1

Metrobank v. Sps. Cristobal G.R. No. 175768

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Foreclosure of Mortgage; After the consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem
the property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right.—Jurisprudence articulates that “[t]he purchaser can demand possession at any time
following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. After the consolidation of title in the
buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right.” In fact, in Sps. Edralin v. Philippine
Veterans Bank, 645 SCRA 75 (2011), we have held that: Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the
redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. In this regard, the bond is no longer needed. The
purchaser can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT. After
consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the
absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title becomes merely a
ministerial function. Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion. Hence, for petitioner to be issued a writ of possession, it must first clearly show
that it has consolidated ownership of the subject properties in its name. It is only at this point that issuance of the writ becomes a ministerial function of
the courts.

Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; While the Court has “ample authority to review and resolve matters not assigned and specified as errors by either of the
parties in the appeal if it finds the consideration and determination of the same essential and indispensable in order to arrive at a just decision in the
case,” the Supreme Court agrees with the respondents that the Court cannot automatically accede to the alleged consolidation, for the matter is
essentially a question of fact best left to the determination of the lower court.— While the Court has “ample authority to review and resolve matters not
assigned and specified as errors by either of the parties in the appeal if it finds the consideration and determination of the same essential and
indispensable in order to arrive at a just decision in the case,” we agree with the respondents that the Court cannot automatically accede to the alleged
consolidation, for the matter is essentially a question of fact best left to the determination of the lower court. In Republic v. Malabanan, 632 SCRA 338
(2010), we held that: [T]his Court has differentiated a question of law from a question of fact. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be
one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of
the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by
the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which
case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
2
Villanueva v. CA G.R. No. 127997

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Finality of Findings of Fact; Jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited
to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive.—Time and again it
has been ruled that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law
allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Exceptions.—Court is not dutybound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below. The rule, however, admits of the following exceptions: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2)
when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by
the evidence on record.
3
Cruz v. People G.R. No. 121422

Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; The rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence
during the course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a separate appeal or review on certiorari, but may be assigned as
errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case.—We find no reversible error in
the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari. The rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of
evidence during the course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a separate appeal or review on certiorari, but may be
assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case. When the court has
jurisdiction over the case and person of the accused, any error in the application of the law and the appreciation of evidence committed by a court after it
has acquired jurisdiction over a case, may be corrected only by appeal.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Demurrer to Evidence; In regard to the denial of a demurrer to evidence, the question of whether the evidence presented by
the prosecution is sufficient to convince the court that the defendant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt rests entirely within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and the error, if any, in the denial of the demurrer to evidence may be corrected only by appeal.—Regarding the denial of the demurrer to
evidence, we have likewise ruled that the question of whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to convince the court that the
defendant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt rests entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court. The error, if any, in the denial of the demurrer to
evidence may be corrected only by appeal. The appellate court will not review in such special civil action the prosecution’s evidence and decide in
advance that such evidence has or has not established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The orderly procedure prescribed by the
Revised Rules of Court is for the accused to present his evidence, after which the trial court, on its own assessment of the evidence submitted, will then
properly render its judgment of acquittal or conviction. If judgment is rendered adversely against the accused, he may appeal the judgment and raise the
same defenses and objections for review by the appellate court.

Same; Same; Same; When the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of certiorari
lies.—Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge interlocutory orders of the trial court may be subject
to exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies.
4
People v. Domingcil G.R. No. 140679

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence; Witnesses; The evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of
the case.—Time and again, this Court has ruled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. The
reason for this rule is that the trial court is in a better position to decide thereon, having personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial. After a thorough and careful review of the records of this case, we find that the guilt of the appellant was
sufficiently established by the evidence, and the trial court’s judgment is well-supported by law and jurisprudence.

Same; Same; Same; Same; What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.—What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that
the sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. In this case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant sold one (1) kilo of marijuana to poseur-buyer SPO1 Orlando Dalusong in the entrapment operation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive
or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit.—The testimonies of the principal
prosecution witnesses complement each other, giving a complete picture of how the appellant’s illegal sale of the prohibited drug transpired, and how the
sale led to his apprehension in flagrante delicto. Their testimonies establish beyond doubt that dangerous drugs were in the possession of the appellant
who had no authority to possess or sell the same. More importantly, all the persons who obtained and received the confiscated stuff did so in the
performance of their official duties. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper
motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit.

Same; Same; Same; Same; For testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be
credible in itself such that a common experience and observation of mankind lead to the inference of its probability under the circumstances.—It is
axiomatic that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself
such that common experience and observation of mankind lead to the inference of its probability under the circumstances. In criminal prosecution, the
court is always guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable and in harmony with the usual course of human experience and not by mere conjecture or
speculation. Testimonies that do not adhere to this standard are necessarily accorded little weight or credence. Besides, instigation, or the appellant’s
claim of a frame-up, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor because the same can easily be concocted and is a
common standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Testimony or identity of the police informant may be dispensed with inasmuch as his or her narration would be merely
corroborative, especially when the poseur-buyer himself testified on the sale of the illegal drug.—The failure of the prosecution to present Oliver, the
police informant, does not enfeeble the case for the prosecution. Informants are almost always never presented in court because of the need to preserve
their invaluable service to the police. Their testimony or identity may be dispensed with inasmuch as his or her narration would be merely corroborative,
especially so in this case, when the poseur-buyer himself testified on the sale of the illegal drug.

Same; Same; Same; The marked money used in the buy-bust operation is not indispensable in drug cases; it is merely corroborative evidence.—Even if
the xerox copy of the P500.00 bill was erroneously admitted in evidence by the trial court, the absence of the original of the marked money is
inconsequential. The marked money used in the buy-bust operation is not indispensable in drug cases; it is merely corroborative evidence.
5
Ong Chia v. Republic G.R. No. 127240

Naturalization; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Formal Offer of Evidence; Judgments; The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) is clearly
not applicable to a petition for naturalization; Decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata.—Petitioner failed to
note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that—These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization
and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. (Emphasis added) Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by petitioner is
clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or
suppletorily in such cases is when it is “practicable and convenient.” That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the
State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a
revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite
party the chance to object to their admissibility. —Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary
evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural
due process. We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to
afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of
the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court
of Appeals.

Same; Same; Public Documents; Where a party fails to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of
documents which have been executed under oath, the court may rely on them.—The Court notes that these documents—namely, the petition in SCN
Case No. 031767, petitioner’s marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner’s income tax returns—are all public
documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Sinoe petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or
irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.

Naturalization; Statutory Construction; It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government
and against the applicant.— The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly
discuss the effect of petitioner’s failure to include the address “J.M. Basa St., Iloilo” in his petition, in accordance with §7, CA. No. 473. This address
appears on petitioner’s Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization.
Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had
been fully published, with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7. This is allegedly because the
publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the government the
opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any
community where he may have lived at one time or another. It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. As noted by the State, CA. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for
naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence. This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in
naturalization cases defeat petitioner’s argument of “substantial compliance” with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground
alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.
6
Catalan v. Catalan-Lee G.R. No. 183622

Remedial Law; Evidence; Divorce; Documentary Evidence; A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of
a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.—The fact
of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), to wit: Respondent is getting ahead of himself.
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or
record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when
the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner’s qualification. Hence, it
was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner’s failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a
written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent
was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the
attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied
him to Philippine personal laws.
7
Boac v. Cadapan G.R. Nos. 184461-62

Writ of Amparo; Evidence; Witnesses; Judicial Notice; The Court takes judicial notice of its Decision in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 568
SCRA 1 (2008), which assessed the account of Manalo to be a candid and forthright narrative of his and his brother Reynaldo’s abduction by the military
in 2006, there is no compelling reason for the Court, in the present case, to disturb its appreciation in Manalo’s testimony.—The Court takes judicial
notice of its Decision in the just cited Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1 (2008), which assessed the account of Manalo to be a
candid and forthright narrative of his and his brother Reynaldo’s abduction by the military in 2006; and of the corroborative testimonies, in the same
case, of Manalo’s brother Reynaldo and a forensic specialist, as well as Manalo’s graphic description of the detention area. There is thus no compelling
reason for the Court, in the present case, to disturb its appreciation in Manalo’s testimony. The outright denial of petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. thus
crumbles.

