RULES ON EVIDENCE

In Re Testate of Suntay | 95 PHIL 500

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decree of the CFI of Bulacan disallowing the alleged will and testament executed in Manila on
November 1929, and the alleged last will and testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China on 4 January 1931 by Jose B. Suntay.

Jose Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in Amoy, Fookien Province, China, leaving real and personal
properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy and 9 children by the first marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz and a child
named Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him.

Intestate proceedings were instituted in the CFI Bulacan and after hearing letters of administration were issued to Apolonio Suntay.
After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate.

On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the CFI of Bulacan for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to
have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay.

This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the
insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. After liberation, claiming that he had found among the files, records
and documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and
that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in
the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will executed in Amoy, China may be probated in the Philippines.

RULING: No. The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on
procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in
1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. In the absence of proof that the municipal
district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings
in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are a deposition or a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so,
it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings
personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside
in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines.

In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and
fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of
proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate
or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this
country.

PCIB vs. Escolin | 56 SCRA 265

FACTS: In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In May 1957, while she was domiciled
here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died.

In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie however also stated in her will that should
her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister.

In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of Charles filed a motion before
the probate court (there was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as the
administratrix of the estate. Magno was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles
himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d like to have Magno appointed as
administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the motion.

Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since said will basically covers the same
estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was granted.
Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the
estate.

Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother and sister and since that is her
will, the same must be respected. Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that under
Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall be
respected regardless of the presence of legitimes (Charles’ share in the estate).

PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the time of
her death (applying the renvoi doctrine).

ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.

HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas. The
Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be
presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court however emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnie’s death is the law applicable
(and not said law at any other time).
Vallarta vs CA | 150 SCRA 336

FACTS: Rosalinda Cruz, the private offended party, and accused Victoria Vallarta are long time friends and business acquaintances.

On November 20, 1968, Cruz entrusted to Victoria Vallarta seven pieces of jewelry.

In December of the same year, Vallarta decided to buy some items, exchanged one item with another, and issued a post-dated check in
the amount of P5,000 dated January 30, 1969.

Rosalinda Cruz deposited said check with the bank. However, upon presentment, the check was dishonored and Cruz was informed that
Vallarta's account had been closed. Cruz apprised Vallarta of the dishonor and the latter promised to give another check. Later, Vallarta
pleaded for more time. Still later, she started avoiding Cruz.

Hence, this criminal action was instituted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Villarta should be held guilty for non-payment of debt

RULING: Yes. By virtue of Rep. Act No. 4885, "(t)he failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack
or insufficiency of funds" is deemed prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

To constitute estafa under this provision the act of post-dating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause
of defraudation, and as such it should be either prior to, or simultaneous with the act of fraud.

Moreover, it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the presumption of
innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence
shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence"

It is still criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is made punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the non-
payment of the debt.

Dela Rama vs Ledesma | 143 SCRA 1

Parol Evidence Rule – Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or
defeat the operation of a valid instrument.

While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has
been fraud or mistake.

SUMMARY: Petitioner sued his nephew, the respondent, over a money claim. It transpired from the war damages claim to be received
by Inocentes de la Rama Inc. wherein petitioner was a stockholder. Petitioner alleged that he sold his 140 shares to the respondent with
an understanding that the latter would deliver to him his (petitioner’s) proportionate equity in the war damage benefits upon payment
by the US foreign claim settlement commission. However, respondent failed to deliver the said payment. Petitioner relied on their verbal
understanding as evidence for his cause of action, however the trial court, as affirmed by the Court, ruled in favour of respondent. It
held that parol evidence cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.

FACTS: Petitioner was a stockholder of Inocentes de la Rama Inc. which suffered damages during the last war. The corporation had an
approved war damage claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission (P106,000.00) and the first payment (P56,000) was made
while De la Rama was still a stockholder. Upon resolution of the majority of its stockholders, it was used for the reconstruction of the
Iris Theater Building.

Petitioner sold his shares to his nephew. On Nov. 18, 1958, prior to the payment of the balance of the war damage claim, De La Rama
sold to Ledesma at par value his 140 shares in the corporation by endorsing his certificates of stock in favor of the latter. This was done
with an alleged understanding that De la Rama reserved to himself his proportionate equity in the war damage benefits due on his 140
shares. Ledesma promised to deliver to him this equity upon payment by the Foreign Claim Settlement Commission of the United States
of the remaining balance.

The corporation received a final payment of its war damage claim (P46,696.33) on March 20.1965 and the Board of Directors passed a
resolution distributing the final payment received by said corporation among its stockholders as dividend computed at P29.59 per share.

o When Ledesma received the dividends pertaining to his total shareholding including the 140 shares he had purchased from De
la Rama, the latter demanded from the former the return and delivery to him of his corresponding share, yet he refused.

Thus, he filed a complaint against respondent, asking for moral and exemplary damages, including attorney’s fees.

o In his answer, Ledesma admitted the allegation in the complaint except: (a) the alleged verbal understanding between De la
Rama and himself regarding the unpaid war damage claim; (b) the alleged equity of De la Rama in the said claim as such equity
is with the corporation itself, and not with the stockholders individually; and (c) his liability for damages.
o By way of special defense, he claimed that the indorsement by De La Rama was their exclusive contract and to allow the latter
to prove an alleged simultaneous oral agreement would be contrary to the Parol Evidence Rule and the Statute of Frauds. Also,
the war damage claim belongs to the corporation, not to the individual stockholders.
o In Reply to the special defense, De La Rama said that the said claim should go to those who actually suffered damages during
the war and that it is not profit of the corporation; that the Statute of Frauds only applies to executory contracts, not to partially
 fulfilled ones; and that the instant case is exempted from the Parol Evidence Rule since the writing fails to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties, and this fact is pleaded.
o He also alleged that the Board of Directors should be guided by the spirit and letter of the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946
and that the oral agreement of the parties is consistent with the trust and confidence of the parties at the time in view of their
close blood relationship.

The trial court, on the issue on whether De La Rama is allowed to present parol evidence to prove his alleged reservation to the war
damage benefits, ruled in the negative.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged verbal agreement of the parties concerning plaintiff's reservation of his right to the balance of the war
damage claim at the time of the sale of his shares to the defendant, can be proven by parol evidence under the Parol Evidence Rule and
the Statute of Frauds

RULING: No. A. (See doctrine) The exceptions to the rule do not apply in the instant case, there being no intrinsic ambiguity or fraud,
mistake, or failure to express the true agreement of the parties. If indeed the alleged reservation had been intended, businessmen like the
parties would have placed in writing such an important reservation.

B. In the case at bar, nowhere in the complaint were the exceptions to the rule alleged or put in issue.

C. Since the alleged reservation is not admissible under the Parol Evidence Rule, the Court does not find it necessary to discuss the
applicability or non-applicability to the present case of the Statute of Frauds.

Lechugas vs CA | GR 39972 Aug 6,1986

SUMMARY: Lechugas filed an action for forcible entry and damages and an action for recovery and possession of the same property
(disputed land) against the Lozas. Leoncia, the vendor of Lechugas, testified during trial that when the deed of sale was executed between
her and Lechugas, the vendor’s intention was to sell Lot 5522 (located south of the disputed land) because the disputed land was already
sold to the Lozas by her father. Lechugas contends that it was improper to subject the true intent of the deed of sale she executed with
Leoncia to parol evidence. SC held that parol evidence rule does not apply and that Leoncia did not intend to sell the disputed land to
Lechugas.

FACTS:
1. LEONCIA Lansague sold a parcel of land to her cousin, Victoria LECHUGAS. The sale is evidenced by a deed of sale.
LECHUGAS took possession through her tenants Jesus Leoncia, Roberta Losarita, and Simeon Guinta.

