skepticism is particularly important since such claims are, after all, about

what otrght to be done. More than anything else, though, one comes to un-
derstand that o t b e r s - d e r ~ o n n b s t r a apersons-hold different, equally
unprovable first principles, depending upon what they value most highly at
the time. For a commitment to some Moral Truth, even one allegedfy "'valid
for everyone," is a persondl cboiice made for one's s o w reasons. Even in em-
bracing principles assumed to be self-evident o r self-justifying, one must
recognize that people often have good reasms for vatuing different things.
Again, just consider the conflicting assumptions entailed by Kantiarr and
utilitarian ethics. The paradox, generally stated, is that conflicting conclu-
sions about the same moral problem can both be right, as long as they are
reasonably guided by different moral assumptions.1"
Yet this paradox is not so much of a threat to universal Moral Truth if
PEI is proderiy understood. To the contrary, the fact that the foundation of
ethics is unprovable is a central theorelical advanlagc, for this uxlprvvability
is precisely what provides the catalyst for further moral thought. In accept-
ing that its various foundational principles are indeterminate, universal
ethics can continue to be and challenged, even by those who be-
lieve in it. (Such questioning can be done either generally or with a specific
system of universal ethics in mind.) In other words, acknowledging that a
belief in Moral Truth is an article of faith should vitiate the dogmatism often
exhibited by those who think they have complete and final knowledge of
morality. In thinking that one has arrived at Moral Truth, one often stops
asking the most pivotal ct-hical quwtions (e.g., Am X really right?). In believ-
ing that evaluating one's own first principles is no longer necessary, one's
moral thinking stops. PE1 has given us sufficient reason to be sure that
moral reevaluation is necessary; since moral incuirions often change, In turn,
we have reason t o question the universality of our moral claims. If nothing
else, we must admit that there is no proof that they are rationally justified.
The central issue, then, is that understanding PEI entails understanding
the role of intrzition and self-)ustification in ethics as well as the role that
confrontation plays in stimulating further moral thought. And now with a
s p e m of communication &at literally spans the globe, it should come as
no surprise that comparative ethics is steadily on the rise. Indeed, what a
fine way for ethics to thrive in this evcr-changing, diverse world. But what
about ail the individuals who must choosc in the face of a moral dilemma or
confrontation? Ours is a personal choice as much about how to be moral as
why, if we are really thinking morally. Only then can we act on what we
think is ultt'matrly right-paradoxicalh with the knowledge that conflict-
ing moral choices may be equally reasonable and with the faith that our
choice is the right one.