Public Diplomacy in The Digital Age

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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
By
SARAH J. BERRY
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1997
Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfillment o f the requirements for the joint degrees of Master of
Arts in Public Policy and Master of Arts in Journalism
Robertson School o f Government
School of Journalism
College of Communication and the Arts
Regent University
Virginia Beach, VA
2002
UMI Number 1413044
Copyright 2002 by
Berry, Sarah Jean
All rights reserved.
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APPROVAL SHEET
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the joint degrees o f Master o f Arts in Public Policy
and Master o f Arts in Journalism
Approved July 2002
Philip C. Bom, Ph.D.

Chairman
Beverly HedbefffPLD.
Copyright
2002
Sarah J. Berry
All Rights Reserved
in
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to express her appreciation to her family for their unwavering
support and encouragement of her academic pursuits. The author is also indebted to
her professors, Drs. Philip C. Bom, Beverly Hedberg, and Douglas Tarpley for their
guidance and advice on the production of this paper.
iv
CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............................................................................................. iv
ABSTRACT......................................................................................................................vi
I. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 2
II. THE SHIFT FROM TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY... 3

A. Traditional Diplomacy........................................................................................... 3
B. Public Diplomacy................................................................................................... 8
C. Reasons for the Shift.............................................................................................13
III. HISTORY OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY....................................................................17

A. Institutions and Agencies Involved in Public Diplomacy..................................... 17
B. History o f the U.S. Information Agency.............................................................. 22
C. Public Diplomacy Under President Clinton..........................................................30
IV. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE........................................36
V. THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY............................................................. 47

A. Challenges to Public Diplomacy.......................................................................... 47
B. Public Diplomacy Undo* President Bush.............................................................56
C. Suggestions for Revamping U.S. Public Diplomacy............................................63
VI. CONCLUSION......................................................................................................... 73
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................ 77
VITA............................................................................................................................... 82
ABSTRACT
This study examines the role public diplomacy plays in U.S. foreign policy in the
digital age. It distinguishes public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy and explains
the shift to a more open and participatory diplomacy.
The key government offices that handle public diplomacy are presented, with
emphasis on the U.S. Information Agency. The paper examines President Clinton’s
imprint on public diplomacy with legislation that merged the USIA with the U.S.
Department o f State.
This study provides a substantive discussion of the transformations the digital age
imposes on diplomatic practice and argues that U.S. foreign policy is better served by
making public diplomacy a central component o f the policy-making process. Secretary
Colin Powell’s approach to public diplomacy illustrates the elevated status it occupies in
a new era o f international relations. After assessing public diplomacy’s strengths and
weaknesses, the paper offers suggestions for preparing the State Department to meet
future challenges to American diplomacy.
vi
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
L
INTRODUCTION
Nations have long recognized the importance of managing the perception o f them
that governments and citizens o f other countries hold. According to The Oxford
Companion to Politics o f the World (2001), diplomacy “is a system of communication
between strangers.”1 It is the formal means by which the sovereign state constitutes and
articulates its self-identity through external relations with other states. Like the dialogue
from which it is constructed, “diplomacy requires and seeks to mediate otherness through
the use o f persuasion and force, promises and threats, codes and symbols.”2
Diplomacy recognizes the need o f governments to communicate with the leaders
and people o f other lands. The centrality o f communication to the conduct o f diplomacy
has long been evident, but only in recent years has an emphasis on public diplomacy been
seen. This paper examines the role public diplomacy must play in U.S. foreign policy in
the digital age. First, it defines and distinguishes traditional diplomacy from public
diplomacy and provides a rationale for the use of public diplomacy in international
relations. Next, the author delineates the key departments and agencies engaged in public
diplomacy and provides a brief history o f the U.S. Information Agency, which was the
primary agency responsible for public diplomacy throughout four decades. Some
1 Joel Krieger, ed., The Oxford Companion to Politics o f the World, 2* ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 217.
2 Ibid.
discussion o f public diplomacy as it was conducted under the Clinton administration is
also provided.
The core o f this paper centers on a substantive discussion o f diplomacy in a global
communication and information environment and what it means for public diplomacy.
The paper assesses the strengths and weaknesses of public diplomacy and offers some
suggestions for revamping U.S. foreign policy organs - namely, the U.S. Department of
State - to prioritize public diplomacy and elevate its role in the policy-making process.
n.
THE SHIFT FROM TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
A. Traditional Diplomacy
Diplomacy is commonly defined as the art and practice o f conducting relations
among sovereign states, which derives from Sir Harold Nicolson’s3 classic definition o f
diplomacy as “the management o f international relations by negotiation.”4 The word
diplomacy itself comes from the Greek verb diploun, which means “to fold.” In the days
of the Roman empire all passports—passes along imperial roads—were stamped on
double metal plates, folded and sewn together in a particular manner. These passes were
called diplomas. This word diploma later was extended to cover other official
1 Sir Harold Nicolson (1886-1968), the British diplomat, author, critic and journalist, was widely
known as an authority on diplomatic problems and procedure. Among his many works are the three-
volume Diaries and Letters, his chronicles o f mid-twentieth century British social and political life.
4 Sir Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (Washington D.C.: Institute for the Study o f Diplomacy,
Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, 1988), 4.
documents, especially those conferring privileges or embodying arrangements with
foreign communities. As these treaties accumulated, it became necessary to employ
trained clerics to index, decipher and preserve these documents.3 It was not until late into
the eighteenth century that the meaning of res diplomatic, diplomatic affairs, was
extended from the management o f archives to the management of international relations.6
According to political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau, the task o f diplomacy is four
fold:
‘Taken in its widest meaning, comprising the whole range o f foreign

policy, the task o f diplomacy is fourfold: (1) Diplomacy must determine
its objectives in the light o f the power actually and potentially available
for the pursuit o f these objectives. (2) Diplomacy must assess the
objectives of other nations and the power actually and potentially available
for the pursuit of these objectives. (3) Diplomacy must determine to what
extent these different objectives are compatible with each other. (4)
Diplomacy must employ the means suited to the pursuit of its objectives.
Failure in any one o f these tasks may jeopardize the success o f foreign
policy and with it the peace o f the world.”7
In other words, Morgenthau believed nations had to evaluate their objectives, as
well as the objectives of other nations when deciding foreign policy; they had to decide
whether those objectives were mutually compatible and what means they were willing to
use to pursue them. Morgenthau described three tools nations could wield while pursuing
their objectives: persuasion, compromise, and threat of force. Yet, as Morgenthau
observed, no diplomacy that relies solely on the threat of force could be called peaceful,
just as no diplomacy that stakes everything on persuasion and compromise could be
called intelligent. Rather, the diplomatic representative of a great power, in order to serve
5 Ibid, 11.
6 Joel Krieger, ed., The Oxford Companion to Politics o f the World, 217*222.
7 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Strugglefor Power and Peace, Brief edition.
(Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill Co., 1993), 361*362.
both the interests of his country and the interests o f peace, must simultaneously be
persuasive, willing to compromise, and impress the foreign power with his country’s
military strength. The art o f diplomacy consists in putting the right emphasis at any given
moment on each of the means at its disposal.8
There are four distinctive aspects of diplomatic activity: govemment-to-
govemment, diplomat-to-diplomat, people-to-people, and government-to-people
contacts.9 The first o f these, govemment-to-govemment contact, refers to diplomacy in
its traditional form. It is the exchange of formal messages between sovereign states by
official representatives. The second, commonly termed personal diplomacy, refers to
individual-level interactions among those who are responsible for making and
maintaining diplomatic contact.10 The third form of diplomatic contact is public
diplomacy and it refers to “government-sponsored programs intended to inform or
influence public opinion in other countries.”11 It is often characterized by cultural and
educational exchanges, such as the Fulbright Program, media development campaigns
and initiatives—“all designed to explain and defend government policies and portray a
nation to foreign audiences.”12 Govemment-to-people contact is yet another form of
public diplomacy, and it includes efforts by the government of one nation to influence
8 Ibid, 363.
9 Jarol Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution o f
Influence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 3.
10 Ibid, 4.
11 “What is Public Diplomacy”; available from the Public Diplomacy Website [maintained by the
Public Diplomacy Foundation and the U.S. Information Agency Alumni Association] at
http://www.Dublicdiplomacv.org/l .htm: Internet; accessed 29 August 2000.
12 Jarol Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy, 4.
public or elite opinion in a second nation for the purpose of turning the foreign policy of
the targeted nation to its advantage.13
Typically, diplomacy is carried out by diplomatic representatives sent by their
governments to the capitals o f foreign nations and by the government officials o f the host
nation. In a sense, the office charged with overseeing foreign affairs can be termed “the
brains” of the operation. It is where the impressions from the outside world are gathered
and evaluated, where foreign policy is formulated, and where the “impulses” emanate,
which diplomatic representatives transform into actual policy. Whereas the foreign office
is the brains of foreign policy, the diplomatic representatives are its eyes, ears, mouth and
fingertips.14
The diplomat, together with his or her foreign office, shapes the foreign policy of
his country. As the foreign office is the nerve center of foreign policy, so are the
diplomatic representatives its outlying fibers, maintaining the two-way traffic between
the center and the outside world. Diplomats must assess the objectives o f other nations
and the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit of those objectives. To
that end, they must inform themselves o f the foreign government’s plans through direct
interaction with government officials and political leaders, as well as by canvassing the
press and seeking out alternative outlets o f public opinion. Furthermore, they must
evaluate the potential influence opposing trends within the government, political parties
and the public may bear on the government’s policies. The diplomat must try to
determine the influence a particular columnist or commentator may exert on official
policy and public opinion at large, and whether such thinking represents the official
13 Ibid.
14 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Strugglefor Power and Peace, 363-364.
mindset or reflects popular trends. The success or failure o f her government’s foreign
policy may well depend on the reliability o f her reports and the soundness o f her
judgment.15
The function of gathering and evaluating information lies at the root o f modem
diplomacy. Diplomatic representatives are not merely the eyes and the ears that report
the events o f the outside world to the nerve center of foreign policy as the raw material
for its decisions; they are also the mouth and the hands through which the nerve center
transmits its identity and its will to foreign governments and their people. “They must
make the people among whom they live, and especially the mouthpieces o f their public
opinion and their political leaders, understand and, if possible, approve the foreign policy
they represent. For this task o f ’selling’ a foreign policy, the personal appeal o f the
diplomat and his understanding of the foreign people are essential prerequisites.” 16 The
foreign office can give its representative instructions concerning the objectives to be
pursued and the means to be employed. But for the execution of these instructions, it
must rely on the judgment and skill o f its representative. How persuasive an argument
will be, what advantages a negotiated agreement will yield, what impression the threat of
force will make, how effectively one or another technique is used—all this lies with the
diplomat, who has in his or her hands the power to bungle a good, or avoid a bad, foreign
policy.17
Modem diplomacy as it is practiced today is distinct from the classical definition
developed by Nicolson. The statist definition o f the diplomat as a courtier at the court,
13 Ibid, 365-366.
16 Ibid, 366-367.
17 Ibid.
representing one sovereign to another, no longer exists." Today’s diplomat not only
represents her nation’s government, but also her nation’s people, her nation’s ideals, and
her nation’s diverse experiences and points of view.
B. Public Diplomacy
Hans N. Tuch,19 a former director of the U.S. Information Agency, defined public
diplomacy as “the process of communication that attempts to enhance understanding
among foreign publics o f the ideas and ideals, of the institutions and cultures, and of the
national goals and policies of the United States.”20 While Tuch’s definition is
satisfactory, this paper makes use of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public
Diplomacy definition: “Public diplomacy involves U.S. government activities intended to
inform and influence foreign publics through international exchanges, international
11 Philip C. Habib, “Concluding Remarks" in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR, ed. Richard F.
Staar (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1986), 283. Ambassador Habib
joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1949. He served in Canada, New Zealand, Trinidad, Korea, and France.
He has served as Under Secretary o f State for Political Affairs and Special Presidential Envoy to the
Middle East After retirement Habib became a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution and was
President o f the World Affairs Council of Northern California at the time of the book’s publication.
19 Hans N. Tuch retired from the U.S. Foreign Service in 1985 as a senior career minister with the
USIA. He held various positions in the USIA, including Press and Cultural Attache in Moscow, USIA
Director for Soviet and East European Affairs, Deputy and Acting Director at the Voice of America. In
addition to articles on public diplomacy and U.S.-West German relations, Tuch is the author of
Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas (New York: St Martins Press, 1990). At
the time Tuch made this statement he was the President o f the USIA Alumni Association.
20 Hans N. Tuch, Discussion following Gifford D. Malone’s paper “Functioning o f Diplomatic