2. While Simeon Gunita was plowing a portion of the land, DEFENDANTS (all surnamed LOZA) entered and forced him to stop
working
a. DEFENDANTS told Gunita that he will be allowed to continue plowing if he signed an affidavit recognizing the
DEFENDANTS as his landlords.
b. Gunita reported the incident to LECHUGAS who sought the help of the police. DEFENDANTS did not vacate the lot
despite demands by the police.
c. DEFENDANTS entered another portion of the land and continued to cut bamboo poles growing thereon despite
warnings.
d. Eventually, the whole parcel of land was occupied by the DEFENDANTS.

3. LECHUGAS filed an action for forcible entry and damages with the Justice of the Peace against DEFENDANTS (case
dismissed). The forcible entry case was appealed to the CFI. While the appeal was pending, LECHUGAS filed an action for
recovery and possession of the same property. The two cases were tried jointly.
a. LEONCIA, as witness for the DEFENDANTS in the proceedings in the trial court, testified that the land she sold
to LECHUGAS did not include the disputed land. What she intended to sell was the land situated south of the
disputed land (referred to as “Lot 5522” in the case).

4. The CFI dismissed the two actions and declared DEFENDANTS owners and lawful possessors of the land. LECHUGAS
appealed to the CA (affirmed CFI). A petition for review was filed before the SC.

5. DEFENDANTS claim that the land that LECHUGAS purchased from LEONCIA is different from the disputed land.
a. HUGO Loza, predecessor-in-interest of DEFENDANTS (except as to Jose and Salvador Loza) purchased the land
from Victorina Limor. Immediately after the sale, HUGO took possession of the property. This sale was evidenced by
a “Venta Definitiva”. HUGO purchased from EMETRIO Lansague (LEONCIA’s father) another parcel of land which
adjoins the land he had earlier bought from Victorina Limor. This sale was evidenced by a public instrument. It would
appear that the land sold by EMETRIO covered the disputed land allegedly sold by LEONCIA to LECHUGAS.
b. DEFENDANTS claim that the land bought by LECHUGAS is the one situated Lot 5522.

6. LECHUGAS claims that it was improper to subject the true intent of the deed of sale she executed with LEONCIA to parol
evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parol evidence rule applies – NO

RULING: Parol evidence rule does not apply –the rule is not applicable where the controversy is between oneof the parties to the
document and third persons.

Parol evidence rule does not apply and cannot be invoked by party-litigants against the other, where at least one of them is (1) not a
party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and (2) does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument or the relation that it establishes. Strangers to a contract are not bound by its terms.
While the deed of sale was executed between LECHUGAS and LEONCIA, the litigation was between LECHUGAS and
DEFENDANTS. Thus, LEONCIA is a stranger to the litigation and is not bound by the rule.

Zulueta vs CA | 253 SCRA 699

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic
of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. After trial, rendered
judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph
3 of plaintiffs Complaint. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her
attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the documents and papers in question are inadmissible

RULING: Yes. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a]
court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify
for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. Petition was denied.

Guerrero vs St. Claire's Realty | GR. 58164

FACTS: The disputed lot was formerly owned by Andres Guerrero, father of the petitioners. Andres physically possessed and cultivated
the land through a tenancy agreement. Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres entrusted the land to his sister,
Cristina Guerrero, who was to enjoy the owner’s share in the produce of the land. After the death of Andres in 1943, Cristina continued
as trustee of the deceased.

Petitioners alleged that the land was surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the name of Andres Guerrero as early as 1957. Then,
at about 1971, the petitioners discovered that the land was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero, on the basis of a “Deed
of Sale of Land” dated 1948 purportedly executed by their Aunt Cristina. They further alleged that notwithstanding the opposition of
the heirs of Cristina, Manuel was successful in his application of the registration of the land in his favor.

Manuel subsequently sold this lot in favor of the defendants Guerreros, also cousins of the petitioners. The defendants Guerreros later
sold the disputed lot to a St.Clare’s Realty, a partnership constituted by them.

According to the complaint, the Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel was fraudulently obtained and that the subsequent deeds of sale were
likewise fraudulent and ineffective since the defendants allegedly knew that the property belonged to Andres Guerrero.

During trial, Laura Cervantes, a daughter of Cristina, was presented as witnesses for the petitioners. She testified that the money used
for the illness of her mother was obtained from Manuel by mortgaging the land as security for the loans obtained. This was objected to
by the counsel of the defendants based on Sec. 20 (a), Rule 130(now, Sec.23, Rule 130). Initially, the trial court allowed the witness to
continue, but upon a written motion to disqualify on the same basis, the trial court declared Laura and Jose Cervantes disqualified from
testifying in the case.

Subsequently, petitioners filed a “Motion for the Judge to Inhibit and/or to Transfer the case to another Branch.” This was denied.
Petitioners then failed to appear at the set schedule for trial, and the trial court judge issued an order stating that petitioners “are deemed
to have waived their right to further present or formally offer their evidence in court” as a consequence of their non-appearance.

Petitioners filed a “Manifestation” that they did not waive their rights to present further evidence, to cross-examine defendants’ witnesses,
and to present rebuttal evidence. They added that they reserved such right upon the decision of the CA in a petition for certiorari which
they were preparing to file.

Despite this, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the defendants Guerreros, even ordering the petitioners to pay damages in the
amount of more than P2M. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether the witnesses Laura and Jose Cervantes were correctly disqualified from testifying in the case and their testimonies
excluded on the basis of the “dead man’s rule”?
Whether the exclusion of petitioners’ evidence and their preclusion from presenting further proof was correctly sustained by the CA?
RULING: Laura and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and neither is they assignors of the parties nor persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted. They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the petitioners aimed to establish that it was not Cristina who
owned the disputed land at the time of the alleged sale to Manuel, and that Cristina merely mortgaged the property to Manuel.

The present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the
executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual
capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Thus, the dead man’s rule is clearly inapplicable.

Aside from the disqualified witnesses, other witnesses testified and it was error to hold that the testimonial evidence should have been
formally offered, or that without such offer, such evidence was waived. The offer of testimonial evidence is affected by calling the
witness to the stand and letting him testify before the court upon appropriate questions.

The trial court rendered its decision solely on the basis of defendants’ evidence and without regard to the proofs that petitioner has
presented. Therefore, exclusion of petitioners’ evidence and their preclusion from presenting further proof was incorrect.

Lichauco vs Atlantic Gulf | 84 PHIL 330

DOCTRINE: Inasmuch as the Dead Man’s Statute disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties, officers and/or stockholders of a
corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand
against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.

FACTS: Richard Fitzsimmons, the president of Atlantic Gulf, a foreign corporation registered and licensed to do business in the
philippines, held 1,000 shares of stock of which 545 had not been fully paid for but were covered by promissory notes in favor of
Atlantic Gulf.

In 1941, P64,500.00 was credited in his favor on account of the purchase price of the said stocks out of bonuses and dividends to which
he was entitled from the company. Under an agreement with Atlantic, should he die leaving the shares unpaid, Atlantic, at his option,
may either acquire said shares by returning to his estate the amount applied thereon, or issue in favor of his estate the corresponding
shares equivalent to the amount paid thereon.

Fitzsimmons died and a proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted.

Atlantic then filed a claim against the estate and offered to reacquire the shares sold to Fitzsimmons upon return to the estate of the
P64,500 paid thereon.

The administrator, Marcial Lichauco, however, denied the alleged indebtedness. During trial, Atlantic presented the testimonies of the
chief accountant and assistant accountant, and of the president and vice-president-treasurer of the corporation.

