NOTES IN LEGAL & JUDICIAL ETHICS

THE LAWYER’S OATH - I , ________________________, of ___________________________,

do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood
nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not
delay any man’s cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation
voluntarily without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God.

LEGAL ETHICS – Embodiment of all principles of morality and refinement that

should govern conduct of every Bar member; branch of moral science treating
of lawyer’s duties to the Court, his client, his Colleagues, and the Public.

SOURCES OF LEGAL ETHICS – Canon of Professional Ethics; Supreme Court

decisions; statutes; Constitution; Treatises and publications; Code of Professional
Responsibility; and the Rules of Court and other related laws.

PRACTICE OF LAW – Any activity in and out of court which requires application of
laws, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience (Cayetano vs.
Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, Sept. 3, 1991).

WHO ARE AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW? As a rule, any person admitted as a

member of the Bar in good and regular standing is entitled to practice of law.

SANTOS vs. ATTY. LLAMAS, AC#4749, 1/20/2000 – Supreme Court rejected

Respondent’s claim that he honestly thought that he was exempted from
payment of IBP dues being a senior citizen and being engaged only in limited
law practice (claiming that farming was his principal occupation). Rule 139-A,
Sec. 9 requires every member of the IBP to pay annual dues, non-payment of
which may warrant suspension from Attorney’s Roll. Respondent can engage in
law practice only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is
“limited”. Further, exemption from taxation of senior citizens does not include
exemption from payment of membership or association dues.

NON-LAWYERS WHO MAY PRACTICE LAW – (a) person representing himself or a

friend in the MTC (Sec. 34, Rule 138, RC; (b) in criminal proceedings before
municipal court in a locality where licensed Bar member not available (Sec. 7,
Rule 116, Rules of Court); (c) person representing himself in the RTC (Sec. 33,
Rule 138, Rules of Court); (d) persons authorized to represent the government in
a case (Sec. 133, Rule 138, Rules of Court); (e) complainant himself or union
representatives in labor cases (Labor Code); (f) law students who have
completed 3rd year law and enrolled in a recognized law school’s Supreme
Court-approved legal education program to represent indigent clients,
provided that, such appearance if before the RTC should be accompanied at
all times by a supervising lawyer (Rule 138-A).

CRUZ vs. ATTY. CABRERA, AC#5737, 10/25/2004 – Supreme Court admonished

Respondent for his remark, “appear ka nang appear, pumasa ka muna”,
directed toward Complainant, who was a 4th year law student who personally
instituted and appeared in his own behalf in civil collection cases before
municipal courts. Although his comment was intended to point out to the trial
court that Complainant was not a lawyer to correct the judge’s impression of
Complainant’s appearance as the judge in her order noted that Complainant
was a lawyer, Supreme Court reminded Respondent that Complainant is not
precluded from personally litigating his cases pursuant to Sec. 34, Rue 138RC.

PUBLIC OFFICIALS PROHIBITED FROM LAW PRACTICE – a) Judges and other

officials or employees of Superior courts (Rule 138, Sec. 35, RC); (b) Officials and
employees of Office of SOLGEN; (c) Government Prosecutors; (d) President,
Vice-President, Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants (Art. VII, Sec. 13,
Constitution); (e) Members of Constitutional Commissions (Art.IX-A, Sec. 2,
Constitution); (f) Ombudsman and his deputies (Art.XI, Sec. 8[2]); (g) Governors,
city and municipal mayors (Ra. 7160, Sec. 90); and (h) those who by special law
are prohibited from engaging in the practice of law.

PUBLIC OFFICIALS WITH RESTRICTED RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW – (a) personal

appearance as counsel by Members of Congress before any court, electoral
tribunal or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies (Sec. 14, Art. VI,
Constitution); (b) Sanggunian members may practice their legal profession
provided that they will not (i) appear in court in any civil case where the local
government or any governmental office, agency or instrumentality is the
adverse party; (ii) appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an national or
local government officer/employee is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office; (iii) collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which they are officials; and
(iv) use property and personnel of the government except when the
sanggunian member concerned is defending the government’s interest
(RA7160); (c) a retired justice or judge receiving pension from the government
cannot act as counsel in any civil case in which the government or any of its
subdivision or agencies is the adverse party or in a criminal case wherein an
officer/employee of the government is accused of an offense in relation to his
office (RA 910, Sec. 1).

SUPREME COURT HAS POWER TO REGULATE LAW PRACTICE – Being so intimately

affected with public interest, law practice is both the State’s RIGHT and DUTY to
control and regulate in order to protect public welfare. Art. 8, Sec. 5(5) of the
Constitution vests in the Supreme Court this power of control.

NATURE OF THE POWER TO ADMIT CANDIDATES TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION – It is a

judicial function and involves exercise of discretion. In fact, a candidate has to
file a petition with the Supreme Court (In re; Cunanan 94 PHIL 534; In re:
Almacen 31 SCRA 562).

REQUIREMENTS FOR A BAR CANDIDATE – Under Secs. 2 and 5, Rule 138, RC: (i)
Philippine citizen; (ii) Philippine resident; (iii) at least 21 years of age; (iv) must be
of good moral character; (v) must not have been charged of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (vi) must have met the required educational requirements
(Secs. 2 and 5, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

RE: PETITION FOR READMISSION, BENJAMIN DACANAY, BM#1678, 12/17/2007 – A

former Philippine citizen previously admitted to the Philippine Bar was naturalized
as a Canadian citizen but later reacquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to
RA9225 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003). Upon his petition,
Supreme Court readmitted him to law practice holding that, Philippine
citizenship lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
later reacquired pursuant to RA 9225, is deemed never to have been lost.
However, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues, but he must first
secure from the Supreme Court authority to do so, conditioned on: (a) updating
and payment in full of annual IBP membership; (b) payment of professional tax;
(c) completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
education; and (d) retaking of the lawyer’s oath.

VILLA vs. AMA, BM#674, 6/14/2005 – Respondent who was one of the members
of Aquila Legis Fraternity implicated and charged for the death of “Lenny” Villa,
was admitted by the Supreme Court to law practice after his conviction for
homicide was set aside by the Court of Appeals finding him only liable for
physical injuries. The crime for which he was convicted was only slight physical
injuries, a light offense which cannot be considered a grave violation of the
moral sentiment of the community or done in the spirit of cruelty, hostility or
revenge – a crime certainly not involving moral turpitude.
REQUISITES FOR ADMISSION INTO THE BAR – A bar candidate must - (1) meet all
academic requirements; (2) pass Bar exam; (3) take oath before SC; (4) sign
Attorney’s Roll and issuance of certificate of membership from Clerk of Court of
the Supreme Court.

AGUIRRE vs. RANA, BM#1036, 6/10/2003 – Supreme Court denied Respondent

who passed the 2000 Bar exam admission to the practice of law for appearing
as counsel for a local candidate before the local canvassing board in the 2000
election prior to even taking his oath. Sc held that, before one is admitted to the
Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal
profession. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he
passes the bar examinations. Respondent was engaged in law practice when
he appeared before the canvassing board without being a member of the Bar.
It is the signing in the Attorney’s Rolls that makes one a full-fledged lawyer.
Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become a lawyer.

VDA. DE ESPINO vs. ATTY. PREQUITO, AC#4762, 6/28/2004 – Respondent

suspended from law practice for issuing worthless checks seemingly without
regard to their deleterious effects to public interest and public order. Issuance of
worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, and puts the erring lawyer’s
moral character in serious doubt, though it is not related to his professional
duties as a member of the bar. It not only sets himself liable for a serious criminal
offense under B.P. Blg. 22, but also transgresses the CPR, specifically the
mandate of Canon 1 to obey the laws of the land and promote the respect for
law.

PURPOSES OF THE NOTARIAL LAW – (a) promote, serve and protect public
interest; (b) simplify, clarify and modernize rules governing notaries public; and
(c) foster ethical conduct among notaries public (Sec. 2, Rule 1 of 2004 Notarial
Practice Rules.

ESPINOSA V. ATTY. OMANA, AC#9081, 10/12/2011 – Supreme Court suspended

Atty. Omana for preparing and allegedly notarizing a “Kasunduan”
extrajudicially allowing the spouses to live separately and dissolving their
marriage and conjugal partnership. Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval is void and a notary public should not
facilitate the disintegration of marriage and the family by encouraging
separation of spouses and extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership. In
preparing a void document, Respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1. Even
granting arguendo that the document was notarized by Respondent’s staff, it
only showed Respondent’s negligence in doing her notarial duties. A notary
public is personally responsible for entries in his notarial register.
TAN TIONG BIO vs. ATTY. GONZALES, AC#6634, 8/23/2007 – Respondent
suspended for notarizing a document in Pasig City when his commission was for
Quezon City. While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, such act
partakes of malpractice of law and falsification.

UY vs. ATTY. SAÑO, AC#6505, 9/11/2008 – For notarizing a document despite

expiration of his notarial commission, Respondent was suspended by the
Supreme Court reasoning that, a lawyer’s act of notarizing without the requisite
commission is reprehensible constituting as it does not only malpractice but
falsification of public documents. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest converting a
private document into a public document without further proof of authenticity.

DELA CRUZ vs. ATTY. DIMAANO, JR., AC#7781, 9/12/2008 – For notarizing a deed
without the personal appearance of certain parties thereto, Respondent was
suspended by the Supreme Court. The latter gave no credence to Respondent’s
defense that he simply relied upon the representations of his long-time
neighbour who he believed would not lie to him. Notaries public should refrain
from affixing their signature and notarial seal on a document unless the persons
who signed it are the same individuals who executed it and personally
appeared before them to attest to the truth of what are stated therein,
otherwise, notaries public would not be able to verify the genuineness of the
signatures and whether the document is the party’s free act and deed.

ATTY. LINCO V. ATTY. LACEBAL, AC#7241, 10/17/2011 – A deed of donation

conveying a real property to the illegitimate child of Complainant’s deceased
husband was notarized by Respondent after the donor had already died.
Supreme Court suspended Respondent reasoning that affiant’s previous
personal appearance before Respondent does not justify the notarization of the
deed due to affiant’s absence n the day of notarization. The rule requires
Respondent not to notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to its contents and truthfulness.

NEVADA V. ATTY. CASUGA, AC#7591, 3/20/2012 – Respondent notarized a lease

contract which he himself signed as the supposed administrator of
Complainant’s hotel. Supreme Court suspended Respondent holding that, his
act of affixing his signature without any qualification, veritably made him a party
to the contract. Thus, his act of notarizing a deed to which he is a party is a plain
violation of Rule 4, Sec. 3(a) of the notarial rules.

JANDOQUILE V. ATTY. REVILLA, AC#9514, 4/10/2013 – Supreme Court

reprimanded Respondent for notarizing an affidavit-complaint signed by
relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity without requiring them to
present valid identification cards. Supreme Court held that Respondent cannot
be liable for not requiring affiants to present valid identification. If the notary
public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them their valid
identification cards. This rule is supported by the definition of a jurat, that affiant
is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent proof of identity.

PENA V. ATTY PATERNO, AC#4191, 6/10/2013 – A disbarment complaint charged

that Respondent sold Complainant’s property by forging her signature and
notarizing said spurious instrument. No copy of the questioned instrument could
be presented because Respondent did not submit to the clerk of court her
notarial report when the deed of sale was executed. For her deceitful conduct,
Supreme Court disbarred Respondent holding that, failure to submit to the
proper RTC Clerk of Court her notarial register/report, has far reaching
implications and grave consequences, as it in effect suppressed evidence on
the veracity of said deed of sale and showed the deceitful conduct of
respondent to withhold the truth about its authenticity. For such deceitful
conduct, Respondent DISBARRED from the practice of law.

ALEJANDRO vs. ATTY. ALEJANDRO, AC#4256, 2/13/2004 – For abandoning

Complainant and their three sons and living with his mistress, SC disbarred
Respondent holding that, the Court has disciplined Bar members found guilty of
misconduct demonstrating lack of good moral character required of them not
only as a condition precedent for admission to the Bar but, likewise, for
continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the
misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private
life because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at
one time and a mere citizen at another.

GUEVARRA vs. ATTY. EALA, AC# 7136, 8/1/2007 – SC disbarred Respondent for
cohabiting with Complainant’s wife. Respondent, a married man cohabited
with Irene, a married woman. The Rules of Court employs “grossly immoral
conduct” as a ground for disbarment and not “under scandalous
circumstances” as used in Art. 334 (concubinage) of the Revised Penal Code.
While the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not
sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for illicit behaviour, it is not so with
respect to the betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of
extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside
marriage is deemed disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
BAUTISTA VS. ATTY. GONZALES 182 SCRA 151 – Respondent accepted a civil case
on 50% contingency based from the litigated property’s value. After termination
of the engagement, Respondent transferred to himself ½ of the property subject
of litigation. SC suspended Respondent citing that, in executing a document
transferring ½ of the subject properties to himself, Respondent violated the law
(Art. 1491, CC) expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client’s property
or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his
profession. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expense
proceedings to enforce the client’s right is CHAMPERTOUS.

NARAG, vs. ATTY. NARAG, AC#3405, 6/29/1998 – Supreme Court disbarred

Respondent for abandoning his family and cohabiting with his 17-year old
student. Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every
member of the bar. Immoral conduct is conduct so wilful, flagrant or shameless
as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Such conduct, must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral, that
is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

CHAM vs. ATTY. PAITA-MOYA, AC#7494, 6/27/2008 – Respondent leased an

apartment owned by Complainant’s company. Despite repeated demands,
she failed to settle her unpaid account and vacated the leased premises
without notice. SC suspended Respondent reasoning that, having incurred just
debts, she had the moral and legal responsibility to settle them when they
became due. Her abandonment of the leased premises to avoid her obligations
for rent and electric bills constitutes deceitful conduct violative of Canon1.

ROA vs. ATTY. MORENO, AC#8382, 4/21/10 – Respondent sold a land and assured
Complainant he could already occupy the same with the certificate of land
occupancy issued by Respondent. It turns out that the property was not owned by
Respondent and was even under litigation. SC suspended Respondent citing that,
his credibility is highly questionable – he even issued a bogus certificate of land
occupancy to Complaint whose only fault what that he did not know better. To the
unlettered, said certificate could have easily passed as document evidencing title.
Respondent violated Rule 1.01CPR. Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to
performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is
whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer
of the court.

SAMANIEGO vs. ATTY. FERRER, AC#7022, 6/18/2008 – Respondent, a married

man, developed a relationship and lived with Complainant who was his client.
Despite Respondent’s insistence of Complainant’s complacency knowing him
to be a married man, SC suspended Respondent citing that, while Respondent
did not abandon Complainant but simply returned to his family, still, the
complacency of one in the affair complained of immorality against her co-
principal does not make this case less serious since it is immaterial whether
complainant is in pari delicto. The Court’s investigation is not about
complainant’s acts but Respondent’s conduct as one of its officers and his
fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.

VENTURA V. ATTY. SAMSON, AC#9608, 11/27/2012 – Respondent admitted to

having sex with Complainant, a 13-year old girl, but insisted that such was not
grossly immoral as it was mutually agreed upon with Complainant who was
allegedly reputed to having sex with other men for pay and that in fact, he pay
her for sex. SC disbarred Respondent holding that, his act of engaging in sex
with a young lass, his former employee’s daughter constituted gross immoral
conduct that warranted sanction. He not only admitted having sexual
intercourse with her but also showed no remorse by asserting that he did nothing
wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money.

BARRATRY – The offense of frequently stirring up quarrels and suits either at law or
otherwise except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it
his duty to do so.

AMBULANCE CHASING – Figuratively, a lawyer’s act of chasing the ambulance

with the victim of an accident for the purpose of talking to him or his relatives
and offering his legal services to file a case against the person who caused the
accident.

EVILS OF AMBULANCE CHASING –– (a) fomenting of litigation with resulting

burden on courts and the public; (b) subornation of perjury; (c) mulcting of
innocent persons by judgment upon manufactured causes of action; (d)
defrauding innocent persons with proper cause of action but ignorant of legal
rights and court procedure by means of contracts retaining exorbitant
percentages of recovery and illegal charges for court costs and expenses and
by settlement for quick returns of fees against the just rights of the injured person.

ULEP VS. LEGAL CLINIC, INC. 223 SCRA 378 – SC held that the best advertising
even for a young lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct.
ATTY. KHAN, JR. vs. ATTY. SIMBILLO, AC#5299, 8/19/2003 – SC suspended for
posting two paid ads in national newspapers advertising his services as an
“annulment expert at P48,000.00 within 4 to 6 months. The practice of law is not
a business but a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture and law advocacy is not capital that necessarily yields profits. Gaining
of a livelihood should be secondary consideration as duty to public service and
to administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers.
Solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the legal profession’s
dignity. If made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to
lawyers and to the Bar.

LINSANGAN vs. ATTY. TOLENTINO, AC#6672, 9/4/09 – For soliciting clients from
Complainant’s law firm of which he was a former lawyer, SC suspended
Respondent reasoning that, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a
profession and not a business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting
cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice – a ground for disbarment.

VILLATUYA VS. ATTY. TABALINGCOS, AC#6622, 7/10/2012 – Respondent owned

what purports to be a financial and legal consultancy company which was in
reality a vehicle for him to procure professional employment, specifically for
corporate rehabilitation. A company letterhead proposed that should the
prospective client agree to the proposed fees, Respondent would render legal
services related to the former’s loan obligation with a bank proves that
Respondent violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from
soliciting cases for the purpose of profit. In suspending Respondent, SC held that,
a lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation.
Impropriety arises though when the business is of such nature or is conducted in
such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the
bar – an inconsistency arising when the business is one that can readily lend itself
to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer, or that can be
used as a cloak for indirectly solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf.

ATTY. VITRIOLO VS. ATTY. DASIG, AC#4984, 4/1/2003 – In disbarring Respondent

who was the Officer-in-charge of the CHED Legal Affairs Service for soliciting
money from various persons with applications pending before her office, SC
held that, generally, a lawyer holding a government office may not be
disciplined as a Bar member for misconduct in the discharge of her official
duties. However, if the misconduct as a government official also constitutes
violation of his lawyer’s oath, then he may be disciplined by the Court as a Bar
member. Respondent’s misconduct as a CHED lawyer is of such a character as
to affect her qualification as a Bar member. As a lawyer, she ought to have
known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of
money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting
action by her office.

