ORDOÑO VS EDUARTE

This is a complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Josephine Palogan-Eduarte originally filed
with this Court on April 18, 1988. On August 10, 1989, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which the case was referred for investigation, submitted a report
confirming in substance the charge of violation of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code and part of the Oath of
Office of a lawyer and recommending the suspension of herein respondent.

The evidence discloses that on July 18, 1983, Antonia Ulibari filed with the RTC, Branch XXII, Cabagan,
Isabela, Civil Case No. 391 for annulment of a document (known as Affidavit of Adjudication of the
Estate of Felicisimo Velasco and Quitclaim Thereof) against her children. The case was handled by Atty.
Henedino Eduarte, herein respondent's husband, until his appointment as RTC judge on October 26,
1984. His wife, Atty. Josephine Palogan-Eduarte, took over. On August 22, 1985, decision in Civil Case
No. 391 was rendered in favor of Antonia Ulibari. Except for Dominga Velasco-Ordonio, one of the
children of Antonia Ulibari and complainant in the instant case, the rest of the defendants did not
appeal. On June 13, 1987, while Civil Case No. 391 was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, Antonia
Ulibari conveyed some parcels of her land to her children in the form of deeds of absolute sale,
prepared and notarized by herein respondent. Significantly, on the same day, Antonia Ulibari also
conveyed 20 hectares of land to herein respondent and her husband as their Attorney's fees for legal
services rendered. All the titles of the lands subject of the deeds of absolute sale and the deed of
conveyance however remained in the name of Antonia Ulibari.

On April 4, 1988, Dominga Velasco-Ordonio filed this complaint for disbarment against herein
respondent on the basis of an affidavit executed by her mother Antonia Ulibari on March 2, 1988 stating
that affiant never conveyed the subject parcel of land to respondent as her attorney's fees and that the
deeds of absolute sale executed in favor of her children were not known to her (and that she received
no consideration therefor).

On August 10, 1989, the Investigation Commissioner submitted a report finding the charges to be true
and recommending a one-year suspension of the respondent from the practice of law.

The first issue to be resolved is whether Antonia Ulibari was defrauded into signing the Deed of
Conveyance transferring to her lawyer (herein respondent) the subject parcel of land containing 298,420
square meters as the latter's attorney's fees. It is clear from Antonia Ulibari's affidavit and deposition
that she never conveyed the said land to her lawyer as attorney's fees.

Even granting for the sake argument that Antonia Ulibari knowingly and voluntarily conveyed the
subject property in favor of the respondent and her husband, the respondent, in causing the execution
of the Deed of Conveyance during the pendency of the appeal of the case involving the said property,
has violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code which prohibits lawyers from "acquiring by assignment property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession."

In the case at bar, the property (which includes the more than 20 hectares of land allegedly conveyed to
the respondent) was already in actual litigation first in the lower court and then in the Court of Appeals.
Whether the deed of conveyance was executed at the instance of the client driven by financial necessity
or of the lawyers is of no moment (In re: Atty. Melchor E. Ruste, 70 Phil. 243). "In either case, an
attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate his terms to a harrased client, in breach of
the rule so amply protective of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney
and client, and of the rights of both." The act constitutes malpractice, even if the lawyer had purchased
the property in litigation. (Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775; In re: Calderon, 7 Phil. 427). We agree
with the Investigating Commissioner's opinion that the prohibition applies when the lawyer has not paid
money for it and the property was merely assigned to him in consideration of legal services rendered at
a time when the property is still the subject of a pending case.

For having improperly acquired the subject property, under the foregoing circumstances, respondent
has violated not only Art. 1491 of the Civil Code but also Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
which provides that "the lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation
which he is conducting."

The last issue to be resolved is whether respondent violated any law in preparing and notarizing the
deeds of absolute sale in making it appear that there were considerations therefor, when in truth there
were none so received by the seller. In her answer, respondent admitted that Antonia Ulibari did not
actually sell the parcels of land to her children for the considerations stated in the deeds of sale and that
she (respondent) "utilized the form of deed of sale as the most convenient and appropriate document to
effect the transfer of the parcels of land to Antonia Ulibari's children in accordance with her wish that
said parcels of land be given to them.

In so doing, respondent has manifestly violated that part of her oath as a lawyer that she shall not do
any falsehood. Not only that. In preparing the documents which do not reflect the true transaction,
respondent has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 10.01. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall be
mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.

ACCORDINGLY, for having violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code, respondent is hereby ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, and, for having stated falsehoods in
the four (4) deeds of absolute sale she prepared and notarized, in violation of the lawyer's oath and Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent is also ordered suspended from the
practice or law for a period of another six (6) months, resulting in a total period on one year, effective
from the date this judgment becomes final.

SUSPENSION ORDERED.
AFURONG VS AQUINO

FACTS:
Paraluman B. Afurong filed a complaint for ejectment against Victorino Flores for nonpayment
of rentals and the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner Paraluman Afurong and the court
issued a writ of execution. Facing eviction, Flores sought help from Citizens Legal Assistance Office and
they assigned Atty. Angel G Aquino to his case. He filed two petitions. When the court set a pre-trial, he
filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement and signed his name as counsel for Flores and indicated the
address of Citizens Legal Assistance Office as his office address notwithstanding the fact that he was
separated from Citizens Legal Assistance Office at that time. In the aforesaid motion, he stated that he
could not attend the pre-trial conference because he had to attend the hearing of a Habeas Corpus Case
before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court that same day and hour.

But the Clerk of Court of the JDR Court certified that a decision had been rendered on the
aforementioned special proceedings case and that there was no hearing.

Thus, Afurong filed a verified letter-complaint for disbarment against Aquino, for filing frivolous
harassment cases to delay the execution of a final decision, committing falsehood in an Urgent Motion
for Postponement, and misrepresenting himself as an attorney for the Citizens Legal Assistance Office.

Atty. Aquino denied the charges against him and contended that such acts had been done
without malice.In a Reply, complainant asserted that Atty. Aquino was declared guilty of contempt of
court and correspondingly fined by this Court for making false allegations in his Urgent Motion for
Postponement. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline submitted a Report finding that Aquino failed to
perform his duties expected of an attorney as provided under the existing Canons of Professional Ethics
and Sec. 20 of Rule 138 of the ROC in force at the time of the commission of the acts in question. They
recommended that he be penalized with 6 months suspension. Board of Gov. of the IBP resolved to
adopt and approve the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

ISSUE:
WON Aquino failed to perform his duties expected of an attorney as provided under the existing Canons
of Professional Ethics and Sec. 20 of Rule 138 of the ROC in force at the time of the commission of the
acts in question

RULING:
The Revised Rules of Court provides that it is the duty of an attorney to counsel or maintain such
actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law.

Respondent Atty. Aquino should not have filed a petition for certiorari considering that there
was no apparent purpose for it than to delay the execution of a valid judgment.

Aquino committed falsehood when he stated in his Urgent Motion for Postponement that he
had to attend the hearing of a special proceedings case the same day as the pre-trial of the Civil Case.
Such act violates the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges an attorney to avoid the concealment
of the truth from the court. A lawyer is mandated not to mislead the court in any manner.

Lower court correctly declared respondent in contempt of court for conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, in violation of Section 3 (d),
Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Atty. Aquino purposely allowed the court to believe that he was still employed with the Citizens
Legal Assistance Office when in fact he had been purged from said office.

The Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Angel G. Aquino guilty of malpractice and SUSPENDS
him from the practice of law for six (6) months commencing upon receipt of notice hereof.
MUÑOZ VS CA & DELIA SUTTON

FACTS:
Delia T. Sutton; a member of the Philippine Bar, connected with the law firm of Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap,
Parlade, and Associates. A pleading entitled "Compliance with Resolution" regarding Vicente Muñoz v.
People of the Philippines and the Court of Appeals case, by the aforesaid law firm was filed on August
14, 1971. It betrayed on its face more than just a hint of lack of candor, of minimizing the effects of
grave inaccuracies in the attribution to the Court of Appeals of certain alleged facts not so considered as
such. Atty. Delia Sutton failed to meet the test of candor and honesty required of pleaders when, in a
petition for certiorari prepared by her to review a Court of Appeals decision, she attributed to it a
finding of facts in reckless disregard, to say the least, of what in truth was its version as to what
transpired. The petition quotes, on page 5 thereof, a portion of the decision appealed from, summing
up the evidence for the defense, and makes reference thereto as ‘findings’ of the Court of Appeals,
which is not true; that, on page 6 of the petition, petitioner states, referring to a portion of the same
quotation, that the same ‘are the established and uncontroverted facts recognized by the Court of
Appeals,’ which is, likewise, untrue; that, on page 8 of the petition, it is averred — ‘It being conceded
that the two versions recounted above are by themselves credible, although they are conflicting, the
same cannot be binding on, and is therefore, reviewable by the Honorable Supreme Court. On page 9 of
the petition, it is alleged that the Court of Appeals had ‘affirmed the minimum penalty of one (1) year
and one (1) day imposed by the lower court,’ although, in fact, the minimum penalty imposed by the
trial court was ‘four (4) months of arresto mayor’; the Court resolved to require counsel for the
petitioner to show cause, within ten (10) days from notice, why they should not be dealt with for
contempt of court [or] otherwise subjected to disciplinary action for making the aforementioned
misrepresentations. However, at such a hearing, respondent Delia T. Sutton appeared. While her
demeanor was respectful, it was obvious that she was far from contrite

