Encyclopedia Judaica:Table of Contents|Taxation|Medicine

The Religious Context

BIBLICAL PERIOD

Deuteronomy 23:20–21 states: "You shall not lend on interest to your brother, interest of food
or money or anything on which interest can be charged. You may charge interest to a foreigner,
but not to your brother that the Lord, your God, may bless you in all you put your hand to in
the land into which you are going, to possess it." This text has become the subject of much
discussion and controversy for nearly two millennia. Within the framework of the so-called
Book of the Covenant, another law on moneylending is to be found, in Exodus 23:24: "If you
lend money to my people, to the poor with you, you shall not act toward him like a creditor.
You must not lay interest [neshekh] upon him." In this verse, nosheh ("creditor") is
philologically and semantically equivalent to the Assyrian rašu ("creditor"), the professional
moneylender. A third pentateuchal law on interest-bearing loans occurs in Leviticus 25:35–38,
in a context usually referred to as the Holiness Code: "If your brother has become poor and
cannot support himself with you, you shall assist him [as] a resident alien [ger ve-toshav], and
he shall live with you. You shall not give him your money on interest [be-neshekh], nor give
him your food for increase [be-marbit]. I am the Lord, your God, who brought you forth out of
the land of Egypt, to give you the land of Canaan, to be your God." Usually the difference
between neshekh and tarbit or marbit is explained as a difference between interest on capital
and interest on food. The passage in Deuteronomy, however, also refers to interest on food
(neshekh okhel) and it is possible that the two codes employ a slightly different terminology.

Many attempts have been made to answer questions on the literary form and the dates of these
pentateuchal laws, but during the last decades detailed study of the various Ancient Near
Eastern codes from the 19th to the 12th centuries B.C.E. has enabled scholars to substantiate
their opinions on the Sitz im Leben of the Hebrew law collections more accurately than hitherto
possible. The Book of the Covenant is generally considered the oldest of the pentateuchal codes,
because of the social and economic structure it presupposes. No urban life or king is referred
to, and there is no organized state or priesthood. There is, moreover, ethnological evidence of
many similarly primitive units, among whom all loans of money and food were given free of
interest, usually up to the time of the next harvest when they could be paid back by the debtor.
Such legislation could not, of course, apply to the alien (nokhri), who was not a permanent
resident.

In comparison, there are some similarities but also major differences between the pentateuchal
law codes and their Ancient Near Eastern antecedents. The latter mirror a society much more
fully developed than that of the still half-sedentary Hebrews. Thus, the tamkarum appears as a
professional moneylender in various sections of the Code of Hammurapi, where rates of interest
are specified for food as well as for money loans. Even in relatively late strata of the Bible, it
is the Canaanite rather than the Israelite or the Hebrew, who is represented as the merchant or
the trader. Had the nucleus of the Hebrew Codes been compiled at the time of the monarchy,
they would have reflected quite different socio-economic conditions. Their literary form is of
equal importance. In his Urspruenge des israelitischen Rechts (1934), 69ff., A. Alt
distinguishes between casuistic law, characteristic of the Ancient Near Eastern codes, and
apodictic law, more frequently, although by no means exclusively, found in comparable
Israelitic source material. Exodus 22:24 is a mixture of both. The casuistic beginning, "If you
lend money to my people…," which would logically be followed by a reference to the rate of
interest or to the punishment to be meted out to a defaulting debtor, concludes apodictically
with: "You shall not act as a creditor."

The Holiness and the Deuteronomic Codes are normally assigned to a much later date than that
of the Book of the Covenant. The problem of their editing and ultimate incorporation into the
Pentateuch is a difficult one, but as far as the laws on interest are concerned, all of them have
elements in common, which stress, directly or indirectly, a special covenant between God and
Israel and the consequent obligations of brotherhood between the members of the community.
Just as biblical history with its predominantly theological tendencies has been described
as Heilsgeschichte, much of biblical law may be classified as Heilsgesetz, addressing itself to
the pre-state sacred institution of the 12 tribes. Moreover, Ancient Near Eastern codes do not
claim divine inspiration, while all Hebrew laws are presented as having been revealed by God
to Moses, even if, as in the case of the prohibitions against taking interest from a brother, no
guidance is given as to judicial procedures against ruthless exploitation of the poor. The few
other passages in the Bible which refer to money-lending confirm the impression that the
relevant pentateuchal ordinances were interpreted by the prophets, psalmists, wisdom-writers,
and chroniclers more as moral exhortations than as laws (cf. Hab. 2:6; Ezek. 18; Ps. 15:5; Prov.
28:8; II Kings 4:1–2; and Neh. 5:1–11; for apocryphal and pseudepigraphical literature, see
Ecclus. 20:15;29 and IV Macc. 2:8). Neither indignation nor pious hopes could replace the
jurisdiction of established courts.

Documentary evidence of the nonobservance of these pentateuchal admonitions comes only

from the Diaspora, but affords an even clearer picture of prevailing conditions. Thus, the
Aramaic Papyri show that the Jews of the military colony in Elephantine lent each other money
on interest at the rate of 60 percent per annum in the fifth century (cf. Cowley, Aramaic nos. 10
and 11). In the Tebtunis Papyri, numbers 815, 817, and 818, loans at interest between Jews are
also referred to. These documents belong to the third and second centuries respectively, and
reflect typical Hellenistic usage in their formulation (cf. Tcherikover, Corpus, 1 (1957)). In the
talmudic period such documents would be invalid. Aristotle had expressed contempt for the
taking of interest in a well-known utterance in his Ethics (4:3), basing his opinion on the nature
of money which is in itself not subject to physical growth. In addition, on several occasions
during the last few pre-Christian centuries, popular resentment against impoverishment through
usury forced Greek and Roman legislators to forbid the taking of interest altogether, although
enactments of this sort did not remain in force for long. Among Jewish Hellenistic writers, Philo
appears to have been the first to add his own comment to Deuteronomy 23:20, by extending the
prohibition about taking interest from the brother to anyone of the same citizenship (astos), or
nation (homofulos) in De Virtutibus, 82. He is, however, not quite consistent and keeps himself
closer to the biblical text in De Specialibus Legibus (II, 73ff. and 122).

THE TALMUDIC PERIOD

After the destruction of the Temple, halakhists and aggadists determined the development of
Jewish religious law proper, at least until the 17th century. The tannaitic Midrash Sifrei
Deuteronomy 23:20f. understands la-nokhri tashikh as a positive commandment; i.e., you shall
lend at interest to a foreigner. Although this is possible on philological grounds, heavy
oppression under Roman rule in the first part of the second century may have led to such an
interpretation, particularly since R. Akiva was closely connected with the revolt of Bar Kokhba
and with the editing of the Sifrei. The contemporary Mekhilta of R. Ishmael offers a different
explanation on the related passage in Exodus 22:24. Interest-free money should be lent to Jews
and gentiles alike, although a Jew should be given preference. In addition, one commentator
states that it is only toward the poor that one should not act as a professional moneylender, but
one may do so toward the rich. From the third century onward, the prohibition against taking
interest had been accepted as applicable to every Jew, rich or poor. The Mekhilta on Exodus
22:24, ends with a homiletic statement by R. Meir: "He who lends on interest… has no share in
Him who decreed against taking interest." Similar denunciations occur frequently in halakhic
and aggadic Midrashim, in Mishnah, Tosefta, baraita, and the Babylonian and Jerusalem
Talmuds. Transgressors against the ever growing injunctions are called robbers and murderers.
They are likened to those who rear pigs, described as denying the fundamental tenets of the
Jewish faith and declared to be unfit as witnesses. The frequency of such utterances implies the
frequency of the offenses. It is to be stressed, however, against apologetic tendencies that still
prevail in the relevant literature, that views of this kind refer to inter-Jewish transactions only,
unless the gentile is explicitly included in the prohibition. The expression "even interest from a
non-Jew" (afillu ribbit de-goi) implies that the difference between them is still clearly felt.

As to inter-Jewish transactions, discussions continue as to whether paid interest, fixed or

unfixed, can be taken back for the debtor by the judges. Also proposed are the relinquishment
of the principal and the rescinding of written contracts or shetarot on which interest was
specified. The Mishnah (BM 5:6) says quite plainly that one may lend to and borrow from
gentiles at interest. In the course of the debate in the Gemara (ad loc.) R. Naḥman transmits
Rav Huna's objection to taking interest from anybody, but it is, apparently again for apologetic
reasons, generally overlooked that his view is challenged by Rava on the basis of the
Deuteronomic law and the Mishnah which precedes the Gemara. R. Ḥiyya replies that money
may only be lent on interest to the non-Jew, as far as it is necessary for the sustenance of the
Jew (bi-khedei ḥayyav). Ravina maintains that the reason for this restriction is based on
religious self-protection. The lender should reduce his contact with the alien to a minimum, lest
he learn from the debtor's deeds (shema yilmad mi-ma'asav; see also Rashi on Mak.
24a, S.V. afillu le-akkum). The Jewish scholar, on the other hand, is allowed to take interest
from non-Jews, even where there is no economic necessity, because he would not be influenced
by the practices of the latter.

There is one further aspect regarding money-lending at interest in talmudic literature which
calls for attention – the regulations against the employment of a non-Jewish intermediary, a
device sometimes resorted to in order to make illegal inter-Jewish loan transactions possible. A
number of tannaitic traditions have a bearing on the subject (cf. BM 71bf. and TJ, BM 10c;
Tos., BM 5:15). This convention has a prehistory in Roman law. Livy mentions that at the
beginning of the second century B.C.E., Roman creditors had found a device (fraus) for
collecting interest by transferring the ownership of accounts to citizens of allied states, who
thus became the real or fictitious lenders without being subject to internal Roman legislation
(ed. by E.T. Sage (1935), 10:18). That such evasive tactics were current among Jews of the
talmudic period is evident not only from the various halakhot, but also from the following
homiletic statement in Bava Meẓia 61b: "Why did the All-Merciful mention the Exodus from
Egypt in connection with the law on interest?… The Holy One, blessed be He, answered: 'I,
who distinguished between the firstborn and those who were not firstborn in Egypt, shall in
future punish him who hangs his money on a gentile and lends it on interest to a Jew.'"

THE GEONIC PERIOD

This period lasted from about the seventh to the 11th centuries. During that time, the main
autonomous center of Jewish life was in Babylonia, although the decisions of the geonim were
considered binding in the remotest communities of Europe and Africa. The Jews were active as
artisans, builders, merchants, and as experts in agriculture and horticulture in many parts of the
new Islamic world. Yet the Koran (4:160) is the first source to accuse them of usury.
Contemporary halakhic compendia offer little original material on the subject. Only one
responsum of the ninth century, by Amram Gaon (Sha'arei Ẓedek, 1792, p. 40a), forbids any
money-lending on interest, permitting only such as would come about in a credit transaction
involving the exchange of money and fruit. He adds that Muslims, too, allow this according to
their law. The strong anti-usury legislation of Islam as well as the almost unrestricted
professional facilities then open to Jews prompted him to be stricter than the traditional rulings
on Jewish-gentile money transactions. In an anonymous responsum of the tenth century, biblical
and talmudic ordinances are stressed again, and it is left to the discretion of the pious to refrain
from money-lending altogether.

