Professional Psychology: Research and Practice Copyright 2003 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

2003, Vol. 34, No. 5, 491– 498 0735-7028/03/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0735-7028.34.5.491

What Tests Are Acceptable for Use in Forensic Evaluations?

A Survey of Experts
Stephen J. Lally
Argosy University/Washington, DC

When conducting a forensic evaluation, what psychological tests do experts consider acceptable to use?
The answer is useful to psychologists making practice decisions but also to the courts, who rely on others’
opinions to base one of the criteria for determining the admissibility of testimony. The author surveyed
diplomates in forensic psychology (N ⫽ 64) regarding both the frequency with which they use and their
opinions about the acceptability of a variety of psychological tests in 6 areas of forensic practice. The 6
areas were mental state at the offense, risk for violence, risk for sexual violence, competency to stand
trial, competency to waive Miranda rights, and malingering. Results are presented for each practice area,
and the implications of these results for the courts, future research, and practice are discussed.

As many psychologists are considering entering forensic prac-
tice, either in a primary or secondary role, they are uniquely
positioned to provide testimony to the court, as compared with
other mental health professionals. Other mental health profession-
als, including psychiatrists, the traditional providers of expert
testimony, generally base their opinions solely on their interview
of a defendant or plaintiff and on collateral sources (records and
interviews of other relevant parties). Psychological tests provide
psychologists with a third source of information, and with these
three legs on which to rest their opinions, psychologists have a
more stable and valid foundation as the basis of their testimony.
However, all psychological tests are not created equal; some are
more appropriate than others for use in a forensic evaluation. For
psychologists entering forensic practice, it is useful to know what
tests are used by forensic psychologists; even more pertinent is
understanding what tests are appropriate for particular types of
forensic evaluations. The answer to this question not only helps
guide practice decisions but also addresses an important element
that courts use to decide whether an expert’s opinion is admissible
at a hearing or trial. Even though it has been 40 years since the
courts have officially recognized psychologists’ place as experts to
provide testimony (Jenkins v. United States, 1962), the admissi-
bility of testimony based on psychological test results still gets
challenged. For the psychologist facing such challenges, it is
STEPHEN J. LALLY received his PhD in clinical psychology from the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1988. He is a diplomate in
forensic psychology from the American Board of Professional Psychology.
He is currently a professor and head of the Department of Clinical Psy-
chology at the American School of Professional Psychology, Argosy
University/Washington, DC. His research interests include psychological
assessment and forensic psychology.
I AM GRATEFUL TO Robert Kline III for his efforts in the collection of the
data.
CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THIS ARTICLE should be addressed to Ste-
phen J. Lally, Department of Clinical Psychology, American School of
Professional Psychology, Argosy University/Washington, DC, 1550 Wil-
son Boulevard, Suite 600, Arlington, Virginia 22209. E-mail:
slally@argosyu.edu
helpful to know whether there is general acceptance in the field for
the use of a particular test.
There is a long tradition of surveying psychologists about the
tests they use in their practice (e.g., Brown & McGuire, 1976;
Louttit & Browne, 1947; Lubin, Larsen, & Matarazzo, 1984;
Lubin, Wallis, & Paine, 1971; Watkins, Campbell, Nieberding, &
Hallmark, 1995). These surveys help inform both practitioners and
training programs about what tests psychologists are using. They
provide a measure of what is the actual standard of practice in the
field. The surveys also document how particular tests change in
popularity. Within forensic psychology (Lees-Haley, Smith, Wil-
liams, & Dunn, 1996; Martin, Allan, & Allan, 2001), the informa-
tion provided by these surveys has an additional purpose. It can be
used to argue for the admission or exclusion of evidence based on
these tests.
In 1923, an appellate court (Frye v. United States, 1923) ruled
that an early form of the polygraph was too experimental to be
allowed into evidence. The court set a standard that expert testi-
mony must be based on scientific principles that “have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”
(Frye v. United States, 1923, p. 1014). Although Frye was only
binding within the court’s jurisdiction of Washington, DC, it
became the model for other courts. It became the “dominant
standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evi-
dence” (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993, p.
2792) for much of the 20th century. Although it came under
increasing criticism, it was used by the majority of courts up until
1993 (Daubert), when the Supreme Court, in a series of rulings
starting with Daubert (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 1993; General Electric v. Joiner, 1997; Kumho Tire v. Car-
michael, 1999; Weisgram v. Marley, 2000), articulated a new
standard based on the Federal Rules of Evidence 702. The Court
stated that expert testimony must be both scientifically valid and
relevant. The court also listed four criteria that the trial judge could
use to decide whether the reasoning and methodology underlying
the testimony was scientifically valid. Although the goal was to
open avenues for novel science to be allowed into testimony, one
of the four listed criteria remained the Frye standard of “general
acceptance.” Most jurisdictions follow Daubert or a Daubert-like