ISSUE:
Whether Delia Sutton violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by asserting as
finding of fact by the court, which actually is not

RULING:
Yes. She failed to meet the test of candor and honesty required of pleaders when, in a petition
for certiorari prepared by her to review a Court of Appeals decision, she attributed to it a finding of facts
in reckless disregard, to say the least, of what in truth was its version as to what transpired. When given
an opportunity to make proper amends, both in her appearance before the Court and thereafter in her
memorandum, there was lacking any showing of regret for misconduct so obvious and so inexcusable.
Such an attitude of intransigence hardly commends itself. Her liability is clear. Only her relative
inexperience in the ways of the law did save her from a penalty graver than severe censure.
As set forth in the applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing operates more certainly to create
or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full
measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does
the false claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that it is the
duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client’s cause." What is
more, the obligation to the bench, especially to this Court, for candor and honesty takes precedence.
ERECTORS VS NLRC

The private respondent, Danilo Cris, a contract worker as Earthworks Engineer in Taif, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, filed the case with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) on February 27,
1984 for the illegal termination of his contract of employment with the petitioner herein, Erectors, Inc.
The petitioner, as a defense, contended that the private respondent was estopped from questioning the
legality of his termination as he already voluntarily and freely received his termination pay. The POEA,
on September 27,1984, rendered a decision adverse to petitioner, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondents ERECTORS, INC. and SOCIETE AUXILLAIRE
D'ENTERPRISES (S.A.E.) jointly and severally, to pay the complainant, DANILO CRIS the sum of SEVEN
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY SIX DOLLARS AND SIXTY SIX CENTS ($ 7,166.6), or its equivalent in
Philippine Currency at the time of actual payment, representing the unpaid salaries for the unexpired
term of complainant's contract. 1

The decision was received by the petitioner on October 25, 1984. Fifteen days later, or on November 9
of the same year, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). The motion which was treated as an appeal was dismissed by the NLRC
"for having been filed out of time." 2

The petitioner, through counsel, alleged that the respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the case and affirmed that the motion for reconsideration or appeal was seasonably filed
explaining thus:

xxx xxx xxx

While it is true that between 25 October 1984 (date of receipt of the POEA decision) and 09 November
1984 (actual date of filing of petitioner's motion for reconsideration), there were actually fifteen (15)
calendar days, however, it can not be disputed that within said period there were only ten (10) working
days, and five (5) non-working or legal holidays, which were as follows:

October 26, 1984--Saturday

October 27,1984--Sunday

November 1, 1984--All Saint's Day

November 3, 1984--Saturday

November 4,198--Sunday 3

xxx xxx xxx

In support of its contention, the petitioner cited two provisions allegedly of the 1984 POEA rules and
procedures, specifying Rule XXIV, sec. 1, and Rule XXV, sec. 2, thereof, which purportedly provide:

Rule XXV

xxx xxx xxx

Section 2. Finality of Decision, Order or Award — all decisions, orders or award shall become final after
the lapse of ten (10) working days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties and no appeal has been
perfected within same period.

RULE XXIV

Section 1. Motion for Reconsideration. — The aggrieved party may within ten (10) working days from
receipt of the decision, order or resolution of the Administration, may file for a motion for
reconsideration; otherwise, the decision shall be final and executory (Emphasis supplied) 4

These cited rules do not exist. Nowhere in any law or rules relative to the POEA may the above
provisions be found.

The POEA was created only on May 1, 1982 by virtue of Executive Order No. 797. Pursuant to the said
Executive Order, the then Minister of Labor, Blas F. Ople promulgated on September 5, 1983 the POEA
Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment which took effect on January 1, 1984. These 1984 Rules
were superseded on May 21, 1985 by the POEA Rules & Regulations.

For the reason that the petitioner's appeal with the NLRC was filed on November 9,1984, the 1984 Rules
should govern. And this was precisely what the petitioner insisted upon — the POEA rules obtaining in
1984 must be applied. 5 Yet therein, it is clear that the period for perfecting an appeal or a Motion for
Reconsideration is ten (10) calendar days. The pertinent rule on the matter is found in Book VII, Rule 5,
of the 1984 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment (POEA/MOLE) to wit:

Section 1. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR APPEAL. The aggrieved party may, within ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of the decision, order or resolution file a motion for reconsideration
which shall specify in detail the particular errors and objections, otherwise the decision shall be final and
executory. Such motion for reconsideration shall be treated as an appeal as provided in this Rule
otherwise the same shall not be entertained.

The above rule is expressed in a language so simple and precise that there is no necessity to interpret it.

Moreover, as early as 1982, this Court, in the landmark case of Vir-Jen Shipping & Marine Services, Inc.
vs. NLRC6 construed the ten (10) day period for filing of appeals7 from decisions of Labor Arbiters or
compulsory arbitrators as ten (10) calendar days, as well as the raison d' etre for the shorter period,
thus:

xxx xxx xxx

...if only because We believe that it is precisely in the interest of labor that the law has commanded that
labor cases be promptly, if not peremptorily, disposed of. Long periods for any acts to be done by the
contending parties can be taken advantage of more by management than by labor. Most labor claims
are decided in their favor and management is generally the appellant. Delay, in most instances, gives the
employers more opportunity not only to prepare even ingenious defense, what with well-paid talented
lawyers they can afford, but even to wear out the efforts and meager resources of the workers, to the
point that not infrequently the latter either give up or compromise for less than what is due them.

xxx xxx xxx

The POEA rule applicable in this case is precisely in consonance with the above ruling in that it expressed
in no uncertain terms that the period for appeal is ten (10) calendar days. For "not even the Secretary of
Labor has the power to amend or alter in any material sense whatever the law itself unequivocably
specifies or fixes." 8

There is, thus, no doubt that the law mandates that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or
appeal with the NLRC is ten (10) calendar days and not ten (10) working days.

It is, therefore, obvious that the counsels for the petitioner deliberately tried to mislead this Court if
only to suit their client's ends. On this regard, said counsels have much explaining to do.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Resolution of
the public respondent, dated December 28, 1984, AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued
by this Court on July 10, 1985 is hereby LIFTED. The counsels for the petitioner are also admonished for
foisting a non-existent rule with the warning that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely. With triple costs against the petitioner.
ADEZ REALITY VS CA

FACTS:
1.In a SC resolution, it directed Atty. Benjamin Dacanay counsel for petitioner Adez Realty, Inc., to
"SHOW CAUSE within 5 days from notice why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for intercalating a
material fact in the judgment of the court a quo thereby altering and modifying its factual findings with
the apparent purpose of misleading the SC in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus failing to
live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar.

2.In his defense, he humbly submitted to the court and threw himself at its mercy. He explained that
whenever he prepares pleadings, he dictates to his secretary and if portions of the decision or order to
be appealed from have to be quoted, he simply instructs his said secretary to copy the particular pages
of the said decision or order. In the case at bar, he did instruct his secretary to copy the corresponding
pages in the decision of the CA. Somehow, however, some words were intercalated on a particular
paragraph. He reasoned that it was his secretary who was at fault.

3.His secretary attached an Affidavit supporting the explanation made by Dacanay and admitted that it
was her who committed the error.

ISSUE:
WON Atty. Dacanay should be disbarred for intercalating a material fact in a judicial decision.

HELD:
4.YES. It is the bounden duty of lawyers to check, review and recheck the allegations in their pleadings,
more particularly the quoted portions, and ensure that the statements therein are accurate and the
reproductions faithful, down to the last word and even punctuation mark. The legal profession demands
that lawyers thoroughly go over pleadings, motions and other documents dictated or prepared by them,
typed or transcribed by their secretaries or clerks, before filing them with the court. If a client is bound
by the acts of his counsel, with more reason should counsel be bound by the acts of his secretary who
merely follows his orders.

5.The distortion of facts committed by counsel, with the willing assistance of his secretary, is a grave
offense and should not be treated lightly, not only because it may set a dangerous precedent but,
rather, because it is a clear and serious violation of one’s oath as a member of the Bar. Rule 10.02,
Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility directs that “[a] lawyer shall not
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing
counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.”

6.Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the text of a court decision constitutes willful disregard of the
lawyer’s solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never
venture to mislead the court by false statements or quotations of facts or laws. Thus, in Bautista v.
Gonzales, We suspended respondent for six (6) months for, among others, submitting to the lower court
falsified documents, representing them to be true copies. In Chavez v. Viola, We suspended respondent
counsel for five (5) months after he filed an Amended Application for Original Registration of Title which
contained false statements.