THE EARLY RABBINIC PERIOD

The center of Jewish life shifted toward Europe. The academies of Babylonia were gradually
replaced by famous schools in France, Germany, and Spain. Monographs on the various
European countries contain detailed accounts of the general and specific in their history. Two
factors, however, stand out: growing anti-Jewish legislation and the development of the feudal
system with its demand for a Christian oath on the acquisition of land. As a result, Jews were
increasingly cut off from landownership. Yet even in countries like Spain and Italy, where
Jewish urbanization took place less rapidly than in England and Germany, the Jews themselves
no longer desired close contact with the soil, although they complained more and more about
the shrinking opportunities to support themselves. An often quoted responsum by the French
11th-century scholar, Joseph b. Samuel Tov Elem *Bonfils , illustrates the change. Leah, the
questioner, expresses dissatisfaction with the fact that taxes for which the community was
responsible to the government were evenly distributed among the Jewish owners of fields and
among merchants and traders. She is assessed for the ground she holds and for the crops it
yields. In addition, the rulers of the land take their share from it. In contrast, money lent on
interest is profitable, because the pledge remains in the hand of the creditor, and the principal
increases without effort or expense. Joseph Tov Elem agrees with Leah's arguments against
those who wish to assess her (cf. Responsa of Meir of Rothenburg, 1895, no. 941). Generally it
must be said that early medieval rabbinic legislation cleared the path for a great variety of
gentile-Jewish and inter-Jewish money transactions. Especially the authority of Jacob b. Meir
Tam, Rashi's grandson, carried great weight with his contemporaries and successors. He
summarizes the reasons for a number of his decisions in the following way: "Today people
usually lend money on interest to gentiles… because we have to pay taxes to the king and
princes and everything serves to sustain ourselves [kedei ḥayyenu]. We live among the nations
and it is impossible for us to earn a living unless we deal with them. It is, therefore, no more
forbidden to lend at interest because 'one might learn from their deeds' than it is to engage in
any other business" (cf., e.g., Tos., BM 70b, 71b and Av. Zar. 2a).

Menahem b. Solomon Meiri, an eminent 13th-century scholar, gives an account of the position
in Provence: "In our days nobody cares about refraining from business dealings with and loans
to gentiles, even on their festivals – not a Gaon, not a rabbi, not a scholar, not a pupil, not
a ḥasid ["pious man"], and not one who pretends to be a ḥasid. All these laws refer only to
idolators and their images, but all transactions with Christians are perfectly legal." Meiri coined
a special phrase for this group: "nations who are restrained by the paths of their religion" (cf. J.
Katz, in: Zion, 18 (1953), 18ff.). He thus differs implicitly or explicitly, with most of his
predecessors, including Maimonides. Only the Ḥasidei Ashkenaz, German-Jewish pietists and
some Spanish kabbalists of the beginning of the 13th century, viewed the new development with
anxiety and disfavor. According to them, interest should not be charged to gentiles if a living
could be made from the fields, although they no longer ventured to state this in terms of a legal
prohibition. Contemporary Jewish commentators on the Bible follow the same distinctions as
halakhic literature. In addition, they reflect full awareness of Christian polemics against the
ever increasing number of Jewish moneylenders. David *Kimhi of Narbonne says the following
about Psalms 15:5: "…the Hebrew must not overreach or rob the alien or steal from him, but
interest which he takes by full agreement [with a non-Jewish lender] is permitted… If the
gentile is kind to the Jew, the Jew must certainly be kind and good to him…" He adds explicitly
that his views should serve as an answer to those Christians who maintain that David did not
distinguish between the Israelite and the gentile.

Meir b. Simeon's only partly edited manuscript (Parma 2749) Milḥemet Mitzvah ("Obligatory
War") contains by far the richest source material on Jewish-gentile moneylending transactions.
His attempts to defend old and established practices show greater knowledge of former
privileges granted by popes, emperors, and feudal lords than that of any of his predecessors,
and he makes the widest possible and often ingenious use of practically all biblical and talmudic
data on the subject. One or two generations older than David Kimḥi and also from Narbonne,
he had frequent discussions with the lower and higher clergy, including two archbishops, the
second of whom was probably Guido Fulcodi, who later became Pope Clement IV.

It was on this occasion that Meir was confronted with the same accusations about gentile
disadvantages in Jewish law as those which had been made in the famous Paris disputation in
1240 at the palace of Louis IX. No Latin record of his disputation appears to be extant, and it
is doubtful whether he could have said all he wrote down in the diary of his public activities.
The whole historical background of his time is unfolded in his work – anti-Jewish legislation,
persecutions, expulsions, and his able and often successful efforts to counter them. His sharp
criticism of the release of interest and sometimes even of the principal, owed to Jews by the
Crusaders, is of special significance. Fearless defense and daring attack are often juxtaposed.
Thus, Joseph b. Nathan ha-Mekanne *Official , a contemporary and fellow-citizen of Meir b.
Simeon, refutes the attacks against Jewish money-lending with the by now usual arguments,
and subsequently adds: "You lend money at high rates… of 100%… and take reward for
delayed payment" (Z. Kahn, in: Birkhat Avraham… Berliner (1903), 89).

Jewish moneylenders in England acted, as far as one can judge from their documents, in exactly
the same way as those on the continent – i.e., in accordance with the ordinances of the sages
(ke-tikkun ḥakhamin), even if there are certain peculiarities which seem to be influenced by
non-Jewish legal practice. Thus, ribbit ("interest"), unless used in connection with ribbit al
yedei goi("inter-Jewish interest charges, made possible through a gentile proxy"), occurs only
four out of about 30 times in M.D. Davis' Hebrew Deeds (1888). Instead of ribbit,
shevaḥ ("profit") is used. In some inter-gentile promissory notes, too, the
expression lucrum ("gain") is found for fenus ("usury"). There is also the sudden emergence of
the formula "if the stipulated time for repayment of the loan is over" (im ya'avor zeman) in
Hebrew shetarot ("promissory notes" see *Shetar ) of English provenance. According to
talmudic law, there is no justification for this, but contemporary regulations of civil and canon
law had adopted the Roman concepts of lucrum cessans and damnum emergens. They may well
have found their way into inter-Jewish transactions, although still under the proviso that creditor
A allow creditor B to borrow from a gentile, to indemnify the lender against damage or loss of
gain.

In Spain, too, similar practices, perhaps even without the gentile intermediary, seem to have
become customary during the 13thcentury, as is known from a responsum by Solomon b.
Abraham Adret (ed. Hanau, 1600, 172b). He declares such convention to be forbidden, but adds
that, strictly speaking, we have in this case to deal with a penalty (kenas) and not with interest.
Officially, at least, Max Weber's distinction between Binnen and Aussen-Moral retained its
validity in talmudic and rabbinic law. Similar Christian differentiations between the "brother"
and the "other" can be traced back to the Church Father Ambrose of the fourth century.
According to him, the Jew must be loaded with such a burden of usury that by the very
punishment of the charges imposed upon him, he is compelled to move more quickly toward
righteousness (De Tobia, 1, Migne, P.L. 14 (1845), 799; and T.P. Mc-Laughlin, Medieval
Studies, 1 (1939), 92, 137).

THE LATE RABBINIC PERIOD

The Jewish analogue of this position was expressed by the 14th-century French philosopher and
exegete, *Levi b. Gershom , who also holds that it is a positive commandment to lend money
to an alien on interest, "if he needs it…, because one should not benefit an idolator… and cause
him as much damage as possible without deviating from righteousness," i.e., without
demanding from him exorbitant rates of interest (see his commentary on Deut. 23:21). Such
sentiments are extreme, though not isolated (cf. R. Tam on BM 70b and Maimonides'
uncensored comment on Av. Zar. chs. 3 and 4). Sometimes the passion of the spirit gave way
to the demands of economic necessity, and periods of quasi-normal business relationships
between believers and non-believers interrupted the cold or actual war between them. More
often the force of faith, never quite unconnected with the relatively high proportion of Jewish
moneylenders, broke through and led to their persecution and expulsion. An ultimate judgment
on the priority of powers which determine political and ideological reality remains difficult, if
not impossible. The situation differed from country to country, from province to province, and
even from town to town. Yet an analysis of the uneven and widely dispersed Jewish and
Christian source material, ranging from the 14th to the 17th centuries, reveals an astounding
development from unyielding medieval thought patterns to their integration with new economic
theories, and leads almost to a breakdown of denominational barriers.

In his Ikkarim, the Spanish philosopher Joseph *Albo declares that the "brother" in the
Deuteronomic law refers to everyone who is not an idolator. Interest is, therefore, only to be
taken from one who belongs to the "seven nations of old" – for instance, from an Amorite or
Amalekite: "If it is permitted to take his life, surely one may take his property" (Im gufo
muttar mamono kol she-ken; ed. Husik, 3 (1946), 237). Albo's words are an almost literal
translation of Ambrose's "ubi enim jus est belli, ibi est usurae" (cf. also Plato's Laws, 10:909).
In a position of defense vis-à-vis the archbishop of Narbonne, Meir b. Simeon had advanced a
similar argument. Albo's statement is not part of the public disputation in Tortosa (1413) in
which he was one of the Jewish spokesmen, but a record of another encounter with a Christian
opponent. It is clear, however, that he did not refer to current halakhic practices, although some
talmudic proof texts can be found in their support. Other Jewish writings, not concerned with
interdenominational altercations, do not question the legality of charging interest from gentiles.
Thus, Joseph Colon, who came from France and held a distinguished position in the Italian
rabbinate during the second part of the 15th century, states casually that the Jews of both
countries hardly engaged in any other business (Resp. Maharik 118, 132). Abraham b. Mordecai
Farissol (1451–1526) confirms Colon's assessment of circumstances prevailing in Italy.
Conditions of this kind were bound to bring about irregularities, but they were not restricted to
Jews. Early propaganda of the Franciscans was, in fact, not specifically directed against the
Jews. Hebraei et Christiani usurarii were the target of Bernardino da Feltre.

The establishment of Jewish loan banks was subject to a license of the papal administration or
of the local rulers or of both. The stipulations of these condotte varied from time to time and
from place to place. They were often changed unexpectedly, and as a result the insecurity of
the Jewish moneylender increased, however much he might have profited from an occasional
boom. Matters came to a climax through the propaganda for the establishment of Christian loan-
banks, the montes pietatis, which were originally meant to work on a nonprofit basis.
Particularly during the Lenten period "the friars [ha-doreshim] are a strap of castigation for
Israel and preach every day to destroy us… Their hand is heavy upon us… and the situation
reaches a point when both body and property are endangered" (Colon, ed. princeps, no. 192).

Isaac Abrabanel's view on interest-bearing loans to gentiles is laid down in his commentary on
Deuteronomy 23:21, and forms part of his elaborate exegesis of the whole book, which was
completed in Monopoli in 1496 and published in uncensored form in Sabbioneta in 1551. He
expounded his theories "before Christian scholars and the masters of the land." The first three
of his arguments offer nothing new; only the fourth is straightforward and assailable on
philological and historical grounds. At the same time, it foreshadows the general development
toward capitalism, so characteristic of the 16th century: "There is nothing unworthy about
interest… because it is proper that people should make profit out of their money, wine, and
corn, and if someone wants money from someone else… why should a farmer… who received
wheat to sow his field not give the lender 10% if he is successful, as he usually should be? This
is an ordinary business transaction and correct…. Interest-free loans should only be given to
the coreligionist, to whom we owe special kindness." Abrabanel sums up with an assurance to
his readers that what he had said in the first three paragraphs was only meant "to promote peace.
What a Jew should really believe is laid down in the tradition of the sages."

Shortly before the completion of Abrabanel's commentary on Deuteronomy, Abraham b.

