[A.C. No. 6148.

February 27, 2004]

FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, the Minors JURIS ALEXIS T. MACARRUBO and GABRIEL ENRICO T.
MACARRUBO as represented by their Mother/Guardian, FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, complainant,
vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARRUBO, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by herself and on behalf of her two children, filed on June 6, 2000 a
[1]
verified complaint for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo (respondent) with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case No. 00-734-A, alleging that respondent deceived her into marrying him despite
his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza.
Detailing the circumstances surrounding respondents complained act, complainant averred that he started courting
her in April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which was celebrated
[2]
on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on December 18, 1991 in the latters Manila office,
[3]
and the second on December 28, 1991 at the Asian Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and that although
respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant,
her family and friends that his previous marriage was void.
Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino; and
that he abandoned complainant and their children without providing them any regular support up to the present time,
leaving them in precarious living conditions.
Complainant submitted documentary evidence consisting of the marriage contract between respondent and Helen
[4] [5] [6]
Esparza and that between her and respondent, and photographs of their (complainant and respondent) nuptials and
of captured moments in their life as a couple and a family.
[7]
Copy of the complaint could not be immediately served upon respondent owing to the difficulty of locating him.
[8]
Complainant later filed a Manifestation before the IBP, furnishing therein respondents address where he
supposedly resided with his third wife Jo T. Constantino-Macarubbo. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline thereupon
[9] [10]
thrice required respondent to file his Answer. He failed to do so, however, on motion of complainant, he was declared
[11]
in default. Complainant was thus allowed to present evidence ex parte.
[12]
The IBP Investigating Commissioner came out with a Report and Recommendation on January 22, 2001.
[13]
By Resolution of May 26, 2001, however, the IBP Board of Governors remanded the case to the Investigating
Commissioner to ensure proper notice or another opportunity to serve notice to the respondent. Subsequently or on
[14] [15]
September 5, 2001, respondent filed a Manifestation/Ex Parte Motion to Re-Open Proceedings which was granted.
[16]
By Comment of October 18, 2001, respondent denied employing deception in his marriage to complainant,
insisting instead that complainant was fully aware of his prior subsisting marriage to Helen Esparza, but that she dragged
him against his will to a sham wedding to protect her and her familys reputation since she was then three-months
pregnant.
Respondent submitted in evidence the final and executory October 30, 2000 Decision of Branch IV of the Regional
[17]
Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City in Civil Case No. 5617, Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Florence J. Teves, declaring
his marriage to complainant void ab initio. He drew attention to the trial courts findings on the basis of his evidence which
was not controverted, that the marriage was indeed a sham and make believe one, vitiated by fraud, deceit, force and
intimidation, and further exacerbated by the existence of a legal impediment and want of a valid marriage license.
Respondent also submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office that complainants name does not appear
[18]
in the National Index of Marriages for Bride; another certification from the National Statistics Office-Office of Civil
[19]
Registrar General that it has no record of the December 28, 1991 marriage of complainant and respondent; and an
attestation from the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite that Marriage License No. 772176221 which
[20]
was used in complainant and respondents marriage is not on file in its records.
 Admitting having sired complainants two children, Juris Alexis and Gabriel Enrico, respondent denied ever
abandoning them.
[21]
In his Supplemental Comment, respondent claimed that he left complainant and their two children with her consent
after explaining to her that the pain and shame of living in sin and ridicule was unbearable.
To refute the charge that he had abandoned complainant and their two children, he presented copies of fully paid
[22]
educational plans for the high school and college education of the children; a Philippine National Bank check dated
January 18, 1999 for P22,556.33 representing his payment of the final amortization of his car which has been in
[23]
complainants possession since 1997; a copy of a petition of complainant in a civil case filed against respondent with the
Quezon City RTC, for judicial authorization to sell certain properties of respondent, wherein she admitted that respondent
issued three postdated checks in the amount of P2,000.00 each for his childrens allowance covering the period October
[24]
1999 to December 1999; and copy of his August 9, 1999 letter to complainant demanding custody of his children, he
[25]
having been barred from seeing them, as well as the return of his personal properties in complainants possession.
To disprove that he is of depraved moral character, respondent submitted certifications from the Office of the Bar
[26] [27] [28]
Confidant, Office of the Ombudsman, Department of Justice, and the Philippine National Police in his hometown in
[29]
Enrile, Cagayan that he has no cases of any nature pending with them. And he too submitted letters from the
[30] [31]
Department of Interior and Local Government and the Metro Manila Development Authority addressed to him to
show that he is a civic-spirited person.
Finally, respondent, in his Supplemental Comment, raised the additional defenses that the judicial decree of
annulment of his marriage to complainant is res judicata upon the present administrative case; that complainant is in
[32]
estoppel for admitting her status as mere live-in partner to respondent in her letter to Josephine T. Constantino; and
that she resorted to forum-shopping in bringing both this administrative action and the civil case with the Quezon City
RTC.
Stressing that he had always been the victim in his marital relations, respondent invoked the final and executory
August 21, 1998 Decision of Branch 158 of the Pasig City RTC in JDRC Case No. 4320, Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Helen
[33]
C. Esparza, declaring his first marriage void on the ground of his wifes psychological incapacity.
After hearing during which both complainant and respondent took the witness stand, the Investigating Commissioner
[34]
rendered a Report and Recommendation the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is recommended that respondent Atty. Edmundo L. Macarrubo be SUSPENDED
FOR THREE MONTHS for gross misconduct reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms of the profession. Moreover, it
must likewise be impressed on respondent that he should comply with the moral and legal obligations incumbent upon
him as a father of the children as a result of his relationship with complainant. (Underscoring supplied)

[35]
The IBP Board of Governors subsequently passed Resolution No. XV-2003-351 which adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
The final disposition of the present administrative case is now before this Court.
It appears that respondent began his legal career in 1986 as Legal Officer of the Department of Education, Culture
[36]
and Sports after which he became Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil Service Commission. He later became
an Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer, then a State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, before finally bowing out
[37]
of public service after about 14 years or in July 2000 to engage in private practice.
The rule that a lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering
[38]
him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court bears reiterating.
Upon the evidence on record, respondent is indeed guilty of gross misconduct in his private affairs which warrant
disciplinary action by this Court as the guardian of the purity and integrity of the legal profession.
The incontrovertible facts show that while respondent had a subsisting marriage with Helen Esparza with whom he
[39]
had two children, he entered into a second marriage with complainant.
While the marriage between complainant and respondent has been annulled by final judgment, this does not cleanse
his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and complainant started living as husband and wife in December 1991 when
his first marriage was still subsisting, as it was only on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage was annulled, rendering
[40]
him liable for concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is required for the continued
[41]
right to practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. It imports moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the basic
[42]
social institution of marriage.
 Even assuming arguendo that respondent was coerced by complainant to marry her, the duress, by his own
admission as the following transcript of his testimony reflects, ceased after their wedding day, respondent having freely
cohabited with her and even begot a second child by her.
xxx
ATTY. PAGUIA [Complainants Counsel]
Q: Are you claiming that the complainant coerced you again to marry her?
A: Yes, I was.
Q: Did she use a gun to coerce you?
A: A lot of people appearing around and a lot of bad mouth from her, threats to sue me and to even kill me by
people around.
Q: So insofar as you are concerned the complainant committed a crime of coercion against yourself?
A: Yes.
Q: And is it correct for me to say that you did not file any case before the Prosecutors Office.
A: I reported that matter to the police.
COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION
Q: In what way did M[s]. Florence Teves coerce you?
A: She placed me in a place where she could guard me and she treated (sic) to sue me, destroy my career. And
at the time of the marriage she sent people to fetch me from my place to be there.And there are a lot of
people with strange faces.
ATTY. PAGUIA
Q: How many days or hours did this coercion last?
A: Thats continuing.
Q: From what day to what day?
A: Its started when she said she was pregnant until the date of the alleged marriage.
Q: Can you tell the Honorable Commission who got her pregnant at that time?
A: Although there was a carnal knowledge once.
Q: Of course you know that the complainant delivered the child after your marriage, is it not?
A: Yes, six months after because she was already pregnant three months during that time already.
Q: Can you tell the Honorable Commission what is the name of the child was (sic)?
A: Juris. I recognized the children. Theres no problem about that. I gave them educational plan, I gave them
support.
Q: After the first child you continued living with the complainant, is it not?
A: Intermittently I get out and then she would call pagkat may sakit yong bata so I have to go back.
Q: Of course it was your responsibility as father to the child to see the condition of the child?
A: Yes, thats why whenever she comes and tells me that the child is sick I go there.
Q: After your wedding with the complainant can you tell the Honorable Commission where you resided?
COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION
Q: When you say where you resided, both of them?
ATTY. PAGUIA: Yes, Your Honor.
A: In the residence of Florence.
ATTY. PAGUIA
 Q: How long did you live with the complainant after your wedding?
A: Intermittently again few months then I get out then when the child is sick I have to visit.
COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION
Q: When you say intermittently you dont stay there?
A: Not permanently.
ATTY. PAGUIA
Q: How often did you come home to the residence of the complainant?
A: Whenever she call that the child is sick.
Q: So you live (sic) with her up to what year?
A: Intermittently 1995.
Q: You mentioned that you have two children with the complainant?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you remember when your second child with the complainant was born?
A: I cannot remember.
Q: Do you know how old the second child with the complainant is?
A: I guess six or seven.
Q: What is his name?
A: Mico.
Q: Who provided the support for these children from the time they were born up to the present?
A: When I was there I gave for their subsistence.
Q: Will you please tell the Commission how much was that?
A: I buy groceries for them and I gave also for their leisure and for their education.
Q: When you gave this support during the intermittently that you had with them?
A: Intermittently also.
A: Roughly, Compaero, can you tell the Honorable Commission from that time they were born to this time how
much you were giving them?
A: I cannot compute.
COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION
Q: What about on a monthly basis, do you recall?
A: I cannot compute although when I left with her consent in 1997 I left valuables in the amount of P400,000.00.
Q: When you say with her consent, did you tell her that you are leaving?
A: Yes, Your Honor, she agreed because I said I can no longer bear living with sin.

[43]
xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The saying that photographs do not lie could not be any truer in those submitted in evidence by complainant which
show a typical happy family with respondent essaying out his role as a husband to complainant and a father to their two
kids. Respondent cannot thus take refuge in the earlier mentioned finding in the decision of Tuguegarao City trial court in
the annulment case he filed against complainant. The decision, rendered in default of complainant, cannot serve as res
[44]
judicata on the final resolution of the present case. As this Court held in In re Almacen, a disbarment case is sui
generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its
officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against
[45] [46]
him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then the judgment of annulment of
respondents marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of
proof clear preponderance of evidence in disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability
[47]
attaches.
The disturbing fact that respondent was able to secure the annulment of his first two marriages and is in the process
of procuring the annulment of his third bears noting. Contrary to the finding of the Investigating Commissioner,
respondent, by his own admission, contracted a third marriage:
xxx
ATTY. PAGUIA
Q: After getting married to the complainant is it a fact that you entered into a third marriage to one Josephine
Constantino?
A: I think that is . . .
Q: I will reform, Your Honor. Do you know a person by the name of Josephine Constantino?
A: Yes
Q: What relation if any do you have with her?
A: I am separated to her since 2000.
COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION
Q: Were you married to Josephine Constantino?
A: Yes, but its in the process of annulment.

[48]
xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In both his marriages to his first wife and to complainant, respondent claimed that he was made to enter into the
marital union against his will. That claim is an affront to the intelligence of the members of this Court to distinguish fact
from fiction, reality from fantasy. It is not easy to believe that a lawyer like respondent could easily be cowered to enter
into any marriage.One incident of a shotgun marriage is believable, but two such in succession would tax ones
credulity. And then, there is a third marriage to Josephine T. Constantino which is again the subject of another annulment
case. It would not come as a surprise if in that pending case, he would again put blame on his third wife in order to send
the marriage to oblivion.
Respondent here has exhibited the vice of entering into multiple marriages and then leaving them behind by the
mere expedient of resorting to legal remedies to sever them. The impact of respondents conduct is incalculable upon his
ex-wives as well as the children he had by them, their lives having been dislocated beyond recall.
Respondents assertion that he has not failed to support his children by complainant is not totally supported by the
evidence on record. He may have secured educational plans for them and doled out some sums of money in the past, but
it appears that he has failed to provide them regular, monthly support. In fact, he admitted that even before he left
[49]
complainants residence in 1995, he was only giving intermittent support to his children with her.
Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this
society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. This must be checked if not stopped.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be perceived to be of
[50]
good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. The moral
delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, including that which makes a mockery of
[51]
the inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community.
In sum, respondent has breached the following precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of
the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

There can then be no other fate that awaits respondent, as a consequence of his grossly immoral conduct, than to be
[52]
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law. The penalty of 3 months suspension recommended by the IBP is, not
commensurate to the gravity of his conduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and is hereby DISBARRED
from the practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show satisfactory evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
and to this Court that he is supporting or has made provisions for the regular support of his two children by
[53]
complainant.
Let respondents name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., on leave.
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo.
"Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a
sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a
female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of
Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a
physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a
change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex
in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207,
impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita
Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live
birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and
1
that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several
doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His
attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
2
surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact
undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his
birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general
3
circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P.
Edel, as witnesses.

4
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful
motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

 Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a
woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his
own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in
granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of
the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice
and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to
change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from
5
"Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE.

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
6
Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

7 8
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s
decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the
ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the
decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it
9
was denied. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to
10
413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial
court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful
motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis
supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry
changes sought. We disagree.

11
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name
12 13
is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the
Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical
errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules
and regulations.

14
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first
name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent
and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition
15 16 17
for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and
procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature,
not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname
may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been
publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not
18
alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create
grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling
19
reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
20
name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and
official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that
court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could
be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under
RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where
his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice
him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of
his first name was concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
21
statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules
22
of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the
23
civil register.

