METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs.

CRISTOBAL (Evidence) G.R. No. 175768

Facts:

Spouses Edgardo M. Cristobal and Ma. Teresita S. Cristobal obtained a loan from petitioner Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company in the amount of P4,500,000.00. The loan was secured by two real estate
mortgages and its three amendments, which respondents executed in favor of petitioner. Respondents
failed to pay their loan, resulting in the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale of their mortgaged
properties. Petitioner emerged as the highest bidder, so a Certificate of Sale was issued in its name.
However the respondents refuse to vacate, hence the MBTC’s petition seeking a Writ of Possession over
the foreclosed properties.

RTC: Denied. Petitioner failed to consolidate the property in question. Also, petitioner did not submit
sufficient evidence from which it could base the amount of bond required in an application for a writ of
possession done within the 12 month redemption period required under Section 7 of Act 3135.

MTCB avers there is absolutely nothing in ACT 3135 which provides that consolidation of ownership over
the foreclosed property is required before a writ of possession may be issued.

CA: concur with RTC decision. The claim is premature. The record is bereft of any indication that petitioner
bank has consolidated its ownership over the subject parcels of land. In accordance with Section 7 of Act
3135, the trial court has the duty to issue a writ of possession before the lapse of the 12-month redemption
period; but this is qualified by the receipt of an ex-parte application and the posting of the required
bond. Even if the 12-month redemption period had already expired and the need for a bond already
dispensed with, possession could not yet be given to petitioner until the ownership is consolidated
and a new transfer certificate of title issued in its name. The court denied the petitioner’s MR and
advised MTBC that it is not precluded from re-filing the petition for a writ of possession in the Court a
quo especially so since it now meets the grounds for the issuance of the said writ.

Despite the advised of CA, MTCB still

Issue:

Whether or not consolidation of title is necessary before possession may be automatically given to
petitioner.

Held:

YES.

We rule that a remand of this case to the trial court is necessary for the reception of evidence to determine
if consolidation has taken place, this being a necessary requisite to the issuance of a writ of
possession. Petitioner can only demand possession after the consolidation of ownership in his name and
the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. Jurisprudence articulates that "[t]he purchaser can
demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to
him of a new transfer certificate of title. After the consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure
of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of
right. Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption
period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. In this regard, the bond
is no longer needed. The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of
ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s
name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into
the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper
application and proof of title becomes merely a ministerial function. Effectively, the court cannot exercise
its discretion. The issue of whether or not petitioner has consolidated ownership in its name is a question
of fact best left to the determination of the lower court. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to
what the law is. on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue
must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue
invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a
question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same;
rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. Here, no question of law
is involved, for it is clear that petitioner has the right to possession once it has established that ownership
has been consolidated in its name. Consolidation is essentially factual in nature, as it requires the
presentation of evidence.

REMANDED.

[G.R. No. 127997 August 7, 1998]

FELIX VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

ALMARIO GO MANUEL, respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

For the Courts resolution is the petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 39731 entitled Almario Go Manuel v. Felix Villanueva [1] dated
January 30, 1996, involving an action for sum of money.
In 1991, private respondent, Almario Go Manuel filed a civil action for sum of money
with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8 against petitioner,
Felix Villanueva and his wife Melchora. The subject matter of the action involved a check
dated June 30, 1991 in the amount of P167,600.00 issued by petitioner in favor of private
respondent. The check supposedly represented payment of loans previously obtained by
petitioner from private respondent as capital for the formers mining and fertilizer business.
The check when duly represented for payment was dishonored due to insufficiency of
funds. A demand was made upon petitioner to make good the check but he failed to do
so. Private respondent then filed a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22[2] before the Cebu City Prosecutors Office and the subject civil complaint for
sum of money. Petitioner, on the other hand, avers that his principal obligation only
amounts to P23,420.00.
On July 27, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

