Case Book On Succession

Submitted To: 12/07/2016
Atty. Ma. Lulu G. Reyes
Submitted By:
Agliam, Christy Faith V.
Fajilan, Emmanuel L.
Guisdan, Jahrelle Erl M.
Hablo, Djandra Di D.
Ignacio, Hannah Grace P.
Nulud, Rodney L.
Peralta, Laureen F.
Valenzuela, Sharmaine G.
Yapit, Clyde Ciddrick S.
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
CASE DIGESTS
Agliam, Fajilan, Guisdan, Hablo, Ignacio, Nulud, Peralta, Valenzuela, Yapit
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Arellano vs. Pascual
G.R. No. 189776, December 15, 2010
FACTS:
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings,
namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters, Agnes P. Arellano
(Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N.
Pascual.Respondents alleged that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in Teresa
Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner,
may be considered as an advance legitime of petitioner. The trial court decided that it was
precluded from determining the validity of the donation. For the purpose of determining
whether the property formed part of the decedents estate, the Deed of Donation was found
valid in light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on to hold
that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous
title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir,
and in the account of the partition.
The CA partially reversed the decision of TC. It sustained the probate courts ruling that
the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation in this wise:
Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on equality
of division, We hold that the property subject of donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia
is subject to collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of the decedent and we
believe that under the circumstances, the value of such immovable though not strictly in
the concept of advance legitime, should be deducted from her share in the net hereditary
estate. The trial court therefore committed no reversible error when it included the said
property as forming part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual
ISSUE:
Is the property donated subject to collation?
HELD:
NO.
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by the
addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and
second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the
Page 1 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
testator during hislifetime. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the
compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the
legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when there are
compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If
there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at
liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives
to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to
a “stranger,” chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir,
however, the donated property is not subject to collation.
Page 2 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Del Rosario vs Ferrer
G.R. No. 187056
September 20, 2010
Facts:
On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a
document entitled Donation Mortis Causa[1] in favor of their two children, Asuncion and
Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their predeceased son, Zoilo) covering
the spouses 126-square meter lot and the house on it in Pandacan, Manila[2] in equal shares.
It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be
respected by the surviving spouse.
It is our will that Jarabini Gonzales-del Rosario and Emiliano Gonzales will
continue to occupy the portions now occupied by them.
It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall not in any
way affect any other distribution of other properties belonging to any of us donors
whether testate or intestate and where ever situated.
It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves the right,
ownership, possession and administration of this property herein donated and accepted
and this Disposition and Donation shall be operative and effective upon the death of the
DONORS
Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the equivalent of a

will, the deed had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The named
donees, however, signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of the document.
Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in September 1968. A few months later or on December 19,
1968, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and interests in
subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972.
Jarabini filed a petition for the probate of the August 27, 1968 deed of donation mortis
causa before the Regional Trial Court. Asuncion opposed the petition, invoking his father
Leopoldo’s assignment of his rights and interests in the property to her.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe’s donation to Asuncion, Emiliano, and
Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in fact a donation inter vivos.
Page 3 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Held:
It is a donation intervivos.
A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express irrevocability of the donation is the
distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos. Here, the donors
plainly said that it is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be
respected by the surviving spouse. The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even
clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation.
Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the right, ownership, possession, and administration
of the property and made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has
consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation
simply means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial
ownership of the donated property while they lived.
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed
required. This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter
vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis
causa, being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donors lifetime.
Page 4 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S. CABATINGAN,

petitioners, vs. THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, namely, LUZ M. BOQUIA, PERLA
M. ABELLA, ESTRELLA M. CAÑETE, LOURDES M. YUSON, and JULIA L. MAYOL, HEIRS
OF GENOVIVA C. NATIVIDAD, respondents.
G.R. No. 131953
June 5, 2002
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a

Deed of Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for House and Lot covering one-half ()
portion of the formers house and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu. Four (4) other deeds of
donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan, bestowing upon: (a) petitioner
Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land - one located in Cogon, Cebu and the other, a
portion of a parcel of land in Masbate; (b) petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion of a parcel of
land located in Masbate; and (c) petitioner Merly S. Cabatingan, a portion of the Masbate
property.
On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died. Respondents filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaue, Branch 55, an action for Annulment And/Or Declaration of Nullity of
Deeds of Donations and Accounting seeking the annulment of said four (4) deeds of donations.
Respondents allege, inter alia, that petitioners, through their sinister machinations and
strategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingans fragile condition, caused the
execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to comply with
the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that
these are donations mortis causa. Respondents prayed that a receiver be appointed in order to
preserve the disputed properties, and, that they be declared as co-owners of the properties in
equal shares, together with petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan
ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed donations are valid
RULING:
No. The donation is one of mortis cause which must be in the form of a will.
