Curr Psychol (2008) 27:177–191

DOI 10.1007/s12144-008-9033-y

The Relations of Cognitive Triad, Dysfunctional

Attitudes, Automatic Thoughts, and Irrational
Beliefs with Test Anxiety

Shyh Shin Wong

Published online: 5 August 2008

# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2008

Abstract Previous research has highlighted the important role of cognition in

anxiety, including test anxiety. The present study explores the role of cognitive
distortions and irrationality in test anxiety by studying the relationships among
cognitive triad (core beliefs), dysfunctional attitudes (intermediate beliefs), negative
automatic thoughts, irrational beliefs, debilitating test anxiety, and facilitating test
anxiety in 138 undergraduates. Multiple regression analyses showed that only the
cognitive triad as a whole was a significant predictor of debilitating anxiety.
Specifically, negative view of self was a significant predictor of debilitating anxiety.
The results supported an expansion of the current cognitive conceptualizations of
test anxiety to include the importance of negative self-view. Other implications are
also discussed.

Keywords Debilitating test anxiety . Facilitating test anxiety . Cognitive triad .

Dysfunctional attitudes . Automatic thoughts . Irrational beliefs

The study of test anxiety provides important practical and theoretical implications
(Anderson and Sauser 1995). Test anxiety has been reported to be widespread with
considerable loss to society (Gonzalez 1995). In general, many researchers found a
significant small to moderate relationship between test anxiety and impaired academic
performance (Chapell et al. 2005; Covington and Omelich 1987; Hembree 1988;
Hunsley 1985, 1987; Schwarzer 1990; Seipp 1991; Spielberger 1966; Zeidner 1998).
Some researchers (for example, Klein et al. 1968; Lawrence 1962; Mandler and
Sarason 1952; Paul and Eriksen 1964) and reviewers (for example, Anastasi 1976;
Anderson and Sauser 1995; Sapp 1993) proposed that a nonlinear or curvilinear
representation of the relationship offers a better explanation of the research findings.
Zeidner (1998) further suggested that the curvilinear relationship between anxiety

S. S. Wong (*)
Psychological Studies Academic Group, National Institute of Education,
Nanyang Technological University, 1 Nanyang Walk, Singapore 637616, Singapore
e-mail: shyhshin.wong@nie.edu.sg
178 Curr Psychol (2008) 27:177–191

and test performance could be underreported in test anxiety research due to the
research design or the statistical techniques employed to analyze the data collected.
A curvilinear anxiety–performance relationship means that individuals who are
usually low anxious benefit from test conditions that arouse some anxiety, while
those who are customarily high anxious perform better under more relaxed
conditions. This explanation is related to the Yerkes and Dodson’s (1908)
Inverted-U Hypothesis of the relationship between arousal level and performance,
which predicts that performance effectiveness will increase as arousal increases – up
to some optimal point – whereupon further increases in arousal will produce a
decrement in performance (Sonstroem 1984). In their classic study, Yerkes and
Dodson (1908) demonstrated that moderate levels of arousal could lead to optimal
performance on certain tasks; nevertheless, performance can deteriorate when
arousal is too high or low. In the case of test anxiety, a similar pattern can be noted,
that is, heightened levels of test anxiety can improve performance on simple tasks. In
contrast, as tasks increase in complexity, heightened levels of test anxiety can serve
as a distraction from the task at hand. In other words, when test anxiety is aroused in
an examination, it can either facilitate test performance or debilitate test
performance.
Alpert and Haber (1960) attempted to measure these two dimensions of
facilitating and debilitating anxiety using Achievement Anxiety Test (AAT) separate
scales for facilitating anxiety (for example, “Nervousness while taking a test helps
me do better.”) and debilitating anxiety (for example, “Nervousness while taking an
exam or test hinders me from doing well.”). They have demonstrated that these
specific facilitating anxiety and debilitating anxiety scales are better predictors of
academic performance than general anxiety scales. Walsh et al. (1968), using the
Achievement Anxiety Test also obtained a positive relation for facilitating anxiety
and a negative relation for debilitating anxiety with academic achievement. In a
major review of the test anxiety literature, Zeidner (1998) also found research
evidence showing that while students with high debilitating anxiety at various grade
levels performed poorly in their studies, those with high facilitative anxiety
performed relatively well. Clearly, test anxiety can have positive as well as negative
effects on academic performance.

