 255 SCRA 616
In order to render a decision in administrative
cases involving elective officials, the decision
of the Sanggunian must be in writing, stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and reasons for
such decision. What the Sanggunian,
therefore, did, on August 12, 1994, was not to
render a decision.
ii. Penalty
Salalima vs. Guingona, 257 SCRA 55
The penalty of suspension should not exceed
six months or the unexpired portion of the
term of office of the respondent for every
administrative offense. An administrative
offense means every act or conduct or
omission which amounts to, or constitutes,
any of the grounds for disciplinary action. The
offenses for which suspension may be
imposed are enumerated in Sec. 60 of the
LGC.
Assuming then that the findings and
conclusions of the Office of the President in
each of the subject four administrative cases
are correct, it committed no grave abuse of
discretion in imposing the penalty of
suspension, although the aggregate thereof
exceeds six months, and the unexpired
portion of the petitioners’ term of office. The
fact remains that the suspension imposed for
each administrative offense did not exceed six
months, and there was an express provision
that the successive service of suspension
should not exceed the unexpired portion of the
term of office of the petitioners.
The Office of the President is without any
power to remove elected officials, since such
power is exclusively vested in proper courts
as expressly provided in the last paragraph of
Section 60 of the LGC.
Pablico vs. Villapando, 385 SCRA 601
It was held that by virtue of Sec. 60 the LGC,
which provides that “an elective local official
may be removed from office on grounds
enumerated by order of the proper court, the
penalty of dismissal from the service may be
imposed upon an erring local elective official
only by a court of law. The provisions of the
IRR granting the disciplining authority the
power to remove an elective local official
administratively are invalid.
c. Appeal
i. Availability of Appeal
Malinao vs. Reyes, 255 SCRA 616
Petitioner brought this case by way of petition
for certiorari and mandamus. A prime
specification of the writ of certiorari, however,
is that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law available to petitioner. But in the case
at bar, petitioner could have appealed the
decision of the Sanggunian to the Office of the
President as provided in Sec. 67(b) of the
LGC.
ii. Execution Pending Appeal
Calingin vs. Court of Appeals, 439 SCRA 173
The decisions of the Office of the President
under the Local Government Code are
immediately executory even pending appeal.
Berces vs. Guingona, 241 SCRA 539
The first sentence of Sec. 68 of the LGC
merely provides that “an appeal shall not
prevent a decision from becoming final or
executory.” As worded, there is room to
construe said provision as giving discretion to
the reviewing officials to stay the execution of
the appealed decision. There is nothing to
infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are
deprived of the authority to order a stay of the
appealed order.
The Supreme Court pointed that AO No. 18
authorizes the Office of the President to stay
the execution of a decision pending appeal.
AO No. 18 was not repealed by the LGC.
d. Effect of Re-election
Aguinaldo vs. Santos, 212 SCRA 768
The rule is that a public official cannot be
removed for administrative conduct committed
during a prior term, since his re-election to
office operates as a condonation of the
officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
b) Appointive officials
J. Recall

1. Initiation
Angobung vs. COMELEC, 269 SCRA 245
The petition to initiate recall proceedings must
be of or by, at least 25% of the total number of
registered voters, i.e., the petition must be
filed, not by one person only, but by at least
25% of the total number of registered voters.
2. Limitations
Paras vs. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 49
SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall.—(a) Any
elective local official may be the subject of a
recall election only once during his term of
office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1)
year from the date of the official’s assumption
to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election.
Claudio vs. COMELEC, 331 SCRA 388
Since the power vested on the electorate is
not the power to initiate recall proceedings but
the power to elect an official into office, the
limitations in §74 of the Local Government
Code cannot be deemed to apply to the entire
recall proceedings—the limitations in Section
74 apply only to the exercise of the power of
recall which is vested in the registered voters.
The limitations in §74 cannot be deemed to
apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other
words, the term “recall” in paragraph (b) refers
only to the recall election, excluding the
convening of the PRA (Preparatory recall
Assembly) and the filing of a petition for recall
with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the
signatures of at least 25% of the voters for a
petition for recall.
3. Mootness
Afiado vs. COMELEC, 340 SCRA 600
The assumption by legal succession of the
petitioner as the new Mayor of Santiago City
is a supervening event which rendered the
recall proceeding against her moot and
academic.
K. Term limits
Section 8, Article X, Philippine Constitution
1. Term
Galarosa vs. Valencia, 227 SCRA 728
- Galarosa is the incumbent president of the
Association of Barangay Councils of Sorsogon
- He was appointed as a member of the
Sanggunuiang Bayan (Pursuant to EO 342)
- As a member of the Sangguniang Bayan,
Galarosa’s term expired on June 30, 1992.
Issue & Held:
Whether Galarosa could continue to serve as
a member of the Sangguniang Bayan beyond
his term of appointment?
YES. The rule is settled that unless holding
over be expressly or impliedly prohibited, the
incumbent may continue to hold-over until
some one else is elected and qualified to
assume office.—
The application of the hold-over doctrine in
both the aforementioned provisions of the IRR
and the issuances of the DILG should be
upheld. The rule is settled that unless “holding
over be expressly or impliedly prohibited, the
incumbent may continue to hold over until
some one else is elected and qualified to
assume the office.” This rule is demanded by
the “most obvious requirements of public
policy, for without it there must frequently be
cases where, from a failure to elect or a refusal
or neglect to qualify, the office would be
vacant and the public service entirely
suspended.” Otherwise stated, the purpose is
to prevent a hiatus in the government pending
the time when the successor may be chosen
and inducted into office. Section 494 of the
Local Government Code could not have been
intended to allow a gap in the representation
of the barangays, through the presidents of the
ABC, in the sanggunian. Since the term of
office of the punong barangay selected in the
28 March 1989 election and the term of office
of the presidents of the ABC have not yet
expired and taking into account the special
role conferred upon and the broader powers
and functions invested in the barangays by the
Code as a basic political unit, as a primary
planning and implementing unit of
government policies in the community, and as
a forum wherein the collective views of the
people may be expressed and considered and
where disputes may be amicably settled, it
would be in harmony with sound logic to infer
that the Code never intended to deprive the
barangays of their representation in the
sangguniang bayan during the interregnum
when the liga has yet to be formally organized
with the election of its officers.
Sambarani vs. Commission on elections, 438
SCRA 319
- During the 2002 Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections, Sambarani ran as Punong
Barangay
- COMELEC issued a Resolution declaring a
failure of elections in Lanao del Sur, and a Special
Election was set on Aug. 13, 2002.
- No Special Elections were held on Aug. 13.
- COMELEC refused to hold another special
election due citing Sec. 6, of the Omnibus Election
Code “special elections shall be HELD ON A
DATE REASONABLY CLOSE TO THE DATE
OF THE ELECTION NOT HELD, but not later
than thirty days after cessation of the cause of such
postponement.”
- COMELEC then left to the DILG to Appoint
Barangay Captains, Kagawads, etc.
- Sambarani argues that as the incumbent punong
barangay, he should remain in office in a Hold
Over Capacity
Whether Sarambani is correct in arguing that as
the Incumbent Punong Barangay, he should
remain in office in a Hold Over Capacity?
YES Since there was a failure of elections in the
15 July 2002 regular elections and in the 13
August 2002 special elections, petitioners can
legally remain in office as barangay chairmen of
their respective barangays in a hold-over capacity.