CATU VS. ATTY. RELLOSA, AC#5738, 2/19/2008 – Respondent, who, as barangay

captain presided over lupon conciliation over a land dispute later entered his
appearance as counsel for defendants in the subsequent ejectment case filed
after the barangay conciliation proceedings. SC suspended Respondent
holding that, while Sec. 90 of the Local Government Code subjecting certain
elective local officials to the proscription to practice their profession, makes no
such interdiction on the punong barangay and members of the sangguniang
barangay, however, Respondent should have procured prior permission or
authorization from the Secretary of DILG before he entered his appearance as
counsel pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 18 of the Revised Civil Service Rules. Non-
compliance therewith constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer to obey the
laws.

SIERRA VS. LOPEZ, AC#7549, 8/29/2008 – In dismissing the complaint against

Respondents who were all city prosecutors charged with dereliction of duty for
not requiring the parties in certain criminal cases filed by Complainant to
simultaneously appear during preliminary investigation, SC held that, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court does not require a confrontation between the parties.
Preliminary investigation is ordinarily conducted through submission of affidavits
and supporting documents through exchange of pleadings.

ALCANTARA VS. ATTY. PEFIANCO, 12/3/2002 – Respondent intervened and

angrily shouted at a lawyer talking to the wife of the murder when Complainant
stepped in to pacify Respondent. The latter turned his ire at, and tried to attack
Complainant. Respondent shouted invectives at Complainant including, “Gago
ka”. SC reprimanded Respondent citing Canon 8CPR which admonishes lawyer
to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow
lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal
profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and
otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times.

SABERON vs. ATTY. LARONG, AC#6567, 4/16/2008 – Respondent acting as

counsel for a bank filed various pleadings using abusive and offensive language
hinting that Complainant was merely blackmailing/coercing the bank for
financial gain. SC fined Respondent reasoning that, the Code mandates for a
lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel and,
in his professional dealings, refrain from using language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper. The adversarial nature of our legal system has
tempted members of the bar to use strong language in the pursuit of their duty
to advance their clients’ interests. However, while a lawyer is entitled to present
his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities
for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession,
a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.

CAMACHO VS. ATTY. PAGULAYAN, AC#4807, 3/22/2000 – Complainant

represented expelled students in a civil case against their school. Respondent as
counsel for the school secured the dismissal of said complaint by brokering a
deal with the students allowing them readmission into the school without
Complainant’s presence or knowledge. In suspending Respondent, SC held that
Canon 9 provides that, “a lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the
subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal
with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid
everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he
should not undertake to advise him as to the law”.

CAMBALIZA VS. ATTY. CRISTAL-TENORIO, AC#6290, 7/14/2004. – Charged with

assisting in illegal law practice for naming her husband as a senior partner of the
law office, Respondent explained that such was because he had substantial
investments in the law office. SC suspended Respondent reasoning that, it is the
lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires
that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the
client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court.

VILLATUYA VS. ATTY. TABALINGCOS, AC#6622, 7/10/2012 – SC warned

Respondent that, an agreement like the one supposedly forged between him
and Complainant for the latter to receive 10% of the former’s attorney’s fees for
every judicially-approved corporate rehabilitation plan prepared by the
Complainant, is violative of Rule 9.02. proscribing a lawyer from dividing or
agreeing to divide fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to
practice law.

HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO VS. ATTY. FLORIDO, AC#5624, 1/20/2004 – Respondent

went to the Complainant who was his estranged wife to demand custody of
their children supposedly based upon a resolution of the Court of Appeals
granting him temporary custody. Per certification from the Court of Appeals, no
such resolution had been issued. SC suspended Respondent reasoning that,
candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the
judiciary would be intolerable if it could take at face value what is asserted by
counsel.

HON. MACIAS VS. ATTY. SELDA, AC#6442, 10/21/2004 – Respondent withdrew as

counsel for protestee in an election protest assigned to Complainant citing
heavy workload. Thereafter, Respondent executed an affidavit citing
Complainant’s pre-judgment of the case as the real reason for his withdrawal.
This affidavit was used in a motion for inhibition filed against Complainant. SC
suspended Respondent reasoning that, all members of the legal profession
made a solemn oath to, inter alia, ‘do no falsehood’ and ‘conduct themselves
as lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients’”. His affidavit retracting his
reason for withdrawing as counsel is an admission under oath of his
misrepresentation. He misled the court in clear violation of his oath as a lawyer
and failed to abide by the Code. Saying one thing in his motion and another in
his subsequent affidavit is a transgression of the cardinal requirement of candor
and honesty which necessitates appropriate punishment.

ATTY. ALONSO VS. ATTY. RELAMIDA, JR., AC#8481, 8/3/10 – For refiling a case of
illegal dismissal after a previous ruling by the Labor Arbiter dismissing the case
finding that there was voluntary resignation became final and executory, SC
suspended Respondent, reasoning that, all lawyers must bear in mind that their
oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality. A lawyer owes fidelity to
his client’s cause but not at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice. Filing multiple petitions constitutes abuse of court processes and
improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice punishable as contempt of court.

AFURONG VS. ATTY. AQUINO, AC#1571, 9/23/1999 – To stay execution of a

decision obtained by Complainant in an ejectment case, Respondent filed
multiple petitions and even a motion to postpone a scheduled hearing
supposedly due to his appearance in another case when there was actually
none. SC suspended Respondent citing that, it is an attorney’s duty to counsel or
maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just and such
defences only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. The
decision having reached finality and execution being effected, Respondent
should not have filed a petition for certiorari considering that there was no
apparent purpose for it than to delay execution of judgment. Respondent also
committed a falsehood when he said in his motion for postponement that he
had to attend another hearing. He himself admitted that he only included such
statement in order to give more “force” to his motion. Such act violates a
lawyer’s duty to avoid concealment of the truth from the court. A lawyer is
mandated not to mislead the court in any manner.
VDA. DE FAJARDO VS. ATTY. BUGARING, AC#5113, 10/7/2004 –Respondent who
failed to agree with Complainant as to his attorney’s fees in a partition case, not
only refused the P100k tendered for his services but later, filed a civil case for
collection with attachment of Complainant’s property. SC suspended
Respondent holding that, the proper time to deal with the issue of professional
fees is upon commencement of the lawyer-client relationship. He should have
determined and entered into an agreement regarding his fees when he was first
retained. Such prudence would have spared the Court this controversy over a
lawyer’s compensation, a suit that should be avoided except to prevent
imposition, injustice and fraud. While a lawyer is entitled to the Court’s
protection against any attempt on the client’s part to escape payment of
legitimate fees, such protection however must not be sought at the expense of
truth.

SEARES, JR. VS. ATTY. GONZALES-ALZATE, AC#9058, 11/14/12 – Complainant

charged Respondent who was his lawyer in his 2007 election protest with
misconduct for representing conflicting interests for serving as Turqueza’s
counsel in an administrative case filed against Complainant who was elected
mayor in 2010 for usurpation of authority. SC dismissed the complaint against
Respondent reasoning that, representing conflicting interests would occur only
where the attorney’s new agreement would require her to use against a former
client any confidential information gained from the previous professional
relation. The prohibition did not cover a situation where the subject matter of the
present engagement was totally unrelated to the attorney’s previous
engagement.

RURAL BANK OF CALAPE, INC. vs. ATTY. FLORIDO, AC#5736, 6/18/10 – For forcibly
taking over the bank with his clients who were the bank’s minority stockholders
aided by armed men, Respondent was suspended by the SC. A lawyer’s first
and foremost duty is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Likewise, it is his duty to
promote respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain from activities
aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the legal system. It is a
lawyer’s duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in
seeking justice and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to their adversaries.

GONZALES VS. ATTY. SABACAJAN 249 SCRA 276 – Respondent held

Complainants’ owner’s copies of land titles purportedly because they owned his
client a sum of money. SC suspended Respondent holding that, if complainant
did have alleged monetary obligations with his client, that did not warrant
Respondent’s summarily confiscating as collateral or any court order authorizing
Respondent to take custody of said title. A lawyer shall impress upon his cient
the need for compliance with law and principles of fairness.

PARIÑAS vs. ATTY. PAGUINTO, AC#6297, 7/13/2004 – A month after Complainant

paid Respondent for her case for annulment of marriage, Respondent
represented to Complainant that the case had already been filed.
Complainant demanded for the return of her money upon learning from the
court that no such case had been filed. SC suspended Respondent reasoning
that, acceptance of money from a client establishes attorney-client relationship
and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to client’s cause. Money entrusted to a
lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for failure to file the case must
immediately be returned to the client on demand. When a lawyer accepts a
case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the
requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. The lawyer has
the duty to exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the case
entrusted to him and to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in
the pursuit or defense of the case.

BUENO VS. ATTY. RANESES, AC#8383, 12/11/2012 – Respondent, as

Complainant’s counsel in a civil case asked for money purportedly to be
divided by him and the judge in exchange for a favorable decision.
Respondent failed to comment on the adverse party’s offer of exhibits and also
failed to submit his memorandum. An adverse decision was rendered which
Complainant only came to know about when the sheriff came to execute.
Despite, a certification showing prior receipt of the decision, Respondent
claimed he had no knowledge of the decision. SC disbarred Respondent
holding that, lawyers should serve their clients with competence and diligence
and not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith renders him liable. Respondent further committed a
fraudulent exaction and at the same time maligned both the judge and the
Judiciary. He extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false
and fraudulent. It is false because no bribery apparently took place as he in fact
lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose of the exaction was
the crime of bribery.

TRINIDAD VS. ATTY. VILLARIN, AC#9310, 2/27/2013 – Respondent, who was

counsel for Purence Realty, was charged of harassing Complainants by sending
the demand letters threatening to file ejectment cases even after Complainants
had secured a final and executory judgment ordering Purence Realty to
delivery titles to them upon their full payment o the original purchase price. SC
held that, the Code provides the limitations that lawyers shall perform their duty
to the client within the bounds of law. They should only make such defense only
when they believe it to be honestly debatable under the law. In this case,
Respondent’s act of issuing demand letters, moved by the understanding of a
void HLURB decision due to non-service of summons upon his client, is legally
sanctioned because if his theory holds water, the notice to vacate becomes
necessary in order to file an action for ejectment. Hence, he did not resort to
any fraud or chicanery prohibited by the Code, just to maintain his client’s
disputed ownership over the subdivision lots. Respondent was however
reprimanded for brazenly typifying one of the complainants as an illegal
occupant – a description the exact opposite of the truth, since he was well-
aware of the final and executory HLURB decision recognizing her as a lot buyer
with a right to complete her payments in order to occupy her property.

BARCENAS VS. ATTY. ALVERO, AC#8159, 4/23/10 – Respondent informed

Complainant that he would deposit the latter’s 300K with the court because the
creditor refuse to accept it as redemption payment for Complainant tenancy
rights. Complainant later demand for the return of his money when he learned
that Respondent was losing a lot in cockfights and no judicial deposit had been
made. SC suspended Respondent reasoning that, when a lawyer receives
money from the client for a particular purpose, he is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that purpose. If
he does not use it for the intended purpose, he must promptly return the money
to his client.

SMALL VS. ATTY. BANARES, AC#7021, 2/21/2007 – Despite Complainant’s

constant follow-up as to the status of the case for which he already paid
Respondent acceptance and filing fees, Respondent merely replied that he was
still preparing the documents. Months passed and still Respondent failed to
present any document prompting Complainant to demand for a full refund,
which Respondent failed to comply. SC suspended Respondent reasoning that,
“every lawyer holds in trust moneys of his client that may come into his
possession and he should account for them and deliver them to the client upon
demand. Respondent received money and since he failed to render any legal
service to Complainant, he should have promptly accounted for, and returned
the money, but he failed to do so.

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY VS. ATTY. MIJARES III, AC#8380, 11/20/09– Respondent

was disbarred for failing to turn over certain papers which he supposedly
secured for Complainant after the latter had paid him P500k to Respondent as
facilitation and processing expenses for the titling of a certain property.
Supreme Court held that, “every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and
advance his client’s interest such that he must promptly account for whatever
money or property his client may have entrusted to him”. A lawyer’s conversion
of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics.

TAHAW vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS P. VITAN, AC#6441, 10/21/2004 – Almost a year

lapsed since Complainant paid Respondent 30K for a partition case, still there
was no news from Respondent as to the case status. In response to
Complainant’s letter, Respondent assured her that he already filed the case.
Upon her personal inquiry, Complainant learned from the clerk of court that no
such case was filed. SC suspended Respondent holding that, when a lawyer
takes a client’s cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all effort for its
prosecution until its final conclusion. Thus, when Respondent’s services were
engaged by Complainant, the former took it upon himself to perform the legal
services required of him. In the instant case, however, Respondent seemed to
have forgotten his sworn duty after he received the money from his client.

BARBUCO VS. ATTY. BELTRAN, AC#5092, 8/11/2004 – Complainant learned that

her appeal had been dismissed by the Court of Appeals because Respondent
failed to file the required appellant’s brief. Respondent explained that he timely
filed the appeal only that, despite receipt of the notice to file brief, he was late
in fling the required brief because he was physically incapacitated for several
days due to a vehicular incident. In suspending Respondent, SC explained that,
an attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and
with utmost diligence. Failure to file brief within the reglementary period
constitutes inexcusable negligence. His supposed involvement in an accident
from which he suffered injuries cannot serve to excuse him from filing his
pleadings because he was a member of a law firm composed of not just one
lawyer. He could have asked any of his partners in the office to file the
appellant’s brief for him, or at least, a motion for extension of time to file said
pleading.

CUIZON VS. ATTY. MACALINO, AC#4334, 7/7/2004 – Complainant was forced to

hire another lawyer after Respondent whom she already paid to represent her
husband convicted of a drug charge failed to attend to her husband’s case.
After she filed a disbarment case against Respondent, Complainant reported to
the Supreme Court that he again committed an infraction of the law by issuing
a worthless check to her. SC disbarred Respondent reasoning that, no lawyer is
obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become his client. However, once he agrees to take up the client’s cause, he
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. An attorney who undertakes to conduct an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.

OVERGAARD VS, ATTY. VALDEZ, AC#7902, 9/20/2008 – Complainant, a Dutch

national, who paid Respondent P900k to represent him in several cases filed by
and against him claimed that Respondent not only failed to update him of the
status of the cases, but also failed to enter his appearance in some cases, and
inform him that he was entitled to prepare a counter-affidavit and that
arraignment dates for the criminal cases against him had already been set.
Warrants for Complainants arrests were subsequently issued for his non-
attendance. In disbarring Respondent, SC held that, he had indubitably fallen
below the exacting standards demanded of Bar members. He did not only
neglect his client’s case, he abandoned his client and left him without any
recourse but to hire another lawyer. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to
the client’s cause. A lawyer is bound to serve his client with competence and
diligence. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

SPS. ARANDA VS. ATTY. ELAYDA, AC#7907, 12/15/10 – Respondent, as Complainants’

counsel in a civil case, failed to notify them and even appear for the scheduled
hearing which resulted in the submission of the case for decision. Later, Respondent
took no steps, or at the very least, inform Complainants of the decision rendered
adverse to them. This decision became final and executory. SC suspended
Respondent not giving credence to his claim that he did not have Complainants’
contact number or address and that they were the ones remiss in making a follow up
with him of the status of their case. It is elementary procedure for a lawyer and his
clients to exchange contact details at the initial stages in order to have constant
communication with each other. While communication is a shared responsibility
between counsel and client, it is the counsel’s primary duty to inform his clients of the
status of their case and the orders issued by the court. He cannot simply wait for his
clients to make an inquiry about the development in their case. Close coordination
between counsel and client is necessary for them to adequately prepare for the case,
as well as to effectively monitor the progress of the case.

PENA VS. ATTY. APARICIO, AC#7298, 6/25/2007 – Respondent threatened

Complainant with criminal charges for tax evasion and falsification if the latter
refused to pay Respondent’s claim of separation pay for his client. In
reprimanding Respondent, SC found no merit in Respondent’s claim that the
disbarment case should be dismissed for want of certification against forum-
shopping because the filing of multiple suits and conflicting decisions rarely
happens in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings are either
taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the IBP upon verified complaint
of any person, thus, if complainant fails to attach a certification against forum
shopping the pendency of another disciplinary action against the same
respondent may still be ascertained with ease. A lawyer is duty-bound to
represent his client with zeal within the bounds of law. His duty is not to his client
but to the administration of justice – his client’s success is wholly subordinate and
his conduct must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While the
writing of demand letters is standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction, the
letter in this case contains more than just a simple demand to pay containing as
it did a threat to file retaliatory charges against Complainant which have
nothing to do with his client’s claim.

ONG VS. ATTY. UNTO, AC#2417, 2/6/2002– Respondent filed criminal charges
against Complainant for alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization
Law and Anti-Dummy Law plus administrative cases before the Bureau of
Domestic Trade, the Commission on Immigration and the Office of the Solicitor
General after the latter failed to heed the former’s demand letters seeking child
support for his client. SC suspended Respondent reasoning that, a lawyer shall
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client
and not to present, participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Respondent
had not exercised the good faith required of a lawyer in handling of his client’s
legal affairs. He tried to coerce Complainant to comply with his demand letter
by threatening to file various charges against the latter. After non-compliance,
he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases –
this act is malicious as the cases filed did not have any bearing or connection to
his client’s cause.

INSTANCES WHEN COUNSEL CANNOT RECOVER FULL AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY’S

FEES DESPITE WRITTEN CONTRACT – (1) when stipulated attorney’s fees are in
excess of what the law expressly provides; (2) when the attorney is guilty of fraud
or bad faith against the client; (3) when counsel’s services were worthless
because of his negligence; (4) when the contract of employment is illegal; (5)
when counsel served adverse interest, unless he acted with consent of both
parties.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING ATTORNEY’S FEES (Rule 20.01, CPR) – (a) time spent
and extent and services rendered and required; (b) novelty and difficulty of
question involved; (c) importance of subject matter; (d) skill demanded of
lawyer; (e) customary charges for similar services and IBP schedule of fees; (f)
probability of losing other compensation; (g) amount involved in the controversy
and benefits resulting from the service; (h) contingency or certainty of
compensation; (i) character of employment whether occasional or established;
(j) the lawyer’s professional standing.

INSTANCES OF ATTORNEY’S FEES ON QUANTUM MERUIT – (a) no express contract

for attorney’s fees; (b) court determines fees stipulated in the contract to be
unconscionable or unreasonable; (c) contract for attorney’s fees is void due to
purely formal matters or defects in the execution; (d) counsel’s inability, for
justifiable cause, to finish the case to its conclusion; (e) when lawyer and client
disregard the contract for attorney’s fees; (f) charging of fees beyond what is
fixed by law.