491
492 LALLY
standard, although 23 states still use Frye or some unique standard
or have not definitively ruled on the matter (Phillips v. Industrial
Machine, 1999). What this means is that whether a test or tech-
nique has general acceptance within a field is still very relevant to
whether a court allows expert testimony based on the test or
technique.
With some notable exceptions (e.g., Ackerman & Ackerman,
1997; Borum & Grisso, 1995; Keilin & Bloom, 1986; Lees-Haley,
1992; Lees-Haley et al., 1996; Martin et al., 2001; Naar, 1961;
Pinkerman, Haynes, & Kaiser, 1993), there has been relatively less
effort to survey the practice of forensic psychology as compared
with general clinical practice. This specific focus on forensic
psychology is important, as the questions asked in forensic eval-
uations differ from standard clinical or therapeutic evaluations and
thus surveys of general clinical practice are of less relevance to this
issue of admissibility. In addition, in the last decade, a large
number of forensic assessment instruments (FAIs; Grisso, 1986),
standardized methods which assess behaviors directly relevant to
legal issues, have been introduced. These FAIs are generally less
well known to judges and attorneys, and even though many have
high levels of reliability and validity, they can have difficulty
gaining admission into testimony. A survey that includes these
instruments can provide useful information to help courts decide
which of these new tests, and also which of the more traditional
tests, should be admitted as evidence.
In addition to the importance of distinguishing surveys of fo-
rensic practice from surveys of standard clinical practice, it is
important to differentiate between different types of forensic ex-
aminations. General surveys of forensic practice (e.g., Martin et
al., 2001) are less useful than surveys that examine test use for
specific types of forensic evaluations (e.g., Borum & Grisso, 1995;
Rogers & Cavanaugh, 1983), as a test that may be acceptable for
one type of evaluation— competency to stand trial—may not be
for another kind of evaluation— child custody. Finally, if a psy-
chological test is used by a high percentage of psychologists
responding to a survey, then it might be argued that there is general
acceptance of the test. However, frequency of use and acceptabil-
ity are not the same thing. A test may be infrequently used because
of cost, unavailability, or lack of widespread training on its ad-
ministration, and yet there may be general agreement among
experts in the field that it is an acceptable test. In general, surveys
of psychologists have only asked about use and have not ques-
tioned psychologists about acceptability. It is the acceptability of a
test, not its frequency of use, that is the legally relevant informa-
tion that should determine a test’s admissibility.
The Survey of Forensic Diplomates
The participants of this survey were psychologists who had been
awarded the diplomate from the American Board of Forensic
Psychology (ABFP). The ABFP is the recognized board-certifying
agency of the American Board of Professional Psychology
(ABPP). Although there are other boards (e.g., American Board of
Psychological Specialties) that award diplomates in forensic psy-
chology, the ABFP was the first national board and the ABPP
board certification is widely recognized by state licensing boards
and national associations. To apply for a diplomate, a psychologist
must have been engaged in 1,000 hr of forensic psychology over
a 5-year period and have completed 100 hr of specialized training
in forensic psychology. The applicant then must submit two work
samples, and, if they are approved, the applicant must then pass a
3-hr oral examination administered by three diplomates covering
the applicant’s knowledge of his or her areas of practice as well as
his or her general knowledge of forensic psychology. Because of
these qualifications, these diplomates in forensic psychology ap-
pear to represent an ideal sample to query about the acceptability
of a test or technique within the field of forensic psychology.
All diplomates who were listed in a recent directory (ABFP,
1999) or who were listed on the ABFP Web site (www.abfp.com)
in November 2000 were sent a letter and a survey requesting their
participation. The return envelopes were coded to keep track of
nonresponders, and 1 month after the initial mailing, a follow-up
letter was sent to all nonresponders. Of the 187 diplomates iden-
tified, 5 surveys were returned undelivered and 64 were com-
pleted. This resulted in a 35% adjusted return rate, comparable to
past survey efforts.
The survey asked about six areas of forensic practice: mental
state at the time of the offense (MSO), risk for future violence, risk
for future sexual violence, competency to stand trial (CST), com-
petency to waive Miranda rights, and malingering. Respondents
were asked to rate a number of specific tests as to whether the tests
were considered unacceptable, acceptable, or acceptable and rec-
ommended. The psychologists were also given the option of
checking “no opinion” and were encouraged to check that option
if they were not familiar with a test or technique. They were also
asked to list the frequency with which they used a test or technique
when conducting evaluations in each area of practice. Respondents
were given the option of declining to give any opinion about a
particular area of forensic practice. Because some respondents did
not feel qualified to rate some areas of practice and some others
were no longer involved in active practice, the number of respon-
dents who rated tests in a specific area was less than the total
number of returned surveys (N ⫽ 64). It ranged from a high of 53
for the questions about assessing malingering to a low of 40 for
evaluation of competency to waive Miranda rights.
The results are summarized in six categories. The first category
includes those tests or techniques that at least half of respondents
rated as recommended for a particular practice area by endorsing
that the test was “acceptable and recommended.” The second
category, acceptable, includes those tests and techniques that at
least half of the respondents rated as either “acceptable” or “ac-
ceptable and recommended.” The third and fourth categories are
equivocal. Tests or techniques in which at least half of respondents
did not rate them as “acceptable,” “unacceptable,” or “no opinion”
were placed in this category. Equivocal was further subdivided
into whether the largest majority of respondents were divided
between whether a test was “acceptable” or “unacceptable” or
whether the largest majority of the respondents were divided
between “acceptable” or “no opinion.” The former are categorized
as equivocal– unacceptable and the latter are categorized as
equivocal–no opinion. The fifth category includes those tests or
techniques that at least half of the respondents rated as unaccept-
able. The sixth category of no opinion was used when at least half
of respondents felt they could not give an opinion about a test or
technique for a specific type of evaluation.
In conducting evaluations of an individual’s mental state at the
time of the offense (see Table 1), the Roger’s Criminal Responsi-
bility Assessment, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory–2
(MMPI-2), Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI), Millon Clin-
 SURVEY OF FORENSIC EXPERTS 493