As the law now stands, the language of Section 5
of RA 9164 is clear. It is the duty of this Court to
apply the plain meaning of the language of Section
5. Since there was a failure of elections in the 15
July 2002 regular elections and in the 13 August
2002 special elections, petitioners can legally
remain in office as barangay chairmen of their
respective barangays in a hold-over capacity. They
shall continue to discharge their powers and duties
as punong barangay, and enjoy the rights and
privileges pertaining to the office. True, Section
43(c) of the Local Government Code limits the
term of elective barangay officials to three years.
However, Section 5 of RA 9164 explicitly
provides that incumbent barangay officials may
continue in office in a hold over capacity until their
successors are elected and qualified.
2. Term Limits
Borja v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157
- Capco was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros
- He became the Mayor by operation of law upon
the death of the incumbent Mayor
- Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two
more terms
- Capco then filed his Certificate of Candidacy as
Mayor for the 1998 elections
- Borja sought Capco’s disqualification on the
ground that Capco had already served for (3)
consecutive terms as mayor
Whether Capco’s has already satisfied the (3) term
limit?
NO
- It is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local
office—he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.—To
recapitulate, the term limit for elective local
officials must be taken to refer to the right to
be elected as well as the right to serve in the
same elective position. Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office,
he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply.

Lozanida v. COMELEC, GR No. 135150, July
28, 1999
- Lozanida was elected and served as Municipal
Mayor of San Antonio Zambales during the
a) 1989-1992 term
b) 1992-1995 term
c) 1995-1998 term
- The 1995 election was protested and was
eventually declared by COMELEC as null and
void on the ground of failure of elections
- Three months before the 1998 elections Lozanida
vacated his post in light of COMELEC’s decision
that there was a failure of elections
- Lozanida proceeded to file his certificate of
candidacy for the 1998 elections for Mayor
Whether Lozanida has satisfied the (3) term limit
rule, thus barring him from running in the 1998
Mayoral Elections?
NO
- Conditions for the application of the
disqualification: 1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms
in the same local government post and 2) that
he has fully served three consecutive terms.—
This Court held that the two conditions for the
application of the disqualification must
concur: 1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post and 2) that he has
fully served three consecutive terms. It stated:
“To recapitulate, the term limit for elective
local officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve
in the same elective position. Consequently, it
is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.”
- Voluntary renunciation of a term does not
cancel the renounced term in the computation
of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts
to an interruption of continuity of service.
- A proclamation subsequently declared void
is no proclamation at all and while a
proclaimed candidate may assume office on
the strength of the proclamation of the Board
of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner
who assumes office subject to the final
outcome of the election protest.
Adormeo v. COMELEC, GR No. 147927,
February 4, 2002
- Talaga served as Mayor of Lucena during the
a) 1992-1995 term
b) 1995-1998 term
- Talaga then lost the 1998 elections to Tagarao
- Before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term ended, a
Recall Election was conducted on May 2000
- Talaga won the Recall Election
- Talaga then ran for Mayor in the 2001 Mayoral
Election
Whether Talaga has already satisfied the (3) term
limit rule, thus barring him from running in the
2001 Elections?
NO
The term limit for elective local officials must be
taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual
has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply.
For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen.
The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by
his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between
his second term and the recall election is sufficient
interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive
terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in
the LGC.
Talaga only served two consecutive full terms.
There was a disruption when he was defeated in
the 1998 elections. His election during the 2000
recall election is not a continuation of his two
previous terms which could constitute his third
term thereby barring him for running for a fourth
term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the
“voluntary renunciation” contemplated by the law.
Socrates v. COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457 (2002)
 was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn
- Hagedorn was elected as Mayor of Puerto was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly
Princessa for three (3) Consecutive terms an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s
a) 1992-1995 service as mayor, not because of his voluntary
b) 1995-1998 renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition.
c) 1998-2001
- Hagedorn did not run in the 2001 elections
- The incumbent Mayor, midway into his term,
faced a Recall Election. Latasa v. COMELEC, GR No. 154829, Dec. 10,
- Hagedorn ran for the unexpired term of the 2003
Mayor that was subjected to the Recall Election
- Socrates, sought the disqualification of Hagedorn
- Latasa was elected Mayor of the
for violating the three (3) term limit rule
MUNICIPALITY of Digos during the 1992,
1995, 1998 terms
Whether Hagedorn violated the three (3) term limit
- The Municipality of Digos was converted to a
rule?
City
- Thus, Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy for
NO
Mayor in the 2001 elections
- These constitutional and statutory provisions
- Sunga argues that Latasa had already satisfied the
have two parts. The first part provides that an
(3) term limit rule, as such the latter was cannot
elective local official cannot serve for more than
run for a 4th term as Mayor
three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that
- Latasa argues that the Conversion of the
only consecutive terms count in determining the
Municipality to a City allowed him to run again as
three-¬term limit rule. The second part states that
the former is separate and distinct from the latter.
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
Thus, he was vying for a different governmental
time does not interrupt the continuity of service.
post
The clear intent is that involuntary severance from
office for any length of time interrupts continuity
Whether Latasa is eligible to run for Mayor of the
of service and prevents the service before and after
City of Digos?
the interruption from being joined together to form
a continuous service or consecutive terms.
NO
- True, the new city acquired a new corporate
After three consecutive terms, an elective official
existence separate and distinct from that of the
cannot immediate re-election for a fourth term,
municipality. This does not mean, however, that
The prohibited election refers to the next regular
for the purpose of applying the subject
election for a fourth term. The prohibited election
Constitutional provision, the office of the
refers to the next regular election for the same
municipal mayor would now be construed as a
office following the same office following the third
different local government post as that of the office
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a
of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial
recall election, is no longer covered by the
jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that
prohibitionfor two reasons:
of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants
1) A subsequent election like a recall election, is
of the municipality are the same as those in the
no longer an immediate reelection after the three
city. These inhabitants are the same group of
consecutive terms; and
voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their
2) The intervening period constitutes an
municipal mayor for three consecutive terms.
involuntary interruption in the continuity of
These are also the same inhabitants over whom he
service.
held power and authority as their chief executive
for nine years.
After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30,
- The framers of the Constitution specifically
2001, he became a private citizen until the recall
included an exception to the peoples freedom to
election of September 24, 2002 when he won by
choose those who will govern them in order to
3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the
September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa
same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for kagawads (as in the Code).
the position of city mayor after having served for - In enacting the general appropriations act of
three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor 1997, Congress appropriated the amount of P400
would obviously defeat the very intent of the million to cover expenses for the holding of
framers when they wrote this exception. Should he barangay elections this year. Likewise, under Sec.
be allowed another three consecutive terms as 7 of RA 8189, Congress ordained that a general
mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then registration of voters shall be held “immediately
be possibly holding office as chief executive over after the barangay elections in 1997.” These are
the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for clear and express contemporaneous statements of
a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the Congress that barangay officials shall be elected
very scenario sought to be avoided by the this May, in accordance with Sec. 43-c of RA
Constitution, if not abhorred by it 7160.
- In Paras vs. Comelec, this Court said that “the
next regular election involving the barangay office
concerned is barely 7 months away, the same
David v. COMELEC, 271 SCRA 90 (1997) having been scheduled in May, 1997.” This
judicial decision is “part of the legal system of the
Philippines (NCC 8).”
- David, in his capacity as barangay chairman and
- RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically
as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa
applies to local government units. It specifically
Pilipinas, filed a petition to prohibit the holding of
and definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that “the
the barangay election scheduled on the second
term of office of barangay officials shall be for
Monday of May 1997.
three years.” It is a special provision that applies
- Meanwhile, Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City
only to the term of barangay officials who were
Chapter also filed a petition to seek a judicial
elected on the second Monday of May 1994. With
review by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional:
such particularity, the provision cannot be deemed
(1) Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160; (2) COMELEC
a general law.
Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of
the holding of the barangay elections on May 12,
2. Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to
1997 and other activities related thereto; and, (3)
only three years constitutional? (YES)
The budgetary appropriation of P400 million
Three-Year Term Not Repugnant to Constitution
contained in Republic Act No. 8250 (General
- The Constitution did not expressly prohibit
Appropriations Act of 1997) intended to defray the
Congress from fixing any term of office for
costs and expenses in holding the 1997 barangay
barangay officials. It merely left the determination
elections.
of such term to the lawmaking body, without any
- Petitioners contend that under RA 6679, the term
specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving
of office of barangay officials is 5 years. Although
to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in
the LGC reduced the term of office of all local
accordance with the exigencies of public service. It
elective officials to three years, such reduction
must be remembered that every law has in its favor
does not apply to barangay officials.
the presumption of constitutionality. The
- As amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q.
petitioners have miserably failed to discharge this
Pimentel, Jr. urges the Court to deny the petitions.
burden and to show clearly the unconstitutionality
they aver.
1. Which law governs the term of office of
- Constitutional Commission on how long the term
barangay officials: RA 7160 or RA 6679? (RA
of barangay officials is: “As may be determined by
7160 – 3 years)
law”; more precisely, “as provided for in the Local
Clear Legislative Intent and Design to Limit Term
Autonomy Code (Sec 43-c limits their term to 3
to Three Years
years).”
- RA 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. It is
basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict
3. Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term
between two laws, the later enactment prevails.
other than that provided under RA 7160? (YES)
(Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.)
- Barangay officials are estopped from asking for
- During the barangay elections held on May 9,
any term other than that which they ran for and
1994 (second Monday), the voters actually and
were elected to, under the law governing their very
directly elected one punong barangay and seven
claim to such offices: namely, the LGC.
Petitioners’ belated claim of ignorance as to what
law governed their election to office in 1994 is
unacceptable because under NCC 3, “ignorance of
the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.”
Rivera v. COMELEC – 523 SCRA 41
- Morales was elected Mayor of Mabalacat for the
a) 1995-1998 term
b) 1998-2001 term
c) 2001-2004 term
- During his 1998-2001 term, Morales was
preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an
anti-graft case and declared by the RTC as a “De
Facto Officer” due to his Void Proclamation
- In the 2004 election filed his certificate of
candidacy
Whether Morales already satisfied the (3) term
limit?
YES
Respondent Morales was elected for the term
1998-2001. He assumed the position. He was
mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the
Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case
filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (Morales) as
mayor (because the trial court’s ruling was
promulgated only after the expiry of the 1998-2001
term). Respondent Morales is now serving his
fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat
continuously without any break since 1995. In just
over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been
mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous
years. His assumption of office for the second term
constituted “service for the full term” and should
be counted as a full term served in contemplation
of the three-term limit prescribed by the
constitutional and statutory provisions barring
local elective officials from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive terms for
the same position.
For the three-term limit for elective local
government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post, and (2)
that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Montebon v. COMELEC, 551 SCRA 50
Montebon had been elected for three
consecutive terms as municipal
councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998,
2001, and 2004 elections. However,
in January 2004, or during his
second term, he succeeded and
assumed the position of vice-mayor
of Tuburan when the incumbent
vice-mayor retired. When he filed
his certificate of candidacy again as
municipal councilor for 2007
elections, a petition for
disqualification was filed against
him based on the three-term limit
rule. In his answer, Montebon
argued that he cannot be
disqualified on the ground of the 3-
term limit rule because his second
term was interrupted when he
assumed the position of vice-
¬mayor due to the retirement of
elected vice¬mayor Petronilo
Mendoza. Petitioners maintained
that Montebon's assumption of
office as vice-mayor in January
2004 should not be considered an
interruption in the service of his
second term since it was a voluntary
renunciation of his office as
municipal councilor.
Issue:
Was Montebon's assumption to the
vice-mayoralty position considered
an involuntary severance or
interruption?
Held:
Yes. Succession in local
government offices is by operation
of law. Section 44 of Republic Act
No. 7160, provides that if a
permanent vacancy occurs in the
office of the vice mayor, the highest
ranking sanggunian member shall
become vice mayor.
The legal successor is not given any
option under the law on whether to
accept the vacated post or not.
Section 44 of the Local Government
Code makes no exception. Only if
the highest-¬ranking councilor is
permanently unable to succeed to
the post does the law speak of
alternate succession. Under no
circumstances can simple refusal of
the official concerned be considered
as permanent inability within the
contemplation of law. Essentially
therefore, the successor cannot
refuse to assume the office that he is
mandated to occupy by virtue of
succession. He can only do so if for
some reason he is permanently
unable to succeed and occupy the
post vacated.
Thus, succession by law to a
vacated government office is
characteristically not voluntary
since it involves the performance of
a public duty by a government
official, the non-¬performance of
which exposes said official to
possible administrative and criminal
charges of dereliction of duty and
neglect in the performance of public
functions. It is therefore more
compulsory and obligatory rather
than voluntary.
In this case, a permanent vacancy
occurred in the office of the vice-
mayor due to the retirement of Vice
Mayor Mendoza. Montebon, being
the highest ranking municipal
councilor, succeeded him in
accordance with law. Thus,
Montebon's assumption of office as
vice-¬mayor in January 2004 was
an involuntary severance from his
office as municipal councilor,
resulting in an interruption in the
service of his 2001-¬2004 term. It
cannot be deemed to have been by
reason of voluntary renunciation
because it was by operation of law.
(Montebon vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
180444. April 9, 2008)
Note:
● Since the law no less allowed
Montebon to vacate his post as
councilor in order to assume office
as vicemayor, his occupation of the
higher office cannot, without more,
be deemed as a voluntary
renunciation of his position as
councilor.
Ong v. Alegre, GR No. 163295, January 23,
2006
Facts: A candidate was disqualified by the
COMELEC en banc to run for mayor for he
has served for three-consecutive terms.
During his second term, the opposing party
filed a protest and the RTC declared the
opposing party as the duly elected mayor.
However, such decision came out three years
after and when the candidate has already
started his third term. Since the COMELEC
disqualified the candidate, his political party
nominated the brother of the candidate as a
substitute. The COMELEC denied due course
the certificate of candidacy in the same
mayoralty election as substitute for his
brother.
Issues:
(a) Whether the assumption of office as
mayor from July 1,1998 to June 30, 2001
may be considered as one full term
service in the context of the consecutive
three-term limit rule.
(b) Whether the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it denied
due course the certificate of candidacy in
the same mayoralty election as substitute
for his brother.
Held:
(a) YES. We hold that such assumption
of office constitutes, " service for the full
term", and should be counted as a full
term served in contemplation of the three-
term limit prescribed by the constitutional
and statutory provisions, supra, barring
local elective officials from being elected
and serving for more than three
consecutive term for the same position.
For the three-term limit for elective
local government officials to apply,
two conditions or requisites must
concur, to wit: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and (2) that he has
fully served three consecutive terms.
(b) NO. A candidate whose certificate of
candidacy has been cancelled or not
given due course cannot be substituted by
another belonging to the same political
party as that of the former.
A person without a valid certificate of
candidacy cannot be considered a
candidate in much the same way as
any person who has not filed any
certificate of candidacy at all cannot,
by any stretch of the imagination, be a
candidate at all.