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such
 as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It
is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
24
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
25
birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the
ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace
26
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." The birth certificate of
petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct.
No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths)
and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions,
naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name).
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and
nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among
those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or
impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a
27
person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature,
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.
The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to
have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
28
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. (emphasis supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil
status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s
cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

 SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the
birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall
be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance
at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth;
(b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known,
of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may
be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
29
birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
30 31
determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a
contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the
civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no
legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that
32 33
distinguish a male from a female" or "the distinction between male and female." Female is "the sex that produces ova
34 35
or bears young" and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." Thus, the words
"male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have
36
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary." Since the statutory language of the Civil Register
Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is
something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included
in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal
basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed
that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even
the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé.
However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man
37
and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
38
female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage
and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-
female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
39 40
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the
41
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be
granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of
the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation.
The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should
govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly
important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in
the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what
procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else.
The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their
dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not
fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an
ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166676

Petitioner, Present:

- versus - Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,

JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Carpio Morales,

Respondent. Tinga,

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 12, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a
reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B.
Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the name
"Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male."

The facts are as follows.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
2
Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted
possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has
small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped
growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed
from Jennifer to Jeff.

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was
posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and
authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a
medical certificate stating that respondent’s condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically
respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally and she has two sex organs – female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that
respondent’s uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly
period. He further testified that respondent’s condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender
because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change
would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted respondent’s petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:

The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for].
Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his
petition. It was medically proven that petitioner’s body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as
his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be
acknowledged and identified as a male.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the
following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:

a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and

b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioner’s school records, voter’s registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent
records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned
ruling.

The issues raised by petitioner are:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN
COMPLIED WITH; AND,

II.

CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN
THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT’S MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL
4
HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE."

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court.

The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation
or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondent’s petition before the
5
court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar. The OSG further contends respondent’s petition is fatally
defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of
6
the Rules of Court. The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth
7
certificate and respondent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not
formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar
was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or
8
processes in the course of the proceedings, respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth
9
certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender, change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule
10
108, and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
11
Court.

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103

CHANGE OF NAME

Section 1. Venue. – A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial
Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court].

Sec. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person
desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least
three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

Sec. 3. Order for hearing. – If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order
reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a
copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in
some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set
for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last
publication of the notice.

Sec. 4. Hearing. – Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor
General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.

Sec. 5. Judgment. – Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has
been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and
reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in
accordance with the prayer of the petition.

Sec. 6. Service of judgment. – Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished
the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith
enter the same in the civil register.

Rule 108

CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the
civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.

Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in
the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of
a minor; and (o) changes of name.

Sec. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.

Sec. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

Sec. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting
the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings.

Sec. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the
civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.

The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court because respondent’s petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108
provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a
party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without
whom no final determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly
notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the
13
rules. The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other
14
persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby. Respondent,
however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules
liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the
matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent
furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look
to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in
so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No.
9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
18
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
19
Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural
children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that
20
occur after birth.

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate" appearance of male
characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone.
A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral
opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal
structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows
older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to
menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.

CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine
adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or
female.[22] The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living
thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes."

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals
have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical
science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia
surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is
considered as suffering from a "disorder" which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by
surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the
category of either male or female.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex
as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested that there is some middle
ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals who are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly
‘female’."[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as
a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally
negates such rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth
certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the

subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female nor
consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
respondent’s body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result,
respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor
in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority,
with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his
body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere
with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent
could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the
categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in
respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately
private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical
treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred
in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society
commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his
intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him
should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent"[27] and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who
are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s
position and his personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with
what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent
deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in
this case.

As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow.[28] The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff
implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s
change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name. Such
a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.

Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City,
herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on
July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia
Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A.
Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia,
while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the
first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the
issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against
both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia
asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-

(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and

(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.

Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of
the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of
therespondent Judge-

(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based on
"agreed facts;" and

(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.

We find the petition devoid of merit.

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties
because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid
until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly
married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
1
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such
fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded
VOID under the law.

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 137110 August 1, 2000

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.
CONSUELO TAN, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.
One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as "void."

The Case

1
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy
as follows:

"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of
Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, [the
court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three (3) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days
of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.

2
Costs against accused."

The Facts

The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial court’s judgment, as follows: "From the evidence adduced by
the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June
27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibañez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly
executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was ‘single’. There is no dispute
either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man, having
been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo
B. Cañares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was further
blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the
same manner, the civil marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29,
1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated
when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by
accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.

"On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of
Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr.
Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.

"On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed
an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision
dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.

"Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second marriage
with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in lawful
marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having been legally
dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime are present,
namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved
or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that
he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential
requisites for validity. x x x

"While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his previous marriage ha[d]
been judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of accused.

"It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991,
accused’s prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any
judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the
nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married
man when he contracted such second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly
3
married to his first wife."

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:

"Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’ But here, the final judgment
declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after,
when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act
4
of any person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally dissolved."

5
Hence, this Petition.

The Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

"A

Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner.

"B

Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishing
bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.

"C

6
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt."

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.

Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage

Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

"The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings."

The elements of this crime are as follows:

"1. That the offender has been legally married;

 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;

7
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity."

When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that
petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted
a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.

Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until set aside by a
8
competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. Thus, he concludes that
9
there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries of former Justice Luis Reyes that "it is now
settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first marriage is
voidable, it is not a defense."

Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, but she points out that that declaration came only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime
had already been consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be
obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.

We agree with the respondent.

To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage has been
10 11
characterized as "conflicting." In People v. Mendoza, a bigamy case involving an accused who married three times, the
Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a second marriage during
the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife then charged him with
bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it had been contracted while
the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that there
was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when he married for the
12
third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon, which involved substantially the same facts.

But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v.
13
GSIS, Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death, the
Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to the second wife and
her children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second marriage. It held: "And with respect to the right of the
second wife, this Court observes that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."

14
In Tolentino v. Paras, however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage was not
necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving
spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the
first wife, holding that "the second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of the first
spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage."

15
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage.
After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had
previously been married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled: "x x x
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such
fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x."

16
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA, the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding that there was no need for
such declaration of nullity.
 17
In Domingo v. CA, the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for the recovery and
the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: "The Family Code has
settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is
now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and
void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again
18
cannot be charged with bigamy."

Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new
provision of the Family Code, which came into effect several years after the promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon.

In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:

"Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the
spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead
and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage
as contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court."

The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person
during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish
19
its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages."

The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family
Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage, as follows:

"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such marriage void."

In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage void was necessary. Verily, the
Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code
Revision Commitee has observed:

"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a person may be null and
void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the second
marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA
315). This provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial decree
20
is necessary to establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033)."

In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon – that there is no need for a judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now necessary
before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and convicted
of bigamy.

21
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre, which involved an administrative Complaint
against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyer’s argument that he was free to enter into a second marriage
because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential." The Court
further noted that the said rule was "cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code." Significantly, it observed
that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first marriage was void, was "bigamous and
criminal in character."
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by petitioner, changed his view on the
subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial declaration of
22
the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage:

"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with
a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second
marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage
should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial
declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x x x."

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a
letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he
committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime
had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy
cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action
as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.

Damages

In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals insofar as it denied her
23
claim of damages and attorney’s fees.

Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she cannot obtain affirmative relief
24
from this Court. In any event, we find no reason to reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which
we quote hereunder:

"We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim
that she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage when she contracted matrimony with
Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove this, and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies.

xxx xxx xxx

"Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous marriage does not inspire belief, especially as
she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that she took the plunge anyway, relying
on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then already living with another man.

"Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully conscious of the consequences of her
act. She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did in this case,
ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own
25
willful making."

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

VITUG, J.:
At the pith of the controversy is the defense of the absolute nullity of a previous marriage in an indictment for bigamy. The
majority opinion, penned by my esteemed brother, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, enunciates that it is only a
judicially decreed prior void marriage which can constitute a defense against the criminal charge.

The civil law rule stated in Article 40 of the Family Code is a given but I have strong reservations on its application
beyond what appears to be its expressed context. The subject of the instant petition is a criminal prosecution, not a civil
case, and the ponencia affirms the conviction of petitioner Vincent Paul G. Mercado for bigamy.

Article 40 of the Family code reads:

"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."

The phrase "for purposes of remarriage" is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like void contracts, are inexistent from
the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that the Family code requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage before a subsequent marriage is contracted; without such declaration, the validity and the full legal
consequence of the subsequent marriage would itself be in similar jeopardy under Article 53, in relation to Article 52, of
the Family Code. Parenthetically, I would daresay that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage
for the purpose of remarriage should be held to refer merely to cases where it can be said that a marriage, at least
ostensibly, had taken place. No such judicial declaration of nullity, in my view, should still be deemed essential when the
"marriage," for instance, is between persons of the same sex or when either or both parties had not at all given consent to
the "marriage." Indeed, it is likely that Article 40 of the Family Code has been meant and intended to refer only to
marriages declared void under the provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37, 38 and 53 thereof.

In fine, the Family Code, I respectfully submit, did not have the effect of overturning the rule in criminal law and related
jurisprudence. The Revised Penal Code expresses:

"Art. 349. Bigamy.---The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

Surely, the foregoing provision contemplated an existing, not void, prior marriage. Covered by article 349 would thus be,
for instance, a voidable marriage, it obviously being valid and subsisting until set aside by a competent court. As early as
1
People vs. Aragon, this Court has underscored:

"xxx Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring
judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an
express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by
said rule of strict interpretation."

Unlike a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and therefore not a defense in bigamy if the
second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of annulment), the complete nullity, however, of a previously
contracted marriage, being a total nullity and inexistent, should be capable of being independently raised by way of a
defense in a criminal case for bigamy. I see no incongruence between this rule in criminal law and that of the Family
Code, and each may be applied within the respective spheres of governance.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.

G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in C.A. – G.R. CV 37897,
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the marriage contract between
private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. It also ordered private respondent
to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.

As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on
March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid
marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of
the parties.

Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein
petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also
had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.

On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying that his
marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married. He
also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he
married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his
marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4,
1979.

Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their marriage was contracted
without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3,
1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted in evidence. Petitioner also
submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which
declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church
marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as evidence during trial and,
according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact that the civil marriage of private
respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is
undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April 4,
1
1982.

The Pasig RTC sustained private respondent’s civil suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab
initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996,
the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to
Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Said the appellate court:

We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendant’s counsel that ‘no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of void marriages.’ It does not say, however, that a second marriage may proceed even without a
judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and void, ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we are
unwilling to rule that the matter of whether a marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine for himself –
for this would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a second marriage even before a competent court
issues a judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say the least, and could not
have been the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code on marriage.

xxx

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in this wise:
 1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo M. Reyes and defendant-
appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and void ab initio;

2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the amount of P15,000.00 to his
children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4, 1991; and

3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.

2
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition asserting that the Court of Appeals erred:

I.

BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE VALIDITY OF PETITIONER’S
MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.

II

IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS.

III

IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL EFFECTS OF THE
RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE LICENSE.

IV

IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT.

The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this question, we shall go over applicable laws and pertinent cases to
shed light on the assigned errors, particularly the first and the second which we shall discuss jointly.

In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to private respondent null and void for
lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage between private respondent and Villanueva. The appellate court
3 4
rejected petitioner’s claim that People v. Mendoza and People v. Aragon are applicable in this case. For these cases
held that where a marriage is void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. But the
appellate court said these cases, decided before the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O
No. 227), no longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read into the provisions of law previously
5
obtaining.

In refusing to consider petitioner’s appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:

Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this case. Although decided by the
High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code, as in the instant
case.

xxx

For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the
6
first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. . . .

At the outset, we must note that private respondent’s first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979,
respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The present case differs significantly from the recent cases
7 8
of Bobis v. Bobis and Mercado v. Tan, both involving a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous marriage was
 9
contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code, under which a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly
required.

Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with
any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the
spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
than seven years, is generally considered as dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and
void by a competent court.

As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no express provision
to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting.

10 11
Originally, in People v. Mendoza, and People v. Aragon, this Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second
marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage
during the subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court acquitted
accused on the ground that the second marriage is void, having been contracted during the existence of the first marriage.
There is no need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void, and the
first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy.
Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that it is not for the spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage
is void or not.

12 13
In Gomez v. Lipana, and Consuegra v. Consuegra, however, we recognized the right of the second wife who entered
into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the
husband. The Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of the
second marriage). And since the death of the husband supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of the
14
second wife to share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity.

15
But in Odayat v. Amante (1977), the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. We exonerated a clerk of
court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void, since
she was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February of the same year. The Court held that no judicial
16
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras.

17
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986), the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with
the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid
18
marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that:

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration
(citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at
the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and
respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. (Emphasis supplied).

19
In Yap v. Court of Appeals, however, the Court found the second marriage void without need of judicial declaration, thus
reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.

At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra,
20
and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code. Article 40 of said Code expressly required a
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage –
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

21
In Terre v. Terre (1992) the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous marriage
during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was
already married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have known that the prevailing case law is that "for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage
was null and void ab initio is essential."

22
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993), the Court held:

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family
Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147,
23
148).

However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero,
24
(1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed
that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue
of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took
place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code,
there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that
time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void
for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second
marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so
25
would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code
has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of
petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate court’s finding
that despite private respondent’s "deceit and perfidy" in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her
silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married private
respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has
raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondent’s allegation that he wed petitioner
but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage license, though it was the same license issued
on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their
civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary
effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense
during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due consideration
and weight. She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social
institution, outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential
and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies.
That this license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof
in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also
to fortify the first. The appellate court might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant
below which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial
court. But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from
what the CA calls "his own deceit and perfidy."

On the matter of petitioner’s counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees.1âwphi1 Although the appellate court admitted
that they found private respondent acted "duplicitously and craftily" in marrying petitioner, it did not award moral damages
26
because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her claim.

Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the present case, but for another
reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status
as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for
annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and
alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife
damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common
sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between
27 28
husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation. There are other remedies.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1996 and its
Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private
respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of
P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne
Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

 [A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000]

ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan,
Samar, respondent. ALEX

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority. In a
Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing
marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with
the office of the Local Civil Registrar alleging

"a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A. YMAN got married and our
marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan Daguman in his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in
Calbayog City, Samar; xxxalex

b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted as our principal sponsor and
spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN; xxx

c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned me without any reason at all;

d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog City and wrote the City Civil
Registrar to inquire regarding my Marriage Contract;

e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog City that my marriage was
not registered; xxxSc lex

f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar, I wrote Judge Juan Daguman, to inquire;

g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all the copies of the Marriage
Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);

h. That no copy was retained by Judge Daguman;

i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to my interest such as: x law

1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;

2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our marriage before the office of the
Local Civil Registrar."

