RTC Judge Valdevilla dismissed Banez’ motion to dismiss and hence, this appeal.
Contents
135. BAÑEZ v. VALDEVILLA ................................................................................................... 1
138. Austria v. NLRC .............................................................................................................. 1
154. BUENVIAJE, et. al vs. CA and Cotton Marketing corp ................................................... 4
156. Juanito Garcia and Alberto Dumago v. Philippine Airlines (PAL) .................................. 5
157. KING INTEGRATED SECURITY SERVICES, INC., and/or MINA KING vs. GALO S. GATAN 5
158. ST. MARTIN vs NLRC ..................................................................................................... 6
159 . PCI vs NLRC .................................................................................................................. 7
160. Laguna Metts Corporation vs. Caalam .......................................................................... 8
161. Agustilo v. CA ................................................................................................................ 9
162. Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. vs. Llamera ........................................................................ 9
163. ..................................................................................................................................... 10
164. ..................................................................................................................................... 10
165. ..................................................................................................................................... 10
166. ..................................................................................................................................... 10
135. BAÑEZ v. VALDEVILLA
Facts:
BebianoBanez was the sales operations manager of private respondent Oro Marketing, Inc. (ORO). In
1993, ORO indefinitely suspended Banez and the latter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
NLRC in Iligan City. The Labor Arbiter found that Banez had been illegally dismissed and ordered the
payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, and of backwages and attorney’s fees. The
decision was appealed to the NLRC, which dismissed the same for having been filed out of time.
In 1995, ORO filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Misamis Oriental against Banez for lost
profit and earnings due to the abandonment or neglect of his duties as sales manager. Banez opposes
this and claims that the action for damages, having arisen from an employer-employee relationship,
was squarely under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the NLRC under the Labor Code and is
barred by final judgment in the labor case.
Issue: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction in the claim for damages filed by ORO.
Ruling: NO.
There is no mistaking the fact that ORO’s claim against petitioner for actual damages arose from a
prior employer-employee relationship.
Article 217(a) (NOW Art. 223 (a)) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor
Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee
relations – in other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by
labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code.
This is, of course, to distinguish from cases of action for damages where the employer-employee
relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different source of
obligation. The jurisdiction of the regular courts was upheld in such cases.
Thus, it is obvious that ORO’s remedy is not in the filing of the separate action for damages, but in
properly perfecting an appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Having lost the right to appeal, the
labor case stands a final judgment on the merits.
138. Austria v. NLRC
G.R. No. 124382, August 16, 1999.
Facts:
The Seventh-Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation. Petitioner Austria was a pastor
of SDA for 28 years until the day his services were terminated. Petitioner was dismissed on the
grounds of misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct,
gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employer's
duly authorized representative, as grounds for the termination of his services. This prompted
petitioner to file a complaint before the LA for illegal dismissal against the SDA and its officers praying
for reinstatement with backwages.
The LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA’s
decision.
SDA’s contention: The LA has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioner due to the
constitutional provision on the separation of church and state since the case allegedly involved an
ecclesiastical affair to which the State cannot interfere.
Issue:
 Does the LA and the NLRC have jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by
petitioner against SDA?
Ruling:
Yes. The principle of separation of church and state finds no application in this case. The case
at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking
cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical affair is “one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of
worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws
and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such
associations those deemed unworthy of membership.” To be concrete, examples of this so-called
ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication,
ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached
religious significance.
The case at bar does not even remotely concern any of the above cited examples. While the
matter at hand relates to the church and its religious minister it does not ipso facto give the case a
religious significance. Simply stated, what is involved here is the relationship of the church as an
employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with
the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. In this case, petitioner was not ex-
communicated or expelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminated from employment.
Indeed, the matter of terminating an employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different from
the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious congregation.
The grounds invoked for petitioner's dismissal, namely: misappropriation of denominational
funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and
commission of an offense against the person of his employer's duly authorized representative, are all
based on Article 282 of the Labor Code which enumerates the just causes for termination of
employment. By this alone, it is palpable that the reason for petitioner's dismissal from the service is
not religious in nature.
It is clear that when the SDA terminated the services of petitioner, it was merely exercising
its management prerogative to fire an employee which it believes to be unfit for the job. As such, the
State, through the LA and the NLRC, has the right to take cognizance of the case and to determine
whether the SDA, as employer, rightfully exercised its management prerogative to dismiss an
employee.