Mordecai Farissol had a disputation in Ferrara at the famous Palace of Ercole d'Este I, again
attended by many prominent people (cf. Magen Avraham, ch. 73, ed. by D.S. Loewinger
in: HHY, 12 (1928), 290ff.). Some of Farissol's answers also represent a definite opposition to
medieval economic concepts. His formulations might well be borrowed from the views of
contemporary civil lawyers. In contrast to the opinion of the canonists and of Levi b. Gershom
who, like Aristotle, considered money as barren metal, a distinction is now drawn between
primitive and advanced society: "After society had expanded and people began to be
distinguished from one another by their views… there followed a new Nature and another
Order. The custom of giving another person something for nothing ceased unless the person
was poor. Thus, the law has developed to pay rent for houses… and to make loans… All comes
for a price… Sometimes credit is even more important than lending an animal or a house.
Hence… it is appropriate to give some compensation for a loan. A proof for this argument is
that even the ba'alei hadatot [canonists] have agreed that one may pay up to 5% for the lending
of money." Farissol seems to refer especially to the montes pietatis, which were forced to charge
a small amount for the maintenance of their administration. As to the rates of interest charged,
"one need not ponder over them, because they are agreed upon by the communities who require
money from the Jews. They fluctuate according… to the availability or scarcity of silver and
gold and the demand for it."
In 1588 the physician David de Pomis published his De Medico Hebraeo Enarratio
Apologetica, in which he set himself the task of putting on record the devoted services of
distinguished Jewish doctors in the past. The book, written in Latin, also contains his views on
money-lending to gentiles. His effusive flattery about the relationship between Christianity and
Judaism makes it unnecessary to refer to the first part of his arguments. Only in the last
paragraph of the relevant section does he return to the practical aspects of the problem: "If the
Jews do sometimes take interest from Christians, it can either be maintained that they abuse the
law or…" and here his statements are almost identical with those of Farissol, "…their
transactions represent an official agreement between the parties concerned… A Jew could effect
the same transaction with another Jew according to recent rabbinic authorities." One form is
technically called tarsha and the other hetter iska (cf. Sh. Ar., YD 167, 177). Both concessions
represent developments dictated by the general change of economic conditions. In practice, de
Pomis' labored defense came late. It was Calvin who challenged the Deuteronomic
differentiation between the "brother" and the "alien" on principle. According to him, interest is
forbidden only insofar as it is contrary to equity and charity. Otherwise, "nous sommes frères
sans aucune distinction."The enunciation of his program became the decisive formula for the
new spirit of capitalism.

FROM OTHERHOOD TO BROTHERHOOD?

From the 17th century onward, the collapse of the traditional Christian exegesis of Deuteronomy
23 is apparent in Europe and in the U.S. On the Jewish side, too, responsa on the subject become
less frequent; even the records of the Council of the Four Lands have relatively little to say on
the matter. The hetter iska (see *Usury ) had opened the path to a mercantilistic interpretation
of talmudic law. Nevertheless, on the readmission of the Jews to England, Manasseh Ben Israel,
in his Humble Address to His Highness the Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England,
did not deem it necessary to revoke the ancient distinction: "For to lay out the money without
any profit was commanded only toward their brethren of the same nation of the Jews, but not
to any other nation" (cf. B.N. Nelson, Idea of Usury (1949), 73–109). In spite of occasional
regressions, a gradual improvement of the position of the Jews in Western Europe became
noticeable. Money-lending still remained one of their main occupations, but they also traded,
sometimes simultaneously, in all kinds of merchandise, or they earned their living as craftsmen
and artisans. Above all, there was the ascendancy of the Court Jew who, in spite of his
fluctuating fortunes, played an important part in the economic administration of the estate of
many a duke and king in peace and war (cf. H. Schnee, Die Hoffinanz und der moderne Staat,
6 vols., 1953–67). The Age of Reason further contributed to the disappearance of barriers
between the various denominations. Although Leopold I expelled the Jews from Vienna and
Lower Austria in 1670, Joseph II issued his Toleranzpatent only about 100 years later.

In 1807, the ecclesiastical and lay representatives of French, Italian, and German Jewry
assembled in Paris to attend a meeting that had been convened by Napoleon. Bearing the proud
title, "Grand Sanhedrin," it concluded a development of 2,000 years and to many of those who
had come seemed to open a new era. Two of the 12 questions they were asked concerned the
problem of inter-Jewish and Jewish-gentile loan transactions. Although eminent rabbinic
scholars of personal integrity were present, the answers, Décisions Doctrinales or, in their
Hebrew version, takkanot, reveal neither any depth of historical understanding nor sincerity on
the part of those who were responsible for their formulation. Neshekh, for example, is defined
as a rate of interest to be determined by the Code Civil (Code Napoleon) of France. Such interest
may be charged by one Jew from another, provided that the lender share the risk of loss and the
chance of gain, and that the debtor give indemnification to the creditor in the case of damnum
emergens. Only the poor Jew must be charged no interest at all. Gentiles, particularly those
living in France or Italy, are to be considered as brothers of the Jews, and there must not be any
difference between them if charity is required. Those who disregard this ordinance will be
called sinners and transgressors of the law of the holy Torah. All this may, to a degree, be
defensible from the standpoint of the halakhah, but a complete renunciation of Jewish
autonomy is implied. Jews have become Frenchmen of the Israelite persuasion. The law of the
State (ḥok ha-medinah) sets the tone and the "Grand Sanhedrin" decides accordingly (Takkanot
ha-Sanhedrin shel Paris (1958), 56–67). Ishmael b. Abraham Isaac ha-Kohen of Modena, who
also received an invitation to the Paris Sanhedrin, was too old to make the journey, but gave his
answers to each question in writing. Although gentle and dignified in his reply, he disassociates
himself from the views expressed in the Décisions Doctrinales: "To deny permission to lend
money on interest to gentiles is against all exegetes, against the Gemara, and against the literal
understanding of the Bible" (cf. J. Rosenthal, in: Talpioth, 4 (1950), 583).

Events of the last 150 years belied the identification of the "brother" and the "other," and in all
probability the reaction of the old rabbi of Modena and those who thought like him, even at the
beginning of the 19th century has not disappeared from Jewish life. The full awareness of
covenantal relationship between God and Israel and Jew and Jew is still strongly felt. Until this
day many Jewish banks both in and outside Israel display a notice to the effect that it is
understood that business and loan transactions between Jews will be conducted according
to hetter iska regulations.

[Siegfried Stein]

The Historical Context

The biblical injunctions against usury relate neither exclusively nor mainly to money-lending
on interest. Their spirit reflects a nomadic and village society where the borrowing of goods is
the norm, and moneylending the exception. Yet the so-called archives of the *Murashu house
discovered at Nippur show Jews in Babylonian regions engaged in extensive financial
operations. The Talmud largely treats the problem of usury and interest from the point of view
of product loans, though financial operations are also dealt with in this connection. There is
evidence that as Jews moved in the city life of the Roman Empire, some of them gave loans on
interest.

With the development of an urban economy in the caliphate of the ninth century, the financing
of the ever-growing needs of trade, of crafts, and of the state, became a pressing need. Jews
financed the business of their coreligionists through participating in various ways as partners,
both in financing and in profits. While some of these means of participation were actual, others
were formal only, devised to evade the prohibitions on usury. In the tenth century, large-scale
Jewish financiers appear, like the *Netirafamily, who loaned large sums to the state on interest,
against the collateral of state incomes. These loans were evidently the accumulated savings of
middle- and small-scale Jewish merchants, deposited with Jewish state bankers for greater
income and security. When (up to the 15th century) the majority of the Jewish people lived in
Islamic lands and in Christian Spain, money-lending was one of the occupations of Jews, as of
other city dwellers. While in Northwestern Europe Jews first came mainly as international
traders, when some of them later turned to local trade (1000 C.E.), they engaged in credit
operations. The impact ofthe First Crusade (1096–99) on the status and livelihood of the Jews
in France, Germany, and England drove them out of trade through the lack of security arising
from the inimical attitude of society in general; at the same time, Jewish merchants and
craftsmen were denied any share in the Christian towns and *guilds which were rapidly
evolving as the only social framework for trade and crafts in those countries. This crystallized
at a time when European trade, agriculture, and building were expanding and in need of
financing. Ready cash – which then meant precious metals – was scarce. Available means in
Christian hands were channeled into credit for merchant ventures and other relatively creative
loans, in which it was also easier to formulate partnerships that evaded the stigma of usury.
Under such circumstances the Church found it easy to act in accordance with the agricultural
ethos of its upper strata, and to insist on the prohibition of usury. There remained the field of
loans for consumption – the need for which arose in cases of illness, litigation, and unforeseen
expenses – for which Christian capital was not readily available and where usury was least
avoidable. Deprived of its former uses, Jewish capital entered this field, as well as granting any
other possible loan. Hence among the Jews of the region between the Pyrenees and Scotland,
between the Atlantic and the Elbe, usury became the main source of livelihood from about the
12th to the 15th centuries. They were not the only people to lend money on interest in that region:
there were also the Cahorsins of southern France, the Catalans, and the Lombards. But religious
enmity, the social separateness of the Jews, and their hateful image, combined to identify Jew
with usurer in the western Christian imagination. In those countries Jews sometimes lent on a
debt deed only, without surety. Medieval Hebrew sources from those regions described this
kind of loan as be-emunah ("on trust"), a practice usually reserved for established and proved
clients. Most loans were given on the double surety of a written deed and a collateral
(Heb. mashkon). Since repayment of a loan for consumption was often difficult, the needy
debtor came to hate the infidel Jewish creditor who, out of his own need, had helped him. Many
anti-Jewish persecutions hence acquired an economic as well as a religious character, the
instigators being no less anxious to destroy incriminating bonds than to eliminate accursed
infidels.

In England the extent as well as the problems of Jewish money-lending were seen at their
clearest. The most common interest rate was two pence in the pound a week (43 1/3 annually),
though half and twice as much were also common. There were many partnerships, often
between members of the same family; this form was utilized by the extremely wealthy *Aaron
of Lincoln . To supervise Jewish lending, to insure maximum tax exactions from the Jewish
lenders, and to make certain that debt deeds would not be lost even in times of massacres,
the *Archa system was introduced. In the 13th century Jewish money-lending was conducted
through tenants of the commons and of the middle class, whose bonds were bought up, on
default, by the nobility and ecclesiastical institutions. This too, aroused the enmity of the
commoners toward the Jews. In 1275 Edward III passed severe anti-usury laws, at the same
time exacting extremely high tallages and calling in Italian moneylenders to replace the Jews.
Some of the latter turned to coin-clipping, which led in part to the total expulsion in 1290.

Though in the heterogeneous Holy Roman Empire money-lending practices varied greatly
according to time and place, the history of Jewish money-lending in *Regensburg may be
typical of Rhenish and south German cities. Until about 1250 the municipality was the chief
beneficiary of Jewish loans; until about 1400 the nobility and clergy were the main recipients;
while after 1400 knights, burghers, and artisans pawned objects for short terms, and borrowed
small sums at high rates of interest. This latter situation eventually became the focus of lower-
class enmity toward the Jews and contributed to their expulsion in 1519.

Interest rates in Germany fluctuated greatly in practice and even in their legal norms.
Frederick II of Austria fixed the Jews' maximum interest rate at 173⅓% in 1244; in the more
developed cities of the Rhineland and south Germany 43⅓% was more common, though this
rate did not apply in the case of foreigners or peasants; 86⅔% was also common and acceptable.
An investigation in 1676, motivated by anti-Jewish feeling, in the electoral Palatinate in western
Germany, showed that an interest rate of 14.5% was honored there by the Jewish moneylenders.
The Christian rulers who exploited Jews as their agents for usury – and then extorted from them
a large part of their usurious gains, especially when the Jews became impoverished – used to
proclaim moratoriums on the individual, partial, or total debts to Jews. The respective treasuries
all profited by such measures, the best known being those of Emperor Wenceslaus in 1385 and
1390, which utterly impoverished the Jews while barely alleviating the burdens of the treasury.
Likewise, total and bare-faced confiscation was often resorted to, as was expulsion, which left
the field open to the Jews' remaining competitors. Because of the collateral in their hands Jewish
moneylenders frequently engaged in related occupations, such as the repair and upkeep of
clothes, armor, and precious objects, and in their sale when pledges were not redeemed, a
frequent occurrence. Hence the rudiments of certain crafts, as well as the sale of *secondhand
goods , were an integral part of this occupation. Articles regulating moneylending constituted
the core of all charters issued to Jews in medieval Germany from the 12th century. They
determined not only the rates of interest, but also ensured the rights of the creditor to the
collateral, even if it had been stolen. The moneylender had to take an oath that he had received
it in good faith and in daylight whereupon the legal owner of the collateral had to repay him the
amount loaned on the pledge. This right clashed with Germanic legal conceptions, which
demanded the return of the object to the rightful owner without any payment; hence the
misconception that the charters allowed the Jews to act as fences.