Cognitive Components and Models of Test Anxiety

Test anxiety has been well established as a multidimensional construct, involving

cognitive, emotional, behavioral, and physiological components (Chapell et al. 2005;
Nasser et al. 1997; Sarason 1984; Tryon 1980; Wine 1982; Zeidner 1998). Previous
research has found that the cognitive components of the test anxiety could explain
the relationship between test anxiety and impaired academic performance. In an
interesting study showing the important role of cognition in test anxiety, Hollandsworth
et al. (1978) monitored the subjects’ physiological reactions during testing. As
expected, they found that high-test-anxious subjects engaged in more task-irrelevant
thinking and negative rumination than low-anxious subjects. Surprisingly, the low-
anxious subjects showed more physiological arousal than the high-anxious subjects,
but they described their anxiety on the Alpert and Haber (1960) Achievement
Curr Psychol (2008) 27:177–191 179

Anxiety Test as facilitative rather than debilitative. Thus, it did not appear to be the
level of arousal per se that had a critical debilitating impact on test performance but
what the subjects said to themselves about the arousal they experienced. This
importance of cognition is further showed in the early intervention studies. The early
studies which tended to employ behavioral techniques such as systematic
desensitization and/or implosion were not found to be successful in changing the
Facilitating Scale of the AAT, and were only able to change the Debilitating Scale of
the AAT four out of seven times in the intervention studies reviewed (Tryon 1980).
One of the cognitive components that has been consistently found to be
negatively related to academic performance is worry (cognitive concern about the
outcome of an event) (Deffenbacher 1977; Doctor and Altman 1969; Morris and
Liebert 1969, 1970; Smith and Morris 1976; Wine 1971; Zeidner 1998). In contrast,
little or no relation has been found between emotionality (automatic arousal) and
academic performance (Morris and Liebert 1969, 1970; Wine 1971; Zeidner 1998).
Wine’s (1971) provided an attentional interpretation of the worry component of
test anxiety. She suggested the test-anxious person worries during examinations, and
worry is an attentionally demanding cognitive activity. Worry is also more
debilitating to task performance than is autonomic arousal. This is known as the
cognitive-attentional model (Zeidner 1998). Tobias (1985) also suggested that test
anxiety debilitate performance by reducing the cognitive capacity for task solution.
The high test-anxious person attends to both self-relevant and task-relevant
variables. The low test-anxious person attends mostly to task-relevant variables.
Sarason (1984) further elaborated on the cognitive-attentional model with the
cognitive-interference model, which suggests that this allocation of attention
between the self and task in high test-anxious person may be due to interfering
cognitive responses that rises when the high test-anxious person is confronted with
difficult or challenging tasks (Sarason 1987).

The Present Study

As seen from the literature on test anxiety, cognition plays an important role in the
understanding of test anxiety (Tryon 1980; Wine 1971, 1980). Besides the cognitive-
attentional and cognitive-interference explanations, other cognitive processes and
structures, such as interpretative bias (cognitive distortion) of schemas and irrational
thought patterns or belief systems have been proposed as other possible cognitive
influences on test anxiety (Zeidner 1998). Aaron Beck’s constructs of core belief,
intermediate belief, and automatic thought, and Albert Ellis’ construct of irrational
belief represent some of interpretative bias and irrationality that have been studied in
the general anxiety and depression literature, which will be examined in the present
study of text anxiety.
Beck’s three cognitive constructs of core belief, intermediate belief, and automatic
thought are hierarchically related. According to Beck’s cognitive model of
psychopathology, cognitive distortions or errors can occur in the cognitive content
of core belief, intermediate belief, and automatic thought, which are thought to be
erroneous assumptions individuals made in association with different forms of
psychopathology. Beliefs are thought to reflect the content of relatively stable
180 Curr Psychol (2008) 27:177–191

cognitive schemas (Beck et al. 1991). A schema is an underlying cognitive structure