Same; Parties; Habeas Corpus; The exclusive and successive order mandated by Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo must be followed since
the order of priority is not without reason —“to prevent the indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for amparo which may even prejudice the right
to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.”—Petitioners finally point out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have the requisite standing to
file the amparo petition on behalf of Merino. They call attention to the fact that in the amparo petition, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen merely indicated
that they were “concerned with Manuel Merino” as basis for filing the petition on his behalf. Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides: The
petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the following order: (a) Any member of the immediate family, namely:
the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party; (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or (c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or
institution, if there is no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party. Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to
allege that there were no known members of the immediate family or relatives of Merino. The exclusive and successive order mandated by the above-
quoted provision must be followed. The order of priority is not without reason—“to prevent the indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for amparo
which may even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.”

Same; Same; Habeas Corpus; In a habeas corpus proceeding, any person may apply for the writ on behalf of the aggrieved party. —The Court notes
that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the petition for habeas corpus on Merino’s behalf. No objection was raised therein for, in a habeas
corpus proceeding, any person may apply for the writ on behalf of the aggrieved party. It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the parents
of Sherlyn and Karen are precluded from filing the application on Merino’s behalf as they are not authorized parties under the Rule.

Writs of Amparo; Command Responsibility; The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and
armed combats; Command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity, and thus a substantive rule that points to criminal or administrative
liability. —Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo, 613 SCRA 233 (2010), expounded on the concept of command responsibility as follows: The evolution of the
command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, “command
responsibility,” in its simplest terms, means the “responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or
other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict.” In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a
superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is “an omission mode of individual criminal liability,” whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for
failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) It
bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity, and thus a substantive rule that points to criminal or administrative
liability.

Same; Same; An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities involved, and neither
does it partake of a civil or administrative suit—rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to
safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals.—An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it
ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure
designed to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved
individuals. Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), enlightens: [An amparo proceeding] does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal
culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance…for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance… (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
8
ATCI Overseas v. Echin G.R. No. 178551

International Law; Foreign Law; Doctrine of Processual Presumption; The party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the
law under the doctrine of processual presumption.—It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the
burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge. The Court’s ruling in EDI-
Staffbuilders Int’l. v. NLRC, 537 SCRA 409 (2007), illuminates: In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that
Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law
intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the
employment of Gran. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign
law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign
law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.

Same; Same; Same; To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court.—The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To
prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
9
Sasan v. NLRC G.R. No. 176240

Labor Law; Procedural Rules; The submission of additional evidence before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is not prohibited by its
New Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases.—Petitioners object to the
acceptance and consideration by the NLRC of the evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal. This is not a novel procedural issue, however,
and our jurisprudence is already replete with cases allowing the NLRC to admit evidence, not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to the
NLRC for the first time on appeal. Technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor officials should use every reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. The
submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law
or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this
directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal.
The submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.

Same; Same; Evidence; Technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination of its sufficiency as
well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position papers and other documents.— The above provision explicitly mandates that when the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. Notably, certified true copies of
these documents, acceptable under the Rules of Court were furnished to the petitioners. Even assuming that petitioners were given mere photocopies,
again, we stress that proceedings before the NLRC are not covered by the technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed in the regular courts.
Technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful look into
the arguments contained in position papers and other documents.

Same; Due Process; It is not the denial of the right to be heard but denial of the opportunity to be heard that constitutes violation of due process of law.
—The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain one’s side. It is also an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It is not the denial of the right to be heard but
denial of the opportunity to be heard that constitutes violation of due process of law. Petitioners herein were afforded every opportunity to be heard and
to seek reconsideration of the adverse judgment against them. They had every opportunity to strengthen their positions by presenting their own
substantial evidence to controvert those submitted by E-PCIBank and HI before the NLRC, and even before the Court of Appeals. It cannot win its case
by merely raising unsubstantiated doubt or relying on the weakness of the adverse parties’ evidence.
10
GSIS v. Villaviza G.R. No. 180291

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Rules; Rules of Court is Suppletory; Suppletory is defined as “supplying deficiencies.” It means that the
provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to apply only where there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule. There is, however, no such deficiency as
the rules of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) are explicit in case of failure to file the required answer.—It is true that Section 4 of the
Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied in a “suppletory character.” Suppletory is defined as “supplying deficiencies.” It means that the
provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to apply only where there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule. There is, however, no such deficiency as
the rules of the GSIS are explicit in case of failure to file the required answer. What is clearly stated there is that GSIS may “render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution.”

Administrative Law; If respondents failed to file their answer, it does not mean that all averments found in the complaint will be considered as true and
correct in their entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the petitioners. We must not forget that even in administrative
proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the petitioners, who have the burden of proving, with substantial evidence, the allegations in the
complaint or in the formal charges.—Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application in this case, petitioners must remember
that there remain averments that are not deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are immaterial allegations and incorrect
conclusions drawn from facts set out in the complaint. Thus, even if respondents failed to file their answer, it does not mean that all averments found in
the complaint will be considered as true and correct in their entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the petitioners. We
must not forget that even in administrative proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the petitioners, who have the burden of proving, with
substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint or in the formal charges.
11
People v. Andan G.R. No. 116437

Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Custodial Investigation; Exclusionary Rule; Evidence; The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the
defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion,
physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.—Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right: (1) to
remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence
against him. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing
police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. The incommunicado character
of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of what really transpired.

Same; Same; Same; An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a
suspect, i.e, when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.—It should
be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to “[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense.” An investigation begins
when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator
starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
this covers “investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and
such other police agencies in our government.”

Same; Same; Same; Fruits of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine; Where the police failed to inform the accused of his constitutional rights when he was
investigated and interrogated, his confession secured thereby, as well as the fruits of his uncounselled confession, is inadmissible in evidence.—
Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his
constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags
recovered from appellant’s house. x x x The victim’s bags were the fruits of appellant’s uncounselled confession to the police. They are tainted evidence,
hence also inadmissible.

Same; Same; Same; When the accused talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession did not
violate his constitutional rights.— The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day, Mayor Trinidad visited the appellant.
Appellant approached the mayor and requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and appellant confessed that he alone committed the crime.
He pleaded for forgiveness. x x x Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant’s confession before the mayor is
inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has “operational supervision and control” over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant’s confession to the mayor was not
made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the
mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant
was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled
confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights.

Same; Same; Same; The constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning
by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime.— Thus, it has been held that the
constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but
given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the
accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellant’s confession to the mayor
was correctly admitted by the trial court.

Same; Same; Same; Confessions to the media in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer, are
admissible.—Appellant’s confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news
reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a
televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.
12
Lejano v. People G.R. No. 176389

Criminal Procedure; Due Process; Legal Research; Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at this
late stage; The ruling in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), that he cites has long been overtaken by the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S.
41 (1988), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful
to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police.—Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure
of the State to produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland that he cites has long been overtaken by
the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen
although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State
presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test. For,
another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting
the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even
after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving
the specimen in the meantime.

Criminal Law; Alibis and Denials; Judges; Impartiality; Not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated—indeed, if the accused is truly
innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi; A judge must keep an open mind, guarding against slipping into hasty conclusion, often
arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case—a positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should
not automatically cancel out the accused’s claim that he did not do it; A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can.—
The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webb’s alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webb’s alibi cannot stand against Alfaro’s
positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of this, to the
lower courts, Webb’s denial and alibi were fabricated. But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly
innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled
into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangman’s noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, “I saw him do it.”? Most judges believe that such
assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth
that the accused is really innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet? There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind.
He must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a
witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accused’s claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can
make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, “He did it!” without blinking
an eye.

Same; Same; Witnesses; The positive identification must meet at least two criteria—first, the positive identification of the offender must come from a
credible witness, and, second, the witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived.—Rather, to be acceptable, the
positive identification must meet at least two criteria: First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible
who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold. And second, the
witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into
inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.

Same; Same; Same; Police assets are often criminals themselves.—Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the
above criteria. She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around that agency for
sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. Police assets are often criminals themselves. She was the
prosecution’s worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she volunteered to play the role of a witness in the Vizconde killings
when she could not produce a man she promised to the NBI.