Laceda v. Lumena – GR 182867, November 25,
2008
FACTS: Petitioner Laceda and private
respondent Limena were candidates for
Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan,
West District, Sorsogon City, during the
October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections. On October 23, 2007,
Limena filed a petition for disqualification
and/or declaration as an ineligible candidate
against Laceda before the COMELEC,
contending that Laceda had already served as
Punong Barangay for Brgy. Panlayaan for
three consecutive terms since 1994, and was
thus prohibited from running for the fourth time
under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9164.
Limena likewise attached the following
certification from the DILG:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that per records in this
office HON. ROBERTO LACEDA, SR.,
incumbent Punong Barangay of Panlayaan,
West District, Sorsogon City. was elected as
Punong Barangay during the May 9, 1994,
May 12, 1997 and July 15, 2002 Barangay
Elections. He resigned from office on March
20, 1995 to run as Municipal Councilor.
Hence, he is covered by the three-term rule of
paragraph 2, Section 2 of RA 9164 which
provides that: No barangay elective official
shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position: Provided,
however, that the term of office shall be
reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections.
Voluntary renunciation of office [for] any length
of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official was
elected.

In his Answer, Laceda admitted having served
as Punong Barangay of Panlayaan for three
consecutive terms. However, he asserted that
when he was elected for his first two terms,
Sorsogon was still a municipality, and that
when he served his third term, the Municipality
of Sorsogon had already been merged with
the Municipality of Bacon to form a new
political unit, the City of Sorsogon, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 8806. Thus, he argued that
his third term was actually just his first in the
new political unit and that he was accordingly
entitled to run for two more terms. He likewise
argued that assuming he had already served
three consecutive terms, Rep. Act No. 9164
which imposes the three-term limit, cannot be
made to apply to him as it would violate his
vested right to office. He alleged that when he
was elected in 1994 the prohibition did not
exist. Had he known that there will be a law
preventing him to run for the fourth time, he
would not have run for office in 1994 as he
was looking forward to the election in 2007.
ISSUE: Whether Laceda served his third term
in a new political unit and therefore he should
not be deemed already to have served a third
term as Punong Barangay for purposes of
applying the three-term limit.
HELD: NO. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164,
like Section 43 of the LGC from which it was
taken, is primarily intended to broaden the
choices of the electorate of the candidates
who will run for office, and to infuse new blood
in the political arena by disqualifying officials
from running for the same office after a term
of nine years. This Court has held that for the
prohibition to apply, two requisites must
concur: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post and (2) that
he or she has fully served three consecutive
terms.
While it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806
the municipalities of Sorsogon and Bacon
were merged and converted into a city thereby
abolishing the former and creating Sorsogon
City as a new political unit, it cannot be said
that for the purpose of applying the prohibition
in Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, the office of
Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan,
Municipality of Sorsogon, would now be
construed as a different local government post
as that of the office of Punong Barangay of
Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City. The
territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan,
Sorsogon City, is the same as before the
conversion. Consequently, the inhabitants of
the barangay are the same. They are the
same group of voters who elected Laceda to
be their Punong Barangay for three
consecutive terms and over whom Laceda
held power and authority as their Punong
Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did
not interrupt Laceda’s term.
In Latasa v. Commission on Elections, this
Court held that where a person has been
elected for three consecutive terms as a
municipal mayor and prior to the end or
termination of such three-year term the
municipality has been converted by law into a
city, without the city charter interrupting his
term until the end of the three-year term, the
prohibition applies to prevent him from running
for the fourth time as city mayor thereof, there
being no break in the continuity of the terms.
Thus, the COMELEC did not err nor commit
any abuse of discretion when it declared
Laceda disqualified and cancelled his
certificate of candidacy.
Dizon v. COMELEC, GR No. 182088, January
30, 2009
FACTS: Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of
Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the
COMELEC to disqualify Morales, the
incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the ground
that the latter was elected and had fully
served three previous consecutive terms in
violation of Section 43 of the LGC. Dizon
alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in
1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales
should not have been allowed to have filed his
CoC on March 2007 for the same position and
same municipality.
Morales, on the other hand, contended that he
is still eligible and qualified to run as mayor of
Mabalacat because he was not elected for the
said position in the 1998 elections. He averred
that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the
decision of the RTC declaring Dee as the duly
elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998
elections. Thus, he was not elected for the
said position in the 1998 elections. His term
should be reckoned from 2001. He added that
his election in 2004 is only for his second
term.
COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of
Morales and denied the petition. It took judicial
notice of SC’s ruling in the Rivera case
promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was
held that Morales was elected as mayor of
Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001
(notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an
electoral protest case that the then
proclamation of Morales was void). The SC
ruled in that case that Morales violated the
three--term limit under Section 43 of the LGC.
Hence, Morales was considered not a
candidate in the 2004 elections, and this
failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a
gap and allows him to run again for the same
position in 2007 elections.
ISSUES:
1. W the period served by Morales in the
2004--2007 term (although he was ousted
from his office as Mayor on May 16, 2007)
should be considered his fourth term.
2. W the 2007--2010 term of Morales is his 5th
term.
HELD:
1. NO. This Court unseated Morales during
his fourth term. We cancelled his CoC dated
30 December 2003. This cancellation
disqualified Morales from being a candidate in
the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for
Morales were considered stray votes.
Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution
and Section 43(b) of the LGC state that the
term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, shall be three years, and
no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
There should be a concurrence of two
conditions for the application of the
disqualification: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms
in the same local government post and (2)
that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.
In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was
elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four
consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007. We disqualified
Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004
elections because of the three-term limit.
Although the trial court previously ruled that
Morales’ proclamation for the 1998-2001 term
was void, there was no interruption of the
continuity of Morales’ service with respect to
the 1998-2001 term because the trial court’s
ruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001,
or after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as
Morales’ involuntary severance from office
with respect to the 2004-2007 term.
Involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by
law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. Our decision in the Rivera case was
promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective
immediately. The next day, Morales notified
the vice mayor’s office of our decision. The
vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor
from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The
assumption by the vice mayor of the office of
the mayor, no matter how short it may seem
to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of
service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for
the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007.
(4th term)
2. NO. Morales occupied the position of mayor
of Mabalacat for the following periods: 1995-
1998; 1998-2001; 2001-2004; and 2004-2007.
However, because of his disqualification,
Morales was not the duly elected mayor for
the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold
the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full
term. Morales cannot be deemed to have
served the full term of 2004-2007 because he
was ordered to vacate his post before the
expiration of the term. Morales’ occupancy of
the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 2004-
2007 cannot be counted as a term for
purposes of computing the three-term limit.
Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30
June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of
the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1
July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively
Morales’ first term for purposes of the three-
term limit rule.
Alboin v. COMELEC, GR No. 184836,
December 23, 2009
Bolos v. COMELEC – 581 SCRA 786 [2009]
FACTS: Petitioner Bolos was elected as the
Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis,
Bohol for 3 consecutive terms (1994,1997,
2002).
In May 2004, during his incumbency, he ran
for Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won. He
assumed office on July 1, 2004 leaving his
post as Punong Barangay.
After serving his term as a councilor he filed
his candidacy for the position of Punong
Barangay in the October 29, 2007 Barangay
and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
Cinconiegue, then incumbent Punong
Barangay and also a candidate for the same
office, filed a petition for disqualification on the
ground that Bolos Jr. has already served the
maximum limit of three- term hence no longer
eligible to run and hold the position.
Cinconiegue contended that Bolos’
relinquishment of the position of Punong
Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his
part, as it could be presumed that it was his
personal decision to run as municipal
councilor in the May 14, 2004 National and
Local Elections. He added that petitioner knew
that if he won and assumed the position, there
would be a voluntary renunciation of his post
as Punong Barangay.