WHEREFORE, We find ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel for petitioner, guilty of intercalating a
material fact in a judicial Decision elevated to Us on certiorari, thereby altering its factual findings with
the apparent purpose, and no other, of misleading the Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment,
and thus miserably failing to live up to the standards expected of him as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Consequently, ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is hereby DISBARRED effective immediately from the
practice of law.
AGUINALDO VS AGUINALDO

Any effort on the part of a litigant to delay, if not to defeat, the enforcement of a final judgment,
executory in character, by raising an objection that at best hardly rises to the level of a technicality is not
likely to elicit the sympathy of this Court or of any court for that matter. Yet, in effect, that is what the
move taken by defendants in this case amounted to. The lower court as was but proper did not lend its
approval. Still undeterred, they would appeal. They ought to have known better. There is no reason to
refuse affirmance to the order of the lower court com-plained of, appointing appellants as legal
representatives of the deceased defendant and substituted in his place pursuant to the Rules of Court in
order that the execution that ought to have taken place long since could at long last be effected.

There is no dispute as to the antecedents. On January 14, 1965, the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch II through its clerk issued a writ of execution reciting that as far back as March 31, 1958,
it rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs,[1] now appellees, requiring one of the defendants therein,
Segundo Aguinaldo, to reconvey one-fourth (1/4) pro-indiviso of the property in litigation to appellees,
and to pay the latter the amount of P300.00 yearly beginning with the year 1955. There was an appeal.
The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on May 23, 1965. It was further set forth therein that
on January 5, 1965, a motion for its execution was granted. Hence the writ of execution. On February
13 of the same year, one Cecilio Aguinaldo filed an urgent ex parte manifestation and motion to quash
such writ of execution based primarily on the allegation that defendant Segundo Aguinaldo died on
August 7, 1959 during the pendency of such appeal. There was an opposition to such motion on
February 25, 1965, inviting attention to Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that in the
event of the death of a party to a pending case, it is the duty of his attorney to give the name and
residence of his executor, administrator, guardian, or their legal representative and alleging that there
was a failure on the part of counsel to comply with the above provision. The prayer was for the denial
of the motion of Cecilio Aguinaldo and for an order requiring counsel for the defendants to furnish the
court the names as well as the residences of the heirs or legal representatives of the deceased in order
that they could be substituted in his stead so as not to render nugatory a decision, final and executory in
character. On March 4, 1965, the lower court, then presided by the Hon. Ricardo C. Puno, gave counsel
of record up to March 22, 1965 within which to submit the name and residence of the executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representative of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo. The aforesaid
counsel in turn merely manifested on March 23, 1965 that he had ceased to be such as of May 31, 1956,
and that such a pleading be considered sufficient compliance with the aforesaid order. Considering the
turn of events, plaintiffs, in order that such a decision in their favor be not rendered nugatory by the
above technicality, had no choice but to ask the court in a motion of April 7, 1965 to have the heirs of
the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo, defendants Cecilio, Anastacia, Simplicio and Domingo, all bearing the
surname of Aguinaldo being the legitimate children, and one Felicitas Bagawisan, a granddaughter,
substituted as defendants. On October 5, 1965, the lower court, this time presided by Judge Andres Sta.
Maria, granted the aforesaid motion and substituted defendants in place of the deceased Segundo
Aguinaldo.
 Hence this appeal to the Court of Appeals, which in turn by resolution of February 17, 1969
certified the matter to this Court, the question involved being one of law. As noted at the outset, we
find for appellees.

1. It would be the height of unreason to impute error to the lower court precisely for
embodying in the order complained of what is set forth in the Rules of Court. Thus: "Whenever a party
to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to
inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and
residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative."[2] Had the defendant,
thereafter deceased, seen to it that a new counsel was appointed, then upon his death there could be
compliance with the above provision. To cause plaintiffs to suffer for such neglect of duty is to cast an
undeserved reflection on the law. It is equally vital to remember that the judgment had become final
and the stage of execution reached. Defendants cannot be heard to allege that it is much too late now
to apply the above rule. That would be to set at naught the principle consistently adhered to by this
Court.

It was succinctly put in Amor v. Jugo[3] in these words: "And with more compelling reason the
respondent court cannot refuse to issue such writ, or quash it or order its stay, when the judgment had
been reviewed and affirmed by an appellate court, for it cannot review or interfere with any matter
decided on appeal, or give other or further relief, or assume supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or
reverse the judgment of the higher court."[4] What was said by us in Li Kim Tho v. Sanchez[5] is worth
recalling: "Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning
party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore
guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them."[6] An excerpt from Villaflor v.
Reyes[7] is equally relevant: "There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time
of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far
from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as
shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious
and indisputable."[8]

2. This appeal, moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an insubstantial objection bereft of

any persuasive force. Defendants had to display ingenuity to conjure a technicality. From Alonso v.
Villamor,[9] a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt as to our disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a
lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rules are precisely designed to
accomplish such a worthy objective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which
they are intended deserves condemnation. We have done so before. We do so again.
ECONOMIC INSURANCE CO VS UY REALITY CO

In this special proceeding for prohibition, petitioner Economic Insurance Co., Inc. would impute a grave
jurisdictional defect to an order of the then respondent Judge Gaudencio Cloribel granting a motion of
the other respondent Uy Realty Company for a writ of execution against petitioner for the amount
represented by its supersedes bond "covering rentals rightfully due" the other respondent as plaintiff in
the ejectment case. By its stress on the claim that the above order of August 26, 1967 was issued
notwithstanding the finality of a previous order of dismissal of the case by respondent Judge, it was
enabled not only to have this Court give due course to such petition, but also to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction upon posting a bond of P1,000.00. The answer filed by respondents altered the
picture thus sedulously sought to be created by petitioner. It was apparent therein that previous to such
order of dismissal, there was a motion by respondent Uy Realty Company for the dismissal of the case
and for the payment of the back rentals secured by the supersedes bond filed by petitioner. Respondent
Judge, however, limited his first order to ordering the dismissal, apparently overlooking the prayer for
the payment of the back rentals guaranteed by the supersedes bond. Thereafter, within the thirty-day
period, respondent sought for an amendment of the above order to include execution on the bond filed
to cover the past rentals due. The order now challenged was the result thereof. It was issued at a time
when the matter was still subject to cognizance by respondent Judge. It would thus appear that this
petition lacks merit. We find for Respondents. The order granting the writ of execution by respondent
Judge is sustained.

As shown by the petition itself, there was a complaint for ejectment dated August 12, 1966 filed by now
respondent Uy Realty Company against a certain Co Hing. 1 There was an answer by defendant on
August 27, 1966, seeking dismissal of such a suit as well as a counterclaim for reimbursement in the
amount of P15,000.00 for alleged improvements made on the leased premises and for damages in the
amount of P5,000.00 for alleged bad faith on the part of the lessor. 2 The decision of the City Court of
Manila of October 20, 1966 ordered the defendant and those claiming under him to vacate the premises
as well as to pay the sum of P4,100.00 representing rents in arrears plus the sum of P1,500.00 a month
beginning September, 1966 for the use and occupation of such premises. 3 Upon an appeal being taken,
which fell to the sala of respondent Judge, a supersedes bond was executed by such defendant as well
as by the petitioner, the Economic Insurance Co., Inc. 4

During the pendency of such appeal, under date of July 31, 1967, a motion for dismissal of the case and
for payment of the supersedeas bond was filed by the plaintiff, respondent Uy Realty Co. It was alleged
therein: "1. That on June 23, 1967, upon failure of the defendant to make the required rental deposits to
comply with the pro visions of Sec. 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, this Honorable Court, upon motion
of undersigned counsel, issued a Writ of Ejectment Execution against the defendant; 2. That counsel for
the defendant did not raise any objection to the enforcement of said writ of execution by the Sheriff of
Manila whereupon said officer placed the plaintiff in possession of the leased premises subject to this
appeal; 3. That defendant having vacated the leased premises and possession thereof having been
surrendered to the plaintiff, the legal issues subject of this appeal have therefore become moot and the
continuation of the trial set for August 2, 1967 will not serve any purpose; 4. That defendant, upon
surrender of the premises to the plaintiff, manifested that he has no longer any interest in the further
prosecution of this case and would have no objection to the dismissal thereof; 5. That on November 23,
1966, defendant filed Supersedeas Bond No. 567 for P8,800.00 thru the Economic Insurance Company,
Inc. to enter the action into this Honorable Court, said bond having for its purpose to guarantee the
payment to the plaintiff of the accrued rentals up to the time of judgment in the City Court of Manila,
including damages, attorney’s fees and costs; 6. That plaintiff is, as of right, entitled to the withdrawal of
the amount covered by the aforementioned supersedeas bond in view of the dismissal of this appealed
case." 5 It sought in the prayer that" (a) this appealed case be dismissed; and (b) that the Economic
Insurance Co., Inc. be ordered to pay to herein plaintiff the amount of P8,800.00 guaranteed by the
Supersedeas Bond No. 567 filed in this case representing rentals, damages and costs as adjudged by the
City Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 151874 in favor of plaintiff." 6