for screening, coding, and evaluating incoming stimuli, or for organizing,
categorizing and interpreting experiences in a meaningful way, so as to orient
oneself in relation to time and space, and shape expectancies and predictions (Beck
1967; Beck et al. 1991). Schemas may account for the repetitive themes in free
associations, images, and dreams, and provide the interpretations of events (Beck
1995). And frequently these interpretations are inaccurate, thus leading to biases.
These biases at the core belief level are also reflected in the cognitive distortions or
errors in dysfunctional attitudes or intermediate beliefs level (Beck 1995) and then at
the negative automatic thoughts level. The “cognitive triad” (Beck et al. 1979) is a
specific set of three schemas or core beliefs that consists of negative view of self (for
example, “I am a useless person.”), negative view of world (for example, “This is a
cruel world.”), and negative view of future (for example, “There is no future for
me.”). Intermediate beliefs (for example, “This test is far too difficult for me. I am
not going to pass it.”) represent the erroneous cognitive process of misinterpreting or
distorting the actual meaning of external stimuli or events (Beck 1976). Negative
automatic thoughts (for example, “I wish I were somewhere else.”) are distorted
thoughts that arise involuntarily in the stream of consciousness as the end products
of both distorted core beliefs and intermediate beliefs (Beck 1976). And these
distorted core beliefs, intermediate beliefs, and automatic beliefs are hypothesized to
be associated with emotional problems such as anxiety and depression (Beck et al.
1985, 1979).
Irrational beliefs are those unreasonable evaluative and inferential beliefs, which
are developed not via logic or reason (for example, “One must be perfectly
competent, adequate, and achieving to consider oneself worthwhile.”) that produce
emotional and behavioral problems. Ellis (1991) hypothesized that our belief
systems will determine the emotional consequences of activating events; irrational
beliefs will lead to negative emotional consequences, whereas rational beliefs will
lead to neutral or positive emotional consequences.
The purpose of this study is threefold. First, it is to examine the relations between
the above mentioned cognitive constructs (that is, cognitive triad, dysfunctional
attitudes, automatic thoughts, and irrational beliefs) and test anxiety. These four
cognitive constructs have been hypothesized to play an important role in the
development, maintenance, and treatment of various emotional problems, including
anxiety and depression (Beck 1976; Beck et al. 1985, 1979; Ellis 1991).
Conceptually, they may shed further light of the role of interpretative bias (cognitive
distortion) and irrationality of beliefs and thoughts in contributing to test anxiety.
According to Sapp (1993), individuals high in evaluation anxiety tend to react to
evaluation cues with habitual over-learned irrational and debilitating cognitions.
Hence, we would expect that Ellis’s irrational beliefs, Beck’s dysfunctional attitudes
and negative automatic thoughts to be related to debilitating test anxiety (Hypothesis
1a). Moreover, individuals with high levels of evaluation anxiety tend to report
negative self-descriptions of themselves on paper-and-pencil personality measures.
Conversely, individuals low in evaluation anxiety tend to react to performance
evaluation with task focused cognitions or cognitions conducive to understanding
the situation. Mueller and Thompson (1984) also found that high test-anxious
individuals showed a negative bias in their self-concept in accepting more negative
Curr Psychol (2008) 27:177–191 181

adjectives as self-descriptive. Wine (1971) also concluded from her review of I. G.