In his Answer, petitioner argued that when he
assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan
member, he left his post as Punong Barangay
by operation of law; hence, it must be
considered as an involuntary interruption in
the continuity of his last term of service.
Pending the resolution of the case before the
COMELEC, Bolos Jr. won in the election.
ISSUE: Whether there was a voluntary
renunciation of the office of Punong Barangay
by Bolos Jr. when he assumed the post of
Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to
have served for three consecutive terms.
HELD: YES. The three--term limit for elective
official is contained in Sec. 8, Article X of the
Constitution states:
“Section 8. The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was
elected.”
The LGC provides for the term of office of
Barangay Officials:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. – x x x (b) No local
elective official shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was
elected.
(c) The term of barangay officials and
members of the sangguniang kabataan
shall be for five (5) years, which shall
begin after the regular election of barangay
officials on the second Monday of May
1997: Provided, that the sangguniang
kabataan members who were elected in the
May 1996 elections shall serve until the
next regular election of barangay officials.
Socrates v. Comelec held that the rule on the
three-term limit, embodied in the Constitution
and the LGC, has two parts: x x x The first
part provides that an elective local official
cannot serve for more than three consecutive
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive
terms count in determining the three-term limit
rule. The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time
does not interrupt the continuity of service.
The clear intent is that involuntary severance
from office for any length of time interrupts
continuity of service and prevents the service
before and after the interruption from being
joined together to form a continuous service or
consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective
local official cannot seek immediate reelection
for a fourth term. The prohibited election
refers to the next regular election for the same
office following the end of the third
consecutive term.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec, the Court stated
that the second part of the rule on the three-
term limit shows the clear intent of the framers
of the Constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time
respect the people’s choice and grant their
elected official full service of a term. The Court
held that two conditions for the application of
the disqualification must concur: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same government
post; and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner
was elected as Punong Barangay for three
consecutive terms, satisfying the first
condition for disqualification.
What is to be determined is whether petitioner
is deemed to have voluntarily renounced his
position as Punong Barangay during his third
term when he ran for and won as
Sangguniang Bayan member and assumed
said office.
The Court agrees with the COMELEC that
petitioner’s relinquishment of the office of
Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as
a consequence of his assumption to office as
Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol,
on July 1, 2004, is a voluntary renunciation.
When petitioner filed his certificate of
candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang
Bayan, he was not deemed resigned.
Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit
of his election as municipal councilor point out
to an intent and readiness to give up his post
as Punong Barangay once elected to the
higher elective office, for it was very unlikely
that respondent had filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan post,
campaigned and exhorted the municipal
electorate to vote for him as such and then
after being elected and proclaimed, return to
his former position. He knew that his election
as municipal councilor would entail
abandonment of the position he held, and he
intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like
resignation, is voluntary.
Petitioner erroneously argues that when he
assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan
member, he left his post as Punong Barangay
by operation of law; hence, he did not fully
serve his third term as Punong Barangay.
The term "operation of law" is defined by the
Philippine Legal Encyclopedia as "a term
describing the fact that rights may be acquired
or lost by the effect of a legal rule without any
act of the person affected." Black's Law
Dictionary also defines it as a term that
"expresses the manner in which rights, and
sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person
by the mere application to the particular
transaction of the established rules of law,
without the act or cooperation of the party
himself.
An interruption in the service of a term of
office, by operation of law, is exemplified in
Montebon v. Comelec and Borja vs. Comelec.
In this case, petitioner did not fill or succeed to
a vacancy by operation of law. He instead
relinquished his office as Punong Barangay
during his third term when he won and
assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan
member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a
voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong
Barangay.

Aldovino v. COMELEC – 609 SCRA 234 [2009]
FACTS: Lucena City councilor Asilo was
elected to the said office for three consecutive
terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-
2007. In September 2005, during his third
term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an
order of 90-day preventive suspension against
him in relation to a criminal case. The said
suspension order was subsequently lifted by
the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance
of the functions of his office. Asilo then filed
his certificate of candidacy for the same
position in 2007. His disqualification was
sought by herein petitioners on the ground
that he had been elected and had served for
three consecutive terms, in violation of the
three-term Constitutional limit.
ISSUE: Whether the suspensive condition
interrupts the three-term limitation rule of
COMELEC.
HELD: NO. The preventive suspension of
public officials does not interrupt their term for
purposes of the three-term limit rule under the
Constitution and the Local Government Code
(RA 7160).
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Asilo
for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in
contravention of the three-term limit rule of
Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his
2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the
preventive suspension imposed on him.
“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does
not involve an effective interruption of service
within a term and should therefore not be a
reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held
the Court. It noted that preventive suspension
can pose as a threat “more potent” than the
voluntary renunciation that the Constitution
itself disallows to evade the three-term limit as
it is easier to undertake and merely requires
an easily fabricated administrative charge that
can be dismissed soon after a preventive
suspension has been imposed.
Datu Michel Abas Kida v. Senate of the
Philippines, GR 196271, February 2012
(reconsideration; holdover provision in RA 9054
Unconstitutional as Congress in passing RA
10153 has made clear)
FACTS: These cases are motions for
reconsideration assailing the SCs Decision
where it upheld the constitutionality of
Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the
constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA
No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in
the ARMM (which were scheduled to be held
on the second Monday of August 2011) to the
second Monday of May 2013 and recognized
the President’s power to appoint officers-in-
charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these
positions upon the expiration of the terms of
the elected officials.
ISSUE: Is the holdover provision in RA No.
9054 constitutional?
HELD: The petitioners are one in defending
the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII
of RA No. 9054, which allows the regional
officials to remain in their positions in a
holdover capacity. The petitioners essentially
argue that the ARMM regional officials should
be allowed to remain in their respective
positions until the May 2013 elections since
there is no specific provision in the
Constitution which prohibits regional elective
officials from performing their duties in a
holdover capacity.
The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution expresses the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to categorically set
a limitation on the period within which all
elective local officials can occupy their offices.
Since elective ARMM officials are also local
officials, they are, thus, bound by the three-
year term limit prescribed by the Constitution.
It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the
Constitution does not expressly prohibit
elective officials from acting in a holdover
capacity. Short of amending the Constitution,
Congress has no authority to extend the
three-year term limit by inserting a holdover
provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of
three years for local officials should stay at
three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution,
and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.
L. Local Governments Units
A. Barangays
Alquizola vs. Ocol, 313 SCRA 273
FACTS: Petitioner Alquizola won the post of
Punong Barangay of Barangay Tubod, Iligan
City, in the 12th May 1997 barangay elections.
Respondents Gallardo Ocol et. al were
appointees of the former punong barangay of
Barangay Tubod.
After the elections, petitioner Alquizola
terminated the services of respondents and
appointed his co-petitioners, Doromal and
Seco, respectively, as barangay treasurer and
as barangay secretary. In consonance with
Section 394 and Section 395 of the LGC, he
submitted both appointments to the
Sangguniang Barangay for approval. The
Sanggunian rejected the appointments.
Following the action taken by the
Sangguniang Barangay, respondents filed a
complaint for quo warranto, mandamus and
prohibition with the RTC to enjoin petitioner
from terminating the services of the former.
The trial court found in favor of respondents
and ordered petitioner Alquizola to cease and
desist from dismissing respondents on the
ground that their dismissal had been effected
without the corresponding approval of the
Sangguniang Barangay. It held that Section
389(b)(5) limited the power of a barangay
captain to remove appointive barangay
officials by requiring an approval of such act
by a majority of the Sangguniang Barangay.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of respondents
without the approval of the Sangguniang Brgy
is valid.