Then came this order of respondent Judge of August 2, 1967: "Upon motion of the plaintiff in view of
the fact that the possession of the property, subject matter of this litigation, has been restored to the
plaintiff, the defendants having vacated the same, this case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs."
7 It was noted in the answer that on August 22, 1967, the aforesaid order of dismissal of respondent
Judge being received by respondent Uy Realty Company only on August 15, 1967, there was a
manifestation and motion to execute bond to this effect: "1. That on August 1, 1967, the undersigned
counsel filed with this Honorable Court their ‘Motion for Dismissal and For Payment of Supersedeas
Bond’; 2. That on August 2, 1967, this Honorable Court issued an Order dismissing the instant case as
prayed for by undersigned counsel but did not resolve the prayer for the payment of the amount
represented by the Supersedeas Bond in this case; 3. That the records of this case will show that on
November 23, 1966, defendant filed with this Honorable Court through the Economic Insurance
Company, Inc. Supersedeas Bond No. 567 for the amount of P8,800.00 which represents accrued rentals
due the herein plaintiff up to the time of judgment in the ejectment case rendered by the City Court of
Manila; 4. That considering the dismissal of this case, plaintiff is entitled as of right to the payment of
the amount represented by the aforementioned Supersedeas Bond as rentals due and owing to the
plaintiff before this case was elevated to this Honorable Court on appeal; 5. That the Economic
Insurance Co., Inc. has been duly notified of plaintiff’s Motion for the payment of the Supersedeas Bond
as of August 1, 1967 and the undersigned counsel has not been served with any opposition thereto" 8
The prayer was for a writ of execution to be issued against now petitioner for the amount represented
by its supersedeas bond covering rentals rightfully due respondent Uy Realty Company. That was the
basis. The result thereof was the challenged order of August 26, 1967, granting the prayer for a writ of
execution against petitioner "for the amount represented by its Supersedeas Bond covering rentals
rightfully due to the plaintiff." 9

Petitioner does not deny, possibly because it could not deny, its liability on the supersedeas bond. It did
not even oppose the motion for its execution. Its objection is that the order of August 26, 1967 was
issued at a time when the matter was outside the jurisdiction of respondent Judge, the case having been
dismissed. It is on the legal proposition, and that proposition alone, that it seeks to make out a case for
prohibition. If the motion of respondent Uy Realty Co. sought merely the dismissal of the case, the
premises having been vacated, then perhaps the case for petitioner, such as it is, would have been
bolstered. As clearly pointed out, however, the motion precisely sought that petitioner be ordered to
pay the amount of P8,800.00 guaranteed by the supersedeas bond. Unfortunately, through haste or
inadvertence, respondent Judge ignored that portion and merely ordered that the appealed case be
dismissed. Within the period, however, before such order attained the stage of finality, a modification
thereof was secured as a result of a manifestation and a motion of respondent Uy Realty Co. to execute
on the bond filed by petitioner. Under the circumstances, what respondent Judge did was clearly within
his authority, and the challenged order can stand the test of the most exacting scrutiny. Hence, this
petition should fail.

One last observation. It is understandable for a party in the situation of petitioner to make full use of
every conceivable legal defense the law allows it. In the appraisal, however, of such attempts to evade
liability to which a party like petitioner should respond, it must ever be kept in mind that procedural
rules are intended as an aid to justice, not as a means for its frustration. Even if the petition were
impressed with a greater degree of plausibility, it would be, considering all the circumstances, to crown
with success an unworthy scheme to evade a just obligation by perverting the ends procedural
requisites are intended to accomplish. Not once but several times, from Alonso v. Villamor, 10 we have
stressed that we are not to lend the imprimatur of our approval to any such effort, the result of which
would be to render illusory substantive rights. We do so again. Technicalities, in the appropriate
Language of Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the situation." 11

WHEREFORE, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by us by virtue of our resolution of September 25,
1967 is set aside, and this petition for prohibition is denied. With costs against petitioner Economic
Insurance Co., Inc.
IN RE: SOTTO

FACTS:

Atty. Vicente Sotto was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt in
connection with his written statement of the Supreme Court's decision in the matter of Angel Parazo's
case, which was published in Manila Times and in other newspapers in the locality.

Sotto was given ten days more besides the five originally given him to file his answer, and
although his answer was filed after the expiration of the period of time given him the said answer was
admitted. He does not deny the authenticity of the statement as it has been published. He however,
contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court
the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, the Supreme Court has has
no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and it can only impose fines and
imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief
Executive. He also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by
the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with
no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his
opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the
honesty or integrity of any one.”

Issue:

Whether or not Sotto is guilty of contempt.

HELD:

The Court finds that the respondent Sotto knowingly published false imputations against its members.
He accused them of such depravity as to have committed "blunders and injustices deliberately." He has
maliciously branded them to be incompetent, narrow-minded, perpetrators of evil, "a constant peril to
liberty and democracy," to be the opposite of those who were the honor and glory of the Philippines
judiciary, to be needing a lesson in law, to be rendering an intolerable sentence, to be needing
replacement by better qualified justices.

Respondent has not presented any evidence or offered any to support his slanderous imputations, and
no single word can be found in his answer showing that he ever believed that the imputations are based
on fact.

It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be
respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken
from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.
ZALDIVAR VS SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:
The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from
investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the adoption
of the 1987 Constitution, respondent’s powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded by the creation of
the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only
conduct an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in
the Issue raised in the Court. This include: (a)That he had been approached twice by a leading member
of the court and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was
approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the
Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned
respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the
cases against two Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the SC’s order
'"heightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because the
people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free” was publicized
in leading newspapers.
Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be punished for
contempt of court for making such public statements reported in the media. Respondent then sought to
get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of the Zaldivar case for alleged
bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from
passing upon the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this
Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. The Court found
respondent guilty of contempt of court and indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Now, he
assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for
this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in
disciplinary and contempt charges."
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression.
Held:
There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it
was simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety
of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that
the statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner
and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. What is here at
stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not
only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the
broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards
of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has some
implications to the society.
TIONGCO VS AGUILAR

Facts:

1. Atty. Jose Tiongco was charged for violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He characterized the decision of respondent Judge as “having been crafted in order to fool the winning
party”; as a “hypocritical judgment in plaintiff’s favour”; one with “perfidious character.”

2. Tiongco described respondent as a liar, perjurer or blasphemer

Ruling:

1. The duty contemplated in Canon 11 is closely entwined with his vow in the lawyer’s oath “to
conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to the courts,” his duty under Section 20(b) of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court “to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers,” and his duty under the first canon “to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not
for the sake of temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance.

2. The use of unnecessary /offensive and abusive/abrasive and offensive language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration or tends
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the members of the Court and
to degrade the administration of justice by the Court.

3. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in making the false and malicious
insinuation against this Court. Such could only come from anger, if not hate, after he was not given
what he wanted. Anger or hate could only come from one who seems to be of that frame of mind
whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own
opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his views.