Table 1
Mental State at the Time of the Offense Evaluations (n ⫽ 52)

Category Measure

Recommended WAIS–III (60%), MMPI-2 (54%)

Acceptable WAIS–III (96%), R-CRAS (94%), MMPI-2 (94%), Halstead–Reitan

(71%), PAI (69%), Luria–Nebraska (58%), MCMI–III (54%),
Stanford–Binet–Revised (52%)

Equivocal–unacceptable MCMI–II, Rorschach, 16PF

Unacceptable Projective drawings (81%), TAT (65%), sentence completion (60%)

No opinion KBIT (52%), WASI (50%)

Note. The percentage listed after the test in the recommended, acceptable, unacceptable, and no opinion
categories is the percentage of the sample that endorsed that category. Recommended ⫽ majority of respondents
recommended the test; Acceptable ⫽ majority of respondents endorsed the test as acceptable; Equivocal–
unacceptable ⫽ the majority of the respondents did not endorse the test as acceptable, unacceptable, or no
opinion, and the majority was divided between acceptable and unacceptable; Equivocal–no opinion ⫽ the
majority of the respondents did not endorse the test as acceptable, unacceptable, or no opinion, and the majority
was divided between acceptable and no opinion; Unacceptable ⫽ the majority of the respondents endorsed the
test as unacceptable; No opinion ⫽ the majority of the respondents endorsed no opinion for the test.

ical Multiaxial Inventory—III (MCMI–III), Wechsler Adult Intel-
ligence Scale—III (WAIS–III), Stanford–Binet–Revised, Halstead–
Reitan, and Luria–Nebraska were rated acceptable by the majority
of respondents. However, only the MMPI-2 and the WAIS–III
were rated as recommended by the majority of the diplomates. The
Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory–II (MCMI–II), the Ror-
schach, and the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF)
were in the equivocal– unacceptable category, where the majority
of the respondents were divided between rating the instruments as
acceptable or unacceptable. The majority of the respondents rated
the following tests as unacceptable for mental state at the time of
the offense evaluations: projective drawings, sentence completion,
and the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). The last category, no
opinion, was checked by at least half of the psychologists for the
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) and the Kauf-
man Brief Intelligence Test (KBIT).
For evaluations of an individual’s risk of violence (see Table 2),
the Psychopathy Checklist—Revised (PCL–R), Psychopathy
Checklist—Screening Version (PCL–SV), Violence Risk Ap-
praisal Guide (VRAG), MMPI-2, WAIS–III, and PAI were rated
as acceptable by the majority of the diplomates. Only the PCL–R
was rated as recommended by more than half of the respondents.
Both versions of the MCMI (II and III) along with the Stanford–
Binet–Revised were in the equivocal– unacceptable category. The
HCR-20, WASI, KBIT, Luria–Nebraska, Stanford–Binet–
Revised, and Halstead–Reitan received divided endorsement be-
tween acceptable and no opinion and thus were categorized as
equivocal–no opinion. The Rorschach, 16PF, projective drawings,
sentence completion, and TAT were rated as unacceptable for risk
of violence evaluations by the majority of the psychologists. The
majority of those surveyed had no opinion about the acceptability
of the Levels of Service Inventory.
In conducting evaluations of an individual’s risk for sexual
violence (see Table 3), the majority of the respondents rated as
acceptable the PCL–R, PCL–SV, VRAG, Sexual Offender Risk
Appraisal Guide, Sexual Violent Risk–20, MMPI-2, PAI, WAIS–

