Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc.

G.R. No. 213948; 25 April 2017

CARPIO, J.

FACTS:
Knights of Rizal (KOR) filed a Petition for Injunction seeking, among others, an order to stop the
construction of respondent DMCI Homes, Inc. (DMCI)’s Torre de Manila project. In a later
resolution, the Court resolved to treat the petition as one for mandamus.
DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) acquired a lot located in Taft Avenue, Ermita for
the construction of the Torre de Manila condominium project and secured the necessary
clearance and permits from the City of Manila for construction of the project. Controversy arose
from its relevant permits as well as its location, which is within the sightline of the Rizal
Monument in Luneta Park.
KOR then filed a Petition for Injunction with the Supreme Court against the construction of the
Torre de Manila project, asserting that the Torre de Manila project violates National Historical
Commission of the Philippines (NHCP) guidelines and the Venice Charter, which both set
standards for the setting of monuments and sites. KOR also asserts that the same project violates
the City of Manila’s prevailing Land Use and Zoning Ordinance (Ordinance No. 8119).
Meanwhile, the DMCI-PDI argues that the KOR failed to present any proof that it did not follow
proper procedure and zoning restrictions of the City of Manila. Aside from obtaining all the
necessary permits from the appropriate government agencies, DMCI-PDI also sought
clarification on its right to build on its site from the NHCP, among other offices.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila
to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila project.
RULING:
No, the Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to stop
the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila project.
There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila project. The Court has held
that what is not expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is
contrary to morals, customs and public order. There is no allegation or proof that the Torre de
Manila project is “contrary to morals, customs and public order.” On the contrary, DMCI-PDI
has secured all the necessary permits for the construction of the project and even sought
clarifications on its right to build on its site.
Furthermore, the mandamus does not lie with the City of Manila. The Rules on Civil Procedure
are clear that mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or
the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus has
a clear legal right to the performance of such act. The City of Manila has no legal duty to
consider the standards set under Ordinance No. 8119 to the Torre de Manila project since the said
standards cannot be applied outside the boundaries of the Rizal Park, where the Torre de Manila
is located.
Hence, the Court cannot issue a write of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to
stop the construction of the Torre de Manila project of DMCI-PDI.
Aguinaldo v. Aquino
G.R. No. 224302; 29 November 2016
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS:
Hon. Philip A. Aguinaldo (Aguinaldo), Hon. Reynaldo A. Alhambra (Alhambra), Hon.
Danilo S. Cruz (Cruz), Hon. Benjamin T. Pozon (Pozon), Hon. Salvador V. Timbang (Timbang),
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed a petition for Quo Warranto and Certiorari
and Prohibition against respondent former President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Aquino)’s
appointment of respondents Associate Justice Michael Frederick L. Musngi (Musngi) and
Associate Justice Ma. Geraldine Faith A. Econg (Econg) as Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan.
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) submitted six candidate shortlists contained in six
separate letters to President Aquino, which the latter shall consider in the six newly created
positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners Aguinaldo, Alhambra, Cruz,
Pozon, and Timbang (Aguinaldo, et al.) were all nominees in the shortlist for the 16 th
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, but none of them were appointed in any of the six open
positions.
Petitioners assert that President Aquino’s power to appoint is limited to each shortlist
submitted by the JBC, and by overlooking the nominees for the 16 th Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice and appointing respondents Musngi and Econg, both nominees for the 21 st
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, as the 16 th and 18th Sandiganbayan Associate Justices,
respectively, President Aquino violated Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution and in
doing so committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the respondents maintain that President Aquino acted in accordance
with the Constitution and well-within his discretionary power to appoint members of the
Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees by the JBC into six separate shortlists
and collectively considered all 37 nominees named in said shortlists for the six vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not President Aquino violated Article VII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
and gravely abused his discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary when he
disregarded the clustering by the JBC of the nominees for each specific vacant position of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
RULING:
NO. President Aquino did not violate the Constitution or commit grave abuse of
discretion in disregarding the clustering of nominees into six vacancies for Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice.
 Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “[t]he Members of the
Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Under this
constitutional provision, the JBC is required to submit at least 18 nominees per vacancy, but this
requirement was even exceeded in the case at bar because the JBC submitted 37 qualified
nominees in total to the President.