In a donation mortis causa, the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while
the donor is still alive. In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following
characteristics must be taken into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
Page 5 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.[13]
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to
petitioners prior to Cabatingans death. The phrase to become effective upon the death of the
DONOR admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the
ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly
confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the following Acceptance and Attestation clauses.
That the donations were made in consideration of the love and affection of the donor does not
qualify the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the
same reason.
The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be rescinded in case
petitioners predecease Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda,[20] one of the
decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void
if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in her
donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect during her lifetime and
that the ownership of the properties donated be transferrred to the donee or independently of,
and not by reason of her death, she would have not expressed such proviso in the subject deeds.
Page 6 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
AUSTRIA-MAGAT vs. CA
G.R. No. 106755. February 1, 2002
DE LEON, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Basilisa Comerciante is a mother of five (5) children, namely, Rosario Austria,

Consolacion Austria, herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat, Leonardo (died), and one of
herein respondents, Florentino Lumubos. In 1953, Basilisa bought a parcel of residential land
together with the improvement thereon, known as Lot 1, Block 1, Cavite Beach Subdivision,
with an area of 150 square meters, located in Bagong Pook, San Antonio, Cavite City. On
December 17, 1975, Basilisa executed a document designated as Kasulatan sa Kaloobpala
(Donation). It was notarized by Atty. Carlos Viniegra with acceptance clause
On February 6, 1979, Basilisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject house and
lot in favor of herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat for Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
Her TCT was now cancelled. Respondents (representing their deceased mother Consolacion
Austria) filed an action to annul the TCT in favor of the petitioner. This was dismissed by the
RTC on the ground that the donation is a donation mortis causa pursuant to Article 728 of the
New Civil Code inasmuch as the same expressly provides that it would take effect upon the
death of the donor; that the provision stating that the donor reserved the right to revoke the
donation is a feature of a donation mortis causa which must comply with the formalities of a
will; and that inasmuch as the donation did not follow the formalities pertaining to wills, the
same is void and produced no effect whatsoever. Hence, the sale by the donor of the said
property was valid since she remained to be the absolute owner thereof during the time of the
said transaction.
The CA reversed, saying that the Deed of Sale is void and TCT in favor of petitioner
shall be cancelled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a transfer of the property to the donees upon their acceptance of the
donation
RULING:
Significant to the resolution of this issue is the irrevocable character of the donation in the case
at bar. In Cuevas v. Cuevas,[12] we ruled that when the deed of donation provides that the
donor will not dispose or take away the property donated (thus making the donation
irrevocable), he in effect is making a donation inter vivos. He parts away with his naked title
but maintains beneficial ownership while he lives. It remains to be a donation inter vivos
despite an express provision that the donor continues to be in possession and enjoyment of the
donated property while he is alive.
Page 7 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Construing together the provisions of the deed of donation, we find and so hold that in the case
at bar the donation is inter vivos. The express irrevocability of the same (hindi na mababawi) is
the distinctive standard that identifies that document as a donation inter vivos. The other
provisions therein which seemingly make the donation mortis causa do not go against the
irrevocable character of the subject donation.
Page 8 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-6600
July 30, 1954
Facts:
The complaint (for annulment and damages) charged that on the first day of December,
1949, Domingo Bonsato, a widower, had been induced and deceived into signing two notarial
deeds of donations in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato,
respectively, transferring to them several parcels of land situated in the Province of
Pangasinan, both donations having been duly accepted in the same act and documents.
Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the
requisite formalities.
The defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations
made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered by
them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without the use of force
and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the dismissal of the case and for
damages in the sum of P2000.
RTC ruled that the deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the latter was
of sound mind, without pressure or intimidation. The deeds were of donation inter vivos
without any condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor;
but as the properties donated were presumptively conjugal, having been acquired during the
coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations were only valid as
to an undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described therein.
The CA reversed and ruled that donations are null and void, because they were
donations mortis causa and were executed without the testamentary formalities prescribed by
law, and ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to surrender the possession of the properties
in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants.
Issue:
Whether the donation was mortis cause and thus must comply with the requisites provided by
law
Held:
NO. It is a donation intervivos
It is well-established at present that the Civil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke away
from the Roman Law tradition, and followed the French doctrine that no one may both donate
and retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut"), by merging the erstwhile donations mortis causa with
the testamentary dispositions, thus suppressing said donations as an independent legal concept.
Page 9 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of the
nature of disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the rules established for
testamentary successions.
