PT & T vs. NLRC G.R. No.

118978; May 23, 1997

FACTS : Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20,
1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with Petitioner Company,
her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1,
1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondent’s services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this time
in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods. After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever
Agreement, her services were terminated. It now appears that private respondent had made the a representation that she was single
even though she contracted marriage months before, in the two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and
July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor sent to private respondent a memorandum
requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the company’s policy of not accepting married
women for employment. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992, which she readily contested
by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter handed down a decision declaring that private respondent, who had
already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. On appeal to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), said public respondent upheld the labor arbiter and it ruled that private respondent had indeed been the subject
of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her employer, PT&T.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an employee.

HELD: Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of
marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing,
according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

G.R. No. 166379 October 20, 2005

LAKPUE DRUG, INC., LA CROESUS PHARMA, INC., TROPICAL BIOLOGICAL PHILS., INC. (all known as LAKPUE
GROUP OF COMPANIES) and/or ENRIQUE CASTILLO, JR.,Petitioners, vs. MA. LOURDES BELGA, Respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner Tropical Biological Phils., Inc. (Tropical), a subsidiary of Lakpue Group of Companies, hired on March 1, 1995
respondent Ma. Lourdes Belga (Belga) as bookkeeper and subsequently promoted as assistant cashier. Belga brought
her daughter to PGH for treatment of broncho-pneumonia, Belga dropped by the house of their Technical Manager and
hand over the documents she worked on and to give notice of her emergency leave. Belga who was pregnant
experienced labor pains and gave birth the same day. On March 22, 2001, or two days after giving birth, Tropical
summoned and sent memorandum ordering her to report for work but Belga could not comply because of her situation.
When Belga attended clarificatory conference on April 4, 2001, she was informed of her dismissal effective that day.
Belga thus filed a complaint with the Public Assistance and Complaint Unit (PACU) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). Attempts to settle the case failed, hence the parties brought the case before the NLRC-NCR.
Tropical terminated Belga on the following grounds: (1) Absence without official leave for 16 days; (2) Dishonesty, for
deliberately concealing her pregnancy; (3) Insubordination, for her deliberate refusal to heed and comply with the
memoranda sent by the Personnel Department on March 21 and 30, 2001 respectively.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Belga and found that she was illegally dismissed. The termination of complainant is
hereby declared illegal. ACCORDINGLY, she should be reinstated with full backwages, which as of May 31, 2002, now
amounts to P122, 248.71. Tropical appealed to the NLRC, which reversed the findings of the labor arbiter declaring
complainant-appellee’s dismissal valid and nullifying complainant-appellee’s monetary claims.
Belga filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which found in favor of Belga.

Issue: WON Belga committed grave misconduct for failure to inform his employer.

Held:
No. Belga’s failure to formally inform Tropical of her pregnancy cannot be considered as grave misconduct directly
connected to her work as to constitute just cause for her separation. The alleged misconduct of Belga barely falls within
the situation contemplated by the law. Her absence for 16 days was justified considering that she had just delivered a
child, which can hardly be considered a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty; much less does it imply wrongful intent on the
part of Belga. Tropical harps on the alleged concealment by Belga of her pregnancy. This argument, however, begs the
question as to how one can conceal a full-term pregnancy.We agree with respondent’s position that it can hardly escape
notice how she grows bigger each day. While there may be instances where the pregnancy may be inconspicuous, it has
not been sufficiently proven by Tropical that Belga’s case is such.

The charge of disobedience for Belga’s failure to comply with the memoranda must likewise fail. Disobedience, as a just
cause for termination, must be willful or intentional. Willfulness is characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude
rendering the employee’s act inconsistent with proper subordination.

In the instant case, the memoranda were given to Belga two days after she had given birth. It was thus physically
impossible for Belga to report for work and explain her absence, as ordered. The court find that the penalty of dismissal
was too harsh in light of the circumstances obtaining in this case. While it may be true that Belga ought to have formally
informed the company of her impending maternity leave so as to give the latter sufficient time to find a temporary
replacement, her termination from employment is not commensurate to her lapse in judgment. An employee who was
illegally dismissed from work is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement
 Libres vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 123737, May 28, 1999
Bellosillo, J.
Facts:

Petitioner Carlos G. Libres, an electrical engineer, was holding a managerial position with National Steel
Corporation (NSC). He received a Notice of Investigation from Assistant VP Isidro F. Hynson Jr., his immediate
superior, requesting him to submit a written explanation relative to the charge of sexual harassment made by
Susan D. Capiral, Hynson’s secretary, allegedly committed by Libres. The notice also warned him that failure
to file his written explanation would be construed as a waiver of his right to be heard. Petitioner submitted his
written explanation denying the accusation against him and offering to submit himself for clarificatory
interrogation. Hynson conducted an internal investigation to which both parties ventilated their sides and the
report was submitted to the Management Evaluation Committee (MEC). MEC concluded that petitioners’ acts
clearly constituted sexual harassment as charged and recommended petitioners suspension for thirty (30) days
without pay.

