Middle East Policy, Vol. XVII, No.
2, Summer 2010
The Evolution of Bashar al-Asad
David W. Lesch
Dr. Lesch is professor of Middle Eastern history and chair of the
Department of History at Trinity University in San Antonio, TX. His most
recent book is The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History (Oxford University
Press, 2008).
A
U.S. official recently comment-
ed to me that in his government
office the analysts had deter-
mined Syria to be more “dia-
bolical” than Iran because Syrian President
Bashar al-Asad “is ten times smarter than
[Iranian President] Ahmadinejad.” My,
how times have changed. It was not that
long ago that iterations emanating from
Washington and beyond regularly derided,
even mocked, Bashar as incompetent, na-
ïve and weak. Indeed, when Bashar came
to power in 2000 following his father’s
death, I pointed out in writing some of the
similarities with the fictional character Mi-
chael Corleone from the Godfather mov-
ies, noting that Michael, like Bashar, was
not originally selected to engage in, much
less take over, the family business.1 A
number of people suggested to me that the
correct analogy should have been made not
with Michael, but with the weak, confused
brother, Fredo. This was usually followed
with some derogatory remarks that the
“real” leader of Syria should be Bashar’s
tough-minded older sister, Bushra, or even
the president’s cosmopolitan wife, Asma.
As seen particularly in Arab society, this
was an attack at Bashar’s manhood, i.e.,
his ability to lead.
© 2010, The Author
70
Congressional testimony in 2002 and
2003 surrounding the passage of the sanc-
tion-lined Syrian Accountability Act (SAA,
signed into law by President George W.
Bush in 2004) helped establish this nega-
tive view of Bashar by overtly attacking
Syria and its president, oftentimes in an
insulting fashion. These diatribes emerged
out of the post-9/11 environment, when
Congress seemed to be on anti-terrorist
steroids, each member trying to outdo the
other in building up his or her creden-
tials. This group-think also contributed to
congressional support for the U.S. invasion
of Iraq in 2003. Syria was an easy target,
as was its president. In the jargon of the
time, they were low-hanging fruit. Syria
could easily be attacked verbally, and even
militarily in targeted strikes, without seri-
ous repercussions. In testimony before the
House Committee on International Rela-
tions in September 2002 on the SAA, Rep.
Dick Armey (R-TX) proclaimed,
Our inaction on holding Syria ac-
countable for its dangerous activities
could seriously diminish our efforts
on the war on terrorism and brokering
a viable peace in the Middle East….
Syria should be held accountable for
its record of harboring and supporting
Journal Compilation © 2010, Middle East Policy Council

terrorist groups; stockpiling illegal
weapons in an effort to develop weap-
ons of mass destruction; and transfer-
ring weapons and oil back and forth
through Iraq.
The co-sponsor of the SAA, Eliot En-
gel (D-NY), asserted, “We will not tolerate
Syrian support for terrorism. We will not
tolerate Syrian occupation of Lebanon….
I do not want to witness horrors worse
than 9/11. I urge the Administration to get
tough on Syria.” His cohort from New
York, Gary Ackerman, said, “This is not
too big a nut to crack. Syria is a small,
decrepit little terror state that has been
yanking our diplomatic chain for years.”
Alluding to President Bashar being a
licensed ophthalmologist, Shelly Berkley
(D-NY) stated the following:
I don’t care if he’s a doctor, a lawyer,
a plumber, a carpenter — this is not
a kinder and gentler leader. This is a
kinder and gentler terrorist, and we
don’t need another one of those. He is
no different from his father; perhaps,
even worse because he should know
better. This is a disgrace that this coun-
try isn’t standing up to this terrorist and
making sure that this type of behavior
is not only condemned, but eliminated.
Bashar had been in power a little over
two years when these comments were
made. They were ignorant, based as they
were on a lack of knowledge in Congress
of how Syria works — or, in many cases,
doesn’t work. For instance, Bashar had an-
nounced in the early days of his regime that
he intended to authorize the opening of pri-
vate banks in Syria, a novelty for a public-
sector-dominated country where most of the
fluid capital found its way into Lebanese
banks. When the private banks did not ma-
71
Lesch: The Evolution of Bashar al-Asad
terialize by 2003, Bashar was taken to task
by some members of Congress and officials
in the Bush administration for not following
through with what he had promised, thus
further revealing his ineptitude and prevari-
cation. He could not be trusted.