The characteristics of a donation mortis causa are:
a. Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked)
and control of the property while alive;
b. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
c. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation, Exhibits 1 and 2,

executed by the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his
lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or produce. This reservation was unnecessary if the
ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of
stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly
declare them to be "irrevocable", a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances
mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator cannot
lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation. Also, even though the conveyance was due to
the affection of the donor for the donees and the services rendered by the latter, such claim only
corroborates the express irrevocability of the transfers and the absence of any reservation by
the donor of title to, or control over, the properties donated, and reinforces the conclusion that
the act was inter vivos
Page 10 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
REYES V. MOSQUEDA
G.R. No. L-45262 July 23, 1990
FACTS:
Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue on November 18,1972. He was
survived by his sister, Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters as follows: (1) Maria
Pascual Reyes- Ruperto Reyes and Jose Reyes; (2) Ines Pascual Reyes-Jose P. Reyes, Benito
Reyes, and Manna Reyes Manalastas; (3) Josefa Pascual Reyes-Augusto Reyes and Benjamin
Reyes; and (4) Escolastica Pascual Dalusong (half- blood Pedro Dalusong.
The heirs of Dr. Pascual filed for the administration of his estate. Atty. Marcela
Macapagal, Clerk of Court of Branch VII was appointed special administratrix. Macapagal was
replaced by Reynaldo San Juan.
Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude some properties from the inventory of
Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles thereto to her. During his lifetime, her brother
executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are included in the
estate. This was granted by the RTC.
Among the properties included in the "donation mortis causa" in favor of Ursula was
Lot 24, Block No. 15 of the subdivision plan Psd-3231, located at 1109-1111 R. Papa St.,
Tondo, Manila
Ursula Pascual executed a deed of absolute sale over the Tondo property in favor of
Benjamin, Oscar, Jose and Emmanuel, all surnamed Reyes.
Benjamin Reyes, private respondent filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092 (of Ofelia) in the Register of Deeds of Manila and/or
reconveyance of deed of title against Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil.
Parungao and Duncil denied Reyes' assertion of ownership over the Tondo property.
They filed a complaint for recovery of possession over the Tondo property against Benjamin
Reyes and his nephew Oscar Reyes. They alleged that as early as 1973, the defendants occupied
two (2) doors of the apartment situated at the Tondo property by mere tolerance of the
previous owner, Dr. Emilio Pascual, and later by her until April 8, 1978 when she formally
demanded that the defendants vacate the premises. Parungao prayed that the defendants be
evicted from the premises.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the probate has jurisdiction to exclude properties donated to Ursula
(2) Whether or not the donation executed in favor of Ursula was a Donation Inter Vivos
HELD:
(1) YES
A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate
or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed
to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties
to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is,
then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
Page 11 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so.
(2) YES
Although the donation was entitled ―donations mortis causa it has been held that dispositions
in a deed of donation do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation. It is the
body of the document which should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor.
For a donation to be a donation mortis causa, the following characteristics should be present:
1. It conveys no title before the death of the transferor or the transferor retains ownership over
the property
2. Before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will
3. The transfer is void should the transferor survive the transferee
The following are not present in the case. The transfer of ownership was immediate and
independent of the death of the donor. The provision stating that the donor has reserved
sufficient properties for himself to maintain him for life confirms the intention of the donor to
give naked ownership immediately after execution of the deed of donation.
Page 12 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
VITUG vs. CA
188 SCRA 755
FACTS:
The probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New
York, U. S.A., on November 10, 1980, naming private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona
executrix. In our said decision, we upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special
administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs. Vitug's) widower, petitioner Romarico G.
Vitug, pending probate. Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the
probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover
allegedly his advances to the estate in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed
were personal funds.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the
same funds withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal partnership
properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement.
She also sought his ouster for failure to include the sums in question for inventory and for
"concealment of funds belonging to the estate
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same
through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19, 1970
“We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN
NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to as the
BANK), that all money now or hereafter deposited by us or any or either of us with the
BANK in our joint savings current account shall be the property of all or both of us and
shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of us during our
lifetime, and after the death of either or any of us shall belong to and be the sole
property of the survivor or survivors, and shall be payable to and collectible or
withdrawable by such survivor or survivors.
We further agree with each other and the BANK that the receipt or check of
either, any or all of us during our lifetime, or the receipt or check of the survivor or
survivors, for any payment or withdrawal made for our above-mentioned account shall
be valid and sufficient release and discharge of the BANK for such payment or
withdrawal”
The trial courts upheld the validity of such agreement. On the other hand, the CA held
that the survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which “did not comply
with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code,” and secondly,
assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the provisions
of Article 133 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the survivorship agreement is in fact a conveyance mortis causa
HELD:
Page 13 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
No. The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be
embodied in a will. A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by
which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with
duties to take effect after his death." In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the
testator. In this case, the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature
of conjugal funds In the case relied on, Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co., we rejected
claims that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one party's separate properties in
favor of the other, but simply, their joint holdings:
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence
it must be presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the
marita. relations.