CASTRO-JUSTO VS. ATTY. GALING, AC#6174, 11/16/2011 – Complainant charged

that, after he wrote demand letter regarding Ms. Koa’s dishonoured checks,
Respondent appeared as Ms. Koa’s counsel in the criminal cases for estafa and
boucing checks which she subsequently filed. SC suspended Respondent
holding that, a lawyer-client relationship can exist despite close friendship. This
relationship was established the moment Complainant sought Respondent’s
legal advice regarding the dishonored checks. Respondent confirmed this
relationship by drafting the demand letter and referring to Complainant therein
as “my client”. The fact that the demand letter was not utilized in the criminal
complaint filed and that Complainant hired another lawyer is of no moment.
Non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate Respondent from
liability. Absence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from
complying with the prohibition against pursuing cases with conflicting interests.

GROUNDS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL – (a) client pursues an illegal or

immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling; (b)
client insists that lawyer pursue conduct violative of canons and rules; (c) his
inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the client’s best interest; (d)
lawyer’s mental and physical condition renders it difficult for him to carry out
employment effectively; (e) client’s deliberately failure to pay fees for services or
failure to comply with retainer agreement; (f) lawyer is elected or appointed to
a public office; and (g) other similar cases (Rule 22.01, CPR).

OBJECTIVES OF DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION – (a) Compel attorney to deal

fairly and honestly with his client; (b) remove from the profession, a person
whose misconduct has proved him UNFIT to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney; (c) punish lawyer although
not so much as to safeguard the administration of justice; (d) set as an example
or warning for other members of the Bar; (e) safeguard the administration of
justice from incompetence and dishonesty of lawyers; (f) protect the public.

CHARACTERISTICS OF DISBARMENT PROCEEDING AS SUI GENERIS – (a) neither civil

or criminal; (b) double jeopardy cannot be availed; (c) can be initiated motu
proprio by the Supreme Court or the IBP and can be initiated without
complainant; (d) can proceed regardless of interest or lack thereof, if facts
proven warrant; (e) imprescriptible (f) conducted confidentially until its final
determination; (g) it is itself due process of law; (h) whatever has been decided
in a disbarment case cannot be a source of right that may be enforced in
another action like reconveyance or damages;
CALUB VS. ATTY. SULLER, AC#1474, 1/28/2000 – Having been acquitted due to
reasonable doubt in the rape case filed against him by Complainant,
Respondent sought the dismissal of the disbarment case against him. SC
disbarred Respondent holding that, acquittal due to prosecution’s failure to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt is not determinative of the administrative
case. The privilege to practice law is bestowed upon individuals who are
competent intellectually, academically and equally important, morally.

TIONG VS. ATTY. FLORENDO, AC#4428, 12/12/2011 – In a conference held, after

Complainant confirmed that Respondent who was his lawyer was having an
affair with his wife, an affidavit admitted the amorous affair seeking forgiveness
from their respective spouses was executed. This affidavit signed by
Complainant, Respondent and their spouses provided that no criminal or legal
action would be taken against the offending parties. Despite such stipulation,
Complainant sought for Respondent’s disbarment who interposed the defense
of pardon. SC suspended Respondent holding that, his act of having an affair
with his client's wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of
marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. A case for suspension or
disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a
civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its
undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. It is not an
investigation into the respondent’s acts as a husband but on his conduct as an
officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. Hence,
the affidavit, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect
of abating the proceedings.

GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT – (a) Deceit; (b) Malpractice or other gross

misconduct in office; (c) Grossly immoral conduct; (d) Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (e) Violation of the Oath of Office; (f) Wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (g) Corrupt or Wilful
appearance as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. (Rule
138, Sec. 27, Rules of Court)

BARRIOS VS. ATTY. MARTINEZ, AC# 4585, 11/12/2004 – Convicted by final

judgment for violation of BP22, SC disbarred Respondent reasoning that, moral
turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals and involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity
in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Enumerating the elements of the crime, the act of a person in issuing a check
knowing at the time of issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in,
or credit with, the drawee bank for the check in full upon its presentment, is a
manifestation of moral turpitude.
WILKIE VS. ATTY. LIMOS, AC#7505, 10/24/2008 – Respondent borrowed P250,000
from Complainant who was her client. Later she issued two post-dated checks
to cover for her loan which checks later “bounced”. SC suspended Respondent
holding that, the issuance of checks later dishonoured for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. It also shows
Respondent’s remorseless attitude, unmindful of the deleterious effects of such
act to the public interest and public order.

SORIANO VS. ATTY. DIZON, AC#6792, 1/25/2006 – Respondent, who was driving
his car under the influence of liquor, reacted violent when Complainant’s
taxicab overtook him. He chased Complainant and confronted him. When
Respondent tried to physically assault him, Complainant subdued Respondent
who was elderly. When Complainant let go and returned to his car, Respondent
got his gun and shot Complainant who was unarmed. Respondent, who fled the
scene, was convicted of frustrated homicide. SC disbarred Respondent for
having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Homicide may or
may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral
turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known
and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction
involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on
all the surrounding circumstances. Respondent was definitely the aggressor, as
he pursued and shot Complainant when the latter least expected it. There was
treachery as a further indication of Respondent’s skewed morals – he shot the
victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the
impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was
merely returning Respondent’s eyeglasses when he was shot. To make matters
worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not
to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape
punishment for his crime.

GONZAGA VS. ATTY. VILLANUEVA, JR., AC#1954, 7/23/07 – Representing himself

as a relative, Respondent offered to handle pro bono the criminal case
involving the murder of Complainants’ parents. After accepting his offer,
Respondent made Complainant sign a paper purportedly authorizing him to
appear in said case. Later, Complainants engaged another lawyer for the
estate proceedings of their deceased parents’ estate, but Respondent filed a
similar intestate petition without Complainant’s knowledge and consent. So as
not to embarrass him, Complainants allowed him to assist their counsel in the
intestate proceedings, but even after Complainants’ appointment as co-
administrators and the formal termination of his appearance in the intestate
case, Respondent continued to appear. SC suspended Respondent holding
that, Complainants never intended him to represent them in the intestate
proceedings. His obstinate refusal to withdraw from said proceedings was
improper and since his unauthorized appearance was wilful, he may be
disciplined for professional misconduct.

VARGAS VS. ATTY. IGNES, AC#8096, 7/5/10 – Complainant charged that

Respondents filed and continued to appear in cases as counsel for Koronadal
Water District (KWD), a gov’t-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC),
despite the legal retainer having been pre-terminated. SC sternly warned and
fined Respondent holding that, their continued unauthorized appearance is
wilful and deliberate. They signed pleadings and presented themselves
voluntarily, on their own volition as counsel of KWD, even in the absence of
authority therefor.

SUSPENSION FROM LAW PRACTICE IN GUAM OF ATTY. MAQUERA, BM#793,

7/30/2004 – Atty. Maquera, a Philippine Bar member, was suspended from
practicing law in Guam due to misconduct for acquiring his client’s property as
payment for his legal services. The Guam court transmitted certified copies of his
suspension to the Philippine Supreme Court. SC held that,
disbarment/suspension of a Philippine Bar member by a competent court or
other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been
admitted as an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension if the basis of
such action constitutes a ground for disbarment/suspension from law practice in
the Philippines. The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment/suspension.

DUMADAG VS. ATTY. LUMAYA, AC#2614, 6/29/2000 – Suspended indefinitely from

law practice, Respondent filed various pleadings including a petition to lift his
suspension seeking among others, clarification as to the exact term of his
suspension considering he was already 62 years of age and scarcity of law
practitioners in their locality. He later wrote the Chief Justice imploring but also
chiding the Court for ‘slumbering’ on acting on his petition although still insisting
his innocence. Instead of lifting his suspension, SC fixed his period of suspension
at 10 years reasoning that, the insolence of Respondent’s remonstrations that
the Court was sleeping on its job in acting on his case not only underscores his
callous disregard of the myriad administrative and judicial travails the Court has
to contend with as the Court of Last Resort, it also betrays his absolute lack of
appreciation and disrespect for the efforts and measures undertaken by the
Court to cope with these concerns. Indefiniteness of Respondent’s suspension,
far from being cruel or degrading or inhuman has the effect of placing, as it
were, the key to restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own
hands – that sanction has the effect of giving Respondent the chance to purge
himself in his own good time of his contempt and misconduct by
acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and
demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards
of conduct rightly demanded from every Bar member and officer of the courts.

MANIAGO VS. ATTY. DE DIOS, AC#7472, 3/30/10 – Previously suspended for 6

months from law practice, Respondent was charged of violating said suspension
order for serving as counsel for a Japanese national. SC dismissed the petition
against Respondent noting that, Respondent had already served her prior 6-
months suspension and had written a manifestation to the Court of such fact. To
be sure, SC laid the following guidelines in relation to resumption of practice
following full service of suspension, to wit: (a) suspended lawyer must first present
proof of his compliance by submitting certifications from IBP and Executive
Judge that he has indeed desisted from law practice during the suspension
period; (b) thereafter, the Court, after evaluation and upon favorable
recommendation from Office of Bar Confidant, will issue a resolution lifting the
suspension order and allow him to resume his practice. It was only unfortunate
that this procedure was overlooked with regards to Respondent’s prior
suspension.

REYES VS. ATTY. VITAN, AC#5835, 8/10/10 – Suspended for an aggregate period
of 2 ½ years as a result of four administrative cases, Respondent petitioned the
Supreme Court for reinstatement as a member in good standing of the Bar and
to be allowed to practice law. SC granted Respondent’s application for
reinstatement effective upon his submission to the Court of a sworn statement
that: (a) he has completely served the four suspension orders imposed on him
successively; (b) he desisted from the law practice during the period of
suspension; (c) he has returned the sums of money to the complainants as
ordered by the court in the previous administrative cases; (d) he has furnished
copies of his sworn statement to the IBP and the Executive Judge.

RICHARDS VS. ASOY, AC#2655, 10/12/10 – Disbarred in 1987 for grave

professional misconduct, Respondent was ordered to reimburse P16K to
Complainant who later wrote the Court several times to report non-payment by
Respondent. In 1996, Respondent sought Bar readmission claiming that he
already consigned the money with the Court’s cashier. According to
Respondent, his belated compliance, that is, 9 years from the reimbursement
order was due to his inability to locate Complainant. After SC denied his
readmission, Respondent filed a later petition in 2010. In denying Respondent
readmission, SC held that his justification was flimsy as it was, considering that
Complainant’s address was readily available with the Court what with the
numerous letters reporting Respondent’s non-compliance, glaringly speaks of his
lack of candor, of his dishonesty, if not defiance of Court orders, qualities that do
not endear him to the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. Respondent
denigrated the dignity of his calling by displaying a lack of candor towards the
Court. By taking his sweet time to effect reimbursement of the P16,000.00 – and
through consignation with this Court at that - he sent out a strong message that
the legal processes and orders of this Court could be treated with disdain or
impunity.

MACARRUBO VS. ATTY. MACARRUBO, AC#6148, 1/22/2013 – In 2004, SC disbarred

Respondent who claimed his previous marriage to be void, marrying
Complainant with whom he had two children and latter abandoning her to
marry a third time. The Court reasoned that while his marriage to Complainant
had been annulled by final judgment, this did not cleanse his conduct of every
tinge of impropriety. Having lived with Complainant as husband and wife while
his first marriage was subsisting made him liable for concubinage – conduct
inconsistent with the good moral character required for continued right to
practice law. Eight years after finality of his disbarment, Respondent filed a
petition (for extraordinary mercy) seeking reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys.
In reinstating Respondent, SC declared that, to be reinstated to the practice of
law, applicant must, like any other candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the
Court that he is a person of good moral character. While the Court is ever
mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant
to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways, as in
this case.

JUDICIAL ETHICS – branch of moral science which treats of the right and proper
conduct to be observed by all judges in trying and deciding controversies
brought before them for adjudication which conduct must be demonstrative of
IMPARTIALITY, INTEGRITY, COMPETENCE, INDEPENDENCE& FREEDOM FOR
IMPROPRIETY.

SOURCES OF JUDICIAL ETHICS – (a) New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary (effective June1, 2004); (b) Code of Judicial Conduct
(effective October 20, 1989); (c) Constitutional provisions (Article 3, 8, and 11,
1987 Constitution); (d) provisions of the rules of court; (e) Revised Penal Code
provisions; (f) RA 3019; (g) Canons of Judicial Ethics; (h) Code of Professional
Responsibility; (i) Judiciary Act of 1948; (j) BP 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980); and (k) SC decisions
QUALIFICATIONS OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES – (a) Justices of the Court of Appeal
and Supreme Court – natural-born Filipino citizen, at least 40 years of age, 15
years in the practice of law [Section 7(1) of Article VIII of the Constitution]; (b)
judges of lower courts – natural-born Filipino citizen, at least 35 (for RTC) and 30
(for MTC) years of age, 10 years (for RTC) and 5 years (for MTC) in the practice of
law [Section 7(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution].

ANONYMOUS VS. JUDGE RIO ACHAS, AM#MTJ-11-1801, 2/27/2013 – To an

anonymous complaint charging amongst, many things, gambling and having
an affair with a young lady, Respondent only admitted to being separated from
his wife and merely breeding game cocks. SC held that, Sec. 1 of Rule 140RC
provides that anonymous complaints may be filed against judges but must be
supported by public records of indubitable integrity. Courts have acted in such
instances needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by the
complainant. Thus, for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in
administrative proceedings which usually rest with the complainant, must be
buttressed by indubitable public records and by what is sufficiently proven
during the investigation. SC held that, while Respondent had been estranged
from his wife for the last 26 years, the fact remained that he was still legally
married. It is not commendable, proper or moral for a judge to be perceived as
going out with a woman not his wife as was determined by the discreet
investigation conducted. Such is a blemish to his integrity and propriety, as well
as to that of the Judiciary. Also, while gamecocks are bred and kept primarily
for gambling, there is no proof that Respondent goes to cockpits and gambles.
Rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, however, Respondent should avoid mingling
with a crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly impairs
the respect due him. As a judge, he must impose upon himself personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
should do so freely and willingly

DECENA VS. JUDGE MALANYAON, AM#RTJ-02-1669, 4/14/2004 – Respondent

was accused of disrupting the session of the municipal council which was
deliberating on the revocation of the authority of his nephew-in-law to operate
a cockpit. Admitting to his presence during the session, Respondent claimed
that he was not drunk and that he was merely there in his private capacity as a
taxpayer. SC fined Respondent holding that, his actuations constitute palpable
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct to avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities – judicial identity does not terminate
at the end of the day when he takes off his judicial robes. Even when garbed in
casual wear outside the halls of justice, a judge retains the air of authority and
moral ascendancy that he/she wields inside the sala.

SALVADOR SISON VS. JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., AM#RTJ-03-1771, 5/27/2004 –

Respondent ordered Complainant, an MMDA traffic enforcer, to appear and
explain why the latter issued a traffic violation ticket against the former’s son. For
failure to appear, Respondent cited Complainant in contempt and ordered him
arrested and discharged only after he admitted before Respondent that he
made a mistake and the traffic incident was all a misunderstanding. In
DISMISSING Respondent, SC held that, initially, Respondent appeared justified in
holding Complainant for contempt due to the latter’s refusal to comply with the
order to appear. However, it is not lost upon the Court that Complainant was
not a party to any of the cases pending. What triggered the contempt charge
was, in fact, the traffic violation incident involving Respondent’s son. Since the
incident involved his own son and the matter was personal to him, Respondent
should have refrained from ordering Complainant’s arrest and detention. Such
act of citing a person in contempt of court in a manner which smacks of
retaliation, is appalling and violative of the mandate that a judge should so
behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.

BESO VS. JUDGE DAGUMAN, AM#MTJ-99-1211, 1/28/2000 – Respondent, a

municipal trial judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar solemnized Complainant’s
marriage in his residence in Calbayog City. SC fined Respondent reasoning that,
a person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also
live and abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts
clearly uncalled for. A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law, he must
also be conscientious and thorough in doing so. Respondent’s reasons to justify
his hurried solemnization of marriage only tend to degrade the revered position
enjoyed by marriage in the hierarchy of social institutions in the country.

CASIMIRO VS. JUDGE FERNANDEZ, AM#MTJ-04-1525, 1/29/2004 – Respondent

failed to return the P4,000-cash bond posted by Complainant in a criminal case
despite the dismissal of said case. Later, Respondent issued his wife’s check in
payment of said cash bond. In suspending him, SC held that, while there is no
direct and hard evidence that Respondent made personal use of the cash
bond, his wife’s issuance of her personal check to Complainant in the amount of
said bond, indicates so. By his actuations then, Respondent placed his honesty
and integrity under serious doubt. A judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities.
TOBIAS VS. JUDGE LIMSIACO, AM#MTJ-09-1734, 1/19/11 – Complainant accused
Respondent of corruption for allegedly offering package deals to litigants
claiming that the court stenographer informed her sister that Respondent asked
for P30,000 to provide counsel, prepare pleadings and ensure a favourable
decision in her ejectment case. Fined for gross misconduct, SC held that,
although his alleged package deal offers to litigants was unsubstantiated, it was
improper for Respondent to talk to prospective litigants in his court and to
recommend lawyers to handle cases. Also, his admitted act of preparing the
motion for counsel to withdraw is likewise improper and unethical. The conduct
of a judge should be beyond reproach and reflective of the integrity of his
office.

RALLOS vs. JUDGE GAKO, JR., AM#RTJ-99-1484, 3/17/2000 – Complainants

accused Respondent for dishonesty for issuing an order stating that they (with
their counsel) were supposedly present during the hearing of a motion despite
the fact that they were absent because said hearing was held, at movant’s
instance, two days before the originally scheduled date for hearing. SC fined
Respondent holding that, judges should not only be impartial but also appear
impartial. Litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing,
would be meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased
judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but
must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and
integrity.

VERSOZA VS. JUDGE CONTRERAS, AM#MTJ-06-1636, 3/12/2007 – Respondent,

who provided information to the police regarding the looting of a PLDT tower
implicated Complainant as accessory thereto, latter conducted the preliminary
investigation over the criminal case involving the alleged looting. SC
reprimanded Respondent holding that, the issue of whether a judge should
inhibit himself is addressed to his sound discretion. However, as a judge,
Respondent must kept abreast with law. He should have known that it is well-
entrenched in the Code of Judicial Conduct, prevailing at that time, that
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings
disqualifies him from taking part therein as the same would necessarily spawn a
perception that he is bias and partial.