Table 2
Risk for Violence Evaluations (n ⫽ 51)

Category Measure

Recommended PCL–R (63%)

Acceptable PCL–R (88%), MMPI-2 (88%), PCL–SV (73%), VRAG (73%),

WAIS–III (67%), PAI (61%)

Equivocal–unacceptable MCMI (II and III), Stanford–Binet–Revised

Equivocal–no opinion HCR-20, WASI, KBIT, Luria–Nebraska, Halstead–Reitan

Unacceptable Projective Drawings (90%), TAT (82%), sentence completion (71%),

Rorschach (53%), 16PF (53%)

No opinion LSI (80%)

Note. See Table 1 note.

494 LALLY

Table 3
Risk for Sexual Violence Evaluations (n ⫽ 42)

Category Measure

Recommended PCL–R (62%)

Acceptable PCL–R (91%), MMPI-2 (81%), PCL–SV (71%), WAIS–III (71%),

VRAG (67%), SORAG (62%), penile plethysmograph (60%),
SVR-20 (57%), PAI (55%)

Equivocal–unacceptable MCMI–III, Stanford–Binet–Revised

Equivocal–no opinion Abel Screen, WASI, KBIT, Halstead–Reitan, Luria–Nebraska

Unacceptable Projective drawings (95%), sentence completion (76%), TAT

(76%), 16PF (60%), Rorschach (52%), MCMI–II (50%)

No opinion Aggressive Sexual Behavior Inventory (81%), Coercive Sexual

Fantasies Questionnaire (76%), MASA (76%), RMAS (72%),
MSI (57%)

Note. See Table 1 note.

III, and penile plethysmograph. Only the PCL–R was recom-
mended by the majority of the diplomates for a risk of sexual
violence evaluation. The survey respondents were divided between
acceptable and no opinion (or equivocal–no opinion) about the
Abel Screen, WASI, KBIT, Halstead–Reitan, and Luria–Nebraska.
The MCMI–III and the Stanford–Binet–Revised both were cate-
gorized as equivocal– unacceptable. At least half of the diplomates
felt that the following tests and techniques were not acceptable:
MCMI–II, Rorschach, 16PF, projective drawings, sentence com-
pletion, and TAT. The majority of the psychologists had no opin-
ion about the use of the following tests and techniques for evalu-
ating risk for sexual violence: the Multiphasic Sex Inventory, Burt
Rape Myth Acceptance Scale, Multidimensional Assessment of
Sex and Aggression, Aggressive Sexual Behavior Inventory, and
Coercive Sexual Fantasies Questionnaire.
For evaluations of individual’s competency to stand trial (see
Table 4), at least half of the respondents rated the following tests
as acceptable: MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool–Criminal
Adjudication (MacCAT-CA), Competency to Stand Trial Assess-
ment Instrument, WAIS–III, Competency Screening Test, Inter-
disciplinary Fitness Interview—Revised, Georgia Court Compe-
tency Test, MMPI-2, PAI, Stanford–Binet–Revised, Halstead–
Reitan, and Luria–Nebraska. Of all those tests, only the
MacCAT-CA and the WAIS–III were recommended by the ma-
jority of respondents. The diplomates were divided between ac-
ceptable and no opinion about the acceptability of using the WASI,
Georgia Court Competency Test–Mississippi Hospital, and Com-
petency Assessment for Standing Trial for Defendants With Men-
tal Retardation for a competency to stand trial evaluation. The
MCMI–III, which the majority of respondents were divided be-
tween acceptable and unacceptable, was categorized as equivocal–
unacceptable. At least half of the sample viewed as unacceptable
the MCMI–II, Rorschach, 16PF, projective drawings, sentence
completion, and TAT. At least half of the respondents also had no
opinion about the use of the Computer Assisted Determination of
Competency to Proceed and KBIT.