The fact of the matter is that Syria
is practically immune to innovation and
short-term change. There is an almost
institutionalized revulsion to it from the
lowest-level bureaucrats to the heads of
ministries. Change in Syria just does not
happen quickly; it is incremental at best.
Syria’s First Lady, Asma al-Asad, herself
steeped in the financial world as a broker
on Wall Street with J. P. Morgan before she
married Bashar, commented to me,
We have not had private banks in
Syria for 50 years. Our public banks
are not functioning….We have staff
who do not speak English, who do not
have computers. So we are on a very,
very basic level….We had no idea
how to do this. We don’t have the
experience.
Both of the Asads told me that the
biggest mistake they made in this case was
announcing to such fanfare the intention to
establish private banks. It created expecta-
tions that could not possibly be met in a
year or two. A handful of private banks
were, indeed, established in 2004, a num-
ber that has grown in ensuing years along
with other monetary reform; and in early
2009, the long-promised Syrian stock ex-
change commenced operations. This is the
Syrian way, but in the sound-byte, four-
year-term American sociopolitical system,
it did not happen fast enough. It is easy,
almost a political imperative, to find fault
with our presumed enemies. It is also easy,
almost a political imperative, to overlook
flaws in our friends.
Middle East Policy, Vol. XVII, No. 2, Summer 2010

Raised expectations were Bashar’s Cold War, and he lived through the tu-
main problem from the beginning. I half- mult in Lebanon. These relationships and
jokingly mentioned to him the first time historical events shaped his Weltanschau-
we met, in May 2004, that he had made a ung, not his sojourn in merry old England.
mistake in letting it be known to the media, Israel is Syria’s primary competitor, and
which widely disseminated it, that he liked Bashar is suspicious of the United States.
Phil Collins’s music. This tended to feed For Syrians, Lebanon should be non-threat-
into an emerg- ening at all costs
ing profile of the Bashar did not adequately adjust to and preferably
unknown second within its sphere
son of Hafiz al- the crucial underlying changes in of influence. In
Asad upon com- American foreign policy after 9/11. addition, Bashar
ing to power in This heightened Syria’s exposure to is the keeper of
2000 that he was the U.S. regime-change rhetoric that the Alawite flame.
a pro-West, mod- Making home
ernizing reformer characterized the Bush doctrine. videos with Sony
cut from a differ- camcorders and
ent cloth than his taciturn father. Bashar listening to the Electric Light Orchestra are
was the ophthalmologist, not the heir to his hobbies; maintaining Syria’s traditional
the throne; that was his more flamboyant interests is his obligation.
and charismatic elder brother, Basil, who
died in a car crash in 1994. Bashar was CONFRONTATION
then in London at the Western Eye Hospital Bashar also came to power in a threat-
attempting to get the equivalent of board ening regional environment. The al-Aqsa
certification in ophthalmology. And in his intifada had erupted a few months after he
inaugural speech in July 2000, he leveled became president. Then, in rapid succes-
unprecedented criticism at the previous sion, came the attacks of 9/11 and the U.S.
regime — his father’s. He was the for- invasions of Afghanistan and Syria’s near
ward-looking head of the Syrian Computer neighbor Iraq. The rules of the game were
Society, something of a computer nerd changing, and they were being dictated
himself and an avid amateur photographer. by the Bush administration in a way that
He liked the technological toys of the West. placed Syria on the outside looking in.
Perhaps Bashar is partially to blame Since the early 1970s, Syria had been
for raising expectations. After all, he did able to straddle both regional and interna-
consecrate a period of political openness tional fences. Hafiz relished this position;
with the so-called “Damascus spring” in it allowed him to select which side of the
2001, which was quickly followed by a fence to be on, based on the circumstances
wave of political repression. Most officials of the day. He was, after all, a foreign-
and commentators in the West, however, policy pragmatist. Syria alone among the
failed to comprehend that he had spent all major Arab players in the Middle East
of 18 months in London, and they were not could play this role. On the one side of the
during the formative years of his life. He fence, Syria is the cradle of Arab national-
is the son of Hafiz al-Asad, a child of the ism, at the head of the confrontation states
Arab-Israeli conflict. He grew up amid the in the Arab world arrayed against Israel

72

and supportive of groups such as Hezbol-
lah and Hamas. It has also not given in
to what in the region is often called the
“American project.” On the other side of
the fence, Syria sent troops to support the
U.S.-led UN coalition forces that evicted
Iraq from Kuwait in the 1991 Gulf War.