Organs" in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR ed. Richard F. Staar (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution
Press, Stanford University, 1986), 153.
information programs, media research and polling, and support for nongovernmental
,,21
organizations.
According to Gifford D. Malone,22 the term public diplomacy was coined in 1965
by Edmund Guillion, the dean o f the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University upon the establishment o f its Edward R. Murrow Center for Public
Diplomacy. In an early brochure, the Center described public diplomacy as “[that which]
deals with the influence o f public attitudes on the formation and execution o f foreign
policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional
diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the
interaction o f private groups and interests in one country with those o f another; the
reporting o f foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those
whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the
processes o f inter-cultural communications."23
The confusion that persists over the terms public diplomacy, public affairs, and
propaganda, as Tuch noted, will result in negative implications for its successful conduct,
unless it is corrected.24 The United States government has always drawn an important
21 David J. Kramer, “No Bang for the Buck; Public Diplomacy Should Remain a Priority,” The
Washington Tunes, 23 October 2000.
22 Gifford D. Malone, a former senior Foreign Service Officer, retired from the U.S. State Department
in 1985. He was twice detailed to the USIA, first as Deputy Assistant Director for the Soviet Union and
East Europe, and second as Deputy and later acting Associate Director for Programs. He is an expert in
Russian foreign policy and has written several books, including American Diplomacy in the Information
Age (1991) and Political Advocacy and Cultural Communication (1988).
23 “What is Public Diplomacy”; available from the Public Diplomacy Website at

http://www.publicdiDlomacv.org/1.htm: Internet; accessed 29 August 2000.
24 Hans N. Tuch, USIA: Communicating with the World in the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Information Agency Alumni Association, Public Diplomacy Foundation, 1994), 155. This commemorative
symposium was held on February 23,1994 in Washington, D.C.
distinction between public diplomacy and public affairs.25 Public diplomacy does not
exist to gain support from the American people for U.S. foreign policy initiatives; that is
the domain o f public affairs. Diplomacy infers “outside o f’ and has nothing to do with
trying to convince, persuade or influence the “inside” public. On the contrary, diplomacy
is the representation o f the national interest abroad.26
Nor is public diplomacy simply propaganda directed at foreign audiences, or
even the government’s application of public relations principles to the political arena to
improve America’s image overseas. Propaganda can be understood as “any word or
deed, short of the use of physical force, designed to make others think or act the way the
initiator wants them to think or act.”27 It encompasses a broad spectrum o f persuasive
communication that includes psychological and political warfare, political campaigning,
evangelism, special pleading, lobbying, editorializing, interpretive reporting, advocacy,
intimidation, appealing to the emotions, inspirational education, and plain argum ent28
Throughout the world, these forms of communication are recognized as propaganda, but
in the United States, propaganda is generally perceived as a pejorative term that implies
negative or offensive manipulation, brainwashing and psychological warfare, such as
25 The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, also known as the Smith*
Mundt Act (22 U.S.C. 1431, et seq.) established the first peace-time propaganda program, which led to the
creation of the USIA in 1953. Though the objectives o f the Smith-Mundt Act were to "promote a better
understanding o f the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the
people o f the United States and the people of other countries,” it prohibits the domestic dissemination of
any USIA materials produced for overseas information programs.
26 Philip C. Habib, “Concluding Remarks” in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR, 283.
27 Walter Joyce, The Propaganda Cap (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 66.
“ Ibid.
10
what occurred under the totalitarian regimes o f Nazi Germany and communist Russia.29
In short, propaganda is thought to characterize state-sanctioned methods to distort the
truth deliberately.
Many Americans today generally view their own government and other Western
democracies as tellers o f the truth, except, perhaps, in time o f war. The USIA
consistently applied the term public diplomacy to its international information programs,
because it did not want the American public to conclude that its own government engages
in psychological warfare and manipulation.
In practice, public diplomacy is not merely the conveyance o f truthful
information. It is a long-term process requiring credibility and deep understanding as
solid foundations for the message one wishes the target audience to accept.30 A 198S
report by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy read, uIt is not one-shot
dramatic efforts that make public diplomacy succeed. Rather, it is the steady, wise use of
all of the resources o f public diplomacy over time.”31 There are three essential
components for the conduct of public diplomacy:
1. Addressing the need for a sound understanding o f America—its history,
traditions, institutions, ideas, and culture (This is a long-term goal, and its
attainment is vital if the U.S. is to reach its short-term goals.);
2. Addressing current objectives of political, economic, and social policy issues
(These policy objectives could include: eliminating human trafficking of women
29 Nancy Snow, Propaganda. Inc. Selling America's Culture to the World, foreword Herbert I.
Schiller, introduction Michael Parent, (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1998), 14.
30 Hans N. Tuch, Discussion following Gifford D. Malone’s paper “Functioning of Diplomatic

Organs’* in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR, 154.
11 Edward J. Feulner, Jr. “Some Issues in Public Diplomacy’’ in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR,
120.
11
and children, promoting sustainable growth and development, fighting terrorism
and drug trafficking, fostering democracy and democratic institutions abroad,
halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and preserving national
security.); and
3. Learning the attitudes and opinions of foreign audiences in order to base one’s
approach and programs on an understanding o f the political and social dynamics
o f a given audience.32
Edwin Feulner, former chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public
Diplomacy, concurred.33 “Public Diplomacy,” he said, “supplements and reinforces
traditional diplomacy by explaining U.S. policies to foreign publics, by providing them
with information about American society and culture, by enabling many to experience the
diversity o f our country personally, and by assessing foreign public opinion for American
ambassadors and foreign policy decision makers in the United States.”34 To influence
foreign public opinion, U.S. foreign policy must understand the cultural backgrounds and
social settings o f the people it hopes to reach with its message. “W e. . . need to
understand the history, the traditions, the culture, and the psychology of other peoples,”
32 Hans N. Tuch, Discussion following Gifford D. Malone’s paper “Functioning o f Diplomatic

Organs” in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR, 154*155.
33 Edward J. Feulner has been the President of The Heritage Foundation since 1975. His professional
biography includes serving as Chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diploma^,
Executive Director o f the Republican Study Committee in the U.S. House o f Representatives, Confidential
Assistant to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, and Administrative Assistant to U.S. Representative
Philip M. Crane.
34 Edward J. Feulner, Jr. “Some Issues in Public Diplomacy” in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR,
119.
12
Tuch said. “Because only by doing so can we hope to be successful in persuading others
to understand us.”35
In summary, traditional diplomacy essentially focuses on govcmment-to-
govemment relations, while public diplomacy seeks to communicate a message to
government officials, business executives, public opinion leaders, political activists,
community volunteers, and foreign populations. American public diplomacy is
conducted openly, in plain view and with the full knowledge of any target government
that might be interested. The messages do, in some instances, reflect overt or subtle
points o f view, but American practitioners prefer to employ techniques that reject the fear
and hate-mongering of an earlier era.36
C. Reasons for the Shift
At a USIA commemorative symposium held in 1994, former USIA Alumni
Association President Hans N. Tuch said, U[0]ur role in the world, our international
relationships, and our national goals have changed drastically, forcing us to focus anew
on the way we communicate with foreign publics and on what we communicate to
them.”37 Indeed, traditional diplomacy is no longer sufficient to regulate the affairs o f
nations, and public diplomacy “[has come] into its own as an indispensable component of
33 Hans N. Tuch, USIA: Communicating with the World in the 1990s, 2.
36 Jarol B. Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy, S.
37 Hans N. Tuch, ed. USIA: Communicating with the World in the 1990s, 2.
13
international relations.”38 As John Lee noted in the preface to his book, The Diplomatic
Persuaders (1968):
“It is no longer possible for high-level statesmen to glide through

the lofty avenues o f diplomacy, trailed by first, second, and third
secretaries in perfect protocol alignment. A government, to survive, must
supplement formal govemment-to-government relations with an approach
to the people. . . To meet this challenge governments around the world
have turned to a totally new concept of international diplomacy. This is
the age o f public diplomacy. . . International opinion wields incredible
power, and we must inform the people of other nations. . . , allies, and
enemies alike. The government that fails to do so may find itself
inarticulate in the face o f world opinion.”39
One important change that has forever altered the nature o f diplomacy is the
communications revolution, which makes possible the instant transmission of all kinds of
information across national boundaries and even into the “tightest fortress o f thought
control.”40 Public opinion is exerting a strong influence on the actions of democratic
governments and totalitarian regimes alike and has become an increasingly important
factor in foreign affairs. Totalitarian governments recognize the power of public opinion
within their own realms, and they fear its influence, otherwise, they would not suppress it
within their dominions and try to prevent it from being affected by anyone other than
their own officials.41
“The exploding communications revolution, the broadcast satellite, the shortwave
radio signal, the ease o f international travel, and the swift global flow of information is
11 Hans N. Tuch, Discussion following Giffbnl D. Malone’s paper “Functioning of Diplomatic

Organs’*in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR, 153.
39John Lee, ed. The Diplomatic Persuaders: New Role o f the Mass Media in International Relations
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), 5-6, quoted in Jarol Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and
American Foreign Policy: The Evolution o f Influence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), ix-x.
40 Hans N. Tuch, Discussion following Giffotd D. Malone’s paper “Functioning of Diplomatic