Same; Same; Alibi; Requisites.—To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he was present at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

Same; Same; If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his father’s connections, can arrange for the local
immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same.—If one is cynical about the
Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his father’s connections, can arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991
departure stamp on his passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation since there had been no indication that
such arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a foreign airlines’ passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in
the U.S. that had his name on them? How could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigration’s record system those two dates in its record of his travels as well as
the dates when he supposedly departed in secret from the U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return there? No one has come up with a
logical and plausible answer to these questions.

Same; Same; Best Evidence Rule; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; While the best evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same
is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see—the practice when a party does not want to leave an important document
with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original.—The Court of
Appeals rejected the evidence of Webb’s passport since he did not leave the original to be attached to the record. But, while the best evidence of a
document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court of Appeals
Justice Tagle said in his dissent, the practice when a party does not want to leave an important document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it
marked as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are binding on the parties
and on the court.

Same; Same; Evidence; Official Documents; Passports; Webb’s passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under international
practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued, and the entries in that passport are presumed true; The U.S. Immigration
certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of which have been authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely
validated the arrival and departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webb’s passport—they have the same evidentiary value—and, the officers
who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to testify on them.—The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of
Webb’s arrival in and departure from that country were authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State Department.
Still the Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for the reason that Webb failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the
13
same. But this was unnecessary. Webb’s passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under international practice, is the official
record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that passport are presumed true. The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-
out, the official certifications of which have been authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure
stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webb’s passport. They have the same evidentiary value. The officers who issued these certifications need not
be presented in court to testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty attached to a breached duty, in the
routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of the record.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If the Supreme Court were to subscribe to the extremely skeptical view taken by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals regarding travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from the airports, it might as
well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence.—The trial
court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign
records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he
supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel
between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours. If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely
skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for
impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what they state, are immune to attack. They are not. That
presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here, however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webb’s
passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S.’ immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back. The prosecution’s rebuttal
evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in the lower court’s minds.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro’s testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect
to the other co-accused.—Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro’s testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to
Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took
place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence against the others must
necessarily fall.

Same; Presumption of Innocence; In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence of the
accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt.—In our criminal
justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore
all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail
where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth. Will the Court send the accused to spend
the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde
massacre that she could not produce?
14
People v. Espinosa G.R. No. 72883

Criminal Law; Evidence; Murder; Witnesses; The trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses, respected and conclusive on appeal.—The Court
has examined the evidence of the parties and sees no reason for overturning the findings of Judge Rosalio A. de Leon, who had the opportunity to
observe the witnesses on the stand and assess their credibility by the various indicia available to the trial court but not reflected in the record. The
demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between fact and fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the
angry tone, the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch—these can reveal if the witness is telling the truth or lying in his
teeth. Absent then a showing that the conclusions of the trial court are arbitrary or without basis, they must be regarded with respect and accepted as
conclusive on appeal.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Discrepancies in the declarations of the witnesses are not unnatural or evidence of perjury.—The discrepancies in the
declarations of Arnold and Ariel are not unnatural or evidence of perjury. When their father was attacked, Arnold was seated at the front of the jeep
beside Jaime and Ariel was sitting behind them. The two brothers had therefore different vantage points that gave each of them a separate view of the
incident. Moreover, it should also be considered that the man being stabbed before their very eyes was their father. Under this traumatizing and
shocking circumstance, the two sons, who were then only sixteen and fifteen respectively, can hardly be expected to remember the grisly stabbing in
perfect detail.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The testimony of a defense witness cannot cancel the sworn declarations of the two witnesses that they actually saw the
two accused kill the victim.—As for Lilia Silva, her testimony is less than conclusive of Floro’s innocence. The mere fact that she did not see Floro at the
scene of the crime does not prove he was not there as she obviously was narrating only the latter part of the incident. Besides, she added that there
were many people around, which could be the reason she did not notice Floro. At any rate, her testimony cannot cancel the sworn declarations of Arnold
and Ariel that they actually saw Espinosa and Floro killing Jaime Mamucod.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Absence of motive of witnesses to falsely identify the accused and the accused-appellant.—The two sons could hardly have
made a mistake regarding this matter. Indeed, the memory of these men is not easily blurred and must have been indelibly imprinted in their young and
impressionable minds. They had no motive for falsely identifying Espinosa and the accused-appellant. The only reason for naming them is the logical
one: that Espinosa and Floro were the men who killed their father.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Necropsy Report; Absence of any mention of punctured wounds in the necropsy report, is not fatal; The phrase “stab
wounds” includes all wounds that may be caused by weapons, such as knives, scissors or ice picks.—The contention that the necropsy report did not
mention any punctured wounds must be rejected. The phrase “stab wounds” is used generically to include all wounds that may be caused “by weapons
such as knives, scissors, three-cornered files, or ice picks with a circular shaft, all possessing a sharp point but having blades of different shapes.”
Stabbing may be done with an ice pick and the puncture is correctly called a stab wound.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The unexplained flight of the appellant is an indication of guilt.—The appellant’s brief did not dispute the finding of the trial
judge that Floro was in hiding for more than two years, which may explain why the information against him could not be filed in 1981, when Jaime
Mamucod was killed. It would also suggest that the accused-appellant is not innocent as he claims, for as we have repeatedly observed, unexplained
flight is an indication of guilt. “The guilty flee when no man pursueth but the innocent are as bold as a lion.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Conspiracy, present in case at bar. —Finally, there is the question of conspiracy. Floro would distance himself from
Espinosa and impute the whole blame to his absent co-accused for the killing of Jaime Mamucod. The evidence shows, however, that they acted in
concert in pursuit of a common design. Floro and Espinosa together blocked Jaime’s jeep and told him not to disturb the basketball game (although
there was none in progress). Floro first hit Jaime with the footlong stick or pipe earlier concealed in a newspaper. Then Espinosa drew his fan-knife and
stabbed Jaime in the back. Then Floro drew his ice pick and stabbed Jaime in the chest. When Jaime ran away from them, they pursued him and
continued stabbing him. Finally, with their victim dying in the ditch, both assailants fled together and disappeared. It is clear from their acts that the two
had come to an agreement concerning the attack on Jaime and decided to commit it. There was thus a conspiracy that made each conspirator liable for
the other’s acts.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Treachery, present; The victim was totally defenseless when killed.—We agree that the killing of Jaime Mamucod was
attended with treachery, qualifying the crime to murder. The victim was totally defenseless. He was caught by surprise when Espinosa and Floro, whom
he considered his friends, suddenly attacked him. Without warning, he was hit in the head, then stabbed in the back. Thus disabled, he was stabbed in
the chest. And even as he ran for his life, he was pursued and stabbed some more when he stumbled. He never had a chance to save his life.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Proof of motive is not necessary for the conviction of appellant in view of his positive identification as one of the killers.—
What prompted the vicious attack must remain a mystery to this Court. Proof of motive is, of course, not necessary for the conviction of the accused-
appellant in view of his positive identification as one of the killers. Even so, one may well wonder why a human life was taken for no apparent reason and
another life must now be needlessly spent in the shadow of the prison bars.
15
Sabili v. COMELECG.R. No. 193261

Remedial Law; Evidence; Entries in Official Records; Three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to be admissible in evidence.—In
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-purpose Cooperative, Inc., 374 SCRA 653 (2002), we explained that the
following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to be admissible in evidence: (a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which
facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
16
Dado v. People G.R. No. 131421

Criminal Law; Homicide; Evidence; Conspiracy; Conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.—Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Although the agreement need not be directly proven,
circumstantial evidence of such agreement must nonetheless be convincingly shown. Indeed, like the offense itself, conspiracy must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Simultaneity alone would not be enough to demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action and purpose.—
Simultaneity alone would not be enough to demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action and purpose that could be the basis for collective
responsibility of two or more individuals particularly if, as in the case at bar, the incident occurred at the spur of the moment. In conspiracy, there should
be a conscious design to perpetrate the offense.

Same; Same; Same; Equipoise Rule; Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates,
the party having the burden of proof loses. —Under equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side
the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if, as in the present case, the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed
quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking.

Same; Same; Same; Animus interficendi must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.—Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that
the use of firearms is dangerous to life. Animus interficendi must be established with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of
the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.

Same; Illegal Discharge of Firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code; Elements.—Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim,
petitioner should be held liable for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of this crime are:
(1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the offender has no intention to kill that person.