Damascus has also entered into both indi-
rect and direct negotiations with Israel for
over three decades, often with U.S. broker-
age, coming tantalizingly close to a peace
deal with Israel in 2000.
The Bush administration essentially
told Damascus that it could no longer play
both sides of the fence; it had to choose
one. After intelligence cooperation with
the United States on al-Qaeda following
9/11(which led one U.S. official to state
that Syria had saved American lives), rela-
tions began to unravel. The United States
invaded Iraq; Syria opposed the move.
Essentially, Bashar did not adequately
adjust to the crucial underlying changes in
American foreign policy after 9/11. This
heightened Syria’s exposure to the U.S.
regime-change rhetoric that characterized
the Bush doctrine. Damascus thought the
old rules of the game were in place, and
administration officials periodically led
them to believe this was the case.
The Syrians may have been guilty of
selectively hearing what they wanted to
hear. At the same time, however, the new
rules of the game were being written in
Washington in the corridors of Congress,
the Pentagon, the vice president’s office and
influential conservative think tanks by those
who saw Bashar and his regime as part of
the problem rather than the solution. The
focus of foreign-policy power in the Bush
administration shifted away from the State
Department as the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq progressed, leading to a more bellicose
posture toward Syria. State Department
73
Lesch: The Evolution of Bashar al-Asad
officials, including Secretary of State Colin
Powell, made comments from time to time
praising Syria’s cooperation against jihad-
ists crossing over into Iraq. This reassured
Damascus that perhaps the old rules still
applied, but in hindsight these statements
carried little weight within the U.S. foreign-
policy apparatus, as Powell and the State
Department became marginalized.
Thus Bashar’s continued verbal as-
saults on Israel and support for Hezbollah
and Hamas well into 2003 played right into
the hands of the ascendant group of U.S.
foreign-policy ideologues. The Syrian
leader was relatively unaware that he and
his regime were becoming more of a tar-
get. As President Bush stated on June 24,
2003, “Syria must choose the right side in
the war on terror by closing terrorist camps
and expelling terrorist organizations.”
Syria assumed that the clear distinction
between al-Qaeda, on the one hand, and
Hamas/Hezbollah, on the other, was self-
evident, as this was well understood by
most in the region. It was apparently lost
on the Bush administration, however.
No longer could the differences be-
tween Washington and Damascus be
resolved as part of a Syrian-Israeli peace
process. Syria now had to meet all of Wash-
ington’s concerns before negotiations with
Israel could even begin. From the point of
view of Damascus, this was a nonstarter,
for it would entail unilaterally relinquish-
ing its few remaining assets, such as its ties
with Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran, before
the initiation of talks. As a result, Syria
was considered by the Bush administration
to be a rogue state. A series of accusations
were hurled against the regime in Damascus
when the United States invaded Iraq, from
harboring members of Saddam Hussein’s
regime and hiding Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction to supplying military equip-
Middle East Policy, Vol. XVII, No. 2, Summer 2010
ment to Iraqi fighters. The most pointed
accusation of all, however, would only gain
momentum as the Iraq insurgency took
shape: that the Syrian regime was actively
supplying the insurgency with financial
and logistical assistance. Now, according
to U.S. officials, Syria was costing U.S.
lives. It had crossed a line. And when the
Bush administration shifted its emphasis
toward promoting democracy in the region,
especially in Lebanon, Syria’s authoritar-
ian regime became a natural target. With
the international revulsion over the assas-
sination of former Lebanese prime minister
Rafiq Hariri in February 2005 — under
orders from Damascus, in Washington’s
view — the subsequent Cedar Revolution in
Lebanon, the evacuation of the last Syrian
troops from the country by April, and the
initiation of a UN investigation of the Hariri
murder, Bashar was clearly on the defen-
sive. The Bush administration expected that
isolation and pressure would lead to sub-
stantial changes in Syrian behavior, if not
foment regime change. It obviously failed.
LEARNING ON THE JOB
In response to the accusations from the
United States, Bashar told me in 2004,
Some see me as bad, some see me as
good — we don’t actually care what
terms they use. It is not right to apply
this term to Syria. I mean, look at the
relationship that Syria has with the rest
of the world; if you have good rela-
tions with most of the rest of the world,
you are not a rogue state just because
the United States says you are.