When it became apparent in Italy that the citizens had need of cash loans, the activities of Jewish
moneylenders were regulated by means of the condotta, conditions set out in charter treaties
between municipalities or rulers and Jewish moneylenders, first signed in the late 13th century
in Umbria. The interest rate varied between 15% and 25% and was never to exceed the value
of the pledge. The profit of the loan banks in 15th-century Florence was approximately 4% (see
also *Monti di Pietá ).

The first privilege granted to Jews in Poland in 1264 regarded them mainly as moneylenders.
However, under favorable conditions, Jews soon took part in other economic activities, so that
within a century money-lending became only one of their many-sided economic functions in
the Polish cities and countryside. The *arenda system, for example, stems from a change from
lending to leasing. By the end of the 16th century, Jewish trade demanded more capital than the
Jews themselves possessed, so that many Jewish traders became indebted to Christians. Lending
on interest between Jews was explicitly initiated and legalized there, in the institution hetter
iska, a legal device which created a formal partnership between creditor and debtor. Interest
rates inside the Jewish business community in the latter half of the 17th century were between
25% and 33⅓%, whereas the Christians loaned at 6%–10%, and interest rates between Jews
and Christians ranged between these two figures. Jews also developed their own system of
credit bonds – the mamran (membranum) – used mainly at the great fairs of Poland-Lithuania.
With the rise of modern*banking , Jewish money-lending of the conventional type gradually
decreased in importance, though in Western Germany and in*Alsace - Lorraine it was
sufficiently widespread to be detrimental to *emancipation of the Jews during the French
Revolution, and later on to influence the attitude of Napoleon *Bonaparte to Jewish
emancipation. It likewise was one of the causes of the anti-Jewish *Hep! Hep! disturbances of
1819, as well as 1830 and 1848.
When Jews moved to western countries in the late 19th-early 20th centuries, moneylending was
a frequent occupation, especially in the first and second generation, and the Jewish moneylender
became a familiar stereotype.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

S. Stein, in: Essays… J.H. Hertz (1942), 403f.; idem, in: JTS, 4 (1953), 161–70; idem, in: HJ,
17 (1955), 3–40; idem, in: JSS, 1 (1956), 141–64; 2 (1957), 94; idem, in: JJS, 10 (1959), 45–
61; idem, Jewish-Christian Disputations in 13th Century Narbonne(Inaugural Lecture,
University College, London, 1969), 1–27; D. Tama, Transactions of the Parisian
Sanhedrin (1807); W. Sombart, Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben (1911); Roth, Italy; J.T.
Noonan, Jr., Scholastic Analysis of Usury (1957); R.W. Emery, Jews of Perpignan in the
13th Century (1959); J. Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance (1961); Baer, Spain; S. Stern, Der
preussische Staat und die Juden, 2 vols. (1962); J. Parkes, Jew in the Medieval
Community (1938), index, S.V. usury; B.N. Nelson, Idea of Usury (1949), index, S.V. Jews; L.
Poliakov, Les banchieri juifs et le Saint-Siège (1965); M. Neumann, Geschichte des Wuchers
in Deutschland (1865), 292–347; J.E. Scherer, Die Rechtsverhaeltnisse der Juden in den
deutsch-oesterreichischen Laendern (1901), 185–96; G. Caro, Sozial-und
Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Juden im Mittelalter, 2 vols. (1908–20), index, S.V.Wucher; M.
Hoffmann, Der Geldhandel der deutschen Juden waehrend des Mittelalters (1910); R.
Straus, Die Judengemeinde Regensburg (1932); idem, Regensburg und Augsburg (1939);
idem, Die Juden in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1964); Kisch, Germany, index; M. Breger, Zur
Handelsgeschichte der Juden in Polen im 17. Jahrhundert (1932); W.J. Fischel, Jews in the
Economic and Political Life of Medieval Islam (1937); Z. Szajkowski, Agricultural Credit and
Napoleon's Anti-Jewish Decrees(1953); idem, Economic Status of the Jews in Alsace, Metz and
Lorraine (1954); H.H. Ben-Sasson, Hagut ve-Hanhagah (1959); idem, Toledot Am Yisrael, 2
(1969), 92–98; S. Simonsohn, Toledot ha-Yehudim be-Dukkasut Mantovah, 2 vols. (1962–64),
index, S.V. Halva'ah u-Malvim be-Ribbit; H.G. Richardson, English Jewry under Angevin
Kings (1960), index, S.V. usury; S. Grayzel, The Church and the Jews in
the XIIIth Century (19662), index; S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 1 (1967),
index, S.V. loans on interest; F.R. Salter, in: Cambridge Historical Journal, 5 (1935–37), 193–
211; P. Elman, in: Economic History Review, 7 (1936–37), 145–54.

Source: Encyclopaedia Judaica. © 2008 The Gale Group. All Rights Reserved.

USURY:

By: Executive Committee of the Editorial Board., Lewis N. Dembitz, Joseph Jacobs
In modern language this term denotes a rate of interest greater than that which the law or public
opinion permits; but the Biblical law, in all dealings among Israelites, forbids all "increase" of
the debt by reason of lapse of time or forbearance, be the rate of interest high or low, while it
does not impose any limit in dealings between Israelites and Gentiles. Hence in discussing
Jewish law the words "interest" and "usury" may be used indiscriminately.
There are three Biblical passages which forbid the taking of interest in the case of "brothers,"
but which permit, or seemingly enjoin, it when the borrower is a Gentile, namely, Ex. xxii. 24;
Lev. xxv. 36, 37; Deut. xxiii. 20, 21.
The Hebrew word for "usury" is "neshek," meaning literally "a bite," from its painfulness to the
debtor; while in Lev. xxv. 36, 37 "increase" is the rendering of the Hebrew "marbit" or "tarbit"
which denotes the gain on the creditor's side, and which in the later Hebrew becomes "ribbit."
Lending on usury or increase is classed by Ezekiel (xviii. 13, 17) among the worst of sins. See
also Ps. xv., in which among the attributes of the righteous man is reckoned the fact that he does
not lend on usury.
The Talmud (B. M. 61b) dwells on Ezek. xviii. 13 (Hebr.): "He has lent on usury; he has taken
interest; he shall surely not live, having done all these abominations"; on the words with which
the prohibition of usury in Lev. xxv. 36 closes: "Thou shalt be afraid of thy God"; and on the
further words in which Ezekiel (l.c.) refers to the usurer: "He shall surely suffer death; his blood
is upon him"; hence the lender on interest is compared to the shedder of blood.
Loss on a Debt.
The sages of the Mishnah knew full well that the forbearance of a debt causes a measurable
loss. Thus the following case is put: A holds a demand on B for 1,000 zuzim payable by
agreement in ten years; but two witnesses testify that B had agreed to pay in thirty days. An
alibi is proved against the witnesses; and they are condemned as "plotting witnesses" to pay the
difference between 1,000 zuzim payable in ten years and the same sum payable in thirty days
(Mak. i. 1). It often happens that money is paid to a husband in right of his wife, in which right
he has an estate for life or during coverture. In modern times the money might be invested, and
the husband would draw the interest or dividends; but in all such cases the Mishnah says: "Let
ground be bought and the husband receive the income!" The Babylonians, from whom the post-
exilic Jews learned much in the way of legal terms and forms, were accustomed to charge
interest at the rate of 20 per cent per annum. Nearly, if not quite, all of their contract tablets
show this rate of increase. (The first allusion in the Babylonian Talmud to a rate of interest [B.
B. 60a] is to one of 20 per cent.) Yet with this knowledge, that the use of capital has a
measurable value, and with the example of the Babylonians before them, the sages of the
Mishnah not only do not mitigate the Scriptural injunction against interest, but carefully close
many avenues of evasion, and forbid even all kinds of "moral usury."
Usury and Increase.
The chapter on usury and increase (B. M. v.) commences thus: "What is usury ["neshek"] and
what is increase ["tarbit"]?"; but by the latter word it seems to refer only to the rabbinical
enlargement of the antiusury law. The former mode of dealing is easily illustrated; e.g., "where
one lends 4 denarii on a promise of the return of 5; or 2 bushels of wheat when 3 are to be
returned"; but the latter, an increase in "fruits" (i.e., provisions which pass by quantity), is more
complex and is put thus: "A has bought from B a kor of wheat for 25 denarii (= zuzim), which
is the market price; afterward, when wheat has gone up to 30 denarii, A says: 'Deliver to me the
wheat which I bought from you, as I wish to sell it and buy wine with the proceeds.' B answers:
'Very well, your wheat is sold to me for 30 zuzim, and you have wine [as much as 30 zuzim
will buy at the ruling market price] in my hands'; when in fact B has no wine in his possession."
Now the first deal, i.e., B's buying the wheat back at a higher price than he had sold it for, is
not objectionable as usury but his agreeing to deliver a named quantity of wine which is then
worth 30 zuzim, but which he does not own, at some future time, when he might have to buy it
in the open market at a higher price, is not indeed Scriptural but is rabbinical usury. The reason
is given: B, who owes A 30 zuzim, takes the risk of having to pay it later on in wine, which
may cost him more than 30 zuzim, in order to gain forbearance for his debt. This rule forbids,
on the ground ofusury, the sale of futures, made when the market price has not yet been fixed.
Case of Partnership.
Some kinds of partnership dealings also are forbidden, because the partner without means is
made to incur the risk of his time and labor besides that of loss by accidents or depreciation, in
consideration of the capital furnished by the other. For instance, one may not give one's corn to
a shopkeeper to sell at retail on half the profit over the wholesale price with which he is charged,
nor may one give the shopkeeper money wherewith he may buy at wholesale and then sell on
half the profits—because he runs the risk of fire and flood and robbery and of fall in price—
unless he is paid wages for selling. And so with the breeding of chickens or the feeding of calves
or colts on half profit; though the rule does not apply to cows or other grown beasts which "earn
their keep." Commenting on B. M. v. 4, R. Judah (tanna of the 2d cent., pupil of Akiba) says
(ib. 68b) that a nominal compensation, say a single dry fig, given to the working member of the
special partnership is sufficient to exempt it from the usury laws. In modern Jewish practise this
view has been followed. The contract between the moneyed man and the small trader is known
as "sheṭar 'isḳa"; and in the well-known scrivener's handbook "Naḥalat Shib'ah" (Amsterdam,
1667) two forms of such an instrument are printed, which the compiler (Samuel ben David ha-
Levi) follows up with an extract from an eminent rabbi of Lublin to this effect: "A man may
say to his friend: 'Here are a hundred florins for thee in business [ ], half profit and half
loss. If thou shouldest say, "I have lost" or "I have not earned any money," thou must take a
solemn oath to clear thyself.' But he must give him wages for his trouble; however, anything [
] is enough for the purpose." Such special partnerships date back a very considerable
time; for 4,000 years ago they were fully regulated by King Hammurabi in sections 100-107 of
his code of laws for Babylon, and it seems that in quite modern times they have been common.
One may not give to an Israelite (money wherewith) to buy a certain quantity of corn before the
market price ("sha'ar") is known; this restriction also is made in order that the man without
means may not incur the risk of loss by higher prices in return for capital furnished. A landlord
may lend to his metayers (tenants on shares) wheat for seed to be returned in kind, but not wheat
for food. A man should not say to his neighbor, "Give me a kor of wheat and I will return it at
thrashing-time"; but he may request such a loan "till my son comes home," or "till I find the
key" (B. M. 75a). The reason is, that wheat might rise and the lender would profit. However,
the Talmud abrogates this prohibition by allowing such a loan to be made when the borrower
has some wheat of his own, though it be a much smaller quantity than that which he borrows.
The Mishnah goes even so far as to forbid an exchange of work between neighboring farmers,
where the later work is more laborious than the earlier. All these prohibitions are rabbinical
only: that against a loan in kind might be called anti-Scriptural; for the Bible, when it speaks of
"usury of victuals" (Deut. xxiii. 29), contemplates a loan to be returned in kind, and forbids
only the return of a greater quantity than that which was lent.
Possible Evasions.
The lender should not lodge in the borrower's house free of rent, nor at less than the usual rent.
The purchase-price must not be increased on account of delay in payment, such as an offer to
sell a field at 1,000 zuzim if paid now, but at 1,200 zuzim in a year's time; but in charging rent
the landlord may charge more when payable at the end of the year than when the rent is paid
every month. It is improper for the seller of a field, after receiving part of the price, to say,
"Bring me the rest of the money whenever you will and then take possession of your own"; for
the income on the field would be interest on the deferred payment, and the purchaser is already
a partial owner. But, what may turn out to be much more oppressive, a man may lend a sum of
money upon a field on the terms "If you do not return me the money in three years, the field is
mine"; and it actually becomes his. "Once Boethos, son of Zenon, did so under the advice of
the learned" (B. M. 63a). It may thus be seen that the legal ban upon interest led to forfeitures
which might give to the moneyed man more gain than even a high rate of interest. The mortgage
in the English and American form is just such a contract as Boethos used to impose on
borrowers. This form was contrived because the English law forbade loans upon interest; and
in early times it was literally carried out, the land becoming the property of the mortgagee at
once if the bond was not paid on the day appointed.
"Fixed" and Other Increase.
The Talmud and the codes distinguish between "fixed increase" ("ribbit ḳeẓuẓah") and the mere
"dust ["abaḳ"] of increase." The Mishnah gives some instances of the latter; e.g., a man sends
presents to a well-to-do neighbor, expecting to obtain a loan from him. This is interest in
advance. Or after he has repaid his loans, he sends presents, "because your money was idle in
my hands." Again, if A had not been in the habit of greeting B first, he should not do him this
honor after he had obtained a loan from him; and, as the later authorities put it, if he was not in
the habit of teaching B the Torah before the loan, he should not do it thereafter.
One difference between usury under the letter of the Law and rabbinical increase is this: the
former, when collected by the creditor, may be reclaimed by action, while the latter may not.
R. Johanan, one of the Palestinian amoraim, insists that even "definite usury," such as is
forbidden by the written law, can not be recovered legally. In this view he is supported (B. M.
61b) by others on the grounds that in the Scriptural words quoted above the vengeance of
Heaven is invoked upon the usurer, and that the rule that he who incurs the pain of death is not
held to payment in a civil suit. The upshot of the dispute as laid down in the codes is this
(Shulḥan 'Aruk, Yoreh De'ah, 161, 2): The rabbinical court will render judgment for the
repayment of definite usury that has been collected, and will not enforce the judgment by levy
on the lands or goods of theusurer's property, but only by force against his body.
Case of a Gentile.
When an Israelite lends money to a Gentile or to an "indwelling stranger" (a half-convert of
foreign blood), he may and should charge him interest; and when he borrows from such a person
he should allow him interest. It is the opinion of Maimonides that for Jews to charge Gentiles
interest is a positive command of the written law. [The reason for the non-prohibition of the
receipt by a Jew of interest from a Gentile, and vice versa, is held by modern rabbis to lie in the
fact that the Gentiles had at that time no law forbidding them to practise usury; and that as they
took interest from Jews, the Torah considered it equitable that Jews should take interest from
Gentiles. Conditions changed when Gentile laws were enacted forbidding usury; and the
modern Jew is not allowed by the Jewish religion to charge a Gentile a higher rate of interest
than that fixed by the law of the land.—E. C.] The intervention of a Gentile may lead to an
evasion of the law between Israelites. For example, one not standing in need of it has borrowed
the money of a Gentile; the borrower lends it to another Israelite, he to pay the interest
thereafter; this the first borrower may do only with the consent of the Gentile, if he will accept
the other Israelite as his debtor, but not on his own responsibility, although the first borrower
would pay to the Gentile the same interest which he should receive from his brother Israelite
(B. M. v. 6).In a baraita (ib. 71a) the other case is also put: "A lends money to a Gentile; the
latter needs it no longer, but meets an Israelite who does. If the Gentile is willing to lend him
the money on interest, he may do so, remaining bound to A; but A must not be a party to the
change of debtor." However, it must have been easy to evade the usury law through the Gentile
intermediary, even while maintaining these distinctions.
The guilt of breaking a Scriptural command falls not on the lender alone, but on the borrower
as well (on the supposition that the verb referring to usury in Deut. xxiii. 20, "tashshik," stands
in the causative form); also on the surety for the borrower, the witnesses, and, according to
some opinions, the scrivener. The latter participants violate the precept "thou shalt not put a
stumbling-block before the blind" (Lev. xix. 14).
Maimonides treats of interest in his "Yad" (Malweh, ch. v.), following the Gemara and the
responsa of the Geonim. He to a certain extent mitigates the usury law; mitigation had indeed
become a necessity in his time, as the Jews no longer dwelt in compact farming settlements like
those of Palestine and Babylonia in the days of the Mishnah and the Talmud, but had been
forced to become traders, brokers, and money-lenders. He says (ib. ch. xiv.): "There are things
resembling interest that are allowed; e.g., a man may buy at a discount bonds belonging to his
neighbor; a man may give his neighbor a denarius, on condition that he lends 100 denarii to a
third person. A may give B a denarius to induce C to lend him (A) 100 denarii" (ib. ch. xv.).
Some things are allowed by law, but have been forbidden by the Rabbis as a cunning evasion.
A says to B, "Lend me 100 zuzim." B says, "I have no money, but I have wheat worth that sum,
which I can lend you." Then he buys the same wheat from him for 90 zuzim. He may afterward
by law recover 100 zuzim because it is not even "dust of interest." Thus a man who has taken a
field in pledge should not rent it back to the owner. But if such evasions are forbidden only by
an appeal to the lender's conscience, very little is left of the enforceable law against usury.
Views of Maimonides and the Shulḥan 'Aruk.
The Shulḥan 'Aruk treats of usury not in the fourth or juridical part, but in the Yoreh De'ah,
among moral and religious duties (§§ 159-177). While Maimonides would restrict the lending
of money to Gentiles within narrow limits, lest the lender should acquire a passion for taking
usury, and practise it on his fellow Israel ites, this later standard declares it "allowable nowadays
in all cases" (ib. § 159). It allows also the money of orphans or of a poor-or a school-fund to be
lent on terms which would be "rabbinical increase"; and if a guardian has improperly lent the
money of his wards even at a fixed interest, the wards who have had the enjoyment of the
income are not bound to restore it when they come of age. To save oneself in great need,
however, one may borrow on interest (ib. § 160). The relaxation on behalf of infants and
charities was unavoidable; for in numerous countries the Jews were precluded from the old plan
of investing funds in land, which alone was permitted by the Talmud.
As a matter of jurisprudence it is found here (ib. § 160; Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, § 52) that when a bond
provides for principal and interest separately, it is enforceable as to the former, but not as to the
latter; but if both are cast up into one sum, the bond is void in toto. When interest, even such as
is forbidden by the written law, is once paid, it is said (Yoreh De'ah, § 161) that the courts may
compel its restoration only by process of contempt (flogging until the defendant is willing to
pay). When this power no longer rested with the Jewish courts, there was no remedy. If the
lender died after he collected unlawful interest, it is here expressly said that his heirs are not
even morally bound to make restitution.
—Medieval Doctrine:
The Church, basing itself upon a mistranslation of the text Luke vi. 35 interpreted by the
Vulgate "Mutuum date, nihil inde sperantes," but really meaning "lend, never despairing" (see
T. Reinach in "R. E. J." xx. 147), declared any extra return upon a loan as against the divine
law, and this prevented any mercantile use of capital by pious Christians. As the canon law did
not apply to Jews, these were not liable to the ecclesiastical punishments which were placed
upon usurers by the popes, Alexander III. in 1179 having excommunicated all manifest usurers.
Christian rulers gradually saw the advantage of having a class of men like the Jews who could
supply capital for their use without being liable to excommunication, and the money trade of
western Europe by this means fell into the hands of the Jews. They were freed from all
competition,and could therefore charge very high interest, and, indeed, were obliged to do so
owing to the insecure tenure of their property. In almost every instance where large amounts
were acquired by Jews through usurious transactions the property thus acquired fell either
during their life or upon their death into the hands of the king. This happened to Aaron of
Lincoln in England, Ezmel de Ablitas in Navarre, Heliot de Vesoul in Provence, Benveniste de
Porta in Aragon, etc. It was for this reason indeed that the kings supported the Jews, and even
objected to their becoming Christians, because in that case they could not have forced from
them money won by usury. Thus both in England and in France the kings demanded to be
compensated for every Jew converted. In the former country only in 1281 would the king give
up his right to half the property of Jews who were converted. There was a continual conflict
between the papal and the royal authority on this subject, and thus as early as 1146 the pope
Eugenius declared all usury null and void, while the debtor was on a crusade, and Innocent XIII.
made an indignant protest against usury, calling on all Christian princes to demand the return
of the interest. Clement V. in 1311 protested against all civil law which permitted any form of
usury by Christians.
It was impossible to carry out the canonical restrictions without stopping all progress in
commerce, and numerous expedients were adopted to avoid the canonical laws. Especially the
Cahorsins and Lombards invented methods by which usury was disguised in the form of
payment for possible loss and injury, payment for delay, and so on. The competition of these
Italian usurers—they were called the "pope's usurers"—rendered Jews less necessary to the
kings in France and England in the middle of the thirteenth century, and both Louis IX. (1254)
and Edward I. (1275) attempted to influence the Jews to avoid usury, but without effect (see
England). No other means of livelihood was open to them.
Amount of Interest.
Very high interest was permitted the Jews in France under Philip Augustus, two deniers on the
pound per week, or 43.3 per cent per annum, and King John in 1360 allowed this even to be
doubled. In Sicily Frederick II. allowed 10 per cent in 1231. In Castile Alfonso X. allowed 25
per cent, while in Aragon the Cortes of Tarragona put 20 per cent as the maximum, and this
was reduced to 12 per cent in the year 1231. In Navarre Philip III. established 20 per cent ("5
for 6") in 1330, while in Portugal Alfonso IV. (1350) fixed the maximum at 33⅓ per cent.
The enormously rapid increase of indebtedness due to this large interest caused ordinances to
be passed to prevent interest being counted on interest, but without avail. As an instance of the
extent to which interest could grow, the abbot of St. Edmund in 1173 borrowed about 40 marks
from Benedict the Jew, and this had grown to £880 in seven years, though not entirely through
interest (see Jacobs, "Jews of Angevin England," p. 60).
The loans were generally made upon Pledges, which could not be sacred vessels of the Church,
to pledge which was punished as early as 814 by confiscation of goods. Almost all other objects
could be pledged, and it became a problem whether when a Jew had the pledge he could claim
usury as well. This applied when lands were pledged for loans, when it was claimed the land or
the produce thereof was sufficient to compensate for any loss of use of capital without further
payment. Notwithstanding this the Jews claimed interest until both capital and interest were
repaid.
 Later on in the Middle Ages the doctrine of Aristotle that "money does not breed" was referred
to usury, and forms the basis of Shylock's and Antonio's contention in "The Merchant of
Venice," I., iii., and the casuists of Roman law drew a distinction between things consumable
and fungible; that is, the use of which is exhausted by one using, and things which can be used
over and over again. Interest or usury was allowed for the latter, but not for the former class, to
which money was supposed to belong, because every passing of coin was regarded as a separate
use. The lending of money with the expectation of any further return was still regarded as
unnatural and disreputable, but in the later Middle Ages the Jews had been bereft of all capital,
so that from the fifteenth century onward they are found mostly as dealers in second-hand
clothing, rather than as usurers. Moreover a class of Christian merchants arose which evaded
the canon law and lent money on interest without any opposition.
Notwithstanding this, the reputation of usurers has clung to the Jews even to modern times,
though there is little evidence of their being more addicted to it than other persons who trade in
money. In Russia the Christian "kulak" is regarded as being much more stringent in his demands
than the Jewish money-lender, though in Bukowina the latter has proved to be somewhat of a
plague. The poverty of the majority of Jews prevents them from any extensive addiction to this
practise (see Poverty).
Bibliography:
 Endemann, Die Nationalökonomischen Grundsätze der Kanonischen Lehre, 1863, pp. 8 et seq.,
20 et seq.;
 Ashley, English Commerce, i. 152-154;
 Scherer, Rechtsverhältnisse der Juden, pp. 185-196.