Criminal Procedure; Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is applied when there is variance between the offense charged and
the offense proved.—Under Rule 120, Section 4, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance between the offense charged in
the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
17
People v. Teehankee Jr. G.R. Nos. 111206-08

Criminal Procedure; Out-of-Court Identification of Suspects; Totality of Circumstances Test; Elements.—Out-of-court identification is conducted by the
police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug
shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a
group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial
of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the
following factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

Same; Same; Same; There is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are identified by witnesses. Identification may be done in open field.
It is often done in hospitals while the crime and the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim.— Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that
the alleged irregularities cited by appellant did not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leino’s
identification of appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this mode was resorted to by the authorities for security
reasons. The need for security even compelled that Leino be fetched and escorted from his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security officials and
brought to the house where he was to make the identification. The Leinos refused to have the identification at the NBI office as it was cramped with
people and with high security risk. Leino’s fear for his safety was not irrational. He and his companions had been shot in cold blood in one of the
exclusive, supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis. Atty. Salvador Ranin, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, correctly testified that
there is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are identified by witnesses. Identification may be done in open field. It is often done in
hospitals while the crime and the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim.

Same; Same; Same; The burden is on the appellant to prove that his mug shot identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible
suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of his out-of-court identification by Leino.— Appellant cannot also gripe that Leino saw his
pictures and heard radio and TV accounts of the shooting before he personally identified him. Indeed, the records show that on July 15, 1991, while
Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown three (3) pictures of different men by the investigators. He identified appellant as the gunman from these
pictures. He, however, categorically stated that, before the mug shot identification, he has not seen any picture of appellant or read any report relative to
the shooting incident. The burden is on appellant to prove that his mug shot identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible
suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of his out-of-court identification by Leino.

Same; Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Testimony; Leino had no illmotive to falsely testify against appellant.—We have no reason to doubt the correctness
of appellant’s identification by Leino. The scene of the crime was well-lighted by a Meralco lamp post. Appellant was merely 2-3 meters away when he
shot Leino. The incident happened for a full five (5) minutes. Leino had no illmotive to falsely testify against appellant. His testimony at the trial was
straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the defense counsels. He never wavered in his identification of appellant. When
asked how sure he was that appellant was responsible for the crime, he confidently replied: “I’m very sure. It could not have been somebody else.”

Evidence; Witnesses; Testimony; There is no rule of evidence which requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness whose statement has not been
priorly reduced to writing.—Appellant cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to reduce to a sworn statement the information
revealed by Leino during his hospital interviews. It was sufficiently established that Leino’s extensive injuries, especially the injury to his tongue, limited
his mobility. The day he identified appellant in the lineup, he was still physically unable to speak. He was being fed through a tube inserted in his throat.
There is also no rule of evidence which requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing.
Reliance by appellant on the case of People v. Alindog to erode Leino’s credibility is misplaced. In Alindog, accused was acquitted not solely on the basis
of delay in taking his statement, but mainly on the finding that the prosecution’s evidence was, at best, circumstantial and “suspiciously short in important
details,” there being no investigation whatsoever conducted by the police.

Same; Same; Same; Natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the
crime was committed. Most often, the face and body movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory.
—We are not likewise impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to have remembered appellant’s face when the incident happened
within a span of five (5) minutes. Five (5) minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of appellant. Experience shows that
precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a
high degree of reliability the identity of criminals. We have ruled that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance
of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body movements of the assailant create an impression
which cannot be easily erased from their memory. In the case at bar, there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to
appellant. The victims and appellant were unknown to each other before their chance encounter. If Leino identified appellant, it must be because
appellant was the real culprit.

Same; Same; Same; Court has taken judicial notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in the solution of crimes considering the risks to
their lives and limbs.—We reject appellant’s submission. Cadenas’ initial reluctance to reveal to the authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently
explained during the trial. He related that he feared for his and his family’s safety. His fear was not imaginary. He saw with his own eyes the senseless
violence perpetrated by appellant. He knew appellant belonged to an influential family. It was only after consistent prodding and assurance of protection
from NBI officials that he agreed to cooperate with the authorities. The Court has taken judicial notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get
involved in the solution of crimes considering the risk to their lives and limbs. In light of these all too real risks, the court has not considered the initial
reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with authorities as an indicium of incredulity. It will not depart from this ruling.

Same; Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence; The harmless error rule has been followed in our jurisdiction in dealing with evidence improperly admitted in
trial wherein its damaging quality and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant is examined. If the impact is deemed slight and insignificant, the
error is disregarded. —Appellant cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge violated the rule on res inter alios acta when he
considered his involvement in previous shooting incidents. This stance is a specie of a mid1800 rule known as the English Exchequer Rule pursuant to
which “a trial court’s error as to the admission of evidence was presumed to have caused prejudice and therefore, almost automatically required a new
trial.” The Exchequer rule has long been laid to rest for even English appellate courts now disregard an error in the admission of evidence “unless in its
opinion, some substantial wrong or miscarriage (of justice) has been occasioned.” American courts adopted this approach especially after the enactment
18
of a 1915 federal statute which required a federal appellate court to “give judgment after an examination of the entire record before the court, without
regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” We have likewise followed the harmless error
rule in our jurisdiction. In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, we examine its damaging quality and its impact to the substantive rights of
the litigant. If the impact is slight and insignificant, we disregard the error as it will not overcome the weight of the properly admitted evidence against the
prejudiced party.

Same; Same; Positive Identification of Accused; The omission of the NBI to compare the bullets fired from the bullets found at the scene of the crime
cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the positive identification of appellant.—The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal
gun with the bullets found at the scene of the crime. The omission, however, cannot exculpate appellant. The omitted comparison cannot nullify the
evidentiary value of the positive identification of appellant.
19
People v. Coderes G.R. No. 136849

Criminal Law; Rape; Guiding Principles in the Review of Rape Cases.—In reviewing rape cases, we have always been guided by the following
principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge; (2) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

Same; Same; Under Article 335, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by R.A. No. 7659), failure to prove that force or intimidation was actually
employed by the accused upon his victim to achieve his end is fatal to the prosecution’s cause.—It is clear from complainant’s above-quoted testimony
that while she claims that she was threatened and injured by appellant, Elsa did not specify how she was threatened, why she was threatened and on
what particular occasion she was threatened by appellant. Thus, the prosecution failed to establish that threat or injury was employed by appellant
during or on the occasion of the rape allegedly committed on November 16, 1996 as a means to force complainant to have sex with him. In rape
committed through force or intimidation under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659), the
prosecution must prove that force or intimidation was actually employed by the appellant upon his victim to achieve his end. Failure to do so is fatal to
prosecution’s cause. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to establish the presence of sufficient force or intimidation that would have created a state
of fear in the mind of Elsa so as to effectively prevent her from putting up a determined resistance.

Same; Same; Incestuous Rape; The rule on moral ascendancy cannot be applied to a case where the accused could have hardly wielded any moral
ascendancy or parental influence over the complainant considering that since the latter’s birth she lived with her grandmother and stayed in the house of
her parents for only one year when she was only twelve years old or four years before the complained incident.—A review of the evidence presented in
the present case discloses that the rule on moral ascendancy cannot be applied in this particular case. We find that the trial court failed to appreciate the
fact that appellant could have hardly wielded any moral ascendancy or parental influence over complainant as evidenced by the unrefuted testimony of
appellant that since her birth, Elsa lived with her grandmother and stayed in the house of her parents for only one year in 1992 when she was only
twelve years old or four years before the complained incident. On November 16, 1996, Elsa was already sixteen years old. Thus, she could hardly be
considered to be of such tender age that she would be easily conditioned or controlled into submitting herself to appellant’s sexual desires specially so,
when she lived with appellant for only one year when she was twelve years old.

Same; Same; While it may be said that tenacious resistance from the victim is not a requirement for the crime of rape, the lack of evidence signifying
obstinate resistance to submit to the intercourse, naturally expected from an unwilling victim, could likewise indicate that no rape has occurred.—In his
Brief, appellant does not deny having sexual intercourse with complainant. He claims that she consented to the sexual act. As earlier found by us, the
prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that complainant resisted the sexual advances of appellant when she was allegedly raped on November
16, 1996. The gravamen in the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will or without her consent. We find nothing in the testimony of
complainant to show that she offered any semblance of resistance when appellant allegedly raped her. While it may be said that tenacious resistance
from the victim is not a requirement for the crime of rape, the lack of evidence signifying obstinate resistance to submit to the intercourse, naturally
expected from an unwilling victim, could likewise indicate that no rape has occurred. Nothing in private complainant’s testimony indicates that she
struggled against the sexual advances of appellant. There was no evidence of appellant’s use of force or threat in having sex with her that evening of
November 16, 1996.