Organs’*in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR, 153-154.
41 Jarol Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy, 5-6.
14
such that democracies and even the most rigid dictatorships cannot ignore public attitudes
and concerns.”42 Traditional diplomats are remiss if they fail to acquire the media skills
and temperament needed to handle the pressures o f today’s instantaneous communication
environment. Media skills are essential to the contemporary diplomat, because the
transparency and openness of the mass media have contributed to the disintegration of
“cabinet diplomacy” in favor o f “the reign of lobbies and anonymous corporations.”43
Ambassador Friederich Hoess believed that the nationalization of private, secret
and cabinet diplomacy by the mass media has “exacerbated the necessity for diplomacy
to be public.”44 In the new interconnected world, every Foreign Service Officer must
therefore regard him or herself as a “public diplomat.” Well trained, loyal, patriotic,
dedicated, and motivated Foreign Service Officers will always have an important role to
play in international relations, he said. Their capacity to evaluate and critically analyze
remain indispensable in impressing their governments’ views on their counterparts
abroad and in formulating political goals that can be achieved through the complementary
use o f public diplomacy 45 Public diplomacy not only complements political goals
abroad, but it also supplements the Foreign Service.
Ed Feulner agreed that public diplomacy efforts should be accorded the same
urgency and concern as traditional diplomatic practices. Feulner noted that “public
42 Edward Feulner, “Some Issues in Public Diplomacy” in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR, 123*
124.
43 Ambassador Friedrich Hoess contributed to Staar’s book on public diplomacy. At the time his essay
was published, Hoess was a member o f the Austrian Parliament. Previously, he served as his country’s
ambassador to Australia and New Zealand. He holds a Doctor o f Laws from the University o f Vienna and
specializes in international law and German affairs. Friedrich Hoess, "Public Diplomacy and the Foreign
Service” in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR, 253-254.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
15
diplomacy has become as important in the affairs o f nations as traditional diplomacy,
economic capacity, and military preparedness.”46 This development should not lead to a
split between those who conduct “classic” diplomatic duties (officers who perform in the
political and economic cones o f the Foreign Service) and those whose job it is to present
the foreign policies of their country in an understandable manner to foreign publics.
Foreign Service Officers should not only view public diplomacy as helpful to their
professional duties, they should consider themselves public diplomats.47
What is the line between public diplomacy and propaganda? Should public
diplomacy advocate America's values—or should it provide neutral, objective
information, along the lines of hard-news reporting? Although this question continues to
be debated, this paper proceeds with the conviction that die United States must recommit
itself to explaining and advocating its values to the world and to prioritizing public
diplomacy in the foreign policy-making process.
The purpose o f public diplomacy is not to increase American popularity or to win
public approval abroad. Rather, public diplomacy is important because foreign attitudes
and understanding have an impact on the success, and failure, of U.S. policies. Some in
the U.S. foreign policy establishment have failed to realize that, as the lone superpower in
the world, this nation is the target of envy and resentment from many in the Middle East
and elsewhere. At a time when the United States needs to project its democratic values to
the world, this nation has underfunded and underprioritized the crucial mission public
diplomacy fills in American relations with foreign countries.
46 Edward Feulner, “Some Issues in Public Diplomacy” in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR, 123-
124.
47 Ibid.
16
The United States has an important story to tell, the story of human striving for
freedom, democracy and opportunity. Since the end of the Cold War, America has failed
to tell that story. Unfortunately, those whose power is based on an ideology of hate have
understood too well the power o f ideas and the power of communicating those ideas.
For, whether the message is one o f hate or peace, in the globalized communications
environment, it is impossible to silence those who send the message, or stop those who
want to receive it, because the Internet is no respecter o f national borders.
It is difficult to change the mentality o f a monolithic federal bureaucracy. But the
United States must try, because ideas have an enormous capacity to rally human,
intellectual, political, economic and military resources to their aid. For American
diplomacy to maintain its relevancy and purpose in the 21st century, the U.S. government
must recognize public diplomacy as a key component of American foreign policy and
national security.
in.
HISTORY OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
A. Institutions and Agencies Involved in Public Diplomacy
According to the U.S. Constitution, the foreign policy process starts with the
presidency. He is the arbiter of foreign policy. The executive branch—under the
direction o f the president—has a constitutional responsibility to formulate and decide the
17
course o f U.S. foreign policy. Within the executive, the Department o f State is primary
in the decision-making process and implementation stage o f foreign policy.48
Other agencies have a role in the policy-making and implementation process,
including the National Security Council, the now-defunct U.S. Information Agency, the
U.S. Agency for International Development, the Central Intelligence Agency, the armed
forces, as well as the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Agriculture and Commerce.49
Although the State Department constitutes the largest part of the Foreign Service, the
before-mentioned agencies and departments also contribute to its composition.
For the better part of the past century, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was
the information and communication branch of the foreign policy establishment, with the
mission of targeting overseas audiences. It manufactured a favorable point of view about
America to foreign audiences to advance the national interests of the U.S. government.
This it accomplished through various means: diplomatic posts, exchange activities (such
as the Fulbright and International Visitor programs), international information programs,
and international broadcasting (Voice o f America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia,
Radio Marti, etc.).30
Under the Clinton administration, the USIA was merged into the State
Department to streamline operations and eliminate bureaucratic waste in October 1999.
Traditionally, the mandate of public diplomacy has been to take foreign policies that have
been formulated and translate them into some form of persuasion, education and
41 Philip C. Habib, “Concluding Remarks*' in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR, 283.
49 Ibid, 284.
50 Nancy Snow, Propaganda, Inc. Selling America's Culture to the World, 14.
18
influence on foreign nations in support of those policies.51 The USIA’s consolidation
with the State Department reflected a conviction that public diplomacy should enter into
the foreign policy process at every level. This new thinking held that any rational policy
making process should take into account whether the public diplomacy aspects o f a
particular policy had been weighed and whether the policy-makers had considered how
overseas audiences would interpret and react to the policy in question.52
The U.S. Agency for International Development continues to function
independently of the State Department, although it now reports to the Secretary o f State.
The Foreign Service components o f the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture also
remain independent of the State Department, as do the representatives o f the Departments
o f Defense, Treasury, Justice, Energy, Labor, and Transportation—all o f whom are
present in American embassies.53
Smaller agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration and the
Environmental Protection Agency, as well as larger ones, such as the CIA and Peace
Corps, are totally independent o f the State Department but play an important part in
securing U.S. foreign policy goals. Overseas representation by the CIA and the Peace
Corps combined exceeds America’s official diplomatic presence abroad. The Peace
Corps has 6,500 volunteers serving in more than 80 countries, and the CIA has a sizable
presence serving undercover in embassies throughout the world.54
]l Philip C. Habib, “Concluding Remarks" in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR, 284.
52 Ibid.
53 Richard Burt, Olin Robison, and Barry Fulton, Diplomacy in the Information Age, a CSIS Advisory
Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998), 35.
54 Ibid.
19
Although the State Department has the statutory authority to conduct relations
with foreign nations, its representation in American embassies abroad has progressively
diminished over the years as a result o f budget cuts and the growth o f other branches o f
the federal government The General Accounting Office found that in the decade from
1984 to 1994, the number of Foreign Service Officers serving in American embassies had
declined from 63 to 33 percent of the American workforce.35 This downsizing trend
continues to the present day. The Foreign Service—representing State, USAID,
Commerce, and Agriculture—now constitutes less than half of American personnel at
U.S. embassies.
On the surface, it may seem clear who is in charge of American foreign policy,
but in practice, it is a far more complex question. Overseas, the ambassador is
responsible for coordinating all diplomatic activities in the country o f her assignment. In
Washington, the president exercises his responsibility through the National Security
Council (NSC) and its staff.56 Created in 1947 under President Truman, the function of
the Council has been to advise and assist the president on national security and foreign
policies. It also serves as the president’s principal arm for coordinating these policies
55 Ibid, 35-36.
56The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act o f 1947 (PL 235 - 61
StaL 496; U.S.C. 402), amended by the National Security Act Amendments o f 1949 (63 Stat 579; 50
U.S.C. 401 et seq.). Later in 1949, as part o f the Reorganization Plan, the Council was placed in the
Executive Office o f the President The National Security Council is chaired by the President Its regular
attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) are the Vice President the Secretary o f State, the Secretary of
the Treasury, the Secretary o f Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
The Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director
o f Central Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. The Chief o f Staff to the President, Counsel to the
President, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting.
The Attorney General and the Director of the Office o f Management and Budget are invited to attend
meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as
well as other senior officials, are invited to attend meetings o f the NSC when appropriate.
20
among various government agencies.37 National Security Advisors, who run the NSC on
a day-to-day basis, have ranged from coordinators such as Brent Scowcroft to primary
executors of policy such as Henry Kissinger. The frequent restructuring of relations
between the NSC and the State Department reflects personality traits, changing
conditions, and recurring bureaucratic turf battles.58
Early in his presidency, George H. W. Bush, Sr. issued a National Security
Directive clarifying the role of the NSC as the principal forum for consideration of
national security policy, as the body to advise and assist the president in integrating all
aspects of national security policy, and as the president’s principal means for
coordinating executive departments and agencies.39 The former president brought
considerable foreign policy experience to his leadership of the National Security Council,
and he restored collegial relations among department heads that was missing under the
prior administration. During the senior Bush administration, the NSC played an effective
role during such major developments as the collapse o f the Soviet Union, the unification
of Germany, and the deployment o f American troops in Iraq and Panama. The Clinton
administration continued a collegial approach to NSC on national security matters, and
NSC membership was expanded to include the Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S.
Representative to the United Nations, the newly-created Assistant to the President for
Economic Policy (who also headed the newly-created National Economic Council, or
57 “The National Security Council’s Function”; available from the National Security Council Website
[maintained by the White House Website] at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/: Internet, accessed 12
January 2002.
51 Richard Burt, Olin Robison, and Bany Fulton, Diplomacy in the Information Age, 36.
"ibid.
21
NEC, to parallel the NSC), the president’s Chief o f Staff, and the president’s National
Security Adviser.60
For SO years, 10 presidents have sought to use the National Security Council
system to integrate foreign and defense policies to preserve the nation’s security and
advance its interests abroad. Recurrent structural modifications over the years have
reflected presidential management style, changing requirements, and personal
relationships, and the future will no doubt witness more changes and proposals for
assigning responsibility and simplifying decision-making. Diplomats must execute their
duties in an increasingly complex world. That some presidents and secretaries of state
have not used the bureaucracy of diplomacy to advance the country’s national interests
effectively reflects, in part, their own personal style, but it also reflects the failure o f
diplomacy to keep up with the pace of change.
B. History of the U.S. Information Agency
The public diplomacy prototype was the Creel Commission o f World War I. To
try to sway American public opinion during the war, the British government set up a
secret war propaganda bureau in 1914. Its most successful technique was to target
influential persons and opinion leaders in U.S. government, business, education, and
media. As one document explained, “It is better to influence those who can influence
“ “History o f the National Security Council, 1947-1997”; available from the National Security
Council Website [maintained by the White House Website] at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/: Internet;
accessed 12 January 2002.
22
others than attempt a direct appeal to the mass of the population.”61 England’s
propaganda efforts succeeded in persuading the United States to join the war. On April
6,1917, the U.S. declared war on Germany and set up its own propaganda organization,
the Committee on Public Information (CPI).
George Creel, a well-known American journalist, headed the CPI, which he
described as, “a plain publicity proposition, a vast enterprise in salesmanship, the world’s
greatest adventure in advertising.”62 The CPI was comprised o f two sections: one
domestic—to persuade the American public against the Germans—and one foreign,
which was divided into a foreign press bureau, a wireless and cable service, and the
foreign film service. Edward Bemays, the father o f public relations, became the Creel
Committee’s chief for Latin America. He persuaded some of the largest U.S.
corporations o f the day to open their Latin-American retail outlets as Creel Committee
outposts.63 In Crystallizing Public Opinion. The Engineering o f Consent, and
Propaganda, Bemays argued that American public opinion must be engineered from
above by society’s few masters, the intelligent minorities, to control the rabble. Bemays
described these engineers of consent as “the invisible government. . . concentrated in the
hands of a few because o f the expense of manipulating the social machinery which
controls the opinions and habits o f the masses.”64 While the British demonstrated the
power of wartime propaganda, they abandoned it in peacetime. The United States,
likewise, abandoned its domestic propaganda efforts, but under Bemays’ leadership, it
61 Nancy Snow, Propaganda. Inc. Setting America "s Culture to the World, IS.
62 Ibid, 16.
63 Ibid, 16-17.
64 Edward L. Bemays, Propaganda (New York: H. Liveright, 1928), quoted in Nancy Snow,
Propaganda. Inc. Selling America's Culture to die World, 18.
23
launched public diplomacy campaigns to generate support for American democracy
around the world.
The USIA’s origins are found in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Office of War
Information, which he established in June 1942 to coordinate all public information on
the war. The OWI was directed by playwright Robert Sherwood.65 Its purpose was
twofold: to conduct psychological warfare abroad and to inform Americans at home of
the progress of the war.66 The OWI immediately recognized that if propaganda is not
used as an offensive weapon, it is no weapon at all. U.S. propagandists, mostly former
newsmen, served in 26 posts overseas,67 which would later become part of the U.S.
Information Service.68 The War Department also launched one o f the greatest
propaganda projects ever to come out o f the Hollywood-Washington alliance with Frank
Capra’s “Why We Fight” films. The films were designed to galvanize America’s war
effort and promote American icons, such as the Declaration o f Independence, the
Founding Fathers, the Liberty Bell, the White House, the American flag, and so forth.
Following World War II, the OWI underwent a number o f changes. In 1945, it
was renamed the Interim International Office and placed under the jurisdiction of the
State Department. In 1946, it became the Office of International Information and
Cultural Affairs, still under the State Department. In 1948, Congress realized there was
no legislation enabling it to grant funds for the information agency. So, it passed the
Smith-Mundt Act, which created the International Information Administration within the
61 Walter Joyce, The Propaganda Gap, 52.
“ Ibid, 58.
67 Nancy Snow, Propaganda, Inc. Selling America's Culture to the World, 19.
“ U.S. Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948 (the Smith-Mundt Act), 22 U.S.C. 1431, et
sec.
24
State Department. The International Information Administration became the first
peacetime information agency charged with the task of promoting a better understanding
o f the United States in other countries and increasing mutual understanding.69
Specifically, the objective of the Smith-Mundt Act was “to provide for the preparation
and dissemination abroad of information about the United States, its people and its
policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media,
and through information centers and instructors abroad.”70
In 1949, the Hoover Commission’s report on foreign affairs recommended that
the foreign information program be removed from the State Department and that a
separate, independent agency be created. However, the recommendations were not acted
on until 1953, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower created the U.S. Information
Agency. The new agency encompassed all the State Department’s international
information programs (including its broadcasting service, Voice o f America), except for
the educational exchange programs. Overseas, the USIA was known as the U.S.
Information Service (USIS).
Edward R. Murrow, the famous World War II broadcaster and television
personality, served as USIA director from 1961 until 1964. Murrow thought of public
diplomacy as an art—the art of getting the message “from the loudspeaker to the mind of
the foreign listeners, or from the book into the consciousness o f the foreign reader.”71 He
is often remembered as saying, “It has always seemed to me the real art in this business is
w Walter Joyce, The Propaganda Gap, 57.
70 Smith-Mundt Act o f 1948.
71 Hans N. Tuch, Discussion following Gifford D. Malone’s paper on “Functioning of Diplomatic