The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.

In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:

1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman had to be solemnized by
respondent in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due
to the following and pressing circumstances: Sc

1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and unable to report to his station
in Sta. Margarita. In the forenoon of that date, without prior appointment, complainant Beso and
Mr. Yman unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent in said City, urgently requesting the
celebration of their marriage right then and there, first, because complainants said she must leave
that same day to be able to fly from Manila for abroad as scheduled; second, that for the parties
to go to another town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail serious problems of
finding a solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsors, while in fact former
 Undersecretary Pacifico Maghacot, Sangguniang Panglunsod [member] Ramon Dean were
already with them as sponsors; third, if they failed to get married on August 28, 1997,
complainant would be out of the country for a long period and their marriage license would lapse
and necessitate another publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond their plans for the
scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would complicate her employment abroad; and, last,
all other alternatives as to date and venue of marriage were considered impracticable by the
parties;

1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments (sic) for a valid marriage,
which respondent found all in order. Spped

1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who, respondent realized,
deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy.

2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in good faith that by so doing
he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not be too expensive and complicated
for citizens to get married.

3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration of the duplicate and triplicate
copies of the marriage certificate, which failure was also occasioned by the following circumstances
beyond the control of respondent: Scmis

3.1. After handing to the husband the first copy of the marriage certificate, respondent left the
three remaining copies on top of the desk in his private office where the marriage ceremonies
were held, intending later to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the forth (sic)
in his office.

3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all the papers relating to the
said marriage but notwithstanding diligent search in the premises and private files, all the three
last copies of the certificate were missing. Promptly, respondent invited by subpoena xxx Mr.
Yman to shed light on the missing documents and he said he saw complainant Beso put the
copies of the marriage certificate in her bag during the wedding party. Unfortunately, it was too
late to contact complainant for a confirmation of Mr. Ymans claim. Mis sc

3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she is out of the country, a
reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the established facts so far in this dispute. If
we believe the claim of complainant that after August 28, 1997 marriage her husband, Mr. Yman,
abandoned her without any reason xxx but that said husband admitted "he had another girl by the
name of LITA DANGUYAN" xxx it seems reasonably clear who of the two marriage contracting
parties probably absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate. Jo spped

3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse but to protect the public
interest by trying all possible means to recover custody of the missing documents in some
amicable way during the expected hearing of the above mentioned civil case in the City of
Marikina, failing to do which said respondent would confer with the Civil Registrar General for
possible registration of reconstituted copies of said documents.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11, 1998 found that respondent Judge "
committed non-feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning
that the commission of the same or future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing out that:

"As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, the authority to solemnize
marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer
within his area of jurisdiction. Miso

Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a
marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:

(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;
 (2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place; Nex old

(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.

The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.

Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he failed to register the
marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.

Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which provides: Ncm

"It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting
parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and
triplicate copies of the certificates not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil
registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. xxx" (underscoring ours)

It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the respondent Judge committed non-feasance in
office, he also undermined the very foundation of marriage which is the basic social institution in our
society whose nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law. Granting that respondent Judge
indeed failed to locate the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, he should have
exerted more effort to locate or reconstitute the same. As a holder of such a sensitive position, he is
expected to be conscientious in handling official documents. His imputation that the missing copies of the
marriage certificate were taken by Bernardito Yman is based merely on conjectures and does not deserve
consideration for being devoid of proof."

After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the evaluation report of the OCA well-
taken. Mani kx

[1]
Jimenez v. Republic underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution thus: "[M]arriage in this country is an
institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity,
continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty
of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation
and ultimately lead to its destruction."

With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides, among others, that

"ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: Maniks

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction; xxx" (Italics ours)

In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:

ART. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may
be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote places
in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing
in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect." (Italics ours) Spped jo

As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judges chambers or courtroom only in
the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request
of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.

In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiance Yman was at the point of death or in a remote
place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage
be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent
Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was "[a]n
overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government
policy." Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e believed in good faith that by
doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens
to get married." Manikan

A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it and render justice at
[2] [3]
all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he must
[4]
also be conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their office should be
[5]
more circumspect in the performance of their duties.

If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization of the marriage in this case only
tends to degrade the revered position enjoyed by marriage in the hierarchy of social institutions in the country. They also
betray respondents cavalier proclivity on its significance in our culture which is more disposed towards an extended period
of engagement prior to marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.Ncmmis

An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that enacted in order to preserve so sacrosanct an inviolable
social institution as marriage and the stability of judicial doctrines laid down by superior authority should have given
respondent judge pause and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties as
a solemnizing officer. A judge is, furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of
[6]
his court. Thus respondent Judge should be reminded that

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only
within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice of
this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as
long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, Judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes
a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down
in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
[7]
administrative liability. Scnc m

Considering that respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar
[8]
only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog.

Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should exercise extra care in the exercise
of his authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observe extra
precautions to ensure that the event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code which
states in no uncertain terms that

ART. 23. - It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting
parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate
copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place
where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the
solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in
his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in
proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place
other than those mentioned in Article 8. (Italics supplied) Sdaad

In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent Judge was less than conscientious in
handling official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and
[9]
official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. However,
the records show that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judges part. This Court reiterates that
judges must adopt a system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient
[10]
dispatch of business. It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court
[11]
because he is after all the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.

In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and
warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. This Court adopts the
recommendation of the OCA. Juris
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED. Mi sedp

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
 [A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002]

MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-
Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B.
Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However,
since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was
likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida
N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to
comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15
February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents
to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not
stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then
requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents
submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he
refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the
parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out
of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who
just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished
the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that
they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge
followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered
to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the
absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her
own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court
Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly
issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the
same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by
respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License
on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000.
However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of such
marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of
the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote
the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal,
informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the
Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the
respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his
territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges
of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
[1]
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy, respondent judge held office and had
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a
wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of
the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the
area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over
the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
[2]
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. (Emphasis supplied.)

In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage
outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that:

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to
apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited
[3]
ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized
the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license.
[4]
In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has
consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of
exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
[5]
discipline of court personnel, would be undermined. Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or
personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or
another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves
the Courts constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust
[6]
character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G.
Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance
of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F.
Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del
Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent
judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and name of the
Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his
actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No. 94-980-
MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16,
"Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely
relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his
[1]
first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in
solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code
which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered
[2]
sufficient for a resolution of the case.
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently proven,
they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be
objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil
status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented
in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge
[3]
Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as
claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him.In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew
Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of
cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she
has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already
dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's
presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before
the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse." (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement
which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven
that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with
pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly,
it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such
neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family
Code, "The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under
Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by
Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or
temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this
Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect."

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having solemnized the marriage
between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states,
a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of
death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn
statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote
place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma
[4]
del Rosario.
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under
Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage
may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8,
which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority
of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within
the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
[5]
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed
with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the
exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
 Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in
the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure
to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to
apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
[6]
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. It is not too much to
[7]
expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law.While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in
an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the
marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of
respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the
law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of
six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 April 2, 2013
(Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, Branch 2; JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA, Branch 3; JUDGE ROSABELLA M.
TORMIS, Branch 4; and JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES, Branch 8; all of MTCC-Cebu ·City; CELESTE P.
RETUYA, Clerk III, MTCC Branch 6, Cebu City; CORAZON P. RETUYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6,
Cebu City; RHONA F. RODRIGUEZ, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Cebu City; EMMA D. VALENCIA, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City; MARILOU CABANEZ,
Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City; DESIDERIO S. ARANAS, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3,
Cebu City; REBECCA ALESNA, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City; and HELEN MONGGAYA, Court
Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City. Respondents.

*PERLAS-BERNABE

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This Court has long held that "[the] administration of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. It
requires that everyone involved in its dispensation ― from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk ― live up to the
1
strictest standards of competence, honesty, and integrity in the public service."

THE CASE

This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July 2007 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator
2
(OCA). The judicial audit team created by the OCA reported alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in
3
several branches of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City. Certain
4
package fees were offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for instant marriages.

THE FACTS

On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu City and headed the audit team
5
created by OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu City. A female and male lawyer of the audit
team went undercover as a couple looking to get married. They went to the Palace of Justice and were directed by the
guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy". The male lawyer feared that he would be recognized by
other court personnel, specifically the Clerk of Court of Branch 4 who was a former law school classmate. The two
lawyers then agreed that only the female lawyer would go inside and inquire about the marriage application process.
Inside Branch 4, a woman named Helen approached and assisted the female lawyer. When the female lawyer asked if
the marriage process could be rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the marriage could be solemnized the next day, but
the marriage certificate would only be dated the day the marriage license becomes available. Helen also guaranteed the
6
regularity of the process for a fee of three thousand pesos (P3,000) only.

In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum dated 6 July 2007 of the judicial audit team as a formal
administrative complaint and directed Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M. Tormis,
7
and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales to submit their respective comments. The Court also suspended the judges pending
8
resolution of the cases against them.

On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño submitted its Memorandum
9 10
dated 29 August 2007 and Supplemental Report. Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates were examined by
11
the judicial audit team. The team reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages were
12 13
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of
14
solemnized marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the courts’ custody. There is also an unusual number
15
of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu. There were even
16
marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day. The town of Barili, Cebu is more than
17
sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost two (2) hours. Liloan, Cebu, on the other
18
hand, is more than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu City.
The judicial audit team, after tape-recording interviews with other court and government personnel, also reported the
following:

1) Celeste P. Retuya admitted that she assisted couples who wanted to get married by checking whether their documents
19
were complete and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, and Rosales afterwards;

2) Corazon P. Retuya referred couples who wanted to get married to Judge Necessario. There were also "assistants" who
would go over the couples’ documents before these couples would be referred to Judge Necessario. Retuya also narrated
several anomalies involving foreign nationals and their acquisition of marriage licenses from the local civil registrar of
Barili, Cebu despite the fact that parties were not residents of Barili. Those anomalous marriages were solemnized by
20
Judge Tormis;

3) Rhona F. Rodriguez assisted couples and referred them to any of the available judges. She admitted that after the
payment of the solemnization fee of three hundred pesos (P300), a different amount, as agreed upon by the parties and
21
the judge, was paid to the latter. She admitted that she accepted four thousand pesos (P4,000) for facilitating the
irregular marriage of Moreil Baranggan Sebial and Maricel Albater although she gave the payment to a certain "Mang
22
Boy";

4) Emma D. Valencia admitted that she assisted couples seeking to get married and that most of the marriage licenses
were obtained from the local civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because the registrars in those towns were not strict
about couples’ attendance in the family planning seminar. She also admitted that couples gave her food while the judge
received five hundred pesos (P500) if the marriage was solemnized inside the chambers. Foreigners were said to have
given twice the said amount. The judge accepted one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500) for gasoline expenses if the
23
marriage was celebrated outside the chambers;

5) Marilou Cabañez admitted that she assisted couples and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, or Rosales.
However, she denied receiving any amount from these couples. She told the audit team that during the 8th, 18th, and
28th of the month, seven (7) to eight (8) couples would go directly to Judge Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute
24
marriage solemnization;

6) Desiderio S. Aranas admitted that he started assisting couples in 2003. He told the investigating team that Judge Gil
Acosta would talk to couples wishing to get married without a license. He would produce a joint affidavit of cohabitation
form on which he or the clerk of court would type the entries. The judge would then receive an envelope containing money
25
from the couple. Aranas also confirmed the existence of "open-dated" marriage certificates;

7) Antonio Flores, Branch 9 Process Server of RTC Cebu City, told the investigating team that couples looked for Judge
26
Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City, "para menos ang bayad." The
excess of three hundred pesos (P300) that couples paid to Judge Econg as solemnization fee went to a certain "sinking
27
fund" of Branch 9;

8) Rebecca L. Alesna admitted that she usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or Tormis. Couples who wanted to
get married under Article 34 of the Family Code were advised to buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint cohabitation for ten
28
pesos (P10);

9) Arvin Oca, Branch 1 Process Server of the MTCC of Cebu City, admitted that he referred couples to Branch 2, Clerk of
Court, Harrish Co. Oca declared that on 28 June 2007, he accompanied a couple to the chambers of Judge
29 30
Necessario. He informed the judge that the couple only had birth certificates. The respondent judge then inquired
31
about their ages and asked them if they had been previously married then proceeded to solemnize the marriage; and

10) Filomena C. Lopez, local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, declared that she does not scrutinize marriage
32
applications. Couples who are non-Barili residents are able to obtain marriage licenses from her Barili office because
33
these couples have relatives residing in Barili, Cebu. She also added that while couples still need to submit a certificate
of attendance in the family planning seminar, they may attend it before or after the filing of the application for marriage
34
license.

Affidavits of private persons were also attached to the records. Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera was a resident of Panagdait,
35
Mabolo, Cebu and on 21 May 2007, she and her then fiancé wanted to set a marriage date. Her younger sister who was
married in a civil wedding last year gave her the number of a certain "Meloy". After talking to Meloy on the phone, the
wedding was scheduled at 2 p.m. on 23 May 2007 and the couple were asked to bring their birth certificates. No marriage
license was required from them. Meloy asked for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500). According to
Baguio-Manera, their marriage certificate was marked as "No marriage license was necessary, the marriage being
solemnized under Art. 34 of Executive Order No. 209". Their marriage was solemnized that day by Judge Rosabella M.
Tormis. Baguio-Manera claimed that they did not understand what that statement meant at that time. However, in her
affidavit, she declared that the situation premised under Article 34 did not apply to her and her fiancé.

Mary Anne Flores-Patoc was a resident of Barrio Luz, Cebu City. In her 5 July 2007 affidavit, she recounted how she and
her boyfriend went to the Provincial Capitol to get married in February 2006. While logging in at the entrance, they were
offered assistance by the guards for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500). The guard also offered to
become "Ninong" or a witness to the wedding. The couple became suspicious and did not push through with the civil
wedding at that time.

On 27 November 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution: a) requiring Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta,
Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales of the MTCC, Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8, respectively, of Cebu City, to
comment on the findings of the 14 August 2007 Supplemental Report of the OCA, within fifteen (15) days from notice; b)
directing the Process Servicing Unit to furnish the judges with a copy of the Supplemental Report; c) requiring the court
personnel listed below to show cause within fifteen (15) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them for their alleged grave misconduct and dishonesty and impleading them in this administrative matter:

1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;

2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;

3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Cebu City;

4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City;

5) Marilou Cabañez, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City;

6) Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City;

7) Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City;

8) Helen Mongaya,Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City.