Sarason’s early experimental studies (Sarason and Ganzer 1962, 1963; Sarason and
Koenig 1965) that high test-anxious individuals generally describe themselves in
more negative terms than do low test-anxious individuals. Hence, we would also
expect Beck’s cognitive triad to be related to debilitating test anxiety (Hypothesis
1b).
Second, this study would try to provide some answers to the question of whether
the cognitive variables studied are predictive of facilitating test anxiety versus
debilitating test anxiety. Since previous studies on test anxiety tend to find consistent
relationship between worry cognition and debilitative effects of test anxiety, it is
expected that the current results will also reflect this bias. Hence, it is expected that
the cognitive variables as a whole will be able to explain more variance in
debilitating test anxiety compared to that of facilitating test anxiety (Hypothesis 2a).
Besides expecting that the cognitive variables as a whole will be able to explain
more variance in debilitating test anxiety compared to that of facilitating test anxiety,
it is also expected that the cognitive triad is able to explain the more variance
compared to intermediate beliefs, irrational beliefs, or automatic thoughts. Cognitive
triad being a type of core belief tends to be more influential across context and time,
compared to intermediate beliefs, irrational beliefs, or automatic thoughts, which
tend to be relatively more situational in their effects on human behaviors. Since the
negative effects of test anxiety tend to be localized in the testing situation and
context, it is hypothesized that cognitive triad may account for more variance in
debilitating anxiety scores than the other cognitive variables (Hypothesis 2b).
The third purpose of the present study is to explore the relations among cognitive
triad, dysfunctional attitudes, automatic thoughts, and irrational beliefs. Theoretically
and empirically, it is expected that there will be some significant associations among
the first three cognitive constructs (Beck and Perkins 2001) (Hypothesis 3a). It
would also be useful to examine the relationships among the cognitive constructs
proposed by Beck versus Ellis, so as to compare these constructs that are derived
from different theoretical orientations. In terms of cognitive structure, both Beck’s
intermediate beliefs and Ellis’ irrational beliefs shared a similar “if-then” or
“conditional” structure. Hence, it is hypothesized that among Beck’s three
constructs, Ellis’ irrational beliefs are most closely related to Beck’s intermediate
beliefs (Hypothesis 3b). In terms of differences, Beck emphasized the role of
cognitive distortions, while Ellis emphasized the importance of irrationality for the
development of unhealthy beliefs. Ellis also saw his approach as more philosophical,
humanistic, and constructivist than that of Beck (Ellis 1993). Since Beck and Ellis
differ in terms of their theoretical orientation, it is expected that irrational beliefs be
to relate lesser with Beck’s core belief and automatic thought (Hypothesis 5).
To date, very few studies have studied irrational belief, cognitive triad,
intermediate belief, and automatic thought, in association with test anxiety. Tobacyk
and Downs (1986) found that Irrational Belief Questionnaire scores significantly
predicted increases in State Anxiety Inventory from Time 1 to Time 2 prior to
examination (R2 =7.2, p<.02). Tryon (1980) reviewed ten treatment studies of test
anxiety employing different types of cognitive treatment. The findings showed that
when compared to no-treatment controls, two studies that used cognitive therapy
showed a significant reduction in self-reported anxiety while two studies that used
182 Curr Psychol (2008) 27:177–191

cognitive therapy showed a significant improvement in academic performance and

other performance measures. Unfortunately, Ellis’ Rational Behavior Therapy was
not significantly different from no-treatment condition in terms of reduction in self-
reported anxiety.

Method

Participants

Participants were 40 (28.9%) male and 98 (71.01%) female University under-

graduates who volunteered to participate in this study for extra credit. The average
age of these participants was 24.76 years and ranged from 18 to 56 years. Racial
composition consists of the following: Asians (84; 60.87%), Caucasians (20;
14.50%), Mixed Asians (5; 3.62%), Asian-Caucasians (9; 6.52%), Pacific Islanders
(9; 7.97%), and Others (11; 7.97%). This racial diversity is typical of the population
in the State of Hawaii where the university is located.

Measures

Achievement Anxiety Test The Achievement Anxiety Test (AAT) was developed to
measure anxiety about academic achievement using nineteen items (Alpert and
Haber 1960). The AAT consists of two separate scales, a “facilitating anxiety scale”
(FS) which assesses anxiety as a motivator for performance, and a “debilitating
anxiety scale” (DS) which assesses the degree to which anxiety interferes with
performance. Each item has a different response category, although all are on five-
point scales. The AAT has 10-week test–retest correlations of .83 for the facilitating
scale and .87 for the debilitating anxiety scale, and eight-month test–retest
correlations of .75 for the facilitating anxiety scale and .76 for the debilitating
anxiety scale (Alpert and Haber 1960). Both facilitating and debilitating anxiety
scores are correlated with verbal aptitude. The AAT also has good predictive validity,
significantly predicting grade point averages (Alpert and Haber 1960).

Cognitive Triad Inventory The Cognitive Triad Inventory (CTI) measures cognitive
triad, a group of negative schemata of self, world, and future (Beckham et al. 1986).
The CTI consists of three subscales: negative view of self, negative view of world,
and negative view of future. All items on the CTI are scored on a seven-point Likert
scale format (One = Totally agree, Two = Mostly agree, Three = Slightly agree, Four =
Neutral, Five = Slightly disagree, Six = Mostly disagree, Seven = Totally disagree).
The CTI has excellent internal consistency, with Cronbach alphas of .91 for view
of self, .81 for view of world, and .93 for view of future. The Cronbach alpha for the
total scale was .95 (Beckham et al. 1986). The CTI concurrent validity was
demonstrated by significant correlation of .77 with the Beck Depression Inventory.
All subscales of CTI correlated significantly with external raters’ ratings of those
three subscales, and the view of self subscale correlate significantly (r=.90) with a
measure of self-esteem, while the view of future subscale correlated significantly
(r=.90) with a measure of hopelessness.
Curr Psychol (2008) 27:177–191 183