4. Tiongco was ordered to pay fine of Php 5,000 plus warning.

LACSON VS CA

In the resolution of 13 July 1994, this Court (a) denied with finality the motion to reconsider the
resolution of 11 May 1994 which denied the instant petition for the failure of the petitioners to
sufficiently show that the respondent court committed any reversible error in rendering the challenged
decision, and (b) directed the counsel for the petitioners, Atty. Mario G. Fortes, to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt of court and declared liable for misconduct for his "apparently malicious
and unfounded accusation that this Court did not read the petition and for craftily suppressing from the
body of the petition the final decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 11465.
In his compliance dated 6 August 1994, Atty. Fortes admitted the charge but tried to explain that:
2 — This is the first time that counsel filed a petition of this kind and nature. The latest resolution
has greatly enlightened counsel and broaden its (sic) outlook on the kind and nature of a petition that
counsel might file in the future.
and justified his outbursts and offered his apology thus:
6 — In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, considering counsel was only motivated
with his enthusiasm to protect the interest if his clients, verily those statements were made without
malice. Counsel was grateful to the Highest Tribunal for its enlightening Resolution. It is with deep regret
that this things happened. Counsel sincerely offers his apologies for the wrong done to the Supreme
Court. Counsel assures this Honorable Court that this incident will not be repeated. Counsel also
promises to be more discreet in his statements in his pleadings.
In the resolution of 12 September 1994, the Court required Atty. Fortes to manifest whether he was
willing to submit the matter on the basis of the pleadings already filed. He asserted in the affirmative in
a manifestation dated 15 October 1994.
The contempt aspect of this case arose from the motion for reconsideration of 6 June 1994 which Atty.
Fortes filed. He sought therein the reconsideration of the resolution of 11 May 1994 which he denied
the instant petition. He contends that "the petition was denied wholly on the basis of technicality"; that
the "denial did not consider the fraud sought to be stopped"; and that in peremptorily denying the
petition, this Court disregarded the purpose of judicial proceedings, i.e., "to seek the truth," even as it is
"unusual that the Resolution failed on this aspect," and upheld" the fake and falsified OCT No. 730 of the
Tuazons." He further stated therein that:
[i]t pained the petitioners and their counsel to surmise that nobody cared to read the Petition. If they
did they refused to understand the arguments in order not to blur the preconceived resolution of this
case.
In the aforementioned resolution of 13 July 1994, this Court said:
While the motion could be easily treated as mere scrap of paper for lack of proof of proper service
thereof on the adverse parties, in view of the aforesaid charges, however, this Court chose to take
action thereon.
The petition was not dismissed on the basis of technicality and it is completely untrue that it was not
read by the Court. The petition, including its annexes, was carefully read, and this Court took pains to
consider the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced therein. It reached the conclusion that the
petitioners have failed to sufficiently show that the respondent Court had committed any reversible
error in rendering the challenged decision. The petitioners' counsel should know, or ought to know, the
nature, character, and scope of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. He should
have, moreover, been candid enough in the petition for review to disclose in its body the fact that CA-
G.R. SP No. 30319, which is the subject of the instant petition, is actually a petition to annul the same
decision of Branch 158 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 81736
which petitioner Aguido Lacson, Jr. appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11465 and which the
latter (Thirteenth Division) affirmed in toto in its decision of 11 November 1992. This decision became
final on 27 November 1992. Entry of judgment was then made on 11 January 1993 [Rollo, 23]. In
Criminal Case No. 81736, petitioner Aguido Lacson, Jr., was found guilty of the violation of Section 1 of
P.D. No. 772 (Anti-Squatting Law) and was sentenced to pay a fine of P5,000.00; however, his wife,
Loreta Quitalig, now his co-petitioner, and two other accused were acquitted. We gathered these facts
only from Annex "A" of the instant petition, which is the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
(Fourteenth Division) in CA-G.R. SP No. 30319, wherein the Court of Appeals stated:
One Last point. It bears reiterating that the decision in Criminal Case No. 81736, which petitioners
sought to annul, is the very same decision which was affirmed in toto by this Court, through its
Thirteenth Division, on November 11, 1992 in CA-G.R. CR No. 11465. Therefore, this Division, the
Fourteenth Division, to which the instant petition was raffled, is in no position to nullify a final judgment
issued by a co-equal and coordinate Division, the former Thirteenth Division. On this ground alone, the
petitioner must fail. (Rollo, 28).
The suppression of the antecedents must have been deliberate since counsel for the petitioners must
have known that a voluntary disclosure thereof in the body of the instant petition would be fatal to the
petitioner's cause.
This Court further observed that petitioner Loreta Quitalig, having not joined, for obvious reason, the
appeal therefrom by her husband, was not a party in CA-G. R. CR No. 11465. Clearly then, she could not
join her husband to challenge the said decision in this case.
Finally, the instant petition concentrates its fire on the alleged fake PCT No. 730. unfortunately, CA-G. R.
SP No. 30319 is hardly the proper remedy to nullify it. Counsel for petitioners should know, or ought to
know, what the proper remedy is.
Indisputably then, Atty. Fortes' assertions in the motion for reconsideration that the petition was denied
wholly on technically; that the Court's peremptory denial disregarded the purpose of judicial
proceedings, which is to seek the truth; that the Court upheld the fake and falsified OCT No. 730 of the
Tuazons; and, worse, that the Members of the Court did not read the petition or that if they did, they
simply refused to understand the arguments "in order not to blur [their] preconceived resolution of this
case," are patently unfounded and malicious. His sole purpose was to show and prove his clients that he
was all the time correct and this Court dismally wrong not only for veering away from the true purpose
of judicial proceedings and suppressing the truth and upholding and illegal title, but, worse, for not even
reading the petition or if it did, for not understanding it in order to hide its prejudgment of the case. In
so doing upon a matrix of false and unfounded premises, Atty. Fortes did an immeasurable disservice to
this Court by putting it into dishonor, disrespect, and public contempt, diminishing public confidence or
promoting distrust in the Court, and assailing the integrity of its Members and even charging them
without violating their duty to render justice.
Thus, Atty. Fortes deliberately disregarded or ignored his solemn oath to conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts and his duties
to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Section 20, Rule
138, Rules of Court; Canon 11, Code of Professional Responsibility), observe candor, fairness and good
faith to the courts (Canon 10, Code of Professional Responsibility), and to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance (Canon 1, Canons of Professional Ethics).
In Salcedo vs. Hernandez (61 Phil. 724, 728-729 [1935]), this Court had already the occasion to state:
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in
duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has
conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he
now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he
neither created nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from
harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining
the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved
turn for protection and relief.
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so
with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to
exercise by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity
of the courts require. The reason for this is that respect of the courts require respect. The reason for this
is that respect of the courts guarantee the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said
institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
and in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel (31 SCRA 1, 16-17 [1970]), this Court said:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the
ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity,
not to promote distrusts in the administration of justice. Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to
preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus has it had been said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice. (citations omitted)
His explanation that this is the first petition he has filed with this Court and his justification that he was
only motivated by his enthusiasm to protect the interests of his clients are unacceptable. On the
contrary, if this was indeed the first petition he has filed with this Court, he should have striven for the
best and demonstrated utmost candor to and respect for the Court. Instead, he tried to hide the futility
of his clients cause by suppressing vital facts in the petition. As to his enthusiasm to protect his clients'
interest , he should be reminded of what this Court had said in Surigao Mineral reservation Board:
A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. lawyers must
always keep in perspective the though that [s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound
servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients as many suppose, but to the administration of
justice; to this, their client's success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics' [5 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1966 ed., p. 69,
citing In re Kelly, 243 F. 696, 706].
WHEREFORE, for his violations of his oath of office, Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the Code
of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, ATTY. MARIO G. FORTES is hereby
ORDERED to pay a FINE of Two Thousand Pesos(P2,000.00) and WARNED that the commission of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
GO VS CA 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner was arrested and booked for frustrated murder but the information was upgraded to murder
following the victim’s death. Respondent judge initially allowed petitioner to post bail but later recalled
the order, directed petitioner to surrender and cancelled the order granting leave for the prosecutor to
conduct a preliminary investigation. Petitioner then filed a motion to suspend proceedings and transfer
verue outside of Metro Manila which was denied. Respondent judge also denied petitioner’s motion for
recusation.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not respondent judge should inhibit from the case for being partial to the prosecution.

RULING:

NO. The divergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party’s counsel, as to applicable
laws and jurisdiction, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the case on the
ground of bias and manifest partiality.

Motion for reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.

BOQUIREN VS DEL ROSARIO CRUZ

This administrative complaint stemmed from Civil Case No. 111 entitled Alex Boquiren, et. al. vs.
Mariano Gutierrez, for ejectment and damages, where complainant Atty. Felixberto N. Boquiren was the
plaintiff's counsel. Atty. Saturnino V. Bactad, the defendant's counsel and the incumbent vice-governor
of the province, and Judge Emperatriz del Rosario-Cruz and Atty. Melinda D. Gatdula, the judge and
clerk of court respectively of the Municipal Trial Court, San Antonio, Zambales where the
aforementioned civil case was docketed. Judge Cruz dismissed the ejectment suit due to plaintiff's lack
of cause of action which complainant, Atty. Boquiren, seasonably appealed to the Regional Trial Court
Branch 70 of Iba, Zambales. On July 5, 1993 Atty. Boquiren filed an administrative complaint against
Judge Cruz and Atty. Gatdula for misconduct, partiality, serious nonfeasance, culpable dereliction of
duty and ignorance of the law relative to the disposition of civil case no. 111.

On the other hand, Atty. Bactad, the defendant's counsel, was charged by the complainant with false
representation and employing scheme to defeat the application of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure the latter alleging Atty. Bactad's claim and false representation that a motion to dismiss is an
allowable pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Proceedings.

On January 26, 1994 the Court "DISMISSED the case without prejudice to the refiling of an
administrative case at the proper time, it appearing that the case is on appeal with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 70, Iba, Zambales where relief is available". On February 18, 1994 complainant Atty.
Boquiren filed a motion for its reconsideration.

On March 2, 1994 the Court dismissed the complaint for not having been verified and for its failure to
show prima facie case against respondent Atty. Gatdula. In reaction thereto, complainant Atty. Boquiren
filed a motion for reconsideration dated March 26, 1994.

We find these two motions for reconsideration devoid of merit.

Civil Case No. 111 from which the subject administrative complaint stemmed has distinct facts from the
latter but the subject administrative complaint can hardly be taken into isolation. We deemed it proper,
as we had properly resolved in our January 26, 1994 Resolution, to dismiss the subject administrative
complaint without prejudice since Civil Case No. 111 is now on appeal with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 70, Iba, Zambales. Necessarily, the appeal of Civil Case No. 111 includes all incidents that
occurred from the initial filing of the complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer on June 5, 1992 up to the
MTC Decision dated February 26, 1993 dismissing said complaint. In fact, a cursory reading of Atty.
Boquiren's appeal before the Regional Trial Court shows that he devoted at least twenty pages in his
twenty-six page appeal statement detailing the incidents, perceived improper conduct, orders,
proceedings, misrepresentation, misapprehension of facts, ignorance of the law and rules of procedure
allegedly all evidencing the culpability of the Judge, the Clerk of Court and the defendant's counsel for
administrative offenses. We note that these are the same grounds that now constitute the bases of the
subject administrative complaint. The issues and matters raised therein were purely judicial in nature
which an appeal can adequately and properly address. The alleged errors committed by Judge Cruz
relative to the disposition of a case are at best errors of judgment and can be amply remedied by any
aggrieved party without recourse to the subject administrative complaint. Besides, it is a matter of
public policy that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous (Revita v. Rimando,
98 SCRA 619 [1980]). More important, any finding that this Court would make relative to the
administrative complaint would undoubtedly influence and affect the outcome of Atty. Boquiren's
appeal. Needless to say, this would constitute an unwarranted judicial interference and sway the
Regional Trial Court's dispensation of the appeal which we cannot allow to happen.