Organs,” in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR, 156.
25
not so much moving information or guidance of policy five or ten thousand miles. That
is an electronic problem. The real art is to move it the last three feet in face-to-face
communication.”72
In 1961, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act consolidated various
international educational and cultural exchange programs and established government-
operated cultural and educational centers abroad. Throughout the 1960s, USIA activities
focused more on information-purveying than on persuasion or propaganda. In fact, the
USIA and Congress avoided all use o f the term propaganda in their materials. Not
everyone agreed with this focus. In a letter to Walter Joyce - a former government
consultant who sanctioned the government’s use of propaganda during the Cold War -
the head o f a Los Angeles advertising agency, Henry Mayers,73 wrote, “But our country
is weakest in the area of propaganda. We have not understood the potentials of that
weapon for our side. Without a policy for insuring effective communication with the
peoples o f other nations, all other U.S. foreign policies may fa il America’s greatest
genius and leadership in the art of mass communication should be mobilized for the
conduct o f propaganda warfare.”74 Joyce agreed with Mayers’ assertion and conceded
that there was no reason to give information, unless persuasion was the goal. Joyce
compared “information purveying” to a telephone directory, explaining that telephone
directories give information, but they don’t move people. Persuasion, on the other hand,
72 Edward R. Murrow interview with ABC correspondent Edward Morgan, quoted in Hans N. Tuch,
Discussion following Gifford D. Malone’s paper on “Functioning o f Diplomatic Organs,” in Public
Diplomacy: USA versus USSR, 1S6.
73 Henry Mayers headed a Los Angeles advertising agency in the 1960s and was a member o f the
USIA’s Executive Reserve. The Reserve was composed of private citizens who were assigned to take over
America’s propaganda programs should the United States suffer a nuclear attack, or in the event that a
bomb were to wipe out Washington, D.C. and with it, the USIA leadership.
74 Walter Joyce, The Propaganda Gap, 77.
26
conveys information, but its primary purpose is to motivate people. He felt that the
United States, had no choice but to go out and persuade foreign audiences in order to win
the propaganda war with the former Soviet Union.
In 1971, the USIA made a vigorous, aggressive anti-communist campaign to
defeat Soviet imperialism its first priority. In 1974, the International Information,
Education and Cultural Relations Panel issued its “Recommendations for the Future"
(also known as the Stanton Panel Report), which the 1975 Foreign Relations
Authorization Act adopted in large measure and made public law. The act mandated that
the Voice o f America be a “consistently reliable and authoritative source o f news” and
that the USIA present “the policies o f the United States clearly and effectively,” as well
as “present responsible discussions and opinions on these policies.”75
U.S. international information programs underwent further consolidation under
President Jimmy Carter. The State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs, including the Fulbright program, was merged into the USIA in 1978 to form the
U.S. International Communication Agency (USICA). President Carter issued a new
mission statement to recognize the agency’s dual roles. The mission statement mandated
that “[t]he principal function of the Agency [is] to reduce the degree to which perceptions
and misunderstandings complicate relations between the United States and other
nations.”76 This mandate was based on the fundamental premise that “it is our national
75 Foreign Relations Authorization Act o f I97S.
76 President Jimmy Carter on March 13,1978, quoted in Hans N. Tuch, USIA: Communicating with
the World in the 1990s, inside back cover.
27
interest to encourage the sharing o f ideas and cultural activities among the people of the
United States and the people of other nations.”77
President Carter believed it was in the country’s best interest that peoples from
other countries knew where die United States stood and why. He wanted them to
understand America’s institutions, culture, values, and history and how these might relate
to their own experiences. Carter thought it was important that the United States made
available to other nations facts they would not otherwise learn about American citizens
and American viewpoints. Likewise, Carter believed it was important that Americans be
given the opportunity to understand the histories, cultures, and problems of other
countries, so they could come to understand the hopes, perceptions, and aspirations of
foreign peoples. In doing so, President Carter hoped the USIA would contribute to the
U.S. government’s management of foreign affairs in a way that was responsible,
effective, and sensitive.
One of the underlying tensions of this period can be traced to the USIA’s dual
role of advocacy, on the one hand, and education, on the other. Authorized by the Smith-
Mundt and Fulbright-Hays78 acts respectively, both roles were important aspects of the
agency’s mandate.79 Throughout the Carter administration, the educational mission of
the USIA was enhanced. President Ronald Reagan’s tenure, however, reaffirmed that the
articulation of U.S. policies was also necessary to building mutual understanding and
77 Ibid
71 The stated goal of the Fulbright International Educational Exchange program is to foster mutual
understanding and cooperation and was not designed for one-way propagandists purposes. The Fulbright
Hays Act (also known as the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act o f 1961) was signed into law
by President John F. Kennedy on September 21,1961 (Public Law No. 87-256).
79 Edward J. Feulner, Jr. “Some Issues in Public Diplomacy” in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR,
119.
28
rational international dialogue. It was through the “vigorous expression of U.S. policies
that the Fulbright and International Visitors programs provide foreign audiences with the
background o f our culture that put those policies in perspective,” as one conservative
thinker explained.80
President Reagan changed USICA’s name back to USIA in 1982. In a address to
the British Parliament in 1982, Reagan called for a new war o f ideas and values with the
Soviet Union and its allies. In many respects, this was the first sign o f a shift in U.S.
policy from the policy o f containment to a policy of advocacy for democracy and free
markets. The USIA launched its democracy and freedom campaign in the mid-1980s by
funding the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Center for International
Enterprise (CIPE). NED and CIPE were preceded by Reagan's Project Democracy and
Project Truth campaigns, which sought to spread the ideals o f democracy and combat
Soviet propaganda campaigns in Latin America.
In 1983, USIA Director Charles Wick oversaw the introduction o f WORLDNET
Film and Television Service, the agency’s pioneering medium for conducting public
diplomacy via television. This action was furthered by President Bill Clinton, when he
signed the International Broadcasting Act establishing the International Broadcasting
Bureau within the USIA. The act consolidated all civilian U.S. government broadcasting,
including VOA, WORLDNET, and Radio and TV Marti, under a Broadcasting Board of
Governors. It also funded a new surrogate Asian democracy radio service called Radio
Free Asia.
“ This objective is articulated in the inside cover o f the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public
Diplomacy’s 1983 Report (Washington, D.C., February I98S).
29
For nearly half a century, the USIA waged ideological war against communism
through worldwide broadcasts and educational programs that promoted the tenets o f
freedom and liberty. Once the Soviet system collapsed, public diplomacy took a new
turn. It shifted gears from fighting communism to opening new markets and liberalizing
trade. In 1998, President Clinton signed the Foreign Affairs Agencies Reorganization
Act to abolish the USIA, effective October 1, 1999. USIA was completely integrated
into the State Department, and the International Broadcasting Bureau became an
independent federal agency.
C. Public Diplomacy Under President Clinton
Throughout the Cold War, the USIA’s professed mission was to counter Soviet
propaganda and win the battle for men’s minds by “telling America’s story abroad.”
After the decline o f communism and the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the USIA shifted gears
to meet new foreign policy objectives, such as expanding markets for American products
overseas. With the dissipation o f U.S.-Soviet tensions, the USIA turned to trade and
economics as its primary raison d’etre.
In a 1993 speech before the opening o f the U.N. General Assembly, President
Clinton outlined his vision o f America’s role in the post-Cold War world. He
proclaimed, “In a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to
expand and strengthen the world’s community o f market based democracies We will
work to strengthen the free market democracies, by revitalizing our economy here at
home, by opening world trade through the GATT, the North American Free Trade
30
Agreement and other accords, and by updating our shared institutions.”81 The USIA
carried out these priorities under the “Clinton Doctrine,” which placed U.S.
competitiveness and integration o f the world economy at the heart of U.S. foreign policy.
The Clinton Doctrine was premised on the belief that U.S. domestic strength was related
to American economic and military leadership abroad.
The USIA Strategic Plan for 1997-2002 reflected this reordering o f foreign policy
priorities. It cited as strategic goals for the five-year period: (1) National Security: To
secure peace, deter aggression, prevent and defuse and manage crises, halt the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and advance arms control and disarmament.
(2) Democracy: To support the establishment and consolidation o f democracies, and
uphold human rights. (3) Economic Prosperity: To expand exports, open markets, assist
American business, and foster sustainable economic growth. (4) Law Enforcement: To
combat international terrorism, crime and narcotics trafficking. (S) Foundation of Trust.
To establish a network o f international cooperation that sustains and promotes current
and future U.S. interests. (6) Free Flow o f Information. To create an open international
information environment that encourages the widest possible exchange of ideas and
fosters an understanding of U.S. policies and institutions.82
President Clinton also listed economic prosperity as a priority in his 1997
National Security Strategy report of national security objectives: (1) To enhance our
security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight and to
" President William J. Clinton, Remarks to the 48th Session o f the United Nations General Assembly
in New York City on September 27,1993.
B “USIA Strategic Plan 1997-2002”; available from the U.S. Department of State Electronic Research
Collection Archive at http:// http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/abtusia/stnitplan/pland.htm: Internet; accessed 12
January 2002.
31
win; (2) to bolster America’s economic prosperity; and (3) to promote democracy abroad.
“To achieve these objectives, we will remain engaged abroad and work with partners,
new and old, to promote peace and prosperity”83
Throughout much of the 1990s, public diplomacy existed to promote international
trade and economic prosperity. The USIA used the bulk o f its resources to promote
American free enterprise, expand American business interests overseas and promote the
American economy as a model for other countries to follow.84 A harsh critic o f Clinton-
style public diplomacy, Nancy Snow83 considered short-term U.S. foreign economic
policy objectives “a political intrusion into the independence of the prestigious
[Fulbright] program”86 and other educational programs. Snow believed the USIA took
on a new post-Cold War “propaganda” campaign with an emphasis on the American free
market economy under the Clinton administration. The Fulbright Program and other
education exchanges, she said, have become “useful promotional tools for the supremacy
o f the American economic model and global integration” to the detriment of its original
13 President Clinton, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century,” May 1997; available from
http:// http://clinton3.nara.gOv/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategv/#prcfacc: Internet; accessed 13 January 2002. This
report was submitted in accordance with Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department
Reorganization Act of 1986.
MNancy Snow, Propaganda Inc. Selling America s Culture to the World, 34*39.
15 Nancy Snow is Assistant Professor o f Political Science at New England College in Henniker, New
Hampshire. She is also Executive Director o f Common Cause o f New Hampshire and serves on the board
o f directors o f the Cultural Environment Movement (CEM). From 1992 to 1994, Snow participated in the
Presidential Management Intern program (a federal program for graduate students) and worked in the
USIA’s Bureau o f Educational and Cultural Affairs. In her book, Propaganda. Inc., Snow used the term
“propaganda” to describe U.S. public diplomacy efforts. She considered the USIA a public relations
instrument o f corporate propaganda, whose aim was to “sell” America’s story abroad by integrating
business interests with cultural objectives.
u Ibid.
32
educational mission “to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United
States and the people of other countries.”87
“Unfortunately, the USIA has downplayed its worthy ideas about mutual
understanding and functions more like a full-time cheerleader for U.S.-led economic and
cultural dominance o f the global economy,” wrote Snow. Its usefulness “is increasingly
measured against USIA’s ‘propaganda’ purpose to ‘explain and support American
foreign policy.’” 88 This tension between USIA’s informational purpose vis-a-vis its
cultural and educational endeavors has persisted, although many had hoped that the end
of the Cold War might bring them back into alignment.89
During Clinton’s tenure, America’s foreign affairs agencies underwent a major
overhaul, with the goal of putting public diplomacy “at the heart of U.S. foreign
policy.”90 After numerous fits and starts, consolidation of the USIA into the State
Department occurred on October 1,1999. A presidential directive91 abolished the USIA
as a separate government agency and the State Department assumed responsibility for all
public diplomacy activities. This mega-merger involved the transfer o f4,025 USIA
employees (including 2,079 Foreign Service Nationals)92 to the State Department’s
17 Ibid, 23-24.
“ Ibid, 25-26.
19 At the tune o f die source’s publication, Joseph Duffey was the Director of the USIA. He served as
Assistant Secretary o f State under the Carter administration. He was also Chairman o f the National
Endowment for the Humanities, Chancellor o f the University of Massachusetts, and President o f American
University. Joseph Duffey in Hans N. Tuch, USIA: Communicating with the World in the 1990s, 21.
90 “Consolidation o f USIA into the State Department: An Assessment After One Year,” U.S. Advisory
Commission on Public Diplomacy Report, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2000), 4.
91 Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-68 entitled International Public Information (PDD-68), April