Dysfunctional Attitude Scale The Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS) measures

cognitive distortions in seven value systems of approval, love, achievement,
perfectionism, entitlement, omnipotence, and autonomy (Weissman 1980). All items
on the DAS are scored on a seven point Likert scale format (One = Totally agree,
Two = Agree very much, Three = Agree slightly, Four = Neutral, Five = Disagree
slightly, Six = Disagree very much, Seven = Totally disagree. The DAS has very
good internal consistency, with Cronbach alphas ranging from .84 to .92. The DAS
also has good stability, with test–retest correlations over 8 weeks of .80 to .84
(Weissman 1980). The concurrent validity of DAS was demonstrated by its
significant correlations with measures of such as Beck Depression Inventory and
Profile Mood States (Weissman 1980).

Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ)

was designed to measure the frequency of automatic negative statements in four
domains captured by the four subscales: Personal Maladjustment and Desire for
Change (PMDC), Negative Self-Concepts and Negative Expectations (NSNE), Low
Self-Esteem (LSE), and Helplessness (H) (Hollon and Kendall 1980). All items on
the ATQ are scored on a five-point Likert scale format (One = Not at all, Two =
Sometimes, Three = Moderately often, Four = Often, Five = All the time). The ATQ
has excellent internal consistency with an alpha coefficient of .97 (Hollon and
Kendall 1980). The ATQ has good concurrent validity for depression, correlating
with two measures of depression, the Beck Depression Inventory and the MMPI
Depression Scale. The ATQ’s scores were also highly correlated with anxiety
(Hollon and Kendall 1980).

Irrational Values Scale Irrational Values Scale (IVS) measures endorsement of

irrational values/beliefs based on the theory of Albert Ellis (MacDonald and Games
1972). All nine items on the IVS are scored on a nine-point Likert scale (One =
Completely disagree to Nine = Completely agree). The internal consistency of the
IVS is fair, with Cronbach alphas of .73 and .79 (MacDonald and Games 1972).
Concurrent validity was demonstrated by significant correlations with the California
Personality Inventory, Eysenck Neuroticism Scale, Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale,
and the MacDonald–Tseng Internal–External Locus of Control Scale. The IVS also
was not correlated with the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale, suggesting
that the scale may be free from social desirability response set.

Procedure

The participants were recruited from undergraduate psychology classes. The students
were told that participation in the study was voluntary and they may withdraw from
the study at anytime they want. They were also told that they would be given two
extra credits if they participated in the study. Interested participants were asked to
read and sign an informed consent form before filling in the questionnaire packet.
The questionnaire packet consisted of the Cognitive Triad Inventory (CTI),
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS), Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ),
Irrational Values Scale (IVS), and a section on demographic information.
184 Curr Psychol (2008) 27:177–191

Results

Descriptive statistics for the one dependent variable (AAT) and four independent
variables (CTI, DAS, ATQ, & IVS) are shown in Table 1. The reliabilities of the
measures used in this study, including those of the subscales were evaluated using the
internal consistency of the items. The Cronbach coefficient alphas for standardized
variables are showed in Table 1. The standardized coefficient alphas ranged from .714
to .952. The scales are considered to have high internal consistency, not much different
from those coefficients obtained in previous studies. The standardized coefficient
alphas for Low Self Esteem (LSE) subscale and Hopelessness (H) subscale were not
calculated because both subscales only have two items each.
Significant bivariate correlation coefficients were obtained between facilitating
anxiety scores and debilitating anxiety scores (r=−.63, p<.001). The direction of the
correlation coefficient is the same as the one obtained in Alpert and Haber (1960; r=
−.48, p<.01). The bivariate correlation coefficients between the cognitive variables
and Facilitating Anxiety Scale, and between the cognitive variables and the
Debilitating Anxiety Scale, are reported in Table 2. As shown in Table 2, there are
more significant bivariate correlation coefficients between the cognitive variables
and debilitating anxiety scale than between the cognitive variables and facilitating
anxiety scale. Bivariate correlation coefficients between the total scores of each of
the four cognitive scales (measuring cognitive triad, automatic thoughts, dysfunc-
tional attitudes, and irrational values, respectively) and Facilitating Anxiety Scale are
as follows: (a) CTI & FS: r=−.26, p<.01; (b) DAS & FS: r=−.07, ns; (c) ATQ &
FS: r=−.15, ns; and (d) IVS & FS: r=−.08, ns. In sum, only one out of four bivariate
relationships is statistically significant. In contrast, bivariate correlation coefficients
between the total scores of each of the four cognitive scales (measuring cognitive
triad, automatic thoughts, dysfunctional attitudes, and irrational values, respectively)
and Debilitating Anxiety Scale are as follows: (a) CTI & DS: r=.41, p<.001; (b)
DAS & DS: r=.29, p<.001; (c) ATQ & DS: r=.41, p<.001; and (d) IVS & DS: r=.23,
p<.01. In sum, all four out of the four bivariate relationships are statistically
significant.