Under the Labor Code, the provision which governs the dismissal of employees, is
comprehensive enough to include religious corporations, such as the SDA, in its coverage. Article 278
of the Labor Code on post-employment states that "the provisions of this Title shall apply to all
establishments or undertakings, whether for profit or not." Obviously, the cited article does not make
any exception in favor of a religious corporation. This is made more evident by the fact that the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, particularly, Section 1, Rule 1, Book VI on the Termination of
Employment and Retirement, categorically includes religious institutions in the coverage of the law,
to wit:
Sec. 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall apply to all establishments and undertakings,
whether operated for profit or not, including educational, medical, charitable and
religious institutions and organizations, in cases of regular employment with the
exception of the Government and its political subdivisions including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
With this clear mandate, the SDA cannot hide behind the mantle of protection of the
doctrine of separation of church and state to avoid its responsibilities as an employer under the Labor
Code.
G.R. No. 182626. December 4, 2009.
Facts:
Respondent Mario Valcueba filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of wage
differential, 13th month pay differential, holiday pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days, and
service incentive leaves with claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, against
Hilario Ramirez. Valcueba claims that he was not paid for holidays and rest days. He was not also
paid the complete amount of his 13th month pay. On 2006, Ramirez’secretary, informed Valcueba
that he would not be allowed to return to work unless he agreed to work on pakyaw basis.
Ramirez, on the other hand, presented a different version of the antecedents, asserting that
Valcueba was first hired as construction worker, then as helper of the mechanic, and eventually as
mechanic. There were three categories of mechanics at the workplace. Valcueba belonged to those
who were classified as rescue/emergency mechanics. Ramirez insisted that Valcueba was never
terminated from his employment. On the contrary, it was the latter who abandoned his job. As
emergency/rescue mechanic, he was assigned to various stations to perform emergency/rescue
work. On February 2006, Ramirez directed him to proceed to Calawisan,Lapu-lapu City, as a unit had
developed engine trouble and the mechanic assigned in that area was absent. Valcueba did not
report to the Calawisan station. Valcueba advanced no reason regarding his failure to answer an
emergency call of duty, nor did he file an application for a leave of absence when he failed to report
for work that day.
The labor arbiter did not find that Ramirez illegally dismissed valcueba but order the former to pay
the latter wage differentials and 13th month pay.
Ramirez received the Labor Arbiter’s decision on 5 June 2006. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Memorandum of Appeal with Urgent Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond on the 9 th day of the
reglementary period or on 14 June 2006 before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). However this was dimissed reasoning that Ramirez has not offered a meritorious ground for
the reduction of the appeal bond and the amount of P10,000.00 he posted is not a reasonable
amount in relation to the monetary award ofP45,825.98. The decision of the Labor Arbiter became
final and executory on 19 February 2007
Ramirez went up to the CA. In a resolution dated 13 July 2007, the CA dismissed the Petition outright
for failure of Ramirez to properly verify his petition and to state material dates. Hence this petition
before the SC.
ISSUES:
1. WON the dismissal of the case by the NLRC was proper.
POSSITIVE. At the outset, it should be stressed that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part
of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed
by and in accordance with the provisions of law. The party who seeks to avail himself of the same
must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, he loses the right to appeal.
The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary
awards from the decision of the labor arbiter. Clearly, the filing of the bond is not only mandatory
but also a jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction
upon the NLRC. Non-compliance with the requirement renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter
final and executory.
Under the Rules, appeals involving monetary awards are perfected only upon compliance with the
following mandatory requisites, namely: (1) payment of the appeal fees; (2) filing of the
memorandum of appeal; and (3) payment of the required cash or surety bond.
This requirement is intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive
the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal. It is also intended to
discourage employers from using an appeal to delay or evade their obligation to satisfy their
employees’ just and lawful claims.
Colby Construction and Management Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission succinctly
elucidates that an employer who files a motion to reduce the appeal bond is still required to post the
full amount of cash or surety bond within the ten-day reglementary period, even pending resolution
of his motion.
In this case, although Ramirez posted an appeal bond, the same was insufficient, as it was not
equivalent to the monetary award of the Labor Arbiter. Moreover, when Ramirez sought a reduction
of the bond, he merely said that the bond was excessive and baseless without amplifying why he
considered it as such. The NLRC had, therefore, the full discretion to grant or deny Ramirez’s motion
to reduce the amount of the appeal bond. The finding of the labor tribunal that Ramirez did not
present sufficient justification for the reduction thereof cannot be said to have been done with grave
abuse of discretion.