the plaintiff and against co-defendant Felix Villanueva, directing the latter to
pay the former P167,600.00, the dismissal of this case with respect to co-
defendant Melchora Villanueva, and finally with costs against the husband.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Apparently aggrieved, both parties appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner prayed for the reversal of the trial courts decision and contended that his
principal obligation is only P23,420.00, while private respondent sought interest of ten
percent (10%) of the principal obligation; twenty-five percent (25%) as attorneys fees, as
well as moral and exemplary damages.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the trial court
subject to the modification that petitioner was directed to additionally pay private
respondent attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the amount of ten (10%) percent
of P167,600.00, and the entire obligation to earn interest at six (6%) percent per annum
from the filing of the complaint.[4] Petitioner now comes before this Court basically alleging
the same issues raised before the Court of Appeals as follows: (a) the Court of Appeals
erred in not ruling that the five (5%) and ten (10%) percent interest imposed is not
enforceable due to absence of such stipulation in writing; (b) the Court of Appeals erred
in not finding that petitioner is only liable for the amount P23,420.00; and (c) the Court of
Appeals erred in not declaring that the Central Bank and Monetary Board has no power
or authority to repeal the usury law.[5]
The petition should be denied.
Time and again it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to
it from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly
committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As such,
this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings below.[6] The rule, however, admits of the following
exceptions: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties
and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.[7]
After a review of the case at bar, we consider petitioner to have failed to raise issues
which would constitute sufficient ground to warrant the reversal of the findings of the trial
and appellate courts.
As regards the matter of legal interest, this Court, in the case of Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[8] laid down the following guidelines:

I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-

contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held
liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVII on Damages of the Civil
Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of

money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due is that which
may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself
earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is

breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at
the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. x x x.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final
and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under
paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality
until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

Applying the foregoing rules, since the principal obligation in the amount of
P167,600.00 is a loan, the same should earn legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum
computed from the time the complaint was filed until the finality of this decision. On the
other hand, if the total obligation is not satisfied it shall further earn legal interest at the
rate of 12% per annum computed from the finality of the decision until payment thereof,
the interim period being deemed to be a forbearance of credit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV 39731 dated January 30, 1996 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the rate of legal interest to be paid is TWELVE PERCENT (12%) per annum of the
amount due computed from the time the complaint was filed until the finality of this
decision. After this decision becomes final and executory, the rate of TWELVE PERCENT
(12%) per annum shall be additionally imposed on the total obligation until payment
thereof is satisfied. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 127997 August 7, 1998]

FELIX VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

ALMARIO GO MANUEL, respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

For the Courts resolution is the petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 39731 entitled Almario Go Manuel v. Felix Villanueva [1] dated
January 30, 1996, involving an action for sum of money.
In 1991, private respondent, Almario Go Manuel filed a civil action for sum of money
with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8 against petitioner,
Felix Villanueva and his wife Melchora. The subject matter of the action involved a check
dated June 30, 1991 in the amount of P167,600.00 issued by petitioner in favor of private
respondent. The check supposedly represented payment of loans previously obtained by
petitioner from private respondent as capital for the formers mining and fertilizer business.
The check when duly represented for payment was dishonored due to insufficiency of
funds. A demand was made upon petitioner to make good the check but he failed to do
so. Private respondent then filed a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22[2] before the Cebu City Prosecutors Office and the subject civil complaint for
sum of money. Petitioner, on the other hand, avers that his principal obligation only
amounts to P23,420.00.
On July 27, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

the plaintiff and against co-defendant Felix Villanueva, directing the latter to
pay the former P167,600.00, the dismissal of this case with respect to co-
defendant Melchora Villanueva, and finally with costs against the husband.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Apparently aggrieved, both parties appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner prayed for the reversal of the trial courts decision and contended that his
principal obligation is only P23,420.00, while private respondent sought interest of ten
percent (10%) of the principal obligation; twenty-five percent (25%) as attorneys fees, as
well as moral and exemplary damages.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the trial court
subject to the modification that petitioner was directed to additionally pay private
respondent attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the amount of ten (10%) percent
of P167,600.00, and the entire obligation to earn interest at six (6%) percent per annum
from the filing of the complaint.[4] Petitioner now comes before this Court basically alleging
the same issues raised before the Court of Appeals as follows: (a) the Court of Appeals
erred in not ruling that the five (5%) and ten (10%) percent interest imposed is not
enforceable due to absence of such stipulation in writing; (b) the Court of Appeals erred
in not finding that petitioner is only liable for the amount P23,420.00; and (c) the Court of
Appeals erred in not declaring that the Central Bank and Monetary Board has no power
or authority to repeal the usury law.[5]
The petition should be denied.
Time and again it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to
it from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly
committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As such,
this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings below.[6] The rule, however, admits of the following
exceptions: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties
and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.[7]
After a review of the case at bar, we consider petitioner to have failed to raise issues
which would constitute sufficient ground to warrant the reversal of the findings of the trial
and appellate courts.
 As regards the matter of legal interest, this Court, in the case of Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[8] laid down the following guidelines:

I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-

contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held
liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVII on Damages of the Civil
Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of

money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due is that which
may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself
earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is

breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at
the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. x x x.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final
and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under
paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality
until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

Applying the foregoing rules, since the principal obligation in the amount of
P167,600.00 is a loan, the same should earn legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum
computed from the time the complaint was filed until the finality of this decision. On the
other hand, if the total obligation is not satisfied it shall further earn legal interest at the
rate of 12% per annum computed from the finality of the decision until payment thereof,
the interim period being deemed to be a forbearance of credit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV 39731 dated January 30, 1996 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the rate of legal interest to be paid is TWELVE PERCENT (12%) per annum of the
amount due computed from the time the complaint was filed until the finality of this
decision. After this decision becomes final and executory, the rate of TWELVE PERCENT
(12%) per annum shall be additionally imposed on the total obligation until payment
thereof is satisfied. No costs.
 SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 140679. January 14, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MANNY A.

DOMINGCIL, appellant.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

For the sale and delivery of one (1) kilo of marijuana to a poseur-buyer, the
appellant Manny Domingcil was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City, Branch 16, for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425 in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 12th day of August, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, not authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver mixed
dried marijuana leaves, tops and seeds in brick form, wrapped with paper placed in a
plastic bag, a prohibited drug, weighing 800 grams, to a poseur-buyer in a buy-bust
operation conducted by Police Officers of Laoag City, in violation of the aforesaid
law.[1]

Upon arraignment on August 29, 1994, the appellant, assisted by counsel,

pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. The case thereafter proceeded to
[2]

trial.

The Case for the Prosecution

On August 12, 1994, at around 11:00 a.m., Belrey Oliver, an employee of

Ferds Upholstery Shop located in Barangay 2, Laoag City, arrived at the Laoag
Police Station. He reported to Chief Investigator SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura that the
appellant went to their shop looking for a buyer of marijuana. Oliver recounted
telling the appellant that he knew of someone who was interested and ready to
buy marijuana, and instructing him to bring one (1) kilo of the substance to a
store located in front of the Divine Word College of Laoag at General Segundo
Avenue, Laoag City at around 1:30 p.m. of that same day. [3]
 Acting on the said report, SPO4 Ventura formed a team to conduct a buy-
bust operation against the appellant. He assigned SPO1 Orlando Dalusong as
the poseur-buyer, and SPO2 Marlin Ramos, SPO2 Warlito Maruquin, SPO1
Rovimanuel Balolong, SPO1 Loreto Ancheta, and SPO2 Rosemarie Agustin,
all assigned at the Investigation Section of the Laoag Police Station as back-
up. The marked buy-money consisting of one P500-bill bearing Serial No. G-
242745 was recorded in the police blotter in accordance with standard
operating procedure. [4]

Except for SPO1 Dalusong and Oliver, the rest of the team left the precinct
on board two (2) owner-type jeeps and posted themselves near the Macmac
Store, across the gate of the Divine Word College. Five minutes later, SPO1
Dalusong and Oliver arrived at General Segundo Avenue. Oliver immediately
[5]

approached the appellant, who was then standing between the Macmac Store
and a xerox center, and introduced poseur-buyer SPO1 Dalusong, who was
sporting casual clothes and slippers: Pare, daytoy tay gumatangen (Friend, this
is the buyer).At this point, the appellant who was carrying an orange plastic bag,
brought out a brick-like item wrapped in newspaper. He handed the item to
SPO1 Dalusong, who forthwith checked the same by making a small hole
through it. Convinced that the brick-like item was indeed marijuana, SPO1
Dalusong handed the P500 bill to the appellant. He thereupon scratched his
head, a signal to the back-up men that the transaction had been
consummated. Momentarily, the back-up officers, who had earlier positioned
[6]

themselves separately in different strategic locations near the poseur-buyer,

rushed to the scene and arrested the appellant. SPO1 Dalusong then handed
the orange plastic bag containing the suspected marijuana to SPO4
Ventura. SPO2 Ramos frisked the appellant and recovered the buy-money from
the latters pocket. Thereafter, the appellant was brought to the headquarters
where he was booked, and the incident was recorded in the police blotter. The
[7]

suspected marijuana was brought to and initially examined by Dr. Joseph

Adaya, an accredited physician of the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), who
certified that the item comprised of three genuine mixture of marijuana leaves
with seeds.[8]