ATTY. DESCALLAR V. HON. RAMAS, AM#RTJ-06-2015, 12/15/10 – Respondent

reported for work intermittently or did not report at all after he issued an Order
that he would temporarily stop working due to death threats he received in
relation to a decision made over an election protest. SC fined Respondent
reasoning that, indeed, there may be threats to his life as alleged in his order but
such threats do not justify cessation from performing judicial functions Threats
are concomitant peril in public office especially in the judiciary, where
magistrates decide and determine sensitive issues that normally generate or
provoke reprisals from losing litigants. This is a consequence that a judge should
be prepared for. Their exalted position entails a great responsibility unyielding to
one’s personal convenience. A judge is enjoined to perform official duties
honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.

PANTILO III VS. JUDGE CANOY, AM#RTJ-11-2262, 2/9/11 – For verbally ordering
the release of accused in a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide even when no information was yet filed and granting accused’s
motion to release impounded vehicle despite said motion being vilative of the
3-day notice rule, SC fined Respondent despite his invocation of accused’s
constitutional right to bail which supposedly did not require that a person be
charged in court before one could apply for it. While it is settled that an
accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right to bail, the complaint
focused on the manner of accused’s release from detention. In sum, there was
no written application for bail, no certificate of deposit of bail, no written release
order. While Respondent insisted that such may be considered as “constructive
bail,” there is no such species of bail under the Rules. Despite the noblest of
reasons, the Rules of Court may not be ignored at will and at random to the
prejudice of the rights of another.

SEVILLA VS. JUDGE LINDO, AM#MTJ-08-1714, 2/9/11 – Complainant claimed that

Respondent repeatedly reset the hearing of the BP22 cases he filed. In imposing
a fine upon Respondent, SC held that, a trial judge who allows, or abets, or
tolerates numerous unreasonable postponements of trial, whether out of
inefficiency or indolence, or out of bias toward a party is administratively liable.
While postponement of a hearing in a criminal/civil case may at times be
unavoidable, the Court disallows undue/unnecessary postponement of hearings
simply because they cause unreasonable delays in the administration of justice,
and thus, undermines the people’s faith in the Judiciary, aside from aggravating
the financial and emotional burden of litigants. The strict policy on
postponements applies with more force and greater reason to prosecution
involving BP22 cases, the prompt resolution of which has been ensured by their
being now covered by Rules on Summary Procedure – a rule precisely adopted
to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to
enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to speedy disposition of cases.

TIGGANGAY VS. JUDGE WACAS, AM OCA IPI#09-3243-RTJ, 4/1/2013 –

Respondent decided an election protest case adverse to Complainant (and in
favor of one Dagadag). Complainant later complained that Respondent should
have inhibited himself for being Dagadag’s second cousin by affinity as
Respondent’s aunt was supposedly married to Dagadag’s uncle. SC dismissed
the charge against Respondent reasoning that, for all his protestations against
Respondent’s impartiality arising out of the perceived relationship by affinity,
Complainant never moved for the judge’s inhibition – a belated attempt to get
back at Respondent for the latter’s adverse ruling in the electoral protest. A
litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the court and to
raise objections only after an unfavorable decision has already been rendered.
Granting arguendo that Respondent’s aunt is married to Dagadag’s uncle, such
reality is not a ground for mandatory inhibition of a judge as required under
Section 1 of Rule 137, since there is actually no relation of affinity between
Respondent and Dagadag because affinity “the relation that one spouse has to
the blood relatives of the other spouse”. There is no affinity between the blood
relatives of one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. Respondent is
related to his aunt by consanguinity in the third degree, it follows by virtue of the
marriage to Dagadag’s uncle that Respondent is the nephew-in-aw of
Dagadag’s uncle, i.e., a relationship by affinity in the third degree. However,
Respondent is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of Dagadag’s uncle
as they are not his in-laws and thus are not related in any way to Dagadag. In
short, there is no relationship by affinity between Respondent and Dagadag as
they are not in-laws of each other. Hence, Respondent is not disqualified under
Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to hear the election protest.

SPS. DECENA VS. JUDGE MALANYAON, AM#RTJ-10-2217, 4/8/2013 – Respondent

appeared in the administrative hearing of the case against his wife and entered
his appearance therein as “counsel for counsel of the respondent. In later
explaining his actions, Respondent contended that he did so out of filial duty
because their daughter who was a recent barpasser and still inexperienced was
representing his wife. During the pendency of the case, Respondent’s wife
moved for the dismissal claiming that Respondent’s right to due process would
be violated considering that he suffered a heart attack that left him with a
permanent mental impairment and would be incapacitated to understand the
nature and object of the administrative proceedings. SC imposed a fine on
Respondent reasoning that, the issue of violation of due process was unfounded
considering that he had not only been given the opportunity to be heard but
had been actually heard since prior to his massive stroke, he already submitted
his comment containing his explanations and refutations of the charge against
him. His occupying a seat beside his daughter reserved for the lawyers during
the hearing displayed his presumptuousness and probably even his clear
intention to thereby exert his influence as an RTC judge on the hearing officer in
order for the latter to favor his wife’s. His excuse, seemingly grounded on a filial
duty towards his wife and his daughter, did not furnish enough reason for him to
forsake the ethical conduct expected of him as a sitting judge. He ought to
have restrained himself from sitting at that hearing, being all too aware that his
sitting would have him cross the line beyond which was the private practice of
law.

DIONISIO VS. HON. ESCANO, AM#RTJ98-1400, 2/1/1999

FACTS: Respondent posted an advertisement for “attractive waitresses and

personable waiters” for a restaurant in the court bulletin board for more than a
week, interviewed about five applicants, and made suggestions to said
applicants during the screening regarding wearing of dresses with short skirts
and low necklines which screening was in fact videotaped by the “Hoy Gising!”
program. A news ad accepting applicants even listed the address of
Respondent’s court.
RULING: Respondent SUSPENDED for 6 months with WARNING that repetition
of same/similar act to be dealt with more severely. Rule 2.00 of CJC
demands that “a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities”. One who occupies an exalted position in the
administration of justice must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon
him, for his private as well as his official conduct must at all times be free
from the appearance of impropriety. Because appearance is as important
as reality in the performance of judicial functions, like Ceasar’s wife, a judge
must not only be pure but beyond suspicion.
Posting advertisements for the restaurant personnel on the court bulletin board,
using his court address to receive the applications, and of screening applicants
in his court constitute involvement in private business and improper use of office
facilities for the promotion of the family business in violation of the CJC. The
restriction enshrined under Rules 5.02 and 5.03 of the Code of Judicial Ethics on
judges with regard to their own business interests is based on the possible
interference which may be created by these business involvements in the
exercise of their judicial duties which may tend to corrode the respect and
dignity of the courts as the bastion of justice.
Judges must not allow themselves to be distracted from the performance of their
judicial tasks by other lawful enterprises. It has been a time honored rule that
judges and all court employees should endeavor to maintain at all times the
confidence and high respect accorded to those who wield the gavel of justice.

LIWANAG VS. JUDGE LUSTRE, AM#MTJ98-1168, 4/21/1999

FACTS: Respondent was charged administratively for gross immorality and grave
misconduct unbecoming of his profession for supposedly sexually molesting
(demanding “fellatio”) from Complainant. The latter alleged that Respondent
took advantage of her as she desperately needed Respondent to
fasttrack/expedite the hearing/arraignment of the BP22 cases filed by her
husband. Respondent’s defense is based on denial particularly that, BEING 67
YEAR OF AGE, he is no longer capable of what ordinary men indulge in, lest he
die in the attempt, what with his heart condition.
RULING: Respondent guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT, having already retired, he
could no longer be dismissed or suspended, FINED P40,000 and BARRED from
employment in any branch of government.
Complainant may have had ill feelings towards Respondent due to the
unjustifiable delays in the hearing of the B.P. 22 cases. But would she falsely
accuse Respondent with sexual molestation only to get back at him? This goes
against the grain of human nature and therefore unlikely. She should know that
by revealing her sexual misadventures with Respondent, graphically describing
each and every detail, she would only be exposing herself and her family to
shame and ridicule. She would stand to gain nothing from the exercise, save the
hope that her dignity may somehow be vindicated in the process.

GALANG VS. JUDGE SANTOS, AM#MTJ-99-1197, 5/26/1999

FACTS: Respondent was charged with acts unbecoming a judge for allegedly
engaging in the publication of The Mirror, a gossip tabloid, as editor and legal
adviser, and as a gossip-mongering columnist of SunStar Clark, a local
newspaper. Respondent supposedly used his newspaper column to ventilate his
biases or personal anger at people or institutions including Complainant,
Governor Lapid and the Provincial Government.

RULING: Respondent DISMISSED with FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits and

accumulated leave credits, BARRED from any government position/
employment. A judge is the visible representation of law and justice from whom
the people draw their will and inclination to obey the law. His official conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior,
not only in the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach. Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct also provides that a judge should so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

In this case, Respondent displayed a lack of respect toward the Provincial

Prosecutor through the insults he hurled in his articles and pleadings submitted to
the Court. Respondent degraded Complainant’s capabilities as legal adviser of
the Provincial Government, and challenged the governor with disqualification
for allegedly practicing a different profession aside from public office. In his
pleadings, Respondent also belittled complainant as a public officer through
unnecessary and injurious descriptions.

There is a difference between freedom of expression and compromising the

dignity of the Court through publications of emotional outbursts and destructive
criticisms. Respondent’s writing of active and vicious editorials compromises his
duties as judge in the impartial administration of justice, for his views printed on
newspapers reflect on his office as well as on the public officers that he
challenges.

In persistently attacking the Governor’s movie-making activities and repeatedly

threatening to file an action against a public officer, Respondent encourages
litigation and causes dissension against the public officer
concerned. Respondent’s role is to maintain equanimity and not instigate
litigation. This is not to say that one can not question the improper activities of
government officials if there are any. However, it is not proper for a judge to
write publications of carelessly-worded editorials in local newspapers.

SIMBAJON vs. JUDGE ESTEBAN, AM#MTJ-98-1162, 8/11/1999

FACTS: Charging Respondent with sexual harassment and grave misconduct,

Complainant alleged that, Respondent told her that she would become his
girlfriend in exchange for his signature on her employment application.
Thereafter he went on to kiss her against her will. Later, after learning that her
application had been approved, Respondent called Complainant to his
chambers and said that she was already his girlfriend, he embraced her, kissed
her and touched her right breast.
RULING: Respondent DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. By the nature of their work, judges are expected to possess the
highest standard of morality and decency. Canon 2 of the CJC provides that “a
judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities”. Rule 2.01 of the same code further requires that, “a judge should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.”

No married woman would cry sexual assault, subject herself and her family to
public scrutiny and humiliation, and strain her marriage in order to perpetuate a
falsehood. Respondent’s lustful conduct was aggravated by the fact that he was
Complainant’s superior. Instead of acting in loco parentis toward his subordinate
employee, he took advantage of his position and preyed on her.

Respondent has violated the Code which requires every judge to be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence and to avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

At a time when the Courts are trying to disprove its ‘hoodlums-in-robes’ image,
this despicable act of respondent turning his august chambers into a bordello
only further tainted the image of the judiciary. Having proven himself unworthy
to remain in office, Respondent should be weeded out from the service the
soonest possible time lest he further [erode] the faith of the people in Courts.”

NABHAN vs. JUDGE CALDERON, AM#MTJ98-1164, 2/4/2000

FACTS: Respondent asked Complainant to see him in his office at 5pm to discuss
the BP22 case she filed. Respondent then told Complainant to buy him drinks.
Along the way, Respondent kept touching Complainant’s breast and asking her
personal questions. Inside the bar and even on the way home, Respondent
repeatedly kept touching her private parts. Complainant charged Respondent
for acts of lasciviousness committed against her.

RULING: Respondent GUILTY. Respondent admitted having gone to a restaurant

with Complainant, although he denied he did anything malicious to
complainant. If it were true, however, that Respondent was eager to go to Pulilan
to attend the memorial mass for his father, he would not have stayed with
Complainant for two hours just eating and drinking. He could have, after a short
while, asked to be brought to Pulilan in time for the mass. Apparently,
Respondent was more inclined to be with Complainant than to attend the mass
for his father.

Time and again we have admonished judges to conduct themselves in a

manner that is free even from the appearance of impropriety. For judicial
officers to enjoy the trust and respect of the people, it is necessary that they live
up to the exacting standards of conduct demanded by the profession and by
the Code of Judicial Conduct. This is especially true in the case of judges who,
on a daily basis, interact with the public. Their official conduct, as well as
personal behavior, should always be beyond reproach.

Respondent having been ordered dismissed for misconduct and abandonment

of office in another administrative case. For obvious reasons, a dismissed officer
cannot be removed again.

CONCERNED EMPLOYEES OF RTC-DAGUPAN CITY vs. JUDGE FALLORAN-ALIPOSA,

AM#RTJ-1446, 3/9/2000

FACTS: Five employees of Respondent’s court grave sworn testimonies in an

investigation launched by the Supreme Court prompted by a letter-complaint
naming Respondent as one of the two most corrupt judges in Dagupan City. The
testimonies cited Respondent’s alleged corrupt practices, ranging from soliciting
money from an accused’s brother to facilitate the latter’s release from
detention despite earlier grant of a motion for demurrer, soliciting money from
practicing lawyers to pay for the food for guests to the Judges’ dialogue with
the Chief Justice, to personal use of the court telephone and Respondent’s
acting as commissioner in ex-parte proceedings at times without the court
stenographer and interpreter present.

RULING: Respondent DISMISSED, all retirement benefits and leave credits

FORFEITED with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency. A
judge is the visible representation of the law and the embodiment of the
people's sense of justice and that, accordingly, he should constantly keep away
from any act of impropriety, not only in the performance of his official duties but
also his everyday actuations. No other position exacts a greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than perhaps a seat in the
judiciary. A judge must be the first to abide by the law and to weave an
example for the others to follow." A judge should always be a symbol of
rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt
whatsoever about his honesty.

Verily, no position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and

uprightness of any individual than a seat with on the Bench. Within the hierarchy
of courts, trial courts stand as an important and visible symbol of government,
especially considering that as opposed to appellate courts, trial judges are
those directly in contact with the parties, their counsel and the communities in
which the Judiciary is bound to serve. Occupying as he does an exalted position
in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor
bestowed upon him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times in such
manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching
scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.
In insulating the Bench from the unwarranted criticism, thus preserving our
democratic way of life, it is essential that judges, like Caesar’s wife, should be
above suspicion.

All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds that
exhortation that "[T]he administration of justice is a mission. Judges, from the
lowest to the highest levels are the gems in the vast government bureaucracy,
beacon lights looked upon as the embodiments of all what is right, just and
proper, the ultimate weapons against injustice and oppression. The Judiciary
hemorrhages every time a Judge himself transgresses the very law he is sworn to
uphold and defend at all costs. This should not come to pass."

FISCAL RUIZ vs. JUDGE BRINGAS, AM#MTJ-00-1266, 4/6/2000

FACTS: Charging Respondent with serious misconduct and inefficiency,

Complainant alleged that during the hearing a criminal case before
Respondent, a verbal exchange between him and Respondent. The exchange
occurred after accused pleaded guilty and Complainant requested for time to
submit his recommendation. To this request, Respondent made several remarks
such as, Complainant would only prolong accused’s agony, he should come to
court prepared. Respondent even directed that it be put on record that
Complainant does not know how to compute the proper penalty and even
took the bar three times (to which Complainant retorted that it be also made on
record that Respondent did not graduate from Ateneo). Complainant further
alleged that, Respondent "is fond of insulting and maligning both young lawyers
and old (like saying, “you go to hell”) including the prosecutors who appear
before him in the presence of party litigants and lawyers.
RULING: Respondent SUSPENDED for 1 month without pay for conduct
unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, WARNED that repetition of the
same/similar act will be dealt with more severely. As stated in Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, “a judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all his activities”.

The duty to maintain respect for the dignity of the court applies to members of
the bar and bench alike. A judge should be courteous both in his conduct and
in his language especially to those appearing before him. He can hold counsels
to a proper appreciation of their duties to the court, their clients, and the public
without being petty, arbitrary, overbearing, or tyrannical. He should refrain from
conduct that demeans his office and remember always that courtesy begets
courtesy. Above all, he must conduct himself in such a manner that he gives no
reason for reproach.

REYES VS. JUDGE DUQUE, AM#RTJ-08-2136, 9/21/10

FACTS: A bank sought a writ of possession of a piece of land against its owners.
Alleging that she had purchased said land from its owners with the bank’s
knowledge, Complainant entered the case as a party-in-intervention.
Complainant charged Respondent of demanding 100T (of which she
supposedly paid 38T) in exchange for denial of the bank’s motion for a writ of
possession. Complainant further alleged that, on one occasion that she
delivered money to Respondent at his house, he embraced and kissed her,
raised her skirt, opened her blouse and sucked her breast, touch her private
parts and attempted to have sexual intercourse with Complainant. Respondent
supposedly stopped only when Complainant said that if he wanted to she
preferred going to a hotel.

RULING: Respondent GUILTY of impropriety and gross misconduct, FINED

P40,000.00 deductible from his retirement benefits. On the charge of graft and
corruption, the Investigating Justice and the OCA found insufficient evidence to
sustain Reyes’ allegation that Judge Duque demanded and received money
from her in consideration of a favorable ruling. Thus, this charge should be
dismissed for being unsubstantiated.

On the otherhand, substantial evidence pointed to Respondent’s impropriety

and gross misconduct when he sexually assaulted Complainant. Respondent
even merely attempted to destroy Complainant’s credibility when he insinuated
that she could be a “woman of ill repute or a high class prostitute” or one whose
"moral value is at its lowest level." However, no judge has a right to solicit sexual
favors from a party litigant even from a woman of loose morals.
Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.Judges should conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with
the dignity of the judicial office.Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to
freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such
rights, they should always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve
the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
judiciary.

Respondent’s conduct fell short of the exacting standards for members of the
judiciary. He failed to behave in a manner that would promote confidence in
the judiciary. Considering that a judge is a visible representation of the law and
of justice,he is naturally expected to be the epitome of integrity and should be
beyond reproach. Respondent’s conduct indubitably bore the marks of
impropriety and immorality. He failed to live up to the high moral standards of
the judiciary and even transgressed the ordinary norms of decency of society.
Had Judge Duque not retired, his misconduct would have merited his dismissal
from the service.