Biblical Law

SOURCES

"If thou lend money to any of My people, even to the poor with thee, thou shalt not be to him
as a creditor (nosheh), neither shall ye lay upon him interest" (Ex. 22:24). "And if thy brother
be waxen poor and his means fail with thee… Take no interest of him or increase; but fear thy
God; that thy brother may live with thee. Thou shalt not give him thy money upon interest, nor
give him thy victuals for increase" (Lev. 25:35–37). "Thou shalt not lend upon interest to thy
brother: interest of money, interest of victuals, interest of anything that is lent upon interest.
Unto a foreigner thou mayest lend upon interest; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon
interest; that the Lord thy God may bless thee in all that thou puttest thy hand unto…" (Deut.
23:20–21). The prohibition on taking interest in Exodus and Leviticus seems to be confined to
the poor in straits and not to extend to moneylending in the normal course of business, but the
deuteronomic prohibition clearly applies to all moneylending, excluding only business dealings
with foreigners.

DEFINITION

The biblical term for interest is neshekh (Ex. 22:24; Deut. 23:20), but in the levitical text it
occurs alongside tarbit or marbit(25:36–37). In the Jewish Publication Society translation
(1962) neshekh is rendered as "advance interest" and tarbit or marbit as "accrued interest" – the
one being deducted in advance, the other being added at the time of repayment. This is only
one of many interpretations that were made of the terms neshekh and tarbit from the time of the
Mishnah (BM 5:1) onward and by no means the best one. One commentator regards neshekh as
accumulating interest and tarbit as a fixed sum of interest that never increases (Ramban to Lev.
25:36). The most authoritative view is that of Rava, that there is no difference in meaning
between neshekh and tarbit (BM 60b); but while Rava maintains that the Torah used two
synonyms in order to make the prohibition of interest a twofold one (ibid.), the better
explanation etymologically would be that neshekh, meaning bite, was the term used for the
exaction of interest from the point of view of the debtor, and tarbit or marbit, meaning increase,
was the term used for the recovery of interest by the creditor (Solomon Luntschitz, Keli Yakar,
Be-Ḥukkotai, Lev. 25:36).

The prohibition on interest is not a prohibition on usury in the modern sense of the term, that
is, excessive interest, but of all, even minimal, interest. There is no difference in law between
various rates of interest, as all interest is prohibited.

LEGAL CHARACTER OF PROHIBITION

It has been said that the prohibition on interest rests on two grounds: firstly, that the prosperous
ought to help the indigent, if not by gifts, then at least by free loans; and secondly, that interest
(or excessive interest) was seen to lie at the root of social ruin and was therefore to be outlawed
in toto. Both these considerations would apply only internally: there could be no obligation to
help foreigners, nor was public policy concerned with their well-being. Moreover,
moneylending transactions with foreigners were motivated solely by the legitimate desire to
make profits, while the internal economy was eminently agrarian and had no money markets of
any importance. It follows from the charitable nature of the prohibition on interest that its
violation was not regarded as a criminal offense to which any penal sanctions attached, but
rather as a moral transgression; in other words, while taking interest would not entail any
punishment, granting free loans and refraining from taking interest would lead to God's rewards
and blessings (Deut. 23:21 and Ramban thereto). It was only in the prophecies of Ezekiel that
usury came to be identified with the gravest of crimes: it is mentioned in the context of larceny,
adultery, homicide, and other such "abominations" that are worthy of death (18:11–13). The
threat of death for usury was later interpreted as the divine sanction against irrecoverable and
illegitimate self-enrichment (BM 61b). "He that augmenteth his substance by interest and
increase" is listed among the "evil men" (Prov. 28:8); while "He that putteth not out his money
on interest" is among the upright and righteous (Ps. 15:5).

IMPLEMENTATION

The prohibition on taking interest does not appear to have been generally observed in biblical
times. The creditor (nosheh), far from giving free loans, is often described as exacting and
implacable (cf. I Sam. 22:2; II Kings 4:1; Isa. 50:1; et al.); and the prophet decries those who
have "taken interest and increase" and forgotten God (Ezek. 22:12). Nehemiah had to rebuke
the noble and the rich for exacting interest, "every one to his brother" (Neh. 5:7); and he had
formally and solemnly to adjure them to abstain from levying execution (12–13). From
the *Elephantine papyri it appears that among the Jews in Egypt in the fifth century B.C.E. it
was a matter of course that interest would be charged on loans: not only did they disregard the
biblical injunctions as far as the taking of interest was concerned, but they made no recourse to
any legal fictions in order to evade the prohibition (R. Yaron, Mishpat shel Mismekhei
Yev (1961), 136).
Talmudic Law

EXTENSION OF PROHIBITION

It is not only the creditor who takes interest who is violating the biblical prohibition, but also
the debtor who agrees to pay interest, the guarantor who guarantees the debt that bears interest,
the witnesses who attest the creation of an interest-bearing debt, and even the scribe who writes
out the deed (BM 5:11; BM 75b; Yad, Malveh 4:2). This is one of the very rare cases in which
accessories to the offense are held responsible (see *Penal Law). "Although the creditor and
debtor transgress these biblical prohibitions, there is no flogging for it, as the interest must be
repaid" (Yad, Malveh 4:3). The Ḥinnukh (no. 74) says further that none of the accessories is
flogged "for since even the creditor is not flogged… it would not be right that those who are
mere accessories should be liable for flogging."

The most far-reaching extensions of the prohibition relate, however, to the nature of the
"interest" prohibited. Interest is no longer only the lending of four dinars for five, or of one
bushel of wheat for two (BM 5:1), but is extended to all benefits that smack of interest or might
look like it. Thus, the borrower may not let the lender live on his premises without payment of
rent or at a reduced rent (BM 5:2), and if he had resided there without paying rent before
borrowing the money, he must now be charged rent (BM 64b). The prohibition of lending one
bushel of wheat for two was also extended to the lending of one bushel of wheat for one, since
it was possible that the value of the wheat might increase between the date of the loan and the
date of the return, and such increase in value would amount to prohibited interest (BM 5:9; TJ,
BM 5:7); but the rule does not apply where seeds are lent for sowing and not for consumption
(BM 5:8), and where the borrower possesses even the smallest quantity of the same species, he
may borrow any quantity (BM 75a; Yad, Malveh 10:1–5). Where two men agree to do work
for each other in turn, they may agree only on the same kind of work for each, as otherwise the
work of one might be more valuable than that of the other and thus amount to prohibited interest
(BM 5:10; Yad, Malveh 7:11). Gifts that one man may send to another in view of a forthcoming
request for a loan, or in gratitude for a loan granted and returned, fall within the prohibition on
interest – as are also "words," conveying to the lender, for instance, any valuable information
(BM 5:10), or even greetings, where they would not otherwise have been exchanged (BM 75b;
Tosef., BM 6:17). A mortgagee, even if he is in possession of the mortgaged property, is not
allowed to take its produce; if he has taken it, he must either return it or set it off against the
capital debt (BM 67a–b; Yad, Malveh 6:1–8; see also *Lien; *Pledge).

Interest in the guise of *sale was also prohibited. Fruit and other agricultural produce may not
be sold unless and until its market price is established (BM 5:7), for otherwise the purchaser
might, by paying in advance a price below the eventual market value, receive interest on his
money; such advance purchases amounted in effect to financing the farmers, and were thus in
the nature of loans rather than sales. But there is nothing to prevent the farmer from selling
below the market value, once that value has been established: this would no longer be a
disguised loan but a genuine if ill-advised sale (BM 63b; Yad, Malveh 9:1), subject always to
the seller's remedies for *ona'ah (BM 4:4). Sales of products without current market values
would be recognized as such, and not be invalidated as disguised loans, only where the goods
sold were actually in the hands of the seller at the time of the sale (Tosef., BM 6:2–5), or, where
they had to be processed or manufactured, were almost completed at the time of the sale
(BM 74a; Yad, Malveh 9:2).
Any payment is prohibited interest that compensates a party to any transaction for money being
left, for any length of time, in the hands of the other party, although it should, according to law
or custom, have already been paid over (BM 63b). Thus, as rent is legally due only at the end
of the period of lease, a discount may be given for rent paid in advance (see *Lease and Hire);
but as the purchase price for goods or land sold is payable at the time of the sale, any price
increase for later payment would amount to prohibited interest (BM 5:2; BM 65a; Yad, Malveh
8:1).

A further notable extension of the prohibition on interest relates to contracts of *partnership.

An arrangement by which one partner finances a business and the other manages it, and losses
are borne by the managing partner only while the profits are shared between them is illegal, for
it comes within the prohibition on interest (BM 70a; BM 5:6; Yad, Malveh 8:12). Where the
financing partner bears or shares the losses, such an arrangement is valid only if the managing
partner is being paid a salary for his work instead of, or in addition to, a share in the profits
(BM 5:4; Yad, Malveh 5:9).

All these talmudic extensions of the prohibitions on interest are known as avak ribbit, i.e., the
dust of interest, as distinguished from ribbit keẓuẓah, i.e., interest proper in an amount or at a
rate agreed upon between lender and borrower (BM 61b, 67a, et al.). The difference in law
between avak ribbit and ribbit keẓuẓah is that the latter, if it has been paid by the borrower to
the lender, is recoverable from the lender, while the former, once paid, is not recoverable,
though a contract tainted with the dust of interest will not be enforced (BM 61b; Yad, Malveh
4:6; Sh. Ar., YD 161:1–2; see also *Contract).