Weathering these multiple storms took
a good deal of skill, with a little bit of luck
thrown in. Bashar al-Asad is no longer
the untested, inexperienced leader. No
one remains president in Syria for 10 years
74
without being capable. Bashar was often
portrayed negatively when cast against
his father in Middle East circles, but one
must remember that Hafiz did not become
Hafiz al-Asad, the clever, tough leader and
shrewd negotiator, overnight. He, too, had
had to negotiate a steep learning curve,
part of which was being taken to the dip-
lomatic cleaners on separate occasions by
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and U.S.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during
and after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
Bashar had to tread very carefully. As
seen from Damascus, the invasion of Iraq
implanted 150,000 U.S. troops in a country
on its eastern border armed with the Bush
doctrine and fresh off a swift, and to the
Syrians shockingly easy, military removal
of the only other Baathist regime on earth.
To the north was Turkey; and while Syria
had markedly improved its relationship
with Ankara, the latter was still a member
of NATO. To the south, of course, was
Israel as well as Jordan, with which Syria
had a longstanding mercurial relation-
ship and which, in any event, was a U.S.
ally. Bashar looked out from his perch in
Damascus and saw that his country was
virtually surrounded by actual and potential
hostile forces. The only friendly neighbor
was Lebanon; and, even there, various do-
mestic factions were agitating more assert-
ively for a Syrian troop withdrawal and less
Syrian interference, something that became
a reality after the Hariri assassination.
In the fresh glow of the Bush adminis-
tration’s “mission accomplished,” several
implicit threats were hurled at Damascus that
Syrian officials took very seriously. Syria
could be next on the Bush doctrine’s hit
list. As such, it is no surprise that the Syrian
regime at the very least cast a blind eye to-
ward Arab insurgents crossing over into Iraq.
Damascus wanted the Bush doctrine to fail,
 Lesch: The Evolution of Bashar al-Asad

and it hoped that Iraq would be the first and Trying to walk a fine line, Bashar
last time it was applied. Anything it could hardened the Iraqi border a bit, but by
do to ensure this outcome, short of incurring 2005, it was clear that the United States
the direct military wrath of the United States, had sunk into a quagmire and was not in a
was considered within its rights. position to turn its guns against Syria. At
While certainly under pressure from this time, there was little harm in meet-
the United States to do more on the border, ing some of the U.S. concerns. After all,
Bashar also had to face a domestic constit- it emerged soon enough that Damascus
uency that identified strongly with the Iraqi and Washington have a shared interest
insurgency. The Syrian regime was caught in stability in Iraq, one area in which the
a bit off guard by the popular reaction in two countries can continue to improve the
the country against the U.S.-led invasion bilateral relationship.
of Iraq, particularly as manifested among The failure of the Bush doctrine in Iraq
Sunni Muslim salafist groups. Because certainly took some of the heat off Bashar
Bashar still had not solidified his hold on just as pressure in Lebanon was ratcheting
power, he could up. The Bush ad-
not afford to be In the summer of 2006, during ministration and
seen as doing anti-regime Syr-
Bush’s bidding — the Hezbollah-Israeli war, ian exile groups
nor did he want Bashar’s confidence grew, perhaps overplayed their
to. In fact, the in proportion to the regional hand vis-à-vis
more the United Damascus by late
perception that Hezbollah, by
States pressured 2005, following a
Syria, the more surviving the Israeli onslaught, had seemingly damn-
it compelled inflicted a defeat upon the IDF. ing preliminary
Bashar to ap- UN report against
peal to a combination of Arab, Syrian and regime figures close to the Syrian president
Islamic nationalism to strengthen his base regarding the Hariri murder. Bashar was
of support. As U.S. pressure accelerated able to use the crisis atmosphere to finally
following the Hariri assassination, Bashar consolidate power. In other words, he used
drummed up a nationalistic response that the internal fallout of “losing” Lebanon to
reinforced the portrayal of internal critics push aside domestic foes and albatrosses.
of the regime as accomplices of the West. Most particularly, he forced the resignation
The external threat environment gave (and exile) of Vice President Abd al-Halim
the regime something of a free pass to Khaddam at a Baath party congress meet-
crack down on civil-society and democ- ing in June 2005. Even though Khaddam
racy activists, some of whom, in and gave some damning interviews and lent
outside of the country, were in contact with some weight to the exiled opposition, the
and being supported by the Bush admin- fact that he was doing this outside of Syria
istration. With chaos reigning in Iraq and was evidence that Bashar had consolidated
instability growing in Lebanon, it was not his position. Khaddam has since faded into
hard to remind the Syrian populace that virtual oblivion.