LADIGON VS. JUDGE GARONG, AM#MTJ-08-1712, 8/20/2008

FACTS: Respondent wrote a letter-complaint to the Chairman of the

Administrative Council of the First United Methodist Church in Michigan, USA,
complaining of the surreptitious manner of the incorporation of the Banard Kelly
Memorial United Methodist Church and singling out Complainant to be part of
the deception. Complainant, prompted by Respondent’s letter, complained to
the Justices of this Court against the Respondent’s improper conduct as an MTC
Judge and his use in a private communication of his official court stationery and
his title as a judge. Respondent, admitting that he used his court’s letterhead
and signed his letter using the word “judge”, reasoned that he merely used an
ordinary bond paper and typed thereon his court’s station “to indicate the
return or inside address”. He further alleged that he “did not see any harm or
abuse in using the word ‘judge’ on the honest belief that he is entitled to use
such appellation.

RULING: Respondent ADMONISHED to be ever mindful of the standards he has to

observe in his use of hi letterhead and title; WARNED that a repetition of this
transgression shall be dealt with more severely.
What is involved here is the rule that “Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities”. Indeed, members of the
Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and
should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their
official duties as well as in their personal behavior and everyday life. No position
exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness on the
individual than a seat in the Judiciary.

That Respondent used an ordinary bond paper and placed thereon his official
station as return address is not totally unmeritorious. This is not an unusual
practice and it would be hypocritical to deny its occurrence at all levels of the
Judiciary, eg., some members of the Judiciary may use a social card with the
letterhead of their office to indicate their address as well as their station within
the judicial hierarchy; some also use notepads bearing their names, designation
and station. A thin line, however, exists between what is proper and what is
improper in such use, and this was the line that the Respondent crossed when
he used his letterhead and title the way he did. Respondent’s transgression was
not per se in the use of the letterhead, but in not being very careful and
discerning in considering the circumstances surrounding the use of his
letterhead and his title.

The use of a letterhead should not be considered independently of the

surrounding circumstances of the use – the underlying reason that marks the use
with the element of “impropriety” or “appearance of impropriety”. Respondent
crossed the line of propriety when he used his letterhead to report a complaint
involving an alleged violation of churchrules and, possibly, of Philippine laws.
Coming from a judge with the letter addressed to a foreign reader, such report
could indeed have conveyed the impression of official recognition or notice of
the reported violation.

The same problem that the use of letterhead poses, occurs in the use of the title
of “Judge” or “Justice” in the correspondence of a member of the Judiciary.
While use of the title is an official designation as well as an honor that an
incumbent has earned, a line still has to be drawn based on the circumstances
of the use thereof. While the title can be used for social and other identification
purposes, it cannot be used with the intent to use the prestige of his judicial
office to gainfully advance his personal, family or other pecuniary interests. Nor
can the prestige of a judicial office be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, or to convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge. To do any of these is to
cross into the prohibited field of impropriety.

PERFECTO VS. JUDGE CONSUELO ESIDERA, AM-RTJ-11-2270, 1/31/11

Respondent was charged with soliciting and receiving money from a fiscal and
a private practitioner supposedly to defray expenses for a religious celebration
and barangay fiesta. In her answer, Respondent brushed off the affidavit of
Fiscal Ching who witnessed the solicitation, claiming that the fiscal who was a
former law student to whom she gave a grade of “3” because her ‘codigo’ was
still inserted in the examination booklet, is of “dubious personality” with a
“narcissistic personality disorder”. FINED for impropriety and conduct
unbecoming, the Supreme Court held that, use of acerbic words was uncalled
for considering Respondent’s status. Further, her act of soliciting (under the guise
of a religious cause) betrays not only her lack of maturity as a judge but also a
lack of understanding of her vital role as an impartial dispenser of justice, held in
high esteem and respect by the local community, which must be preserved at
all times. It spawns the impression that she was using her office to unduly
influence or pressure Atty. Yruma, a private lawyer appearing before her sala,
and Prosecutor Diaz into donating money through her charismatic group for
religious purposes. A judge must be like Caesar’s wife - above suspicion and
beyond reproach. Respondent’s act discloses a deficiency in prudence and
discretion that a member of the judiciary must exercise in the performance of his
official functions and of his activities as a private individual. It is never trite to
caution Respondent to be prudent and circumspect in both speech and action,
keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the courtroom is always under
constant observation.

ATTY. CORREA VS. JUDGE BELEN, AM#RTJ-10-2242

FACTS: Complainant, a co-administrator in an intestate estate proceedings
before Respondent, complained that during a hearing, Respondent disagreed
with various items in the administrator’s report including the financial report,
scolded the accountant with threat of suit before the regulatory body
overseeing all certified public accountants. Respondent also rebuked
Complainant for some mistakes in managing the affairs of the estate, adding
that it is regrettable "because Atty. Raul Correa is a U.P. Law Graduate and a
Bar Topnotcher at that." Later, despite his explanation, Respondent cited
Complainant in indirect contempt for allegedly making unlawful withdraws with
a co-administrator from the estate’s account.

RULING: Respondent GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge, FINED P10,000,

STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely. Indeed, the New CJC exhorts members of the judiciary, in the
discharge of their duties, to be models of propriety at all times. Canon 4
mandates, “propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge”. Also Sections 1 and 6 thereof reads
that, “judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities”, and “judges like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they
shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of
the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary”.

The Code also calls upon judges to ensure equality of treatment to all before the
courts. Section 3, Canon 5 on Equality provides that, “judges shall carry out
judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties,
witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on
any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.

Respondent should be more circumspect in his language in the discharge of his

duties. A judge is the visible representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at
all times, in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand
the most searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of propriety
of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial
system.

A judge must consistently be temperate in words and in actions. Respondent

insulting statements, tending to project Complainant's ignorance of the laws
and procedure, coming from his inconsiderate belief that the latter mishandled
the cause of his client is obviously and clearly insensitive, distasteful, and
inexcusable. Such abuse of power and authority could only invite disrespect
from counsels and from the public. Patience is one virtue that members of the
bench should practice at all times, and courtesy to everyone is always called
for.
ATTY. JIMENEZ, JR. V. JUDGE AMDENGAN, 2/13/2013

Complainant, the lawyer and attorney-in-fact for plaintiff in an ejectment case

before Respondent claimed that the latter judge gross inefficiency and
negligence and gross ignorance of law for failing to render decision in said civil
case within the 30-day period mandated under the Rules of Summary
Procedure and for having subsequently dismissed the case without prejudice for
failure to comply with barangay conciliation procedure. SC FINED Respondent
for unde delay in rendering a decision. The charge of gross ignorance of the law
was dismissed for being judicial in nature. Complainant in charging Respondent
with gross ignorance of the law was already assailing the propriety of the
decision rendered. The administrative complaint did not contain allegations that
the dismissal of the ejectment case was marred by unethical behaviour on his
part. Thus, an administrative complaint against Respondent is not the proper
remedy to assail his judgment. Administrative complaints against judges cannot
be pursued simultaneously with judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved
by erroneous orders or judgments of the former. Administrative remedies are
neither alternative to judicial review nor do they cumulate thereto, where such
review is still available to the aggrieved parties and the case has not yet been
resolved with finality. In the instant case, Complainant had the available
remedy of appeal when her ejectment complaint was dismissed.

NAVARRO V. JUDGE DEL ROSARIO, AM#MTJ-96-1091, 3/21/1997

Complainant filed a complaint for physical injuries when his son was side swept
by a fast-m0ving passenger jeepney. Trial was conducted for a year by Judge
Bantolo who later was transferred to another municipal trial court. Meanwhile,
Respondent assumed the post of judge of the court where Complainant’s case
was pending and was notified upon manifestation by private prosecutor that
since rebuttal witness could not be presented, they were submitting the case for
decision. Respondent failed to render a decision confiding to Complainant that
he could not decide the case since it was filed prior to his assumption. The case
remained undecided for 3 years constraining Complainant to write the Chief
Justice to complain of such delay in violation of the constitutional mandate for
speedy dispensation of justice. Respondent explained that he could not decide
the case because Judge Bantolo should be the one to pen the decision having
tried the case in its entirety, nonetheless, he would decide the case if told to do
so. Complainant’s letter was then docketed as an administrative matter. SC
FINED Respondent P8,000 reasoning that his contention that it was Judge
Bantolo who should write the decision having conducted the entire trial is
without basis he already assumed the post when the case was submitted for
decision. Admin.Circ. No 3-94 required cases submitted for decision at the time
of the appointment of a new judge to be decided by the judge to whom they
were submitted for decision. Respondent’s failure to decide the criminal case for
an inordinate length of time, that is, more than 4 years constitutes neglect of
duty. The requirement of the law that cases be decided within a specified
period from their submission (Art. 8, Sec. 15, Constitution) is designed to prevent
delay in the administration of justice. For justice delayed is often justice denied,
and delay in the disposition of cases erodes the people’s faith and confidence
in the judiciary, lowers its standard and brings it into disrepute.

RAYMUNDO VS. JUDGE ANDOY, AM No. MTJ-09-1738, 10/6/2010

FACTS: Respondent, presiding over several BP22 cases filed by Complainant,

ordered accused as having waived the right to present evidence. He later
recalled this order and kept resetting the schedule for the hearing of the cases
on account of accused’s absence. When Respondent finally issued an order
striking accused’s testimony from the records Complainant filed two motions
(spanning two years from each other) for the resolution/decision of the cases.
Notwithstanding said motion, Respondent failed to render judgment thereon.

RULING: Respondent guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision and violating

Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC) and FINEDP20,000.
Respondent failed to observe the mandated period of time to decide cases
under Section 17 of the Rule on Summary Procedure (that is, within 30 days from
termination of trial). His failure to meet this deadline is a patent indication that he
did not take into account and had disregarded the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Judges are enjoined to dispose of the court’s business promptly and

expeditiously and to decide cases within the period fixed by law. Failure to
comply with the mandated period constitutes a serious violation of the
constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases – a lapse
that undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it to disrepute. This constitutional policy is reiterated in Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires a judge to
dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods. The requirement that cases be decided within the reglementary period
is designed to prevent delay in the administration of justice, for obviously, justice
delayed is justice denied.

RALLOS, ET. AL. vs. JUDGE GAKO, JR., AM#RTJ-99-1484

FACTS: This relates to the resolution of the complaint filed by Executive Secretary
Zamor against Respondent for ordering the release of 25,000 sacks of rice which
were pending seizure and forfeiture proceedings with the Bureau of Customs
RULING: Respondent guilty of gross ignorance of law, SUSPENDED for 3 months
without pay, STERNLY WARNED that commission of similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. A judge may be held administratively liable for gross ignorance
of the law when it is shown that -- motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption -- he ignored, contradicted or failed to apply settled law and
jurisprudence.

Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or
regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of
Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. The
Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and
forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from
assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus. Clearly, Respondent decided against a settled
doctrine. This act constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

TUGOT vs. JUDGE COLIFLORES, AM#MTJ-00-1332, 2/16/2004

FACTS: Respondent dismissed an ejectment case wherein Complainant was one

of the plaintiffs who were later advised to re-file their notice of appeal because
the latter was not in the records transmitted to the appellate court. As it turned
out, the notice of appeal was not lost but was simply misplaced in Respondent’s
office. Also, Respondent waited for 900 days for defendants to submit their pre-
trial brief, and conducted the preliminary conference in violation of the
requirements of the applicable rules on summary procedure.

RULING: Respondent FINED P20,000 for negligence and violation of a Supreme

Court Rule and directive. Courts exist to dispense and promote justice. The
realization of this solemn purpose depends to a great extent on the intellectual,
moral and personal qualities of the men and women who are called to serve as
judges. Verily, the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that they possess the
highest degree of competence, integrity and independence.
Judicial competence demands that judges should be proficient in both
procedural and substantive aspects of the law. They have to exhibit more than
just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules and be conversant,
as well, with basic legal principles and well-settled authoritative doctrines. To
the end that they be the personification of justice and rule of law, they should
strive for a level of excellence exceeded only by their passion for truth. Anything
less than this strict standard would subject them to administrative sanction.

Respondent failed to demonstrate the required competence in administering an

ejectment case. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases are covered by
summary procedure because they involve the disturbance of the social order
which must be restored as promptly as possible. Respondent caused undue
delay in dispensing the civil suit by failing to observe the period within which to
conduct the preliminary conference which, according to Sec. 8 of Rule 70, shall
be held “not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed.” Respondent
conducted the preliminary conference more than two years after the filing of
the last answer. Note that the adoption of the Rule on Summary Procedure is
part of the commitment of the judiciary to enforce the constitutional right of
litigants to a speedy disposition of their cases. Any member of the judiciary who
causes the delay sought to be prevented by the Rule is sanctionable.

The misplacement of the notice of appeal indicates gross negligence.

Respondent should have been more prudent in determining the cause of its
temporary loss, which caused unnecessary inconvenience to Complainant,
whose right to appeal was affected. As administrative officers of the courts,
judges should organize and supervise court personnel to ensure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, as well as the observance of high standards of
public service and fidelity at all times. He should adopt a system of records
management, so that files are kept intact despite the temporary absence of the
person primarily responsible for their custody.

ALCARAZ vs. JUDGE LINDO, AM#MTJ-04-1539, 4/14/2004

FACTS: Complainant impleaded as co-defendant in a civil collection suit before

Respondent was declared in default. After ex-parte presentation of evidence
by plaintiff, judgment was rendered against Complainant and her co-
defendants from which they filed a motion to annul judgment. The latter motion
however was denied. Complainant alleged that she was not furnished various
pleading and orders including plaintiff’s motion to declare defendants in default
and the order granting the same.

RULING: Respondent FINED P5,000 for violating Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct; WARNED that repetition of this or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. Rule 9, Section 3 (a) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that,
“a party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but shall
not take part in the trial”. As such, even when a defendant is already declared in
default, he is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings. Complainant’s
assertion that she was not furnished, not only with the order of default, but the
subsequent orders of Respondent and Respondent’s failure to controvert this
allegations, leaves us with no other conclusion other than that respondent judge
was remiss in his duty to observe the Rules.

Respondent’s failure to comply with the elementary dictates of procedural rules

constitutes a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Code is explicit in its
mandate that, “a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence”. Competence is the mark of a good judge. Having accepted the
exalted position of a judge, whereby he judges his own fellowmen, the judge
owes it to the public who depend on him, and to the dignity of the court he sits
in, to be proficient in the law.

We reiterate that judges are duty bound to be faithful to the law and to maintain
professional competence at all times. Their role in the administration of justice
requires a continuous study of the law, lest public confidence in the judiciary be
eroded by incompetence and irresponsible conduct.

SPS. CABICO vs. JUDGE EVELYN DIMACULANGAN-QUERIJERO, AM#RTJ-02-1735,

4/27/2007

FACTS: Complainants were the parents of a 17-year old rape victim in a criminal
case pending before Respondent’s sala. When Complainants’ counsel
manifested in court that there would be no settlement in the rape case,
Respondent angrily shouted at Complainant (Silva) to right then and there return
all the money already received as partial payment for settlement of the civil
aspect. Later, Respondent forced them to sign an affidavit of desistance, and
despite their refusal, issued an order dismissing the case against the three
accused supposedly on the ground of full payment of civil liability and disinterest
to prosecute the criminal aspect. Respondent claimed that the charges against
her was a machination of Complainants’ counsel who had an axe to grind
against her for losing a petition for habeas corpus decided by Respondent.
Respondent added that in disposing the criminal case, she applied Section 2(a),
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court requiring courts to “consider the possibility of an
amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of resolution.”

RULING: Respondent FINED P21,000for gross ignorance of the law; with STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will merit more severe
sanction. Respondent dismissed the criminal case after the accused had paid
their individual civil liability. This is in utter disregard and in gross ignorance of
the law because payment of civil liability does not extinguish criminal liability.

The victim’s affidavit of desistance] (subsequently made) could not have

justified the dismissal of the criminal cases. Republic Act No. 8353, (Anti-Rape
Law of 1997) having reclassified rape as a crime against persons, any public
prosecutor, even without the complaint of the victim or her parents, or
guardian, can prosecute the offender. Even further, the victim’s affidavit of
desistance, would not justify the dismissal because said affidavit, by itself, is not
a ground for the dismissal of an action, once the action has been instituted in
court. When a law or a rule is basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply
the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the law.

As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is

expected to keep abreast with and be proficient in the interpretation of our
laws. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, Respondent owes the
public and the court she sits in proficiency in the law.

Respondent also clearly violated Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct that, “a judge should behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”. Respondent
showed partiality in accused’s favor when she ordered the dismissal of the
criminal case supposedly due to payment of civil liability and private
complainant’s disinterest in prosecuting the criminal aspect when the records
revealed that on that same day, Complainants had refused to sign the affidavit
of desistance already prepared for them.
Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that “a judge
shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence”.
Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. When a judge
displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, such incompetence erodes the
public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. Basic rules of procedure
must be at the palm of a judge’s hands.

We cannot countenance Respondent’s discourtesy in insulting Complainant

during the hearing and her statement then was unbecoming a judge – a
display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of a trial which is
incompatible with the needful attitude and sobriety of a good judge.
Respondent’s actuations violated Rule 3.04 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, that, “a judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers,
especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing
before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of
mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the
litigants”.

OCA vs. vs. JUDGE BAGUNDANG, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1937

FACTS: Following a judicial and physical inventory of cases, in March 2003,

Respondent was ordered by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to
explain his failure to decide and take action on various cases. About two years
later, Respondent submitted his compliance attaching copies of the decisions
and orders issued by him in the cases cited by the OCA memo in 2003. He
however offered no explanation as to his failure to decide within the mandatory
period the cases cited in the same memo.

RULING: Respondent FINEDP20,000.00 for gross inefficiency. Sec. 15, Art. 8 of the
Constitution requires lower courts to decide or resolve all cases within three
months from date of submission. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct states that, “a judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and
decide cases within the required periods”. The 90-day period is mandatory. Any
delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of
his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
Respondent failed to decide five (5) cases and to resolve a pending motion
within the mandatory period, and offered no explanation for it. Worse, he
submitted his compliance with the OCA directives only two (2) years after they
were issued against him. Failure to decide even a single case within the
required period, absent sufficient justification,constitutes gross inefficiency
meriting administrative sanction.
Regarding directives from the OCA, judges should treat them as if issued directly
by the Court and comply promptly and conscientiously with them since it is
through the OCA that this Court exercises its constitutionally mandated
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. Failure to do
so constitutes misconduct and exacerbates administrative liability.
In the case at bar, suspension is not an option considering that Judge
Bagundang retired compulsorily on July 10, 2004. Hence, the imposition of a fine.