The Court in the same resolution also: a) ordered the referral to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas for
appropriate action on the administrative matter involving the violation of the law on marriage by Ms. Filomena C. Lopez,
Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and one Ms. Veronica S. Longakit, former Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu; b)
directed the Process Serving Unit to furnish the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas with a copy of the
Supplemental Report of the OCA; and c) required Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, RTC, Branch 9, Cebu City, to
comment within fifteen (15) days from notice on the statement of staff member Antonio Flores saying that Branch 9’s court
personnel received an amount in excess of the P300 solemnization fee paid by couples whose marriages were
36
solemnized by her. This amount goes to the court’s "sinking fund".

37
In their Comments and/or Answers to the Memorandum dated 5 July 2007 of the OCA and its Supplemental Report, the
respondent judges argued the following:

Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding the documents presented to him by
38
contracting parties. He claims that marriages he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code had the required
affidavit of cohabitation. He claims that pro forma affidavits of cohabitation have been used by other judges even before
39
he became a judge. He avers that he ascertains the ages of the parties, their relationship, and the existence of an
40
impediment to marry. He also asks the parties searching questions and clarifies whether they understood the contents of
41
the affidavit and the legal consequences of its execution. The judge also denies knowledge of the payment of
42
solemnization fees in batches. In addition, he argues that it was a process server who was in-charge of recording
43
marriages on the logbook, keeping the marriage certificates, and reporting the total number of marriages monthly.

Judge Gil R. Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage license and that he is not required to inquire whether the
44
license was obtained from a location where one of the parties is an actual resident. The judge believes that it is not his
duty to verify the signature on the marriage license to determine its authenticity because he relies on the presumption of
45
regularity of public documents. The judge also outlines his own procedure in solemnizing marriages which involves: first,
the determination whether the solemnization fee was paid; second, the presentation of the affidavit of cohabitation and
birth certificates to ascertain identity and age of the parties; third, if one of the parties is a foreigner, the judge asks for a
certificate of legal capacity to marry, passport picture, date of arrival, and divorce papers when the party is divorced;
fourth, he then asks the parties and their witnesses questions regarding cohabitation and interviews the children of the
46
parties, if any.

Judge Rosabella M. Tormis denies the charges brought by the OCA. She calls the actions of the judicial audit team during
47
the investigation an "entrapment". She also claims that there is nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the date of
the issuance of the marriage license and with the fact that the issued marriage license was obtained from a place where
48
neither of the parties resided. As to the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she argues that she cannot be faulted for
49
accepting it as genuine as she and the other judges are not handwriting experts. The affidavits also enjoy the
50 51
presumption of regularity. Judge Tormis also discredits the affidavit of Baguio-Manera as hearsay. The respondent
said that when Baguio-Manera and her husband were confronted with the affidavit they executed, they affirmed the
52
veracity of the statements, particularly the fact that they have been living together for five years. The judge also
53
attributes the irregularity in the number of marriages solemnized in her sala to the filing clerks.

54
Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales denies violating the law on marriage. He maintains that it is the local civil registrar who
55
evaluates the documents submitted by the parties, and he presumes the regularity of the license issued. It is only when
there is no marriage license given that he ascertains the qualifications of the parties and the lack of legal impediment to
56
marry. As to the affidavits of cohabitation, the judge believes there is nothing wrong with the fact that these are pro
forma. He states that marriage certificates are required with the marriage license attached or the affidavit of cohabitation
only and the other documents fall under the responsibility of the local civil registrar. He surmises that if the marriage
certificate did not come with the marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation, the missing document might have been
inadvertently detached, and it can be checked with the proper local civil registrar. As to the payment of the docket fee, he
contends that it should be paid after the solemnization of the marriage and not before because judges will be pre-empted
from ascertaining the qualifications of the couple. Besides, the task of collecting the fee belongs to the Clerk of
57 58
Court. The judge also argues that solemnization of marriage is not a judicial duty.

On 12 November 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea for Early Resolution, Lifting of
59
Suspension and Dismissal of Case. This Court in a Resolution dated 11 December 2007 lifted the suspension of the
60
respondent judges but prohibited them from solemnizing marriages until further ordered.

On 7 December 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Motion for Early Resolution with Waiver of Formal and/or
61
Further Investigation and Motion to Dismiss. In a Resolution dated 15 January 2008, the Court noted the motion and
granted the prayer of Judges Tormis and Rosales for the payment of their unpaid salaries, allowances and all other
62
economic benefits from 9 July 2007.

THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE OCA

63
In its Memorandum dated 15 June 2010, the OCA recommended the dismissal of the respondent judges and some court
employees, and the suspension or admonition of others. The OCA summarized the liabilities of the respondents, to wit:

JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with
questionable documents and wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his
capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors
during the cohabitation.

xxx

JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee
has been paid. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the Family
Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.

JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with
questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid and for solemnizing marriages
wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the
required certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing a marriage without
the requisite marriage license.
JUDGE ROSEBELLA M. TORMIS is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with
questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid, for solemnizing marriages
wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the
required certificate from the embassy and for solemnizing a marriage with an expired license.

xxx

HELEN MONGGAYA is guilty of grave misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel that prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit or
implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions and for giving false information for
the purpose of perpetrating an irregular marriage.

RHONA RODRIGUEZ is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by instructing her to indicate her
residence as Barili, Cebu.

DESIDERIO ARANAS and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for
providing couples who are to be married under Article 34 of the Family Code with the required affidavit of cohabitation.

CELESTE RETUYA, EMMA VALENCIA and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration for
64
assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary.

The OCA, however, recommended the DISMISSAL of the complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Corazon
P. Retuya, and Marilou Cabañez, for lack of merit.

THE ISSUE

The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty of
gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most
severe penalty of dismissal from service.

THE COURT’S RULING

The findings in the 2010 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator are supported by the evidence on record
and applicable law and jurisprudence.

This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a heavy burden and responsibility of keeping
65
the faith of the public. In Obañana, Jr. v. Ricafort, we said that:

Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. This Court
shall not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which
66
would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.

The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift marriages. The respondent judges and
court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice of the parties and the proper administration of justice.

The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales are
all guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when they solemnized marriages without following the proper procedure
laid down by law, particularly the Family Code of the Philippines and existing jurisprudence. The OCA listed down aspects
of the solemnization process which were disregarded by the judges. The Court will now discuss the individual liabilities of
the respondent judges and court personnel vis-à-vis the evidence presented by the OCA against them.

Liability of Judge Anatalio S. Necessario

The OCA reported that Judge Necessario solemnized a total of one thousand one hundred twenty-three (1,123)
67
marriages from 2005 to 2007. However, only one hundred eighty-four (184) marriage certificates were actually examined
68
by the judicial audit team. Out of the 184 marriages, only seventy-nine (79) were solemnized with a marriage license
while one hundred five (105) were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. Out of the 79 marriages with license,
forty-seven (47) of these licenses were issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu. This translates to 42.93% of
69
the marriages he solemnized with marriage license coming from Liloan for over a period of years. There were also
twenty-two (22) marriages solemnized by the judge with incomplete documents such missing as marriage license,
70
certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation.

Judge Necessario solemnized nine (9) marriages that had questionable supporting documents such as marriage
71
licenses. The OCA found that the place of residence of the contracting parties appearing in the supporting documents
72
differ from the place where they obtained their marriage license. The documents invited suspicion because of erasures
73
and superimpositions in the entries of residence. Likewise, in lieu of the required certificate of legal capacity to marry, a
74
mere affidavit was submitted by the parties. Variations in the signatures of the contracting parties were also apparent in
75
the documents.

The respondent judge solemnized forty-three (43) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code. These marriages
appeared dubious since the joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties show minority of one or both of them during
76
cohabitation. For example, he solemnized on 14 May 2004 the marriage of 22-year-old Harol D. Amorin and 19-year-old
77
Dinalyn S. Paraiso who are residents of Lapu-Lapu City.

There are also sixteen (16) marriage licenses with attached official receipts of the solemnization fee but the corresponding
78
marriage certificates cannot be found. The presence of the receipts implies that these marriages were solemnized.

Liability of Judge Gil R. Acosta

79
Judge Acosta solemnized a total of eighty-seven (87) marriages from 2003 to 2007. However, the logbook showed that
he solemnized two hundred seventy-two (272) marriages while the monthly reports of cases showed that he solemnized
five hundred twelve (512) marriages over the same period. Out of the 87 marriages, he solemnized seventy-five (75)
under

80
Article 34 of the Family Code. This is equivalent to 86.21% of the marriages solemnized under Article 34 in a four-year
81
period.

There were forty-one (41) marriage certificates signed by Judge Tormis or Judge Necessario as solemnizing officers
82
found in his custody. There were also ten (10) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code where one or both of the
83
contracting parties were minors during cohabitation. To illustrate, respondent judge solemnized on 4 May 2004 the
84
marriage of Julieto W. Baga, 22 years old, and Esterlita P. Anlangit, 18 years old.

There were seventeen (17) marriages under Article 34 where neither of the contracting parties were residents of Cebu
85
City. The judge solemnized three (3) marriages without the foreign party’s required certificate of legal capacity to
86
marry. Lastly, there was no proof of payment of the solemnization fee in almost all of the marriages the judge
87
officiated.

Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis

Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to 2007 based on the marriage
88
certificates actually examined. However, the monthly report of cases showed that she solemnized three hundred five
89
(305) marriages instead for the years 2004 to 2007. The OCA report also noted that it was only in July 2007 that her
90
court started to use a logbook to keep track of marriages.

Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with incomplete or missing documents such as the marriage
91
license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. In several instances, only affidavits
92
were submitted by the foreign parties in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity to marry.

Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the questionable character of the validity of the required
93
documents particularly the marriage license. The judicial audit team found numerous erasures and superimpositions on
94
entries with regard to the parties’ place of residence.

In one instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo and Anselma B. Laranio on 28 December
2006 despite the marriage license containing a rubberstamp mark saying, "THIS LICENSE EXPIRES ON" and a
95
handwritten note saying "12/28/06" under it.
The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein the marriage
requirements’ authenticity was doubtful due to the circumstances of the cohabitation of the parties and the given address
96
of the parties. These irregularities were evident in the case of 22-year-old John Rey R. Tibalan and Ana Liza Secuya
who were married on 25 May 2007. The residential address of the couple in the marriage certificate is "Sitio Bamboo,
Buhisan, Cebu City." However, there was an application for marriage license attached to the marriage certificate showing
97
that Secuya’s address is "F. Lopez Comp. Morga St., Cebu City."

Liability of Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales

Judge Rosales solemnized a total of one hundred twenty-one (121) marriages from 2006 to 2007 based on the marriage
98
certificates examined by the judicial audit team. However, only three (3) marriages were reported for the same
99
period. Out of the 121 marriages the judge solemnized, fifty-two (52) or 42.98% fall under Article 34 of the Family
100
Code. Thirty-eight

(38) marriage licenses out of the sixty-six (66) obtained or 57.57% were from the local civil registrar of Barili,
101 102
Cebu. Nineteen (19) or 28.79% were from the local civil registrar of Liloan, Cebu. Nine (9) or 13.64% were from other
103
local civil registrars.

There were marriage documents found in his court such as marriage licenses, applications for marriage license,
certificates of legal capacity to contract marriage, affidavits in lieu of certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, joint
affidavits of cohabitation, and other documents referring to the solemnization of one hundred thirty-two (132) marriages,
104
with no corresponding marriage certificates. He solemnized two marriages of Buddy Gayland Weaver, an American
105
citizen, to two different persons within nine (9) months. No copy of the required certificate of legal capacity to contract
106
marriage or the divorce decree was presented.

The judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages without or with incomplete supporting documents such as the certificate
107
of legal capacity to marry and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. He solemnized nine (9) marriages under questionable
circumstances such as the submission of an affidavit or affirmation of freedom to marry in lieu of the certificate of legal
capacity to marry, the discrepancies in the residence of the contracting parties as appearing in the marriage documents,
108
and the solemnization of the marriage on the same day the marriage license was issued.

Judge Rosales also solemnized forty-three (43) marriages with no proof that the solemnization fee of P300 was
109 110
paid. On the other hand, there were twenty-six (26) marriages whose solemnization fees were paid late.

To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:

First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the couples
were incomplete and of questionable character. Most of these documents showed visible signs of tampering, erasures,
111
corrections or superimpositions of entries related to the parties’ place of residence. These included indistinguishable
features such as the font, font size, and ink of the computer-printed entries in the marriage certificate and marriage
112 113
license. These actions of the respondent judges constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, the Court held that
inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.

Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The Court, in
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Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as the failure to give one’s attention to a task expected of him and it is
gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to
endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit team show that corresponding
115
official receipts for the solemnization fee were missing or payment by batches was made for marriages performed on
116
different dates. The OCA emphasizes that the payment of the solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage
application process and even puts a "stamp of regularity" on the process.

Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who
did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the foreigners submitted were mere
affidavits stating their capacity to marry. The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are required under Article
117
21 of the Family Code displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing
the documents required for the marriage license issuance. Any irregularities would have been prevented in the
118
qualifications of parties to contract marriage.

Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the
119
Family Code with respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during cohabitation such
 120
as the minority status of one party. The audit team cites in their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose
ages ranged from eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old who were married by mere submission of a pro forma joint
121 122
affidavit of cohabitation. These affidavits were notarized by the solemnizing judge himself or herself.

Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of marriages of some couples where no marriage
license was previously issued. The contracting parties were made to fill up the application for a license on the same day
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the marriage was solemnized.

The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the ascertainment of the validity of the marriage
license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of evidence that
point to the contrary. As correctly observed by the OCA, the presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license
disappears the moment the marriage documents do not appear regular on its face.

124
In People v. Jansen, this Court held that:

…the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly
issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the
competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to
ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.

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However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas, that "the presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." The visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses
should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance.

It follows also that although Article 21 of the Family Code requires the submission of the certificate from the embassy of
the foreign party to the local registrar for acquiring a marriage license, the judges should have been more diligent in
reviewing the parties’ documents and qualifications. As noted by the OCA, the absence of the required certificates
coupled with the presence of mere affidavits should have aroused suspicion as to the regularity of the marriage license
issuance.

The judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under Article 34 of the Family
Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such as minority of a party.
Marriages of exceptional character such as those made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
126
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a
127
general rule should be strictly but reasonably construed. The affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued and
accepted pro forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter. The five-year period of
cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
128
marriage contract. The parties should have been capacitated to marry each other during the entire period and not only
129
at the time of the marriage.

To elaborate further on the gravity of the acts and omissions of the respondents, the Family Code provides the requisites
for a valid marriage:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)

130
The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void ab initio. The actions of the judges have raised a
very alarming issue regarding the validity of the marriages they solemnized since they did not follow the proper procedure
 131
or check the required documents and qualifications. In Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano, the Court said that a
marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void and the subsequent issuance of the license cannot render valid or
add even an iota of validity to the marriage. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a license constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

As held by this Court in Navarro v. Domagtoy:

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at least proficient in the law they are sworn to apply,
more than the ordinary layman. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. It is not too much
132
to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.

It is important to note that the audit team found out that Judge Rosabella M. Tormis ordered Celerina Plaza, a personal
133
employee of the judge, to wait for couples outside the Hall of Justice and offer services. Crisanto Dela Cerna also
stated in his affidavit that Judge Tormis instructed him to get all marriage certificates and bring them to her house when
134
she found out about the judicial audit. In the language of the OCA, Judge Tormis considered the solemnization of
135
marriages not as a duty but as a business. The respondent judge was suspended for six (6) months in A.M. No. MTJ-
071-962 for repeatedly disregarding the directives of this Court to furnish the complainant a copy of her comment. She
136
was also fined the amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000) in A.M. Nos. 04-7-373-RTC and 04-7-374 RTC. She was
137
reprimanded twice in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 and in A.M. No. MTJ-001337. Finally, in the very recent case of Office of
the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, promulgated
last 12 March 2013, Judge Tormis was found guilty of gross inefficiency, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and
circulars and gross ignorance of the law by this Court. She was dismissed from service, with forfeiture of all benefits and
privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

138 139
The respondent judges violated Canons 2 and 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact competence, integrity
and probity in the performance of their duties. This Court previously said that "Ignorance of the law is a mark of
incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of
140
integrity." In connection with this, the administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon assumption to
office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation of the law and more
141
importantly of justice.

The actuations of these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright shameful.

Liability of Other Court Personnel

The Court agrees with the recommendations of the OCA on the liability of the following employees:

Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City, is guilty of grave
misconduct when she informed the female lawyer of the judicial audit team that she can facilitate the marriage and the
142
requirements on the same day of the lawyer’s visit.

What Monggaya was proposing was an open-dated marriage in exchange for a fee of P3,000. Section 2, Canon I of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit based on
any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.

Mongaya’s claim that she was merely relating to the lady lawyer what she knew from other offices as the usual
143
practice is inexcusable. As found by the OCA in its Memorandum, "Monggaya deliberately gave false information for
144
the purpose of perpetrating an illegal scheme. This, in itself, constitutes grave misconduct." Sec. 52, Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules on

Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as "a grave offense that carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service even on a first offense.

In Villaceran v. Rosete, this Court held that:

Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice; parties seeking redress from the
courts for grievances look upon court personnel, irrespective of rank or position, as part of the Judiciary. In performing
their duties and responsibilities, these court personnel serve as sentinels of justice and any act of impropriety on their part
immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s trust and confidence in this institution.
Therefore, they are expected to act and behave in a manner that should uphold the honor and dignity of the Judiciary, if
145
only to maintain the people's confidence in the Judiciary.

Mongaya acted improperly and in a manner opposite of what is expected of court personnel. Her actions placed doubts on
the integrity of the courts.

Rhona Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the MTCC, Cebu City, is guilty of gross
misconduct. She assisted the couple, Moreil Sebial and Maricel Albater, and demanded and accepted P4,000 from
146
them. The act was a violation of Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. As found by the OCA
and adopted by this Court, Rodriguez induced Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by instructing her to
147
indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu. The claim that she gave the amount to a certain Borces who was allegedly the
real facilitator belies her participation in facilitating the marriage. According to the OCA, when the couple went back for
148
their marriage certificate, they approached Rodriguez and not Borces. When Borces told Rodriguez that the marriage
149
certificate had been misplaced, it was Rodriguez who instructed Sebial to fill up another marriage certificate.

This Court has held that improper solicitations prohibited by Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
150
Personnel, merits a grave penalty. Such penalty can be dismissal from service.

Desiderio Aranas, Branch 3 Process Server, MTCC, Cebu City and Rebecca Alesna are guilty of conduct prejudicial to
the best of interest of the service. Aranas provided couples who were to be married under Article 34 of the Family Code
151
with the required affidavit of cohabitation. On the other hand, Alesna refers such couples to Aranas to acquire the said
affidavit which according to Alesna costs P10. As aptly put by the OCA, even if the amount involved in the transaction is
minimal, the act of soliciting money still gives the public the wrong impression that court personnel are making money out
152
of judicial transactions.

153
The Court said in Roque v. Grimaldo that acts of court personnel outside their official functions constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service because these acts violate what is prescribed for court personnel. The
purpose of this is to maintain the integrity of the Court and free court personnel from suspicion of any misconduct.

Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the MTCC, Cebu City, Emma Valencia, Stenographer III of Branch 18, RTC,
Cebu City, and Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1, MTCC, Cebu City, admitted to the audit team that they
154
received food from couples they assisted. This is in violation of Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration for assisting or attending to parties
engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary. As recommended by the OCA, they are
admonished considering that this is their first offense and the tips were of minimal value. In Reyes-Domingo v. Morales,
155
this Court held that commission of an administrative offense for the first time is an extenuating circumstance.

The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence against Corazon P. Retuya. The OCA reports that Corazon Retuya
admitted initially that she received P5,000 from spouses Ichiro Kamiaya and Mary Grace Gabiana to secure necessary
156
documents. The information was volunteered by Corazon Retuya with no supporting sworn statement from the couple.
157
However, she denies this fact later on in her Comment. Finding the earlier statement of Corazon Retuya as unclear and
lacking support from evidence, the Court adopts the findings of the OCA and decides to give her the benefit of the doubt.

The Court also finds insufficient evidence to support the claims against Marilou Cabañez. Cabañez was only implicated in
this case through the sworn statement of Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera who attested that they paid a certain "Meloy" P1,200
158
for the wedding under Article 34 of the Family through the assistance of Cabañez. Cabañez denies that she was the one
who assisted the couple and explained that it may have been Celerina Plaza, the personal assistant of Judge Rosabella
M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera got the nickname "Meloy" not from Cabañez herself but from Baguio-Manera’s younger
159
sister. When Baguio-Manera met the said "Meloy" at the Hall of Justice, she did not obtain confirmation that the said
"Meloy" is Cabañez. The Court adopts the findings of the OCA that there is lack of positive identification of Cabañez and
160
finds merit in her denial.

The Court accepts the recommendation of the OCA as to the dismissal of the case against Judge Geraldine Faith A.
Econg. The judge was only implicated through the statement of Process Server Antonio Flores about an "alleged sinking
fund". No evidence was presented as to the collection of an excess of the solemnization fee. Neither was it proven that
Judge Econg or her staff had knowledge of such fund.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents:

1. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;

2. Judge Gil R. Acosta, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency
or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of
his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;

3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that she would have been DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation, had she not been previously
dismissed from service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-MTCC);

4. Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 8, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;

5. Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of violating Section 2,
Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of
her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;

6. Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, GUILTY of
gross misconduct for Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to
falsify the application for marriage and that she be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement
benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or -controlled corporation;

7. Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and that he be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months with a
warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;

8. Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and
that she be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely;

9. Celeste Retuya, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City, and Emma Valencia, Stenographer III,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of
violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that they be ADMONISHED with a
warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;

The complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City;
Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City; and Marilou Cabañez, Court
Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto dela Cerna,
should be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of initiating disbarment proceedings against the
judge.

The Honorable Mayors of Barili, Cebu and Liloan, Cebu, are to be furnished copies of the Supplemental Report dated 14
August 2007 and are ADVISED to conduct an investigation with respect to the statements of Filomena C. Lopez, Civil
Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and Bonita I. Pilones, Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu, regarding the processing of marriage
licenses and to take the necessary action as the findings of the investigation may warrant.
Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondents’ files that are with the Office of the Bar Confidant and
distributed to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000]

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

[1]
For review is the decision dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144, which affirmed the
[2] [3]
decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.

Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of
[4]
Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick
[5]
and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978,respectively.

The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto.
[6]
Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.

On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two
children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his father's residence at
[7]
Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,1988, and from then on, lived with his father.

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case No. 7900 before the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for
separation of property on the grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living
separately for more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September
[8]
29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Judgment was rendered
dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the
[9] [10]
Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. The trial court also granted custody of the children to Filipina.

In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband, docketed as Criminal Case No.
88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to
the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and
bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with
the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance,
Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that
her husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina
suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband,
evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time Fernando
[11]
maltreated her.

[12]
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision dated April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando only of the lesser
crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Edpmis

Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 8273,on the
following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4)
abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San
[13]
Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision dated December 4,1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical
violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll
to petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent.

[14]
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the
ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her
favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her
which led to the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also
cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live
with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her,
performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her
[15]
husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest thereafter.

[16]
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision dated December 9, 1993, denied the petition of
Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the
respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage. Lexjuris

[17]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning respondent's purported psychological
incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential
requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the
trial court that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the celebration of
their marriage. And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals
[18]
affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to be in accordance with law and the evidence on record.

[19]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution dated November 21,
[20]
1996.

[21]
Hence, this appeal by certiorari wherein petitioner now raises the following issues: Jurismis

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE

FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER
15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE
THERETO;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION

OF FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO
NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER
MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent];

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION

OF FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE
ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE
WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;Jjjuris

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A
REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT
TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT
A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND

5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA

[22]
20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO.

In sum, two issues are to be resolved: justice

1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage
license at the time of the ceremony; and

2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a
declaration of its absolute nullity.

Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its
celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance
of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous. Jksm
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would
[23]
contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, in a number of instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural
rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants.
We said that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their
[24]
existence would be defeated. Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular case from the
[25]
operation of technicalities should not be subject to cavil. In our view, the case at bar requires that we address the issue
of the validity of the marriage between Fillipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of
a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note,
however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their effects according
to existing law.

Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of marriage before the trial court
that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the
conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were
contained in the documents she submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage
certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the
[26]
trial. The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is
admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration
[27]
of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting it. This fact was also
[28]
affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination, as follows: Es m

ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November 15,1973?

FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.

November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and daughter's birth
certificates, which are also attached as Annexes " B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
[29]
before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial. These pieces of evidence
on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A
marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage
contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor
[30]
private respondent ever resided in Carmona.

Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in
her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage
and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was
issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable
conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent
[31]
denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an
exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among
[32]
those enumerated in Articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the
marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. Es msc

We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son
Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the
trial below, which shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been
made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open
court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of
the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these
[33]
documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain us. It is mooted by our
conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their
marriage was solemnized. Esmm is

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, dated
December 9,1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated
November 21, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between
petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at
the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

1
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioner’s appeal and affirming the
2
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February
2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.

The antecedent facts are:

3
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8
December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their
4
wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. They got married on
the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de
Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing
a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a
sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local
civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988,
they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their
5 6
marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.

Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains
that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona,
Cavite. Contrary to petitioner’s representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14
7
October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992. Petitioner has a mistress with
8
whom he has three children. Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for
9
concubinage. Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court
10
of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60. Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of
merit.

On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:

The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;

2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per month as support
for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and

11
3. To pay the costs.

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioner’s appeal. His Motion for
12
Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had
not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties’ marriage contract being a public
13
document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
 a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has
no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage license at the precise
moment of the solemnization of the marriage.

b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the Marriage License No.
7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and was not
the Marriage license number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by this
Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).

d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the observance of
14
procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants.

We deny the petition.

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage
license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for
15
them. The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro
16
who solemnized the marriage belongs. He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage
license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a
resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight
because the certification states that "Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara
17
and Miss Rosita Almario" but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
18 19
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.

20
Article 53 of the Civil Code which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties states:

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in
21
every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the
court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.

22
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search and
inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held
that the certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by
the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a
marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.

23
In Cariño v. Cariño, the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S.
Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-
issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not
being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the
deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.

24
In Sy v. Court of Appeals, the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony
took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed
contracted without a marriage license.

In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license,
the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In
this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification
25
to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita
Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:

This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued
in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.

This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may
26
serve.

This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage
27
license was done in the regular conduct of official business. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is
overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to
28
an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. Significantly, apart from these,
29
petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent
is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and
respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the
contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the
30
10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the
31
irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states
that the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not
impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals
the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It
therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the
parties.

32
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, petitioner cannot pretend that he was not
responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license.
33
Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he "initiated it." Petitioner is an educated person. He is a
mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and
voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from
the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We
34
cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the same
marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a
gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.lavvphi1

In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the
marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in
petitioner’s testimony as follows—

WITNESS

As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.

COURT

What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church.

WITNESS

I don’t remember your honor.

COURT

Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?

WITNESS

I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I don’t know if it is good enough
for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.

COURT

In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already a Marriage Contract?

WITNESS

Yes your honor.

COURT

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued which
Marriage License is Number 7054033.

WITNESS

35
Yes your honor.

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that time.
Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect
36
attended the civil wedding.

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged everything for them and who
facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not
strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be
37
presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the
solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed
from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had
38
fulfilled the requirements of law.
 39
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February
2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

1
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision of
2
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision in Civil Case
No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA
Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled
to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of
Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria.

3
In the Marriage Contract of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite
on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this
case.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were
4
married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On
January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz
St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to
undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony
was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage
license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein
5
the marriage license number could be found. The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he
submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo
6
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. Said certification reads as follows:

11 July 2003

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on
January 8, 1993.

7
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had
gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage
8
license on advice of his counsel.

Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite.
Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents
pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20,
9
1993.
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued
10
chronologically. He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion,
Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same
11
serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas
Goo and May Ann Ceriola.

Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is
12
authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines. He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar
13
Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993. He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo
14
Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola. He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and
15
that he is familiar with the requirements. Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the
16
day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary. After the solemnization of
the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract
17
and copy of the marriage license with that office.