Nomination by the JBC shall be a qualification for appointment to the Judiciary, but this
only means that the President cannot appoint an individual who is not nominated by the JBC. It
should be stressed that the power of the JBC to recommend cannot be used to restrict or limit the
President’s power to appoint as the latter’s prerogative to choose someone whom he/she
considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. The President is not
bound by the clustering of nominees by the JBC and may consider as one all the separate
shortlists submitted by the JBC.
Therefore, President Aquino did not violate the Constitution or commit grave abuse of
discretion in disregarding the clustering of nominees into six vacancies for Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice.
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 221697; 8 March 2016
PEREZ, J.

FACTS:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) filed an application for an ex
parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad),
Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) assailing four COMELEC
resolutions.
Petitioner was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo
and was taken in by Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Emiliano reported and registered
the petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR). Fernando
Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces adopted the petitioner.
In 1991, the petitioner went to the United States to become a permanent resident therein
and on October 18, 2001 has become a naturalized American citizen. After the death of the
petitioner’s father, however, she and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005. She came to Philippines on May 24, 2005 after
deciding to stay in the country for good. Before that, however, and even afterwards, she has been
going back and forth between the US and the Philippines. In the second half of 2005, petitioner
bought a condominium unit in San Juan, and in early 2006,
On July 18, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration (BI) granted her petition declaring that she
reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new
Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the
MTRCB, she renounced her Americal citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to cancel her candidacy on the grounds that
she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her
biological parents or either of them were Filipinos, and that she was not able to fulfill the 10-year
residency requirement to run for Presidency, among others.
In her defense, the petitioner submitted that customary international law dictates that
foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are presumed to be citizens of the country where they
are found, and that she has sufficiently reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under
the provisions of RA 9225. Furthermore, residence is a matter of evidence and she reestablished
her domicile in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005.
The COMELEC cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship
and residency requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of
candidates
2. Whether or not petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen
3. Whether or not petitioner satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
RULING:
1. NO. Article IX-C, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides for the powers and
functions of the COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a
candidate is not one of them.
In the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, it provides that “[t]he
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.” As for the qualifications of candidates for such
positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in
determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack of provision cannot
be supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility
into grounds for disqualification in its rules of procedures would be contrary to the intent
of the Constitution. Hence, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to rule over the
qualifications of candidates.
2. YES. Petitioner is considerably a natural-born Filipino.
Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the
Court felt the need to examine the intent of the framers, and the findings of the
deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended
foundlings to be covered by the enumeration of natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
Furthermore, treaties and the general principles of international law automatically confer
foundlings with natural-born citizenship. Although the Philippines is not signatory to
some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having
been born of the country which the foundling is found.
Therefore, the petitioner is considered a natural-born Filipino.
3. YES. Petitioner satisfied the 10-year residency requirement.
There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1) Residence or bodily presence in a
new locality; 2) an intention to remain there; and 3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile.
The petitioner has presented sufficient evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon
permanently her domicile in the US. Her domicile had been timely changed as of May
24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her application under RA 9225 was approved by
the BI. Along with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her
family’s actual stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when the petitioner
returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good. Hence, the petitioner met the 10-year
residency requirement for candidacy in the Presidential election.
Ocampo v. Medialdea
G.R. No. 225937; 8 November 2016
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Ocampo, et al. (petitioners) submitted several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against Medialdea, et al. (respondents) on the issue of former President Marcos burial
at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).
On August 7, 2016, Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a
memorandum to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General
Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the internment of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(Marcos) at the LNMB in compliance with the verbal order of President Rodrigo R. Duterte
(Duterte) to fulfill his election campaign promise to that effect.
On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez (Enriquez) issued the
corresponding directives to the Philippine Army Commanding General.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, various parties filed several petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, essentially arguing that the decision to have the remains of
former President Marcos interred at the LNMB violated various laws, that Marcos is not entitled
to be interred at the LNMB, and that the Marcos family has already waived such burial.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the issuance of the contested memorandum and directive violate the
Constitution, domestic and international laws
2. Whether or not historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the
Marcoses and their cronies, and the decisions of the Court on the Marcos regime nullified
his entitlement as a soldier and former President to internment at the LNMB
RULING:
1. NO. The assailed memorandum and directive, being the President’s decision, to bury
Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, domestic and international
laws.