Table 4
Competency to Stand Trial Evaluations (n ⫽ 52)

Category Measure

Recommended WAIS–III (62%), MacCAT–CA (56%)

Acceptable MacCAT–CA (90%), WAIS–III (90%), CAI (85%), CST (77%),

MMPI-2 (73%), GCCT (65%), Halstead–Reitan (64%), IFI–R
(62%), Stanford–Binet–Revised (54%), PAI (52%), Luria–
Nebraska (50%)

Equivocal–unacceptable MCMI–III

Equivocal–no opinion GCCT–MSH, CAST*MR, WASI

Unacceptable Projective drawings (87%), TAT (77%), sentence completion

(69%), Rorschach (60%), 16PF (58%), MCMI–II (50%)

No opinion CADCOMP (85%), KBIT (50%)

Note. See Table 1 note.

 SURVEY OF FORENSIC EXPERTS 495

In conducting evaluations of an individual’s competency to
waive Miranda rights (see Table 5), the majority of the diplomates
rated as acceptable Grisso’s Instruments for Assessing Under-
standing and Appreciation of Miranda Rights (Grisso instru-
ments), the MMPI-2, WAIS–III, Stanford–Binet–Revised,
Halstead–Reitan, and Luria–Nebraska. The Grisso instruments and
the WAIS–III were the only tests that were recommended by the
majority of the respondents. The majority of the psychologists
were divided between acceptable and no opinion (equivocal–no
opinion) for the PAI, WASI, and KBIT. The majority of the
respondents were divided between acceptable and unacceptable
(equivocal– unacceptable) for the MCMI–III. The majority of the
survey’s respondents rated the following tests as unacceptable to
use in an evaluation of an individual’s competency to waive
Miranda rights: MCMI–II, Rorschach, 16PF, projective drawings,
sentence completion, and TAT.
For the evaluation of malingering (see Table 6), the majority of
the respondents rated as acceptable the Structured Interview of
Reported Symptoms (SIRS), Test of Memory Malingering, Valid-
ity Indicator Profile, Rey Fifteen Item Visual Memory Test,
MMPI-2, PAI, WAIS–III, and Halstead–Reitan. The SIRS and the
MMPI-2 were recommended by the majority. The psychologists
were divided between acceptable and unacceptable about using
either version of the MCMI (II or III). They were also divided,
although between acceptable and no opinion, for the WASI, KBIT,
Luria–Nebraska, and Stanford–Binet–Revised. The diplomates
viewed as unacceptable for evaluating malingering the Rorschach,
16PF, projective drawings, sentence completion, and TAT. The
majority gave no opinion on the acceptability of the Malingering
Probability Scale, M-Test, Victoria Symptom Validity Test, and
Portland Digit Recognition Test.
In addition to being asked their opinion about the acceptability
of various tests and techniques in different areas of forensic
practice, the diplomates were asked to list the frequency with
which they used the tests and techniques in their practice (see
Table 7). The majority of the respondents provided information
about the frequency of use. Specifically, the number of respon-
dents providing information about frequency of use ranged from a
low of 64% for assessments of risk for sexual violence to a high of
85% for mental state at the time of the offense evaluations. Within
each practice area, the psychologists reported that they used, with
at least some frequency, an average of 3.9 (competency to waive
Miranda rights evaluations) to 5.8 (assessing malingering) differ-
ent tests or techniques. Not surprisingly, almost all (either 99% or
100%, depending on the practice area) of the respondents rated the
tests and techniques that they used as being at least acceptable.
However, across the different practice areas, most diplomates
listed a number of tests and techniques (average ranged from 3.4
to 6.6, depending on the practice area) that they did not use in their
practice but which they rated as acceptable to use for the specific
type of forensic evaluation.
In summary, the results clearly indicate that frequency of use is
not the same as general acceptance. Almost without exception, if
a test or technique was used with at least some frequency, the
responding diplomates rated that test or technique as acceptable.
However, there was almost an equal number of tests and tech-
niques that were not used by the respondents but that were judged
as acceptable for use. This illustrates why just examining the
frequency of use is not a sufficient measure for judging whether a
test meets the general acceptance criteria. Although some tests
were rated as acceptable across the different types of evaluations,
the strength of endorsement varied by type of evaluation. In
addition, some tests were rated as acceptable for one area and not
for another. This highlights the importance of examining the
acceptability of tests by type of forensic evaluation.
Implications
The results of the survey can help inform and guide both
entering as well as established forensic psychologists about the
choice of tests that are used for specific forensic evaluations. It is
important to note that although a test may be recommended by the
majority of the diplomates for a particular type of evaluation, this
is not the same as stating that the standard of care requires the use
of such a test. It is interesting to note that across the different
practice areas, a number of the recently developed FAIs were rated
favorably by the surveyed psychologists. In fact, in five of the six
evaluation categories, FAIs were rated by the majority of the