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother
18
of the bride, Felicitas Goo. He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple,
19
and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993. He further testified that he did
20
not know where the marriage license was obtained. He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the
marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer
21
and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present
22
at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez
at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male
23
person went to their house with the application for marriage license. Three days later, the same person went back to
their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
24
solemnizing officer. She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she
25
was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona. She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by
Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10,
26
2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the
wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could
identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty.
Sanchez.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures
27
as proof. She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one
of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after
several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin
returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing
28
officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.

29
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura
during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the
30
RTC of Manila.

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said
marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and
31
those around them at the time were Chinese.

The Ruling of the RTC

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage
32
license had been issued for Gloria and Syed. It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of
Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family
33
Code. As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage
license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is
hereby annulled;

2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent even if no property
was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are hereby
ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas
and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.

34
SO ORDERED.

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal
the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the CA

In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE
APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE
OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF
35
THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.

The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted,
36
and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was sufficient
testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with
37
all the requisites laid down by law.
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the
parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a
38
case against him for bigamy.

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27
January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar
Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.

39
SO ORDERED.

40
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution
41
dated July 24, 2008.

Hence, this petition.

Grounds in Support of Petition

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE
COURT’S OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE,
WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
42
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of
the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and
35(3), which read as follows:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the
authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt
from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case,
thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid
marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as
well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued,
Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It
was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of
43
Appeals such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by
his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.

In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license, the Court held:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of
public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where
they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
44
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued,
issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial
number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine
copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of
Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.

In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and since the
certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted
and thus the certification could not be given probative value.

45
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. It is worth noting that in that particular
case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the
same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court to apply.

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts
 46
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those
of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her
office.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the
marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains
to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could
the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to
not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for
assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license
was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this
Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were
submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured
from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that
there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.

47 48
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño, following the case of Republic, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.
The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it
became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required
49
marriage license had been secured. Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage
license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage
license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.

To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To
quote the CA:

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly
married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A
certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave
their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several
pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
members of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held
after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.

xxxx

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who
was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to
have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him
for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to
reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit
50
from his own deceit and perfidy.

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
 51
Code. Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized
without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that
he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove
that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage
license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008
and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION

1 2
TINGA, J.: This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166, declaring that
(1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a
marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation
sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the
Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a
marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth,
respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
3
(trial court. In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his
4
responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child."

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was
facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save
her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to
get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and
wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.

5
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000, the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not
valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the
child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower
court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide
support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial
declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and
validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing
to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with
respondent, saying that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and
6
reward him of his being irresponsible." Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by
petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.

The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the
marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State,
through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the
Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests
upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the
7
child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1)
declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring
 the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a
8
competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant.

9
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition.

Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent because as shown by the
evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that the
affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and
respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a
10
substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license. Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the
appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action for
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction
to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for
11
support. Citing several authorities, petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus,
there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between the
parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented
would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden
12
of the courts. Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial
of the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.

In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file
13
their respective comments on the petition.

14
In her Comment, respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision
of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their
marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for
that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward
testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she
adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA
15
testing to prove paternity and filiation.

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare null
16
and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog, it states
that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner
hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court
showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that their
affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least
five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent
17
is not valid. In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of
18
petitioner and thus entitled to support.

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second, whether the child is the daughter of
petitioner.

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
19
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we
held:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need
arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code
20
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

21
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court
may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary,
22
to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
23
whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from
the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five
24
years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-
examination, thus—

ATTY. CARPIO:

Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for the last five years on or
before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?

25
A Yes, sir.

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim
of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a
26
marriage license. In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
27
children. Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed
28
by the Rules of Court and special laws.

29
The Certificate of Live Birth of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving
additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:

1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better
30
Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila;

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the
latter, but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner
was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At
times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant
which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely
forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to
"B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2"
and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding
ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of
31
kissing the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV
No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated
16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE
NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December
11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved
1
due to their father's death.

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
2
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded
on a pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true
and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the
3
1997 Rules. However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
4
review.

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable
5
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. A valid
6
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
7 8
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. The requirement and issuance of marriage
license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
9
general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity
10
of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be
11
protected by the State. This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
12 13
union" and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
14
which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication
of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
15
persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve
their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
16
other." The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76
of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during
the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where
the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties
should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage
license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required
in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
17
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. The Civil Code
provides:

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice
the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith
make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he
shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by
the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first
18
spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages
19
and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. The law
sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to
the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of
the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage void
after his death?

20
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows
"the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains
to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab
21
initio is considered as having never to have taken place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot
be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during
the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
22
marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
23
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect
on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51,
53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was
dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
24
marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and
25
declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken
place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact
of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before
or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either,
26
the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
27 28
second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason,
29
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily,
if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the
bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta,
Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the
law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in
1 2
San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22
March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent
3
Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and
bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and
Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as
4
husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According
to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise,
he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for
being designed merely to harass him.

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be
found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution
on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.

For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside
5
his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits of the late Manzano and of
Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos,
respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their
families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the
basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family
Code.

We find merit in the complaint.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing
officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;
 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are
without legal impediment to marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the
6
parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits
executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were
"separated."

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would
7
make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano
was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny
knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation
does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the
separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that
they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a
long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for
exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
8
The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that
9
judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary,
10
the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the
amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179474

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both
1
challenging the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which
declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.

The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was
2 3
solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, also
dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

4
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage
ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had
lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was
introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his
landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could
claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from
Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers
so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him
that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he
signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered
that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of
Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When
he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that
they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that
5
she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded
that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31
August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative
complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National
6
Statistics and Coordinating Board. The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
7
conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument.

8
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so
holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby
9
ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24
November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper.
[Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package
for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect
suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother
would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces
of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived
by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]

[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his
wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988,
one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company
I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the
only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a
lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of
his sister.

When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a
witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the
signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the
marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if
indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all
10
the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.

11
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article 87 of the New Civil
Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years
after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:

That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and
machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity,
the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the
12
marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August
2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision
reads:

13
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for
14
annulment of marriage under Article 86 of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it
ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by
law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage,
the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the
action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation
must be commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the
time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he
had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7,
15
1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a
16
marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional
character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that
Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of
the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the
Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The
appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing
officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was
17
a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56 of the
Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer’s
18
church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 7 of the Family Code which does not govern the
parties’ marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central
opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of
the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the
woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he
maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended
Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring
the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.

19
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.

20
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog, and reasoned that:

In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of
their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5)
years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be
the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
– meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of
the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the
same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that
a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone
who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of
21
a marriage license.

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a
22
Resolution dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review
before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be
reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting.
Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court’s
Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of
23
the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO

FELISA.

II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO
PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.

III

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF
24
MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.

25
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal. She differentiates the case at bar
from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not
obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a
criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises
that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we
shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage
exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
26
validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals. To buttress its assertion, the
Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s
position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and
formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said
affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that
the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a
fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the
Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil
Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of
marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993
issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived
together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s
name as his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the
Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract:

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

 (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)

27
Article 58 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil
registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character
28 29
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that a
marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
30
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. This is in stark contrast to the
31
old Marriage Law, whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the
compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
32
contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79.
To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in
33
remote places, (2) consular marriages, (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage,
34
(5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and
who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

35
The reason for the law, as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may
36
discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof,
they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each
37
other." One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite
38
of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but
39
reasonably construed. They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
40
favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions,
41
the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine
qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly
written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum
period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76
is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For
a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law
not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76
42
also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their
sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June
43
1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony
that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
 44
Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced
45
to live in her house.

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in
46
nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Under Rule
47
45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review. It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to
this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory
findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or
administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings
48
are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the
requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the
validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit.
Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.

Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case
at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a
49
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Restated
more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
50
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The present case does not involve an apparent
marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered
into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.

51
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of
marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of
Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a
marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the
law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which
52
was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. The
protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of
53
an invalid one as well. To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive
schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by
the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the
parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to
an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation,
which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and
effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief
because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It
54
must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. There is a law on the ratification of marital
cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent
55
that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his
marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990,
notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years
before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

56
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a
marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a
void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under
Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal
57
union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage,
characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is
58
unbroken.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED,
without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO
RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF
CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO
ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO
DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO
DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-
REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-
MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS
OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL,
AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA
ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA
1
RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors; and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as
2 3
Intervenor, Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court
4
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 55, in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its
5
decision dated October 24, 2002.

FACTS OF THE CASE

6
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. The main issue in
this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it
is attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.

The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs
of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and
7 8
grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his
9 10
illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado

11
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other
children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa
Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa
Delgado.

12
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was Ramon Osorio with
whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without
the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.

The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants because the
answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate
13
succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married,
then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the
latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate
and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.

Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they assert that no
evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged
marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio.
14
Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the
 15
natural child of Felisa Delgado), significantly omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his
16
father. Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not
necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral
relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-

adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

17
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is
disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To
prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a
baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.

The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessity
mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919
and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period
spanning more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To
support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:

1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P.
Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;

2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;

3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in the Active Military or
Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration
of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his
18
marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;

4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado.

The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took into their home the
youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what
was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.

19
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-
respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his
daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920
until her father’s demise. In fact, Josefa Delgado’s obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the
intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified
20
Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.

Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo
Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory
acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since
21
the documents she presented were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.

On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the
22
adoption of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated,
23
acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction." The petition was overtaken by his death on February
28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian
and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia
24
Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.

ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of
administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila,
25
Branch 55. This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda.
26
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz; (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3)
the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda.
de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative
Josefa Delgado.

In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving
descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the
motion was granted.

On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as husband and wife.

On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the
estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and
the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.

On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had
died on May 18, 1987.

27
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates. The
dispositive portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed
in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa
Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among
themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision.

Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo
Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties
hereto.

The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15,
1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.

As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is] considered consolidated in this
proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner
Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court
hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to
the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.

Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA.
DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration
of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals
and income due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to
such estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately
upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her actual administration
of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
 28
SO ORDERED.

On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on appeal was not filed on
29 30 31
time. They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. However,
on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties’ oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave
32
due course to oppositors’ appeal in the interest of substantial justice.

In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the ground that
oppositors’ failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the
appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our
33
decision read:

As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in
the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.

xxx xxx xxx

The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court’s pronouncements as to certain matters of substance, relating to
the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to be
raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late
filing.

xxx xxx xxx

In this instance, private respondents’ intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should not have been
construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx

A review of the trial court’s decision is needed.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27,
1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private respondents’ Record on Appeal
and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Court’s May 11, 1990 decision.

SO ORDERED.

34
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals partially set aside the trial court’s decision. Upon motion for
35 36
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision. The dispositive portion of the amended decision
read:

With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of
the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-
Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate of
Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal
heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred
to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia;
thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.

The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite
bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the
subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the
assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the
appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an
accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty
(60) days from notice of the administrator’s qualification and posting of the bond.

The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973
is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas
and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.

Hence, this recourse.

The issues for our resolution are:

1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;

2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;

3. who should be issued letters of administration.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of
other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in
37
turn, either conclusive or disputable.

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxx xxx xxx

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;

xxx xxx xxx

In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to
be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration
filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."

Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a
38
witness attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as
39
"Señorita" or unmarried woman.

We are not persuaded.

First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no
40
marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support
thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen
41
the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the
42
passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was
43
married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado,"
more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence
44
of the facts stated therein. No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the
recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support their
position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had
"lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.

45
Third, the baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized the
46
child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein, such as the alleged single or
unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.

Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every
intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are
presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold
themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper
47
praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.

The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado

To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa
Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.

As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences
48
which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them. On the other hand,
disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient
evidence to the contrary.

Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now
respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing
evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis
49
Delgado’s and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the
50
natural child of Felisa Delgado).

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa
Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with
Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and
51 52
the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children.

Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:

Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural brothers and
sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent, even
though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab
intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the
illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that

succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason
impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case
under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate
relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten
with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation.
We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them.
Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all
53
are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.

Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-
brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of
Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only
in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by
54
grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of
her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on
55
September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being clear on this matter,
it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at
56
the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance
57
with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to
one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.

Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate
all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to
himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs
are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the
parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a
public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action
of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the
office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)

The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia

58
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be
59
entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She, however, claimed the
status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at
which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.

Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights.
This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to
illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.

60
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. Recognition is compulsory in any of the following
cases:

(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the
conception;

61
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother) by the direct
acts of the latter or of his family;

(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;

62
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or
63
in any authentic writing.

Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.

There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her
putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could
64
have compelled acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment
65
has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent. On the death of either, the action for
 66
compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory
acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.

The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of
voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This
67
includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his. Did intervenor’s report card from the
University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings
under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of
Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no
participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the
notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published
obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing
was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the
newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor’s claim.

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with
law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon
the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the
deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a relationship similar to that which
results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure
laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and
entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption
is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its
68
existence.

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma
Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the
new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining
69 70
claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and nephews.

Entitlement To Letters Of Administration

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6
of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or
to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of
the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be
71
appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where

72
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a
situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a
nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is
hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:

1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The
remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children
of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her
death. Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the
trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share
in her estate.

3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s estate) shall be inherited by
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and
the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall
be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased,
their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall
issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint
administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by
the trial court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010

MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS and JOHN DESANTIS NERI, Petitioners,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, represented by BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI as Special
Administrator, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

1 2
On appeal is the Decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576. In the said decision,
3
the Court of Appeals nullified, on certiorari, the Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, of Negros Occidental
4
(intestate court) allowing herein petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the estate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G.
5
Jalandoni. The decretal portion of the decision of the appellate court reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Orders dated July 2, 2004 and January 26,
2005, of the Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. No. 338 are hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and a permanent
injunction is hereby issued enjoining respondents [petitioners], their agents and anyone acting for and in their behalves,
6
from enforcing the assailed Orders. No costs.

The antecedents are:

7 8
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20 December 1966. He died without issue.

On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the issuance of letters
9
of administration with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to commence the judicial settlement of the latter’s
10
estate. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 338 and is currently pending before the intestate court.