Same; Same; Witnesses; Misleading Questions; Even if a misleading question, which is simple enough to be easily understood and evaluated by a
witness, was not objected to, a witness could have easily denied it if it were not really true.— While we find the last quoted question propounded by the
counsel for appellant to be downright misleading under the Rules on Evidence, to which the inattentive prosecutor unfortunately did not object, private
complainant could have easily denied the same, if it were not really true. But she did not. Although misleading, the question is simple enough to be easily
understood and evaluated by Elsa who, on the date of her testimony was already seventeen years old. Her above-quoted statements are open to
different interpretations. Was she bothered by her conscience (“nakunsiyensya”) because she was afraid that appellant would also rape her sisters; or
was she bothered by her conscience because she realized that what she and her father were doing was a sin against her mother?

Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one of which is
consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, then the evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.—In a criminal case, every circumstance or evidence favoring a man’s innocence must be taken into account. If the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, then the evidence does not
pass the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. Thus, the presumption of innocence founded on the basic principle of justice
as embodied in our Constitution prevails in the present case.

Same; Same; Compromise; The fact that the accused admitted having tried to settle the case against him may not be used as a basis of his conviction in
the absence of competent evidence presented by the prosecution that complainant was raped through force and intimidation.—From the foregoing, it
can be seen that while appellant admits that he tried to settle the case filed against him by his daughter, he, nonetheless, denied that he raped her.
Thus, the fact that appellant admitted having tried to settle the case against him may not be used as a basis of his conviction in the absence of
competent evidence presented by the prosecution that complainant was raped through force and intimidation. The prosecution may not rely on the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. Instead, it must depend on the strength of its own evidence and establish the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. This, the prosecution failed to do.
20
People v. Alido No. L-12449

Criminal Law; Murder; Indications of Guilt.—The conduct of the accused, who was a first cousin of the deceased, in not initiating the move to have the
authors of his cousin’s death investigated, his advice of a prompt burial, and his advice to the widow to declare that her husband had been killed by a
bolo wound, and not by a gunshot wound, attest to his interest in suppressing the truth to save himself, and indicates a guilty conscience.

Same; Identity of the Accused; Judicial Notice.—The Court may take judicial notice of the fact that during the months of May and June, the days are long
and the sun sets after 6:00 in the afternoon, for which reason, although it was actually 6:00 in the afternoon when the assault was made, the witnesses
could easily see and recognize the assailants because it was not yet dark and considering that the said assailants were well known to them.
21
People v. Ayonayon No. L-16664

Evidence; Alibi; Weight in calculation of time.—The defenses of alibis are of very little weight or value when given by relatives of the accused. When they
stated that they were in their respective homes around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the crime, the time given was merely a calculation, because what
may have been considered by one witness as 6:00 o'clock may actually have been 5:30, etc. The time is immaterial where witnesses for the prosecution
positively identified the accused
22
People v. Madera No. L-35133

Criminal procedure Evidence; Dying declaration; Credibility of witness's testimony regarding statement made by decease as to who shot him.—The
lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to the testimony of Pat. Feliciano that while they were on their way to the Municipal Building, Elino
Bana (deceased victim) told him that he could not identify the persons who shot him. Said policeman has been an investigator in the police force since
1964. He should have asked Elino Bana while he was giving his dying declaration in the Municipal Building why he said earlier that he did not know who
shot him. But Pat. Feliciano did not do this. It must be noted that not only Pat. Feliciano but also Francisco Viloria, a witness to the dying declaration,
testified to its lawful execution.

Same; Same; Failure to reveal right away identity of assailants of deceased does not affect their credibility.—The fact that J.B. and B.B. failed to reveal
right away the identities of the appellants to the victim himself and to their relatives does not militate against their credibility. There is no evidence on
record that they were asked by their relatives about the identity of the appellants. Had they been asked, they would have readily revealed appellants'
identities as they did to the Chief of Police and Municipal Mayor of Gabaldon only a few hours after the fateful incident, during a formal investigation of
the case in the Office of the Chief of Police when and where they executed their respective sworn statements.

Same; Same; Fact that witness was gripped with fear does not prove he failed to recognize assailants.—Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with
fear when he heard the burst of gunfire. But that would not prove that he failed to recognize the appellants. "An excited person may overlook the
presence of another whom he would otherwise have observed." Under some circumstances, however, excitement may whet the attention to a keen
edge. x x x In some other cases, it has been observed, in effect, that the emotion incident to the impending peril may not be the kind of excitement which
confuses, but that which focalizes the faculties to scrutinize the circumstance of the threatened danger in order to avoid it."

Same; Same; Judicial notice; Courts may take notice of whether the moon was shining or not on a particular night.—The Court can take judicial notice of
the "laws of nature" and, under this rule, of the time when the moon rises or sets on a particular day. This notwithstanding and for certainly, We took it
unto Ourselves to get a certification from the Weather Bureau which shows that the moon was bright at the time of the shooting incident.

Same; Same; When proof of motive not necessary.—lt was not necessary for the prosecution to prove motive on the part of the appellants for there is no
doubt as to their identities.

Same; Same; Where paraffin test conducted 14 days after the incident.—lt is true that according to the forensic chemist of the NBI, appellant Raymundo
Madera was found negative in a paraffin test. But it was admitted that, the paraffin test having been conducted 14 days after the incident, the test could
have given a negative result even if the appellant had fired a gun 14 days earlier, because the nitrate deposits on his hands could have been washed off
by washing or could have been removed by perspiration.

Same; Same; Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification of accused.—The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
appellants by the prosecution witnesses. The house of appellant Raymundo Madera is just about 400 meters away from that of the victim.

Same; Same; Conspiracy; Mere passive presence of co-accused at the scene of crime where no conspiracy was shown did not make them liable as co-
principals or accomplices.—The fact that these two appellants were standing behind appellant Madera when the latter fired shots at Elino Bana, did not
make them liable for what Madera did, there being no proof whatsoever of any conspiracy among the three appellants. They were not armed. They did
nothing to help Madera. Their mere passive presence at the scene of the crime did not take them liable either as coprincipals or accomplices.
23
People v. Sison No. L-45857

Evidence; Rape; Complainant’s version that on Sunday afternoon on a street at Galas, Quezon City, the accused forced her to take a tricycle ride at the
point of a knife not credible. Court takes judicial notice that street of Galas are filled with people on a Sunday afternoon.—This is quite incredible
because, on such Sunday afternoon, with many people passing by or idling in the vicinity, as Galas is thickly populated by low-income and middleclass
groups—of which fact the Supreme Court can take judicial notice—she could have resisted and shouted for help. It was not easy for appellant to grab
her and force her into the tricycle without being noticed by passers-by and by-standers. She claims that after she was seated inside the tricycle,
appellant drove his tricycle to the España Rotonda, a busy intersection of España St., Manila, Quezon Avenue, España Extension (now E. Rodriguez
Ave.), Mayon St., and Pulog St. going towards Galas, Quezon City. Said rotonda is over one kilometer from Galas, with several street corners to pass
along the way.

Same; Same; With appellant driving the tricycle, complainant could easily have shouted for help.—With appellant driving the tricycle, complainant could
have shouted for help while seated in the rear compartment for passengers behind him, since as aforestated, from the corner where she was allegedly
forced to board the tricycle up to España Rotonda is quite a distance, with so many houses and several persons along the way. And children would be
playing on the streets. Or she could have jumped out of the tricycle for a tricycle does not run fast and the tricycle is always open at its right side just
behind appellant who was on the driver’s seat. Appellant could not be poking a knife with one hand at Violeta and driving the tricycle with the other hand.