Table 5
Competency to Waive Miranda Rights Evaluations (n ⫽ 40)

Category Measure

Recommended WAIS–III (83%), Grisso instruments (55%)

Acceptable WAIS–III (100%), Grisso instruments (88%), MMPI-2 (70%),

Halstead–Reitan (68%), Stanford–Binet–Revised (63%), Luria–
Nebraska (55%)

Equivocal–unacceptable MCMI–III

Equivocal–no opinion PAI, WASI, KBIT

Unacceptable Projective drawings (95%), TAT (78%), sentence completion (70%),

Rorschach (63%), 16PF (63%), MCMI–II (55%)

No opinion

Note. See Table 1 note.

496 LALLY

Table 6
Malingering Evaluations (n ⫽ 53)

Category Measure

Recommended MMPI-2 (64%), SIRS (58%)

Acceptable MMPI-2 (92%), SIRS (89%), WAIS–III (75%), Rey (68%), PAI
(53%), VIP (53%), TOMM (64%), Halstead–Reitan (51%)

Equivocal–unacceptable MCMI (II or III), Stanford–Binet–Revised

Equivocal–no opinion WASI, KBIT, Luria–Nebraska

Unacceptable Projective drawings (89%), sentence completion (72%), TAT

(72%) 16PF (66%), Rorschach (55%)

No opinion VSVT (72%), M-Test (64%), Portland Digit Recognition Test

(60%), MPS (58%)

Note. See Table 1 note.

diplomates as not only acceptable but also recommended. Clearly,
although courts and attorneys, and even many psychologists, may
be less familiar with these instruments, many of the FAIs are
strongly endorsed and accepted by experts in the field. In 1995,
Borum and Grisso predicted that these instruments would be
increasingly used and valued by clinicians; these results support
their prediction. Not all FAIs were positively endorsed; a number
were categorized as either equivocal–no opinion or no opinion.
This may reflect either some controversy about a particular instru-
ment or that a test is just not very well known in the field.
A number of tests were fairly uniformly endorsed across the
evaluation types. This includes the stalwarts of the MMPI-2 and
the WAIS–III, and, to a lesser degree, the relative newcomer, the
PAI. The two traditional neuropsychological batteries (Luria–
Nebraska and Halstead–Reitan) and the Stanford–Binet–Revised
were also positively rated in MSO, CST, and Miranda waiver
evaluations. In addition, the Halstead–Reitan was rated as accept-
able for assessing malingering. Some objective personality tests
did not fare so well. The MCMI–III was only rated as acceptable
in MSO evaluations and was viewed equivocally in the other areas.
This less-than-glowing endorsement probably reflects some of the
criticism of the instrument that has been raised recently in the
literature (Rogers, Salekin, & Sewell, 1999). There was greater
consensus about the 16PF; in five of the practice areas, the ma-
jority of respondents rated it as unacceptable. This negative eval-
uation may reflect some of the weaknesses that critics have pre-
viously identified (Rotto, 1995).
Projective tests were also not viewed favorably by the majority
of the respondents. Specifically, projective drawings were over-
whelmingly— between 81% and 95% of the respondents, depend-

Table 7
Frequency of Use and Acceptability of Tests and Techniques

No. of tests
No. of tests not used rated
% reporting reported used % of tests as acceptable
frequency used rated as
Type of evaluation of use M SD acceptable M SD