2. WON an appeal bond may bereduced.
POSITIVE . While Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC’s New Rules of Procedure allows the Commission to
reduce the amount of the bond, the exercise of the authority is not a matter of right on the part of
the movant, but lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon a showing of meritorious grounds.
It is daylight-clear from the foregoing that while the bond may be reduced upon motion by the
employer, this is subject to the conditions that (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based
on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by
the appellant; otherwise, the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the
period to perfect an appeal. The qualification effectively requires that unless the NLRC grants the
reduction of the cash bond within the 10-day reglementary period, the employer is still expected to
post the cash or surety bond securing the full amount within the said 10-day period.
3. WON the failure to verify a petition on appeal is fatal and therefore warrant a dismissal.
POSSITIVE.On Ramirez’s failure to verify his petition, it is true that verification is merely a formal
requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters that are alleged are true and
correct. Thus, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and
waive strict compliance with the rules. However, this Court invariably sustains the Court of
Appeals’ dismissal of the petition on technical grounds under this provision, unless considerations
of equity and substantial justice present cogent reasons to hold otherwise. In Moncielcoji
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court states the rationale –
Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and orderliness
as well as to facilitate attainment of justice, such that strict adherence thereto is
required. The application of the Rules may be relaxed only when rigidity would
result in a defeat of equity and substantial justice. But, petitioner has not
presented any persuasive reason for this Court to be liberal, even pro hac
vice. Thus, we sustain the dismissal of its petition by the Court of Appeals on
technical grounds.
4. WON failure to state material dates on certiorari on Rule 65 is fatal.
For the same reasons above, we also find no reversible error in the assailed resolution of the Court of
Appeals dismissing Ramirez’s petition on the ground of failure to state material dates, because in
filing a special civil action for certiorari without indicating the requisite material date therein, Ramirez
violated basic tenets of remedial law, particularly Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
There are three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule
65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received; second, the
date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration was filed; and third, the date when notice of
the denial thereof was received. In the case before us, the petition filed with the Court of Appeals
failed to indicate when the notice of the NLRC Resolution was received and when the Motion for
Reconsideration was filed, in violation of Rule 65, Section 1 (2 nd par.) and Rule 46, Section 3 (2nd par.).
Failure to comply with any of the requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition.
154. BUENVIAJE, et. al vs. CA and Cotton Marketing corp
G.R. No. 147806 November 12, 2002
Petitioners were former employees of Cottonway Marketing Corp., hired as promo girls for their
garment products. In 1994, their services were terminated as the company was allegedly suffering
business losses. They filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, as well as underpayment and non-
payment of monetary benefits due them. The Labor Arbiter found the retrenchment valid and
ordered Cottonway to pay petitioners' separation pay and their proportionate thirteenth month pay.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered the reinstatement of
petitioners, and ordered Cottonway to pay petitioners full backwages computed from the time their
salaries were withheld from them up to the date of their actual reinstatement.
In 1996, Cottonway filed with the NLRC a manifestation stating that they complied with the order of
reinstatement by sending return-to-work notices to petitioners, but to no avail; and consequently,
they sent letters to petitioners terminating their employment for failure to comply with the return to
work order. They again filed a similar manifestation in 1997, further alleging that petitioners have
already found employment elsewhere.
In 1997, petitioners filed with the NLRC a motion for execution of its Decision on the ground that it
had become final and executory. The Labor Arbiter then issued an Order declaring that the award of
backwages and proportionate thirteenth month pay to petitioners should be limited from the time of
their illegal dismissal up to the time they received the notice of termination sent by the company
upon their refusal to report for work despite the order of reinstatement.
However, this later order was set aside by the NLRC, which ruled that its Decision dated March 26,
1996 has become final and executory and it is the ministerial duty of the Labor Arbiter to issue the
corresponding writ of execution to effect full and unqualified implementation of said decision
(meaning without regard to the manifestations filed by Cottonway)/
The CA ruled that petitioners' reinstatement was no longer possible as they deliberately refused to
return to work despite the notice given by Cottonway. It thus held that the amount of backwages due
them should be computed only up to the time they received their notice of termination.
ISSUE: WON the payment of backwages should be limited from the time they were illegally dismissed
until they received the notice of termination sent by Cottonway on August 1, 1996 as argued by
respondent company, or whether it should be computed from the time of their illegal dismissal until
their actual reinstatement as argued by the petitioners.