The trial court however refused to admit said testimonies on the ground of incompetency under the Dead Man’s State, as the witnesses
were not only stockholders and members of the Board of Directors, but officers as well.

ISSUE: Are the officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against an administrator disqualified from testifying under the
Dead Man’s Statute?

RULING: No. To hold that the statute disqualifies all persons from testifying who are officers or stockholders of a corporation would
be equivalent to materially amending the statute by judicial legislation.

The Dead Man’s Statute disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties; officers and/or stockholders of a corporations, therefore, are
not disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of
a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such person.

Goni vs CA | GR.27434

FACTS OF THE CASE: Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Court of Appeals. The three (3) haciendas known as San
Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria were originally owned by the Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas
[TABACALERA]. Sometime in 1949, the late Praxedes T. Villanueva negotiated with TABACALERA for the purchase of said
haciendas. As he did not have sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda
Sarria to one Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin Villegas. Private respondent Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor
for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA.

Villanueva further contracted or promised to sell to the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of
P13,807.00.

Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit from his account the amount of P13,807.00 as payment for the balance of the
purchase price. However, as only the amount of P12,460.24 was actually needed to complete the purchase price, only the latter amount
was debited from private respondent’s account. The difference was supposedly paid by private respondent to Villanueva, but as no
receipt evidencing such payment was presented.

On December 10, 1949, TABACALERA executed a formal deed of sale covering the three haciendas in favor of Villanueva. Fields
Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria were thereafter registered in the name of Villanueva. Meanwhile, Fields nos.
4 and 13 were delivered to private respondent Vicente.

On November 12, 1951, Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings were instituted, among the properties included in the inventory submitted
to the court were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.
Private respondent Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property and damages. He sought to recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda
Dulce Nombre de Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the contract/promise to sell executed by the late Praxedes Villanueva in his
favor on October 24, 1949.

the trial court rendered a decision ordering therein defendants-heirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente field no 3, to execute a formal deed of
sale covering fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 in favor of Vicente. CA affirmed lower Court.

ISSUE: May Gaspar Vicente testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, which constitutes a claim
or demand upon his estate, in violation of Rule 130, sec. 20 par. (a) ?

RULING: YES. The object and purpose of Rule 130, Sec. 20 par. (a) (commonly known as the SURVIVORSHIP
DISQUALIFICATION RULE or DEAD MAN STATUTE) is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to
the opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party
defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the
deceased.

The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter had been distributed to them,
remains within the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of the deceased,
not only because they succeeded to the decedent’s right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so placed
in litigation that they are called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense which the deceased
might have made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased might have been interested to establish, if living.

HOWEVER, the protection under the Rules, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private respondent
Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff’s deposition is taken by the representatives of the estate or when counsel for the representative
cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased’s lifetime." It must further be observed that petitioners presented a
counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the
action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields nos. 13 and 14. Evidently,
as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes
Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate of representatives of the estate/deceased person.

Under the great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or communications with the deceased or
incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But
the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those transactions or communications which were had with the agent. The
inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20 (a) of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to
either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because death has permanently sealed the former’s lips, does not actually exist in the
case at bar, for the reason that petitioner Goni could and did not negate the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while
admitting the existence of the said contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goni testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal
contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.

People vs Carlos | 47 PHIL 626

SUMMARY: Dr. Sityar performed a surgical operation on the wife of Carlos because the latter was suffering from appendicitis. The
former demanded payment to Carlos but the latter protested such payment. Dr. Sityar was stabbed by Carlos after an argument between
the two. Carlos claimed self-defense. CFI ruled out self-defense and found that Carlos is guilty of murder. This is based on a finding of
evident premeditation when the court admitted in evidence a letter written by the wife of Carlos addressed to him two days after the
death of Dr. Sityar stating that Carlos might have resorted to physical violence. SC found that Carlos is guilty only of simple homicide.
The letter is inadmissible because the defense was not given the opportunity to assent to its contents during trial.

DOCTRINE: Where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally or
not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the
communication, if competent, becomes admissible. The illegality of the search and seizure must be directly litigated and established by
a motion made before trial for the return of the things seized in order that the communication be excluded in evidence. However, in
case of letters, the spouses must be given opportunity in the witness stand to assent to its contents.

FACTS: 1. Dr. Pablo Sityar performed a surgical operation for appendicitis and other ailments on Fausto Carlos’s wife. After the
operation, Carlos and his wife visited Dr. Sityar several times for the purpose of dressing the wounds.

2. During one of the visits to Dr. Sityar, the latter asked Carlos to buy some medicine. Carlos states that during his absence, Doctor
Sityar outraged the wife.

3. Carlos, while confined in PGH due to a stomach trouble, received a letter from Dr. Sityar asking the former to settle their account for
services rendered to the wife.

4. May 26, 1924: Carlos went to the clinic of Dr. Sityar and found the latter alone. Without any quarrel, Carlos attacked Dr. Sityar with
a fan-knife and stabbed him twice. Dr. Sityar made an effort to escape but Carlos pursued him and inflicted another wound upon him.
He died within a few minutes. Carlos escaped but surrendered himself to the Constabulary at Malolos, Bulacan, in the evening of the
following day.

5. Carlos admits that he killed Dr. Sityar but maintains that he did so in self-defense. (CFI ruled out self-defense for being contrary to
the evidence of the prosecution)

6. The CFI found Carlos guilty of murder due to presence of evident premeditation. This was sustained by taking into consideration a
letter written to Carlos by his wife and seized by the police in searching his effects on the day of his arrest. The letter shows that the
wife feared that Carlos contemplated resorting to physical violence in dealing with the deceased.

7. The defense argues that the letter was a privileged communication and therefore not admissible in evidence. Also, the letter was
obtained through a search for which no warrant appears to have been issued. The defense argues that documents obtained by illegal
searches are not admissible in evidence in a criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the letter is admissible in evidence – NO

RULING: CFI decision is MODIFIED. Carlos is guilty of simple homicide.

RATIO:
1. SEE DOCTRINE.

2. The letter must be excluded. The letter was written by the wife and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have been admissible
to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand. The letter was therefore not offered for the purpose. Also, if the
defendant had indicated his assent to the statements contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is not the case.
The fact that he had the letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is therefore nothing but
pure hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the
witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this respect there can be no difference between an
ordinary communication and one originally privileged.

3. The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a conversation between a husband
and wife overheard by the witness. Testimony of that character is admissible on the ground that it relates to a conversation in which
both spouses took part and on the further ground that where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement made to him by his
spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is contained in an unanswered letter.

4.With the letter excluded in evidence, there is no sufficient evidence that the crime was premeditated.

US vs Antipolo | 37 PHIL 726

FACTS:
1. The appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Batangas, charged with the murder of one
Fortunato Dinal.
2. The trial court convicted him of homicide and from that decision he was appealed.
3. One of the errors assigned is based upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the man
whom the appellant is accused of having murdered, to testify as a witness on behalf of the defense concerning certain
alleged dying declarations.
4. Upon asking question to the witness, the fiscal objected.
“I object to the testimony of this witness. She has just testified that she is the widow of the deceased, Fortunato Dinal, and that
being so I believe that she is not competent to testify under the rules and procedure in either civil or criminal cases, unless it be
with the consent of her husband, and as he is dead and cannot grant that permission, it follows that this witness is disqualified
from testifying in this case in which her husband is the injured party.”
5. Defense: The disqualification which the fiscal evidently had in mind relates only to cases in which a husband or wife of one of
the parties to a proceeding is called to testify; that the parties to the prosecution of a criminal case are the Government and the
accused; that, furthermore the marriage of Dinal to the witness having been dissolved by the death of her husband, she is no
longer his wife, and therefore not subject to any disqualification arising from the status of marriage.
6. Objection was sustained.
7. To this objection counsel took exception and made an offer to prove by the excluded witness the facts which he expected to
establish by her testimony.