The Court strongly notes the excessive prose employed by complainant Atty. Boquiren in his Motions for
Reconsideration describing the Court's Resolutions as: "highly questionable"; "based on insufficient or
incorrect reasons"; "a classic arbituarily concluded resolution", "a glaring violation of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics"; "pregnant with aptness to mislead, deceptive or delusive quality"; "patently erroneous";
"a BRAZEN LIE and MOCKERY OF JUSTICE" "classic carelessness, inefficiency, if not lack of industry on the
part of Special Asst. to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the 3rd Div. and/or to the adjudication
officer/office"; "mirror[ing] the Adjudicating Tribunal's and/or its staff's BRAZEN MOCKERY OF JUSTICE
with their gross violation of the PUBLIC INTEREST POLICY of the State" [Emphasis in the original]

It appears prima facie that the foregoing words are aimed at seriously undermining the integrity of this
Court. Complainant seems to have forgotten his duty, as a lawyer and as an officer of the court, to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers (Canon 11, Code of Professional
Responsibility).

ACCORDINGLY, finding the motions for reconsideration without merit the same are hereby DISMISSED.
Complainant Atty. Felixberto N. Boquiren, however, is hereby ordered to explain within five (5) days
from receipt of this Resolution why he should not be cited for contempt and/or subject to disciplinary
action.
ACME SHOE RUBBER & PLASTIC CORPORATION VS CA

FACTS:

In June 1978, Acme Shoe, Rubber & Plastic Corporation executed a chattel mortgage in favor of
Producers Bank of the Philippines in consideration of a loan in the amount of P3 million. The loan was
paid. Thereafter, Producers Bank extended another P2.7 million loan to Acme. The same was paid. In
1984, Producers Bank extended a P1 million loan to Acme. This time, Acme was unable to pay and
eventually, Producers Bank foreclosed the property subject of the chattel mortgage executed in June
1978.

Acme opposed the foreclosure as it alleged that the 1984 loan was no longer covered by the chattel
mortgage of 1978. Acme is also asking for moral damages (worth P3 million) for the groundless
foreclosure done by Producers Bank.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Acme Shoe is entitled to moral damages.

HELD:

No. It is true that the chattel mortgage executed in 1978 for the initial P3 million loan only covers the
initial loan and not the 1984 P1 million loan. However, Acme Shoes is not entitled to moral damages.
Moral damages are granted in recompense for physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. A
corporation, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, has no feelings,
no emotions, no senses; therefore, it cannot experience physical suffering and mental anguish. Mental
suffering can be experienced only by one having a nervous system and it flows from real ills, sorrows,
and griefs of life — all of which cannot be suffered by Acme Shoes as an artificial person.
PEOPLE VS CARILLO

The appellant was found guilty of murder by the Court of First Instance of Cebu and was sentence to
reclusion perpetua with the accessories of law and to pay the heirs of the deceased an indemnity of
P2,000 and costs.

Defendant admits the commission of the crime charged. The dispute centers on the manner and the
motive of the killing.

The evidence for the prosecution consist of Exhibit A, defendant's confession made in answer to
question propounded by Capt. F.M. Palanca, a former guerrilla officer attached to the Philippine Army,
and Exhibit B, another confession in which he ratified Exhibit A, also in the form of questions and
answers, before Assistant City Fiscal Cesar Kintanar of the City of Cebu. In his first confession, the
accused stated that he had killed Pastor Calma in the early evening of June 29, 1945, at the Philippine
Independent Church cemetery by shooting him with a carbine. He said his reason for taking Calma's life
was "because of my hatred against him when he tried to arrest and take me to the Jap kempetai, last
year, 1944." He added that Calma "not only held my neck but he also slapped me about three times and
at the same time inquired from me the reason of my hanging around his place."

By way of corroboration, Jorge Dapat that, while talking with friends he heard shooting and then saw
many people gathering at the Philippine Independent Church cemetery. He went to the place, which
was near defendant's house, and saw Pastor Calma dead. About a minute later, Silvestre Carillo with an
American MP arrived. The American MP asked Carillo whether he was the one who shot Pastor Calma,
and Carillo answered yes, but witness did not hear the other questions which the American MP asked
defendant.

At the trial, defendant gave an entirely different version of the killing. He said he was a soldier; had been
one since 1943. He sought to prove that Calma was an escaped prisoner, having run away from the
stockade where he had been confined as a former Japanese-employed undercover, and that when he
tried to arrest Calma, the latter resisted. Calma, he said, started to rush against him to wrest his gun.
Asked how he happened to sign Exhibit A, defendant answered that as Palanca was a captain and he
was a mere buck private, he did not more than obey Palanca's order. He declared that in the office of
the American MP he had been told to make a statement and an American had struck him in the head.
He further said he did not read Exhibit B, his statements before Fiscal Cesar Kintanar; that he signed it
because he was not aware of its contents. He denied that this exhibit was translated to him. He swore
that he appeared in the City Fiscal's office because he had been cited and that the fiscal suggested he
plead guilty in order that he might be used as a government witness against Calma's wife whom the
Fiscal was planning to prosecute.

Jorge Dapat testifying for the defense stated that Calma was shot because he was an escaped prisoner
and "because, as I have known, he did not want to be brought back alive to the jail," and that Calma
himself told him this at Rosing's house.
It is obvious that appellant's confession as transcribed in Exhibit A was freely made. No violence
intimidation or duress is alleged to have been employed by Capt. Palanca to wring this confession
against accused's will. The reason given by defendant for repudiating Exhibit A — that he could not
refuse Captain Palanca's order to sign it because Palanca was his superior in rank — leaves out
unexplained the all — important question why he made the statements themselves which are set forth
in that document.

If an American MP hit the accused in the head, as the latter declared, that incident, if true, does not
seem to have direct relation to his examination by Captain Palanca. The inference we drew from his
vague and unexplicit testimony on this point is that his experience with the American military police was
in an investigation conducted before he was turned over to the Philippine Army in which he belonged.
The accused admitted that Captain Palanca and he were alone at Palanca's office when his statements
were taken down, although, as a matter of fact, another officer, who wrote the said statements on
typewriter, was present.

Like Exhibit A, Exhibit B stands unimpeached. Speaking of Exhibit B, defendant merely said that he
signed it because he did not know what it contained. He did not charge Fiscal Kintanar with having
resorted to any improper means during the examination to force him to make any declaration.
Defendant's testimony that the Fiscal promised to use him as a witness against Calma's wife in
consideration of his confession does not make sense, and this testimony does not seem to have been
given in earnest.

If defendant's confession as transcribed in Exhibit A was voluntary, we have to conclude that Calma was
slain in the manner and for the reason set out in that document. It is needless to say that no one in his
right mind would convict himself without compulsion by fabricating a highly self-damaging story and
suppressing the truth which would absolve him.

Several questions of identical character affecting the admission of Exhibits A and B are raised.

Paragraph 18, section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "no person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself," does not support the proposition that the confession of an
accused is inadmissible.

The conviction of an accused on a voluntary extrajudicial statement in no way violates the constitutional
guarantee against self-incrimination. What the above inhibition seeks to protect is compulsary
disclosure of incriminating facts. While there could be some possible objections to the admissibility of a
confession on grounds of its untrustworthiness, such confession is never excluded as evidence on
account of any supposed violation of the constitutional immunity of the party from self-incrimination.
(Hendrickson vs. People, 10 N.Y., 33; 3 Wigmore on Evidence, p. 250.) The use of voluntary confession is
a universal, time-honored practice grounded on common law and expressly sanctioned by statutes.
More of this presently.lawphil.net
Appellant assails the admissibility of Exhibits A and B on another ground. He contends that under article
24 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, these documents should be
rejected.

Article 24 of Act No. 408 is as follows:

ART. 24. No witness before a military court, commission, court of inquiry, or board, or before any officer
conducting an investigation, or before any officer, military or civil, designated to take a deposition to be
read in evidence before a military court, commission, court of inquiry or board, or before an officer
conducting an investigation shall be compelled to incriminate himself, or to answer any question not
material to the issue when such answer might tend to degrade him.