MSO 85 (44/52) 4.7 2.0 100 3.8 3.6

Risk for violence 82 (42/51) 5.1 2.7 99 3.8 3.0

Risk for sexual violence 64 (27/42) 5.7 3.1 99 5.7 3.3

CST 83 (43/52) 5.4 2.5 99 6.6 4.0

Miranda waiver 73 (29/40) 3.9 1.7 100 3.4 2.9

Malingering pathology 74 (39/53) 5.8 2.2 99 3.7 2.9

Note. % reporting frequency of use ⫽ percentage of respondents who reported the frequency of use of any tests
and techniques; values in parentheses are the number of respondents who reported the frequency of use over the
total number of respondents who provided ratings for the evaluation area. No. of tests reported used ⫽ number
of tests reported used with at least minimal frequency; % of tests used rated as acceptable ⫽ percentage of tests
used with at least minimal frequency that were also rated as acceptable; No. of tests not used rated as
acceptable ⫽ number of tests reported as not being used but still rated as acceptable; MSO ⫽ mental state at the
time of the offense; CST ⫽ competency to stand trial; Miranda waiver ⫽ competency to waive Miranda rights.
 SURVEY OF FORENSIC EXPERTS
ing on type of evaluation—rated as unacceptable. This uniformity
of opinion is consistent with the concerns about projective draw-
ings that I raised in an earlier article (Lally, 2001). With somewhat
less uniformity of opinion, the TAT and sentence completion tests
were also rated as unacceptable across the different evaluation
types by the majority of the respondents. Although the Rorschach
was not rated as negatively as other projective tests, it was still
rated by the majority of respondents as unacceptable in five of the
six evaluation areas. The appropriateness and acceptability of
using the Rorschach in forensic evaluations has recently been the
focus of vigorous debate (e.g., Grove, Barden, Garb, & Lilienfeld,
2002; Ritzler, Erard, & Pettigrew, 2002a, 2002b).
This survey examined forensic experts’ opinion about the ac-
ceptability of using various tests and techniques within six areas of
forensic practice. However, a test may be seen as acceptable in
other areas of clinical or forensic practice. For example, a test that
is rated as unacceptable in evaluating risk for violence might be
judged differently in an assessment of psychosis. In addition,
although a test may be rated favorably in a particular practice area,
that does not mean that test might be used in a manner that would
not either be considered acceptable by the experts or admissible in
court. To illustrate, the MMPI-2 was rated very favorably by the
experts for use in mental state at the time of the offense evalua-
tions, but the MMPI-2 has no scale or index for past mental state.
It provides information about an individual’s current response
style and psychopathology that may be relevant to informing the
psychologist’s opinion about the legal issue, but it is not the same
as the legal issue. FAIs generally assess behaviors directly relevant
to the legal issue, but with non-FAIs, such as the MMPI-2, there is
an increased risk that psychologists might use the test in a manner
that the experts would find unacceptable and the courts might view
as being neither relevant nor reliable.
It is important to note that the surveyed practice areas were all
within criminal law and that no effort was made to survey other
areas of forensic practice (e.g., custody evaluations, personal in-
jury). The respondents were given the option of not giving an
opinion in a practice area to limit the results to those diplomates
who felt they had sufficient knowledge, experience, or both to give
an opinion about a given practice area. Many of the respondents
declined to give an opinion on a particular practice area— depend-
ing on the area, between 17% and 22% declined to give an
opinion— however, other than the respondents’ diplomate status
there is no way to be certain whether a particular respondent had
a substantive knowledge of the specific forensic practice area. Any
survey is a snapshot of a specific moment in time; the ratings of
various tests and techniques may change. This is especially likely
for those tests that were in one of the two equivocal categories or
in which the majority of the respondents endorsed the option of no
opinion. Tests in these three categories may be relatively new and
therefore unfamiliar to the majority of the diplomates. In addition,
the test’s status and acceptability may be controversial. In either
case, it is reasonable to assume that the tests and techniques that
fell into these categories probably will move either into the ac-
ceptable or unacceptable category either as they become better
known or as the conflict about their status is resolved.
The tests and techniques in this survey were categorized as
acceptable when at least half of the respondents rated the tests as
acceptable; however, there is no legal definition of what consti-
tutes “general acceptance.” Rather than half, a court could just as
497
easily decide that endorsement by a third of the professionals in a
field would constitute general acceptance. Also, the endorsement
by the majority of respondents to this survey does not substitute for
the court’s assessment of the relevance and reliability of the
evidence. Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(1993), general acceptance is only one criterion for deciding