ISSUE: Whether or not the LC erred in excluding the testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta?

HELD: Yes. The widow of the deceased is a competent witness, in a prosecution for homicide, to testify on behalf of the defense or the
prosecution regarding dying declarations to her by the deceased concerning the cause of his death.

RATIO:
A. Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows:
Except with the consent of both, or except in cases of crime committed by one against the other, neither husband nor wife shall be a
competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both shall be parties.

B. This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is based. The purpose of section 58 is to protect accused
persons against statements made in the confidence engendered by the marital relation, and to relieve the husband or wife to whom such
confidential communications might have been made from the obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse.

C. Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a statement regarding the manner in which
he received those injuries, the communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a communication is made for
the express purpose that it may be communicated after the death of the declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause
of his death.

D. On grounds of public policy the wife can not testify against her husband as to what came to her from him confidentially or by reason
of the marriage relation, but this rule does not apply to a dying communication made by the husband to the wife on the trial of the one
who killed him.

E. The declaration of the deceased made in extremes in such cases is a thing to be proven, and this proof may be made by any competent
witness who heard the statement. The wife may testify for the state in cases of this character as to any other fact known to her. . . . It can
not be contended that the dying declaration testified to by the witness was a confidential communication made to her; on the contrary,
it was evidently made in the furtherance of justice for the express purpose that it should be testified to in the prosecution of the defendant.

National Devt Co vs Workmen's Compensation Comm | 19 SCRA 861

FACTS: Respondent Gertrudes Lucas Vda. de Raymundo filed a claim for workmen's compensation for the death of her husband, Luis
Raymundo. She averred that her husband was employed at the NDC for more than 12 years, his last designation being machine tender
in the Finishing Department. His work consisted of lifting heavy loads, pushing a wagon loaded with dyed and wet cloth and mixing
chemicals for use in dyeing and printing textiles and that because of strenuous work done mostly at night and because of exposure to
sudden changes in temperature, her husband began to lose weight, complained of headaches and chest pains and later spat blood. On
account of poor health, Luis Raymundo retired from the service of petitioner on May 6, 1953. Eight months after, he died of pulmonary
tuberculosis.

RTC ruled in favor of respondent. On review, this decision was affirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Commission. In reaching
this conclusion, the Commission relied partly on the testimony of respondent and on the following:

Exhibit "E" — Death certificate which states that Luis Raymundo died on January 23, 1954 of pulmonary tuberculosis.

Exhibit "F" — Affidavit of Dr. Crisanto S. Vito Cruz in which he states that he treated Luis Raymundo for pulmonary
tuberculosis from December, 1952 to January 22, 1954.

Exhibit "G" — Petitioner's letter, dated May 6, 1953, advising Luis Raymundo of the termination of his employment.

Petitioner appealed to this Court. It contends that both respondent's testimony as well as Exhibits "E", "F" and "G" should have been
excluded, because the first is self-serving while the second are hearsays. Petitioner adds that while the death certificate (Exh. "E") is
admissible to prove the fact and date of death; it is not competent to prove the cause thereof.

ISSUE: Whether the evidence presented by respondent is admissible to support an award in her favor

RULING: Yes. The right of a party to be present and give evidence as provided in section 49 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act
would be meaningless if it did not include the right to testify in his own behalf. The argument that the testimony of an interested party
is self-serving and therefore is inadmissible in evidence misses the essential nature of self-serving evidence and the ground for its
exclusion. Self-serving evidence is evidence made by a party out of court at one time; it does not include a party's testimony as a witness
in court. It is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence that is the lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse
party and on the consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. On the other hand, a
party's testimony in court is sworn and affords the other party the opportunity for cross-examination.

Nor is there merit in the claim that Exhibits "E", "F" and "G" were erroneously admitted in evidence. While they may be hearsay by
common law rules of evidence, they are nevertheless admissible under section 49 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Aside from the
evidence objected to, there is some other substantial evidence supporting the award. There is in the record the testimony of Bienvenido
Dizon, a former co-employee of Luis Raymundo. There is likewise evidence of the payment of gratuity to Raymundo on account of his
illness. In addition, there is a presumption created by section 44 that Raymundo's illness was aggravated by the nature of his employment
and that Dr. Vito Cruz' affidavit that he treated Raymundo for tuberculosis is correct. This presumption is intended to reverse the burden
of proof and make it the duty of petitioner, as employer, to establish by substantial evidence, that the illness was not in fact aggravated
by the nature of the job. Petitioner has failed to overcome the evidence and presumptions in favor of respondent.

People vs Amajul | GR. 14626-27

P.S. the full text discussed the participation/ no participation of each of the accused. I only included the facts related to the doctrine for
this case.

FACTS: Yakan Djalalang, Moros Salahuddin, Djalim, Hamiddin alias Sauril, Asakil, Sahadain, Amajul, Albani, Musa, Lahud, Wadja
Madjid and Amdad were accused of the crime of robbery in band with murder and frustrated murder. While there is no dispute as to the
commission of the offenses charged, the investigations conducted by the authorities failed to bring to light the identity of the culprits,
for none of the survivors was able to recognize or identify the malefactors.

On suspicion of having taken part in the ambushes, Yakan Djalalang, Djalim, Hamiddin alias Sauril, Asakil, Amajul, Albani, Lahud,
Wadja Madjid and Amdad were apprehended by the police authorities.

Relying on the extra-judicial confessions of Yakan Dialalang, who escaped from detention during the pendency of the case; of Hamiddin
alias Sauril, who pleaded guilty to the criminal case; and of Wadja Madjid, the trial court, in the absence of other identification, relied
exclusively only the extra-judicial confessions of Dialalang, Sauril and Wadja Madjid, convicted the accused as conspirators.

As to appellant Asakil, the evidence was only that when being arrested and searched, the amount of P16.00 was found in his right shoe
and P3.00 in the left shoe The Solicitor General tries to add as another item of circumstantial evidence the fact that in the morning of
the crime, Asakil, employee of the robbed company, turned in his tools and left his work allegedly because of sickness and yet when,
on his way home, he was offered a ride by the party in the ill-fated jeep, he refused upon the pretense that he preferred to hike.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the lower court, in the absence of other identification and relying exclusively only the extra-judicial confessions of
some of the accused, implicate the other accused in the same case.
2. Whether the circumstantial evidence against Asakil can prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:
 1. No. A confession made by a defendant is admissible against him but not against this co-defendant as to whom said confession
is hearsay evidence for he had no opportunity to cross-examine the former. While it is true that voluntary extra-judicial
confessions may be admitted to confirm direct testimonial evidence, without the latter, the confessions do not warrant
consideration. Here, aside from the extra-judicial con-confessions of the persons referred to, no direct evidence conspiracy or
of involvement in the crimes in question was introduced.
2. No. These circumstances, standing alone, do not conclude Asakil's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution’s reliance
is placed on the sworn declarations of Pedro Morados and Francisco Jamero, both workmates of Asakil, which statements,
although forming, part of the records of the municipal court, were not properly introduced in evidence and, therefore, cannot
be considered in the evaluation of appellant Asakil's guilt.