30,1999.
92 “Consolidation o f USIA into the State Department: An Assessment After One Year,” 4-5.
33
regional and functional bureaus. A new position, the Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs, was created with responsibility for two bureaus—the
Bureau for Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) and the Bureau of Public Affairs
(PA)—and for the Office for International Information Programs (IIP, formerly known as
the “I Bureau”). In addition, the USIA’s Research Office was placed under the State
Department’s Bureau o f Intelligence and Research. The overseas officers responsible for
carrying out public diplomacy activities, known as Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) no
longer were to report to their USIA area directors in Washington, D.C., but directly to
their ambassadors or chiefs-of-mission. The broadcasting parts of the USIA (Voice of
America, Radio Marti, and others) were placed under the Broadcasting Board of
Governors, a separate federal entity.93
According to the Clinton administration’s “Reorganization Plan and Report”94 the
integration was intended to bring public diplomacy insights into the policy-making
process sooner, so that more effective policies could be developed. It was hoped that the
infusion of the USIA’s strategic approach to public diplomacy, its open style, its close
ties with NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), its skillful use o f the Internet, and
93 The Reorganization Plan was submitted to Congress on December 30,1998, pursuant to Section
1601 o f the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998. In addition to the changes highlighted
above, the plan also integrated the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency into the State Department,
effective March 28,1999. The U.S. Agency for International Development was to remain a separate
agency, but effective April 1,1999, the USAID Administrator was to report to and be under the direct
authority and foreign policy guidance o f the Secretary of State. For more information, see “Foreign Affairs
Reorganization Fact Sheet,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, 30 December 1998; available from
the State Department Website at:
hlB>://www.state.gov/www/global/general foreign nolicv/fs 981230 reorg.html: Internet; accessed 13
January 2002.
99 See also Public Law 105-227.
34
other technological mechanisms would make U.S. foreign policy more agile and
responsive to change.95
One year after consolidation, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public
Diplomacy reported a mixed record o f success. The Commission stated that much
remains to be done before the stated goals of the reorganization plan are achieved. The
2000 report found that consolidation has had a wrenching effect on public diplomacy
personnel; morale among the State Department’s new employees is “worryingly low.” 96
The transition for former USIA employees to State has been difficult, and while the
consolidation has afforded USIA employees unprecedented career opportunities, it has
also imposed new bureaucratic hurdles on them. The consolidation’s impact on former
USIA programs hasn’t been quite as great. Educational and cultural exchanges,
information and speaker programs, and other public diplomacy activities continue apace,
but their implementation has become more cumbersome under the State Department’s
highly centralized and hierarchical bureaucracy. To be fair, one year is not enough time
to reach any final conclusion, but the State Department’s public diplomacy work is bound
to suffer if worker morale does not rebound.97
The consolidation o f the USIA into the State Department reflects the rigors of the
new international environment, which former USIA Director Joseph Duffey observed
began several years ago. Duffey said he avoids using the term public diplomacy,
because, as he sees it, almost all aspects of diplomacy have become public. “I think
95 “Reorganization Plan and Report”; available from the State Department Website at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/general foreign nolicv/mt 981230 reorel.html: Internet; accessed 13
January 2002.
96“Consolidation o f USIA into the State Department An Assessment After One Year,” 3.
97 Ibid, 15.
35
diplomacy used to be, maybe one could say IS percent public. But diplomacy, the
substance o f relationships between nations these days, it seems to me, is about 90 to 95
percent public, and requires skills and the professionalism and the expertise and the
sensitivity that this agency [USIA] has brought. And I see that increasingly—now and in
the future—being understood.”98
IV.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
The world is changing fundamentally. Images and information respect neither
time nor borders. Hierarchy is giving way to networking, and openness is crowding out
secrecy and exclusivity. Ideas and capital move swiftly and unimpeded across a global
network of governments, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations. In this world
o f instantaneous information and communication, traditional diplomacy is struggling to
sustain its relevance.
Fundamental forces that demand change in the practice of American diplomacy
include: the revolution in information technology, a proliferation of new media, the
globalization of business and finance, a widening public participation in international
relations, and complex issues that transcend national boundaries.
The major mover o f change is information technology. The Internet is expected
to reach one billion people by 200S and to be available to half the world’s population by
2010. This network will become the backbone of future relations between nation-states,
* Joseph Duffey, in Hans N. Tuch, USIA: Communicating with the World in the 1990s, 21*22.
36
corporations and individuals. The global Internet has connected together people,
institutions, and countries more tightly than they have ever been. It has forced, into close
connection, individuals and groups that have not always been good neighbors. And it has
accelerated the evolution o f legal, social, and economic institutions.99
In this environment, the government is not the only source of information and it
has limited power to control the dissemination of information. Information on foreign
affairs can be transmitted by any number of private individuals, companies, community
organizations, and on-line chat rooms. In an editorial entitled, “Foreign Policy 3.1,” A/ew
York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman posited that transnational corporations, such
as Microsoft, have an influence on foreign policy. “U.S. foreign policy will be shaped to
a significant degree by decisions taken in Washington—Redmond, Washington,”
Friedman proclaimed.100
Few would dispute that technology has changed the environment in which
diplomacy takes place. Two complementary technologies account for the changes the
world is witnessing today: computers and telecommunications. Today’s personal
computers, selling for a couple hundred dollars, operate ten times faster than a 1970 IBM
mainframe computer that sold for nearly SS million.101 By 2010, prices are expected to
have plunged to less than $100. The cost of telecommunications has not dropped as
dramatically, but the decline is accelerating due to fiber-optic cables, satellites,
digitization, and deregulation. When these two technologics—computers and
” Dr. Michael Paige, Vice President and Director of Xerox Palo Alto Research Center, Remarks
delivered at the Net Diplomacy 2001 Conference in Washington, D.C. on September 6,2001.
100Thomas L. Friedman, “Foreign Policy 3.1,” The New York Times, 8 October I99S, sec. 4, p. 13.
See also Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), 194-197.
101 W. Michael Cox and Richard Aim, “Time Well Spent The Declining Real Cost of Living in
America,” 1997 Annual Report of the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank, 18.
37
telecommunications-are integrated into networks o f connectivity, opportunities for new
applications will proliferate.
Information technology is changing our lives, our society, our institutions, our
culture. Yet there remain many constants, including time and human relations.
Traditionalists who insist that diplomacy need not change are wrong, but so are those
who insist that it must change completely. Finding a balance that honors the past and
respects the future is the challenge facing America’s diplomatic corps. Contemporary
diplomatic practices were honed in an era when the American press was perceived as a
means to amplify the government’s version o f international news. Edward R. Munow’s
reports from London during World War II supported the American conduct o f the war.
That all changed three decades later, when Walter Cronkite’s reports suggested that
American policy in Vietnam was wrong-headed. People came to the realization that the
government and the media have two contradictory versions of the truth, and trust in both
institutions declined as a result.
Demand for larger shares of the viewing audience has driven television news
networks to reduce their international coverage in the past two decades. Some
commentators assume that the media are making American foreign policy, and policy
makers have felt their impact. Former Secretary to State Madeleine Albright told the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Television’s ability to bring graphic images of
pain and outrage into our living rooms has heightened the pressure both for immediate
engagement in areas of international crisis and immediate disengagement when events do
not go according to plan.”102
102Johanna Neuman, Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving International Politics?
(New York: S t Martin’s Press, 1996), 14.
38
However, the “CNN effect” is less powerful than many previously assumed.
While the media can be a force in decision-making, their role is minimal when policy is
clearly formed, articulated, and supported. Former Washington lim es correspondent
Warren Strobel, argued in Late-Breaking Foreign Policy that the media take their cue
from the executive, Congress, and relief organizations.103 Recent research also has
shown that the “CNN effect” has been overstated. Policy-makers should consider the
media, but they should not be subservient to their role. The media are not heady
instruments of foreign policy, but rather interactive elements in a complex process.
Where the global market influences editorial decisions, it is fair to say that
globalization will lead to a greater concentration of media ownership. However, the price
of entering the publishing or broadcasting sectors is dramatically lower than it ever has
been. With moderate technological know-how, a personal computer and modem, almost
anyone can be a self-publisher and have an Internet presence. While a handful of
corporations will control the major media markets, alternative media outlets will continue
to proliferate.
Merrill Brown, editor-in-chief o f MSNBC Online, predicted that Web sites that
provide audio and video on demand will become tomorrow’s primary source of news and
information. He said several million people use the Internet as their daily news source,
and MSNBC Online already averages 350,000 users per day.104 According to the Pew
Research Center, the number o f Americans obtaining their news on the Internet is
103 Warren P. Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace
Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute o f Peace Press, 1997), 162.
104 Merrill Brown, “The Future o f News in the Internet Age,” (speech delivered at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies Conference “Is Technology Changing Everything? The Impact of New
Communications Technology” at the University o f Southern California in Los Angeles, CA on April 7,
1998.)
39
growing at an astonishing rate. A 1998 news consumption survey found that 36 million
Americans are reading news on the Internet at least once a week.105 By March 2001, the
number of Americans reading news online had jumped to 64 million.106
The time that it takes a rumor or speculation started in one place to find its way
into local radio and television broadcasts can now be measured in minutes, rather than
days or weeks. As Internet access becomes more readily available, the important criteria
for choice will be technical excellence, content, and trust. Consumers will turn to news
sources they can trust. The public will become more fragmented and specialized, such
that governments will find it more difficult to develop a national consensus on public
policy. On the other hand, authoritarian governments will also find it more difficult to
manipulate publics. As the Internet grows and direct broadcast satellites proliferate,
governments will have more channels than ever to communicate their message; this
proliferation o f channels could see a resurgence of international news coverage.
Globalization of finance and business has diminished the relevance o f national
boundaries. The constraints o f distance are disappearing in the information economy.
Markets are becoming more efficient, but also more volatile. As communities,
governments, organizations and individuals that have never been neighbors are brought
together, profound forces collide, and it could take years, or decades, before new
invisible and intangible boundaries are established. While some argue that most nations
105 “Event-Driven News Audiences: Internet News Takes Off,” The Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press Biennial News Consumption Survey, June 8,1998; available from
http://208.240.91.18/mcd98rot.htm: internet; accessed 2 February 2002.
106 The Pew Internet A American Life Project’s new report is based on a survey o f 1,501 Americans
from March 1-31,2001, and has a margin o f error o f+/- 3 percentage points. John B. Horrigan and Lee
Rainie, “Getting Serious Online,” The Pew Internet A American Life Project (Washington, D.C.: The Pew
Charitable Trusts, March 2002)
40
will benefit from globalization,107others fear growing disparities between the rich and the
poor.108 While there are many differences between this and the previous century, the
greatest is the role o f information in the global economy. The primary source o f wealth
in the United States has been transformed from manufacturing industries to the service
sector, and the knowledge worker is the key to continuing American prosperity.
Because o f the new technologies and liberalized trade regimes, there has been a
resurgence o f trade and migration, an explosion in capital flows, and an unprecedented
exchange o f information among countries. Peter Schwartz and Peter Leyden wrote, “We
are watching the beginnings o f a global economic boom on a scale never experienced
before.”109 They believe that the global economy, driven by advances in information
technology, will continue its surge for at least another two decades.
The road ahead will not be without bumps, even some major detours.
Globalization contributes to new economic problems. One example is the East Asian
currency meltdown, which began in Thailand in mid-1997. The depreciation of the Thai
baht led to dire warnings by the U.S. Federal Reserve and the expression of security
concerns by the White House. In this environment, a Center for Strategic and
International Studies report upheld that diplomacy plays a critical stabilizing role.
“When other nations deny market access or compete unfairly, diplomacy must ensure that
107The CSIS report defined globalization as the increased integration o f the world’s economies
through trade, finance, transportation, and information technology. It includes, or is influenced by, several
kinds o f exchange between nations: human (labor, migration, tourism); trade (goods, services); finance
(banking, investment); and knowledge (information, education, entertainment). Richard Burt, Olin
Robison, and Barry Fulton, Diplomacy in the Information Age, 19.
Ibid, 9.
109 Peter Schwartz and Peter Leyden, “The Long Bloom: A History o f the Future, 1980-2020,” Wired,
July 1997,116.
41
the international agreements are honored. And when financial instability threatens, the
U.S. must take the lead to restore order.”110
The public dimension o f the digital age receives less attention, but it may be the
most significant change to the conduct o f diplomacy. Virtually no major foreign affairs
or domestic initiative is taken today without first testing public opinion. Individual
citizens are developing new competencies for global activism, such that this public
dimension is fast becoming the central element of the new diplomacy.
It is a common perception that Americans have lost interest in foreign affairs.
Yet, despite the perception o f an uninvolved public, polling data from the past several
years demonstrate that public opinion is very fluid, sometimes leading, sometimes
lagging behind elite opinion. Elites tend to underestimate the public’s support for
American engagement abroad, exaggerating the differences that separate them and
confusing ignorance for apathy. Yet, there appears to be a public willingness to respond
positively to U.S. leadership on international issues.
A 1994 study by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations compared “leader”
and public opinions on foreign policy issues. It found that public attitudes had remained
remarkably stable, but foreign policy concerns were noticeably absent from the public’s
“top-ten list” o f problems facing the country.111 However, the public did demonstrate an
elevated interest in foreign policy concerns that related to local issues: stopping the flow
of illegal drugs, protecting American jobs in a global economy, and reducing illegal
immigration. A 1999 study found that 61 percent of the public support an active role for
110 Richard Burt, Olin Robison, and Barry Fulton, Diplomacy in the Information Age, 9.
111 “American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy,” The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
Report, February IS, 1995; available from http://www.ccfr.org/publications/opinion/intro.html: Internet;
accessed 2 February 2002.
42
I
the United States in the world, and 96 percent o f leaders favor such activism. Fifty
percent o f the public believe America plays a more important and powerful role as a
world leader today than 10 years ago, and more than three-quarters o f the public (79
percent) and 71 percent o f leaders foresee the United States playing an even greater role
10 years from now.112
Public opinion does not exist in a vacuum, but is developed and nurtured by
opinion leaders in the government and press. If Congress and the administration do not
lead, it should not be expected that leadership on international issues will emerge from
the public. If there is any surprise, it is that public opinion has remained so stable in the
absence of a coherent vision of the U.S. role in the world.
Within this landscape, the one critical element that binds government and the
public is trust. In a world that is vulnerable to “information overload,” information alone
is a useless commodity. Reliable, trusted interpreters are needed, but where can one turn
for reliable information on international relations? From the time of the Vietnam buildup
through the election o f Ronald Reagan, trust in the federal government has plummeted.
For diplomacy to be effective, it must be backed by a public willing to trust government
to act wisely on its behalf. Absent that mist, people will turn to other institutions that
have earned their trust.
The information age poses intense challenges to public diplomacy, either
magnifying international disagreement and discord, or distracting people from vital
concerns abroad. At a time when international commerce was largely conducted between
nations and when communication was relatively slow, the traditional tools of diplomacy
112John E. Rielly, ed. “American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy,” The Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations Report, 1999; available from http://www.ccfr.org/Dublications/ooinion/intro.html:
Internet; accessed 2 February 2002.
43
were appropriate and adequate. However, with instantaneous communication and capital
movement, and with the addition o f numerous new actors, classic diplomacy no longer
suffices. Neither yesterday’s diplomatic culture nor its technology will survive in this
complex environment. New diplomatic tools and training will be required to weather the
storms o f change and to ensure global stability.
Several assailant features of this new environment merit comment. The first is
connectivity. Small changes have distant and unpredictable consequences. The second
characteristic of the new environment is speed. Decision-making must be accelerated if it
is to be effective. Modem technology and efficient practices must be adopted to ensure
that government is a real-time actor in rapidly unfolding international events. The third is
the proliferation o f new actors. This is the public dimension o f the digital age. Power is
broadly shared by government with businesses, NGOs, universities, and interested
publics—and amplified by the media. The fourth is thefeedback from the environment,
which requires a rich flow o f relevant and accurate information and a system that
operates on public trust.
In this complex environment, control is elusive. Recent research has pointed to a
waning interest in international relations in the United States as the general public turns
its focus inward to address more pressing domestic concerns.113 Intense competition for
an increasingly fragmented market audience will encourage media to sensationalize
international conflicts and thus, erode the opportunities for informed dialogue.
International financial and economic interdependence could become a destabilizing force,
converting local problems into global nightmares. And, as a CSIS report noted, the trend
111 “American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy,*' The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
Report, (Lake County Press: Waukegan, IL, 1999), 6; available from
http://www.ccfr.org/publications/opinion/ooinion.html: Internet; accessed 2 February 2002.
44
towards a convergence o f information and entertainment will persist and Walter
Lippmann's distinction between “the world outside and the pictures in our heads”114will
become blurred as images multiply exponentially.115
The third Summit of the Americas, which convened in Canada April 20 • 22,
2001, recognized the new prominence connectivity has come to occupy as a national and
hemispheric goal of sovereign nations and international organizations. A background
document prepared for the Organization o f American States Special Committee on Inter-
American Summits Management observed the need to develop hemispheric “connectivity
for community” in the information age. It recognized that the world is undergoing
dramatic transformation by information and communications technologies (ICTs) and the
rapid pace o f innovation and change. The information revolution is stimulating
fundamental changes in democratic, economic and social institutions: New technologies
are breaking down barriers, expanding dialogues and altering the nature o f the
relationships between government, the private sector, and civil society.
The OAS background paper perceived connectivity, not as the solution to all
human problems, but as a tool for human development. “Support for a connectivity
agenda does not imply the abandonment of more fundamental development objectives. . .
A comprehensive commitment to development can and should encompass not only
efforts to meet basic needs, but to ensure that the benefits o f new and emerging
technologies are more broadly shared and that opportunities to participate in knowledge-
114 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1922), 3.
115 Richard Burt, Olin Robison, and Barry Fulton, Diplomacy in the Information Age, 32.
45
based economies are expanded.”116 The OAS believes that the development and
distribution o f information technology and connectivity holds the promise o f
“unprecedented opportunities for political, economic and social development in the
Americas”" 7
The OAS Special Committee on Inter-American Summits Management said the
challenge to closer hemispheric integration is to ensure that the potential benefits of
connectivity are maximized and shared by the greatest number o f people and by closing
digital divides within and between countries. The third Summit o f the Americas was to
consider how information and communications technology could assist participant
nations in advancing a common agenda o f strengthening democracy, creating prosperity,
and realizing human potential.
The body proposed initiatives that would promote more equitable access to and
distribution o f the benefits of technology “in the interest of enhancing prosperity,
reducing insecurity and strengthening the hemispheric community. . . ”" 8 The principal
objective of improving connectivity in the Americas was to create new instruments and
linkages to “sustain diversity, enhance understanding, extend the ability o f governments
to provide services, empower citizens to improve their lives, and bring new knowledge
and skills to those who need them.”119 In the digital age, the United States must take
116 **2001 Summit of the Americas: Themes,” Permanent Council o f the Organization o f American
States Special Committee on Inter-American Summits Management, Background Paper, 18 August 2000;
available from http://www.summit-amencas.org/Canada/Summit-Themes-CSO-ENG.htm: Internet;
accessed 4 February 2002.
117 Ibid.
Ibid.
"’ Ibid.
46
advantage o f the benefits o f connectivity to promote acceptance of American values and
policies abroad through public diplomacy.
V.
THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
A. Challenges to Public Diplomacy
One challenge diplomacy faces in the future is to keep the American public
informed o f and engaged in international affairs. President Harry S. Truman said the
foreign policy of the United States rests upon the support o f the public. He believed the
American public is neither naive nor innocent. When based upon whatever degree o f
information has been handed to them, Truman insisted that people manage to accumulate
enough knowledge to understand the issues o f the day. Former Ambassador Philip Habib
believed the problem is not the ignorance of the general public, but rather, the
incompetence o f the officials who represent them. “The capacity of the American people
to deal with these issues is much greater than intellectuals are likely to give them credit
for. Their confidence that they understand what they are being told and have the ability
to react to it, is shaken by only one thing—their lack of confidence in elected and
appointed officials.”120
American Foreign Service Association President F. A. ‘Tex” Harris said at a 1994
USIA symposium that he believes the key to securing the engagement of the American
public in U.S. foreign policy resides in effective presidential leadership. “Can we engage
110Philip C. Habib, “Concluding Remarks” in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR, 283.
47
the public through presidential leadership so that there is an understanding that American
policies and American presence abroad are in fact related to American jobs and the
quality o f life here in the United States?” Harris asked.121 Former USIA Association
President David Gergen122agreed that the single most important question in American
foreign policy today is how to convince the public to remain engaged. He suggested that
the answer lies in domestic reform and renewal.
“If this country is to deteriorate inside, and we turn toward greater class
antagonism, racial antagonism, ethnic antagonism, then I will tell you, we
will withdraw from the world. That’s when we are going to turn more
paranoid, we are going to turn xenophobic, and our foreign policy is going
to be extremely difficult to sustain on an international basis. To me, that’s
fundamental. Domestic reform is terribly important to the success o f our
foreign policy, to be able to sustain public support for foreign policy.
Beyond that, I think we have to engage the country on levels that have
been different from the past.”123
Although one may disagree with Gergen’s call for domestic renewal, bolstering
public support for U.S. foreign policies is critical to the future success o f diplomacy. The
United States must exert leadership in the international arena. No longer under the
exigencies of the Cold War, the United States owns special responsibilities and
opportunities as the sole remaining superpower to address an expanded roster o f global
issues and concerns. America does not have the power to force change in the world by
itself, nor can it solve the world’s problems alone. However, it is equally apparent that
the world’s great problems won’t be solved without American leadership.
121 FA. “Tex” Harris in Hans N. Tuch, USIA: Communicating with the World in the 1990s, 33.
122 David Gergen gave the keynote address at the 1994 USIA symposium. He worked at USIA and
was an advisor to several U.S. presidents.
123 David Gergen in Hans N. Tuch, USIA: Communicating with the World in the 1990s, 33.
48
People will look to the United States for leadership, but they will also demand
that they be treated with respect and dignity. In this context, if America hopes to
influence the policies of its friends and allies overseas, it must bolster old alliances and
initiate new partnerships. Public opinion and understanding in foreign countries are as
vital to the success of American foreign policy as they are to building domestic support
for policies at home. As America pursues its foreign policy objectives through
aggressive public diplomacy campaigns, it must not neglect the power of personal
relationships. Partnerships are formed and maintained through skillful relationship-
building. The U.S. government must have people on the ground in foreign countries who
understand what America is all about and who are able to transmit that message to
foreign publics.
The mission of U.S. public diplomacy is to tell America’s story in a way that
touches the hearts and minds o f people of other countries. As advertising guru Steve
Hayden124 asserted, u[T]o communicate with clarity and power, and maybe to change the
world a little for the better, you must touch people emotionally as well as rationally."125
At the 2001 Net Diplomacy Conference, Hayden pointed out that America has excellent
“brand” values. A brand “is the intangible sum of a product’s attributes: its name,
packaging and price, its history, and the way it’s advertised. A brand is also defined by
124 Steve Hayden is the Vice Chairman of Ogilvy & Mather Worldwide. He headed the 1994 multi-
media campaign that changed the image of IBM, known as “Big Blue,” from a remote, arrogant business
into a company that was more caring and accessible. Within a short period, Hayden said the business
giant’s brand-name recognition went from a bottom ranking of283rd to the “world’s third most valuable
brand” after only Coca Cola and McDonalds.
123 Steve Hayden, Vice Chairman o f Ogilvy & Mather Worldwide, Remarks at the Net Diplomacy
2001 Conference in Washington, D.C. on September 5, 2001.
49
consumers’ impressions o f the people who use it, as well as their own experience."126 A
brand is not a product, but a relationship. Products are tangible and can be experienced
through the senses, whereas brands are intangible. They are about trust and feeling and
emotional connection. People project their hopes, dreams and sometimes their fears on
brands. In like manner, American diplomats are the stewards and caretakers of the
largest brand o f all: the American dream.
The United States is not die only country thinking about its brand identity.
England has a government-sponsored “Brand England” program. Belgium followed an
image repair and development program after a series o f “incidents” damaged the
country’s reputation. France held a nationwide contest to find a woman to represent the
Spirit o f Liberty - “La Liberte” - whose visage now adorns every public office and every
government Web site. India hired a public relations firm to produce a global brand
analysis to help it identify which unique characteristics the country could leverage to
pursue its national interests. In an environment where public participation in
international affairs has grown due to the democratization of information and
communication, no foreign policy can succeed without a sustained public diplomacy
effort to understand, inform, and influence private individuals and organizations, as well
as governments.
The digital age brings with it some important changes to the conduct of
diplomacy, yet some elements are timeless. Former Secretary o f State George P. Shultz
summarized the aspects that remain the same and identified key changes to the practice of
diplomacy in a speech he gave at the U.S. Institute o f Peace. First, he said, the diplomat
l26D*vid Ogilvy’s I9S5 definition of brand, as quoted by Steve Hayden, Remarks at the Net
Diplomacy 2001 Conference.
50
must truly represent the United States. Shultz understood diplomacy as “a fundamental
human activity, conducted between people as well as among nations.”127 Second, Shultz
believed that a diplomat must be able to speak with authority for his or her country;
otherwise, no one will take him or her seriously. Therefore, the good diplomat must
build and nurture his or her base o f authority. Third, a diplomat must verify that the other
party speaks with his or her government’s authority, so that true agreements can be
reached.
A fourth point relates to the nature o f negotiations: international relationships and
alliances must offer the possibility o f benefit to all parties involved.128 Former U.S.
Ambassador to Turkey William Macomber remarked, “The consummate art of the
diplomat is to negotiate an agreement that is not only to the advantage o f his side, but
which contains sufficient advantage to the other side that the latter will wish to keep
it.’’129 Negotiations are not exercises in charity. Their purpose is to produce results that
are advantageous to both sides and produce results that last.
Shultz reminded his audience that most negotiations are not one-time events but a
process, and that process has its ups and downs. Therefore, the relationship should be
constructed with long-term considerations in mind and not on the basis o f what is
expedient. Sixth, good diplomacy relies on accurate, timely and relevant information.
Writing careful dispatches back home has always been a key function o f the U.S. Foreign
Service. Reporting has to be solid and well-considered; it has to emerge from deep
127George P. Shultz “Diplomacy in the Information Age,” (keynote address at the Virtual Diplomacy
Conference, sponsored by the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. on April 1 ,1997).
'“ Ibid.
William Macomber, The Angels' Game: A Handbook o f Modem Diplomacy (New York: Stein and
Day Publishers, 1975), 49.
51
experience and understanding of the society reported on; and above all, it must be
completely accurate.130 Macomber also noted that diplomatic reporting requires accuracy
and discrimination. Discriminate reporting is especially important at a time when the
sheer volume of diplomatic cable threatens to overwhelm foreign offices and State
headquarters. Diplomats must be able to sort through a myriad o f facts and determine
which are o f direct and significant interest to their government’s interests.131
CNN reporting is no substitute for diplomatic reporting, Shultz said. True, CNN
may do it faster and better, but it may not always be accurate. Furthermore, television
journalism is not universal. “[Journalism] focuses on places and topics the editors think
the viewers are interested in,”132 not on the issues that affect America’s national interests.
One must distinguish between excellent means o f communication, i.e., the wonders o f
information technology, and excellent communication. The bane of the information age
is that it makes a mind-boggling flood o f information available and making sense o f it all
becomes more challenging. This is where Foreign Service Officers in the field prove
invaluable; they provide insight, meaning and context to the raw data.
Seventh, Shultz said skillful diplomacy is busy at work even in the absence o f
acute problems and burning crises. Diplomats work to resolve minor disturbances before
they become glaring problems. This requires building confidence and understanding, so
that when a crisis does arise, one has a solid base from which to work. Vision and
strategic ideas are essential. Without a strategic plan and vision, one can very easily lose
110George P. Shultz, “Diplomacy in the Information Age.”
131 William Macomber, The Angels' Game: A Handbook o f Modem Diplomacy, 42-43.
132George P. Shultz, “Diplomacy in the Information Age.“
52
bis way as he tries to cope with the constant barrage o f “mini-crises” that inevitably
spring up.
Finally, Shultz said, there is die essential interplay between strength and
diplomacy to consider. The two go hand-in-hand. Diplomacy without strength—military
and economic—is fruitless, but strength without diplomacy is unsustainable. In marrying
diplomacy to power, Shultz rendered a realist interpretation of the relations between
nation-states, similar to Hans J. Morgenthau’s definition of diplomacy. “Diplomacy,
however morally unattractive its business may seem to many,” Morgenthau wrote, “is
nothing but a symptom of the struggle for power among sovereign nations, which try to
maintain orderly and peaceful relations among themselves.”133
Ambassador Marc Grossman, President George W. Bush’s Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs, would concur with Shultz’ assessment that diplomats in the
21st century must command more skills than their predecessors. Grossman told an
audience of public diplomacy officials that 21st century diplomats must be proficient not
only in languages, but also in inter-cultural communication. They must be effective
managers, knowing how to get the most from their people and how to develop each of
their subordinates to their fullest potential. Twenty-first century diplomats must possess
a broad understanding o f global issues. They must understand the important role that
public diplomacy plays in America’s relations with both established and emerging
democracies around the world. Twenty-first century diplomats must possess negotiating
skills. They must also be able to deal effectively with nongovernmental organizations,
the media, and the private sector. They must understand the principles o f preventive
diplomacy and international peace operations, and they must be comfortable with the
,M Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Strugglefor Power and Peace, 373.
53
latest technologies, which are constantly changing and will continue to change in ways
we cannot imagine today.134
The raw material o f diplomacy is information—getting it, assessing it, putting it
into the system for the benefit or puzzlement o f others. The world is also much more
open than ever before. Even authoritarian, closed societies have a hard time keeping
important developments to themselves, or keeping their own citizens from knowing what
is goes on inside, let alone outside, their borders. And any society that aspires to be a
part o f the modem world simply cannot operate in a closed, compartmentalized system.
Sovereignty is still a clear and powerful concept, but its meaning has been altered. The
media will play a larger role in this environment; with their elevated role, media must
assume greater responsibilities than ever before. This interplay between events and the
media produces a phenomenon some have called “quantum diplomacy.” “An axiom of
quantum diplomacy is that when you observe and measure some piece o f the system, you
inevitably disturb the whole system. So the process of observation is itself a cause of
change.”135
The struggle to speak with authority for one’s country will become more difficult
The secretary o f State must struggle, not only with colleagues in the executive branch and
with members o f Congress, but also with groups that hold widely diverse, sometimes
conflicting, agendas. The Internet has a democraticizing influence on society, in that it
brings more people into the mix and gives them tools to amplify their opinions and
multiply the impact of their actions. That is not to say that the trend toward
114 Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, Remarks at the Net Diplomacy 2001
Conference in Washington, D.C. on September S, 2001.
>)SGeorge P. Shultz, “Diplomacy in the Information Age.”
54
decentralization in modem organizations grants people leave to “do their own thing,” nor
does it imply that headquarters or command centers no longer matter in die digital age.
Nonetheless, information technology is producing a radical shakedown o f strictly
hierarchical organizations and societies. It is redefining the center in ways that are more
inclusive and which allow governments to be more responsive to the needs of their
citizens.
Once the trend towards decentralization hits the State Department, several
management changes will follow. Hiring will be done on a different basis, because the
department will look for people who not only can carry out orders from the top, but who
can also see the big picture and be a leader and manager for their team. Furthermore, the
State Department will have to bring people into the analytical and decision-making
process earlier, before information becomes outdated and irrelevant to policy
considerations. In other words, quicker response time and quicker decision-making
processes will be required in the new information-rich environment.136
The digital age should enhance accountability in American diplomacy. What one
says and does will be recorded in an ever-larger public domain. The quality o f one’s
decisions and one’s capacity to execute them effectively will be on display. This
spotlight should result in improved performance and accountability. With instantaneous
communication, the pressure mounts for rapid reactions and real time operations.
136‘‘Consolidation o f USIA into the State Department: An Assessment After One Year,” 3.
55
B. Public Diplomacy Under President Bush
As the nation’s 65th Secretary o f State, General Colin Powell has taken the helm
of a State Department that many believe is in decline. A recent report compiled by the
U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy found that morale among new and old
employees is suffering.137 This assessment was confirmed by an independent task force
report. The report, cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, called for major reform of the State Department.138
Upon Powell’s appointment and nomination to the State Department, more than
1,500 Foreign Service Officers signed a letter to Powell in which they described the
department as “dysfunctional” and complained that its traditions and culture needed
change.139 Among other concerns, the letter lodged complaints against the numerous
layers of approval that are needed for the most basic administrative tasks, from
procurement and personnel to grant-making and travel. Many employees are
discouraged, and retirements and early departures have been on the rise, leaving the
Foreign Service with more than 700 positions unfilled.140 Lack of resources has been
another source o f employee discouragement. The State Department has been
137“Consolidation o f USIA into the State Department: An Assessment After One Year,” 3.
111 Frank C. Carlucci, and Ian J. Brzezinski, “State Department Reform,” Independent Task Force
Report by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies; available
from: httD://www.cfr.org/p/Dubs/StateDeDart TaskForce.html: Internet; accessed 1 February 2001.
119 Brian Friel, “The Powell Leadership Doctrine,” GovExec.com, 1 June 2001.
140“Consolidation o f USIA into the State Department An Assessment After One Year.”
56
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
underfunded for years, and overall spending on international affairs accounts for barely
one percent of the federal budget.
In the opening months o f the Bush administration, Secretary o f State Colin
Powell, the son o f Jamaican immigrants, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Persian Gulf War hero, and one o f the most respected leaders in America, has boosted the
morale of the foreign policy establishment Powell laid out a battle plan to address a host
of management problems identified in various reports. Powell aims to rally the troops at
the State Department and turn the Foreign Service into a “well-oiled diplomatic machine
on the front lines of American international relations.”141
State Department veterans say Powell already has devoted more attention to
management problems than any secretary in memory. “I’m not coming in just to be the
foreign policy adviser to the president, although that is what the principle title is. I’m not
just coming in to serve the foreign policy needs o f the American people. I’m coming in
as the leader and the manager o f this department,” Powell said to State Department
employees within a day of his installation. “And so I want you to know that 1 will do
everything I can to give you what you need to make sure that all o f the units that we have
around the world doing the people’s business get what they need to do that work.”142
Powell may be committed to improving the department, but he faces decades of
management neglect. State Department officials have been complaining about
management for years, but the problems have persisted. Veteran Foreign Service
Officers say recent memos describing management challenges at the department are
141 Brian Friel, “The Powell Leadership Doctrine."
142Secretary o f Stale Colin Powell, State Department Briefing, (remarks delivered to employees at the
U.S. State Department in Washington, D.C. on January 22,2001.
57
nearly identical to those produced 25 years ago. Powell’s first months on the job offered
a glimpse of his leadership doctrine. At a town hall meeting held in Washington, D.C. on
January 25,2001, Powell said:
UI am not only a foreign policy adviser to the president I believe that my