On September 5, 1994, SPO4 Ventura sent a letter to the Commanding

Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Camp Diego Silang, San
Fernando, La Union, requesting for the examination of samples of the
suspected marijuana taken from the appellant. On September 6, 1998, SPO1
[9]

Loreto Ancheta, evidence custodian of the Laoag City, PNP, delivered the
orange plastic bag containing the suspected marijuana to the PNP provincial
crime laboratory service in Camp Juan, Laoag City. The bag, together with
SPO4 Venturas letter-request, was received by SPO3 Diosdado Mamotos. On [10]
September 8, 1994, SPO3 Mamotos forwarded the laboratory request and the
confiscated item, and were duly received by SPO4 Tampos. The latter, in turn,
[11]

handed the item to Police Superintendent Theresa Ann B. Cid, Forensic

Chemist of the Crime Laboratory Center, Region I, Camp Diego Silang,
Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union, who conducted an examination of
representative samples extracted from the suspected marijuana confiscated
from the appellant. On the basis of her examination, Superintendent Cid
[12]

issued Chemistry Report No. D-074-94 with the following findings:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED :

One (1) block of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing eight hundred grams
(800) wrapped with newspaper pages contained in an orange plastic bag.

...

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION :

To determine the presence of marijuana on the above-mentioned specimen.

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen prove

POSITIVE result to the test for marijuana, a prohibited drug.
[13]

The Case for the Appellant

The appellant interposed the twin defenses of denial and alibi. He testified
that sometime in the first week of August 1994, he and Ernesto Gamiao went
to the City of Laoag to canvass the price for the repair of the upholstery of a
passenger jeepney. On that occasion, they befriended a certain Belrey Oliver
who was an employee of the Ferds Upholstery Shop. In the course of their
conversation, Oliver asked the appellant where he came from and what his
occupation was. Upon being told that he helped in harvesting mangoes in
Cagayan, Oliver immediately offered refreshments to Gamiao and the
appellant. While taking their snacks, Oliver inquired whether they wanted to
back up the promotion of certain policemen who, in the future, might be able to
return the favor to them. When the appellant asked in what way they could
extend help, Oliver suggested that they look for somebody in Cagayan from
whom they could buy one (1) kilo of marijuana. He agreed to Olivers
suggestion. The latter handed to him the amount of P700.00 to cover the
purchase of the marijuana. The appellant immediately went to the terminal
bound for Cagayan to look for somebody from that province who could be of
help. When he could not find anyone, he decided to personally take the trip. He
then instructed Gamiao to just go home to Vintar and inform his mother that he
was going to Cagayan.
The appellant thereafter took a bus bound for Tuguegarao, Cagayan. After
three (3) days, he was able to buy one kilo of marijuana for P300.00. When he
returned to Laoag City on August 12, 1994, he went to Ferds Upholstery Shop
at 11:30 a.m. to inform Oliver that he had procured the order. After seeing the
marijuana, Oliver instructed him to take it and meet him at about 12:30 p.m. of
the same day in front of the Divine Word College where they would hand over
the marijuana to the policemen they intended to help.
At about 12:00 noon, the appellant arrived at Macmacs Store and took his
merienda. Momentarily, Oliver arrived alone on a tricycle. Oliver summoned
him and they walked southward, away from the Macmacs Store, looking for the
policemen to whom they would deliver the marijuana. They walked back
northward, at which point they encountered an owner-type jeep which suddenly
stopped. He was nonplussed when Oliver grabbed him by the neck, seized his
knapsack containing the marijuana, and pushed him inside the jeep. He was
made to sit beside the driver with another policeman, while Oliver seated
himself at the back seat with another policeman. The jeep they were riding was
followed by a patrol car. Still dazed at the sudden turn of events, he asked Oliver
four times, Why is it that this is now happening to me(?), but Oliver did not
respond. At the police station, he was immediately locked up. That afternoon,
SPO4 Ventura and SPO2 Ramos, accompanied by Oliver, brought him to the
City Fiscals Office. He was later brought to the provincial hospital where he was
subjected to a physical check-up.That was the last time he saw or heard of
Oliver.[14]

On July 9, 1999, the court a quo rendered judgment, the dispositive

[15]

portion of which reads :

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court is morally convinced beyond

reasonable doubt that the accused Manny Domingcil is GUILTY under Sec. 4 of Art.
II, RA No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. The quantity of marijuana involved is more than 750 grams; hence, in
accordance with Sec. 20, the penalty provided for in Sec. 4, shall be applied. The
accused is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties and
to pay the costs.