People vs Serrano | 105 PHIL 531

Facts: Eulogio told Cenon, Domingo, Santiago, Filemon and Anastacio who were gathered at the house of Eulogio that Pablo Navarro
had been prompting people to call on Senator Pablo David and testify on the Maliwalu massacre and for that he manifested his desire
and plan to do away with Pablo. Eulogio instructed them to wait for PABLO in Bacolor, lure him to go with them to Dolores and there
kill him. In pursuance of the plan, the group waited for PABLO in Bacolor where he used to hang around. After three days of waiting,
the group finally got to invite Pablo to a drink using a jeep driven by Simplicio Manguerra. He was brought to Dolores where he was
killed together with the jeepney driver.

Cenon, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes were
charged with illegal detention with murder for the death of Pablo Navarro in an information filed by the provincial fiscal of
Pampanga. Upon motion of the assistant provincial fiscal, the Court ordered the discharge of Anastacio Reyes from the information to
testify as witness for the prosecution. (Melchor and Benjamin are civilian guards who actually shot Pablo.)

The appellants contend that in order that the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his co-conspirator, it must
appear and be shown by evidence other than the admission itself that the conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is to be
bound by the admission was a privy to the conspiracy. And as there is nothing but the lone testimony of prosecution witness Anastacio
Reyes, a co-conspirator, the trial court erred in finding that conspiracy has been established and in convicting the appellants based upon
the lone testimony of their co-conspirator.

Issue: Whether the lone testimony of the co-conspirator is admissible in evidence against the appellants sufficient to establish the
conspiracy

Held: Yes. Section 30, Rules 130 that provides "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence,
may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration," applies
only to extra-judicial acts or declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime is always subject to grave suspicion,
"coming as it does from a polluted source," and should be received with great caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless
admissible and competent

People vs Nierra | 96 SCRA 1

Facts: In order to monopolize those businesses in the locality, Paciano Nierra conceived the Idea of liquidating his competitor, Juliana.
For that purpose, he hired a convicted murderer who in 1965 had escaped from the Davao Penal Colony, to kill Juliana.

Between seven and eight o'clock that night, the unwary Juliana went to the beach where she was accustomed to void and when she
squatted, Misa unexpectedly appeared behind her, held her hair, thus tilting her face, and while in that posture, he inserted into her mouth
the muzzle of the pistol and fired it. Paciano and Gaudencia, who were near the beach, witnessed the actual killing.

On August 7, 1969, Misa was interrogated by Patrolman A.B. Vencer Jr. of the city police department. He signed a confession admitting
the killing of Juliana Nierra and implicating the other accused therein. The statement was sworn to before the fiscal. Two days later, he
reenacted the killing. Photographs were taken of the reenactment. A sketch of the scene of the crime was prepared.

On August 11, 1969, Misa testified at the preliminary in-vestigation. In his testimony, he admitted again the killing and confirmed his
confession implicating Paciano Nierra, his wife Gaudencia, Doblen and Rojas. He executed another confession on August 12, 1969
which was sworn to before the city judge.

As already stated, Misa pleaded guilty.

His counsel de oficio contends that Misa made an improvident plea because the trial court allegedly failed to explain thoroughly to him
the gravity of the offense and the consequences of his plea of guilty.

Issue: Whether Misa made an improvident plea because the trial court allegedly failed to explain thoroughly to him the gravity of the
offense and the consequences of his plea of guilty.

Ruling: That contention is not well-taken. Misa, as an escaped prisoner, had acquired some experience in criminal procedure. Not only
that. He executed two extrajudicial confessions. He reenacted the crime as the triggerman He testified at the preliminary investigation,
and, after he was sentenced to death, he was the prosecution star witness during the trial of his co-accused. His testimony against his co-
accused, delineating their roles in the commission of the killing, which he had perpetrated, fortified his plea of guilty and removed any
scintilla of doubt as to his culpability and as to his understanding of the consequences of his mea culpa

Under the circumstances, we cannot grant counsel de oficio's prayer that the judgment of conviction be set aside and that the case be
remanded to the lower court for new trial to hold a new trial. wherein Misa himself would again be the star prosecution witness, would
be a repetitious and preposterous ceremony.
People vs Victor | 181 SCRA 818

FACTS: When Victor went to Boljoon to visit his wife, Guneda met him at the market place and proposed to him a plan to rob the
residence of an American named Myles Castle and the cottage of Charles Turner, an American Peace Corps Volunteer assigned in the
Municipality of Boljoon the two agreed to execute their plan.

After killing Turner, the trio ransacked the cottage of Turner's personal belongings. Thereafter, Guneda left his two companions, who
waited for a bus to carry their loot to Cebu City.

Meanwhile, based on informations gathered, Victor came out as one of the suspects. Victor surrendered voluntarily when the PC
searched him in Cebu. Upon interrogation, Victor verbally admitted being one of those who killed the American Peace Corps Volunteer
in Boljoon, Cebu. The team recovered an empty .38 caliber revolver shell inside the house of Victor who explained that said empty shell
was left by his co-accused Roberto Montebon.

From there, Victor led the team to the house of Montebon where the latter was arrested. Both Victor and Montebon were informed of
their constitutional rights under custodial investigation, waived the same and voluntarily gave their sworn statements wherein they did
not only admit participation in the killing of Charles Turner but also implicated their co-accused Ceferino Guneda

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of a co-accused, affirming his extra-judicial confession, may be used in evidence against another? Is it
sufficient to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING: Section 27 of the Rules of Court refers only to the extra-judicial statement or admission of a conspirator. When such extra-
judicial statement is confirmed at the trial, it ceases to be hearsay. It becomes, instead, a judicial admission being a testimony of an
eyewitness admissible in evidence against those it implicates.

Such testimony cannot by itself and without corroboration be considered as proof to a moral certainty that the latter had committed or
participated in the commission of the crime. It is required that the testimony be substantially corroborated by other evidence in all its
material points. It is also required that such testimony be credible. Guided by the requirements of credibility and corroboration on
material points in the appreciation of the evidence on record, we hold that the testimony of Roger Victor is sufficient to warrant the
conviction of accused-appellant Ceferino Guneda.

First of all, the voluntariness of the testimony is beyond question. Second, the testimony of Roger Victor is replete with details that only
a participant in the crime could have known. Third, the testimony of Roger Victor is corroborated in its material points by other evidence
on record. Finally, there is the extra-judicial confession of Roberto Montebon, sworn to by him before Judge Alfredo Buenconsejo of
the Municipal Trial Court of Boljoon during the Preliminary Investigation, which confession points to Guneda as the mastermind.

Main point: While the general rule is that an extra-judicial confession of an accused is binding only upon himself and is not admissible
against his co-accused, it has been held that such a confession is admissible against a co-accused where the confession is used as
circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the co-conspirator. The judicial confession of Roger Victor as
corroborated by the other evidence, establishes the guilt of accused-appellant Guneda beyond reasonable doubt.

People vs Pajera | 30 SCRA 693

FACTS: As Antonio Abad Tormis, lawyer and columnist-editor of Cebu City's leading daily newspaper The Republic News, came out
of the Esquire Barber Shop and proceeded towards his car, which was parked nearby. He had already entered his car when a man
suddenly whipped out a revolver and pumped three bullets into him.

The police received a tip that two laborers in the arrastre service at the port of Cebu, namely, Cesario Orongan and Gaspar Mesa, might
have had some participation in the commission of the crime. First to be apprehended was Gaspar Mesa, who, after being duly investigated,
executed a sworn written statement wherein he admitted that he was the gunman's companion at the time. He positively identified Cesar
Roble as the one who fired the gun, pursuant to the instruction of a certain "Toto", who had earlier supplied the fatal weapon.