U.S.-promoted democracy could likewise In addition, with the intense anti-Amer-
rip the fabric of its own society apart. ican feeling in the region, the more the Syr-

75
Middle East Policy, Vol. XVII, No. 2, Summer 2010
ian exile opposition appeared to attach itself
to the United States, the more it became dis-
credited in Syria; the more Bashar seemed
to stand up to Washington, the more popular
he would become, and not only inside Syria,
but in the Arab world in general.
Bashar continued his maneuvering,
reshuffling his cabinet in early 2006 and
implanting loyalists in the military-security
apparatus. A senior Syrian official was
asked in December 2005 if his country
would make concessions, muddle through
or lash out in order to relieve the burden of
international pressure. He responded that
Syria would do all three. This is the Syr-
ian way, and Bashar was in control.
CONFIDENCE
I have personally seen Bashar al-Asad
grow more comfortable as president over
the years — perhaps too comfortable.
When I first met him in 2004, he was still a
bit unsure of the world about him. Particu-
larly befuddling was U.S. policy. In 2005,
he was defensive and angry, especially
as Syria had been forced out of Lebanon,
something for which he felt he should
have received at least a little credit. In
early 2006, having survived the worst that
2005 had to offer, he began to feel more
secure in his position, more sure of his
future. In the summer of 2006, during the
Hezbollah-Israeli war, Bashar’s confidence
grew, perhaps in proportion to the regional
perception that Hezbollah, by surviving
the Israeli onslaught, had inflicted a defeat
upon the IDF. His anger at the United
States turned almost into cockiness; the
Bush administration had taken its best
shot, and he was still standing.
In May 2007, amid Bashar’s re-elec-
tion in a referendum to another seven-year
term, I noticed something in him that I
had not detected before: self-satisfaction.
76
Maybe this is inevitable in a neo-patri-
monial authoritarian state, and maybe he
was getting his due after such a tough ride,
but Bashar has been a very unpretentious
leader, even self-deprecating. Despite be-
ing surrounded by very dangerous circum-
stances, he never seemed to take himself
too seriously. Indeed, one time I asked him
to talk about his greatest accomplishments
to date, and he responded that perhaps we
should spend more time on his biggest
failures. He is not a commanding figure at
first glance. Soft-spoken, gregarious, with
a child-like laugh, he does not fit the typi-
cal profile of a dictator. However, for this
very reason, he commands attention, be-
cause you know what lies beneath him in
the pyramidal Syrian political and military
structure. That he has reached that pinnacle
and remained there despite his unassuming
nature is almost counterintuitive.
The election of 2007 generated
tremendous mass support for Bashar.
Mingling among the throng around Um-
ayyad Square in Damascus for two days,
I could sense that a good portion of this
affection was genuine. Certainly much
was pre-arranged, as in Syria when one
group, whether it be a ministry or a private
corporation, starts to organize celebratory
events, others get onboard very quickly,
creating an avalanche of support. But this
time it was bolstered by strong pro-Bashar
sentiments in the country. He had finally
been able to tap into an aquifer of support
he had built up, and he experienced it in
grand style. It seemed to be a cathartic
moment for him after the difficulties of the
previous two years. He seemed genuinely
touched by the celebrations and parades in
his honor. More important, he got the mes-
sage: his people were behind him.
This was the case even though he ran
unopposed in a referendum. Visiting a poll-

ing location, I observed that each “voter”
had to check the “yes” or “no” box in pub-
lic amid a band playing and people singing
pro-Bashar tunes. It would be an intrepid
voter who would check “no,” especially
with security personnel no doubt watching
closely. The Bashar posters draped over
almost every standing structure and out of
every window and the “I love Bashar” (in
English and Arabic) pins, pendants and
billboards belied his eschewing of such
cultish popular behavior to date. Bashar
understood that the 97 percent vote to re-
elect him was not an accurate barometer
of his real standing in the country. He said
it was more important to look at turnout
rates for voters, as those who did not vote
were more than likely to have voted “no.”
According to Syrian estimates, the voter
turnout rate was 75 percent, still a very
favorable response for Bashar.
This is the first time I felt that Bashar
began to believe the sycophants, that to
lead the country was his destiny. Maybe it
is, but his view of the office had certainly
evolved since the early years of his rule.