Hence, the present appeal.

 The appellant submits the following assignment of errors:

1. The lower Court erred in finding that the accused was not instigated in looking for
marijuana and bringing it to Laoag.

2. The lower Court erred in finding that the accused received the FIVE HUNDRED
PESO bill, despite his denial that he received the same and that his denial cannot
prevail over the positive testimony of the police officers who are presumed to be
regularly performing their official duties, there being no improper motive attributed to
them.

3. The lower Court erred in convicting the accused. [16]

The appellant contends that contrary to the collective testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses, Oliver instigated him to buy marijuana. The trial court
erred in not giving credence and probative weight to his testimony and in
considering the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution.
The appeal has no merit.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that the evaluation by the trial court of
the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal unless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. The reason
for this rule is that the trial court is in a better position to decide thereon, having
personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. After a thorough and careful review of the records of
[17]

this case, we find that the guilt of the appellant was sufficiently established by
the evidence, and the trial courts judgment is well-supported by law and
jurisprudence.
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the
proof that the sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti as evidence. In this case, the prosecution adduced proof
[18]

beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant sold one (1) kilo of marijuana to
poseur-buyer SPO1 Orlando Dalusong in the entrapment operation.
q How has the case involving drug or marijuana involving the accused brought to your
attention or to your office, for that matter?
a Our informant by the name of Belrey Oliver tipped of (sic) to us that he met Manny
Domingcil at the Upholstery Shop along Ablan Avenue and he also informed us that
he ordered P500.00 worth of marijuana.
q Who ordered from whom?
a Belrey Oliver from Manny Domingcil, sir.
q By the way, who was the chief of the Intelligence Section of Laoag City PNP, at that
time?
a SPO4 Ventura, sir.
q Was he present when the informant Belrey Oliver tipped you of (sic) about this matter?
a Yes, sir.
q And because of that information from Belrey Oliver, what did your Chief, SPO4 Ventura
do?
a SPO4 Ventura made or designed a plan purposely to conduct a buy-bust operation,
sir.
q Where will the operation take place?
a In front of Macmac Store, particularly, in front of the Divine Word College of Laoag, sir.
q And did you have any participation in that operation?
a Yes, sir, I acted as the poseur buy (sic).
q At what time was the operation scheduled to be executed?
a 1:30 P.M. of August 12, 1994, sir.
q For the said operation, what preparations, if any, did your group take?
a Our Chief of Intelligence made a plan, sir.
q What was the plan?
a To conduct the buy-bust operation, sir.
q And you said that you were to act as poseur buyer, anything was given to you in
connection with your specific participation?
a I was given the buy-bust money in the amount of P500.00, sir.
q And what will you do with that P500.00?
a The Chief of Intelligence, SPO4 Ventura directed me to reflect the serial number of the
money in the police blotter, the P500.00 to be used as marked money.
q And after the serial number was entered in the police blotter, what next did you do?
a Before we went out of the station, the team or companions of SPO4 Ventura went
ahead to the place where the transaction will take place, sir.
q And who were the companions of SPO4 Ventura who went ahead?
a Rosemarie Agustin, SPO2 Marlin Ramos and SPO4 Balolong, sir, while Oliver and
myself were the ones who went together.
q Who went ahead to the place where the sale will take place?
a The team of SPO4 Ventura, sir.
q And did you reach the place where the transaction will take place?
a Yes, sir.
q Before you started to the place where the transaction will take place in front of the
Divine Word College of Laoag, did you know then the face of Manny Domingcil?
a No, sir.
q How did you know his face then?
a Belrey Oliver, the informant, informed me that the person is Manny Domingcil.