Armed with this information, the police arrested Avelino Monzolin a.k.a. "Toto" mentioned by Gaspar Mesa. Monzolin broke down and
confessed that he had been ordered by city treasurer Felipe B. Pareja to contact a killer who would shoot Tormis for a reward, because
Tormis had been relentlessly attacking him (Pareja) in The Republic News regarding the "garbage can scandal". Monzolin also pointed
to appellant Pareja as the mastermind of the killing.
In the meantime, a combined force went on a hunt for Orongan. After Orongan’s arrest, he made sworn statements which were reduced
to writing and then duly signed, substantially corroborating statements previously given by Monzolin and Mesa. He said that the .32
Caliber revolver he used had been furnished him by Monzolin; that he killed Tormis in consideration of the sum of P400.00; that he
received the money from Monzolin when the latter took back the revolver from him; and that he shot Tormis on orders of Monzolin,
who told him about having an "understanding" with his boss.

ISSUE: Whether extrajudicial confessions, granting they were voluntarily made, may not be used against an accused because
confessions are admissible only against the makers.

RULING: No. Confessions, while not admissible as proof in themselves of specific acts imputed to Pareja, may be taken into
consideration as strongly indicative of the truth of the other evidence against him, particularly the testimony of the confessed triggerman,
Cesario Orongan.

The prevailing rule is that in the absence of collusion among the declarants, their confessions should be read together in order to form a
complete picture of the whole situation and to consider them collectively as corroborative or confirmatory of what evidence there is
apart from the confessions themselves.
US vs Dela Cruz | 12 PHIL 87

FACTS: The guilt of the defendant and appellant of the crime of homicide of which he was convicted in the court below is conclusively
established by the evidenced of record.

The trial court was of opinion that its commission was not marked by either aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and sentenced
the convict to fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, the medium degree of the penalty prescribed by the code.
Burt we are of opinion that the extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9 should have been taken into consideration,
and that the prescribed penalty should have been imposed in its minimum degree. Subsection 7 of article 9 is as follows:

The following are extenuating circumstances:

xxxxxxxxx
That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation.

The evidence clearly discloses that the convict, in the heat of passion, killed the deceased, who had theretofore been his querida
(concubine or lover) upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance. We think that under the
circumstances the convict was entitled to have this fact taken into consideration in extenuation of his offense under the provisions of the
above-cited article.

ISSUE: Whether the extenuating circumstance should warrant the mitigation of the penalty of the accused

RULING: Yes. All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately and after due reflection had resolved
to kill the woman who had left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his perverse intention with safety, notwithstanding the
fact that he was already provided with a clean and well-prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides those already in
his revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone courteously and conversed with his victim, in what appeared to be in a proper
manner, disguising his intention and calming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully accomplish
his criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had planned to do beforehand. In the former case the cause alleged "passion and
obfuscation" of the aggressor was the convict's vexation, disappointment and deliberate anger engendered by the refusal of the woman
to continue to live in illicit relations with him, which she had a perfect right to do; his reason for killing her being merely that he had
elected to leave him and with his full knowledge to go and live with another man. In the present case however, the impulse upon which
defendant acted and which naturally "produced passion and obfuscation" was not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with
him, but the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another. As said by the
supreme court of Spain in the above-cited decision, this was a "sufficient impulse" in the ordinary and natural course of things to produce
the passion and obfuscation which the law declares to be one of the extenuating circumstances to be taken into consideration by the
court.

People vs Alegre | 94 SCRA 109

FACTS: This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla. According to the Necropsy Report, she died of asphyxia by manual
strangulation. Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and several cabinets were open,
and some personal garments, hadbags and papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the commission of the crime. Appellant
Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the
Pasay City police headquarters for investigation in connection with the case, but was later released that same day for lack of any evidence
implicating him in the crime.

Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from
the victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and
robbery of Adlina Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban City. In this statement,
which was written in the English language, Melecio Cudillan implicated Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla and Ramiro
Alegre.

When arraigned, Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla and Ramiro Alegre entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution
presented nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however, testified on the actual commission of the crime. The recital of facts was based
principally and mainly on the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan.

ISSUE: Whether an extrajudicial declaration of an accused is admissible and does have probative value against his co- accused.

RULING: No. The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan, on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how
Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro
Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet" there being no independent evidence of
conspiracy. As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not
have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. While there are
recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such
exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to
deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate
of the Pasay City jail.

US vs Tolosa | 5 PHIL 616

FACTS: In the judgment appealed from the defendant was sentenced for the crime of homicide. The Solicitor-General now asks this
court to acquit the defendant on the ground that, in his opinion, the latter acted in self-defense when he inflicted the wounds which
caused the death of the deceased. According to the testimony of the defendant, deceased unjustly and unlawfully attacked the defendant,
striking him with his fist and kicking him until he, the defendant, fell to the ground, and continuing the aggression with a heavy piece
of bamboo with which he struck him several blows, as a result of which he, the defendant, again fell to the ground. The defendant,
seeking to save himself from a further attack with the piece of bamboo, drew a pocketknife from his pocket and attacked the deceased,
inflicting upon him the wounds which resulted in his death a few hours later. It appears from this testimony that this attack upon the
defendant was not preceded by any provocation on his part.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of the defendant, corroborated by eyewitnesses to the occurrence, is sufficient proof to be acquitted.

RULING: Yes. The probatory force of this testimony has not been overcome by any evidence introduced at the trial. No eyewitness
was called in support of the Government's case. Also, the deceased made an extrajudicial statement some hours before his death, to the
justice of the peace who conducted the preliminary investigation, even assuming that it was admissible as evidence, is not in conflict
with the testimony of the witnesses for the defense, since the deceased limited himself to making a general statement as to there having
been a fight between himself and the defendant, a fact which is certainly not denied either by the defendant or his witnesses. The
deceased gave no details from which, in this case as in others, the juridical nature of the specific act could be ascertained.

People vs Ola | 152 SCRA 1

FACTS: Senen Ola, was charged before the then CFI as the principal in the crime of Attempted Robbery with Homicide and
Unintentional Abortion. His co-accused, Jose Bustamante and Rustico Matimtim were charged only as accomplices. Upon arraignment.
Ola pleaded not guilty. Bustamante pleaded guilty to the charge.

The accused-appellant in this case assails the judgment of conviction, first, upon the ground that the testimony of Jose Bustamante
comes from a polluted source, and therefore, must be subjected to careful scrutiny. Accused-appellant likewise points out that the
accomplice Matimtim repudiated his extrajudicial confession and declared that he was forced to sign the same. Finally, the defense
argues that other than one testimony of Bustamante, there is no evidence positively Identifying the accused-appellant as the author of
the crime charged, hence his defense of alibi should have been given due significance.

ISSUE:
1. Whether an extrajudicial confession made by a co-accused, when subsequently repudiated, can still be used an evidence against
another accused.
2. Whether the following circumstantial evidence, to wit: a footprint found near the stove in the kitchen of the victim's house, a hole in
the wall of said kitchen, the linear cuts or incisions found on Ola's index finger and mandible, and what the lower court considered as
the "dying gesture" of the victim, allegedly pointing to the general direction of " Ilaya, " where both the accused Bustamante and Ola
resided is sufficient to convict Ola.

RULING:
1. No. The extrajudicial statements of the accused Matimtim are inadmissible against the appellant Ola for being hearsay. To buttress
the testimony of Bustamante, the trial court deemed as corroborative evidence, the extrajudicial statements of the other accomplice
Rustico Matimtim, among others. The proper test in determining the corroboration of a testimony is to examine the other evidence with
a view to ascertain if these tend to connect the accused to the offense. With respect to the extrajudicial statements of Matimtim
implicating Ola, the trial court should have been guided by the settled rule that extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-
accused may not be utilized against the latter unless repeated in open court.