HELD: NO. Section 389. Chief Executive:
Powers, Duties, and Functions. x x x
(b) For efficient, effective and economical
governance, the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the barangay and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code, the punong barangay shall:
xxx
(5) Upon approval by a majority of all the
members of the sangguniang barangay,
appoint or replace the barangay treasurer, the
barangay secretary, and other appointive
barangay officials;
The term replace would obviously embrace
not only the appointment of the replacement
but also the prior removal of, or the vacation
by, the official currently occupying the
appointive position concerned. To replace is
to take the place of, to serve as a substitute
for or successor of, to put in place of, or to fill
the post of an incumbent. In order to provide a
replacement to an office, the prior holder must
have first been removed or the office must
have, otherwise, been previously rendered
vacant.
Aside from what may be implicit in Section
389, there is no other provision in the LGC
that treats of the power of the Punong
Barangay to remove the barangay secretary,
the barangay treasurer, or any other
appointive barangay official from office. The
duration of the term of office of these
barangay officials have not been fixed by the
LGC. Where the tenure of the office is not
fixed by law, it is a sound and useful rule to
consider the power of removal as being an
incident to the power of appointment.
Elsewise stated, the power to remove is
deemed implied in the power to appoint.
The Code explicitly vests on the punong
barangay, upon approval by a majority of all
the members of the sangguniang barangay,
the power to appoint or replace the barangay
treasurer, the barangay secretary, and other
appointive barangay officials. This provision is
reinforced, in the case of the secretary and
the treasurer, by the provisions of Section 394
and Section 395 of the LGC; to wit:
Section 394. Barangay Secretary:
Appointment, Qualifications, Powers and
Duties. - (a) The barangay secretary shall be
appointed by the punong barangay with the
concurrence of the majority of all the
sangguniang barangay members. The
appointment of the barangay secretary shall
not be subject to attestation by the Civil
Service Commission.
Section 395. Barangay Treasurer:
Appointment, Qualifications, Powers and
Duties. - (a) The barangay treasurer shall be
appointed by the punong barangay with the
concurrence of the majority of all the
sangguniang barangay members. The
appointment of the barangay treasurer shall
not be subject to attestation by the Civil
Service Commission.
Verily, the power of appointment is to be
exercised conjointly by the punong barangay
and a majority of all the members of the
sangguniang barangay. Without such conjoint
action, neither an appointment nor a
replacement can be effectual.
Applying the rule that the power to appoint
includes the power to remove, one that the
Court finds no cogent reason to now depart
from, the questioned dismissal from office of
the barangay officials by the punong barangay
without the concurrence of the majority of all
the members of the Sangguniang Barangay
cannot be legally justified. To rule otherwise
could also create an absurd situation of the
Sangguniang Barangay members refusing,
like here, to give their approval to the
replacements selected by the punong
barangay who has unilaterally terminated the
services of the incumbents. It is likely that the
legislature did not intend this absurdity to flow
from its enactment of the law.
B. Municipality and Cities
1. Employees
Aguirre vs De Castro, 321 SCRA 95
FACTS: Respondent Atty. De Castro is the
Chief of the Legal Affairs and Complaint
Services of the Division of City Schools of
Manila. Respondent received a letter from
public respondent Aguirre, City Legal Officer
of Manila accompanied by copies of alleged
complaints against her. Respondent was
required in the said letter to explain within 72
hours upon receipt why no administrative
sanctions shall be imposed upon her for gross
misconduct and conduct unbecoming x x x a
public officer in violation of the Civil Service
Law, Rules and Regulations.
Respondent de Castro filed her answer-
affidavit which was received by the Office of
the City Legal Officer.
Subsequently, Aguirre notified the respondent
that her answer-affidavit was found
unsatisfactory for which reason she was
summoned to appear before the said City
Legal Officer for the purpose of conducting a
formal investigation.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss. She
claimed that she was a subordinate of the
Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS). Thus, the case
should be endorsed to the Office of the DECS
Secretary or its legal division as nowhere in
RA 409, Charter of the City of Manila is there
a provision conferring upon the Office of the
City Legal Officer jurisdiction to try and
investigate personnel of the DECS in general,
or the Division of City Schools where
petitioner is under, in particular.
This motion to dismiss of respondent was
denied citing Sec. 455 b(1) and (V) of the LGC
and Section 3(c) of the same code. It was held
that the records of the personnel office
disclosed that respondent was included in the
plantilla of the City of Manila and therefore her
salary derived wholly and mainly from the
funds of the City for which reason she was
subject to the disciplinary authority of the said
City Legal Officer.
Thereafter, respondent was notified to appear
before the panel formed by the City Legal
Officer to hear administrative case CLO 24-96
filed against her for grave misconduct and
conduct unbecoming x x x a public officer.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the City Legal
Officer of Manila has jurisdiction to investigate
the complaint for grave misconduct filed
against the respondent.
HELD: NO. Under Book IV, Chapter V,
Section 7(4) of the Administrative Code of
1987, the power to appoint and discipline first-
level employees, which include respondent, is
specifically lodged with the regional director of
the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports.
(4) Appoint personnel to positions in the first
level and casual and seasonal employees;
and exercise disciplinary actions over them in
accordance with the Civil Service Law."
This is also clear in Book V, Section 47 (2) of
the same Code; and in Section 32, Rule XIV
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987.
SEC. 32. The Secretaries and heads of
agencies and instrumentalities, provinces,
cities, and municipalities shall have jurisdiction
to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction.
The LGC did not automatically repeal the
provisions in the 1987 Administrative Code,
contrary to petitioners argument. There is no
provision in the LGC expressly rescinding the
authority of the DECS regional director to
appoint and exercise disciplinary authority
over first-level employees. On the other hand,
implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing
of such intention.
Furthermore, responden’ts position as senior
legal officer in the Division of City Schools is
not one of the offices covered by the city
mayor’s power of appointment under the LGC.
Moreover, petitioners failed to show a specific
provision in the LGC showing that the power
to discipline officials in the Division of City
Schools has been devolved from the regional
director of the DECS to the city mayor. All that
Section 17 (4) of the LGC states is that the
city must provide support for education and
other such services and facilities.
Section 455 (b-1-x) of the LGC which provides
that the city mayor may cause to be instituted
administrative or judicial proceedings against
any official or employee of the city, is not
necessarily incompatible with the provisions of
the Administrative Code of 1987 authorizing
the regional director to discipline national
education employees. Nothing prohibits the
mayor from filing complaints against
respondent before the DECS.
Petitioners cite paragraph 12, Section 2 (a) of
Executive Order (EO) 503, which states that
devolved personnel are automatically
reappointed by the local chief executive. Since
respondent was deemed reappointed by the
city mayor, it follows that the latter can
exercise disciplinary authority over her.
We are not convinced. First, the above
provision applies to devolved personnel, and
there is no proof whatsoever that respondent
is one of them. Second, even if respondent
can be considered as a devolved personnel,
the cited paragraph of EO 503 must not be
read in isolation from but in conjunction with
the other paragraphs in Section 2 (a).
Thus, paragraph 12 -- along with paragraphs
5, 6, 8, 13 and 14[15]of EO 503 -- deals with
safeguards against termination, reduction of
pay and diminution in rank of existing
personnel; it is not about the power of the
mayor to discipline personnel of the Division
of City Schools. In effect, the said provision
serves more to limit the appointing authority of
the city mayor, whose acts must be
circumscribed by the aforecited conditions. It
is not incompatible and can exist with
aforecited provisions of the Administrative
Code. Indeed, it cannot be deemed to have
divested the regional director of his
disciplining power.