Same; Same; Complainant’s failure to shout for help despite the fact that she and accused took several jeepney rides from España Rotonda to
Novaliches shows claim of rape incredible.— From the España Rotonda, they took a passenger jeepney for Balintawak, Quezon City. They were
allegedly the only passengers of the jeepney, with appellant holding her hands and telling her that he would kill her if she tried to go home. From España
Rotonda to Balintawak is a distance of about five kilometers. Being a passenger jeepney, it presumably took the usual passenger jeepney routes. It
would be unbelievable that all throughout the distance of about five kilometers, a Sunday afternoon, no other passenger boarded the jeepney between
España Rotonda and Bali itawak. The route of said jeepney must pass through Mayon St. towards North Cemetery beside Balintawak. But even
assuming that they were the lone passengers of the jeepney throughout the distance she could have shouted for help or created a commotion to alert
the jeepney driver. It is also possible that she must have seen policemen along the route, especially near the gate of the North Cemetery. The various
jeepney routes from Quezon City to North Cemetery include Mayor Norberto Amoranto St. (formerly Retiro), Del Monte Avenue, Dapitan, Laong-Laan
St., and from Manila to the North Cemetery then to Balintawak, via Dimasalang St., and coming from Rizal Avenue Extension and passing the Chinese
General Hospital via Blumentritt. Upon reaching the busy intersection in front of the North Cemetery gate, with a lot of people around, including
employees of the gas station just across the gate of the North Cemetery, she could have screamed for help, but she did not.

Same; Same; Same.—At Balintawak, appellant allegedly brought her to the house of his aunt; to whom he allegedly introduced her as his girl-friend.
After talking to her aunt, he and complainant left the house and rode in a passenger jeepney bound for Novaliches, Quezon City. There were other
passengers inside the jeepney but she did not make any outcry nor ask help from the other passengers during that long trip from Balintawak to
Novaliches, which is a lot farther than from España Rotonda to Balintawak. Balintawak is also a busy street all the way to Clover Leaf (the hub
connecting to Novaliches) and there are many houses and shops along the way—more so upon reaching the busy market near the Clover Leaf. And
then from Clover Leaf through Quirino Avenue towards Novaliches, there must have been numerous persons that Sunday afternoon, because Quirino
Avenue is likewise a busy avenue, being the only route to Novaliches from the Clover Leaf and the traffic along that thoroughfare is heavy at all hours of
the day because of the numerous passenger buses, jeepneys, cargo trucks, and private cars on the road. But she did not cry for help.

Same; Same; It is unthinkable that complainant’s alleged cries while in the house of appellant’s aunt could not have been heard by its inmates.—At
Novaliches, appellant led her to the house of another aunt, Maria Aviles Reyes and took her purse containing P12.00. After eating their supper, appellant
allegedly brought her to a room and ordered her to lie down. She resisted and appellant slapped her repeatedly. She became unconscious and upon
regaining consciousness, she found herself naked with appellant on top of her and his penis inside her vagina “up to her stomach.” If she resisted as she
claimed, there should have been some commotion and maybe pieces of furniture like chairs and tables being pushed or the sound of shuffling feet,
accompanied by her cries or screaming indicating resistance. When he slapped her repeatedly, she must have shouted in pain and even cursed him
aloud with the usual vulgar invectives. With such commotion, screaming, cries of pain and vulgar curses, it is unthinkable that the aunt and the rest of
the inmates of the house would not have heard the same. They could have been curious about the commotion and could have frustrated whatever
criminal intention appellant might have towards her.

Same; Same; Complainant’s testimony that she was raped several times for several days at the house of appellant’s aunt and yet not once did she
complain to said aunt and other inmates of the house about it renders her charge vulnerable.—She alleged that he had sexual intercourse with her three
times that July 15 even as she was experiencing pain. The following day (July 16), he had sexual intercourse with her four times. Then on the third day
(July 17), he did the same to her. They stayed in Novaliches from July 15 to July 21, 1973. Never did she complain to his aunt or to the other inmates of
the house about what appellant did to her. During those six days, she must have gone out of the room to eat or to attend to personal necessities in the
bathroom. During those six days too, his aunt and the other members of the family would have noticed her painful expression or her moaning in pain and
would have asked her the cause of the same.

Same; Same; Supreme Court can take judicial notice of the geography of Metro-Manila, distances therein of important districts and nature of traffic flow
on crowded areas.—It should be stressed, as heretofore intimated, that this Court sitting in Metro Manila, can take judicial notice of the geography of
said metropolis, and the approximate distance from Galas to España Rotonda, from España Rotonda to Balintawak, and from Balintawak to Novaliches,
the passenger routes to said place, the nature of traffic along said routes, the heavy population in Metropolitan Manila, and the habits of the residents
therein.

Same; Same; Failure of prosecution’s evidence to show why complainant’s employer and her mother do not appear to have missed her for six days
affects veracity of rape charge.—There is nothing in the record to indicate as to why her mother and her employer did not look for her during the six days
that she was missing from the house of her employer and why they did not report to the police authorities said fact of her being missing for almost a
week. Neither is there any intimation that her employer inquired about the money he gave to her to purchase slippers, which is quite unnatural.
24
Lapit v. Chua GR No. 177809
25
Songco v. NLRC G.R. Nos. 50999-51000

Labor Law; Commissions; The nature of the work of a salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate clearly
that commissions are part of petitioners’ wage or salary.—We agree with the Solicitor General that granting, in gratia argumenti, that the commissions
were in the form of incentives or encouragement, so that the petitioners would be inspired to put a little more industry on the jobs particularly assigned to
them, still these commissions are direct remunerations for services rendered which contributed to the increase of income of Zuellig. Commission is the
recompense, compensation or reward of an agent, salesman, executor, trustee, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the same is calculated as a
percentage on the amount of his transactions or on the profit to the principal (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., citing Weiner v. Swales, 217 Md. 123, 141
A.2d 749, 750). The nature of the work of a salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate clearly that
commissions are part of petitioners’ wage or salary. We take judicial notice of the fact that some salesmen do not receive any basic salary but depend on
commissions and allowances or commissions alone, although an employer-employee relationship exists.

Same; Same; Separation Pay; Purpose of; The Purpose of separation pay is to alleviate the difficulties which confront a dismissed employee thrown to
the streets to face the harsh necessities of life.—Bearing in mind the preceding discussions, if We adopt the opposite view that commissions do not form
part of wage or salary, then, in effect, We will be saying that this kind of salesmen do not receive any salary and therefore, not entitled to separation pay
in the event of discharge from employment. Will this not be absurd? This narrow interpretation is not in accord with the liberal spirit of our labor laws and
considering the purpose of separation pay which is, to alleviate the difficulties which confront a dismissed employee thrown to the streets to face the
harsh necessities of life.

Same; Same; Same; The average commissions earned by petitioners during their last year of employment should be used in computing the separation
pay, applying the case by analogy in Soriano vs. NLRC, et al. (155 SCRA 124).—Additionally, in Soriano v. NLRC, et al., supra, in resolving the issue of
the salary base that should be used in computing the separation pay, We held that: “The commissions also claimed by petitioner (‘override commission’
plus ‘net deposit incentive’) are not properly includible in such base figure since such commissions must be earned by actual market transactions
attributable to petitioner.” Applying this analogy, since the commissions in the present case were earned by actual market transactions attributable to
petitioners, these should be included in their separation pay. In the computation thereof, what should be taken into account is the average commissions
earned during their last year of employment.

Same; In carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code’s provisions and its implementing regulations, the workingman’s welfare should be the primordial
and paramount consideration.—The final consideration is, in carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code’s provisions and its implementing regulations,
the workingman’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal
and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that “all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of
the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor” (Abella v. NLRC, G.R. No 71812,
July 30, 1987, 152 SCRA 140; Manila Electric Company v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 78763, July 12, 1989), and Article 1702 of the Civil Code which
provides that “in case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
26
People v. Besmonte G.R. Nos. 137278-79

Criminal Law; Rape; Judicial Notice; Rape could take place in the same room where other members of the family are sleeping; It is of judicial notice that
it is at the middle of the night when children are in deep slumber and could not be easily awakened.— The presence of people nearby is no guarantee
that rape will not be committed, for lust is no respecter of time and place. Rape has been committed in places where people congregate, like parks or
school premises and even in a house where there are other occupants. There is no rule or norm that a woman can only be raped in seclusion. It has
been committed in a room adjacent to where other members of the family stay or in a room, which the victim shared with others. We have more than
once observed that rape could take place in the same room where other members of the family were sleeping. In the instant cases, both rapes
complained of were committed in the middle of the night. It is of judicial notice that it is at this time when children are in deep slumber and could not be
easily awakened. The fact that Melanie’s siblings were not awakened at the times she was ravished is not improbable. Hence, appellants’ thesis that it
was impossible for them to have committed the rape in the presence of private complainant’s siblings who were sleeping next to her deserves scant
consideration.