In the instant case, the appellant never had an opportunity to cross-examine Matimtim on the latter's incriminating statements. Not only
were said statements not repeated in court, but they were repudiated by Matimtim during his testimony wherein he claimed that he was
prevailed upon by Bustamante to implicate Ola. The latter expressly denied the facts narrated in his confession which incriminate Ola.
This is not one of those instances when the extrajudicial statements of a co-accused might be taken into consideration in judging the
credibility of the testimony of an accomplice where certain conditions concur, such as: a) the statements are made by several accused;
b) the same are in all material respects Identical; and c) there could have been no collusion among the co-accused in making said
statements. These conditions do not obtain in the instant case, and therefore, said evidence cannot be considered even in the appreciation
of Bustamante's testimony.

2. No. Circumstantial evidence may be characterized as that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue
may be established by inference. This Court cannot, by any stretch of imagination, infer from said evidence, the Identity of the victim's
assailant nor the actual participation of the appellant Ola in the crime charged.

The footprint allegedly found on the "abuhan" was never measured nor Identified as Ola's, or as of the same foot size as Ola's. The
prosecution failed to connect the wounds to the commission of the crime. Finally, the gesture of the dying woman too vague to be given
much probative value in determining the culpability of the appellant. The evidence comes to the courts couched in the witness' second
hand perception and possibly, imbued with his personal meanings and biases. This is what makes hearsay evidence objectionable.

As a matter of exception to the Hearsay Rule, statements made by the victim at the point of death which qualify as dying declarations
may be admitted by the courts. It is not clear from the decision under review whether the dying gesture was admitted as a dying
declaration. Without ruling on the admissibility of said evidence as a dying declaration, We find that such an equivocal act of pointing
with the hand does not in anyway corroborate Bustamante's testimony on the Identity of Ola as the victim's assailant.

People vs Cusi | 14 SCRA 944

FACTS: In Criminal Case No. 6813 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa, Jose Gustilo, Filomeno
Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were charged with robbery in band with homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty.

During the trial, and while Sgt. Lucio Bano of the Police Force of Digos, Davao was testifying as a prosecution witness regarding the
extrajudicial confession made to him by the accused Arcadio Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his participation in the
commission of the offense charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to to commit the offense, mentioning the name of
each and everyone of them. Following up this testimony, the prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention in court the names of
Puesca's alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the ground that whatever
the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients were concerned.
The respondent judge resolved the objection directing the witness to answer the question but without mentioning or giving the names
of the accused who had interposed the objection. In other words, the witness was allowed to answer the question and name his co-
conspirators except those who had raised the objection.

The prosecuting officer's motion for reconsideration of this ruling was denied. Hence the present petition for certiorari praying that the
abovementioned ruling of the respondent judge be declared erroneous and for a further order directing said respondent judge to allow
witness Bano to answer the question in full.

ISSUE: Whether abovementioned ruling of the respondent judge was erroneous

RULING: Yes. In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer, as manifested by him in the discussions below, is nothing
more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of those who conspired with him to commit
the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or the answer to be given by Sgt. Bano would be competent and admissible
evidence to show that the persons so named really conspired with Puesca.

For this limited purpose, we believe that the question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to
answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons
named really and actually conspired with Puesca and later took part in the commission of the offense.

People vs Saliling | 69 SCRA 427

Facts: On January 8, 1966 at about three o'clock in the morning, Rodrigo Arsenio, his wife and three children ten, seven and six years,
were asleep in their house at Barrio Liberty, Samar.

They saw and recognized Antonio Saliling, Concordio Jumadiao, Sergio Diano and Raymundo Villanueva when they heard voices
outside of their house.

Jumadiao told Argenio that he wanted to buy a chicken and that he desired to go up the house for some purpose. Believing that Jumadiao
and his companions had no evil motive, Argenio unbolted the door.

Once inside the house, Saliling without any preliminaries stabbed Argenio in the abdomen with a long bolo. Then, Diano stabbed him
in the chest. Argenio fell on the floor. Villanueva seized the buri bag (bayong) and took therefrom a wallet containing sixty pesos or
three twenty-peso bills.

Cahusay, the barangay captain, ordered Barandino, his first rural police sergeant, to investigate the wounded man. Barandino wrote with
a ball pen on a piece of ruled pad paper the statement in the dialect of Argenio, which the latter thumbmarked and which, as translated,
reads: "I, Rodrigo Argenio, at 3:15 1 was stabbed by Antonio Saliling, they were four of them, namely: Raymundo Villanueva,
Concordio Jumadiao and Sergio Diano inside my house." (Exh. D-1).

Argentino died the in the afternoon of the same day.

A case of robbery with homicide was filed against the malefactors.

During the trial, the trial court regarded Exhibit D as containing Argenio's dying declaration notwithstanding Barandino's denial that
Exhibit D is in his own handwriting.

The accused contends that Exhibit D does not satisfy the requisites of a dying declaration is not well-taken.

Issue: Whether Exhibit D does not satisfy the requisites of a dying declaration

Ruling: No. ”The declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of an impending death, may be received in a criminal case
wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death" (See. 31, Rule 130,
Rules of Court).

A dying declaration is admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. It is regarded as trustworthy because "truth sits on the
lips of a dying man". Considering that the declarant is at the threshold of death, his "mind is induced by the most Powerful considerations
to speak the truth; a situation solemn and so awful is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is created by a
positive oath administered in a court of justice."

To be admissible, it is necessary (a) that a dying declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death; (b) that at the time it was made the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that he was a competent
witness, and (d) that the declaration is offered in evidence in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the declarant is
the victim

All those requisites are present in this ease. The declarant's wife testified that he was conscious of his imminent death when he revealed
to Barandino that Saliling was his assailant As correctly observed by the trial court, the prosecution's evidence proves appellants' guilt
even without taking into account Argenio's dying declaration.

Ong vs CA | 100 SCRA 641

Evidence not formally offered during the trial cannot be used for or against a party litigant. Neither may it be taken into account on
appeal. Furthermore, actual and moral damages must be proven before any award thereon can be granted.

Identification of evidence is different from offer of evidence. Identification: marking of the evidence as an exhibit; Offer: done when the
party rests its case; evidence not offered cannot be considered by the court.
FACTS: Sps. Renato & Francia Ong boarded as paying passengers Inland bus, which was owned and operated by Inland Trailways
under a Lease Agreement with Philtranco. It was driven by Calvin Coronel. When the Inland bus slowed down to avoid a stalled cargo
truck in Tiaong, Quezon, it was bumped from the rear by another bus, owned and operated by Philtranco and driven by Apolinar Miralles.
Francia sustained wounds and fractures in both of her legs and her right arm, while Renato suffered injuries on his left chest, right knee,
right arm and left eye. They were brought to the San Pablo City District Hospital for treatment and were confined there from February
9 to 18, 1987.

Sps. Ong, petitioners, filed an action for damages against Philtranco and Inland. Philtranco answered that the Inland bus was registered
and owned by Inland; that its driver, Calvin Coronel, was an employee of Inland; that Philtranco was merely leasing its support facilities,
including the use of its bus tickets, to Inland; and that under their Agreement, Inland would be solely liable for all claims and liabilities
arising from the operation of said bus. Philtranco further alleged that, with respect to its own bus, it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its drivers, and that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of either
the cargo truck or the Inland bus which collided with said cargo truck.

Inland answered that, according to the Police Report, it was Apolinar Miralles, the driver of the Philtanco bus, who was at fault, as
shown by his flight from the situs of the accident; that said bus was registered and owned by Philtranco; and that the driver of the Inland
bus exercised extraordinary diligence as testified to by its passengers. Inland and Philtranco filed cross-claims against each other.