It is clear from the title and purpose of this enactment that article 24 has reference to court martial
proceedings, not to proceedings in the ordinary civil courts of justice. And a close examination of the
article will show that it seeks to protect a witness from being compelled to answer incriminating
questions, or degrading questions not material to the issue, but is does not prohibit the taking of
incrimating or degrading statements of witnesses who choose to give them voluntarily, uninfluenced by
fear of punishment, if they refuse, or by promises of leniency or reward. This legal precept does not
differ essentially from the general rule of evidence embodied in the Rules of Court as sections 14 and 96,
Rule 123, which expressly make acknowledgment of guilt evidence against the person making it, subject
only to the indispensable condition that it be free from any taint of compulsion sufficient to vitiate its
voluntary character.

Our attention is called to paragraph 2, section 37, of Commonwealth Act No. 58, known as the Charter
of the City of Cebu, by reason of which, in appellant's opinion, the court erred in admitting Exhibit B.
This particular provision of the Cebu City Charter states in substance that sworn statements made
before the City Fiscal in the course of an investigation conducted by him may not be accepted as
evidence against the declarant in case of eventual prosecution.

The prosecution contends that the Rules of Court, which were promulgated in 1940, after the passage of
Commonwealth Act No. 48, pursuant to section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution, have repealed the
provisions of the Charter of the City of Cebu which are inconsistent with these Rule. The case of Ruges
vs. Dosdos ( 69 Phil., 158), is cited, in which the court held that General Orders No. 58, as amended by a
resolution of this court of March 24, 1937, adopted under the powers conferred upon it by the above-
mentioned section and article of the Fundamental Law, abrogated section 45 of the Cebu City Charter
because the latter clashed with the new rules regarding the time and manner in which an appeal should
be taken from any final judgment of the justice of the peace or of the municipal court by the convicted
party to the Court of First Instance. It is argued that by the same token, section 37, paragraph 2, of Act
No. 58 must give way to the above-mentioned sections 14 and 96, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, with
which it is in conflict.

It is unnecessary to decide this objection and we refrain from rendering any ruling thereon. The
statements in Exhibit B are mere confirmatory of the statements in Exhibit A, which, independently of
Exhibit B, establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
The lower convicted the accused of murder with evident premeditation, apparently, as qualifying
circumstance. The Solicitor General, in recommending affirmance of the sentence bases his
recommendation on the alleged presence of this qualifying circumstance. Treachery was not proved and
is not now urged.

We are not fully satisfied that evident premeditation, within the meaning of this term as used in the
Revised Penal Code, has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Although in appellant's confession
there is a statement that, on the morning of June 29, when he heard that Calma was at large, he
proposed to kill the now deceased, there is an entire absence of evidence showing that he meditiated
and reflected on his intention between the time it was conceived and the time the crime was actually
perpetrated. Defendant's proposition was nothing but an expression of his own determination to
commit the crime, which is entirely distinct from the premeditation which the law requires to be well
defined and established to aggravate the criminal responsibility. (United States vs. Angeles, 6 Phil., 480.)
To authorize the finding of evident premeditation, it must appear not only that the accused had made a
decision to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution but that this decision was the result
of meditation, calculation or reflection, or persistent attempt. As has been pointed out, the evidence
fails to prove that appellant meditated and reflected on his purpose to permit the formation of a
deliberate determination.

We cannot close this decision without making a reference to the defamatory remarks which counsel for
appellant makes in his brief, casting aspersions on the trial Judge's motives and conduct. These remarks
have no relevancy to the case, are of no value to us in the decision of the issues, and are not borne out
by the record. To say that it is unprofessional worthy of the highest rebuke for a lawyer to attribute to a
judge motive which do not appear on the record and have no materiality to the case is to reassert
aplatitude. (Ferrer vs. De Inchausti, 38 Phil., 905.)

The fact that counsel, according to a writing filed later with this court, has apologized to the judge and
the judge has expressed satisfaction with the apology, has not written finish to the episode; for the libel
transcends the confines of personalities, injured feelings or mental anguish. Its poison infects the
judiciary of which the judge is a member. In attempting to heap ridicule on the judge and bring him into
disrepute without justifiable ends and basis, in connection with the performance of his official duties,
counsel by his act put in jeopardy the good name of and confidence in the court over which the judge
presides.

Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that courtesy all have a right
to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration
of justice.

We find the appellant guilty of homicide and modify the judgment from which this is an appeal by
sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, with the accesories of law,
to pay the heirs of the deceased P2,000 by way of indemnity, and to pay the costs on both instances.
BALOING VS CALDERON

FACTS:
SEVERAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST BALAOING.

BALAOING vs. JUDGE DOJILLO

i. Balaoing was required to show why he should not be disciplinarily dealt for suppressing certain
material facts of which he was charged with knowledge and for having engaged in forum-shopping.
ii. Balaoing’s motion for reconsideration was denied, his explanation was declared unsatisfactory and
he was severely censured for having instituted a patently unfounded and frivolous admin action and
warned that the commission of same conduct will be dealt more severely.

BALAOING vs. JUDGE MALIWANAG

i. Grave misconduct for failure and regusal to issue corresponding write of action (pending appeal)
prayed for by complainant in his motion in civil case, ZABALA vs. BUENO.
ii. Balaoing’s use of unsavory, defamatory and offensive language against Judge brought dismissal to
the complaint, 1-year suspension and P1000 fine for violation of canons.

2 MORE COMPLAINTS: CALDERON AND MALIWANAG.

i. BALAOING: filed complaint against CALDERON for grave abuse of authority and malicious delay in
administration of justice.
1. CALDERON does not follow the Circular and merely treats it as directory; practice of Judge to
automatically grant postponements and deferment of hearing of cases to a later hour whenever his OIC
makes a manifestation in open court that a certain lawyer or party called up requesting that his case be
postponed.
2. Judge drinks a lot and fraternizes openly.
3. Delayed cases:
a. Allowed defendants to keep postponing hearings more than 1 year.
b. Cahoots with deputy sheriff, unlawfully prevented implementation of writ of Possession.
4. Charged both CALDERON AND OIC, MANIAGO with misconduct, grave abuse of authority and
malicious delay in admin of justice.
5. OIC MANIAGO alleges BALAOING calling her notorious, swindler, insane.

ii. CALDERON: Balaoing won a foreclosure case and became the highest bidder in the public auction,
Certificate of Sale was issued and registered.
1. He prevented the writ of Possession dude to prejudice.
a. Gavilan’s widow (former owner), Alice and children were residing in the properties; period to
redeem the properties had not yet expired.
2. When redemption period elapsed, he issued write of possession but up to present time, Balaoing has
not yet taken possession and showed his disinterest.

iii. MALIWANAG denied BALAOING allegation, judgment is based on equity and justice against
injustice by a lawyer on the unlearned and poor couple from Baguio.
ISSUE:
WON Balaoing’s admin complaints hold merit? NO.
Is Balaoing guilty of gross misconduct? YES.

HELD:
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS DISMISSED. BALAOING DISBARRED.
CANON 11: Lawyer shall observe and maintain respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03: Lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before
Courts.
Rule 11.04: Lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by record or have no materiality
to the case.
Complaints are based on his personal interpretation of the law and not on material allegations of fact,
substantiated by evidence.
MACEDA VS VASQUEZ

Facts:
Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against
petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has
falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been
submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before
January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been
rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera
alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.

Issue:
Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s
constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts

Held:
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious
misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under
the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts
and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court
clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
PEOPLE VS JARDIN

FACTS:
The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter-complaint of the Provincial Auditor of Quezon
requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the necessary criminal action under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public
documents on six counts. The cases were assigned to Assistant Fiscal Meliton V. Angeles who set them
for preliminary investigation. The accused moved to postpone the investigation four times but the
accused and his counsel failed to appear every time. Inspire of their absence, the preliminary
investigation was conducted and shortly afterwards, the six information’s were filed against the accused
before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. The arraignment was set for May 9, 1967. On the
records it was show that from May 9, 1967, the arraignment was re-set for June 6; then re-set for June
26; then from August 16, the same was re-set for September 5, all because of the motions for
postponement filed at the instance of the accused. When the arraignment of the accused was called on
September 5, 1967, counsel for the accused verbally moved for reinvestigation on the ground that the
accused was not given the opportunity to present his defense during the preliminary investigation. This
was granted by the court and the first reinvestigation was set on November 24, 1967. Accused moved to
postpone many times, failed still to appear. When he finally appeared with his counsel, they asked for
15 days to file memorandum. The memorandum was never filed, so the investigating fiscal filed a
manifestation before the court that the records of these cases be returned and the trial on the merits of
the same be set. The court transferred the case to new branch of CFI Quezon without acting on
manifestation. Arraignment date was set but more postponements was filed at the instance of accused;
moved for reinvestigation again. Arraignment finally happened on Sept 8, 1970. Accused pleaded NOT
GUILTY and asked for trial to be postponed. On postponed date, accused asked for another
postponement.