whether evidence based on a test should be admissible. Tests or
techniques that have not attained general acceptance— however
that is defined by the court—may still be admitted under other
criteria. Some recent articles (e.g., Grove et al., 2002; Lally, 2001;
Rogers et al., 1999; Sachsenmaier & Lally, 2001) have examined
various psychological tests and techniques with regard to the other
Daubert criteria, but more work should be done in this area.
Currently, courts often decide about whether a test or technique
has gained “general acceptance in the particular field” (Frye v.
United States, 1923, p. 1014) based on the testimony of a single
mental health professional, who may not even be a psychologist.
The results of this study provide the courts with a firmer scientific
foundation on which to make a determination of admissibility.
References
Ackerman, M. J., & Ackerman, M. C. (1997). Custody evaluations prac-
tices: A survey of experienced professionals (revisited). Professional
Psychology: Research and Practice, 28, 137–145.
American Board of Forensic Psychology. (1999). Directory of diplomates
of the American Board of Forensic Psychology. Pittsburgh, PA: Author.
Borum, R., & Grisso, T. (1995). Psychological test use in criminal forensic
evaluations. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 26, 465–
473.
Brown, W. R., & McGuire, J. M. (1976). Current psychological assessment
practices. Professional Psychology, 7, 475– 484.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
General Electric v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
Grisso, T. (1986). Evaluating competencies: Forensic assessments and
instruments. New York: Plenum Press.
Grove, W. M., Barden, C., Garb, H. N., & Lilienfeld, S. O. (2002). Failure
of Rorschach-Comprehensive-System-based testimony to be admissible
under the Daubert-Joiner-Kumho standard. Psychology, Public Policy,
and Law, 8, 216 –234.
Jenkins v. United States, 307 F. 2d 637 (1962).
Keilin, W. G., & Bloom, L. J. (1986). Child custody evaluation practices:
A survey of experienced professionals. Professional Psychology: Re-
search and Practice, 17, 338 –346.
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
Lally, S. J. (2001). Should human figure drawings be admitted into court?
Journal of Personality Assessment, 76, 135–149.
Lees-Haley, P. (1992). Psychodiagnostic test usage by forensic psycholo-
gists. American Journal of Forensic Psychology, 10, 25–30.
Lees-Haley, P. R., Smith, H. H., Williams, C. W., & Dunn, J. T. (1996).
Forensic neuropsychological test usage: An empirical survey. Archives
of Clinical Neuropsychology, 11, 45–51.
Louttit, C. M., & Browne, C. G. (1947). Psychometric instruments in
psychological clinics. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 11, 49 –54.
Lubin, B., Larsen, R. M., & Matarazzo, J. D. (1984). Patterns of psycho-
logical test usage in the United States: 1935–1982. American Psychol-
ogist, 39, 451– 454.
Lubin, B., Wallis, R., & Paine, C. (1971). Patterns of psychological test use
in the United States: 1935–1969. Professional Psychology, 2, 70 –74.
Martin, M., Allan, A., & Allan, M. M. (2001). The use of psychological
tests by Australian psychologists who do assessments for the courts.
Australian Journal of Psychology, 53, 77– 82.
498
Naar, R. (1961). Testing in juvenile courts: A survey. Journal of Clinical
Psychology, 17, 210.
Phillips v. Industrial Machine, 597 N. W. 2d 377 (1999).
Pinkerman, J. E., Haynes, J. P., & Kaiser, T. (1993). Characteristics of
psychological practice in juvenile court clinics. American Journal of
Forensic Psychology, 11, 3–12.
Ritzler, B., Erard, R., & Pettigrew, G. (2002a). A final reply to Grove and
Barden: The relevance of the Rorschach Comprehensive System for
expert testimony. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 8, 235–246.
Ritzler, B., Erard, R., & Pettigrew, G. (2002b). Protecting the integrity of
Rorschach expert witnesses: A reply to Grove and Barden (1999) Re:
The admissibility of testimony under Daubert/Kumho analyses. Psychol-
ogy, Public Policy, and Law, 8, 201–215.
Rogers, R., & Cavanaugh, J. L. (1983). Usefulness of the Rorschach: A
survey of forensic psychiatrists. Journal of Psychiatry and the Law, 6,
55– 67.
Rogers, R., Salekin, R. T., & Sewell, K. W. (1999). Validation of the
Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory for Axis II disorders: Does it meet
the Daubert standard? Law and Human Behavior, 23, 425– 443.
LALLY
Rotto, P. C. (1995). Review of the Sixteen Personality Factor Question-
naire. In J. C. Conoley & J. J. Kramer (Eds.), The twelfth mental
measurement yearbook (pp. 948 –950). Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press.
Sachsenmaier, S. J., & Lally, S. J. (2001). Toward a scientific foundation
of sex offender risk assessment. In D. P. Farrington, C. R. Hollin, & M.
McMurran (Eds.), Sex and violence: The psychology of crime and risk
assessment (pp. 23–37). New York: Routledge.
Watkins, C. E., Jr., Campbell, V. L., Nieberding, R., & Hallmark, R.
(1995). Contemporary practice of psychological assessment by clinical
psychologists. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 26,
54 – 60.
Weisgram v. Marley Co., 120 S. Ct. 1011 (2000).
Received January 6, 2003
Revision received May 9, 2003
Accepted May 16, 2003 䡲