In the 1950s, U.S. authorities frequently
referred to friendly dictatorships as tran-
sitional authoritarian regimes, a neces-
sary stage in the heat of the Cold War that
would “transition” to democracy with U.S.
guidance and support. Of course, more
often than not, the transitional authoritar-
ian leaders did not want to transition. They
liked the level of power they had accumu-
lated, and in many cases had become con-
vinced (or had convinced themselves) that
the well-being of the country was synony-
mous with their tenure in power. Consider-
ing that domestic and regional unrest have
somewhat abated, I wonder if Bashar has
passed the tipping point in this regard.
By late 2007, Bashar felt vindicated.
Syria was even invited to attend the An-
77
Lesch: The Evolution of Bashar al-Asad
napolis conference the Bush administration
sponsored that November, with the inten-
tion of jumpstarting the Middle East peace
process. European and Middle Eastern
diplomats were beginning to travel to Da-
mascus to meet with Bashar on a regular
basis. The wall of U.S.-imposed isolation
appeared to be crumbling.2 While not
claiming victory outright, Bashar certainly
believed that the noose had been lifted
from his neck; indeed, time was on his
side now. Syrian officials scoffed at the
popular notion that their country could be
brought in from the cold à la Libya, and
that a friendly U.S.-Syrian relationship
awaited Damascus if only it would give
up Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran, as Libyan
leader Muammar Qadhafi had renounced
weapons of mass destruction and made
amends for the 1988 Lockerbie airplane
bombing. Quite to the contrary, the Syr-
ians believe they have stayed the course,
and it has proved to be the correct one. It
was the United States that needed to be
brought back in from the cold. The 2008
presidential election, with the victory of
Democratic candidate Barrack Obama in a
resounding renunciation of the Bush presi-
dency, allowed the United States — not
Syria — an opportunity to make amends.
TAKEN SERIOUSLY
Bashar — and Syria — just wants
to be taken seriously by the international
community. In a telling exchange in July
2006 during the Hezbollah-Israeli war, I
asked the Syrian president what he thought
about President Bush’s expletive that was
inadvertently caught on tape at the G-8
summit meeting earlier in the month. In a
conversation with British Prime Minister
Tony Blair about the conflict in Lebanon,
Bush said, “Yo Blair, you see, the…thing
is, what they need to do is get Syria to get
Middle East Policy, Vol. XVII, No. 2, Summer 2010
Hezbollah to stop doing this s**t and it’s
over.” Despite the U.S. president’s mis-
reading of the influence that Syria did not
actually have over Hezbollah, Bashar’s
reaction was unexpected and interesting.
He said, “I love it. I love that he [Bush]
said that. It makes me feel great, because
at least he is thinking about Syria. He is
thinking about us.” Syria was not behind
Hezbollah’s actions, and Damascus was
lucky the Israelis knew that and decided
not to take out their wrath against Syria as
well. But the perception that Syria could
inflict a bit of damage gave it some utility,
some leverage, some more arrows in what
had been a nearly empty quiver.
As Syrian scholar Sami Moubayed
commented, however, Damascus wants to
be seen as a problem solver, not a problem
seeker. One might say that Syria sees its
ability to create problems, which it be-
lieves it had every incentive to do when
the noose was being tightened, as now
providing it with the ability to solve prob-
lems. Certainly Bashar has been consistent
with me in trying to portray his county
as a positive facilitator in the region. He
has, with a good bit of legitimacy, touted
Syria’s role in defusing crises:
● Orchestrating the 2007 Meccan agree-
ment that briefly reconciled the Palestin-
ian Authority with Hamas
● Mediating the release of British sailors
captured by Iran in the Persian Gulf later
in the year
● Helping to bring about the Doha agree-
ment, ending the mini-crisis in Lebanon
that developed in May 2008 (and, by the
way, secured veto power in the Lebanese
cabinet for pro-Syria Hezbollah and its
allies)
78
If Syria is denied this role, its util-
ity — and leverage — in the region would
be drastically reduced, so do not expect
Damascus to completely sever its ties
with Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. Quite
to the contrary, Bashar sees his country as
a conduit for the West to develop a dia-
logue with these very entities. While Syria
continues to maintain friendly relations
with them — to the great consternation of
the United States — Bashar believes that
his country cannot play the role of regional
facilitator unless it cultivates its diverse
connections. Unfortunately, his timing in
doing so, especially in early 2010, when
the Obama administration appeared to be
reaching out to Damascus, is occasionally
less than ideal. This has given the naysay-
ers in Washington more grist for the mill,
feeding their opposition to any improve-
ment in U.S.-Syrian relations.