As to petitioner’s argument that respondents
salary is wholly or mainly paid out of city
funds, suffice it to say that the source of the
wages is not the only criteria in determining
whether the payor may be deemed the
employer. In fact, the most important factor is
the control test; that is, who has the power to
supervise and direct the work of the employee
concerned?
Absent any contrary statutory provision, the
power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove or to discipline. Since respondent was
appointed by the regional director of DECS,
she may be disciplined or removed by the
latter pursuant to law.

Finally, respondent’s primary duty is to
conduct investigations of cases involving
teaching and nonteaching personnel of the
Division of City Schools of Manila. The report
on the results of her investigations is then
submitted for final evaluation to the DECS
regional director, who may approve,
disapprove or allow respondent to modify it.
This fact clearly shows that supervision over
respondent is lodged with the regional
director, not the mayor.
2. Powers of Mayors
a. Imposition of conditions for issuance of
mayor’s permit
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 329 SCRA 314
b. Issuance of mayor’s permit
Robe Arraste, Inc. vs. Villaflor, 499 SCRA 434
c. Revocation of mayor’s permit
Gordon vs. Veridiano, 167 SCRA 51
Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 387 SCRA 149
d. Appointment of employees
Lopez vs. Civil Service Commission, 195 SCRA
777
e. Removal of employees
Municipal of La Libertad vs. Penaflor, 453 SCRA
833
f. Prevention of pollution
Technology Development Inc, vs. Court of
Appeals, 201 SCRA xi
C. Provinces
1. Appointment of officials
Dimaandal vs. Commission on Audit, 291 SCRA
322
2. Vice Governor
Gamboa vs. Aguirre, 310 SCRA 867
Atienza vs. Villarosa, 458 SCRA 385
1. Basic Principle
A. Policy and Application
1. Declaration Policy
a. Local autonomy for territorial and political
subdivisions
b. Accountability of Local Government units
through recall, initiative and referendum
c. Consultation by national offices with local
government units and no-government
organizations before implementing any program
(Sec.2)
2. Rules interpretation
a. Liberal Interpretation of power of local
government units
b. Strict construction of tax ordinances
c. Liberal interpretation of general welfare
provisions
d. Application of Original terms of construct or
law upon vested rights
e. Resort to customs in the absence of law or
jurisprudence (Sec.5)
B. General Powers and Attributes of Local
Government Units
1. A local government unit may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries
substantially altered by law in the case of a
province, city, municipality, or other political
subdivision, or by city or provincial ordinance in
the case of a barangay
2. The creation or conversation of a local
government unit to another level shall be based
on:
a. sufficient income
b. Population
c. Land area (Sec.7)
3. Division and merger of local government units
shall comply with the same requirements for
their creation. The income, population or land
area shall not be reduced to less than the
minimum requirements.(Sec.8)
4. a local government unit may be abolished
when its income, population or land area has
been reduced to less than the minimum
requirements (Sec.9)
5. The creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of the boundaries of local
government units must be approved by
plebiscites in the political units affected. (Sec.10)
6. The corporate existence of a new local
government unit shall commence upon election
and qualification of its chief executive and
majority f the members of the sangunian.
(Sec.14)
7. Every local government unit is a body politic
and corporate. (Sec.15)
8. Powers
a. Powers expressly granted
b. implied powers
c. powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for efficient and effective governance
d. Powers essential for promotion of general
welfare. (Sec.16)
9. A local government unit may exercise the
power of eminent domain.
a. an offer must have been made to the
owner and rejected.
b. The local government unit may
immediately take the possession upon filling of
expropriation proceedings and deposit in court
of 15% of the fair market value. (Sec.19)
10. a local government unit may close or open
any local road, alley, park or square by two
thirds vote of all members of the sangunian.
Property permanently withdrawn from public use
may be used or conveyed for any proposes.
(Sec.20 )
11. Corporate Powers
a. powers
i. To have continues succession in the name
ii. To sue and the sued
iii. To have and use a seal
iv. To acquire and convey property
v. To exercise other powers granted to
corporations. (Sec.22)
b. The local chief executive may not enter into
any contract without prior authorization by
sangunian. (Sec.22)
12. Local government units and their officials are
not exempt from liability for death or injury to a
person or damage to property. (Sec.24)
C. Intergovernmental relations
1. national government and local government
units
a. The President shall exercise general
supervision over government units.
i. The President shall exercise supervisory
authority directly over provinces, highly
urbanized cities and independent component
cities.
ii. The President shall exercise supervision over
component cities and municipalities though the
province and over barangays through the city
and municipality.(Sec.25)
b. No project shall be implemented by
government authorities without consultation with
the local government units and prior approval of
the sangunian.(Sec.27)
2. Inter-Local Government Relations
a. The province, through the governor, shall
ensure that any component city and municipality
acts within powers. (Sec.27)
b. The city or municipality, through the major,
shall ensure that barangays act within the scope
of their powers.(Sec.29)
c. The governor shall review all executive
orders promulgated by the mayor. The mayor
shall review all executive orders promulgated by
punong barangays. (Se.30)
II. Elective Officials
A. Qualifications and Election
1. Qualifications
a. Common qualifications
i. Filipino Citizen
ii. Registered over the local government
unit, or the district where he intends to elected in
the case of members of the sangunian.
iii. Residence therein for the least one
year immediately before the election.
iv. Ability to read and write Filipino or
any other local dialect.
b. Age
i. candidates and the provinces and highly
urbanized cities--- 23 years.
ii. Candidates for mayor or vice mayor of
component cities or municipalities--- 21 years
iii. Candidates for sangunian member in
component cities and municipalities—18 years
iv. Barangay officials—18 years
v. Sanguniang kabataan--- 15 to less than 18
years (Sec. 7, Rep. Act. No. 1964)
2. Disqualifications
a. Those sentenced for an offense involving
moral turpitude or an offense punishable by
imprisonment for one year or more, within two
years after serving sentence
b. Those removed from office because of an
administrative case
 c. Those convicted for violating oath of
allegiance t the Philippines
d. Those with dual citizenship
e. Fugitive from justice
f. Permanent residents in a foreign country or
those who have the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of it.
g. The insane feeble minded
3. Election
a. The Governor, vice governor, mayor,
vice mayor, and punong barangay shall be
elected large. (Sec.41)
b. For Provinces and cities with two or
more legislative districts, the elective member of
sangunian shall be elected by legislative
districts. Provinces and cities and municipalities
in Metropolitan in Manila with only one
legislative district shall be divided into two
districts by the Commission on Elections. (Sec.
3 (a) and (b) Rep. Act. No. 7166; Sec. 1, Rep.
Act. No. 7887)
c. Regular elective members of the sangunian
of cities and municipalities shall be elected at
large. (Sec.1, Rep. Act. NO. 7887)
d. Sanguniang barangay members shall be
elected in large.
e. The president of the league of the sangunian
members of component cities and municipalities
shall be ex officio member of the sanguniang
panlalawigan.
f. The president of the liga ng mga barangay
and the pederasyon ng mga sanguniang
kabataan shall be ex officio member of the
sangunian.
g. There shall be a sectoral representative
from the women, workers, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, disabled
persons, or any other sector determined by the
sangunian. (Sec.41)
4. Terms of office 3 years (Sec.43, as amended
by Sec. 2, Rep. At. No. 9164)
B. Vacancies and Sucession
1. Governor and mayor
a. Vice governor and vice mayor
b. sanguniang members according to ranking
2. Punong barangay
a. Highest ranking sanguniang barangay
member
b. Second highest ranking sanguniang
barangay member
3. Ranking in the sangunian shall be determined
on the basis of the proportion of the votes
obtained to number of registered voters in each
district.