The RTC ruled in n favor of Sps. Ong, absolving Inland Trailways, Inc., from any liability whatsoever, and against Philtranco, ordering
the latter to pay the petitioners.

On appeal, the CA resolved that Philtranco’s liability for damages could not be predicated upon the Police Report which had not been
formally offered in evidence. The report was merely annexed to the answer of Inland, and petitioner did not adopt or offer it as
evidence. Consequently, it had no probative value and, thus, Philtranco should be absolved from liability. Instead, the appellate court
found that petitioners sufficiently established a claim against Inland based on culpa contractual. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Police Report, which was not formally offered in evidence, could be used to establish a claim against Philtranco
based on culpa aquiliana

RULING: No. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, provides that [t]he court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. A formal offer is necessary, since judges are required to base their findings of fact and their judgment solely and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow parties to attach any document to their pleadings and then expect
the court to consider it as evidence, even without formal offer and admission, may draw unwarranted consequences. Opposing parties
will be deprived of their chance to examine the document and to object to its admissibility.

In the case at bar, the defendant INLAND and plaintiffs-appellees did not identify the said Annex 1 or the Police Investigation Report
as evidence. Thus, under Section 35 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. Corollary, the Police Investigation Report of Annex 1 cannot be given any evidentiary value.

The petitioners’ allegations in their Complaint did not establish a cause of action against Philtranco. They similarly failed to make any
reference to said Police Report during the presentation of their case. This is precisely why Respondent Philtranco opted not to present
further evidence. A document or an article is valueless unless it is formally offered in evidence, and the opposing counsel is given an
opportunity to object to it and to cross-examine any witness called to present or identify it. Evidence not formally offered before the
trial court cannot be considered on appeal, for to consider them at such stage will deny the other parties their right to rebut them.

People vs Mansueto | 336 SCRA 715

Facts: Jacinto Pepito (hereafter JACINTO) lived at his mothers house in Liloan, Cebu with his son Jeovani and 17-year-old daughter
Cleofe (hereafter CLEOFE). At around 8:25 p.m. on 26 October 1991, CLEOFE roused JACINTO from his sleep and informed him
that a man outside the house was calling for him. JACINTO got up and went down the house. Downstairs, JACINTO saw the man who
was standing outside the gate of the house. Are you Jacinto? the man asked. Yes, I am Jacinto, JACINTO replied. Without warning, the
man drew a gun and fired one shot at JACINTO.

The man tried to shoot JACINTO a second time but the gun would not fire. Summoning whatever strength was left in him, JACINTO
reached out for his assailant. The man, however, hurriedly ran across the street to where a motorcycle was waiting. He boarded the
motorcycle; he and the driver sped away. At that point, JACINTOs body lay on the ground lifeless.

The driver of the getaway motorcycle was identified at the investigation conducted by the police to be the accused-appellant, Oscar
Mansueto (hereafter OSCAR). After the preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor filed on 11 November 1992 an
Information for Murder with Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City.

The States principal witness, CLEOFE, testified on the circumstances leading to the death of her father as already narrated.When asked
whether she had a good look (at) the man who was driving the motorcycle, CLEOFE said that she is familiar with his face because (she)
often see(s) him. She further explained that she had a good view of said driver for about five seconds as he and the gunman sped away.
Besides, the place where the driver waited for the gunman was illuminated by the light coming from a nearby vulcanizing shop owned
by one Arnold Hernandez. She then identified the driver of the motorcycle as OSCAR, whom she claimed was the paramour of her
mother, Moisesa Pepito.

Oscar was then convicted.

Issue: Whether the Clourt erred in giving credence to the statements of witness CLEOFE immediately after the shooting incident as part
of the res gestae
Ruling: No. In lending added credence to CLEOFEs testimony, it is not amiss to state that relatives of a victim of a crime have a natural
knack for remembering the face of the assailant and they, more than anybody else, would be concerned with obtaining justice for the
victim by the malefactor being brought to the face of the law. Indeed, family members who have witnessed the killing of a loved one
usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants.

Even assuming that CLEOFE did not actually identify OSCAR as the driver of the getaway motorcycle, sufficient circumstantial
evidence was established to uphold his conviction.

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. -- Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by
inference. Such evidence is founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the known
and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved

People vs Florendo | 68 PHIL 619

FACTS: On 28 August 1996 at around 2:30 in the afternoon appellant and his wife Erlinda were inside their house engaged in an
animated conversation. Living with them in the same house in Barangay Bulbulala, La Paz, Abra, was appellants father Agustin Florendo.
After Erlinda was heard to have told Imong to go to sleep, the latter all of a sudden and without any provocation hacked Erlinda with a
bolo in the head and other parts of her body.

Agustin, who was resting at that time, witnessed the incident.

Agustin then reported such situation in the barangay.

Charges were filed against acussed. At the pre-trial conference, appellant admitted killing his wife but put up the defense of insanity to
claim exemption from criminal liability.

The trial court held that the crime committed was parricide.

The Court rejects the plea of insanity. Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code exists when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of reason; he acts without the least discernment because of
complete absence of the power to discern; or, there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will. The onus probandi rests upon him who
invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.

We cannot sustain the ruling of the trial court that cruelty aggravated the killing simply because according to the autopsy report the
victims body bore sixteen (16) wounds all in all, four (4) of which were severe, deep and fatal. The number of wounds is not a test for
determining cruelty; it is whether appellant deliberately and sadistically augmented the victims suffering. Thus, there must be proof that
the victim was made to agonize before appellant rendered the blow which snuffed out her life.

ISSUES: Appellant Florendo now contends that (1) the trial court erred in not acquitting him on the ground of insanity; (2) for
appreciating cruelty instead as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, and (3) for upholding the legitimacy of his
common-law relationship with the victim in order to bring the killing within the ambit of Art. 246 of The Revised Penal Code.

RULING: (1) In the case at bar, appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was committed to the BGHMC a
few months after he killed his wife.

It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming that he had some form of mental illness by virtue of the premonitory symptoms of
schizophrenia, it did not totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence of his reasoning faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound
judgment and satisfactorily articulate certain matters such as his jealousy over the supposed infidelity of his wife, sufficiently discounts
any intimation of insanity when he committed the dastardly crime. While appellant on many occasions before the commission of the
crime did things that would indicate that he was not of sound mind, such acts only tended to show that he was in an abnormal mental
state and not necessarily of unsound mind that would exempt him from criminal liability. Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not
exclude imputability.

(2) We cannot sustain the ruling of the trial court that cruelty aggravated the killing simply because according to the autopsy report the
victims body bore sixteen (16) wounds all in all, four (4) of which were severe, deep and fatal. The number of wounds is not a test for
determining cruelty; it is whether appellant deliberately and sadistically augmented the victims suffering. Thus, there must be proof that
the victim was made to agonize before appellant rendered the blow which snuffed out her life.[22] Although Erlinda received sixteen
(16) wounds in all there is no showing that appellant deliberately and inhumanly increased her suffering.

(3) As to the marriage of the victim and appellant, the trial court properly upheld its legitimacy. In parricide, the best proof of relationship
between appellant and the deceased is the marriage certificate, and in the absence thereof, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be
considered. The testimony of appellant that he was married to the deceased is an admission against his penal interest. It is a confirmation
of the sem per praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[23] Even if the marriage certificate was not presented, that the victim was the legitimate wife
of appellant is evident from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In open court, appellant himself volunteered the information
in his offer of evidence through counsel and on direct examination that the victim was his legitimate wife.