Same; Same; Witnesses; The trial court’s assessment of complainant’s credibility, considering that it had the advantage of observing her demeanor as
she testified, is not easily discarded.— In ruling upon Melanie’s credibility, the trial court found her testimony to be “forthright, clear, and free from serious
contradictions.” The trial court’s assessment of complainant’s credibility, considering that it had the advantage of observing her demeanor as she
testified, is not easily discarded. The trial court judge is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of the complainant’s testimony. Unless it is
shown that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight or substance that would otherwise affect the
result of the case, its findings will not be disturbed on appeal. We find no compelling reason now to depart from said rule. We have carefully read the
victim’s testimony and find that the discrepancy harped upon by appellants focused more on her account of events immediately preceding the rape by
Apuyan. They did not zero in on her narration of the crime itself. Complainant’s testimony may not be flawless, but its substance, veracity, and weight
were unaffected by the triviality of the alleged inconsistency.

Same; Same; Same; The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the truth of the rape charges, for the display of such emotion indicates
the pain that the victim feels when asked to recount her traumatic experience.—What is material here is Melanie’s testimony on how she was sexually
abused. She positively identified appellants in open court as her ravishers without any hesitation. Indeed, where the accusing words come from a girl of
tender years and they are directed against her own relatives, they are difficult to disbelieve. We further note that Melanie broke out in tears while
testifying. The crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of the truth of the rape charges, for the display of such emotion indicates the pain that
the victim feels when asked to recount her traumatic experience. Melanie testified in a categorical, straightforward, and frank manner, and she remained
consistent under crossexamination. The inescapable conclusion is that she is a credible witness. The sole testimony of a rape victim, if credible, suffices
to convict.

Same; Same; Same; Although visibility is an important factor in the identification of a felon, its relative significance depends largely on the attending
circumstances and the discretion of the trial court; The sense of smell, in the right circumstances, might be a reliable mode of identification, but it could
also prove to be tenuous if it were the sole source of identification under circumstances that leave much room for other probabilities to contend with.—
Appellant Besmonte’s bid for exoneration on the theory of doubtful identification, in our view, is an exercise in futility. The absence of illumination in the
place of the commission of the crime does not detract from the positive identification by Melanie of Besmonte as her ravisher. Although visibility is an
important factor in the identification of a felon, its relative significance depends largely on the attending circumstances and the discretion of the trial
court. We have held that the sense of smell, in the right circumstances, might be a reliable mode of identification, but it could also prove to be tenuous if
it were the sole source of identification under circumstances that leave much room for other probabilities to contend with. In the case against Besmonte,
there is not much room to doubt the positive identification on account of the victim’s olfactory faculties.

Same; Same; Same; The basis for the complainant’s identification was her long familiarity with the accused—she knew him well prior to the sexual
assault and she was familiar with his body smell; The sound of the voice of a person is an acceptable means of identification where it is established that
the witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of years; The Court finds no reason to doubt the accuracy of the
identification of the malefactor based on auditory and olfactory perception by the victim.—The prosecution’s case against Besmonte is founded on
Melanie’s familiarity with him. If she was not at all familiar with appellant Besmonte, the prosecution’s whole case against him collapses, for such
familiarity was its very foundation. In the instant case, it was not disputed that Melanie had lived in the same house with Besmonte for almost four years
prior to the incident. In fact, Besmonte himself testified that he had treated her like a daughter and was even responsible for her schooling. Thus, the
basis for her identification was her long familiarity with Besmonte. She pointed to him because she knew him well prior to the sexual assault. Melanie
was familiar with his body smell. No doubt she could perceive and recognize that smell at the time of sexual contact. At that time, private complainant
was as close to Besmonte as was physically possible, for a man and a woman could not be physically closer to each other than during a sexual act.
Moreover, the victim did not solely rely upon her sense of smell in identifying her ravisher. She emphatically declared in open court that she also
recognized Besmonte from his voice when he uttered threatening words to her in the dark. It is highly inconceivable that complainant would not
recognize Besmonte’s voice, having lived with him for quite some time. The sound of the voice of a person is an acceptable means of identification
where it is established that the witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of years. We find no reason to doubt the
accuracy of the identification of the malefactor based on auditory and olfactory perception by the victim on December 15, 1994. Under the
circumstances, Melanie was able to perceive who her rapist was and to make known that perception. Nor is there any reason to doubt her sincerity to tell
the truth, for there is no showing at all by the defense that she charged Besmonte with rape due to an evil or corrupt motive.
27
State Prosecutors v. Muro A.M. No. RTJ-92-876

Remedial Law; Evidence; Judicial Notice; Doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts.—The doctrine of judicial notice
rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.

Same; Same; Same; Requisites of Judicial Notice.—Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be
one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within
the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence,
it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.

Same; Same; Same; Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are “commonly” known.—To say that a court will take judicial notice of a
fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is
because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal
knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are “commonly” known.

Same; Same; Same; Facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries and other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood.—Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial notice,
may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person.

Same; Same; Same; Judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent,
cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration.—Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on
the basis of a mere newspaper account which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the supposed
lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took
cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not yet in force when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice
cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. The reason is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of
common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a
fact.

Same; Same; Same.—Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB
Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order of dismissal was issued.
28
People v. Padilla G.R. No. 137648

Criminal Law; Rape; Guiding Principles in the Review of Rape Cases.—The Court has repeatedly reiterated the three principles that guide its review of
rape cases, to wit: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused to disprove; (2) in
view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.

Same; Same; When a woman or a child victim says that she has been raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed.—In the case under scrutiny, we find no compelling reason to overturn the factual findings of the trial court. The testimony of the complainant,
Eula Padilla, who was only ten years old at the time she testified, deserves full faith and credit. Her simple, positive and straightforward recounting on
the witness stand of her harrowing experience lends credence to her accusation. Moreover, being a mere child of tender years, her age belies any
allegation that her charge was a mere concoction or fabrication impelled by some ill-motive or revenge. As has been stressed by this Court in numerous
cases, when a woman or a child victim says that she has been raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.

Same; Same; Witnesses; Words and Phrases; To say that the word “bird” is vague is plain sophistry, as a child victim of rape could not be expected to
be sophisticated and knowledgeable in the ways of sex—what she meant by the word “bird” was no other than a male genital organ.—Accused-
appellant brands as vague the portion of complainant’s testimony how she was raped: “ipinasok niya ang bird niya sa ari ko.” It is appellant’s contention
that such testimony does not positively establish that the rape was committed. The Court does not agree. To say that the word “bird” is vague is plain
sophistry. A child victim of rape could not be expected to be sophisticated and knowledgeable in the ways of sex. What she meant by the word “bird” was
no other than a male genital organ. Although the term is not as definitive as the word “penis” a young and innocent child cannot be expected to be as
graphic and explicit in her language as an adult.

Same; Qualified Rape; Judicial Notice; Birth Certificates; The presentation of the certificate of birth is not at all times necessary to prove minority and the
minority of a victim of tender age who may be below the age often is quite manifest and the court can take judicial notice thereof.—In the case at bar,
however, the victim was only ten years old when the rape was committed. In such an instance, the court may take judicial notice of the victim’s age and
independent proof of minority may not be necessary. In the case of People vs. Tipay, the Court pronounced that the presentation of the certificate of birth
is not at all times necessary to prove minority and the minority of a victim of tender age who may be below the age of ten is quite manifest and the court
can take judicial notice thereof. In People vs. Bali-balita, the victim was only ten years old when she was raped by the live-in partner of her mother. The
Court held that the victim’s minority was sufficiently proven. As the victim, who was ten years and four months old at the time of the rape, testified in
court only about four months after the rape, it would not have been difficult for the trial court to take judicial notice that she was under 18 years of age.
29
Solidbank Corporation vs. Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation G.R. No. 153535

Corporation Law; Corporate officers cannot be held personally liable for the consequences of their acts, for as long as these are for and on behalf of the
corporation, within the scope of their authority and in good faith.—Basic is the principle that a corporation is vested by law with a personality separate
and distinct from that of each person composing or representing it. Equally fundamental is the general rule that corporate officers cannot be held
personally liable for the consequences of their acts, for as long as these are for and on behalf of the corporation, within the scope of their authority and
in good faith. The separate corporate personality is a shield against the personal liability of corporate officers, whose acts are properly attributed to the
corporation.