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it
was to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the
spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the other.
The agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal partnership by "mere

stipulation" and that it is no "cloak" to circumvent the law on conjugal property relations.
Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal property, say, by way of a
joint and several bank account, more commonly denominated in banking parlance as an
"and/or" account. In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No.
35342-038, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture.
They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been sanctionable as
a prohibited donation. And since the funds were conjugal, it can not be said that one spouse
could have pressured the other in placing his or her deposits in the money pool.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in
reality, that contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being death. Such
agreements are permitted by the Civil Code.
Under Article 2010 of the Code:
ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind
themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall give or
do upon the happening of an event which is uncertain, or which is to occur at an
indeterminate time.
Page 14 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Pasco v. vs. Heirs of De Guzman

G.R. No. 165554 : July 26, 2010
FACTS
The present petition began with a Complaint for a Sum of Money and Damages filed on
December 13, 2000 by respondents, the heirs of Filomena de Guzman, represented by
Cresencia de Guzman-Principe, against petitioners Lauro Pasco and Lazaro Pasco. The case
was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bocaue, Bulacan, and docketed as Civil
Case No. MM-3191.
In their Complaint, herein respondents alleged that on February 7, 1997, petitioners obtained a
loan in the amount of ₱140,000.00 from Filomena (now deceased). To secure the petitioners’
loan, Lauro executed a chattel mortgage on his Isuzu Jeep in favor of Filomena. Upon her
death, her heirs sought to collect from the petitioners, to no avail. Despite numerous demands,
petitioners refused to either pay the balance of the loan or surrender the Isuzu Jeep to the
respondents. Thus, respondents were constrained to file the collection case to compel the
petitioners to pay the principal amount of ₱140,000.00 plus damages in the amount of 5%
monthly interest from February 7, 1995, 25% attorney’s fees, exemplary damages and expenses
of litigation.
ISSUES:
Whether of not the Special Power of Attorney validly authorized Cresencia to enter into the
Compromise Agreement on behalf of her co-heirs.
RULING:
Yes. Cresencia’s co-heirs executed a Special Power of Attorney, dated April 6, 1999,
designating the former as their attorney-in-fact and empowering her to file cases for collection
of all the accounts due to Filomena or her estate. Consequently, Cresencia entered into the
subject Compromise Agreement in order to collect the overdue loan obtained by Pasco from
Filomena. In so doing, Cresencia was merely performing her duty as attorney-in-fact of her co-
heirs pursuant to the Special Power of Attorney given to her.
However, the proceeds of the loan should be released to Filomenas heirs only upon
settlement of her estate.
Finally, it is true that Filomenas estate has a different juridical personality than that of the
heirs. Nonetheless, her heirs certainly have an interest in the preservation of the estate and the
recovery of its properties, for at the moment of Filomenas death, the heirs start to own the
property, subject to the decedent's liabilities. In this connection, Article 777 of the Civil Code
states that [t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.
Unfortunately, the records before us do not show the status of the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of Filomena, if any. But to allow the release of the funds directly to the
heirs would amount to a distribution of the estate; which distribution and delivery should be
made only after, not before, the payment of all debts, charges, expenses, and taxes of the estate
Page 15 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
have been paid. We thus decree that respondent Cresencia should deposit the amounts received
from the petitioners with the MTC of Bocaue, Bulacan and in turn, the MTC of Bocaue,
Bulacan should hold in abeyance the release of the amounts to Filomenas heirs until after a
showing that the proper procedure for the settlement of Filomenas estate has been followed.
Page 16 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
NATALIA CARPENA OPULENCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ALADIN SIMUNDAC

and MIGUEL OLIVAN
G.R. No. 125835 July 30, 1998
FACTS:
Herein private respondents Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that [herein
petitioner Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in their favor a CONTRACT TO SELL Lot
2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna at P150.00 per square meter; that
plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300,000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed to comply
with her obligations under the contract. Private respondents therefore prayed that petitioner be
ordered to perform her contractual obligations and to further pay damages, attorney’s fee and
litigation expenses.
The preamble of the contract reads:
xxxxxxxxx
WHEREAS, the SELLER suffers difficulties in her living and has forced to offer
the sale of the above-described property, which property was only one among the other
properties given to her by her late father, to anyone who can wait for complete
clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father.
WHEREAS, the SELLER in order to meet her need of cash, has offered for sale
the said property at ONE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (150.00) Philippine Currency,
per square meter unto the BUYERS, and with this offer, the latter has accepted to buy
and/or purchase the same, less the area for the road and other easements indicated at
the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2125 duly confirmed after the survey to be
conducted by the BUYERs Licensed Geodetic Engineer, and whatever area [is] left.