11
On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation before the intestate court. In the
Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)—who, in turn, was revealed to
12
be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis.

The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmother—Isabel—was, at the time of Rodolfo’s death, the legal
13
spouse of the latter. For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo.

Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that they be allowed to intervene on her behalf
14
in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni. As it was, by the time the Manifestation was filed, both
15
Sylvia and Isabel have already passed away with the former predeceasing the latter.

To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their Manifestation, the following documents:

16
a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo;

17
b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia; and

18
c.) Their respective proof of births.

It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings that the foregoing pieces of evidence sufficiently establish that Isabel
was the spouse of Rodolfo, and that they are her lawful representatives.

The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now represented by Bernardino as its Special Administrator,
however, begged to differ. It opposed the intervention on the ground that the petitioners and their siblings have failed to
establish the status of Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo. The very evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings
showed that Isabel had a previous and subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time she was purportedly married to
Rodolfo.
 19
In its Comment to the Manifestation, the respondent called attention to the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia, who
20
was born on 14 February 1946. As it turned out, the record of birth of Sylvia states that she was a "legitimate" child of
21 22
Isabel and John Desantis. The document also certifies the status of both Isabel and John Desantis as "married." The
respondent posits that the foregoing entries, having been made in an official registry, constitute prima facie proof of a prior
23
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.

According to the respondent, Isabel’s previous marriage, in the absence of any proof that it was dissolved, made her
24
subsequent marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio.

On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing the petitioners and their siblings to take part in the settlement
25
proceedings. The intestate court was convinced that the evidence at hand adequately establish Isabel’s status as the
legal spouse of Rodolfo and, by that token, permitted the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the proceedings on
26
her behalf.

The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of Sylvia was insufficient to prove that there was a previous marriage
27
between Isabel and John Desantis. It ventured on the possibility that the entries in the birth record of Sylvia regarding
her legitimacy and the status of her parents, may have been made only in order to save Isabel and her family from the
28
social condemnation of having a child out of wedlock.

The respondent sought for reconsideration, but was denied by the intestate court in its order dated 26 January
29
2006. Undeterred, the respondent hoisted a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

30
On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and nullified the orders of the intestate court.

In coming to its conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that it was an error on the part of the intestate court to have
31
disregarded the probative value of Sylvia’s birth certificate. The appellate court, siding with the respondent, held that
Sylvia’s birth certificate serves as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated—which includes the civil status of her
32
parents. Hence, the previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis should have been taken as established.

The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer any other evidence proving that the
marriage of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved by the time she was married to Rodolfo, it then follows that the
33
latter marriage—the Isabel-Rodolfo union—is a nullity for being bigamous. From that premise, Isabel cannot be
considered as the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The petitioners and their siblings, therefore, failed to show that Isabel has any
interest in the estate of Rodolfo.

34
Hence, the instant appeal.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the orders of the intestate court
allowing the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the settlement proceedings.

The petitioners answer in the affirmative. They proffer the following arguments:

35
One. The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review under a writ of certiorari. In nullifying the intestate court’s order,
the appellate court did not confine itself to the issue of whether the same was issued with grave abuse of
36
discretion. Rather, it chose to re-assess the evidence and touch upon the issue pertaining to Isabel’s right to inherit from
37
Rodolfo.

Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of whether grave abuse of discretion exists, it would have found that the
38
intestate court did not act whimsically or capriciously in issuing its assailed orders. Grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the intestate court is belied by the fact that the said orders may be supported by the two (2) marriage certificates
39
between Isabel and Rodolfo.

Second. Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court of Appeals was correct in addressing the issue of whether there
was sufficient evidence to prove that Isabel has a right to inherit from Rodolfo, it nevertheless erred in finding that there
40
was none. A proper evaluation of the evidence at hand does not support the conclusion that Isabel had a previous
41
marriage with John Desantis.
To begin with, the respondent was not able to produce any marriage certificate executed between Isabel and John
42
Desantis. The conspicuous absence of such certificate can, in turn, only lend credibility to the position that no such
marriage ever took place.

Moreover, the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia do not carry the necessary weight to be able to prove a marriage
43
between Isabel and John Desantis. In assessing the probative value of such entries, the Court of Appeals should have
taken note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples who, in order to "save face" and "not to embarrass their
44
families," concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate.

Since the alleged previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis was not satisfactorily proven, the Court of Appeals
clearly erred in finding that her marriage with Rodolfo is bigamous.

We are not impressed.

First Argument

The first argument raised by the petitioners is specious at best. The question of whether the intestate court gravely
abused its discretion is intricately linked with the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Isabel’s status
as the legal spouse of Rodolfo.

A court’s power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand of
sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to
45
intervene. Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding, to
46
intervene therein.

Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to intervene in a case—the mistake is
not simply an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made in excess of the court’s
jurisdiction and can only be the product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind of error may be reviewed in
a special civil action for certiorari.

Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the limits of review under a writ of certiorari, when it examined the
evidence proving Isabel’s right to inherit from Rodolfo. The sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence determines
whether the petitioners and their siblings have successfully established Isabel’s interest in Rodolfo’s estate—which, as
already mentioned, is an indispensable requisite to justify any intervention. Ultimately, the re-assessment of the evidence
presented by the petitioners and their siblings will tell if the assailed orders of the intestate court were issued in excess of
the latter’s jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

We now proceed to the second argument of the petitioners.

Second Argument

The second argument of the petitioners is also without merit. We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The
very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in Rodolfo’s estate.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis
was adequately established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between Isabel and John
Desantis exists on record.

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and
47
exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence
48
other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of
49
the marriage between his parents.

In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage between Isabel
and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were
50
"married" and (b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child. In clear and categorical language, Sylvia’s birth certificate speaks
of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
 51
Pursuant to existing laws, the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight. They are presumed to be true. Hence,
52
unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts attested. In the case at
bench, the petitioners and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.

The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvia’s birth certificate as untruthful statements made
53
only in order to "save face." They urge this Court to take note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples to
concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot
countenance.

The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other evidence, do not diminish the probative
value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the petitioners would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of a supposed
folkway and conclude therefrom that the usage was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that the petitioners would
themselves argue that the document on which they based their interest in intervention contains untruthful statements in its
vital entries.

Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves which, properly appreciated,
supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously married to John Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of any
proof that such marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion is that
the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.

The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that Isabel’s prior marriage was dissolved
results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners and
their siblings in the settlement proceedings cannot be justified. We affirm the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to
the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any
other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on
evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
1 2
Decision and the March 24, 1999 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No.
3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on
January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and
3
applicable laws to any and/or both parties."

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
4 5
1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued
6
by the Australian government. Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of
7
Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as
8
"single" and "Filipino."

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
9
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

10
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of
bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She
claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
11
subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a
12
divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt

On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was
pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage
13
ha[d] irretrievably broken down."

14
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action. The
15
Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of
16 17
both parties. After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
 Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of
the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce
decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to
nullify or annual.

18
Hence, this Petition.

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

"I

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with
the petitioner.

"2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to
marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.

"3

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

"4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code
as the applicable provisions in this case.

"5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree
obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a
19
recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts."

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the
divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v.
20
Cheong Seng Gee, petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition
in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged
divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are
governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the
presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place
where the marriage was performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not
21
provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
22 23 24
even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a
25
Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
26
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by
a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
27
laws.

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
28
are valid according to their national law." Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts,
the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
29
it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration
requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:

"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

xxx xxx xxx

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;

xxx xxx xxx

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to
furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the
deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x
x.

"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document – a written official act of
an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document
30
must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.
31
Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act
32
of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
33
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
34
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian
35
family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for
petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
36 37
Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted
in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
38
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer
39
bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of
40
adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from
the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce
decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a
long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial
notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in
41
the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of
the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations
42
in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

43
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they
must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by
44
reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Second Issue:

Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her
in 1994.

Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his
legal capacity to marry under Australian law.

Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends
45
it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in
effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the
46
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which
was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only
47
after proof of good behavior.

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
 "1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
48
died) commits the offence of bigamy."

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of
the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence
49
as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been
presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together
with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal
capacity to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned.
The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal
50
capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of
the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for
51
petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint; (b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-
52
Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; (c) Exhibit "C" –
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in
53
Malabon, Metro Manila; (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information
54
of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its records; and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of
55 56
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto; (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer; (b) Exhibit "S" –
57
Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; (c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate
58
of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto; (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family
59
Court of Australia Certificate; and Exhibit "5" – Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto
60
and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a
quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least,
to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy.
After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the
divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive
evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may
declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the
other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quofor the
purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that,
of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
1
G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch
2
22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy
and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

3
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage by
respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December
1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus,
Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage,
respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines
for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to
the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her
requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent
Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she
eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel
in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the
sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of
their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown
reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname
of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations
made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since
Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them.
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being
incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles
68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.

4
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an
American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to
respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his
Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant
at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latter’s drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of
sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have been
extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons
as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was
insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide
financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the
U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent
Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers.
After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship.
She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status
shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was
presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount
of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the
foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent
Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.

5
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs, the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity
6
to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08
7
September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint; (2) the Certification, dated 13 April
1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and
8
Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961; and (3) the invitation to the
9
wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husband’s surname, Micklus.

10 11
Fely’s counsel filed a Notice, and, later on, a Motion, to take the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her
children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York
12 13
and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders and Commissions issued by the RTC to the
Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written
interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year
since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the
14
RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998, considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence. The
case was thus deemed submitted for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and
Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings –

The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiff’s
testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological
incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help
and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him.
She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man and has establish [sic] another
family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another
man in another country.

Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE
nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were eventually manifested after the wedding. It
appears to be the case in this instance.

Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for that sacred and
inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident
that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already
there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in
herein case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.

Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited
unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These are her excessive
disposition to material things over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the
marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is
a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab
15
initio.

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an
appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed
Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage
between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit –

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United
States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their
marriage…

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A
DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER
TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE
LAW."

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a
Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse
because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her
American husband’s citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26
aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and thus
becomes herself an alien.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as married to
defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled
in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge
essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will
not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial court’s declaration of the nullity of the
16
marriage of the parties.

17
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002, denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner
Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds –

I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do not per se constitute psychological incapacity.

II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the
Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable
18
to the case at bar.

19
In his Comment to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely’s psychological incapacity was clearly
established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed
applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen.
He further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute
the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant
Petition to be meritorious.

The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads –

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down
guidelines for determining its existence.

20
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus –
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
21
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated…

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –

(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
22
involved.

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were
23
handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, which, although quite lengthy, by its significance,
deserves to be reproduced below –

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job…

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts…

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
24
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

25
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality
of the evidence presented during the trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence
presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely;
therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily
put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other
pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between
respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding
of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband’s surname. Even considering the admissions
made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to
convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations
of marriage.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
26
less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves,
27
also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting
a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness
28
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of
the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an
American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her
alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the
root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental
defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor
that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling
29
in Marcos v. Marcos, respondent Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of
30
Appeals and Molina that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its
incapacitating nature be fully explained.

31
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. No less than the Constitution of 1987
sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
32
family.
 II

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines –

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino
citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained
her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her
Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United
States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had
been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to
the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws
on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine
laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have
validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

III

The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration
of nullity of marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State.
Article 48 provides –

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and
to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from intervening in
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the
33
Government. His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and
its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of
the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the
34
services of lawyers.

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and
protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties,
or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and
legal defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of
such intent, rather than thwart it.

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the
35
People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals. While it is
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated
to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts
when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v.
36
Ancheta –

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court
of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
37
for the State…

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
38
Voidable Marriages, which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as
to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority
of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages
before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below –

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of
such service within the same period.

Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the
Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant
interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period
herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.

Sec. 19. Decision. –

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision
personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive
part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be
made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the
Solicitor General.

Sec. 20. Appeal. –

…
(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of
Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a
copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and
sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment,
sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court
commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage,
39
this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539,
dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30
October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

1
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
2 3
G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 Resolutions of the
4
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor
of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia
Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
5
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
6
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William
7
Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children
with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s
8
estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100
San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as
legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties,
both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
9
dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for
letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of
residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she
was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

10
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal of the
11
petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss.

12
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition thereto. She
submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he
regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982.
Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to
prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the
13
legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van
14
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the
15
Order denying their motions to dismiss. They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
16
derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding
Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

17
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent,
as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile,
18
the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was
substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

19
Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion
20
for reconsideration from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and
law on which it was based.

21
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to
Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

22
On April 24, 1995, the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of
23
venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested that he is adopting the
arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and
24 25
Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, and June 20, 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that
the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not
bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.

26 27
Respondent moved for reconsideration and for the disqualification of Judge Arcangel but said motions were
28
denied.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed
Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the
29
trial court for further proceedings.

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted
that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26
30 31
of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. It found that the marriage
between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to
contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no
justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of
the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot
deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The
32
foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have
capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not
be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial
33
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x

34
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Court of Appeals.

35
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. Rodolfo later filed a
36
manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted.

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They
37 38
contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, "residence" is
synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return.
They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent
cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

39
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should
be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule
40
v. Court of Appeals, we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from
domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the
terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence
41
must be more than temporary. (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case
because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election
laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated
as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
42
returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
43
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his
residence in one place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved
that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted
44
in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid
45
property. She also presented billing statements from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the
period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa."
46
Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association and Ayala
47 48
Country Club, Inc., letter-envelopes from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang
49
address, and the deceased’s calling cards stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional
50
Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17,
1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court
51
Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first
resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil
Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.

52
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was
subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under
Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be
protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the
properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs.
Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when
thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to
the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
53
property.

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the
alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still marriedto
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should
54
not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)

55
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against
his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses
56
from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other."

57
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign
58
spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was
obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be
denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a
59 60
valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Garcia v. Recio, the
61
Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.

62
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and
38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into
law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended,
it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
63
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law
already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
64
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. Marriage, being a mutual
and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien
spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

65 66
Petitioners cite Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as
Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should
67
not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. In Alonzo v. Intermediate
68
Appellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions
the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this
is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable,
and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied
in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our
nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots
to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his
due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a
way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed
69
with justice.