CAÑEDA vs. JUDGE MENCHAVEZ, AM# RTJ-06-2026, 3/4/2009

FACTS: Complainant was counsel for one of the defendants in a civil case for
partition before Respondent’s sala. During the hearing, Respondent asked
Complainant if his clients were amenable to segregate only a share of one of
the plaintiffs. Complainant then advanced the idea that the parties go to
mediation. Respondent then blurted out, “never mind mediation,
walayhinungdanna (it's useless).” When Respondent checked on the progress of
the case, Complainant remarked that it was being delayed because no proper
summons (by publication) had been served on defendants residing outside the
country. Respondent reacted by angrily banging his gavel and shouting, “I said
no publication period.” He banged the gavel so hard, it broke and its head flew
into the air almost hitting Complainant. Respondent then slammed the table
with his hand, went inside his chambers and later returned with a holstered
handgun which he smashed on the table. Angrily Respondent shouted at
Complainant, “Unsay gusto nimo? Yawa! Gahigulo!” (What do you want? Devil!
Hardheaded!).

RULING: Respondent FINED for vulgar and unbecoming conduct a judge;

WARNED that repetition of the same or similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely; Complainant ADMONISHED to be mindful of the respect due to the
court and avoid actions bordering on disrespect in representing his clients.
There were basic disagreements on approaches and issues in the partition case.
In the courtroom, a lawyer makes submissions before a judge whose role is to
hear and consider the submissions, and subsequently rule on the matter. It is not
a situation where two equals, such as the opposing counsels, argue against
each other. Respondent apparently had a misplaced concept of what a
courtroom situation should ideally be, so that he was effectively arguing with
counsel as shown by his clearly contentious stance when he made his ruling. This
was Respondent’s first error; he should have coolly ruled and allowed counsel to
respond to his ruling, instead of proceeding in a manner that invited further
arguments.

Complainant also erred since he continued to argue despite Respondent’s

ruling. Respondent judge’s response, under this situation, should have been to
direct Complainant to wind up his arguments under pain of direct contempt if
this warning would be disregarded. Thereafter, he could have declared
Complainant in direct contempt if he persisted in his arguments. A direct
contempt, of course, is not enforced by a judge’s act of bringing out his weapon
and asking counsel the direct question “What do you want?” This
confrontational manner – shown usually in the western genre of movies – has no
place in our present justice system. There are agents of the law, specifically,
officers of the court and the police who can be called upon to implement
contempt orders and restore order as needed.

Respondent overreacted in his handling of the situation before his court.

Bringing out a gun for everyone present in the court to see, even for purposes of
maintaining order and decorum in the court, is inexcusable in the absence of
overt acts of physical aggression by a party before the court. The New Code of
Judicial Conduct requires “`(Judges) shall ensure that not only is their conduct
above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer,” and their “behavior and conduct x xx must reaffirm the peoples' faith
in the integrity of the judiciary”.
The Code itself sets limits on how a judge should do this. Section 6, Canon 6 of
the Code provides: “Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in
an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or
control.

JUSON vs. JUDGE MONDRAGON, AM#MTJ-07-1685, 10/3/2007

FACTS: Complainant charged that Respondent unduly delayed resolving (for

over three years), the motion to intervene which Complainant filed in a civil
case for recovery of possession of a land. The pendency of Complainant’s
motion caused numerous postponements and resetting of the main case.
Respondent admitted the delays but cited, failing health due to a stroke and his
load of supervising three courts at a time, as causes of delay.

RULING: Respondent FINED P10,000 for undue delay in the disposition of

Complainant’s motion for intervention; WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Rules prescribing time within which certain acts must be done, or certain
proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention
of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory. Judicial office
exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in
the discharge of official duties. Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution,
mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower courts must be decided or
resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for decision or
resolution.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, directs judges to “dispose
of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.”
Strict adherence to this rule is intended to preserve the integrity, competence,
and independence of the judiciary and make the administration of justice more
efficient and in order not to negate the Court’s efforts minimize, if not totally
eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued
Philippine courts. Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics also exhort
judges “to be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering
that justice delayed is often justice denied” and “to be punctual in the
performance of his judicial duties x xx”.

His failing health, as an excuse for the delay hardly merits serious consideration.
Even if he was stricken by an illness hampering his due performance of his
duties, it was incumbent upon him to inform this Court of his inability to
seasonably decide the cases assigned to him. As to his additional work in
supervising three courts at a time, such will not exonerate him. His failure to
decide the case on time cannot be ignored. Respondent should have know that
if his caseload, additional assignments or designations, health reasons or other
facts prevented the timely disposition of his pending cases, all he had to do was
simply ask this Court for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of his cases.

As frontline of the judiciary, judges should, at all times, act with efficiency and
with probity. They are duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but likewise
to maintain professional competence to sustain the trust and confidence which
the public reposed in them and the institution they represent. The judge is the
visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. Thus, he must
be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow.
He should be studiously careful to avoid committing even the slightest infraction
of the Rules.

MONTICALBO V. JUDGE MACARAYA, AM#RTJ-09-2197, 4/13/11

In admonishing Respondent for citing a non-existent case – Jaravata v. Court of

Appeals with case number CA G.R. No. 85467 supposedly promulgated on April
25, 1990 – in his order, the Supreme Court held that, a search of available legal
resources reveals that no such decision has been promulgated by the Supreme
Court. Further, Supreme Court docket numbers do not bear the initials, “CA G.R.”
and, it cannot be considered a CA case because the respondent was the
“Court of Appeals.” This was counter to the standard of competence and
integrity expected of those occupying Respondent’s judicial position. A judge
must be “the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.” While
a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment without proof that it was
made with a deliberate intent to cause an injustice, still he is required to observe
propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official duties.

TAN VS. JUDGE USMAN, AM#RTJ-11-2666, 2-15-11

Complainant and her co-party litigants filed a motion to inhibit Respondent.

During the hearing for said motion, Respondent became emotional, forced
Complainant to testify without counsel, demanding a public apology,
relentlessly interrogating her and finally ordering her detained for direct
contempt finding her in direct contempt until she divulged her informant or
publicly apologized to the court but not exceeding 30 days. Supreme Court
fined Respondent. No amount of rationalization can reconcile the limit of the 10-
day period of imprisonment for direct contempt set in Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court with the 30-day maximum period of imprisonment fixed by Respondent.
By virtue of his office, Respondent knows or should have known this so basic a
rule. The glaringly clarity of the rule tripped Respondent to commit a glaring
error which was made even more flagrant by the fact that Respondent was
actually detained for 19 days. Failure to follow basic legal commands as
prescribed by law and the rules is tantamount to gross ignorance of the law.

OCA VS. FORMER JUDGE LEONIDA, AM#RTJ-09-2198, 1/18/11

Per judicial audit and inventory conducted when Respondent availed of

optional retirement, the Office of the Court Administrator determined that
Respondent failed to decide 102 criminal cases and 43 civil cases as well as to
resolved motions in 10 civil cases. Supreme Court FINED Respondent. A judge’s
failure to decide a case within the reglementary period warrants administrative
sanction. The Court treats such cases with utmost rigor for delay in the
administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a
speedy disposition of his case. Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking
justice, it undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary lowering
its standards and bringing it to disrepute. The administration of justice demands
that those who don judicial robes be able to comply fully and faithfully with the
task set before them. As frontline officials of the judiciary, judges should, at all
times, act with efficiency and with probity. They are duty-bound not only to be
faithful to the law, but likewise to maintain professional competence. The pursuit
of excellence must be their guiding principle. This is the least that judges can do
to sustain the trust and confidence which the public reposed on them and the
institution they represent.

OCA VS. JUDGE ESTRADA, AM#RTJ-09-2173, 1/18/11

In the review of the monthly report of cases from MTCC Malaybalay, Bukidnon,
the OCA noted that Respondent issued orders dismissing certain cases even
when he was no longer the judge of said court having been promoted to the
RTC. Likewise the RTC Executive Judge (Bacal) issued similar orders affecting
certain MTCC cases. Both judges admitted the acts claiming that they did not
intend to violate the law, acting as they did out of their desire to uphold the
accused’s right to liberty in the cases they took cognizance of. Supreme Court
FINED both judges. Their shared intention to uphold the accused’s right to liberty
cannot justify their action in excess of their authority in violation of existing
regulations. The vacuum in a first level court (MTC) due to the absence of a
presiding judge is not remedied by a take-over of the duties of the still-to-be
appointed or designated judge for that court, which is what they did. Instead of
allowing Respondent and herself to act on pending MTCC cases, the RTC
Executive Judge should have designated a municipal judge within her area of
supervision to act on the pending cases.

MARCOS VS. JUDGE PAMINTUAN, AM#RTJ-07-2062, 1/18/11

In 1996, then Judge Reyes issued an order which later became final and
executor releasing the Golden Buddha statue in custodial legis to the heirs of
Rogelio Roxas. In implementing said order, Respondent in his May 2006 Order
added a statement to the effect that the Golden Buddha in the court’s custody
was a “fake or mere replica”. Having been previously warned and punished for
various infraction, Respondent was dismissed from the service by the Supreme
Court. While judges like any other citizen are entitled to freedom of expression,
belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always
conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial
office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. It is axiomatic that
when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered
it or even by the Supreme Court. It is inexcusable for Respondent to have
overlooked such basic legal principle no matter how noble his objectives were
at that time. Judges owe it to the public to be well-informed, thus, they are
expected to be familiar with the statutes and procedural rules at all times. When
the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it,
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

CONQUILLA VS. JUDGE BERNARDO, AM#MTJ-09-1737, 2/9/11

Respondent was charged with usurpation of authority, grave misconduct and

ignorance of the law for conducting a preliminary investigation and finding
probable cause therein to charged Complainant with direct assault. Supreme
Court SUSPENDED Respondent, reasoning that, Respondent’s conduct of such
preliminary investigation directly contravenes A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC (effective
October 5, 2005), amending Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure (removing the conduct of preliminary investigation from judges of the
first level courts and making it incumbent upon them to forward records of the
case to the Prosecutor’s Office for preliminary investigation). Indeed,
competence and diligence are prerequisites (Canon 3) to the due performance
of judicial office. Hence, when a law or rule is basic, judges owe it to their office
to simply apply the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the law. Judges
should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules and should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in
law and jurisprudence.

DIALO, JR. vs. JUDGE MACIAS, AM#RTJ-04-1859, 7/13/2004

FACTS: A prior administrative complaint was filed by Respondent’s wife for

immorality. Complainant, upon request by Respondent’s wife to help catch and
gather evidence to prove her husband’s philandering, witnessed Respondent
retreat to the house of his suspected mistress. On their way to Manila for the
hearing of the complaint filed by Respondent’s wife, Complainant and another
witness RuelMutia (who were on-board the same boat as Respondent) were
arrested and detained by police officers following Respondent’s report that they
(Complainant and Mutia) were would-be assassins. Hence, this administrative
complaint against Respondent for oppression, abuse of authority, incriminating
an innocent person, grave misconduct and obstruction of justice. Complainant
latter wrote that he was withdrawing his complaint the contents of which he
claimed he did not read and was merely prepared for him and instigated by
Respondent’s wife.

RULING: Respondent FINED p20,000 for oppression. The withdrawal or disavowal

by a complainant of the contents of his administrative complaint does not
necessarily warrant its dismissal. Administrative actions cannot depend on the
will or pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone
what may be detestable. The Court does not dismiss administrative cases
against members of the Bench merely on the basis of withdrawal of the charges.
Desistance cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and decide
the complaint against the respondent because public interest is at stake in the
conduct and actuations of officials and employees of the judiciary.

Having purportedly not seen the list of witness against him in the immorality
complaint, Respondent may not indeed have known that Complainant was
going to testify against him, yet, Respondent was well aware that Mutia, who
was in Complainant’s company in the same boat ride taken by Respondent
(and who was also arrested and detained by the Pasay City Police), was in the
said list of witnesses. Respondent’s disclaimer then that he could not have
committed “obstruction of justice” does not readily persuade.

By respondent’s act of requesting for complainant’s and his companion’s

warrantless arrest, he violated complainant’s constitutional right, an act which
partakes of the nature of oppression, defined as an “act of cruelty, severity,
unlawful exaction, domination or excessive use of authority.”

LASTIMOSA-DALAWAMPU vs. JUDGE YRASTORZA, AM#RTJ-03-1793, 2/5/2004

FACTS: Complainant appeared before Respondent’s court and asked for a

resetting but Respondent cut her off by saying that, “Do not give me so many
excuses, Atty. Dalawampu! I don’t care who you are!”. As she was leaving the
courtroom, Respondent said, “I don’t care who you are”. “You can file one
thousand administrative cases against me. I don’t care”. In another case,
Complainant appeared as private prosecutor, Respondent scolded her for
failure to file pre-trial brief. Subsequently, when pre-trial was conducted and
Complainant was absent due to another engagement, Respondent ordered
Complainant’s client to produce the original documents in five minutes, or the
case would be dismissed – this, despite the fact that, Complainant’s submitted
pre-trial brief indicating that documentary exhibits would be marked in the
course of trial.

RULING: Respondent REPRIMANDEDfor discourtesy against Complainant;

WARNED that repetition of this or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Mere desistance on Complainant’s part does not warrant dismissal of an
administrative complaint against any member of the bench and the judiciary.
The Court’s interest in the affairs of the judiciary is a paramount concern that
knows no bounds. Hence, instead of dismissing the charge as recommended,
the Court, in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision, resolves to
reprimand respondent judge for his failure to exercise greater circumspection in
dealing with the complainant.

Upon his assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He

becomes the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice.
He must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. A
magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such manner that his
conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the
public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.

The tenor of Respondent’s statement can easily instill in the minds of those who
heard them that as a judge he is above the law. Such a remark creates an
impression on the public that whatever administrative case they will file against
respondent or against any judge will only be a futile exercise. Statements such
as those made by respondent judge erode the public’s confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary. Respondent’s unwarranted statement is a clear
derogation of his duty to be faithful to the law which he swore to uphold as a
member of the judiciary.

Respondent’s unfounded act of insulting Complainant in open court and cutting

her off in mid-sentence while she was still explaining her side exhibited a
manifest disregard by respondent of his duty to be patient, attentive, and
courteous to lawyers. A judge should conduct proceedings in court with fitting
dignity and decorum.

A judge’s duty to observe courtesy to those who appear before him is not
limited to lawyers. The said duty also includes being courteous to litigants and
witnesses. Respondent’s conduct towards Consuelo Aznar leaves a lot to be
desired. Respondent’s act in this instance smacks of judicial tyranny. A judge
anywhere should be the last person to be perceived as a petty tyrant holding
imperious sway over his domain. Thus, the role of a judge in relation to those who
appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy.

Judges are strictly mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial
Conduct and existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of our
people in the administration of justice. Any act which falls short of the exacting
standard for public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve
the image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced.

HECK vs. JUDGE SANTOS, AM#RTJ-01-1657, 2/23/2004

FACTS: “MAY A RETIRED JUDGE CHARGED WITH NOTARIZING DOCUMENTS

WITHOUT THE NECESSARY COMMISSION MORE THAN 20 YEARS AGO BE
DISCIPLINE THEREFOR? Complainant charged that, prior to appointment as RTC
Judge, Respondent violated the notarial law for notarizing documents in 1980 to
1984 without being duly commissioned as notary public. Respondent countered
that Complainant was neither privy to, nor prejudiced by the documents in
question and that further, Complainant had an axe to grind being one of the
defendants in a civil suit which he decided in favor of the plaintiff therein.

RULING: Respondent FINED P5,000.00 for notarizing documents without the

requisite notarial commission. It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for
acts committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary. This is recognized by
the new Rule itself which provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme
Court for disposition and adjudication of charges against justices and judges
before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary.

Good moral character is a requirement that is not dispensed with upon

admission to the Bar. It is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
legal profession – its continued possession is essential to maintain one’s good
standing in the profession. Thus, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession
of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but
also a continuing requirement to the practice of law.

Respondent is being charged not for acts committed as a judge; he is charged,

as a member of the bar, with notarizing documents without the requisite notarial
commission therefor. Even then, though Respondent has already retired from
the judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the bar and as such, is not
immune to the disciplining arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be
treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act
of notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as
“reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also the crime of
falsification of public documents.”

Pursuant to Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, administrative cases against erring

justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the
government service may be automatically treated as disbarment cases.
However, this case was filed prior to the effectivity of said resolution, hence, the
latter will not apply in this case.

To protect members of the judiciary from harassing complaint, an administrative

complaint against a retiring or retired judge or justice to be dismissed outright
requires the concurrence of the following: (1) the complaint must have been
filed within six months from the compulsory retirement of the judge or justice; (2)
the cause of action must have occurred at least a year before such filing; and,
(3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the respondent. In this
case, the complaint was filed more than one year after Respondent retired
compulsorily from the service. Likewise, the ground for disbarment or disciplinary
action alleged to have been committed by Respondent did not occur a year
before Respondent’s separation from the service. Furthermore, and most
importantly, the instant complaint was not prima facie shown to be without
merit and intended merely to harass the respondent.

CAÑADA vs. SUERTE, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1884, 2/22/2008

FACTS: Complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, he refused Respondent

who was trying to sell him a dilapidated cargo truck and Daewoo car. Later,
Respondent allegedly offered to act as broker for the sale of Complainant’s real
property, to which Complainant agreed. When he had a prospective buyer,
Respondent demanded that of the P1.6M purchase price he would get a P1M-
commission. Complainant refused, and the sale did not push through,
thereupon Respondent became angry and threatened Complainant that, as a
judge, he could deprive Complainant of his property, even have him arrested
and executed. Later, despite the deal being botched, Respondent demanded
a P200T-commission, Complainant allegedly paid P100T. In his defense,
Respondent denied forcing Complainant to purchase certain vehicles but
made no mentioned about receiving P100T from Complainant.

RULING: RULING: Respondent FINED p40,000 for dishonesty; DISBARRED for

violating Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the CPR; his name
ORDERED STRICKEN from Attorney’s Roll. While this case was pending,
respondent was dismissed from the service in another administrative case for
gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and incompetence.

In administrative proceedings, complainant has the burden of proving the

allegations in his complaint with substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion. If a judge should be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence
against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. Here,
Complainant failed to present concrete evidence to substantiate his charges
against Respondent. He did not appear before the investigating justice to prove
his allegations. While he attached to his complaint two affidavits to corroborate
his story, the affiants—a prospective business partner and an AFP comrade—
were not disinterested witnesses whose statements could be given credence.
Mere allegations will leave an administrative complaint with no leg to stand on.