Libres filed a complaint for illegal suspension and unjust discrimination against respondent NSC on ground that
MEC failed to grant him audience despite his offer to answer clarificatory questions, and that he was denied
due process since his request for personal was denied by MEC.

Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan however ruled that due process was properly observed and that there
was a positive finding of sexual harassment to justify petitioners suspension. Hence the present petition
wherein Libres primarily disputes the failure of the NLRC to apply RA No. 7877,in determining whether he
actually committed sexual harassment. He asserts that his acts did not fall within the definition and criteria of
sexual harassment as laid down in Sec. 3 of the law.

ISSUE: WHETHER LIBRES WAS ACCORDED DUE PROCESS

RULING: YES,Libres was accorded due process.

With respect to the issue of not applying RA 7877, the Court emphasized that said law was not yet in effect at
the time of the occurrence of the act complained of. It was still being deliberated upon in Congress when
petitioner’s case was decided by the Labor Arbiter. As a rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect unless
otherwise provided, or except in a criminal case when their application will favor the accused. Hence, the
Labor Arbiter have to rely on the MEC report and the common connotation of sexual harassment as it is
generally understood by the public. Faced with the same predicament, the NLRC had to agree with the
Labor Arbiter.

On the question of due process- Requirements were sufficiently complied with. Due process as a
constitutional precept does not always and in all situations require a trial type proceeding. Due process is
satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend
himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.

It is undeniable that petitioner was given a Notice of Investigation informing him of the charge of
sexual harassment as well as advising him to submit a written explanation regarding the matter; that he
submitted his written explanation to his superior. The VP further allowed him to air his grievance in a private
session where he was given more than adequate opportunity to explain his side and air his grievances.

Personal confrontation was not necessary. As held in Homeowners v NLRC (1996), litigants may be heard
through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments.

Petition is denied.
 Domingo vsRayala
GR No. 155831; February 18, 2008
Ponente: Nachura, J.
FACTS:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo, Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a complaint for sexual harassment
against NLRC Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala before DOLE Secretary BienvenidoLaguesma. According to
Domingo, Rayala was “[h]olding and squeezing Domingos shoulders; running his fingers across her neck and
tickling her ear; having inappropriate conversations with her; giving her money allegedly for school expenses
with a promise of future privileges; and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones”.
The complaint was then referred to the Office of the President (OP), Rayala being a presidential appointee.
The OP ordered Sec. Laguesma to create a committee to investigate the allegations in the complaint.
Thereafter, Sec. Laguesma issued an administrative order creating a Committee on Decorum and Investigation
in accordance with Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995. The Committee found
Rayala guilty as charged and recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under the
administrative order, which it erroneously stated as suspension for six (6) months (the correct penalty being
6months and 1 day). Upon receipt of the decision of the Committee, the OP ordered instead the dismissal of
Rayala from service.
Thus, Rayala appealed. The Court of Appeals likewise found him guilty of sexual harassment and imposed the
penalty of dismissal for violation of RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees. Rayala filed a motion for reconsideration. The CA modified the penalty to suspension from
service for a maximum of one year.
Hence this petition separately filed by Rayala and Domingo. Rayala insists that acts do not constitute sexual
harassment, because Domingo did not allege in her complaint that there was a demand, request, or
requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her continued employment or for her promotion to a higher
position.
ISSUE: WoNRayala is guilty of sexual harassment.
HELD:YES.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions
of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed
independently of the others. This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.
The CA correctly ruled that Rayala’s culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA
7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of sexual harassment.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be
administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or requirement of a sexual
favor." But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a
categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender.
That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the
common factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo reported the matter
to an officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit.
DR. RICO S. JACUTIN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VITUG, J.:

Facts:
Sometime on or about 01 December 1995, in Cagayan de Oro City the accused, a publicofficer, being then the
City Health Office, in relation to his official functions and takingadvantage of his position, demand, solicit,
request sexual favors from Ms. Juliet Q. Yee, a young22 year-old woman, single and fresh graduate in Bachelor
of Science in Nursing who wasseeking employment in the office of the accused.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of sexual harassment in view of the
inapplicability of Republic Act No. 7877.

Held:
No. While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel, itshould stand to reason,
nevertheless, that a recommendation from petitioner in the appointmentof personnel in the municipal health
office could carry good weight. Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words and
actions, an impression that he could facilitateJuliet’s employment. Indeed, petitioner would not have been able
to take undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City Health Office of
Cagayan deOro City.WHEREFORE, the accused is guilty.