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In
70
Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments.
It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must
be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of
a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
71
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies
72
of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
73
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained
by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has
the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

74
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of
the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
75
contingent.

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo
by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce
and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of
76
the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage
is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
77
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be
Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the
78
property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. In Saguid v. Court of
79
Appeals, we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
80
effect, Article 148 governs. The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry
each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual
contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding
shares shall be presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the
case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the
81
strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may
arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article
148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28,
1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which
dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E. BRAGANZA, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

1
This petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated August 6, 2004,
2
which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636,
declaring the marriage between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of bigamy,
3
as well as the Resolution dated January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for reconsideration.

4
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they
migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage,
5
Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988.

Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao,
6
Pangasinan. Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio
7
Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against
Orlando and Merope.

8
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not a real
9
party-in-interest, but it was denied. Trial on the merits ensued.

On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan and against defendants Orlando B.
Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as follows:

1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan is declared null and void ab initio;

2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff by way of moral damages the amount of
P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of
P50,000.00, including costs of this suit; and

3) The donation in consideration of marriage is ordered revoked and the property donated is ordered awarded to
the heirs of Juliana Braganza.

Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. Arenas, Jr. and Atty. Nolan Evangelista.

10
SO ORDERED.

Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the appeal and consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
appealed decision. We likewise DISMISS Civil Case No. D-10636, RTC, Branch 44, Dagupan City. No costs.

11
SO ORDERED.

After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN COURT TO QUESTION THE NULLITY OF THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS;
 II.

WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DECLARE THE QUESTIONED MARRIAGE VOID
12
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.

Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought embarrassment to her and her
children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to address her grievances and to protect her family from
further embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring
13
the marriage void despite overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.

The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy. However, this issue may not be resolved without first determining
the corollary factual issues of whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized American
citizens and whether they had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.

While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the
14
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case, there are, however, exceptions to this rule, like
when the findings of facts of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are conflicting, or when the findings are conclusions
15
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and respondent Orlando were naturalized American citizens
and that they obtained a divorce decree in April 1988. However, after a careful review of the records, we note that other
than the allegations in the complaint and the testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of competent evidence to
prove their naturalization and divorce.

The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it held:

In light of the allegations of Felicitas’ complaint and the documentary and testimonial evidence she presented, we deem it
undisputed that Orlando and Felicitas are American citizens and had this citizenship status when they secured their
divorce decree in April 1988. We are not therefore dealing in this case with Filipino citizens whose marital status is
governed by the Family Code and our Civil Code, but with American citizens who secured their divorce in the U.S. and
16
who are considered by their national law to be free to contract another marriage. x x x

Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of the petitioner to refute or contest the allegation in
respondents’ brief, that she and respondent Orlando were American citizens at the time they secured their divorce in April
17
1988, as sufficient to establish the fact of naturalization and divorce. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her
18
complaint that they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. It is
19
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.

Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types.
The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first
20
kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. A divorce obtained abroad
by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
21
foreigner. However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take
22
judicial notice of foreign laws.

Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of whether petitioner has
the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the
petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage
23
even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the
respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and
24 25
respondent Merope, and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.

However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of Orlando, does not restrict
remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor should each have the
personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequently contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective,
Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlando’s subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of
26
this subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas. x x x

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family
Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party
who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other
27
actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of
28 29
action. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.1awphi1.net

Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically provides:

SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. —

(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife.

xxxx

In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the
absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception
of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether
the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents’
marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of
marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for its proper disposition. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances
handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

1
In the first, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify
2 3
the April 30, 2002 Resolution of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002, granting a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of
support pendente lite to Rebecca.

4 5
The second, a petition for review under Rule 45, docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision of the
CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support
commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside
certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its
6 7
face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen born in Agaña, Guam,
USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then
on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo,
Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican
8
court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96, ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry
after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the
9
same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97, settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an
10
Agreement they executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property which
they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties
11
therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the
12
Makati City RTC a petition dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as
13 14
Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved and secured approval of the motion to withdraw the petition.

15
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American citizen;
that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute
16
nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and
entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256
of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support
for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

17
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of
her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal
complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on
the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

18
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting
Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's
Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby
ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month
to Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.

19
SO ORDERED.

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente
lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving
legal support.

20
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on
a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
21
injunction. His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

22
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO. On April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via a Resolution,
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order
dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil
Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.

23
SO ORDERED.

24
Rebecca moved but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on
25
May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but
the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition
for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.
 Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No.
01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA
Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the
Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil
Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.

26
SO ORDERED.

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the following premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in
27
determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action. Applying said rule in the light of the essential
28
elements of a cause of action, Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared void, the union
having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an
American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's
capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree
was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that
her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the
Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father.

(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that nationality status and
having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b)
when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually secured an American passport on January 18,
1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case
No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus
soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she secured her foreign
divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally
29
assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution. Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under
G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of
which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTC's orders which would
have entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A
QUO.

II
 THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN
RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS

ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY
VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON
30
THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the success or failure of the
petition in G.R. No. 155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a
Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national
31
law of the foreigner. Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a
Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in
32
this jurisdiction.

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of
the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a
Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996;
and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an
American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle
of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was,
33
and may still be, a holder of an American passport.

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as an American
citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3)
when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of
34
Acknowledgment in which she stated being an American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC
9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been
recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June 8,
2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition
issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed
hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars are as follows:
 Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953

Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown

Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none

was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the
1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated
st
October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1 Indorsement dated June
8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.

th
Given under my hand and seal this 11 day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate
st
Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1 Indorsement of Secretary of
Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost
five years from the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October
11, 1995after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on October 11,
1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for
st
this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of the 1 Indorsement by Secretary of
Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January
22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the
Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code,
specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization
regulatory services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the
confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.

35
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the Department of Justice an
official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for
confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification
Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification
Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date
of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after
st
then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1 Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to
attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation
or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that
no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore,
st
the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1 Indorsement issued only on
June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days
later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.
 When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is
indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she
secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for
declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her
alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it
was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the
foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly,
the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex
"A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on
October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the
question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the
withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted
of the following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her
36
Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001) did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No.
RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to
motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she
was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At
the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital
relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil
Decrees, which pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason
of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States
nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa,
Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN
OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married
and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court
represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the
th
19 of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized
37
and authorizing him to subscribe all the acts concerning this case. (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country
which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their
38
Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and
duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was
valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here,
39
provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may,
the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and
40
allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by
the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And
neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true
with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that
the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule
39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this
jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima
41
facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly
represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce
decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and
Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation
by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to
nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we
stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's
policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
42
obtained.

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicataeffect in this
jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculumbetween Rebecca and Vicente is
considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no
longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after
43
completing the legal requirements."

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the
44
Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as
follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
 x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
45
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their
citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on December 14,
1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's
conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage
consists only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502
Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M.
46
Bayot, x x x. (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second divorce
decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into between
th
the parties dated 14 day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by
reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every
47
provision of said agreement."

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her
representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their
48
family home in Ayala Alabang.

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of
action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of action, thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss
based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations
in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A
cause of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right
of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
49
maintain an action for recovery of damages.

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and
Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief does not exist
50
rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. With the valid foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be
dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their
daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support
given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the
majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She
would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is
best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be
proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente
owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is,
Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her
petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the
CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the
petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and
June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

1
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated
2
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on
3
November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig
4
City. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to
the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair
with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court
of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree
5
took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new
Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce
decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National
Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to
be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to
6
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved
(petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a
notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her
desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that
she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

7
In its October 30, 2008 decision, the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper
party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It
ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
8 9
Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of
10
Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; the provision was enacted to
"avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
11
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."

THE PETITION

12 13
From the RTC’s ruling, Gerbert filed the present petition.

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he,
thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking
into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision
applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido
by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with
sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries
his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry
14
Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, both support Gerbert’s position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to
aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURT’S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right
it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code.

15 16
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void and voidable marriages. In both cases, the
basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
17 18
marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C.
19
Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted Executive Order No. (EO)
227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s
20 21
holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the
alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The
Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still
subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
22
are to be served.

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
23
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created
by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
24
remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would
be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
25
bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of
the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however,
can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and
26
legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words,
only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no
right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in
favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition
before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does
not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The
foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the
title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite
interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have
declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce
27
is valid according to his or her national law.

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
28
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law
29
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim
or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity
to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates
30 31
proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this
point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand
the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the
Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested
parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution
must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized,
32 33
shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments
between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending
judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not
obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce
34
decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. We consider the
recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
35
illegitimate, or his being married or not."

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that must
be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce
decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:

(a) births;

(b) deaths;

(c) marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;

(f) legitimations;

(g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in which
they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

 (2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement
of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present
case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted
totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s
marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular
36 37
No. 4, series of 1982, and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 – both of which required a final order
from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry,
but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree
does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil
registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order."
The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding
by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail
the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation
or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed
38
with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who
39
have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be
40
published in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules
41
of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case
to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Civil Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner,

vs.
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

1 2
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision and Resolution regarding the issuance of
letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

The facts are as follows:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States from his
first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.

On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.

Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was
docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.

On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of
Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.

The two cases were subsequently consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc.
No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that
a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and
docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.

Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando
despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.

3
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. The trial court ruled that since the deceased was a
divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between
him and petitioner was not valid.

Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed
by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in
determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.

On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A,
the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married
Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause.
Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of
4
administration.
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA)
via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration.

Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration may have been filed by an "uninterested
person," the defect was cured by the appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has
a better right to administer the decedent’s properties, the RTC should have first required the parties to present their
evidence before it ruled on the matter.

On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy.
She should have instead filed a petition for review rather than a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for
Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the
CA allowed the Petition and continued to decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:

As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of
an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the other. A petition for letters of administration is a special proceeding. A special proceeding is
an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary
civil action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or respondent. The only party in this kind of proceeding is the
petitioner of the applicant. Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration can hardly be barred
by a similar pending petition involving the estate of the same decedent unless both petitions are filed by the same person.
In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party to the petition filed by the private respondent, in the same manner that
the latter was not made a party to the petition filed by the former. The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The
contention of the petitioner must perforce fail.

Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the provision of the Rules requiring a petitioner
for letters of administration to be an "interested party," inasmuch as any person, for that matter, regardless of whether he
has valid interest in the estate sought to be administered, could be appointed as administrator for as long as he files his
petition ahead of any other person, in derogation of the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of preference in
the appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of administration. As a spouse, the petitioner
would have been preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like any other
public document, is only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged
with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by
contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been dissolved or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. The deduction of the trial
court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with
Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to deny the
findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an interested
party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the
trial court is in place.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

5
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

6
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. She alleged that the reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating,
on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando
was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.

On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.

Hence, this Petition.

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case
No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that, because petitioner
was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of
the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that
petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.

Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already
ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign
7
nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. wherein we said:

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx

8
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals, to wit:

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no
longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce
obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter
of comity. xxx

9
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio, to wit:

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed
the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian
family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for
petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in
evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer
bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of
adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from
the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce
decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a
long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial
notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in
the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in
their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.1âwphi1 Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know
by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied)

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the
United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to
the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued
the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is
undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

10
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, in which we said:

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the
U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce
judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having
legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies
of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be
issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October
2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this
case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for
1
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order dated
31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
2
Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his
wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay
and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
3
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain
a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground
4
of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2)
that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
5
Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such
6
annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing
7
the case from its active civil docket. The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent,
where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court
based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the
8
preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition." Apparently, the RTC took the view that
only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of
9
foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," and not a civil
10
action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." In other words, the
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife
and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with
11
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
12
courts.

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the
13
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply
Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki,
"[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be
14
the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage." Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a
bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable.
15
Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753) in relation to Article 413 of the Civil
16
Code. The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send
a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage
17
was solemnized." Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of
annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or
18
correction. The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on
the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it
dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with
the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki
19
cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s
20
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." Moreover, petitioner
alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
because he substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that
21
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. The
trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a)
22
and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" in the proceeding because he "is not the
husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x
23
x x." On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court
cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited
24
by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
25
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
26
marriages x x x." Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
27
correction of entry] x x x."

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial
28
court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition. Moreover, the verification and certification against
29
forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this
also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
 30
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review. The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
31
and Motion.

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to
comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
32
proceedings. The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can
sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
33
Republic which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this
Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period
that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent
marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a
subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the
34
prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a
35 36
Rule 108 proceeding. In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
37
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." While Corpuzconcerned a foreign
divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other
words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a
38
person’s legal capacity and status x x x." The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108,
39 40
citing De Castro v. De Castro and Niñal v. Bayadog which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be
41
collaterally attacked."

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the
42 43
petition. Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. Maekara
44
also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay. On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason
45
to oppose the petition. She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause
46
misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
47
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the
48
reason behind the petition is bigamy."

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To
be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
49
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese
Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be
made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal
50
of office.

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court
51 52
and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, the service of summons, the
53 54 55 56
investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the judgment of the trial court. This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit
57
repetitive litigation on claims and issues." The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the
58
merits. In Mijares v. Rañada, this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the
merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded
59
litigation."

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
60
laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition
by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the
status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court
of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the
foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can
only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover,
Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise
limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review
61
embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
62
states.

63
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a
64
Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence. Divorce involves the dissolution
of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
65
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese
Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25,
in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the
State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
66
marriage, which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this
Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of
67
a party or a particular fact."

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest
68
derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances ) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
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marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of
70 71
the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.

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Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends
further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
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Code. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
74
integrity of his marriage. In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting
the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration
75
of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife" —it refers to the husband or the
wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning.
Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of
the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article
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349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate
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prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can
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file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore
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interested in the judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of
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all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules
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of Court. Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. The
RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards
of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
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requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and
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children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the investigation of the public
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prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to
prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No.
8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court
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"where the corresponding civil registry is located." In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of
a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of
Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
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Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido, this Court recognized the
legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
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remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" under the
laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to
adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts
cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage
between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly
consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or
her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is
already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
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this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against
91
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare
the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies
because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of
his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—
the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation
where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference
between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family
Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her.
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal
capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino
party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding
public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is
neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that
the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in
the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
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establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for
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bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and
the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.