Table 1 Descriptive statistics and Cronbach coefficient alphas for AAT, CTI, ATQ, DAS, & IVS

Measure Sample, n M SD Coefficient alpha

FS 135 28.42 5.12 .71

DS 137 31.30 6.42 .82
CTI 135 67.67 19.11 .93
Selfview 137 70.07 7.26 .82
Worldview 135 65.77 7.41 .80
Futureview 137 60.04 7.15 .90
DAS 137 113.91 26.38 .906
ATQ 137 48.56 15.77 .95
PMDC 138 10.27 4.05 .83
NSNE 138 10.35 3.56 .87
LSE 138 2.34 .84 –
H 138 2.76 1.06 –
IVS 137 30.41 11.39 .82
Curr Psychol (2008) 27:177–191 185

Table 2 Bivariate correlation coefficients between the cognitive variables and facilitating scale and
debilitating scale

Measure Facilitating scale Debilitating scale

CTI −.26** .41*

Selfview −.26** .40*
Worldview −.20*** .38*
Futureview −.22*** .32*
DAS −.067 .29*
ATQ −.15 .41*
PMDC −.21*** .42*
NSNE −.13 .38*
LSE −.13 .19***
H −.16 .29*
IVS −.076 .23**

*p<.001; **p<.01; ***p<.05

Bivariate correlations among the cognitive variables are shown in Table 3. Scores on
the CTI, DAS, ATQ, and IVS are significantly correlated with the scores of each other.
Both age and gender account for only 3.81% of the variance in facilitating test
anxiety [R=.195, F(2, 131)=2.59, ns]. And age and gender account for only 4.75%
of the variance in debilitating test anxiety [R=.218, F(2, 131)=3.27, p<.05].
Multiple standard regression analyses were conducted separately for facilitating test
anxiety and debilitating test anxiety as dependent variables. First, regressing CTI,
ATQ, DAS, and IVS scores on FS scores account for only 7.33% of the variance in
facilitating test anxiety [R=.27, F(4, 123)=2.43, ns]. Second, regressing CTI, ATQ,
DAS, and IVS scores on DS scores accounts for 20.84% of the variance in
debilitating test anxiety [R=.457, F(4, 123)=8.10, p<.0001]. Comparing the four
standardized beta weights, only the beta for CTI is statistically significant (β=.23
p<.05). CTI’s three subscales (negative view of self, negative view of world and
negative view of future) scores were also regressed on debilitating test anxiety. This
accounts for 20.84% of the variance in debilitating test anxiety [R=.457, F(3, 130)=
11.41, p<.0001]. Comparing the standardized beta weights for the three subscales,
only the beta for negative view of self is statistically significant (β=.26 p<.05).
Finally, even though all the predictors are significantly correlated with each other,
multicollinearity was not a serious problem since the tolerance values are all above
the recommended .10 value (Cohen et al. 2003).