In late 2008, when I visited with
Bashar, he certainly believed that he could
now sit back and wait to see how things
unfolded, such as the policy direction of
the new Obama administration as well as
the shape of the new Israeli government.
He felt empowered politically; 2008 was a
pretty good year for him. The Doha agree-
ment enhanced, for the time being, the Syr-
ian position in Lebanon. French President
Sarkozy welcomed Bashar to Paris on Bas-
tille Day along with other heads of state,
including Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert, signaling a significant breach of
the West’s attempt to isolate Syria and a
major victory for Bashar. Perhaps most
important of all, the Bush administration
was all but gone, following a presidential
election that brought to power someone
whose foreign-policy philosophy was a
direct repudiation of his predecessor’s.
To date, President Obama has indicated
 Lesch: The Evolution of Bashar al-Asad

in word and action that he is favorably what each of them had to say. It was very
disposed toward exploring a dialogue with impressive, and it is very effective. This
Damascus. Traditional diplomacy has seems to come naturally to him, when he
made a return. Perhaps the old rules of the allows himself to do it.
game will return as well. Syria is vulnerable to pressure, and
If Syria wants to be taken seriously, there is not much it can do about it in any
however, it can do a much better job at immediate sense. The Israelis struck a
pubic diplomacy. Bashar — and Asma suspected nuclear site in Syria in September
— is much more adept at it than his father 2007. Hezbollah’s operations mastermind,
was, but Hafiz barely engaged in it at all; Imad Mughniyeh, was assassinated in a
in fact, the elder Asad seemed to have a fashionable district of Damascus in Febru-
healthy disdain for it. As Bashar gains ary 2008 in what was a very embarrassing
confidence in incident for the
his international It is absolutely necessary from his Syrian regime.
standing, one With virtual im-
hopes he will perspective for the entire Golan punity, the United
become more Heights to the June 4, 1967, line to States staged a
comfortable with be returned to Syria. This is vital to cross-border raid
public diplomacy. in October 2008
To him it is a
his domestic legitimacy and to his to kill an alleged
matter of trust, regional clout. Iraqi insurgent.
and he remains The response
very suspicious, as does Syria as a whole, from Damascus to the latter affront: close
of the outside world. I have seen his the American cultural center and the Ameri-
public diplomacy at the domestic level can school. Not exactly earth-shattering.
improve immeasurably over the last six But Israel and the United States know
years. I was with him (and his wife) after Syria cannot do much to retaliate directly.
a special concert at the new opera house Bashar was wise to keep his eye on the ball
in Damascus in May 2007, and he did a despite these incidents, not allowing them
superb job of working the room at the re- to spiral out of control or reverse what has
ception that followed the performance, lis- been his steady emergence from the cold,
tening intently to every person with whom especially as it was clear that a more favor-
he visited. By the end of the evening, he ably disposed president was likely to come
had spoken personally with everyone. I to power in Washington. This equanimity
saw him work the balcony, so to speak, reveals what he has learned over the years
while viewing the post-election parade in and how much his vision of Syria’s foreign-
front of his very modest presidential of- policy objectives has been stamped on the
fice in the Rowda area of Damascus. He Syrian foreign-policy-making apparatus.
made eye contact with and pointed toward But Bashar is definitely not all-power-
as many of the people marching in front ful. He struggles against systemic corrup-
of him as he could, even inviting whole tion and an institutional, bureaucratic and
families from the street to spend some time cultural inertia. On many issues, he has
with him on the balcony. He spoke with to negotiate, bargain and manipulate the
each member of the family and listened to system to get things done, and I have wit-

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Middle East Policy, Vol. XVII, No. 2, Summer 2010
nessed this first hand. An array of Faustian
bargains was erected under his father, such
as unswerving loyalty in return for personal
enrichment. This has the regime sincerely
saying and wanting to do one thing while
important groups connected to or actually
in the regime are sometimes doing some-
thing quite different. There is really nothing
Bashar can do about it without undercutting
his support base, especially in a threaten-
ing regional environment when he needs
all the friends in and outside of the regime
that he can muster. He told me something
in October 2008 that provided insight
into his thinking along these lines. We
were discussing the potential of elevating
the indirect Syrian-Israeli peace negotia-
tions brokered by Turkey that had begun
earlier in the year to direct talks. He said
that he really did not want to elevate them
without more assurance of success, that he
was “new to this game” and, since it was
his “first time doing this,” that he “could
not afford to fail.” He made his decision
regarding pursuing negotiations with Israel,
and he has arrayed people around him who
agree with it. But there are elements who do
not agree, so Bashar believes he has just one
shot at this, and he had better get it right.