charge is also to be the leader and the manager of the State Department
My leadership style. . . is a very open, collegial kind o f style. But don’t
mistake it; I’m still a general And so you will find me trying to run a
very open, loose style, but with high standards and with high expectations
for performance. If you perform well, we are going to get along fine. If
you don’t, you are going to give me push-ups. So it’s a high-standard
organization, high-performing organization.”143
Ultimately, Powell takes final responsibility for management. He has told his
subordinates that he is the department’s chief management officer and chief personnel
officer. And he has pledged to make management important throughout the department.
For the past decade, the State Department has been unable to convince the
administration or Congress to give it more money. Many at State see Powell as the
secretary who will bring prestige—and more resources—to Foggy Bottom. He has the
proven leadership experience and political stature to demand more money from Congress.
Powell fought for budget increases with the Office of Management and Budget and the
White House. His case was not for vast increases in foreign aid, but for increases in the
operational budget of the State Department. When he finished his lobbying, the Bush
administration’s proposed fiscal 2002 budget included a 19 percent increase in
administrative spending at the State Department, even though the average increase in
federal agency spending was only 4 percent. Powell’s budget increase will pay for 546
new positions, including 310 Foreign Service Officers, 50 civil service professionals and
186 security specialists. Powell’s budget also included S210 million for two major
141 Secretary Colin L. Powell, Remarks delivered at a Town Hall Meeting in Washington, D.C. on
January 25,2001.
58
information technology initiatives—putting full Internet access on every State
Department employee’s desktop and connecting all of the department’s posts to the
classified communications network. It devoted SI.3 billion to embassy security,
construction and maintenance—including S1S1 million for perimeter security at
embassies. O f the SI.2 billion increase in the overall foreign affairs budget, Powell’s
budget proposal devoted 74 percent to operations, and when he presented his budget
proposal to Congress, he received lawmakers’ overall support.
But in exchange for the budget increase, Congress and the administration will
want to see improvements in the way the State Department spends money. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms, R-N.C., proposed a “resources-for-
reform method” o f funding foreign aid. “If you reduce the size of the bureaucracy by
five percent,” Helms told Powell, “I personally will help you fight for a five percent
increase in U.S. assistance. If you reduce the bureaucracy by 10 percent, I will champion
a 10 percent increase.” 144 While not committing to a dollar-matching deal, Powell’s
management team has embraced the resources-for-reform concept, promising to spend
money more effectively in return for budget increases.
On February 2,2001, Powell met with a small group o f employees, led by Office
of Foreign Missions Deputy Assistant Secretary Ted Strickler, who organized a campaign
called “SOS for DOS.” The group drafted a letter, before the 2000 presidential election
was decided, calling on the next Secretary of State to pay attention to management
“Outdated procedures and chronic resource shortages have taken their toll,” the group’s
letter said. “We ask for the support, involvement and leadership needed to undertake a
144 Senator Jesse Helms, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing in Washington, D.C. on March
8, 2001.
59
long-term, nonpartisan effort to modernize and strengthen the Department of State.”145
Out of about 17,000 employees worldwide, 1,614 Foreign Service and civil service
workers signed the letter. At the meeting, Powell urged the employees to send their
comments and ideas for change directly to him, and the group came away encouraged.
The State Department has been slow to adapt to the Internet age, in part because
o f budget restraints, but mostly because officials long believed security concerns
outweighed the value o f full Internet access. Secretary Powell has embraced the Internet.
Before coming to the State Department, he served on the board o f directors for America
Online. Powell sees the Internet as a tool for dealing with the new reality that nation-to-
nation negotiation is no longer the primary method of international relations, but only one
of many methods, including multilateral negotiations, dealings with nongovernmental
organizations, corporations and the people, rather than the governments, of other
countries. “The world is so complex with so many additional countries that need to be
dealt with and tended to since the end of the Cold War, that we’ve got to use information
technology not to centralize power and authority but to decentralize power and
authority,” Powell told the House Budget Committee in March 2001.146 Powell signaled
his intentions to bring the State Department into the information age at the Net
Diplomacy 2001 Conference in Washington, D.C.147 He said technology tools would
usBrian Friel. “The Powell Leadership Doctrine.”
146 Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony before the House Budget Committee in Washington,
D.C. on March 15,2001.
147The State Department’s Office o f Information Programs (UP) sponsored the second annual
conference on conducting foreign affairs in the Internet age September 5 - 7,2001. "Net Diplomacy 2001”
examined the role that the Internet and other forms o f electronic communication can play in furthering U.S.
foreign policy objectives. The conference featured Secretory o f State Colin Powell; Steve Hayden, Vice
Chairman o f the advertising firm Ogilvy & Mother Worldwide; Michael Paige, Vice President and Director
60
play a critical role in allowing the department to carry out its diplomatic mission around
the world. During his tenure, Powell said he was committed to upgrading the technology
tools available to department staff:
w[T]he tools that we now have through Net Diplomacy are just
remarkable, in the sense that they can go over political boundaries, they
can go over cultural walls, they can break down any barrier that is out
there to communication It is that ability to communicate
instantaneously that we now have that we must use. We must break away
from old patterns and habits. Not that they were bad, but they are not as
relevant as the new patterns that exist for us___ I am determined as
Secretary o f State that I am going to get an Internet-accessible computer
that’s going at something other than 4KBS. . . an Internet-accessible
computer with pipes to support it at the level we need it on every desk in
the State Department and every embassy around the world. We cannot
fight this battle of values and information with one hand tied behind our
back. And I am bringing in people who understand this Charlotte
Beers [my new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs]
. . . I wanted one of the world’s greatest advertising experts, because what
are we doing? We’re selling. We’re selling a product. That product we
are selling is democracy It is our job to be salespersons, and one o f the
best tools we are going to have is the Internet, Web design. Net
Diplomacy, all o f the things you’re working on. It is vital that we do it
well. It is vital that we do it right.”148
Virginia Senator George Allen, who also spoke at the Net Diplomacy 2001
Conference, believes the Internet can be a powerful tool for spreading “common sense
Jeffersonian conservative principles,” the idea that governments derive their just powers
from the consent o f the governed, and that governments are constituted by people to
protect God-given rights of life, liberty, property, and the pursuits of happiness. Allen
said the Internet is the modern-day equivalent of the Gutenberg press, which made
possible the dissemination of Martin Luther’s 95 theses. M[W]e need to adapt this tool,
o f Xerox Palo Alto Research Center, Carl Yankowski, CEO o f Palm, Inc.; Senator George Allen (R-VA);
and Ambassador Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political AfTairs.
141 Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Remarks at the Net Diplomacy Conference in Washington, D.C.
on September 6,2001.
61
this creativity, this innovation, and this technology in advancing our enlightened ideas. I
think that that’s the best way to preserve our principles with truthful information,
knowledge, and unfettered ability o f people to attain that knowledge [A]s it becomes
more prevalent, the Internet, and more ubiquitous, then the march o f freedom and free
thought will go forward.”149
Secretary Powell’s considerable leadership experience may not guarantee his
success at the State Department. While Powell convinced the administration to endorse a
budget boost for 2002, he still faces the continual challenge of pushing budget increases
through Congress every year. Another problem is the internal culture of the State
Department. Last year, Stephanie Kinney, a senior Foreign Service Officer, interviewed
48 officers for an article that appeared in the online publication American Diplomacy.
When Kinney asked the officers about the core values of the Foreign Service and the
State Department, 20 said there were no core values, and even among those who said
such values existed, many of the “core values” they cited were negative.130 Unlike the
military, where Powell served a long and distinguished career, the new secretary has but a
few short years to boost morale at the State Department, and it may not be enough time.
In the age o f globalization, when nongovernmental groups and private interests,
not just governments are major players on the world scene, the State Department must
become a more nimble agency that focuses on public diplomacy. When the consolidation
o f the USIA into the State Department was first proposed in 1997, its supporters in
Congress expected it to reinvent the way the United States conducts its foreign affairs.
149 Senator George Allen (R-VA), Remarks at the Net Diplomacy 2001 Conference in Washington,
D.C. on September 5, 2001.
,so Stephanie Kinney, “Developing Diplomats for 2010: If Not Now, When? Part II,” American
Diplomacy S, no. 3 (Summer 2000).
62
Real reinvention of the department has been on hold for years, but there is renewed
optimism that it will take place under Powell’s watch.
C. Suggestions for Revamping U.S. Public Diplomacy
Diplomacy must become increasingly public to serve the national interests of the
United States in the digital age. Many 20th century diplomatic practices are irrelevant
and need to be updated. With a new culture, new technologies, new media, and new
relationships -- the foreign affairs community will be ready for the challenges o f the
future. American diplomacy “must be guided by coherence, capability, discipline, and
agility. It must be characterized by openness and permeability.”131 The time for change
is now.
To succeed in the future, U.S. foreign policy demands a commitment to new
thinking and new structures that place public diplomacy at the center. Public diplomacy
must be fully integrated into U.S. foreign policies. The culture of American diplomacy
must be overhauled to make it more accessible and participatory; obsolete technology
must be discarded and replaced to make diplomacy more efficient and relevant; and a
larger community of international and domestic actors must be included in deliberations
and implementation. These changes require bold and sustained leadership, as well as a
better-trained, more efficient diplomatic corps. Below are some recommendations for
change:
ls> Richard Burt, Olin Robison, and Barry Fulton, Diplomacy in the Information Age, 52.
63
1. End the culture o f secrecy and exclusivity and create a more accessible
environment152
Ending secrecy is a requirement for developing a collaborative relationship with
the public. The sense that diplomacy takes place in a “dosed universe of privileged
intellectuals” must change. In an environment of openness, limited room remains for
confidential information. Where national security is at stake, there should be no
transparency; however, the Cold-War mentality of shielding information from the public
is counterproductive in these open times. The State Department should work to heighten
public awareness of and engagement in international relations. Foreign Service Officers
should strive to cultivate relationships with communities, corporations, NGOs, academic
institutions and media organizations. American diplomacy becomes more effective when
quality information about our system, our values, and our policies is available to the
public.
2. Replace the hierarchical model with a decentralized decision-making paradigm
that delegates authority and streamlines bureaucracy.153
The State Department should examine infrastructure and administrative costs
carefully with an idea of enhancing diplomatic capability by reducing the size o f support
staff abroad and increasing the number of regional and functional experts. Also,
decision-making must be decentralized. Major issues should be able to surface at top
levels with greater speed, and mid-level issues should be considered and acted upon at
lower levels.
152 Ibid, 53-69.
'"Ibid.
64
3. Replace outdated workplace practices with ongoing training in communication
strategies and techniques, information technology, and continued professional
development
Apart from language training and area studies, Foreign Service Officers are
offered little opportunity for professional development. Professional education,
exchanges in the private sector, and mentorship programs for junior and mid-level
officers should be offered, and professional growth and job excellence should be
rewarded.
Corporate guru Peter Senge offered a promising perspective on what he calls
“learning organizations”: “organizations where people continually expand their
capability to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of
thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are
continually learning how to leant together.”154 The State Department must become an
organization that cultivates a culture o f life-long learning, so that it is not frozen in time
and does not expend its energy reacting to events. ‘Too often public diplomacy is seen
as reactive, not proactive, and as a response (often defensive) to a crisis,”135 observed
Peter Peterson, chairman o f the Council on Foreign Relations and the Blackstone Group.
Furthermore, the State Department currently provides only minimal public
diplomacy training for officers entering the Foreign Service. All new officers participate
in a seven-week entry-level course, but only one hour of training is devoted to public
diplomacy. For officers entering the public diplomacy career path, a three-week public
114 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice o f the Learning Organization, (New
York: Doubleday, 1990), 3.
135 Peter G. Peterson, “Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs Journal 81, no.
5 (2002), 74.
65
diplomacy course is strongly encouraged but not required. After completing that training,
public diplomacy officers then serve a consular tour, as opposed to a public diplomacy
training tour. The State Department’s much-reduced public diplomacy training contrasts
with the USIA’s previous practice o f requiring new officers to attend a three-month-long,
intensive seminar, followed by an public diplomacy training tour.136
Current levels of training are inadequate in the global communications
environment, when government officials must respond to events as they are reported in
real time. Public advocacy and foreign language skills are essential for today’s diplomat.
Public diplomacy officers should strive to build relationships with foreign journalists and
seek out opportunities to meet with the editorial boards o f foreign press. They must be
comfortable making public statements and appearing on television and other indigenous
media outlets. They need to be able to speak for the United States without excessive
clearance requirements from headquarters. The State Department should encourage
collaborative relationships with transnational corporations and international NGOs to
reflect the evolving role of these organizations. The State Department should cultivate a
more collegial relationship with the media. The new diplomacy needs the press, and the
press requires more transparency and openness from government. The State Department
should take a more proactive role in engaging the opinion-makers in society in order to
generate more lively discussions of foreign policy.
The State Department should offer training to new officers and ongoing services
in public opinion research, cultural and attitudinal analysis, strategy formulation, political
campaign management, marketing and branding, technology, communications and
strategic planning, and media trends. It should seek partnerships with the private-sector,
I5tn»kL
66
so that it can learn “best practices” and techniques in research, marketing, campaign
management, and other relevant fields that could be applied to public diplomacy. Doing
so would enhance the quality of the State Department’s public diplomacy programs and
improve the skills o f the next generation o f foreign affairs professionals.
The Internet is radically transforming the relationship between information
content and communications channels. Since America’s public diplomacy resources are
limited and it is highly improbable that one could put those resources to work to reach
100 percent o f any target audience, Foreign Service Officers must know how to use
existing technology to identify, prioritize, and target those who most need to hear the
message. Although the Internet is not widely available in many developing countries,
diplomats can still make use of all the communications resources available in their
assigned field.
4. Develop an information strategy that supports democratization and transparency
in international relations, and provide state-of-the-art computers, electronic
connectivity, and cutting edge technology to all diplomatic personnel.157
Seeking a balance between human interaction and the use o f technological
resources will be one of the greatest challenges to diplomacy over the next few years.
The “zealous embrace” of unstable and complicated technology that leads diplomats
away from the societies in which they are supposed to interact into the “false comfort o f a
virtual world” is unacceptable.158 Computers, the Internet, and email are tools that should
be used to facilitate diplomacy, not supplant it. The State Department must develop an
information strategy that utilizes the information tools at its disposal and encourages
157 Richard Burt, Olin Robison, and Barry Fulton, Diplomacy in the Information Age, 53-69.
'“ Ibid.
67
broader global participation. The State Department’s preoccupation with absolute
security limits diplomats from receiving vital information. Instead of designing a
telecommunications system that poses zero risk to security, State should build a system
which minimizes risk to tolerable levels. The department should install a single system
that provides employees access to e-mail, the Internet and official cable traffic, and it
should develop an integrated intranet telecommunications network. It could even
establish a capital fund for replacing and upgrading obsolete computer equipment as
needed.
5. Prioritize commercial diplomacy.
Diplomacy must be proactive in promoting American values and goals, such as
assisting American businesses abroad and expanding global markets. This, in turn,
requires the presence of more commercial officers that are attuned to the needs of
American businesses. The CSIS Advisory Panel recommended one-on-one exchange
programs for Foreign Service Officers with the American business community. Career
commercial officers could spend at least one assignment with an American corporation to
acquire a balanced combination o f field and business experience. The panel also
recommended the creation of a public-private consortium, supported by public and
private funds, to develop and manage American Business Centers in ten emerging
economic markets identified by the Commerce Department. These centers would serve
as physical and electronic meeting places for American and host country business
representatives.
6. Move public diplomacy from the sidelines to the core o f U.S. foreign policy.
68
Public diplomacy should move in the direction of digital diplomacy. The recent
consolidation of the State Department and the USIA affords a unique opportunity to
redefine public diplomacy. In the past, the State Department and the USIA have always
drawn a distinction between public diplomacy (information geared towards foreign
publics) and public information (information directed to a domestic audience). The
USIA’s mission statement was simply “to understand, inform, and influence foreign
publics in promotion of the national interest and to broaden the dialogue between
Americans and U.S. institutions and their counterparts abroad.” Yet, in a world of porous
borders, these distinctions confound and confuse rather than clarify. Congress should
consider repealing those portions of the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act that prohibit the domestic
distribution of information designed for foreign publics.159
The 50-year-old Smith Mundt prohibition prevents the State Department from
using propaganda on its own citizens. Rightfully so, many members o f Congress,
including Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), worry that public diplomacy programs will be
used for domestic and partisan purposes. Yet, in a global information age where
geographical boundaries are easily penetrated through the World Wide Web, this
outmoded ban should be lifted to allow global access to the State Department’s archival
materials for informational purposes.
Strong leadership, imaginative thinking and planning, and inter-agency
coordination are critical to the success o f public diplomacy. U.S. leaders must provide
the sustained, coordinated, robust, and effective public diplomacy that America requires.
Peter Peterson of the Council on Foreign Relations recommended that the Bush
administration initiate a structured evaluation of diplomatic readiness and prioritized
159 Ibid, 53-69.
69
spending through a “Quadrennial Diplomacy Review.” This evaluation, similar to the
existing Quadrennial Defense Review, he said, could be conducted by the Secretary of
State in consultation with the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy.
Peterson’s QDP would replace budget-driven reviews o f the status quo with strategy-
based assessments o f themes, diplomatic readiness, requirements, and capabilities, as
well as provide a much-needed, long-term information strategy for international
affairs.160
The marginalization o f public diplomacy has created a legacy o f underfunded and
uncoordinated efforts. For example, the approximately $1 billion spent annually on the
State Department’s information and exchange programs and U.S. international
broadcasting is only four percent of the nation’s international affairs budget. In the area
of international broadcasting, the resources of the U.S. government reach roughly 100
million people weekly in 65 languages. The Broadcasting Board o f Governors oversees
the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio and TV Marti, Radio
Free Asia, and WORLDNET television. A former chairman o f the Federal
Communications Commission found the funding shortfall deplorable. “Today, when we
most need to communicate our story,” he said, “our broadcasts are not even a whisper.
People in every country know our music, our movies, our clothes and our sports. But they
do not know our freedom or our values or our democracy.”161
A promising new development is the Middle East Radio Network (MERN), which
was added to the BBG’s portfolio in the spring o f2002. This radio station aims to attract
140Peter G. Peterson, “Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism.”
161 Newton N. Minow, “Why the World Isn’t Listening To Us,” Chicago Tribune, 19 March 2002,17,
ZoneN.
70
young Arab adults and is delivered via local FM and AM radio and digital satellite. Most
o f the programming is Middle Eastern and American music, with newscasts twice per
hour. Gradually, new components will be added to make MERN more interactive with its
audience. Other public diplomacy initiatives could follow MERN’s example.
U.S. public diplomacy must be funded at significantly higher levels that it has
been in the past. Federal funds should be phased in over several years, tied to specific
objectives, monitored for its effectiveness, and adjusted to ensure that it achieves its
purported goals. The State Department must work to build stronger congressional
support for public diplomacy efforts. Congressional support for public diplomacy could
be achieved through sustained oversight and the formation o f a new congressional
subcommittee structure within the Senate Foreign Relations and the House International
Relations Committees. Congress’ role in authorizing and appropriating resources for
public diplomacy is crucial, and it may be more forthcoming with needed resources if the
legislative body has a sense of ownership and oversight o f public diplomacy. Congress
should at the very least, increase the budget and operational authority o f the Under
Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.
However, throwing money at the problem will not resolve it. America needs to
use all o f the communications talent and resources it has at its disposal. Even the highly
professional VOA may not be persuasive enough in a market o f shouting, often deceitful
and hateful voices. The U.S. government should partner with other voices to get its
message out to foreign publics. This is a job not only for American journalists, but also
for American corporations, universities, research centers, and NGOs.
71
Public diplomacy is needed to repair America's damaged image in some circles
and regions o f the world. Today, some perceptions o f the United States are colored more
by the country’s global brands - IBM, Microsoft, Coca Cola, Nike, McDonald’s - than
they are by America’s brand values, such as freedom o f religion, freedom o f speech,
freedom o f the press, and freedom of assembly. Advertising executive Steve Hayden
noted that when a brand derives its power by subverting a value that many in the society
hold dear, there is a risk that the scheme will backfire. “There’s tremendous power in
borrowing from culture to define your brand, associating it with a movement or ethos.
But when you sow the wind, you can also reap the whirlwind,” he warned.162 In turn, the
perversion of a cherished value produces a new phenomenon - the birth o f an anti-brand
movement whose sole purpose is to protest and defeat the brand’s widespread acceptance
and growth.
The State Department must develop what is known in the advertising field as a
“brand print” to counter misperceptions and misinformation about the United States.
Similar to an architectural blueprint, the “brand print” serves as a guide for what the
brand stands for and presents consistent truths about the owner’s society, culture, history,
politics, values, and ideals.
One of many challenge public diplomacy officials face is countering the
perception of U.S. hegemony that much of the world holds. “People like leadership but
not dominance,” Hayden stated.163 Although it is but one outlet for conveying America’s
story, the State Department should continue its official Web presence. Maintaining a
savvy Internet presence is a powerful conduit for supporting and promoting the U.S.
1(2 Steve Hayden, Remarks at the Net Diplomacy 2001 Conference.
“ * Ibid.
72
brand abroad. The State Department’s virtual identity should be managed by a staff that
is policy sensitive, technically competent, and creative. The site should be easily
navigable and should furnish high quality, accurate, reliable and timely information. To
run a good Web site, Hayden said, one needs to: have a clear understanding of the goal of
the site; base content and design on user research and feedback; and enforce the site
guidelines (its format, style and overall appearance) with “Stalinist zeal."164 In the
bewildering web of Internet sites, the State Department’s official site should strive to
become the authoritative resource on U.S. foreign policy.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Challenges to American diplomacy abound. The strength o f the United States as
a democracy lies in the multitude of voices that intrude upon the formulation and
implementation of foreign policy. It is also a weakness, for while the new world of
communication offers an opportunity for more people to receive information about the
United States, it is becoming increasingly difficult for them to distinguish and understand
our message.
The explosion of information that characterizes the digital age will likely continue
long into the future. Having recognized that there are untold sources o f information,
quality will become a more important criterion of selection. Once people find voices,
channels, or programs they can trust, they will turn to them more readily, because the rest
is questionable or dubious.
164 Ibid.
73
Although traditional diplomats overtly may express a willingness to include
public diplomacy officers in their meetings, they are still hesitant to turn to their
counterparts with information of interest. When the stakes are high, any allegiance to
President Woodrow Wilson's “open covenants openly arrived at” disappears from the
traditional diplomat’s thinking, and the last thing he or she wants to do is shed light
prematurely on a carefully constructed compromise which, if revealed for all to see,
could prove quite compromising.165
In recent years, there have been more concerted efforts to advance U.S. positions
on policy issues before the public eye, both in the United States and abroad. However, in
most instances, the aid and counsel o f public diplomacy experts were enlisted after policy
decisions had been made.166 As a rule, those involved in formulating policy do not
routinely consult public diplomacy experts for advice on the consequences o f their
decisions. They may use the media to promote their policy views publicly, but only after
an agreement has been reached are public diplomacy or public affairs officials asked to
explain the agreement to their respective foreign or domestic audiences.167
Diplomacy is the art of advancing national interests through the sustained
exchange o f information among nations and peoples. It is the practice of state-to-state
persuasion; its purpose is to change attitudes and behavior. Classic diplomacy assumes
that sovereign states control international relations. The State Department is only one of
several foreign affairs agencies in the U.S. government that is encumbered with the
165John R. Clingerman, Discussion following Gifford D. Malone’s paper on “Functioning of