However, Respondent should be held for dishonesty

. Respondent claimed he never owned a dilapidated cargo pick-up truck and

could not recall if he had a Daewoo car in 1998. But his Statements of Assets and
Liabilities for the years 1998 to 2001 on file in the Court prove otherwise. They
show that among his personal properties were a Daewoo car acquired in 1996
and an L-200 double cab acquired in 1998.

Dishonesty is defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;

untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray. This is a grave offense that carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service, even for the first offense. Respondent showed his
capacity to lie and evade the truth. His dishonesty not only tended to mislead
the Court but also tarnished the image of the judiciary. It will warrant the
maximum penalty of dismissal, if not for the fact that he has already been
dismissed from the service in another administrative case.

LYDELLE CONQUILLA V. JUDGE LAURO BERNARDO, AM#MTJ-09-1737, 2/9/11

Respondent was charged with usurpation of authority, grave misconduct and

ignorance of the law for conducting a preliminary investigation and finding probable
cause therein to charged Complainant with direct assault. Supreme Court SUSPENDED
Respondent, reasoning that, Respondent’s conduct of such preliminary investigation
directly contravenes A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC (effective October 5, 2005), amending Rules
112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The latter removed the
conduct of preliminary investigation from judges of the first level courts and making it
incumbent upon them to forward the records of the case to the Prosecutor’s Office for
preliminary investigation. Indeed, competence and diligence are prerequisites (Canon
3) to the due performance of judicial office. Hence, when a law or rule is basic, judges
owe it to their office to simply apply the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the law.
Judges should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules and should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law
and jurisprudence.

JESSIE DE LEON V. ATTY. EDUARDO CASTEL AC#8620, 1/12/11

Complainant complained that Respondent committed dishonesty and falsification in

pleadings filed in behalf of defendants in a civil case who were already dead at the
time of the filing of such pleadings. In DISMISSING the complaint Supreme Court held
that, being officers of the court, attorneys enjoy not only presumption of regularity in the
discharge of their duties, but also immunity from liability to others so long as
performance of their obligations to their clients does not depart from their character as
servants of the law and officers of the court. In particular, statements made in their
client’s behalf relevant, pertinent or material to the subject of the inquiry are absolutely
privileged regardless of their defamatory tenor. Such cloak of privilege is necessary and
essential in ensuring the unhindered service to their clients’ causes and in freely and
courageously speaking for their clients, verbally or in writing, in the course of judicial
and quasi-judicial proceedings, without running the risk of incurring criminal prosecution
or actions for damages. Respondent did not misrepresent that defendants (Spouses Lim
Hio and Dolores Chu) were still living. On the contrary, he directly stated in the
responsive pleading that said spouses were already deceased. Granting arguendo that
any of Respondent’s pleadings might have created any impression that defendant
spouses were still alive, still Respondent cannot be guilty of any dishonesty or
falsification as he was acting in the interest of the actual owners (children of the
deceased spouses) of the properties when he filed the answer with counterclaim and
cross-claim. “The fair fame of a lawyer, however innocent of wrong, is at the mercy of
the tongue of ignorance or malice. Reputation in such a calling is a plant of tender
growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored.” A lawyer’s reputation is, indeed,
a very fragile object. The Court, whose officer every lawyer is, must shield such fragility
from mindless assault by the unscrupulous and the malicious. It can do so, firstly, by
quickly cutting down any patently frivolous complaint against a lawyer; and, secondly,
by demanding good faith from whoever brings any accusation of unethical conduct. A
Bar that is insulated from intimidation and harassment is encouraged to be courageous
and fearless, which can then best contribute to the efficient delivery and proper
administration of justice.

RODOLFO ESPINOSA V. ATTY. JULIETA OMANA, AC#9081, 10/12/2011

Respondent is charged with violation of the lawyer’s oath, malpractice and gross
misconduct in office for advising Complainant and his wife that they could live
separately and dissolve their marriage, preparing for that purpose, a “Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay. Respondent claimed that, it was not her but a part-time office staff who
notarized the document. In suspending Respondent from law practice and being a
notary public, the Supreme Court held that, extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval is void and a notary public should not facilitate
the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the
spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly
what Omaña did in this case.In preparing and notarizing a void document, Respondent
violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 (duty not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful). Respondent knew fully that the Kasunduan has no legal effect and is against
public policy. Even granting arguendo that, it was her part-time staff who notarized the
contract, it only showed Respondent’s negligence in doing her notarial duties. A notary
public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not
relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any
member of his staff.

ATTY. FLORITA LINCO V. ATTY. JIMMY LACEBAL, AC#7241, 10/17/2011

Respondent is charged with dishonesty and violation of the Notarial Law for notarizing a
deed of donation allegedly executed by Complainant’s husband (Atty. Alfredo Linco)
in favor of his illegitimate minor child, despite Respondent’s knowledge that affiant died
a day prior to notarization. Respondent claimed affiant, whom he meet prior to his
demise, asked him to notarize the deed of donation which affiant signed in
Respondent’s presence. Since Respondent did not have his notarial register, he told
affiant to bring the deed to his office anytime for notarization. Hence, despite
knowledge of death, Respondent notarized the deed to accommodate a colleague.
The Supreme Court suspended Respondent from law practice and being a notary
public finding that, affiant’s previous personal appearance before Respondent does
not justify the notarization of the deed due to affiant’s absence on the day of
notarization. The rule requires Respondent not to notarize a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to its contents and truthfulness. Further, in
the notarial acknowledgment, Respondent attested to affiant’s personal appearance
before him on the day of notarization, yet, affiant clearly could not have appeared as
he already died a day before. Clearly, Respondent made a false statement and
violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.

CORAZON NEVADA V. ATTY. RODOLFO CASUGA, AC#7591, 3/20/2012

Complainant is the principal stockholder of a hotel where One in Jesus Christ Church
holds its services in one of its function rooms. Respondent and Complainant being both
church members, became friends. Respondent took advantage of their friendship by
failing to deliver the P90,000 rental deposit paid, after Respondent represented himself
as hotel administrator and entered into a lease contract with Jung Chul for office
space in the hotel. Complainant also entrusted to Respondent several jewelries
intended for sale. Respondent however, failed to return the proceeds of the sale or the
unsold articles to Complainant. In suspending Respondent from law practice and being
a notary public, the Supreme Court held that, he was guilty of misrepresentation, when
he made it appear that he was authorized to enter into a contract of lease in behalf of
Nevada when, in fact, he was not. For failing to return or remitting proceeds of the sale,
upon demand, he also breached his duty to hold in trust property belonging to his
client (Canon 16, Rule 16.03). Moreover, Respondent’s act of affixing his signature
above the printed name “Edwin Nevada”, without any qualification, veritably made
him a party to the lease contract. Thus, his act of notarizing a deed to which he is a
party is a plain violation of the Rule IV, Sec. 3(a) of the Notarial Rules.

ELPIDIO TIONG V. ATTY. GEORGE FLORENDO, AC#4428, 12/12/2011

Complainant confirmed that Respondent who was his lawyer was having an affair with
his wife when he overheard, through the extension phone, Respondent say “I Love You”
to Complainant’s wife. Later, and in the presence of their spouses, Respondent and
Complainant’s wife admitted their amorous affair and then and there, executed an
affidavit before a notary public attesting to their illicit and seeking their respective
spouses’ forgiveness. This affidavit signed by Complainant, Respondent and their
spouses provided that no criminal or legal action would be taken against the offending
parties. Despite such stipulation, Complainant sought for the disbarment of Respondent
who interposed the defense of pardon. Supreme Court suspended Respondent from
the practice of law holding that his act of having an affair with his client's wife
manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital
vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his
profession. Undeniably, this illicit relationship amounts to a disgraceful and grossly
immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action from the Court. A case for suspension or
disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil
case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable
members in order to protect the public and the courts. It is not an investigation into the
respondent’s acts as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his
fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. Hence, the affidavit, which is akin to an
affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating the proceedings.

LORENZO BRENNISEN V. ATTY. RAMON CONTAWI, AC#7481, 4/24/2012

Being a US resident, Complainant entrusted the administration of land together with its
owner’s duplicate title to Respondent. Via a spurious Special Power of Attorney,
Respondent mortgaged and subsequently sold the subject property to Roberto Ho.
Supreme Court found that Respondent breached Canon 1 in disposing his
Complainant’s property without his knowledge or consent and partaking of the
proceeds of the sale for his own benefit. Respondent’s contention that he merely
accommodated the request of his then financially-incapacitated office assistants to
confirm the spurious SPA is flimsy and implausible, as he was fully aware that
complainant's signature reflected thereon was forged.

ANTONINO MONTICALBO V. JUDGE CRESENTE MACARAYA, AM#RTJ-09-2197, 4/13/11

In admonishing Respondent for citing a non-existent case – Jaravata v. Court of

Appeals with case number CA G.R. No. 85467 supposedly promulgated on April 25,
1990 – in his order, the Supreme Court held that, a search of available legal resources
reveals that no such decision has been promulgated by the Supreme Court. Further,
Supreme Court docket numbers do not bear the initials, “CA G.R.” and, it cannot be
considered a CA case because the respondent was the “Court of Appeals.” This was
counter to the standard of competence and integrity expected of those occupying
Respondent’s judicial position. A judge must be “the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence.” While a judge may not be disciplined for error of
judgment without proof that it was made with a deliberate intent to cause an injustice,
still he is required to observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of
his official duties.

SPS. VIRGILO & ANGELINA ARANDA V. ATTY. EMMANUEL ELAYDA, AC#7907, 12/15/10

Respondent who was Complainants’ counsel in a civil case filed against them, failed to
notify them and appear of the scheduled hearing which resulted in the submission of
the case for decision. Later, Respondent took no steps, or at the very least, informed
Complainants of decision subsequently rendered adverse to them. The decision
became final and executory. Respondent claimed that he did not have Complainants’
contact number or address and that they were the ones remiss in making a follow up
with him of the status of their case. Supreme Court suspended Respondent from the
practice of law citing amongst others, his duty of fidelity to his client’s cause (Canon 17)
and his duty to serve his client with competence (Canon 18), mindful not to neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him (Rule 18.03). It is elementary procedure for a lawyer and
his clients to exchange contact details at the initial stages in order to have constant
communication with each other. While communication is a shared responsibility
between counsel and client, it is the counsel’s primary duty to inform his clients of the
status of their case and the orders issued by the court. He cannot simply wait for his
clients to make an inquiry about the development in their case. Close coordination
between counsel and client is necessary for them to adequately prepare for the case,
as well as to effectively monitor the progress of the case.

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON V. ATTY. MARIANO PEFIANCO, AC#6116, 8/1/2012

After failing to pay Complainant the agreed commission for a case referral,
Respondent wrote to inform Complainant that the client would shoulder payment of
the commission because he agreed to reduce his attorney’s fees. Respondent was
suspended from law practice. The Supreme Court held that, practice of law is a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for the profession. Respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon
of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not
obtain in the case at bar.

GRACE M. ANACTA V. ATTY. EDUARDO RESURRECCION, AC#9074, 8/14/2012

Respondent committed deceitful and dishonest acts by misrepresenting that he had

already filed a petition for annulment of marriage on Complainant’s behalf after
receipt of P42,000.00. He went to the extent of presenting to Complainant a supposed
copy of the petition duly filed with the court. Later, Complainant found out from the
court that no such petition was filed. Finding Respondent guilty of deceit and gross
misconduct, the Supreme Court suspended him from law practice reasoning that, there
is no ironclad rule that disbarment must immediately follow upon a finding of deceit or
gross misconduct. The Court is not mandated to automatically impose the extreme
penalty of disbarment where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.

Anent the issue of whether Respondent should be directed to return the money he
received from Complainant, this case is the opportune time to harmonize the Court’s
ruling on this matter. When the matter subject of the inquiry pertains to the mental and
moral fitness of the respondent to remain as member of the legal fraternity, the issue of
whether respondent be directed to return the amount received from his client shall be
deemed within the Court’s disciplinary authority. In this case, it is clear that Respondent
violated his lawyer’s oath and code of conduct when he withheld the amount of
P42,000.00 despite his failure to render the necessary legal services and after
complainant demanded its return. He must be therefore directed to return the same.

HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. V. ATTY. RICHARD FUNK, AC#9094, 8/15/2012

Hocorma Foundation hired Respodent’s legal services in connection with, among

others, the transfer of one of the properties subject of several suits and over which same
property he later instituted a suit in behalf of Mabalacat Institute without the
foundation’s written consent. The Supreme Court suspended Respondent from the
practice of law reasoning that a lawyer owes his client undivided allegiance. Because
of the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship, sound policy dictates that he be
prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. An
attorney may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. This rule is so
absolute that good faith and honest intention on the erring lawyer’s part does not
make it inoperative. The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his former
client’s doings, whether documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have
acquired were it not for the trust and confidence that his client placed on him in the
light of their relationship.

MANUEL VILLATUYA VS. ATTY. BEBE TABALINGCOS, AC#6622, 7/10/2012

Absent convincing evidence, still the Supreme Court warned that, an agreement like
the one supposedly forged between Respondent and Complainant for the latter to
receive 10% of the former’s attorney’s fees for every judicially-approved corporate
rehabilitation plan prepared by the Complainant, is violative of Rule 9.02. proscribing a
lawyer from dividing or agreeing to divide fees for legal services rendered with a person
not licensed to practice law.

Respondent owned what purports to be a financial and legal consultancy company

which was in reality a vehicle for Respondent to procure professional employment,
specifically for corporate rehabilitation. A company letterhead proposing that should
the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, Respondent would render legal
services related to the former’s loan obligation with a bank proves that Respondent
violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the
purpose of profit. In suspending Respondent, Supreme Court held that, a lawyer is not
prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises
though when the business is of such nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises
when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional
employment for the lawyer, or that can be used as a cloak for indirectly solicitation on
the lawyer’s behalf; or is of such a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be
regarded as practice of law.

FIDELA AND TERESITA BENGCO V. ATTY. PABLO BERNARDO, AC#6368, 6/13/2012

Complainants charged that Respondent with a certain “Magat” enticed them to pay
money supposedly to expedite titling of their property without having performed the
task for which he was engaged. The Supreme Court found untenable Respondent’s
defense of prescription – that the complaint was filed two years after the supposed
deceit was committed. Administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse
of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer.

RODRIGO MOLINA V. ATTY. CEFERINO MAGAT, AC#1900, 6/13/2012

Respondent was counsel for an accused against whom Complainant filed a case for
assault upon an agent of a person in authority and breach of peace and resisting
arrest. Respondent move for quashal of said cases alleging double jeopardy as
supposedly a similar case for slight physical injuries had been filed against his client. The
records revealed however that no such case was filed by Molina. The latter claimed
that the filing of the motion to quash was in bad faith to mislead the court. Supreme
Court suspended Respondent from the practice of law finding that, there was
deliberate intent on his part to mislead the court when he filed the motion to dismiss the
criminal charges on the basis of double jeopardy. He should not make any false and
untruthful statement in his pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar case for slight
physical injuries that was really filed in court, all he had to do was secure a certification
from that court that, indeed, a case was filed.

LEONARD RICHARDS V. PATRICIO ASOY, AC#2655, 10/12/10

In 1987, Respondent was disbarred for grave professional misconduct and ordered to
reimburse P16,000 to Complainant. The latter wrote the Court several times to report
non-payment by Respondent. Respondent then sought readmission to the Bar in 1996,
claiming that he had consigned the money with the Court’s cashier. According to
Respondent, his belated compliance, that is, 9 years from the order to reimburse was
due to his inability to locate complainant. Supreme Court denied Respondent’s
petition and the a later petition in 2010 reasoning that, Respondent’s justification flimsy
as it is, considering that Complainant’s address was readily available with the Court
what with the numerous letters reporting Respondent’s non-compliance, glaringly
speaks of his lack of candor, of his dishonesty, if not defiance of Court orders, qualities
that do not endear him to the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. Respondent
denigrated the dignity of his calling by displaying a lack of candor towards the Court.
By taking his sweet time to effect reimbursement of the P16,000.00 – and through
consignation with this Court at that - he sent out a strong message that the legal
processes and orders of this Court could be treated with disdain or impunity.

new new new new new new new new

ORCINO VS. ATTY. JOSUE GASPAR, AC#3773, 9/24/1997

Respondent entered into a written contract with Complainant to serve as her counsel in
the murder case she filed against several suspects in the slaying of her husband. When
Respondent failed to attend the hearing where bail was granted to all the accused,
allegedly due to non-receipt of notice of hearing, Complainant confronted
Respondent and accused him of deliberately jeopardizing the case. She became
belligerent and said that she would refer her case to another lawyer. She demanded
for the case records and left with them. Respondent never heard or saw her again.
Respondent then filed a motion to withdraw as counsel without Complainant’s consent.
The court ordered that his appearance as private prosecutor would continue until he
secured his client’s consent. Complainant refused to sign her conformity to
Respondent’s withdrawal and the hearings of the criminal case continued. Respondent
did not appear at the haring nor did he contact Complainant who was constrained to
engage another lawyer.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-
client relation at any time with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or
terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably
restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who
undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is
not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from
a case before its adjudication arises only from the client’s written consent or from a
good cause.

Sec. 26, Rule 138RC, a lawyer may retire from any action or special proceeding with
written consent of his client filed in court and copy thereof served upon adverse party.
Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the
court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party will determine whether he
ought to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based on good
cause.

In the instant case, complainant did not give her written consent to respondent’s
withdrawal. The court thus ordered respondent to secure this consent. Respondent
allegedly informed the court that complainant had become hostile and refused to sign
his motion. He, however, did not file an application with the court for it to determine
whether he should be allowed to withdraw. Granting that his motion without client’s
consent was an application for withdrawal, still his reason for withdrawal was not
justified. Respondent’s withdrawal was made on grounds that “there no longer existed
confidence between them and that “there had been serious differences between
them relating to the manner of private prosecution. Rule 22.01 of Canon 22CPR
provides for the valid grounds for withdrawal to include (a) client insists upon an unjust
or immoral conduct of his action, (b) client insists that lawyer pursue conduct violative
of CPR, (c) client has two or more lawyers and the lawyers could not get along to the
detriment of the case; (d) mental or physical condition of the lawyer makes him
incapable of handling the case effectively; (e) client deliberately fails to pay attorney’s
fees agreed upon; (f) lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; (g) other similar
cases.

The instance case does not fall under any of the grounds mentioned. Neither can this
be considered analogous to the grounds enumerated. This case arose from a simple
misunderstanding between complainant and respondent. She was upset by
respondent’s absence at the hearing where bail was granted. She vehemently
opposed the grant of bail. Thus, it was a spontaneous and natural reaction for her to
confront respondent with his absence. Her belligerence arose from her overzealousness,
nothing more.