RULING: It should be computed from the time of their illegal dismissal until their actual
reinstatement.
Under R.A. 6715, employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their actual
compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. If reinstatement
is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of their illegal termination up
to the finality of the decision.
The decision of the NLRC dated March 26, 1996 had become final and executory. Said judgment may
no longer be disturbed or modified by any court or tribunal. Any amendment or alteration which
substantially affects a final and executory judgment is void, including the entire proceedings held for
that purpose. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it
executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a writ of execution becomes a ministerial duty of
the court. The writ of execution must therefore conform to the judgment to be executed and adhere
strictly to the very essential particulars.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners abandoned their desire to return to their previous work at Cottonway so
as to justify the modification of the final and executory decision of the NLRC.
RULING: No. To justify the modification of the final and executory decision of the NLRC, the CA cited
the existence of a supervening event, that is, the valid termination of petitioners' employment due to
their refusal to return to work despite notice from respondents reinstating them to their former
position. However, petitioners' alleged failure to return to work cannot be made the basis for their
termination. Such failure does not amount to abandonment which would justify the severance of
their employment. To warrant a valid dismissal on the ground of abandonment, the employer must
prove the concurrence of two elements: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship.
The facts of this case do not support the claim of Cottonway that petitioners have abandoned their
desire to return to their previous work at said company. Three months after the NLRC rendered its
decision ordering petitioners’ reinstatement to their former positions, Cottonway sent individual
notices to petitioners mandating them to immediately report to work. After their failure to do so,
Cottonway then sent them individual notices of termination, without giving them the opportunity to
explain why they were not able to report to work. The records do not bear any proof that all the
petitioners received a copy of the letters. Cottonway merely claimed that some of them have left the
country and some have found other employment. This, however, does not necessarily mean that
petitioners were no longer interested in resuming their employment at Cottonway as it has not been
shown that their employment in the other companies was permanent. It should be expected that
petitioners would seek other means of income to tide them over during the time that the legality of
their termination is under litigation. Furthermore, petitioners never abandoned their suit against
Cottonway. While the case was pending appeal before the NLRC, the Court of Appeals and this Court,
petitioners continued to file pleadings to ensure that the company would comply with the directive of
the NLRC to reinstate them and to pay them full backwages in case said decision is upheld. Moreover,
in his reply to the company’s first letter, petitioners’ counsel expressed willingness to meet with the
company’s representative regarding the satisfaction of the NLRC decision.
It appears that the supposed notice sent by Cottonway to the petitioners demanding that they report
back to work immediately was only a scheme to remove the petitioners for good. Petitioners’ failure
to instantaneously abide by the directive gave them a convenient reason to dispense with their
services. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that the employer must either admit the dismissed
employee back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or
reinstate him in the payroll to abate further loss of income on the part of the employee during the
pendency of the appeal. This provision does not give the employer the right to remove an employee
who fails to immediately comply with the reinstatement order, especially when there is reasonable
explanation for the failure. If Cottonway were really sincere in its offer to immediately reinstate
petitioners to their former positions, it should have given them reasonable time to wind up their
current preoccupation or at least to explain why they could not return to work at Cottonway at once.
Cottonway did not do either. Instead, it gave them only five days to report to their posts and when
the petitioners failed to do so, it lost no time in serving them their individual notices of termination.
156. Juanito Garcia and Alberto Dumago v. Philippine Airlines (PAL)
G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009
Facts:
Philippine Airlines filed a case against its employees –herein petitioners for allegedly caught
in the act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security personnel and law enforcers raided the
PAL Technical Center’sToolroom Section.
After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioner for transgressing company’s Code of Discipline
prompting them to file a Complaint for illegal dismissal which the Labor Arbiter (LA) in its decision
ruled on their favor ordering PAL to immediately comply with the reinstatement aspect of the
decision. Prior to the judgment, SEC placed PAL under Interim Rehabilitation Receiver who
subsequently replaced by Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver. On appeal, NLRC reversed said
decision and dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit.
Subsequently, LA issued a Writ of Execution respecting the reinstatement aspect of his
decision. Respondent filed an Urgent Petition for Injunction with the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the
validity of the Writ and the Notice issued by LA but suspended and referred the action to the
Rehabilitation Receiver for appropriate action.