(Emphasis added).
Opulencia admitted the execution of the contract in favor of Simundac and Oliven and receipt of
P300,000.00 as downpayment. However, she put forward the following that the property
subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena, Natalia Opulencia’s
father, in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24, Binan, Laguna. She also added that at the time the contract was executed, the
parties were aware of the pendency of the probate proceeding and that the contract to sell was
not approved by the probate court. Thus, realizing the nullity of the contract, Natalia
Opulencia had offered to return the downpayment received from Simundac and Oliven but the
latter refused to accept it. Lastly she averred that Simundac and Oliven further failed to provide
funds for the tenant who demanded P150,00.00 in payment of his tenancy rights on the land
thus Opulencia had chosen to rescind the contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract to sell was valid despite absence of permission from the probate
court to such transaction.
Page 17 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
RULING:
Yes, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because Natalia entered into
the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the
estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the lawful owner and seller of the subject
parcel of land. She also explained the reason for the sale to be difficulties in her living
conditions and consequent need of cash. These representations clearly evince that she was not
acting on behalf of the estate under probate when she entered into the Contract to
Sell. Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedents
death.[14] Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her
father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because
the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of
her late father.
Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that the possession of hereditary property is deemed to
be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in
case the inheritance be accepted. And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a
person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to
the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus
formed among the coowners of the estate while it remains undivided. And according to article
399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common
property, and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted him in the partition upon the dissolution of the community.
Page 18 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
JOSE C LEE and ALMA AGGABAO v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
G.R. No. 146006

23 FEBRUARY 2004
FACTS:
Dr. Juvencio Ortaez died leaving behind his wife, three legitimate children and five illegitimate
children. Rafael, a legitimate child, filed a petition for the administration of the intestate estate
of Juvencio. Thereafter, Rafael and Jose were appointed as joint administrators of the estate.
They then presented an inventory of the estate of their father including the herein disputed
Philinterlife shares of stock.
On April 15, 1989, the wife of Juvencio , claiming that she owned 1,014 shares of stock as her
conjugal share in the estate, sold said share to FLAG (Filipino Loan Assistance Group). Jose
Ortaez also, claiming that he owned the remaining shares of stock, sold the said shares in favor
of FLAG. The sale was consolidated and FLAG was the owner of the said shares of stock.
However, it appears that several years before (but during the pendency of the intestate
proceedings), the wife and her two children entered into a memorandum of agreement for the
extrajudicial settlement of the deceased, partitioning the estate which was the basis of the sale
to FLAG.
ISSUE: Whether the sale of the shares of stock was valid?
HELD:
No. The sale of the shares of stock was void. Jurisprudence is clear that (1) any disposition of
estate property by an administrator or prospective hei pending final adjudication requires court
approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate
court.
In this case, the wife and three sons invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement
extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that
there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the
intestate court. Such sale could not be lawfully executed pending the final adjudication of the
estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants
to the estate. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by the wife and her children was
invalid, the subsequent sale thereof to a third part (FLAG), without court approval, was
likewise void.
Page 19 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Balus v. Balus
G.R. No. 168970
January 15, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner, Celestino, and respondents, Saturnino and Leonarda, are the children of the spouses
Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died on July 6,
1984.
On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as security for a loan he
obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a
result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the
sole bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. .A Certificate of Sale was executed by the
sheriff in favor of the Bank. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by
law. More than two years after the auction, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in the
Bank's favor. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank
On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject property.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the
subject property from the Bank, and a Deed of Sale of Registered Land[6] was executed by the
Bank in favor of respondents.
Petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.
On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages
against petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they
were the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender
possession of the same to them.
Page 20 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
The RTC rendered a decision ordering the plaintiffs to execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the
defendant, the one-third share of the property in question, presently possessed by him.
The CA reversed and set aside RTC’s decision and ordered petitioner to immediately surrender
possession of the subject property to the respondents.
Hence, the petition to the SC.
Issue:
Whether co-ownership by petitioner and respondents over the subject property persisted even
after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after
it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled against the petitioner. It stated that ruled that petitioner and
respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that at the time of the execution of the
Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property formed part of the estate of their deceased father
to which they may lay claim as his heirs. The Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the
contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition,
the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations
existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening
of the succession. In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during
his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer
formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and
respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father. In the eyes of the law, the
disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of
Rufo at any given point in time.
There is no co-ownership to talk about and no property to partition, as the disputed lot never
formed part of the estate of their deceased father.
Page 21 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their
supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject
Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject
property divided or partitioned to each of them. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-
ownership,[21] an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.