This is a very important reason that it
is absolutely necessary from his perspec-
tive for the entire Golan Heights to the
June 4, 1967, line to be returned to Syria.
This is vital to his domestic legitimacy,
his legacy-in-the-making compared with
that of his father (who “lost” the Golan
as minister of defense in the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war), and to his regional clout, his
ability to play the facilitator and create
some distance between Damascus and
Teheran. In a sense, inculcating the return
of the Golan into the minds of two genera-
tions of Syrians, while an obstacle to the
conclusion of an Israeli-Syrian agreement
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in the past, could actually work in favor of
peace today. It would empower the Syrian
regime —Bashar — to deliver on height-
ened domestic expectations and regional
responsibilities as the price for peace.
What the Syrians would really like to
see is a unified voice coming out of Wash-
ington regarding engagement with Syria.
Bashar has been burned in the past by
listening to certain voices in Washington
over others, and he often chose wrongly in
the early years of his rule. There is still a
good bit of leftover anti-Syrian inertia in
the Obama administration, in the Pentagon
and the intelligence communities, and in
Congress, not to even speak of the nega-
tive image of Syria among the American
people. There are also other obstacles to
an improvement in U.S.-Syrian relations:
a web of UN resolutions, a UN tribunal
on the Hariri assassination and a sanctions
regime erected by the Bush administration.
The Syrians will not fully trust anyone but
President Obama himself to offer public
declarations on improving the U.S.-Syrian
relationship. When Obama talks — or acts
— the rest of the U.S. government will line
up behind him, just as the rest of the U.S.
government lined up behind Bush’s con-
frontational policies. However, Obama’s
waffling during the last year in the face of
stiff diplomatic resistance from a hawkish
Israeli government has not generated confi-
dence in Damascus that it can count on the
U.S. president just yet.
The United States tends to paint a
picture of foreign leaders based on whether
or not they are for or against U.S. interests.
Gamal Abd al-Nasser was viewed as a pos-
sible ally and an implacable foe at different
times in the 1950s and 1960s based on his
own positioning of Egypt in the Cold War.
Saddam Hussein was America’s friend
in the 1980s and its enemy in the 1990s.
 Lesch: The Evolution of Bashar al-Asad

I don’t know if these leaders changed
as much as our perception of them did.
Bashar has evolved, but he is basically
the same person, even if he has an inflated
opinion of his role now. Being president
of a country will do that. The fact that he
was not traditionally groomed to be presi-
dent, that he gave up his avocation to serve
his country, has won him some breathing
space in Syria. The regime has milked this
as well to buy him a long learning curve,
and he has delivered enough, amid con-
stant pressure, to warrant it.
The Bush administration wasted
six years with Syria when it could have
cultivated a productive relationship with
an inexperienced and more pliable Syr-
ian president early on. The Bush legacy
to Obama is that the American president
will now have to deal with a stronger
leader, battle-tested by policies that were
meant to get rid of him. There have been
positive gestures between Damascus and
Washington since Obama came to office.
The Obama administration has begun a
diplomatic dialogue, has announced the
return of the U.S. ambassador to Syria,
and has waived some restrictions in the
Syrian Accountability Act. On the other
side, Syria has played a largely positive
role in Lebanon of late, has stepped up
security cooperation with the United States
along the Iraqi border, and seems to have
repaired its fractured relationship with
Saudi Arabia while building its friendship
with Turkey. These efforts can help offset
Iranian influence in the region. The quid
pro quos must continue to overcome the
recent legacy of mistrust on both sides.
With reference to Syria’s support for Hez-
bollah, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
commented on April 29, 2010, that Bashar
al-Asad was “making decisions that could
mean war or peace in the region.” This is
probably just the way the Syrian president
likes it. So, although we seem to be back
where we started in 2000, with another
opportunity to explore and construct a
mutually beneficial relationship with Syria,
we are actually far from where we began.

1
For this and other remarks on, observations of, or direct quotes from Bashar al-Asad, see David W. Lesch,
The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria (Yale University Press, 2005). They are also
derived from the author’s many meetings with President Bashar since the publication of the book.
2
I saw this firsthand. By 2008, it was much harder for me to see President Bashar, as his schedule was filling
up with visiting foreign dignitaries and with his own trips abroad. Between 2004 and 2008, I essentially only
had to compete with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for his
time.

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