On appeal, the appellate court partially granted the petition and effectively reinstated the
NLRC resolution insofar as it suspended the proceedings. By manifestation, respondent informed the
Court that SEC issued an Order granting its request to exit from rehabilitation proceedings.
Issue:
Whether petitioner may collect their wages during the period between the LA’s Order of
reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC decision overturning that of the LA, now that PAL has
exited from rehabilitation proceedings.
Ruling:
A dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the LA is entitled to receive
wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory. Unless there is a
restraining order, it is ministerial upon the LA to implement the order of reinstatement and it is
mandatory on the employer to comply therewith.
The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the LA
is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of
the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. It settles the
view that the LA’s order of reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer has to either
re-admit them to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to
reinstate them in the payroll, and that filing to exercise the options in the alternative, employer must
pay the employee’s salaries.
When reinstatement pending appeal aims to avert the continuing threat or danger to the
survival or even the life of the dismissed employee and his family, it does not contemplate the period
when the employer-corporation itself is similarly in a judicially monitored state of being resuscitated
in order to survive.
157. KING INTEGRATED SECURITY SERVICES, INC., and/or MINA KING vs. GALO S. GATAN
G.R. No. 143813 July 7, 2003
FACTS: Galo S. Gatan, respondent, filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal deduction and
underpayment of wages against King Integrated Security Services, Inc. and/or Mina King, petitioners,
docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 04-0264295. The labor arbiter ordered respondent to pay the
complainant herein his wage differential in the total amount of P184,780.30.
On appeal, the NLRC issued a Resolution modifying the Labor Arbiter’s Decision by deleting the
amount representing respondent’s wage differential for the period from November 2,1990 to
February 10, 1992, pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor Code which provides that all money claims
arising from employer-employee relations shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the
cause of action accrued, otherwise, they shall be forever barred.
The NLRC Resolution, having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter issued an order directing
the issuance of a writ of execution. From this order, petitioners interposed an appeal to the NLRC, but
it was dismissed in a Resolution. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Forthwith, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the NLRC
Resolution dismissing their appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed with
modification the Resolutions of the NLRC: The petition is DISMISSED and the assailed resolutions are
AFFIRMED except as to the monetary award covering the period from February 11, 1992 to April 9,
1992, which shall be deducted from the computation made by the Research and Information Unit of
the NLRC.
ISSUE: whether or not an order of execution of a final judgment is appealable.
RULING: No, we have ruled that an order of execution of a final and executory judgment is not
appealable, otherwise, there would be no end to a case.5
In Fabular vs. Court of Appeals,6 we held:
"The judgment in this case had long become final and had in fact, been executed. It is now beyond
the power of the lower court, or of this Court for that matter, to modify the same. Settled is the rule
that after a judgment has become final, no additions can be made thereto, and nothing can be done
therewith except its execution; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting at naught
the main role of courts of justice, which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order, by setting justiceable controversies with finality."
Yet, despite the fact that what is being assailed is the NLRC Resolution ordering the issuance of a writ
of execution, still the Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition for certiorari and evaluated
the parties’ evidence. Clearly, the Court of Appeals overstepped its jurisdiction.
Once a decision or resolution becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court or
tribunal to order its execution. Such order, we repeat, is not appealable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
SET ASIDE.
158. ST. MARTIN vs NLRC
G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998.*
FACTS: The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by
herein private respondent before the NLRC. Private respondent alleges that he started working as
Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was
no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the
semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its (VAT) to the (BIR).
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle
of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin’s Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private
respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance
from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily
helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business. In January 1996, the mother of Amelita
passed away, so the latter took over the management of the business. She then discovered that there
were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to
show that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation
and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management
thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally
terminated his employment.
Based on the position papers of the parties, the LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner
declaring that no ER-EE relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no
jurisdiction over the case.3 The NLRC set aside the LA’s decision and remanded the case to the LA for
immediate appropriate proceedings.5 Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the NLRC hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion.7
1. Do the courts have power of judicial review over NLRC decisions?
YES. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on
questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose
of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the
substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the
separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.11
2. What is the precondition for the remedy to the courts?
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or
subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65,
for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision.
Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed
as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take
cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within
the reglementary period under Rule 65.
 3. Which court has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning the judgments of the
NLRC? The Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court?