EVASION OF PROHIBITION

It has been said that the evasion of the prohibitions on interest reflects the conflict between law
and life (Globus, see bibl., p. 39). It is remarkable how the talmudic jurists extended the
prohibition on interest so as to cover, and invalidate, transactions far removed from the loans
to which the biblical prohibition had attached, and at the same time sought ways and means to
validate transactions clearly or conceivably falling within that prohibition. This phenomenon
can only be explained by the change of economic conditions: it was in the amoraic period in
Babylonia that the prohibitory laws against interest proved to be no longer compatible with the
economic needs of the community; and ever since the necessity of finding legal subterfuges to
evade those laws has persisted. The prohibition of price increase for payment that is made after
a time lapse was practically abolished by the provision that any price may be agreed upon and
recovered so long as the increase involved is not expressly but only tacitly stipulated
(BM 65a; YD 173:1). The mishnaic rule that a managing partner must be paid a salary in order
to validate the partnership agreement was set at nought in practice by the provision that such a
salary need be nominal only (BM 68b). Profit-sharing partnerships were validated by regarding
the investment of the financing partner as half loan and half deposit. While the borrower is
responsible for the loan, the bailee is not responsible for the loss of the deposit; thus, the
financing partner (as bailor) will also bear his share in the losses, and the partnership is legal
(BM 104b). Even where the financing partner's share in the profits is redeemed in advance by
a down payment, the agreement is upheld, provided that the business could reasonably be
expected to be profitable (TJ, BM 5:8); and, later, deeds were formulated in which a pre-
estimate of the expected profits was stipulated in advance as a fixed sum (BM 68a).

A farmer who had received a loan was allowed to make a formal conveyance of his lands (or
part of them) to his creditor and still remain on his lands as his creditor's tenant; the creditor
would be entitled to the produce of the land, not as interest on the loan but as income from his
property (BM 68a). One jurist even held that it was permissible to let money on hire, like
chattels, against payment of rent, as distinguished from giving a loan against payment of interest
(BM 69b). A vendor may sell goods on credit at a price of 100 units payable at a future date,
and immediately repurchase the goods at the price of 90 units payable cash down: each of the
two contracts of sale would be valid (BM 62b).

Another form of evasion was to lend money on interest to a non-Jew, in order that the non-Jew
might relend the money to the intended Jewish debtor; both lending transactions are valid
(BM 61b).

Some of these forms of evasion, though practiced in talmudic times, have not become
the *halakhah (BM 68a per Rava; Yad, Malveh 5:8; 5:16; 6:4–5); others, though recognized as
legally valid and feasible, were deprecated as reprehensible and forbidden (BM 61b–62b; Yad,
Malveh 5:15) because of the stratagem involved in the device (ha'aramah).

SANCTIONS

Originally, courts appear to have been empowered to fine the creditor for taking interest by
refraining from enforcing even his claim for the repayment of the capital (Tosef., BM 5:22),
but the rule evolved that taking interest did not affect the creditor's enforceable right to have his
capital debt repaid (BM 72a; Yad, Malveh 4:6). Where a bill, however, includes both capital
and interest without differentiating between them, the bill is not enforceable (YD 161:11; Sh.
Ar., ḤM 52:1), and "whoever finds a bill which includes interest, shall tear it up"
(Tosef., BM 5:23; see also *Contract). Moneylenders who take interest are disqualified
as *witnesses and are not administered oaths (Sanh. 3:3), and even the borrower who pays
interest is disqualified (Sanh. 25a). In their moral turpitude, moneylenders who take interest are
likened to apostates who deny God (Tosef., BM 6:17) and to shedders of blood (BM 61b); and
they have no share in the world to come (Mekh. Sb-Y 22:24). They are doomed to lose all their
property and go bankrupt (BM 71a; Sh. Ar., YD 160:2).

LEGALITY OF INTEREST

While biblical law allowed the taking of interest from foreigners, excluding alien residents
(Lev. 25:35), talmudic law extended the exemption: "One may borrow from them [foreigners]
and lend them on interest; similarly in the case of an alien resident" (BM 5:6, 70b–71a).
However lawful interest transactions with foreigners were, they were looked upon with
disapproval: some jurists held that they were permissible only when no other means of
subsistence was available (BM 70b); others would allow them only to persons learned in the
law, as the uneducated might fall into the error of believing that interest is permissible in general
(BM 71a). The psalmist's praise of the man who would not lend his money on interest (Ps. 15:5)
was interpreted to apply to the man who would not take interest from a foreigner (Mak. 24a).

Post-Talmudic Law

TRANSACTIONS AMONG JEWS

The talmudic evasions of the prohibition against interest served as precedents for the
legalization of transactions involving interest. Thus it was deduced from the evasions reported
in the Talmud that it would be permissible for a lender to lend 100 units to a businessman for
him to use in his business; when it had increased to 200, the lender would be entitled to the 200,
provided that he had paid the borrower some salary in consideration of his work (Piskei ha-
Rosh BM 5:23; Mordekhai BM 319). Rashi is reported to have ruled that you may send your
friend to take a loan on interest from another for you, or you may send your friend to give your
money on interest to another; for interest is prohibited only as between lender and borrower,
but not as between their respective agents. The general rule that a man's agent is like himself
(see *Agency) would not apply here, as the taking of interest is a criminal offense, and in
criminal matters no man can be made responsible for the deed of another (see *Penal
Law; Mordekhai BM338).

In time, a standard form of legalization of interest was established, known as hetter iskah,
meaning the permission to form a partnership. A deed, known as shetar iskah, was drawn up
and attested by two witnesses, stipulating that the lender would supply a certain sum of money
to the borrower for a joint venture; the borrower alone would manage the business and he would
guarantee the lender's investment against all loss; he would also guarantee to the lender a fixed
amount of minimum profit. The deed would also contain a stipulation that the borrower would
be paid a nominal sum as a salary, as well as an agreement on the part of the lender to share the
losses. In order to render this loss-sharing agreement nugatory, provision would normally be
made for such loss to be proved by particular, mostly unobtainable, evidence (Naḥalat Shivah,
no. 40; cf. Terumat ha-Deshen, Resp. no. 302). The amount of the capital loan plus the
guaranteed minimum profit would be recoverable on the deed at the stipulated time it matured.

In the course of the centuries this form of legalizing interest has become so well established
that today all interest transactions are freely carried out, even in compliance with Jewish law,
by simply adding to the note or contract concerned the words al-pi hetter iskah. The prohibition
on interest has lost all practical significance in business transactions, and is now relegated to
the realm of friendly and charitable loans where, indeed, it had originated.

TRANSACTIONS WITH NON-JEWS

In 1179 the Church decreed that the taking of interest was forbidden by Scripture as well as by
the laws of nature, and that all Christian usurers would be liable to excommunication. As canon
law did not apply to Jews, this decree did not prevent them from lending money on interest, and
moneylending soon became a typically Jewish business. The Jews were practically forced into
it by the severe restrictions placed upon them in the pursuit of any other trade or profession in
most countries of Europe. From the point of view of Jewish law, the taking of interest from
non-Jews was permitted; and the talmudic restriction that it should not be done unless there
were no other means of subsistence was duly held to be complied with: "If we nowadays allow
interest to be taken from non-Jews, it is because there is no end to the yoke and the burden king
and ministers impose on us, and everything we take is the minimum for our subsistence, and
anyhow we are condemned to live in the midst of the nations and cannot earn our living in any
other manner except by money dealings with them; therefore the taking of interest is not to be
prohibited" (Tos. to BM 70b S.V.tashikh). With the renewed change in circumstances, the
prohibition on taking interest would apply to Jews and non-Jews alike (YD 159:1).

For nonlegal aspects see also *Moneylending.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:
J. Marcuse, Das biblisch-talmudische Zinsenrecht (1895); E. Cohn, in: Zeitschrift fuer
vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, 18 (1905), 37–72; J. Hejcl, Das alttestamentliche Zinsverbot
im Lichte der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz sowie des altorientalischen Zinswesens (1907); H.L.
Strack, in: Realencyklopaedie fuer protestantische Theologie und Kirche, 21 (19083), 518–21;
I.S. Zuri, Mishpat ha-Talmud, 5 (1921), 63f., 134–9; Gulak, Yesodei, 2 (1922), 72, 107, 172–
6; I. Bernfeld, Das Zinsverbot bei den Juden nach talmudisch-rabbinischen Recht (1924); S.
Rosenbaum, in: Ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri, 2 (1926), 27, 191–4; E.L. Globus, in: Ha-Mishpat, 2
(1927), 23–43; E.S. Rappaport, in: Zeitschrift fuer vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, 47
(1932/33), 256–378; A. Gulak, Toledot ha-Mishpat be-Yisrael bi-Tekufat ha-Talmud, 1 (Ha-
Ḥiyyuv ve-Shi'budav, 1939), 45, 117f., 145; Herzog, Instit, 2 (1939), 135; S.J. Rabinowitz,
in: Yavneh, 3 (1949), 165–74; R. Katzenelboigen, ibid., 175–9; B.N. Nelson, The Idea of Usury,
from Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood (1949); ET, 1 (19513), 46f.; 2 (1949), 51; 4
(1952), 111; 7 (1956), 394; 9 (1959), 714–22; 10 (1961), 102f., 108; J. Rosenthal, in: Talpioth,
5 (1951/52), 475–92; 6 (1952/53), 130–52; T. Be'eri, in: Ha-Torah ve-ha-Medinah, 5–6
(1952/54), 296–301; J. Segal, ibid., 9–10 (1957/59), 451–90; E. Neufeld, in: JQR, 44 (1953/54),
194–204; idem, in: HUCA, 26 (1955), 355–412; M. Elon, in: Ḥok u-Mishpat, 1 (1955), issue
22, pp. 6–8; S. Stein, in: JSS, 1 (1956), 141–64; B. Rabinowitz-Te'omim, in: Ha-Torah ve-ha-
Medinah, 11–13 (1959–62), 16–45; J.T. Noonan, The Scholastic Analysis of Usury(1957); N.N.
Lemberger, in: No'am, 2 (1958/59), 33–37; J. Wassermann, ibid., 3 (1959/60), 195–203; M.N.
Lemberger, ibid., 4 (1960/61), 251–7; Z. Domb, ibid., 258–65; Elon, Mafteʾaḥ, 302–7; B.
Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law, 2 (1966), 433–56, 784f.; S.E. Loewenstamm, in: EM, 5 (1968),
929f. ADD. BIBLIOGRAPHY: M. Elon, Ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri (1988), 1:94, 97, 114, 197, 489,
575, 577, 642, 654, 660, 730, 738, 764, 787–89; 2:993, 1031, 1051, 1053, 1069, 1073, 1231,
1247; 3:1443; idem, Jewish Law(1994), 1:105, 109, 128, 222; 2:596, 708, 711, 795, 809, 816,
901, 910, 941, 966–68; 3:1201, 1246, 1269, 1272, 1294, 1475; 4:1716; M. Elon and B.
Lifshitz, Mafte'aḥ ha-She'elot ve-ha-Teshuvot shel Ḥakhmei Sefarad u-Ẓefon Afrikah (legal
digest) (1986), 2:448–59; B. Lifshitz and E. Shochetman, Mafte'aḥ ha-She'elot ve-ha-Teshuvot
shel Ḥakhmei Ashkenaz, Ẓarefat ve-Italyah (legal digest) (1997); B-Z. Eliash: "Ideological
Roots of the Halakhah: A Chapter in the Laws of Interest," in: Shenaton ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri, 5
(1977), 7; A. Hacohen, "Banka'ut lelo Ribit ve-Hetter Iskah bi-Medinah Yehudit ve-Demokratit,
Halakhah ve-Eein Morin Ken?" in: Sha'arei Mishpat, 2 (1999) 77; N. Dreyfus, "Dinei Ribbit
ve-Hetter Iskah be-Re'i ha-Kalkalah ha-Modernit," in: Teḥumin, 14 (1992), 207; Z.Y. Ben-
Yaakov, "Hetter Iskah – Setimat Kol ha-Peraẓot," in: Teḥumin, 23 (2003), 373.

Yahudilikte faiz konusu

Yahudilere karşı tarih boyunca ‘Tanrı adına’ işlenen suçların izini sürecek olursanız,
sahnenin arkasında her zaman ekonomik faktörü bulursunuz, sevgili okurlar. Yahudiler
tarih boyunca dine dayalı her türlü konuya uygun günah keçileri olmuştur. Yahudilerin
para için çevrelerini istismar ettiği düşüncesi kökünden yanlıştır.Tam aksine Yahudileri
kullananlar ve onları tefeciliğe itenler, çoğu zaman yaşadıkları Hıristiyan ülkeler
olmuştur. Nasıl mı?