4. Ties will be resolved by drawing of lots.
(Sec.44)
5. Sangunian
a. Provinces, highly urbanized cities, and
independent component cities---- appointment
by President
b. Component city and municipality ----
appointment by governor
c. Sanguniang barangay – appointment by
mayor
d. Except for the sanguniang barangay, the
appointment shall come from the political party
of the member who caused the vacancy.
e. If the member does not belong to any party,
the appointee shall be recommended by the
sangunian.
f. The appointee for the sanguniang barngay
shall be recommende by the sanguniang
barangay.
g. Vacancy in the representation of the youth
and the barangay in the sangunian shall be filed
by the official next in rank in the organization.
(Sec.45)
6. Temporary Vacancy
a. When the governor, the mayor or
punong barangay is temporarily incapacitated to
perform his duties, the vice governor, vice
mayor, or ranking sanguniang barangay
member shall exercise his powers except the
power to appoint, suspend or dismiss
employees, which can only be exercised after 30
working days.
b. When the local chief executive is traveling
within the Philippines for not more than 3
consecutive days, he may designate an officer-
in-charge. The authorization shall specify the
powers of the officers-in-charge except the
power to appoint, suspend or dismiss
employees.
c. If the local executive does not issue the
authorization, the vice governor, vice mayor, or
highest ranking sanguniang member shall
assume his powers on the fourth day of his
absence. (Sec.46)
C. Legislation
1. The vice governor, the vice mayor, and the
punong barangay shall be presiding officer of
the sangunians but shall vote only in case of a
tie.
2. In case of inability of the presiding officer,
the members shall elect a temporary presiding
officer from among themselves. (Sec.49
3 For disorderly behavior and absence without
justifiable cause for four consecutive sessions a,
member may be censured, reprimanded,
excluded from the session, suspended for not
more than 60 days, or expelled. Suspension or
expulsion shall require concurrence of at least
two –thirds of all the sanggunian members. A
member sentenced by final judgment to
imprisonment for at least one year for a crime
involving moral turpitude shall be automatically
expelled. (Sec.50
4 Every sanggunian member, upon assumption
of officer , shall make a full disclosure of his
business and financial, or professional
relationship or any relation within the fourth
degree which he may have with any one
effected by any ordinance or resolution of the
sanggunian which involves a conflict interest.
a. such relationship included:
I Investment in the entity to which the ordinance
may apply
Ii Contracts with any person to which the
ordinance nance may apply
b. Conflict of interests refers to a situation
where a sanggunian member may not act in the
public interest due to personal consideration
that may affect his judgment to the prejudice of
the public. (Sec. 51)
5 A special session may be called by the local
chief executive or a majority of the sanggunian
members. Unless concurred in by two-thirds
vote of the members present, no matter may be
considered at a special session except those
stated in the notice. (Sec. 52)
6 A majority of all the members of the
sanggunian shall constitute quorum. (Sec. 53)
7 The veto shall be communicated to the
sanggunian within 15 days in the case of a
province and 10 days in the case of a city or
municipality. The sanggunian may override the
veto by two-thirds of all its members. (Sec. 54)
8 The governor or mayor may veto any item in
the following cases:
a. Appropriation ordinance
b. Ordinance adopting a local development plan
and public investment program.
c. Ordinance directing the payment of money or
creating a liability. (Sec. 55)
9. Review
a. the sangguniang panlalawigan shall review
ordinances and resolutions of cities and
municipalities to determine if they are within their
power. (Sec. 56)
b The sangguniang panlungsod or bayan shall
review sangguniang barangay ordinance to
determine if they are lawful. (Sec. 57)
10. Effectivity
a. Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance, it
shall take effect after 10 days from posting at the
provincial capitol or city, municipality or
barangay hall and two other conspicuous
places.
b.The gist of all ordinance with penal sanction
shall be published in in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province. In the absence of
such newspaper, the ordinance shall be posted
in all municipalities and cities of the province
where the sanggunian of origin is situated.
c. In highly urbanize and independent
component cities, in addition to posting , the
main features of the ordinance shall be
published in a local newspaper of general
circulation. In the absence of such newspaper, it
shall be circulation. (Sec. 59)
D. Disciplinary Action
1 Grounds
a. Disloyalty to the Philippines
b. Culpable violation of the Constitution
c. Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office,
gross negligence, or dereliction of duty
d. Commission of an offence involving moral
turpitude or punishable by at least prision mayor
e. Abuse of authority
f. Unauthorized absence for 15 consecutive
working days, except sanggunian members
g. Application for acquisition of citizenship,
resident or immigrant status of another country
h. Other grounds in the code and other laws,
2. Filling complaint
a. Elective provincial or city official – Office of
the president
b. Elective municipal official – sangguniang
panlalawigan, whose decision may be appealed
to the Presidfent.
c. Elective barangay official - sangguniang
panglungsod or bayan, whose decision shall be
final (Sec.61)
3. NO investigation shall be held and no
preventive suspension shall be imposed within
90 days before any local election. (Sec.62)
4. Preventive Suspension
a. Authority
i. Official of province, highly urbanized city or
independent component city- President
ii. Official of component city or official
iii. Barangay official – mayor
b. Ground
i. Strong evidence of guilt; and
ii. Probability that continuance in office can
influence witnesses or endanger safety records.
c. Duration
i. Single suspension – 60 days
ii. Several suspensions – 90 days within a year
5. The respondent has the right to appear and
defend in person or by counsel, to confront the
witnesses against him, and the compulsory
process to require the attendance of witnesses
and production of evidence in his favor
6. Penalty
a. The penalty of suspension shall not exceed
the unexpired term of the respondent nor bar his
candidacy.
b. Removal from office shall bar candidacy of
the respondent for any elective office. (Sec.66)
7. Appeal
a. Period – Thirty days
b. Appellate authority
i. sangguniang panglusod of component cities
and sangguniang bayan - sanguniang
panlalawigan
ii. Sangguniang panlalawigan and sangguniang
panglungsod of highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities – President
iii. President – final (Sec.67)
c. Execution; The decision shall be executory
pending appeal, and respondent shall be
considered as under preventive suspension
should he win the appeal. (Sec.68)
E. Recall
1. Initiation
Petition of at least 25% of the registered voters
in the local government unit. (Sec.71)
2. Recall shall be effective upon proclamation of
successor receiving the highest number of
votes. (Sec.72)
3. Prohibition against Resignation,
The official sought to be recalled cannot resign
during the recall. (Sec.73)
4. Limitations
a. An official may be subject of recall only once
during his term.
b. No recall shall take place within one year
from assumption of office or one year before
regular local election. (Sec.74)
III. Human Resources and Development
A. Casual Employees
The local chief executive may employ casual
employees without approval of the Civil Service
Commission for not more than six months.
(Sec.77)
B. Limitation on Appointment
No person shall be appointed in the career
service if he is related within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity to the appointing or
recommending authority. (Sec.79)
C. Compensation
Increase in compensation of elective local
officials shall take effect after expiration of the
term of those approving the increase. (Sec.81)
D. Resignation
1. Submission
a. Governor, vice governor, vice mayor, of
highly urbanized and independent component
cities – President
b. Municipality mayor, municipal vice mayor,
and mayor and vice mayor component city –
Governor
c. Barangay official – Mayor
2. Effectivity
a. Resignation takes effect upon acceptance.
b. It is deemed accepted if not acted upon within
15 working days