Assuming nevertheless that Respondent was justified in terminating his services, he

however, cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. The lawyer
has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal would be granted by the court.
Until his withdrawal is approved, he remains counsel of record who is expected by his
client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his client require. He must still
appear on hearing dates for the attorney-client relation does not terminate formally
until there is a withdrawal of record. Respondent is admonished to exercise more
prudence and judiciousness in dealing with his client and ordered to return a portion of
his attorney’s fees.

FERNANDO COLLANTES VS. ATTY. VICENTE RENOMERON, AC#3056, 8/16/1991

Complainant, as counsel for V&G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. complained that
Respondent, the Register of Deeds of Tacloban committed several irregular actuations
including extortion (asking for roundtrip tickets for Tacloban and Manila plus P2,000
pocket money for his trips) and inaction upon the subdivision’s application for
registration of 163 deeds of sale. After being found administratively guilty and dismissed
from government service. A disbarment case against Respondent was instituted.

Respondent DISBARRED. The issue in disbarment proceedings is whether respondent

registrar of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the Court for his malfeasance
as a public official. The answer is yes, for his misconduct as a public official also
constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath imposes upon every
lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer’s oath is a source of
his obligations and its violation is a ground for suspension, disbarment or other
disciplinary action. Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public
service of the highest order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose
conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose
primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for which he has
sworn to be a fearless crusader.

The CPR applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks
(Canon 6) just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
requires public officials and employees to process document and papers expeditiously
(Sec. 5) and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material
interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them
from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which
may be affected by the functions of the office (Sec. 7, a & d), the CPR forbids a lawyer
to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct or delay any man’s
cause for any motive or interest.

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.

The act of dishonesty and oppression which Respondent committed as a public official
have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law.

JUDGE RENE BACULI VS. ATTY. MELCHOR BATTUNG, AC#8920, 9/28/2011

During the hearing on the motion for reconsideration of a civil case, Respondent
shouted while arguing his motion. Complainant advised Respondent to tone down his
voice but instead, Respondent shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he
would be cited for direct contempt, Respondent shouted, “then cite me!” Complainant
cited him in direct contempt and fined him P1,000.00. Respondent then left only to re-
enter the courtroom when other cases were being heard and shouted, “Judge, I will file
gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you”. At which, Complainant ordered
the sheriff to escort Respondent out of the courtroom and cited him in direct contempt
again. After his hearings, Complainant went out and saw Respondent at the hall of the
courthouse, apparently waiting for him. Respondent again shouted in a threatening
tone, “Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!” He kept
shouting “I am not afraid of you!” and challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and
lawyers escorted Respondent out of the building.

Respondent SUSPENDED for one year for violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11, CPR.
Respondent’s violations are no less serious as they were committed in the courtroom in
the course of judicial proceedings where he was acting as an officer of the court, and
before the litigating public. His actions were plainly disrespectful to Judge Baculi and to
the court, to the point of being scandalous and offensive to the integrity of the judicial
system itself. A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the
latter’s role, stature and position in our justice system. When Respondent publicly
berated and brazenly threatened Complainant that he would file a case for gross
ignorance against the latter, Respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to
erode the public confidence in Complainant’s competence and in his ability to decide
cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in
the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer
cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system
into disrepute.

Litigants and counsels, particulary the latter because of their position and avowed duty
to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge,
and the court that he represents. Canon 11 (A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others. Rule 11.03 (a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the courts.

ERNESTO ORBE VS. JUDGE MANOLITO GUMARANG, AM#MTJ-11-1792, 9/26/2011

Complainant was the plaintiff of a small claims case which was assigned to Respondent
for continuation of trial following failure to reach amicable settlement. Hearings were
reset on multiple occasions at Respondent’s instance (for reasons including power
outage and his supposed schedule for medical check-up). In his administrative
complaint, Complainant alleged that Respondent violated the Rule on Small Claims
cases for failing to decide the civil case within 5 days from receipt of the order of
reassignment. While admitting that he failed to decide the case within five working
days from receipt of the order, he pointed out that the Rule needed clarification since,
as in his case, the five working days should be construed to mean five calendared trial
dates falling on Thursdays only, considering that he allotted only one day, that is
Thursday to hear and try small claims cases as he was merely an assisting judge to the
municipal trial court where Complainant’s case was assigned.

RESPONDENT FINED p5,000 for UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING A DECISION AND VIOLATION
OF THE RULE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES. Sec. 22 of the Rule on Small Claims cases clearly
provides for the period within which judgment should be rendered, that is, “the new
judge shall hear and decide the case within 5 days from receipt of the order of
reassignment.

In this case, it is undisputed that it took more than 2 months for Respondent to render a
decision on the subject case as he himself admitted the series of postponements which
occurred during the pendency of the case. His lone argument was that he hears small
claims cases on Thursdays only, hence, he claimed that, in his case, the period of five
working days being referred to by Section 22, should pertain only to Thursdays.

Respondent must have missed the very purpose and essence of the creation of the
Rule for Small Claims cases, as his interpretation of the rule is rather misplaced. This
system will enhance access to justice especially by those who cannot afford the high
costs of litigation even in cases of relatively small value. The theory behind the small
claims system is that ordinary litigation fails to bring practical justice to the parties when
the disputed claim is small, because the time and expense required by ordinary
litigation process is so disproportionate to the amount involved that it discourages a just
resolution of the dispute. The small claims process is designed to function quickly and
informally. There are no lawyers, no formal pleadings and no strict legal rules of
evidence.

Thus, the intent of the law in providing the period to hear and decide cases falling
under the Rule on Small Claims cases, which is within 5 days from receipt of the order of
assignment is very clear. The exigency of prompt rendition of judgment in small claims
cases is a matter of public policy. There is no room for further interpretation; it does not
requires respondent’s exercise of discretion. He is duty-bound to adhere to the rules and
decide small claims cases without undue delay.

ATTY. FRANKLIN GACAL VS. JUDGE JAIME INFANTE, AM#RTJ-04-1845, 10/5/2011

Complainant is the private prosecutor in a criminal case for murder assigned to

Respondent Judge. The latter acting upon the recommendation of the fiscal in the
information for a P4000,000-bail, issued two orders granting the accused bail and
releasing same accused from custody. Complainant charged Respondent with gross
ignorance of the law, gross incompetence and evident partiality for failing to set a
hearing before granting bail to the accused and for releasing him immediately after
allowing bail.

The offense of murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum to death (Art.
248, RPC). By reason of the penalty prescribed by law, murder is considered a capital
offense and, grant of bail is a matter of discretion which can be exercised only by
respondent judge after the evidence is submitted in a hearing. Hearing of the
application for bail is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine
whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong. It becomes, therefore, a
ministerial duty of a judge to conduct hearing the moment an application for bail is
filed if the accused is charged with capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. If doubt can be entertained, it follows that the
evidence of guilt is weak and bail shall be recommended. On the other hand, if the
evidence is clear and strong, no bail shall be granted.

Respondent judge erred when he issued an order granting accused’s bail application
based merely on the order issued by the fiscal recommending bail for the provisional
liberty of the accused without even bothering to read the affidavits of the witnesses for
the prosecution. Respondent judge cannot abdicate his right and authority to
determine whether the evidence against accused who is charged with capital offense
is strong or not. Respondent judge’s errors are basic such that his acts constitute gross
ignorance of the law.

Respondent would excuse himself from blame and responsibility by insisting that the
hearing was no longer necessary considering that accused had not filed a petition for
bail, inasmuch as no application for bail had been filed, his orders were not orders
granting an application for bail but were instead his approval of the bail bond posted.
The willingness of Respondent to rely on the mere representation of the public
prosecutor that his grant of bail upon the public prosecutor’s recommendation had
been proper, and that his (public prosecutor) recommendation of bail had in effect
waived the need for a bail hearing perplexes the Court. He thereby betrayed an
uncommon readiness to trust more in the public prosecutor’s judgment than in his own
judicious discretion as a trial judge. He should not do so.

TERESITA SANTECO VS. ATTY LUNA AVANCE, AC#5834, 2/22/2011

Complainant filed an administrative complaint against Respondent for mishandling her

civil case for declaration of nullity of a deed of sale. Supreme Court had found
Respondent guilty of gross misconduct and suspended her for five years from law
practice. While Respondent’s five-year suspension was still in effect, RTC Judge
Consuelo Amog-Bocar sent a letter-report to the SC Court administrator informing the
latter that Respondent had appeared and actively participated in three cases wherein
she misrepresented herself as “Attty. Liezel Tanglao”. When her opposing counsels
confronted her and showed the court a certification regarding Respondent’s
suspension, she admitted and conceded that she is Atty. Luna Avance but qualified
that she was only suspended for 3 years and that her suspension had already been
lifted.

RESPONDENT DISBARRED for gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders
of a superior court. SC finds Respondent unfit to continue as a member of the bar. As
an officer of the court, it is a lawyer’s duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the
court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer’s
obedience to court orders and processes. Respondent’s conduct fell short of what is
expected of her as an officer of the court as she obviously possesses a habit of defying
this Court’s order. She willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued her law
practice despite the five-year suspension order against her and even misrepresented
herself to be another person in order to evade said penalty. Failure to comply with
Court directives constitute gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits
a lawyer’s suspension or even disbarment. In repeatedly disobeying this Court’s orders,
respondent proved herself unworthy of membership in the Philippine Bar. Worse, she
remains indifferent to the need to reform herself. Clearly, she is unfit to discharged the
duties of an officer of the court and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.

JOHNNY PESTO VS. MARCELITO MILLO, AC#9612, 3/13/2013

An attorney who conceals his inefficiency and lack of diligence by giving wrong
information to his client regarding the matter subject of their professional relationship is
guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court. He thereby violates his lawyer’s
oath to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his client. He also thereby
violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18, CPR, by which he is called upon to serve his client with
competence and diligence.

IN 1990, Complainant’s wife engaged Respondent to handle the transfer of title over a
lot to her name and the adoption of her niece, paying him a total of P24,00.00.
Respondent thereafter repeatedly gave them false information and numerous excuses
to explain his inability to complete the transfer of title, making them believe that the
capital gains tax had already been paid but they found out later that such were not
yet paid despite, his inability to produce any receipt for such payment, Respondent
insisted that he already paid the same. Later Respondent returned his legal fees for the
transfer of title and promised in writing to assume the liability for accrued penalties.

Complainant charged that Respondent let the adoption case be considered closed
due to two years inaction. One time, they were made to believe that an interview with
the DSWD was scheduled but were dismayed to be told that no such interview was
scheduled.

Every attorney owes fidelity to the causes and concerns of his clients. He must be ever
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the clients. His duty to safeguard
the client’s interests commences from his engagement as such, and lasts until his
effective release by the clients. In that time, he is expected to take every reasonable
step and exercise ordinary care as his clients’ interests may require.

Respondent’s acceptance of the sums of money from Complainant and his wife to
enable him to attend to the transfer of title and to complete the adoption case
initiated the lawyer-client relationship between them. From that moment on,
Respondent assumed the duty to render competent and efficient professional service
to them as his clients. Yet, he failed to discharge his duty. He was inefficient and
negligent in going about what the professional service he had assumed required him to
do. He concealed his inefficiency and neglect by giving false information to his clients
about having already paid the taxes, In reality, he did not pay such taxes, rendering
the client liable for a substantial financial liability in the form of penalties.

It seems very likely that Respondent purposely disregarded the opportunity to answer
the charges granted to him out of a desire to delay the investigation of the complaint
until both Complainant and his wife, being residents in Canada, would have already
have lost interest in prosecuting it, or, as happened here, would have already departed
this world and be no longer able to rebut whatever refutations he would ultimately
make, whether true or not. An attorney who is made a respondent in a disbarment
proceeding should submit an explanation and should meet the issue and overcome
the evidence against him. The obvious reason for this requirement is that an attorney
thus charged must thereby prove that he still maintained that degree of morality and
integrity expected of him at all times.

RESPONDENT SUSPENDED from law practice for six months and ordered to return to the
heirs of Johnny and Abella Pesto the sum of P10,000.00 plus legal interest at 6 per cent
per annum.

GLORIA P. JINON VS. ATTY. LEONARDO JIZ, AC#9615, 3/5/2013

Complainant, seeking to recover the title of a property which she disputed with a sister-
in-law engaged Respondent’s services. After paying a total of P61,000, Complainant
inquired about the status of the case and was surprised to learn from Respondent that
a certain Atty. Caras was handling the same. Also, Complainant learned that had been
collecting rentals from her property. Upon demand for these rentals, Respondent
merely gave her P7,000.00 claiming that the balance of P,000 would be added to the
expenses for the transfer of the title to her name.

SC SUSPENDED Respondent or two years. Atty. Jiz was remiss in his duties as a lawyering
in neglecting his client’s case, misappropriating her funds and disobeying the
Committee on Bar Discipline’s lawful orders requiring submission of his pleadings and his
attendance at hearings. Undeniably, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he
covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to
exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family
makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes him
answerable not just to client but also to the legal profession, the court and society.
Moreover, money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the
processing of transfer of land title, but not used for the purpose, should be immediately
returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of
his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use in violation of the trust reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment.

PERLA BURIAS VS. JUDGE MIRAFE VALENCIA, GR#176464, 2/4/2010

Respondent borrowed P7,500 from Complainant evidenced by promissory notes. A civil

case for ejectment filed by Complainant was then assigned to Respondent. After the
parties in the civil case filed their position papers, Respondent again borrowed money
from Complainant evidenced by two handwritten notes. Complainant filed an
administrative complaint against Respondent after the latter demanded for P50,000
and the writing off of her previous debts in exchange for a favorable decision in the
ejectment case.
With respect to the charge of borrowing money in exchange for a favorable judgment,
Rule 5.02, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall refrain
from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court’s
impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities or increase
involvement with lawyers or person likely to come before the court. A judge should so
manage investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases
giving grounds for disqualification.

Under Rule 5.04 of Canon 5, a judge may obtain a loan if no law prohibits such loan.
However, the law prohibits a judge from engaging in financial transactions with a party-
litigant. Respondent admitted borrowing money from complainant during the
pendency o the case. This act alone is patently inappropriate. The impression that
Respondent would rule in favor of complainant because the former is indebted to the
latter is what the Court seeks to avoid. A judge’s conduct should always be beyond
reproach.

Since Respondent retired in 2008, the penalty of P20,000.00 is imposed.

VALERIANO NUNEZ VS. JUDGE FRANCISCO IBAY, AM#RTJ-06-1984, 6/30/2009

Complainant, a driver at the Engineering Department of the Makati City Hall, parked
the government vehicle he was driving at the basement of Makati City Hall and left the
key in their office because drivers were not allowed to bring such vehicles home. He
then received an order from Respondent directing him to appear before the latter to
explain why he occupied the parking space allotted for Respondent.

When Complainant appeared before Respondent, the latter asked him if he had a
lawyer and despite replying in the negative, Respondent still further questioned him.
Complainant apologized and explained that he did not intend to park in Respondent’s
space and that he did not know that such space was reserved for Respondent. The
latter refused to accept Complainant’s apology and instead, found him guilty of direct
contempt of court for using the former’s parking space sentencing him to five days
imprisonment with a P1,000 fine. In his comment, Respondent alleged that judges were
assigned their respective parking spaces in the basement of city hall, that he had
placed a marker with his name at his allotted space to facilitating the orderly parking,
considering that he already programmed his activities to maintain and/or improve his
present position as the third ranking judge for 2004 among RTC judges of Makati. He
cited that Complainant’s improper and inconsiderate parking disturbed his train of
thought as to the intended disposition of his cases. Citing similar incident in the past, he
admitted having cited erring city hall employees in contempt for disrupting his
performance of official duties.

Having opted to avail of optional retirement, SC imposed a P40,000 fine upon

Respondent deductible from his retirement benefits.

Respondent wrongly argues that complainant delayed the administration of justice

when he improperly parked the van on respondent’s assigned slot which disrupted his
scheduled disposition of cases. Respondent’s reaction to complainant’s mistake is
exaggerated. The complainant’s act may have caused inconvenience to the
respondent but it could not delay the administration of justice. There is no evidence to
show that complainant parked the van at respondent’s slot purposely to anoy him or
he was aware of the previous similar incidents. In fact, complainant explained that his
mistake was not deliberate and he asked for respondent’s forgiveness.

The power to punish for contempt must be used sparingly with due regard to the
provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual. It should be exercised
strictly for the preservation of the dignity of the court and its proceedings. In the instant
complaint, respondent exercised the said power in an arbitrary and oppressive manner
and for purposes that are purely personal. The exacting standards of conduct
demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of
the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages
disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary
itself.

FOODSPHERE, INC. VS. ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., AC#7199, 7/22/2009

Complainant is a corporation engaged in meat processing and manufacturing and

distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand “CDO”.

Respondent is a writer/columnist of tabloids and a host of a tv and radio program.

One Alberto Cordero purportedly bought from a grocery canned goods including a
can of CDO liver spread. When he and his relatives were eating bread with said liver
spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms
inside the can. Cordero filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug
Administration as laboratory results confirmed the presence of parasites in the liver
spread.

Cordero demanded for P150,000 damages, Complainant merely offered to return

actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by the Corderos. Respondent sent
Complainant an advance issue of the tabloid which Complainant found to contain
articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it and its products.
Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to the
P150,000 demand of the Corderos. Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for
P50,000, P15,000 for the Corderos and P35,000 to his BATAS Foundation and directed
Complainant to place paid ads in the tabloids and television program. Thereafter, an
agreement was written, leading to the dismissal of the complaint. However, when
Respondent did not find Complainant’s compliance with the ad requirement sufficient,
he proceeded to announcement a contest on his radio program for phone-in callers to
name which liver spread had parasites. Respondent also wrote columns in his tabloid
articles which put complainant in a bad light (KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD). Even
after civil and criminal cases against him, Respondent continued to write derogatory
articles against Complainant.

The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer
to act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession, which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible
and improper conduct of a member of the bar.

Respondent violated Rule 1.01, CPR which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged
in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to
advance his interest – to obtain funds for his BATAS Foundation and seek sponsorships
and ads for the tabloids and his television program. He also violated Rule 13.02,CPR that
a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. For despite the pendency of the
civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining
further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint
of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products.
At the same time, Respondent violated Canon 1,CPR which mandates lawyers to obey
the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities for he defied the
status quo order issued by the court.

The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the
radio and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a
certain extent have affected the sales of complainant. RESPONDENT suspended for
three years.