Petitioners invoked Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II; Sec. 17 of Art. VII,
Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV; Sec. 1 of Art. XI; and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution.
While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety
should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely
related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not
self-executing. The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of
broad constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and
 the lack of judicial authority to wade “into the uncharted ocean of social and economic
policy making.”
In the same vein, Sec. 1 of Art. XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision.
The Court also found the reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of
the Constitution to be misplaced, with such provisions bearing no direct or indirect
prohibition to Marcos’ interment at the LNMB. The Court also found no violation of
President Duterte’s mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution to take necessary
and proper steps to carry into execution the law.
Furthermore, petitioners argued that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB will violate the
rights of the human rights violation victims (HRRVs) to “full” and “effective” reparation,
provided under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, and the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection
and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity.
When the Filipinos regained their democratic institutions after the successful People
Power Revolution that culminated on February 25, 1986, the three branches of the
government have done their fair share to respect, protect and fulfill the country's human
rights obligations.
The 1987 Constitution contains provisions that promote and protect human rights and
social justice. As to judicial remedies, aside from the writs of habeas corpus, amparo,
and habeas data, the Supreme Court promulgated AO No. 25-2007, which provides rules
on cases involving extra-judicial killings of political ideologists and members of the
media. On the part of the Executive Branch, it issued a number of administrative and
executive orders. Congress has passed several laws affecting human rights.
Contrary to petitioners’ postulation, our nation's history will not be instantly revised by a
single resolve of President Duterte, acting through Enriquez, to bury Marcos at the
LNMB. Whether petitioners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already
engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the present generation of
Filipinos. As to the unborn, it must be said that the preservation and popularization of our
history is not the sole responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and collective
endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.
2. NO. Marcos remains to be qualified to be interred at the LNMB.
Under AFP Regulations G-161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the
LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c)
Secretaries of National Defense; (d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers of the
AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include active draftees and
trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA)
who died in combat operations or combat related activities; (g) Former members of the
AFP who laterally entered or joined the PCG and the PNP; (h) Veterans of Philippine
Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries,
Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment or reinternment
has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National
Defense; and g) Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen,
National Artists, widows of Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief
of Staff.
Similar to AFP Regulations G-161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in
the LNMB: (a) Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the
service; and (b) Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude.
In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations G-
161-375 remains to be the sole authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified
to be interred at the LNMB. Interestingly, even if they were empowered to do so, former
Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, who were themselves
aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the rules by expressly prohibiting the burial
of Marcos at the LNMB.
It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to argue
that the word "bayani" in the LNMB has become a misnomer since while a symbolism of
heroism may attach to the LNMB as a national shrine for military memorial, the same
does not automatically attach to its feature as a military cemetery and to those who were
already laid or will be laid therein.
Whether or not the extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be
restricted in order to be consistent with the original purpose of the LNMB is immaterial
and irrelevant to the issue at bar since it is indubitable that Marcos had rendered
significant active military service and military-related activities. Petitioners did not
dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a
Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor
awardee.
For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, the Court may disregard
Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief, but the Court cannot deny him the right
to be acknowledged based on the other positions he held or the awards he received. In
this sense, the Court agreed with the proposition that Marcos should be viewed and
judged in his totality as a person. While he was not all good, he was not pure evil either.
Certainly, just a human who erred like us.
Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the
disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G-161-375. He was neither convicted by final
judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from active military service. Despite ostensibly persuasive
arguments as to gross human rights violations, massive graft and corruption, and dubious
military records, the 1986 popular uprising as a clear sign of Marcos’ discharge from the
AFP, the fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any offense
involving moral turpitude. The various cases cited by petitioners, which were decided
with finality by courts here and abroad, have no bearing in this case since they are merely
civil in nature; hence, cannot and do not establish moral turpitude.