Same; Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction; To disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and
convincingly established; it cannot be presumed.— Under certain circumstances, courts may treat a corporation as a mere aggroupment of persons, to
whom liability will directly attach. The distinct and separate corporate personality may be disregarded, inter alia, when the corporate identity is used to
defeat public convenience, justify a wrong, protect a fraud, or defend a crime. Likewise, the corporate veil may be pierced when the corporation acts as a
mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or when it is so organized and controlled and its affairs so conducted as to make it merely an
instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation. But to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing
must be clearly and convincingly established; it cannot be presumed.

Civil Law; Obligations and Contracts; It is axiomatic that solidary liability cannot be lightly inferred.—It is axiomatic that solidary liability cannot be lightly
inferred. Under Article 1207 of the Civil Code, “there is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of
the obligation requires solidarity.” Since solidary liability is not clearly expressed in the Promissory Note and is not required by law or the nature of the
obligation in this case, no conclusion of solidary liability can be made.

Same; Damages; Fraud; Fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence is not adequate.—Fraud must
be established by clear and convincing evidence; mere preponderance of evidence is not adequate. Bad faith, on the other hand, imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, not simply bad judgment or negligence. It is synonymous with fraud, in that it involves
a design to mislead or deceive another.

Same; Same; The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be done in accordance with the proper norm; When the right is exercised
arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.—
Article 19 of the Civil Code expresses the fundamental principle of law on human conduct that a person “must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” Under this basic postulate, the exercise of a
right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be done in accordance with the proper norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

Same; Same; Elements to be Liable under the Abuse-of-Rights Principle.—To be liable under the abuse-of-rights principle, three elements must concur:
a) a legal right or duty, b) its exercise in bad faith, and c) the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Needless to say, absence of good faith must be
sufficiently established.

Same; Same; Malicious Prosecution; To justify an award of damages for malicious prosecution, one must prove two elements: malice or sinister design
to vex or humiliate and want of probable cause.—For damages to be properly awarded under the above provisions, it is necessary to demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that the action instituted by petitioner was clearly so unfounded and untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad
faith. To justify an award of damages for malicious prosecution, one must prove two elements: malice or sinister design to vex or humiliate and want of
probable cause.
30
Sps. Saguid v. Security Finance

Civil Law; Contracts; Requisites; Consideration; The presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion
that it has no consideration.— Under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, it is presumed that consideration exists and is lawful unless the debtor proves the
contrary. Moreover, under Section 3(r) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is presumed that there is a sufficient consideration for a contract. The
presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no consideration. To overcome the
presumption of consideration, the alleged lack of consideration must be shown by preponderance of evidence.

Same; Same; Mortgages; It is settled that a mortgage is a mere accessory contract and its validity would depend on the validity of the loan secured by it.
—As regards the chattel mortgage, it is settled that a mortgage is a mere accessory contract and its validity would depend on the validity of the loan
secured by it. The chattel mortgage constituted over the subject vehicle is an accessory contract to the loan obligation as embodied in the promissory
note. It cannot exist as an independent contract since its consideration is the same as that of the principal contract. A principal obligation is an
indispensable condition for the existence of an accessory contract. Since it has been sufficiently established that there was no cause or consideration for
the promissory note, it follows that the chattel mortgage has no leg to stand on. Hence, it must be extinguished and cannot have any legal effect on
petitioners.

Same; Same; Damages; Actual Damages; It is well-settled that actual or compensatory damages must be proved and proved with reasonable degree of
certainty.—It is well-settled that actual or compensatory damages must be proved and proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A party is entitled only
up to such compensation for the pecuniary loss that he has duly proven. It cannot be presumed. Absent proof of the amount of actual damages
sustained, the Court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent
proof that they have been suffered by the injured party and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof.

Same; Same; Same; Moral Damages; There is no hard-andfast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each
case must be governed by its own peculiar facts.—Petitioners are entitled to moral damages having suffered undue embarrassment when the subject
vehicle was seized from their home. There is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each
case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. The yardstick should be that it is not palpably and scandalously excessive. We find the amount of
P500,000.00 awarded by the lower court to be excessive. In our view, the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is reasonable under the facts
obtaining in this case.

Same; Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; When moral damages are awarded, exemplary damages may also be granted.— Exemplary or corrective
damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
When moral damages are awarded, exemplary damages may also be granted. We, however, find the P1,000,000.00 awarded by the lower court to be
excessive and should accordingly be reduced to P50,000.00.

Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; Petitioners are entitled thereto because they were compelled to litigate in order to protect its interest.—Attorney’s fees
may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party.
Petitioners are entitled thereto because they were compelled to litigate in order to protect their interest. Moreover, there being an award for exemplary
damages, it follows that there should be an award thereof. An award of P20,000.00 will be sufficient as the award of P200,000.00 by the RTC is too
much.
31
Simon v. Canlas G.R. No. 148273

Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Impleading the lower court as respondent in a petition for review on certiorari
does not automatically mean the dismissal of the appeal but merely authorizes the dismissal of the petition; While the Supreme Court has the discretion
to dismiss the appeal for being defective, sound policy dictates that it is far better to dispose of cases on the merits, rather than on technicality as the
latter approach may result in injustice.—Anent the procedural defects raised by respondent, the Court agrees that the correct procedure, as mandated
by Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is not to implead the lower court which rendered the assailed decision. However, impleading
the lower court as respondent in the petition for review on certiorari does not automatically mean the dismissal of the appeal but merely authorizes the
dismissal of the petition. Besides, formal defects in petitions are not uncommon. The Court has encountered previous petitions for review on certiorari
that erroneously impleaded the CA. In those cases, the Court merely called the petitioners’ attention to the defects and proceeded to resolve the case on
their merits. The Court finds no reason why it should not afford the same liberal treatment in this case. While unquestionably, the Court has the discretion
to dismiss the appeal for being defective, sound policy dictates that it is far better to dispose of cases on the merits, rather than on technicality as the
latter approach may result in injustice. This is in accordance with Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which encourages a reading of
the procedural requirements in a manner that will help secure and not defeat justice.

Same; Same; Questions of Fact and Questions of Law; Words and Phrases; A party’s contention that he was denied substantive due process is a pure
question of law.—Anent respondent’s submission that the petition failed to raise a question of law, the Court disagrees. For a question to be one of law, it
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. Petitioners’ contention that they were
denied substantive due process is a pure question of law.

Same; Motion for Postponement; Postponements and continuances are a part and parcel of our procedural system of dispensing justice; In considering
motions for postponements, two things must therefore be borne in mind: (1) the reason for the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the
movant.—As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which should always be
predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should
be served thereby. After all, postponements and continuances are part and parcel of our procedural system of dispensing justice.” When no substantial
rights are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest with the corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it is
sound judicial discretion to allow the same to the end that the merits of the case may be fully ventilated. Thus, in considering motions for postponements,
two things must be borne in mind: (1) the reason for the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the movant. Unless grave abuse of discretion is
shown, such discretion will not be interfered with either by mandamus or appeal.

Actions; Documentary Evidence; Due Execution of Documents; Admission of genuineness and due execution of a document simply means that the party
whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority, that at the time it was
signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it, that the document was delivered, and that any formalities
required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him; Admission of the genuineness and due
execution of a document does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations,
estoppel and want of consideration.—As to the effect of petitioners’ admission of the due execution of the real estate mortgage during the pre-trial
conference, it must be noted that in Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 445, 459 (2001), this Court ruled that the admission of the
genuineness and due execution of a document simply means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it
was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the
party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp,
which it lacks, are waived by him. However, it does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment,
statute of limitations, estoppel and want of consideration. Petitioners therefore are not barred from presenting evidence regarding their claim of want of
consideration. It bears stressing that the matter of absence of consideration and alleged fraudulent scheme perpetuated by third-party defendants, being
evidentiary, should be threshed out in a proper trial. To deny petitioners their right to present evidence constitutes a denial of due process, since there
are issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the merits.