Diplomatic Organs” in Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR, 143.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
74
traditions and tools o f the past. However, for American diplomacy in the 21st century to
flourish, it must overturn its culture o f secrecy and its penchant for exclusivity.
American diplomacy faces unacceptable performance gaps between outdated practices
and the new requirements of the information age.
This revolution - the information revolution - is absolutely, utterly and
profoundly changing the way that people do business, the way people relate to one
another, and certainly the environment in which nations must conduct diplomacy.
Thomas Jefferson knew that knowledge and freedom were bound together like cords in a
rope. In 1779, he wrote that “the most effectual means of preventing the perversion of
power into tyranny are to illuminate as far as practicable the minds of the people at
large.”168
Today, the United States stands at the threshold of a new era of international
relations. Here is an opportunity to pioneer something completely new and different
from anything that has preceded it. America is strategically positioned to harness the
power o f the information age, as well as the responsibility that comes with it, to promote
American principles and policies around the world. U.S. policy makers must work to
ensure that these technologies are more readily available to the world's populations.
Totalitarian regimes may believe they can keep this “Internet genie” in a bottle, but they
will have a hard time doing so. The Internet will likely have an even more profound
effect on people than what the last century has witnessed.
While there’s no substitute for traditional diplomacy and person-to-person
diplomacy, there is ample room in American diplomacy for new and better uses of
161 President Thomas Jefferson, quoted by Under Secretary o f Sate for Political Affairs Marc
Grossman, during Remarks delivered at the Net Diplomacy 2001 Conference in Washington, D.C. on
Septembers, 2001.
75
cutting-edge information technology. Effective leadership by the United States depends
on the ability o f the nation’s foreign affairs agencies to change and adapt to the
imperatives o f the digital environment American diplomacy must be empowered with
the tools and techniques of the 21st century. Without change, American diplomacy risks
becoming irrelevant. U.S. public diplomacy should communicate to people everywhere a
steadiness o f purpose about who we are, what we are, and what we hope to achieve.
America must seek a foreign policy that fosters respect and a willingness to cooperate
with the United States to achieve common goals. That means telling our story.
America cannot afford to sit on the sidelines and watch as other global players
define the field for us. The ability to achieve our goals will depend, in large part, on our
ability to lead diplomacy in the 21st century. And without the capacity to manage and to
master information technology, we will not succeed. Leading and supporting America’s
diplomacy in the 21st century will not be the same job it was 50 years ago, or even 10
years ago. American diplomacy at that time, focused on deterring the spread of
communism and promoting the twin pillars of American democracy and the free market
economy. New security threats exist today. Religious extremists, tyrannical regimes,
and anti-American movements would preach to all who care to listen that America is
about hate, intolerance, greed, infidelity, imperialism, and economic dominance.
American public diplomacy must rise to the challenge and counter these false perceptions
in order to achieve its strategic goals around the world. It is time for America to lead.
76
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81
VITA
Sarah Berry was bom January 21,1975 in Norfolk, Virginia, but grew up in North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Spain. She attended public high school in Madrid, Spain,
where her parents serve as missionaries with the International Pentecostal Holiness
Church. Sarah returned to die United States to pursue her college education, attending
first Emmanuel College in Franklin Springs, Georgia to receive an Associate of Arts
degree in general education in 1995. Sarah continued her studies at the University of
South Carolina in Columbia, graduating magna cum laude with a Bachelor of Arts degree
in Contemporary European Studies and a minor in Spanish in 1997.
Sarah interned at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the spring o f2001
and worked at the Republican National Committee during 2001 and 2002. Upon
graduation from Regent University, Sarah hopes to pursue a career in U.S. foreign policy
and international relations.
82