Page 22 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED, LUISITO E. DELA MERCED, BLANQUTIA M.

MACATANGAY, MA. OLIVIA M. PAREDES, TERESITA P. RUPISAN, RUBEN M.
ADRIANO, HERMINIO M. ADRIANO, JOSELITO M. ADRIANO, ROGELIO M.
ADRIANO, WILFREDO M. ADRIANO, VICTOR M. ADRIANO, CORAZON A.
ONGOCO, JASMIN A. MENDOZA and CONSTANTINO M. ADRIANO vs. JOSELITO
P. DELA MERCED
G.R. No. 126707 February 25, 1999
Facts
On March 23, 1987, Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate. At the time of her death,
she was survived by three sets of heirs: (1) Francisco M. dela Merced, her legitimate brother;
(2) Teresita P. Rupisan, her niece from a sister who died in 1943; and (3) the legitimate children
of another sister who died in 1965.
On March 19, 1988, Francisco died. He was survived by his wife plus their three
legitimate children.
On April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of Evarista, referring to (1) the heirs of
Francisco; (2) Teresita and (3) the legitimate children of Eugenia, executed an extrajudicial
settlement adjudicating the properties of Evarista to them, each set with a share 1/3 pro-
indiviso.
Joselito P. Dela Merced, the illegitimate son of the late Francisco, filed for the
annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Evarista, alleging that he was
fraudulently omitted from the said settlement made by petitioners who were fully aware of his
relation to the late Francisco. Claiming successional rights, he prayed that he be included to
share in the 1/3 pro-indiviso share in the estate of Evarista, corresponding to the heirs of
Francisco.
Issue
Is Joselito barred from inheriting from Evarista because of the provision of Article 992
of the New Civil Code?
Held
No.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code is inapplicable because involved here is not a situation
where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father,
which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it is a scenario where an
illegitimate child inherits from his father, the latter's share in or portion of, what the latter
already inherited from the deceased sister, Evarista.
When Evarista died ahead of Francisco, the latter inherited a portion of the estate of the
former as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco died, his heirs—his spouse, legitimate
children, and Joselito, an illegitimate child, inherited his share in the estate of Evarista. Joselito
does not claim to be an heir of Evarista by right of representation but participates in his own
right, as an heir of the late Francisco, in the latter's share in the estate of Evarista.
Page 23 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Coronel vs. CA
GR No. 103577
7 October 1996
Facts
Constancio Coronel died leaving a house and lot which were inherited by his children all named
Coronel. The Coronels entered into an agreement with Ramona Alcaraz wherein they will
transfer in their name the title of the property registered in the name of their father upon
receipt of the downpayment from Ramona. They further agreed that the Coronels will bind
themselves to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of Ramona and that Ramona will pay the
balance of the purchase price. As agreed upon, Ramona paid the downpayment and the
Coronels transfered in their name the title of the house and lot. However, the Coronels sold the
house and lot to Catalina Mabanag and cancelled its contract with Ramona. Ramona then filed
an action for specific performance against the Coronels to execute a Deed of Sale in her favor.
The Coronels argued that there could be no perfected contract between them and Ramona
because they were then not yet the absolute owners of the inherited property.
Issue
Is there no perfected contract between the Coronels and Ramona on the ground that the former
were not the absolute owners of the subject property?
Held
No. There is a perfected contract.
The Civil Code expressly provides that rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent. In this case, when the Coronels’ father died, they stepped into
the shoes of their father insofar as the inherited house and lot are concerned, such that any
rights or obligations pertaining thereto became binding and enforceable upon them. Thus, the
Coronels were already the absolute owners of the house and lot at the time they contracted
with Ramona.
Page 24 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Paulmitan vs. CA
G. R. No. 61584
November 25, 1992
FACTS:
Agatona Paulmitan is married with Ciriaco Paulmitan and they begot two legitimate
children—Donato and Pascual. When Agatona died, shortly thereafter, Pascual also died.
Agatona left two lots upon her death. Donato, then settled one lot to himself only, based on the
claim that he is the only heir. Concerning the other lot, Donato sold the same to Juliana, his
daughter. This lot was later on forfeited by the government and sold at public auction due to
non- payment of taxes, but Juliana was able to redeem the property. Upon learning this, the
respondents children of Pacual filed a complaint for partition of said property. Juliana opposed
claiming that she acquired exclusive ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of sale but
also by way of redemption from the government.
ISSUE:
Did Juliana acquire exclusive ownership of the property, leaving respondents no right
from their grandmother’s property?