ISSUE:
Whether the acts of the accused and his counsel obstruct the administration of justice.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the dilatory tactics of the defense counsel and the failure of both
judge and the fiscal to take effective counter measures to obviate the delaying acts constitute
obstruction of justice. An attorney as an officer of the court is called upon to assist in the due
administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. For this reason,
any act on the part of a lawyer that obstructs perverts or impedes the administration of justice
constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him.
Acts which amount to obstruction in the administration of justice may take many forms. They include
such acts as instructing a complaining witness in a criminal action not to appear at the scheduled
hearing so that the case against the client, the accused, would be dismissed. asking a client to plead
guilty to a crime which the lawyer knows his client did not commit, advising a client who is detained for
a crime to escape from prison prosecuting clearly frivolous cases or appeals to drain the resources of the
other party and compel him to submit out of exhaustion and filing multiple petitions or complaints for a
cause that has been previously rejected in the false expectation of getting favorable action.
ARTIAGA JR VS VILLANUEVA

Adm. Case No. 1892(Atty. Luis U. Artiaga, Jr., vs. Atty. Enrique Villanueva.)

Before the Court for resolution is respondent Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva's Motion for Leave of Court for
Respondent to File Motion for Clarification dated January 9, 2002 of the Resolution of the Court dated
July 7, 1989, and said Motion for Clarification.

The motion is an offshoot of the antecedental proceedings in this case, as follows:

Despite the pendency before the Court of the complaint for disbarment filed against respondent, he was
appointed on February 9, 1987 as the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna.

On August 11, 1988, respondent received a telegraphic transfer from the Secretary of Justice advising
him to go on leave pending the outcome of the administrative complaint. Respondent complied with the
directive of the Secretary of Justice and went on leave.

On July 29, 1988, the Court rendered judgment against the respondent ordering his indefinite
suspension from the practice of law from date of notice thereof until such time that he can demonstrate
to the court that he has rehabilitated himself and deserved to resume the practice of law.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court and on July 7,1989, the
Court issued a Resolution granting the motion of respondent and lifting respondent's indefinite
suspension from the practice of law.

Respondent forthwith resumed the performance of his duties as Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna. Even
as respondent reached the retirement age of 65, the President of the Philippines extended his term for
six (6) months.

Upon his retirement from the service, respondent was not paid his basic salaries during the period of his
leave from August 11, 1988 to July 1989.

By April 10, 2001, respondent was already 76 years old, suffering from asthma and bedridden. On said
date, respondent pleaded to the Secretary of Justice that in view of the July 7, 1989 Resolution of the
Court, coupled by his debilitating illness, he be paid his back salaries and other emoluments from August
11, 1988 to July 1989.

In a legal opinion dated October 17, 2001, the Chief State Counsel stated that the Resolution of the
Court granting the motion for reconsideration of respondent and lifting his suspension from the practice
of law did not exonerate him; hence, he is not entitled to the payment of his back salaries during the
period of his forced leave. The Secretary of Justice concurred with the opinion of the Chief State Counsel
and so informed respondent thereof.
On November 22, 2001, respondent sent a letter to the court Administrator requesting for a clarification
as to whether or not, under the Resolution of the Court dated July 11, 1989, he was exonerated from
the charges filed against him. On December 4, 2001, the Court Administrator replied to the letter of
respondent that he had no jurisdiction to interpret or render an opinion on decisions or resolutions of
the Court.

Hence, the motion of respondent for clarification as to whether or not under the Resolution of the Court
dated July 11, 1989, he was exonerated from the charges lodged against him so as to entitle him to his
back salaries and other emoluments during the period of his forced leave.

In Pedro P. Clemente vs. Commission of Audit,[1]cralaw we defined to "exonerate" thus:

"To exonerate means 'to exculpate, to relieve' (35 C.J.S., p. 227). It is 'to clear from accusation or blame'
(Webster, Third New International Dictionary of the English Language). The word 'exonerate' may imply
complete clearance not only from immediate charge or accusation but from suspicion or attendant
denigration xxx"

It is clear from the July 7, 1989 Resolution of the Court that respondent was not exonerated from the
charges in the complaint for disbarment lodged against him. Although the Court granted respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration and lifted his suspension from the practice of law, it also declared that his
suspension from the practice of law was sufficient disciplinary action against him:

"A careful examination of the records of the case shows that the acts of respondent may he attributed
to his extreme zeal and enthusiasm in prosecuting the cause of his client. There is no proof of any
dishonest motive or fraud, much less of any contemptuous act committed by him towards the courts or
towards the adverse party or counsel. While the courses of action he took tended to delay the
disposition of the controversy and were redundant, his suspension from the practice of law is sufficient
disciplinary action against him.Moreover, there is proof that the fault cannot be attributed entirely to
the respondent.Complainant and his counsel also contributed to the delay in filing Civil Case No. 183 for
recovery of' possession, which is still pending appeal, and in failing to comply with the agreement to
settle the dispute by arbitration. Respondent and his client Aquino were willing to settle the problem
but Estolano and his counsel did not care to pursue this course, of action which could have terminated
the matter once and for all.

The attestations of responsible persons in the public and private sector as to the integrity and good
moral character of respondent show that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve another chance to
resume the practice of law." (Underscoring supplied.)

In fine, respondent was meted the disciplinary penalty of suspension from notice of the Decision of the
Court up to the issuance of the Resolution granting his Motion for Reconsideration.

It is clear from the foregoing that the issuance of the Court's Resolution dated July 11, 1989, did not
exculpate respondent from the charges filed against him in the complaint for disbarment.Hence, he is
not entitled to back salaries during the period of his leave of absence, in accordance with our ruling in
Ricardo Gloria vs. Court of Appeals,[2]cralaw thus:

The principle governing entitlement to salary during suspension is cogently stated in Floyd R. Mechem's
A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers as follows:

§864. Officer not entitled to Salary during Suspension from Office.- An officer who has been lawfully
suspended from his office is not entitled to compensation for the period during which he was
suspended, even though it be subsequently determined that the cause for which he was suspended was
insufficient. The reason given is "that salary and prerequisites are the reward of express or implied
services, and therefore cannot belong to one who could not lawfully perform such services.

Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges against him. In addition, his
suspension must be unjustified. The case of Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals itself similarly states that
payment of salaries corresponding to the period [1] when an employee is not allowed to work may be
decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his suspension and [2] when the suspension
is unjustified.

xxx

In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, a public school teacher who was found guilty of violation of reasonable
office rules and regulations for having been absent without leave and reprimanded was given back
salaries after she was exonerated of the charge of having taken part in the strikes.[3]cralaw

Moreover, it is evident that respondent's motion for clarification is merely an afterthought. As aforesaid,
we issued our resolution granting the motion for reconsideration of the respondent as early as July 11,
1989. Respondent retired from government service sometime in 1991 and failed to receive any back
salaries from the Department of Justice during the period of his leave of absence. And yet, respondent
filed his motion for clarification, with the Court only on January 17, 2002, or after the lapse of well-nigh
more than eleven (11) years after his retirement from the government service.

WHEREFORE, respondent's Motion for Leave to File Motion for Clarification is GRANTED and his Motion
for Clarification is ADMITTED. However, the Court hereby declares that its Resolution dated July 7, 1989
granting the respondent's motion for reconsideration and lifting respondent's indefinite suspension
from the practice of law did not exonerate him from the charges of engaging in unethical acts in the
practice of his profession, but merely shortened the penalty of suspension meted on him under the
Decision of the Court dated July 29, 1988. Accordingly, respondent is not entitled to back salaries and
other emoluments corresponding to the period of his suspension.
SANCHEZ VS BRION

FACTS:
Bienvenido Sanchez and spouse were plaintiffs in an ejectment case “Sanchez v. de Guzman”. They
won the case but the writ of execution was stayed because of a compromise agreement. The
compromise agreement provides that (a) Sanchez would execute a deed of absolute sale of lot in
favor of de Guzman and (b) de Guzman would pay 150k. The de Guzman failed to comply with the
agreement so a writ of execution was issued. Atty. Galileo Brian, counsel of de Guzman, filed several
cases to prevent the execution. (1) Petition for certiorari and prohibition with RTC assailing the writ.
When the court ordered a hearing to determine the truth of the allegations, he appealed this decision
to the CA and SC, which was denied. (2) Complaint for breach of contract against the Sanchez spouses
with RTC. (3) Motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the
alias writ of execution (4) Another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC (5) Yet another
petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA, which was earlier granted by reversed Complainant
Sanchez now files an administrative complaint against Atty. Brion for forum-shopping. Atty. Brion
argue that his honesty and good-faith in pursuing the cause of his clients should not merit
administrative sanction.

ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Brion should be disbarred RULING: 43 Legal Ethics Cases (Alimurung) 2D 2012

HELD:
No. Lawyers should remember that their primary duty is to assist the court in the administration of
justice. Any conduct with tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes
such lawyers’ duty. Lawyers must not abuse the court processes. The court has repeatedly reminded
the lawyers to avoid resorting to forum shopping for it clogs the court dockets. Willful and deliberate
forum-shopping is punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of court provided in SC
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 However, the actions of the lawyer, Atty. Brion, does not warrant
the supreme penalty of disbarment. He is CENSURED for resorting to forum-shopping and WARNED
that any future violation will be dealt with more severely.
TAN VS LAPAK
ASD

CORDOVA VS LABAYEN
EDRIAL VS QUILAT- QUILAT
PEOPLE VS FERRY