To the Court’s mind, the word "service" should be construed as that rendered by a
military person in the AFP, including civil service, from the time of his/her commission,
enlistment, probation, training or drafting, up to the date of his/her separation or
retirement from the AFP. Civil service after honorable separation and retirement from the
AFP is outside the context of "service" under AFP Regulations G-161-375. Hence, it
cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency during the EDSA
Revolution is tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion or discharge from the
military service.
Not being a military person who may be prosecuted before the court martial, the
President can hardly be deemed "dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the
service" as contemplated by AFP Regulations G-161-375. Dishonorable discharge
through a successful revolution is an extra-constitutional and direct sovereign act of the
people which is beyond the ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere administrative
regulation. It is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the
people through the so-called EDSA Revolution. Said political act of the people should not
be automatically given a particular legal meaning other than its obvious consequence -
that of ousting him as president. To do otherwise would lead the Court to the treacherous
and perilous path of having to make choices from multifarious inferences or theories
arising from the various acts of the people.
Lagman v. Medialdea
G.R. No. 231658; 04 July 2017
DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation
No. 216. The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and
lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time. The Report also
highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role it plays in
Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic
repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued a resolution
expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 to be
satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law. In the same Resolution, the Senate
declared that it found no compelling reason to revoke the same. The House of Representatives
likewise issued a resolution expressing its full support to the President, as it finds no reason to
revoke Proclamation No. 216.
Invoking the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, various
citizens filed several petitions, essentially invoking the Court’s specific and special jurisdiction
to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216; and seeking to nullify
Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual basis.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Court involves the
calibration of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief
2. Whether or not the Proclamation No. 216 may be considered, vague, and thus null and
void:
a) with its inclusion of “other rebel groups”; or
b) since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region
3. Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the
Report of the President to Congress sufficient bases for the existence of actual rebellion;
or for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao region
 4. Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism equivalent to actual rebellion
and the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
RULING:
1. NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision
pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do
so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and
an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.
2. a. NO. The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when
viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No.
216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of
reference in its Whereas clauses.
b. NO. There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the
implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders
issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed
under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts
or human rights violations, should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a
risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed a trespassing into the
sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.
3. YES. A review of the facts available to the President that there was an armed public
uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the
Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any
of his power and prerogatives leading to President to believe that there was probable
cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety
requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. The President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual
bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President’s conclusion was reached
after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged
his burden of proof. After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of
probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.
4. YES. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus to be valid, there must be concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the
public safety requirement. In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence
perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against government
forces or establishment but likewise against civilians and their properties. In addition and
in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were issued, road blockades and
 checkpoints were set up, schools and churches were burned, civilian hostages were taken
and killed, non-Muslim or Christians were targeted, young male Muslims were forced to
join their group, medical services and delivery of basic services were hampered,
reinforcement of government troops and civilian movement were hindered, and the
security of the entire Mindanao Islands was compromised. Based on the foregoing,
Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe
that rebellion exists and that public safety requires the martial law declaration and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
The Court reverts back to the premise that the discretion to determine the territorial scope
of martial law lies with the President. The Constitution grants him the prerogative whether to put
the entire Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. There is no constitutional edict that
martial law should be confined only in the particular place where the armed public uprising
actually transpired. This is not only practical but also logical. Martial law is an urgent measure
since at stake is the nation's territorial sovereignty and survival. As such, the President has to
respond quickly. After the rebellion in the Court's compound, he need not wait for another
rebellion to be mounted in Quezon City before he could impose martial law thereat. If that is the
case, then the President would have to wait until every remote corner in the country is infested
with rebels before he could declare martial law in the entire Philippines. For sure, this is not the
scenario envisioned by the Constitution.
Going back to the illustration above, although the President is not required to impose
martial law only within the Court's compound because it is where the armed public uprising
actually transpired, he may do so if he sees fit. At the same time, however, he is not precluded
from expanding the coverage of martial law beyond the Court's compound. After all, rebellion is
not confined within predetermined bounds.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct
proportion to the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and
public safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies
precise measurements; hence, the determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only
be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered these
limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in determining the territorial
scope of martial law. Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not
limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the
present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of
lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their
supply lines coming from different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or
suspension to the place where there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of
declaring martial law, it will make the exercise thereof ineffective and useless.