Table 3 Bivariate correlation coefficients among the cognitive variables

Measure 1 2 3 4

1. CTI – .53* .68* .32*

2. DAS – .56* .50*
3. ATQ – .32*
4. IVS –

* p<.001
186 Curr Psychol (2008) 27:177–191

Discussion

This study explores the role of cognitive distortions and irrationality in test anxiety
by studying the relationships among cognitive triad (core beliefs), dysfunctional
attitudes (intermediate beliefs), negative automatic thoughts, irrational beliefs,
debilitating test anxiety, and facilitating test anxiety. The findings of this study
provide a number of implications. First, as expected, all four cognitive variables
were significantly correlated with debilitating test anxiety (Hypothesis 1a, b). This
means that debilitating test anxiety is related to various types of cognitive problems
such as dysfunctional attitudes, negative automatic thoughts, irrational beliefs, and
cognitive triads.
Second, as expected, the four cognitive variables as a set accounted for more than
twice as much variance in debilitating test anxiety than in facilitating test anxiety
(Hypothesis 2a). The findings were not surprising since the cognitive constructs of
core belief, intermediate belief, and irrational belief were developed in clinical work
with clients who are suffering from the debilitating effects of anxiety or other
emotional problems. This finding further reinforces Wine’s (1980) suggestion that
the component common to general self-report measures of test anxiety is actually
evaluation anxiety (Sapp 1993) and the cognitive component of test anxiety (that is,
worry), may be viewed as an index of self-preoccupation or self-related thinking
(Wine 1982; Zeidner 1998).
The second implication is that among cognitive variables studied, the negative
view of self was the only cognitive predictor to account for unique variance in
debilitating test anxiety on test anxiety scores (Hypothesis 2b), even though all
cognitive predictors were significantly correlated with debilitating test anxiety in the
negative direction. This means that even though distorted and irrational cognitions
are closely related to debilitating test anxiety, negative cognitions that are self-related
are more important than the other negative cognitions in predicting to debilitating
test anxiety. People who score high on the negative view of self subscale of CTI tend
to see themselves in bad light, such as not being able to do anything well, keep
meshing things up, seeing themselves as a failure, and thinking they are imperfect,
inadequate, incompetent, useless, and worthless. This finding is consistent with what
is previously known about highly test anxious individuals. They have been found to
be negatively self-centered, self-focused, self-oriented, self-preoccupied or self-
relevant, including being self-condemning, self-critical, and self-dissatisfied
(Meichenbaum and Butler 1980; Richardson 1973; Sarason 1960, 1972; Sarason
and Stoops 1978; Tobias 1985; Wine 1971; Zeidner 1998). High test-anxious
individuals tend to a greater tendency to focus on negative self-evaluative cognitions
(Sapp 1993), negative self-descriptions (Sapp 1993), self-deprecatory preoccupa-
tions (Sarason 1980), self-deprecatory thinking (Wine 1971), self-evaluative
thinking (Wine 1971), self-derogatory worry cognitions (Sarason 1972), ruminative,
self-evaluative worry (Wine 1971), negative self related thoughts (Zeidner 1998);
and fears of negative evaluation (Hembree 1988). In fact, one of these negative
trends of self-cognitions in particular — worry — has been found to be related to
performance expectancy (Liebert and Morris 1967; Spiegler et al. 1968).
Third, the finding that self-schema is also important for debilitating anxiety could
be seen in light of the larger literature on threat schemas in both general anxiety
Curr Psychol (2008) 27:177–191 187