Although both the SC and the CA have the power to review NLRC decisions, all such petitions should
henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the
hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. Apropos to this directive that
resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with their hierarchical order, this
pronouncement in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al.25 should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of
petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses
before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from
this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their
original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice
must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also
because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case
which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules
of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We,
therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction.
159 . PCI vs NLRC
G.R. No. 154379. October 31, 2008.*
FACTS: Sometime in 1994, respondent NUBE-AMEXPEA/PCI Travel Employees Union filed a Complaint
for unfair labor practice against petitioner PCI Travel Corporation. It claimed that petitioner had been
filling up positions left by regular rank-and-file with contractual employees, but were performing
work which were usually necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of the petitioner.
Respondent prayed that the Labor Arbiter order the petitioner to pay the “contractual employees”
the differentials between the wages/bene-fits of regular employees and the actual wages/benefits
paid to them from the first day of their employment, plus moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees of not less than P300,000.00 per employee. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the Union was not the real party-in-interest. Subsequently, petitioner
manifested that while it was ready and willing to prove that said employees were provided by
independent legitimate contractors and that it was not engaged in labor-only contracting in a position
paper yet to be submitted, petitioner prayed that the Labor Arbiter first resolve the issues raised in
their motion to dismiss.
The LA rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed with
modification the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals. On March 27, 2001, the CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing the
petition outright for petitioner’s failure to attach copies of pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent to the petition. More importantly, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
was signed by Elizabeth Legarda, President of the petitioner-corporation, without submitting any
proof that she was duly authorized to sign for, and bind the petitioner-corporation in these
proceedings.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the Rules of Court does not require the
submission of proof of due authorization to sign the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping for a petition to prosper. Nonetheless, petitioner subsequently filed a manifestation stating
that earnest efforts and diligence have been exerted in searching for said board resolution, but to no
avail. Unperturbed, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration stating that without such board
resolution or secretary’s certificate, Elizabeth Legarda cannot be deemed fully clothed by the
corporation to act for and on its behalf.
Whether or not the President of a corporation is authorized to sign the verification and certification
against non forum shopping without need of a board resolution.
YES. In the recent case of Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,8 the
Court clarified the issue on whether the President of a corporation is authorized to sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping, without need of a board resolution. We quote:
“It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25, of the Corporation Code, clearly
enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties
controlled by the board of directors. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its
directors and officers and can only exercise its corporate powers through the board of directors.
Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise any corporate power
pertaining to the corporation without authority from theboard of directors. This has been our
constant holding in cases instituted by a corporation.
In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
v. CA (G.R. No. 139495, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 126, 132-133), we recognized the authority of
a general manager or acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum
shopping; in Pfizer v. Galan (G.R. No. 143389, May 25, 2001, 358 SCRA 240, 246-248), we upheld the
validity of a verification signed by an “employment specialist” who had not even presented any proof
of her authority to represent the company; in Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. CA (G.R. No. 146125,
September 17, 2003, 411 SCRA 211, 217-220), we ruled that a personnel officer who signed the
petition but did not attach the authority from the company is authorized to sign the verification and
non-forum shopping certificate; and in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources
International Pty. Ltd (Lepanto) (G.R. No. 153885, September 24, 2003, 412 SCRA 101, 109), we ruled
that the Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company can sign the verification and
certificate against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the board’s authorization.
In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the
verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of
Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4)
Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification
and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done
on a case-to-case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of
corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against
forum shopping, being “in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in
the petition.”
With this issue settled, that the President of the corporation can sign the verification and certification
without need of a board resolution, there thus exists a compelling reason for the reinstatement of
the petition before the Court of Appeals. A perusal of the petition for certiorari would reveal that
petitioner intended to show the grave abuse of discretion committed by the labor tribunals in not
allowing the petitioner the ample opportunity to submit its position paper on the alleged violation of
the CBA. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC viewed it as a waiver on its part and hastened to rule that
”since the complainant’s allegations remain unrebutted, they are deemed correct and valid.”9 Due
process dictates that a person should be given the opportunity to be heard. Unfortunately, this was
not accorded to the petitioner and such right was even foreclosed when the appellate court
dismissed the petition before it on technical grounds. The policy of our judicial system is to encourage
full adjudication of the merits of an appeal. Ends of justice are better served when both parties are
heard and the controversy decided on its merits. Thus, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the
Court will not hesitate to reverse the dismissal of appeals that are grounded merely on
technicalities.10
160. Laguna Metts Corporation vs. Caalam
GR No. 189220, July 27, 2009
Facts:
Aries C. Caalam and Geraldine Esguerra filed a labor case against petitioner Laguna Metts
Corporation (LMC). The labor arbiter decided in favor of private respondents and found that they
were illegally dismissed by LMC. On appeal, however, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) reversed the decision of the labor arbiter. Private respondents’ motion for reconsideration
was denied.