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II. THE SHIFT FROM TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY... 3

III. HISTORY OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY....................................................................17

IV. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE........................................36

V. THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY............................................................. 47

Companion to Politics o f the World (2001), diplomacy “is a system of communication

Diplomacy recognizes the need o f governments to communicate with the leaders

The core o f this paper centers on a substantive discussion o f diplomacy in a global

Diplomacy is commonly defined as the art and practice o f conducting relations

diplomacy as “the management o f international relations by negotiation.”4 The word

of the Roman empire all passports—passes along imperial roads—were stamped on

foreign communities. As these treaties accumulated, it became necessary to employ

extended from the management o f archives to the management of international relations.6

According to political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau, the task o f diplomacy is four­

‘Taken in its widest meaning, comprising the whole range o f foreign

In other words, Morgenthau believed nations had to evaluate their objectives, as

their objectives: persuasion, compromise, and threat of force. Yet, as Morgenthau

just as no diplomacy that stakes everything on persuasion and compromise could be

moment on each of the means at its disposal.8

There are four distinctive aspects of diplomatic activity: govemment-to-

govemment, diplomat-to-diplomat, people-to-people, and government-to-people

contacts.9 The first o f these, govemment-to-govemment contact, refers to diplomacy in

official representatives. The second, commonly termed personal diplomacy, refers to

maintaining diplomatic contact.10 The third form of diplomatic contact is public

diplomacy and it refers to “government-sponsored programs intended to inform or

influence public opinion in other countries.”11 It is often characterized by cultural and

educational exchanges, such as the Fulbright Program, media development campaigns

nation to foreign audiences.”12 Govemment-to-people contact is yet another form of

12 Jarol Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy, 4.

the targeted nation to its advantage.13

Typically, diplomacy is carried out by diplomatic representatives sent by their

determine the influence a particular columnist or commentator may exert on official

Modem diplomacy as it is practiced today is distinct from the classical definition

her nation’s diverse experiences and points of view.

diplomacy as “the process of communication that attempts to enhance understanding

Diplomacy definition: “Public diplomacy involves U.S. government activities intended to

inform and influence foreign publics through international exchanges, international

20 Hans N. Tuch, Discussion following Gifford D. Malone’s paper “Functioning o f Diplomatic

policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional

diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the

processes o f inter-cultural communications."23

23 “What is Public Diplomacy”; available from the Public Diplomacy Website at

is the representation o f the national interest abroad.26

Nor is public diplomacy simply propaganda directed at foreign audiences, or

improve America’s image overseas. Propaganda can be understood as “any word or

initiator wants them to think or act.”27 It encompasses a broad spectrum o f persuasive

communication that includes psychological and political warfare, political campaigning,

evangelism, special pleading, lobbying, editorializing, interpretive reporting, advocacy,

negative or offensive manipulation, brainwashing and psychological warfare, such as

In short, propaganda is thought to characterize state-sanctioned methods to distort the

in psychological warfare and manipulation.

According to political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau, the task o f diplomacy is four