(Mathews and Mackintosh 1998; Mathews and MacLeod 1994) and test anxiety
(Zeidner 1998), in which anxiety are associated with increased attention to threat
cues. If Beck’s view of self could be conceptualized as a form of threat to the self-
schema, then it is not surprising that individuals of high negative self-views or self-
schemas tend to feel more debilitating test anxiety. Interestingly, Zeidner reported
that “due to their negative self schema, high-test-anxious subjects tend to be biased
in processing more self-detrimental than self-enhancing information in test situations
and thus constantly perceive ego threat” (p., 188).
Fourth, the finding that negative self-view is the only significant predictor of
debilitating test anxiety in the cognitive triad is consistent with research suggesting
that the cognitive triad is actually dominated by the negative self view. Theoretically,
Haaga et al. (1991) have proposed that Beck’s cognitive triad can be more
parsimiously conceptualized as referring to “views of the self as a whole and two
aspects of the self [i.e., the self’s world and future rather than the world and future
per se], not three completely distinct entities” (p. 218). Empirically, Mcintosh and
Fischer (2000) found evidence to support the view that the three factors in Beck’s
cognitive triad are highly correlated with a single underlying factor which represent
negative evaluations pertaining to the self – “self-relevant negative attitude”.
Fifth, this finding about the self-schema may have important clinical implication for
counselors and teachers working with students whose test performance suffer from test
anxiety. In fact, some authors (for example, Young 1990; Young et al. 2003)
advocated the development of intervention approaches based on the modification of
schema. This development in the cognitive treatment of emotional disorders provided
timely impetus to Wine’s (1980) recommendation about combining cognitive
interventions with behavioral interventions for test anxiety, since research showed
that behavioral intervention strategies tend to treat emotionality component of test
anxiety, but not the cognitive component of test anxiety. Moreover, the use of
cognitive intervention strategies were found by Meichenbaum (1972) to be able to
reduce debilitating test anxiety as well as facilitating test anxiety.
Sixth, the cognitive variables examined in this study do not play a significant role
in the facilitating effects of anxiety on test performance. The implication of this
finding is that reducing the number of negative cognitive biases does not necessarily
mean that a student can also automatically benefits from the facilitating effects of test
anxiety. This difficulty of enhancing the facilitating effects of test anxiety is further
exacerbated by the finding at facilitating test anxiety is inversely related to debilitating
test anxiety which means that individuals who scored low on the facilitating test
anxiety scale tended to score high on the debilitating test anxiety scale.
Seventh, the lack of a significant role by cognitive variables in predicting
facilitating test anxiety may also mean that the measures designed to predict
psychopathology are not necessarily useful for predicting psychological wellness
(see Lopez and Snyder 2003; Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2000). Ingram and
Wisnicki’s (1988) development of a positive equivalent of the Automatic Thoughts
Questionnaire (ATQ), named Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire-Positive (ATQ-P)
could be included in future studies.
In terms of the relationships among the cognitive variables, they are all
significantly correlated to each other as expected, which is consistent with prior
research (Beck and Perkins 2001). Moreover, a closer examination of the effect sizes
188 Curr Psychol (2008) 27:177–191

and covariance provide the seventh implication relating to the theories of Beck and
Ellis. First, as theoretically expected, the CTI shared more covariance with ATQ and
DAS respectively compared with IVS, since both the automatic thoughts and the
cognitive distortions are the “surface indicators” of the deeper underlying schemata
(Hypothesis 3a). Second, as expected, IVS shared the most covariance with DAS
(24.90%) and lesser with CTI (10.50%) (Hypothesis 3b). The finding that IVS
shared the most covariance with DAS could be due to IVS and DAS both tapping
item content that share certain characteristics, for example, some irrational beliefs
and cognitive distortions are absolutistic or all-or-none kind of thinking in nature. In
terms of cognitive structure, both Beck’s intermediate beliefs and Ellis’ irrational
beliefs are considered conditional beliefs, with a “if-then type” of cognitive
structure. Third, as expected, IVS shared the least covariance with ATQ (9.92%)
since conceptually, IVS measures beliefs while ATQ measures thoughts. Hence, this
study provides some evidence that it is not easy, but not impossible to differentiate
the related theoretical concepts in the cognitive theories of Beck versus Ellis. This
may also suggest that empirically, some of the theoretical constructs may be
measuring the same latent construct. Future studies using a larger sample size and
confirmatory factors analysis may shed more light on this issue.
Notwithstanding the implications of this study, a number of limitations need to be
taken into consideration when interpreting or generalizing the results. The first
limitation is that this study does not provide answers to the question of cause and
effect. The second limitation involves the small sample size used, which may have
reduced the power of the findings. Future research also appears necessary to determine
the stability of negative view of self as a predictor of debilitating anxiety by testing its
measure on different sample types such as those with a different ethnic composition or
a clinical sample. The third limitation is that only one test anxiety measure is used.
Multiple measures of test anxiety using the Worry-Emotionality Questionnaire, the
Inventory of Test Anxiety, or the Test Anxiety Inventory, together with the AAT could
be used in future study. The fourth limitation is that the effects of debilitating and
facilitating anxiety on academic performance are assumed based on prior research. It
would be helpful to have exact examination marks included in the analysis.
Intervention studies using cognitive intervention strategies could also be considered
as suggested by Wine (1980) to see whether modification of the negatively biased self-
schemata will result in reduction in the debilitating test anxiety. In conclusion,
consistent with previous research which found worry cognition to be an important
component of test anxiety; this study revealed that negative self-schema may also play
an important role in relation to debilitating test anxiety.

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