Counsel for private respondents filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The motion alleged that, for reasons stated therein, the
petition could not be filed in the Court of Appeals within the prescribed 60-day period. Thus, a 15-day
extension period was prayed for. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and gave private
respondents a non-extendible period of 15 days within which to file their petition for certiorari. LMC
moved for the reconsideration of the said resolution claiming that extensions of time to file a petition
for certiorari are no longer allowed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC which was denied. According to the appellate court, while the amendment of
the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65 admittedly calls for stricter application to discourage the
filing of unwarranted motions for extension of time, it did not strip the Court of Appeals of the
discretionary power to grant a motion for extension in exceptional cases to serve the ends of justice.
Aggrieved, LMC assails the resolutions in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court contending that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it
granted private respondents’ motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari as the Court of
Appeals had no power to grant something that had already been expressly deleted from the rules.
Issue:
Does the CA have the power to grant the motion for extension to file petition?
Ruling: NONE
Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the
mere expediency of claiming substantial merit. As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing
specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent
needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these
rules are regarded as mandatory.
In De Los Santos v. Court of Appeals, we ruled:
Section 4 of Rule 65 prescribes a period of 60 days within which to file a
petition for certiorari. The 60-day period is deemed reasonable and sufficient time
for a party to mull over and to prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of
discretion by a lower court. The period was specifically set to avoid any
unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of the parties to a
speedy disposition of their case.
While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend the period for filing a petition
for certiorari beyond the 60-day period the amendments to Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC
disallowed extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari with the deletion of the paragraph that
previously permitted such extensions.
161. Agustilo v. CA
ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The employer may also terminate
the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by
serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving
devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent
to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever
is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations
of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the
separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (½) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1)
whole year.
Facts: Petitioner Edgar Agustilo was hired on July 1, 1979 by respondent SMC as a temporary
employee at its Mandaue Brewery. On October 1, 1979, he was made permanent and designated as a
safety clerk. On May 1, 1982, he was transferred to the Engineering Department as an administrative
secretary. Sometime in 1991, SMC Mandaue Brewery adopted a policy that managers would no
longer be assigned secretaries and that only director level positions may be given secretaries. As a
result, on August 5, 1991, petitioner's position as administrative secretary was abolished and he was
transferred to the company's Plant Director's Office-Quality Improvement Team. On February 7,
1992, petitioner was informed that 584 employees, including him, would be retrenched due to the
modernization program of the company. Petitioner was told that his services would be terminated
effective March 15, 1992 and that he would be paid his benefits 30 days after he was cleared of all
accountabilities. In a letter, dated February 13, 1992, SMC notified the DOLE of its modernization
program. On April 8, 1992, petitioner was given separation pay in the amount of P302,450.38,
representing 175% of his entitlements under the Labor Code. He signed a quitclaim designated as
"Receipt and Release" in favor of SMC before Senior Labor Employment Officer Mateo P. Baldago of
the Labor Standards Enforcement Division of the DOLE, Region VII.
Petitioner then filed a complaint against respondents for unfair labor practice, illegal
dismissal, and payment of separation pay, attorney's fees, and damages. The Executive labor arbiter
rendered a decision dismissing petitioners’ complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC reversed.
Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the decision of the NLRC and reinstating that of the
labor arbiter.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed.
Ruling: No. Petitioner's employment was terminated on the ground of the installation of labor saving
devices by SMC as governed by Art. 283 of the Labor Code.While quitclaims and releases are
generally held contrary to public policy, there are nevertheless voluntary agreements which
represent reasonable settlements and are considered binding on the parties. Such is the "Receipt and
Release" involved in this case. Petitioner is not an illiterate person who needs special protection. As
the labor arbiter found, petitioner holds a master's degree in library science and is an instructor in
political science at the University of San Carlos. He was also at that time a law student in the said
university. While it is the duty of the courts to be vigilant in preventing the exploitation of employees,
it also behooves them to protect the integrity of contracts so long as they are not contrary to law. In
this case, when petitioner acknowledged receipt of the letter of termination, he wrote: "Accepted
under protest and without prejudice." But when he later signed the "Receipt and Release," 22 he did
not qualify his act.