HELD:
No. Juliana did not acquire exclusive ownership. From the time of death of Agatona to
the subsequent passing away of her son, Pascual, the estate remained unpartitioned. Donato
and Pascual were, therefore, co- owners of the estate left by their mother as no partition was
ever made. When Pascual died, his children, the respondents, succeeded in the co- ownership of
the disputed property. When Donato sold the lot to Juliana, he was only a co- owner with
respondents, and as such, he could only sell that portion which may be allotted to him upon
termination of the co-ownership. It did not vest ownership in the entire land with the buyer but
transferred only the seller’s pro- indiviso share in the property and consequently made the
buyer a co- owner of the land until it is partitioned.
Moreover, the redemption of the land by Juliana did not terminate the co- ownership
nor give her title to the entire land subject of the ownership. The result is that the property
remains in a condition of co- ownership. But she did acquire the right to be reimbursed the half
of the redemption price she paid to the government. Until reimbursed, she holds a lien upon the
subject property for the amount due her.
Page 25 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Rioferio vs. Court Appeals
GR No. 129008 January 13, 2004
Facts:
In 1995, Alfonso Orfinada Jr. died without a will. He was survived by Esperanza, his wife and
their seven children. Legitimate children discovered that Teodora and her children executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with quitclaim involving the properties
of the estate of the decedent in Dagupan. The illegitimate, obtained a loan from the bank by
executing Real Estate Mortgage over the property. Clyde, the legitimate son filed a petition for
Letters of Administration. Respondents filed a complaint for annulment or rescission of said
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. Petitioner answered that the properties originally belongs
to the parents of Teodora Riofero and that the titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance
inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his name.
Issue:
Do the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased subsequent
to the commencement of the administrative proceedings.
Held:
Yes. Pending the filing of administrative proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal
personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision
of Article. 777 of the New Civil Code that the rights to succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent. The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle
that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person
are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
The three exceptions to the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the
recovery of property of the estate are:
1. The executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit

2. When the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he
is made a party defendant
3. When there is no appointed administrator
Page 26 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
TRANSMISSION/ACQUISITION THROUGH DEATH
EMILIO EMNACE v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Facts: Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business
concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to
dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the
partnership properties among them. Petitioner Emnace failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any
statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the
partnership's finances.
Petitioner Emnace also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's
1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership. Tabanao's heirs filed against petitioner Emnace
an action for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages.
Issue: Whether or not the heirs of Vicente Tabanao have the capacity to sue petitioner Emance.
Ruling: Yes. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or
administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are complainants
in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente
Tabanao's death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his
heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner
Emance were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession,
which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. Moreover, respondents
became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.
Page 27 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Limjoco v. Fragrante
G.R. No. L-770
April 27, 1948
Facts:
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel
Ibañez, rendered its decision in favor of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of
public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said
commission held that the evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will
be promoted in a proper and suitable manner by authorizing the operation and maintenance of
another ice plant of two and one-half (2-½) tons in the municipality of San Juan.
It also stated that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the
time of his death and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed
service.
The commission, therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered that
under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of
public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante,
authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by
the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily
productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell
the ice produced from said plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of
Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City.
Issue:
Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial personality.
Held:
Yes . The Supreme Court held that the estate of Fragrante must be extended an
artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante had lived, in view of the evidence of record, would
have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has
not changed except for his death, and the economic ability of his estate to appropriately and
adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from
the decedent himself.
The estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr.
Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural
persons. It said in another work that 'persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A natural
person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural
persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the
capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a
limited extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person." Our own
Page 28 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
cases inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by the authors from whom
we have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim against a decedent's
estate, to designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person, naming him. Unless we
accept this definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases where, as here, the
forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged; and this is a result to be
avoided if it can be done consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in avoiding such a
result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as
an artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the
assets to be properly made, and, although natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an
interest in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity. The interest which
natural persons have in it is not complete until there has been a due administration; and one
who forges the name of the decedent to an instrument purporting to be a promissory note must
be regarded as having intended to defraud the estate of the decedent, and not the natural
persons having diverse interests in it, since ha cannot be presumed to have known who those
persons were, or what was the nature of their respective interest. The fraudulent intent is
against the artificial person, — the estate — and not the natural persons who have direct or
contingent interest in it.
In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O.
Fragrante is considered a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than
his death would entail prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found
by the commission, not counting the expenses and disbursements which the proceeding can be
presumed to have occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate
thereafter. In this jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased
person is also considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs.
Page 29 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Arayata vs Joya
51 Phil 654
FACTS:
Cecilio Joya inherited from his deceased parents the right to lease six lots of friar lands. On 4
June 1906, Cecilio Joya married Basilia Arayata. When the Insular Government acquired the
said land, Joya continued his lease. While married, Joya purchased the lots he had been leasing,
on installments, from the Government, as the number of lots which a purchaser could acquire
under the law was limited, lots Nos 1153 and 2352 were excluded and put up for sale. In order
not to lose them, Joya had Pedro Tiongco buy them, supplying him with the necessary funds.