31 Ekim 2013 6896 görüntüleme Estreya SEVAL VALİ Kavram

Eğer Ortaçağ Avrupası’nda olduğu gibi, bir halkın herhangi bir alanda emek sarf etmesine
izin vermezseniz, Yahudilerin çalışabileceği iş kollarını giderek kısıtlar ve onları sadece
faiz vermeye mahkûm ederseniz... Öyle mi oldu gerçekten? Yani Yahudiler yan gelip
yatmak ve bir tek tefeci olmak istemedi mi yani? Bu mümkün mü, sevgili okurlar? Durup
dururken tefeci olmayı kim ister?

Arz, talepten doğar. Sizden borç isteyen yoksa siz bugün bankaların yaptığı gibi, istediğiniz
kadar yırtının “Borç vereceğim, hem de gayet uygun faizle” diye, kimse size yüz vermez.
Ya da bir kadın dünyanın en eski mesleğini yapsın, herkes eşiyle mutlu mesut yaşıyorsa,
ne kadar cazip ve güzel olursa olsun -ki pek azı öyledir- kimse hayat kadınına gitmez.

FAİZİ KİM İCAT ETTİ?

Faizi Yahudiler mi icat etti peki? Ne münasebet? Antik Yakındoğu toplulukları hareketsiz
nesneleri, bir bitki, hayvan ya da insanmışçasına, kendi kendine üreme yeteneği olan
canlılarmış gibi ele alır. Dolayısıyla ‘yemek parası’ adı altında, herhangi bir maddi desteğe
-zeytin, hurma, tohum ve hayvanlar- faiz uygulanması normal sayılırdı. Hangi dönemde
mi? M.Ö. 5000’lerde örneğin. Kayıtlara göre gümüşe yüzde 10 ilâ 25, tahıllara ise yüzde
20 ilâ 35 faiz uygulanırmış. Mezopotamya, Hititler, Fenike ve Mısır’da faiz yasal olup devlet
eliyle alınırmış. Sümerlerde yıllık borca genellikle uygulanan faiz yüzde 20 imiş. Günümüze
ulaşan Sümer antlaşmalarında görülen rakam hep budur. Hammurabi Kanunları bu tür
akitlerle ilgili maddeler içerir.

Yahudi Kanunu borç ve faiz hakkında ne diyor, merak ediyor musunuz? Tora’mızı
açalım ve bakalım.
“Halkıma, yanındaki fakire borç para vereceğin zaman, ona alacaklı gibi davranma.
Onun üzerine faiz yüklemeyin” (Şemot – Mısır’dan Çıkış 22:24)
Öncelikle bu dizeden çıkan birkaç ilke var: Eğer aynı anda Yahudi olan ve olmayan iki kişi
gelip borç isterse, Yahudi olmayandan faiz almaya izin olmasına karşın (bu konuyu biraz
ileride göreceğiz), öncelik Yahudi’nindir (halkıma). Ayrıca maksat faiz almak, yani çıkar
sağlamak değil, yardım etmektir. Eğer biri fakir olan diğeri fakir olmayan iki Yahudi gelirse,
öncelik fakirindir (fakire). Başka şehirden bir fakir ile kendi şehrinden bir fakir gelirse, kişi
önceliği kendi şehrinden olana vermelidir (yanındaki). Kendi şehrindeki herhangi bir fakirle,
fakir bir akraba gelirse, öncelik akrabanındır (yanındaki).
Borç alanlar Tanrı’nın Halkı’dır; geçimleri, Tanrı’nın sorumluluğu altındadır. Bu nedenle
onlara yardım eden herhangi bir Yahudi, Tanrı’nın, bu davranışının karşılığını
vereceğinden emin olmalıdır.
Borç veren kişinin, parasını geri almaya elbette hakkı vardır ancak karşı tarafı sıkıştırarak
veya borcunu sürekli hatırlatarak onu utandırmamalıdır. Borçlunun borcunu geri ödeme
zamanı gelmişse ve durumunun iyi olmadığı biliniyorsa, onu ödeme yapmaya zorlamak
yasaktır (Raşi). Zorlamak bir yana, onun göreceği şekilde önünden geçmekten bile
kaçınılmalıdır (Talmud, Bava Metsia 75b).
Yani “Moiziko’nun borcunu şimdiye kadar ödemesi lazımdı. Gerçi sıkıntıda ama ben yine
de dükkânının önünden şöyle bir geçeyim de kendimi hatırlatayım”... I-ıh. Yasak!

Şimdi Levililer Kitabı’na geçiyoruz:

“Kardeşin düşkünleşir, senin yanında iken (maddi) bocalamaya girerse, onu

desteklemelisin – hem onu, hem de bir Ger (Tsedek) veya (Ger) Toşav’ı – ki seninle
yaşayabilsin. Ondan faiz ve artırma alma -Tanrından çekin- ve kardeşin seninle
yaşayabilsin. Paranı ona faizle verme. Yiyeceğini artırma amacıyla verme.”
(Vayikra 25:35-37)
Hemen açıklamalara girişelim: Düşkünleşmek fiili, para kaybetmeye başlamış ancak
henüz tamamen fakirleşmemiş olan bir Yahudi’yi tanımlamaktadır. Onun düşüşünü
yavaşlatmak ve varlığını yeniden kazanmasına yardım etmek, yanındaki tüm Yahudilerin
sorumluluğudur.

“Senin yanında”, “seninle” anlamına gelen İbranice imah sözcüğü burada iki kez
geçmektedir. Bu vurgunun ifade etmek istediği: Bir kişi, zor durumda olan başkalarının
sıkıntısını, kendisiyle ilgisizmiş gibi kabul edemez. “Bu onun derdi, bana ne?” diyemez.
Böyle bir kişiye yardım etmek herkesin sorumluluğudur. Kişi, gözünün önünde gerçekleşen
trajediler karşısında duyarsız kalamaz (İbn Ezra).
Pasuk, aslında şöyle demektedir: Sıkıntıda olan kişiye yardım etmek için tamamen
fakirleşmesini bekleme. İlk işaretleri gördüğün an, devreye gir çünkü tamamen düşerse,
onu tekrar kaldırmak çok daha zor olacaktır.

Ger (Tsedek), Yahudiliği sonradan kabul eden, Ger (Toşav) ise Yahudi olmayan ancak
Nuh’un Yedi Emri’ni benimsemiş olan, putperestlik yapmayan ve Yahudilerin arasında
yaşayan Yerleşik Yabancı’dır. Bu kişiler de, maddi durumlarının bozulması halinde,
yardımı hak eder.
Fakir biri tsedaka almaya alışkındır ama borca ihtiyacı olan kişi, genelde fakirlik görmemiş
olan kişidir. Tsedakaisteyemeyecek kadar gururludur. Bu yüzden kimseden hiçbir şey
talep etmeden ölüp gidebilir bile. Tora bu nedenle onun düşmesine meydan vermeden
desteklemeyi emreder (Meam Loez). Burada vakur kişilerden söz edilmektedir tabii,
yüzsüzlerden değil.
TORA’DA FAİZ KONUSU
Tora, borç karşılığı faiz verme konusunda, Yahudi olmayan kişilere kısıtlama getirmemiştir.
Başka bir deyişle, Yahudi olmayan biri, bir Yahudi’ye, faiz alma amacıyla borç verebilir.
Aynı şekilde bir Yahudi, Tora izin verdiği için, Yahudi olmayan birinden faiz alabilir.
Karşılıklı bir eşitlik söz konusudur.

Ancak bir Yahudi’nin başka bir Yahudi’den faiz alması yasaktır. Bu da, karşılıklı bir eşitlik
örneğidir.

‘Faiz’(Neşeh) ile ‘arttırma’ (Tarbit) sözcükleri aslında eşanlamlıdır. Din âlimi Kli
Yakar, neşeh sözcüğünün ısırma anlamına gelen neşiha ile aynı kökten geldiğini
vurgular. Neşeh, yılan ısırığına benzer. Topuğuna küçük bir ısırık alan kişi belki bunu fark
etmez ama zehir sonradan yayılıp vücudu sarar ve insanı öldürür. Faiz de buna benzer.
Bir örnekle daha iyi anlamaya çalışalım mı?

Eğer bir kişi bir başkasına 100 lira borç verir ve borcunu geri ödemediği her ay için ona 1
lira ödeme şartı koyarsa, bu Neşeh’tir. Zira zaman geçtikçe borç “ısıra ısıra” birikmektedir.
Öte yandan bir kişi belirli bir zamana kadar 100 lira borç verir ve bu süre dolduğunda hem
parayı, hem de üzerine 5 lira ödemesini şart koşarsa, bu Tarbit’tir. Çünkü burada sürekli
bir ısırma yoktur. Borç para, bir süre sonra “artmaktadır”. Ancak bunların her ikisi de
yasaktır.
Dizedeki “yiyeceğini arttırma amacıyla verme” ifadesi, örneğin buğdaydan
da tarbit alınabileceği (100 kg buğdayı borç verip geriye 105 kg almak gibi) anlamına
gelmektedir.
DEVARİM (YASA’NIN TEKRARI)
Geldik üçüncü kitabımız (aslında Tora’nın beşinci kitabı) Devarim’e (Yasa’nın Tekrarı):
“Kardeşine -(ister) para faizi, (ister) yiyecek faizi, (isterse de normalde karşılığında)
faiz alınan (başka) herhangi bir şeyin faizi (olsun)- faiz verme. Yabancıya faiz
verebilirsin ama kardeşine faiz veremezsin.”(23:20-21)
Başka bir deyişle “kardeşinden faiz karşılığında borç alma.” Böylece Tora daha önce faiz
karşılığı borç vermeyi yasaklamışken, burada faiz karşılığı borç almayı da
yasaklamaktadır. Başka bir deyişle, Yahudiler arasında faizin hem verilmesi, hem de
alınması yasaktır. (Sifre 262; Talmud, Bava Metsia 75b, Raşi)
Parasal başka konularda, mağdur durumdaki bir kişiye yönelik bir yasak yoktur. Bir kişi
maddi kayba razıysa, bunu çekme hakkına sahiptir. Ancak faiz konusunda Tora, faiz
vermeyi bile yasaklamıştır. Bunun muhtemel nedeni kolayca işlenebilecek bir günah
olmasıdır. Tora bunu her iki yönden engellemek istemiştir (Ramban).

Yahudiler Ortaçağ’da neden tefecilik yapmaya başladı konusuna geri dönecek olursak...
Faizsiz dönemeyen ekonomilerini doğrultmak isteyen Hıristiyan derebeyleri, Tora’nın (ki,
Eski Ahit adı altında İncil’in ilk bölümünü teşkil eder) bu emirlerini ele alarak
‘kardeş’sözcüğünün kendileri arasında da geçerli olduğunu sanmış ve birbirlerine faiz
veremeyecekleri sonucuna varmış. Ortada hazır bir günah keçisi olduğundan, borç alma
verme durumlarında Yahudileri kullanmaya karar vermiştir. Bunun bir avantajı daha vardı
tabii. Hıristiyanların arasında sığıntı gibi yaşayan Yahudiler seslerini yükseltemediğinden,
borçlarını ödeme konusunda zora düşen asiller ne yapardı dersiniz? Borçlarını
ödemeyiverirler, olur biterdi. Ya da tefeci ile birlikte bütün Yahudi köyünü kılıçtan geçirirler,
ortada ne borçlu kalırdı, ne alacaklı. Temiz iş... Maalesef.