On the contention that the Court of Appeals cannot revise the factual findings of the NLRC--
In St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, it was held that the special civil action of certiorari is the mode
of judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC, and that in the exercise of its power, the Court of
Appeals can review the factual findings or the legal conclusions of the NLRC.
162. Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. vs. Llamera
G.R. no. 152514July 12, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. (LSMI) with principal office in Cagayan de Oro City is
engaged in the manufacture and processing of corn oil and coconut oil. Petitioners Alfonso U. Lim,
Albino U. Limketkai, and Engr. Lorenzo U. Limketkai, are the authorized representatives of LSMI. On
June 16, 1982, LSMI hired respondent EdithaLlamera as a laboratory analyst, assigned at the quality
control department.
Sometime in March 1994, LSMI received reports that some of its oil products, particularly Marca
Leon Cooking Oil and Corn Oil had visible impurities and rancid taste. Hence, it directed some of its
employees, including respondent, to explain the reported adulteration. The concerned employees,
except respondent who was then on maternity leave, submitted their respective written
explanations. In the meanwhile, they were all placed under preventive suspension. Forthwith, LSMI
immediately conducted a formal investigation. During the investigation, respondent, who was back
from maternity leave, denied having anything to do with the adulteration of LSMI’s oil products.
On June 6, 1994, LSMI terminated the services of the suspended employees. Respondent
challenged her dismissal and filed against LSMI, a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal
suspension and illegal dismissal, and demanded payment of backwages, separation pay, maternity
benefits, service incentive leave pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
 Labor ArbiterConchita J. Martinez ruled in favor of respondent Llamar, finding petitioners herein
guilty of unfair labor practice and awarded the monetary claims in favor of Llamar. On appeal, the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the above Decision holding that respondent
Llamar was legally dismissed. Not satisfied with the ruling, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration with the NLRC and was denied for lack of merit. Respondent filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court found respondent’s petition partly
meritorious. It held that respondent’s dismissal was illegal and ordered petitioner LSMI to jointly and
severally pay respondent Llamar the following:
a) Separation pay computed in accordance with the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement;
b) Full backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits allowed by law computed from the
time the compensation was withheld up to the finality of this judgment; and
c) Attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.
In this case, petitioners simply allege that respondent’s failure to report to the quality control
head the batch that did not meet the minimum standard showed connivance to sabotage petitioners’
business. Not only is petitioners’ logic flawed, it is an instance of arguing non sequitur. Said allegation
alone, without proven facts to back it up, could not and did not suffice as a basis for a finding of
willful breach of trust.
The Court is thus constrained to hold that petitioners failed to prove the existence of a valid
cause for the dismissal of respondent. Therefore, the dismissal must be deemed contrary to the
provisions of the Labor Code, hence illegal.
An employee who has been illegally dismissed is entitled to reinstatement and full back wages,
that is, without deducting earnings earned elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal.
However, where, as in this case, reinstatement is no longer feasible due to strained relations
between the parties, separation pay shall be granted in lieu of reinstatement. In addition to
separation pay and full back wages, respondent is also entitled to attorney’s fees equivalent to ten
percent of the total monetary award.

Aggrieved by the CA Decision, LSMI filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of
Appeals, in its assailed Resolution, denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition.
Issues:
163.
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in not according the NLRC’s evaluation of evidence due respect
and finality? 164.
No, the Court of Appeals can review the factual findings of the NLRC in a special civil action for
165.
certiorari, as held in St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC. It is true that the general rule is that the
findings of fact by the NLRC are deemed binding and conclusive. However, where, as in the instant 166.
case, the findings of fact by the NLRC contradict those of the Labor Arbiter, a departure from the
general rule is warranted.

2. Was respondent Llamar illegally dismissed?

Yes. In its ruling on the issue of illegal dismissal, the Court of Appeals accorded more weight to
respondent’s detailed and technical discussion of the cause of the reported adulteration. The CA
found unsubstantiated the petitioners’ sweeping statement that respondent “conspired” in the
sabotage of petitioners’ oil products. In the mind of the appellate court, petitioners simply failed to
prove that respondent’s dismissal was for a valid cause.
The willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer must be founded
on facts established by the employer. The latter must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial
evidence the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made
to rest.