q So, what you are saying is: when you arrived at the scene where the transaction would
take place, Manny Domingcil was already there and that Belrey Oliver pointed him
to you?
a Yes, sir.
q After that, what did you do with Belrey Oliver?
a We went near Manny Domingcil, sir.
q And after or as soon as you were near him, what happened next?
a Belrey Oliver introduced Manny Domingcil to me as the buyer, sir.
q What did Oliver say?
a Pare, daytoy tay gumatangen, (which when translated into english[sic] means): Pare,
this is the buyer.
q And so, what was the reaction of Manny Domingcil?
a Before that I asked Manny Domingcil if he has the stuff that was ordered.
q And what did he say?
a Manny Domingcil said: There is, Pare.
q By the way, who ordered the stuff from Manny Domingcil?
a Belrey Oliver, sir.
q Did you ask Oliver where he ordered that from Manny Domingcil?
a Yes, sir.
q Where?
a At the Upholstery Shop at Ablan Avenue, sir.
q That was what Oliver told you when he ordered the stuff?
a Yes, sir.
q When Manny Domingcil said: There is, pare, what transpired next, if any?
a I told him: Can I look at it and he brought out a wrapped brick-type form wrapped in a
newspaper inside an orange plastic bag.
q And after he had brought out the said thing, what did you do with it?
a I checked the contents if it is real marijuana, sir.
q You said the thing was wrapped with newspaper and you said you checked its
contents?
a Yes, sir, I opened the wrapper, by making a small hole at the side.
q And what was the result of your inspection?
a I found out that it was real marijuana, sir.
q And, so what did you do then?
a After I found out that it was marijuana I handed to Manny Domingcil the P500 peso bill,
sir.
q And as soon as you have handed the P500.00 bill, what did you do next?
a I gave the signal to my companions, sir.
q And what did your companions do when you gave the signal?
a They apprehended Manny Domingcil, sir.
q What was your signal?
a I scratched my head, sir.
q And, what was your attire at that time you bought the brick-type marijuana from Manny
Domingcil?
a Ordinary clothes, sir, wearing slippers.
q And all the time during your transaction with Manny Domingcil, where was Belrey
Oliver?
a At my side, sir.
q And during the transaction, did Belrey Oliver say anything?
a None, sir.
q And after giving your signal to your companion police officers who were nearby and
they rushed to your place where you were, what happened?
a They apprehended Manny Domingcil, sir.
q And what about the marijuana which you said Manny Domingcil sold to you?
a I handed it to SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura, sir.
q And what about the P500 peso bill, do you know what happened to it?
a SPO2 Marlin Ramos recovered the P500 peso bill from the pocket of Manny Domingcil.
q And after arresting Manny Domingcil where did your group go?
a To the police station, sir.
q Do you know if any records were made to your police station when you returned or
arrived there?
a Yes, sir.
q What for example?
 a They made a request ... we reflected in the police blotter the apprehension of Manny
Domingcil, the confiscation of the marijuana and the recovery of the marked money
in the amount of P500.00.
q Was the serial number of the P500 bill you recovered from the pocket of Manny
Domingcil recorded?
a Yes, sir.
q And do you know what happened to the stuff later on after you returned to the police
station?
a They made a request to Dr. Adaya to conduct an initial examination on the confiscated
marijuana, sir.[19]

The foregoing testimony of SPO1 Orlando Dalusong was corroborated on

material points by SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura, then Chief of the Intelligence Section
of the PNP of Laoag City who organized and conducted the operation and was
part of the buy-bust team itself. SPO4 Ventura remained steadfast and
[20]

unwavering on cross-examination despite intense grilling by the defense

counsel. [21]

Police Superintendent Theresa Ann Cid, the Forensic Chemist assigned at

the PNP Crime Laboratory Center at San Fernando, La Union, confirmed Dr. [22]

Joseph Adayas initial finding that the substance seized from the appellant was
[23]

indeed marijuana, a prohibited drug.

It was also fairly established by SPO3 Diosdado Mamotos and SPO1 [24]

Loreto Ancheta that the confiscated marijuana was the same substance
[25]

examined by the forensic chemist and later presented as evidence in court.

The testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses complement each
other, giving a complete picture of how the appellants illegal sale of the
prohibited drug transpired, and how the sale led to his apprehension in flagrante
delicto. Their testimonies establish beyond doubt that dangerous drugs were in
the possession of the appellant who had no authority to possess or sell the
same. More importantly, all the persons who obtained and received the
confiscated stuff did so in the performance of their official duties. Unless there
is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were
inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their
testimonies on the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit. [26]

The appellants bare denial of the crime charged and his barefaced claim
that he was merely instigated by Oliver into procuring the marijuana cannot
prevail over the straightforward and positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. It is incredible that the appellant, who had just met Belrey Oliver in
the course of his canvass for the upholstery of his brothers jeepney, would
readily leave his errand behind and allow a stranger to talk him into buying a
prohibited drug, a known criminal activity for which he could be prosecuted, and
if convicted, sentenced to reclusion perpetua. All this he was willing to risk, in
exchange for an empty promise of alleged future favors from another who was
also unknown to the appellant. The appellant supposedly traveled to and spent
almost three days in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, just to be able to accommodate a
newly found acquaintance, who handed the appellant the meager sum
of P700.00 for the intended purpose. The Court cannot give credence to such
a preposterous stance as advanced by the appellant and confirmed by his
supposed corroborative witness, Ernesto Gamiao.
It is axiomatic that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself
such that common experience and observation of mankind lead to the inference
of its probability under the circumstances. In criminal prosecution, the court is
always guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable and in harmony with the
usual course of human experience and not by mere conjecture or
speculation. Testimonies that do not adhere to this standard are necessarily
accorded little weight or credence. Besides, instigation, or the appellants claim
[27]

of a frame-up, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor because the same can easily be concocted and is a common standard
defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. Thus, in People vs. Bongalon, the Court held:
[28] [29]

As we have earlier stated, the appellants denial cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We are not unaware of the perception that,
in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract
information or even to harass civilians. However, like alibi, frame-up is a defense that
has been viewed by the Court with disfavor as it can easily be, concocted, hence,
commonly used as a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. We realize the disastrous consequences on the
enforcement of law and order, not to mention the well-being of society, if the courts,
solely on the basis of the policemens alleged rotten reputation, accept in every
instance this form of defense which can be so easily fabricated. It is precisely for this
reason that the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed
exists.

The failure of the prosecution to present Oliver, the police informant, does
not enfeeble the case for the prosecution. Informants are almost always never
presented in court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to
the police. Their testimony or identity may be dispensed with inasmuch as his
or her narration would be merely corroborative, especially so in this case, when
the poseur-buyer himself testified on the sale of the illegal drug. [30]
 The appellants claim that the prosecution offered in evidence a mere xerox
copy of the P500.00 buy money and did not account for its failure to adduce in
evidence the original copy thereof is not supported by the records. The records
show that the original, and not merely a xerox copy of the marked money, was
in fact offered in evidence by the prosecution. The appellant would surely have
[31]

objected if the prosecution had offered in evidence a mere xerox copy of the
bill. The appellant did not do so. The only ground for his objection to the
admission of the marked money was that it was self-serving.
Even if the xerox copy of the P500.00 bill was erroneously admitted in
evidence by the trial court, the absence of the original of the marked money is
inconsequential. The marked money used in the buy-bust operation is not
indispensable in drug cases; it is merely corroborative evidence. Moreover,
[32]

the appellant was charged not only for the sale of marijuana but also for the
delivery thereof, which is committed by the mere delivery or transfer of the
prohibited drug. The consideration for the transaction is of no moment. [33]

The law defines deliver as a persons act of knowingly passing a dangerous

drug to another with or without consideration. Considering that the appellant
[34]

was charged with the sale and the delivery of prohibited drugs, the
consummation of the crime of delivery of marijuana may be sufficiently
established even in the absence of the marked money. The erasures and
alterations in the Joint Affidavit of the policemen involved in the buy-bust
operation did not debilitate the case of the prosecution. First. The Joint Affidavit
of the policemen was not admitted in evidence for any party. Second. The
investigator who prepared the Joint Affidavit erroneously stated that the
two P500.00 bills were used by the policemen who conducted the buy-bust
operation bearing Serial Numbers AA823675 and G242745. As shown by the
prosecutions evidence the policemen used only the P500.00 bill bearing Serial
No. G242745 for the purchase of the drug. Hence, the Joint Affidavit of the
policemen had to be corrected to reflect the truth.
All told, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty is, in this
case, uncontradicted by evidence to the contrary and, therefore, stands. This is
bolstered by the fact that the prosecutions evidence fully shows and confirms
such regularity. Accordingly, there exists no cogent reason to reverse or even
modify the findings of the trial court giving credence to the evidence of the
prosecution.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, in Criminal Case No. 7079, finding the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.