Subsequently, Tiongco transferred his rights to said lots to Joya by donation. These transfers
were approved by the Director of Lands.
Joya conveyed his right to Lot No. 1058 to Florentino for P2,000 which was also approved by
the Director of Lands. On 11 May 1919, Cecilio conveyed his right to lot no,547 to Marcelino
and Franciso Joya in consideration of the sum of P450, conveyance having been approved by
the Director of Lands. Furthermore, Cecilio executed a will devising lot no. 1058 to Florentino,
lot 1086 to Pablo, lot 1031 to Delfin and Felicima Blancaflor, lot 1153 to the brothers Agustin
and Pedro, lot 2352 tp Feliciano and Asuncion Bobadilla, and lot 547 to Marcelina and
Francisca Joya. At the time of his death, Cecilio had not yet completed the payment of the price
of the lots.
Basilia Arayata alleged that her signature had been obtained by fraud.
ISSUES:
1. Were Cecilio’s conveyances of his interest to Florentino Joya and to the sisters
Marcelina and Francisca fraudulent?
2. Were Cecilio’s legacies to the other defendants null and void?
HELD:
1.
No. The holder of a certificate of sale of friar land has a right to sell his interest therein,
even before having fully paid the purchase price and upon presentation of the certificate
of transfer to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for registration, he is subrogated
to all the rights of the holder of the certificate.
In the case, the conveyances have been made in accordance with the provisions
of the law, Florentino, Marcelina and Francisca were subrogated to all of Cecilio’s
rights to said lots and there is nothing to show conclusively that said conveyances were
fraudulently obtained.
2.
Page 30 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Act No. 1120 states that, in the event of the death of a holder of a certificate the issuance
of which is provided for in Sec 12 hereof, prior to the execution of a deed by the
Government to any purchaser, his widow shall be entitled to receive a deed of the land
stated in the certificate upon showing that she has complied with the requirements of
law for the purchase of the same.
Thus, Cecilio’s legacies in his will to Delfin and Felicima, Pablo, Agusting and Pedro,
and Feliciano and Asuncion are null and void, being contrary to the provisions of Act
No. 1120 which grants his widow, Basilia Arayata, the ownership of the lands purchased
and not transferred by him during his lifetime, provided that she complies with the legal
requirements for the purchase of the same.
Page 31 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Alvarez v. IAC and Yanes

G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990
FACTS:
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private
respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while
the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was
survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. The object of the controversy is two parcels of lands
registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-
4858 (8804) issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental Negros.One of
the lots left by Aniceto was later found in the possession of Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella
(Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773.Santiago sold the lots to Fuentebella
and a new TCT was issued.After Fuentebella died, his wife became the administrator.
The widow Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo
Alvarez.A new TCT was also issued in favor of Rosendo Alvarez Two years later or on May
26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado
and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against
Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also
prayed that an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint
be made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the share or money
equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay
plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees.
The CFI ruled in favor of the Yaneses.However the execution was problematic since the
sheriff found out that Lot 773 was subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they were "in
the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not
be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of execution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligations of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos.
773-A and 773-B could be legally passed or transmitted by operation of law to the heirs
without violation of law and due process.
HELD:
YES. It is a settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that rights and obligations of the
deceased are generally transmissible to his legitimate children and heirs. The binding effect of
contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of
Page 32 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the
residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89).
The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a
payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or
reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive."Under our law, therefore,
the general rule is that a party‘s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
successors. Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages.
That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal
fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary
estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the
payment of the debts of the estate.
Page 33 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Rufino Lim vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. 124715
January 24, 2000
Facts:
Rufina is the surviving spouse of Pastor Lim whose estate is being subjected to probate. Pastor
died intestate. the respondents, in this case, however, are corporations which were established
by Pastor when he was still alive. Rufina filed a petition for administration. The corporations
asked the trial court to exclude their properties from the estate. Eventually, Rufina was
assigned as a special administratrix. The probate court, however, denied the motion to exclude
the properties of the corporations. The Court of Appeals granted the restraining order. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties of the corporations whould be excluded from the estate of Pastor
Lim.
Held:
Yes. There was no compelling evidence presented by Rufina that Pastor had title over the
properties. The properties were in the name of the corporations, thus, the conclusiveness of
title stands. Corporations have separate and distinct personalities from those who have
established them. Mere ownership is not sufficient to disregard the separate personalities of the
owner from the corporation itself.
Page 34 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
ESTATE OF ORLANDO LLENADO and WENIFREDA T. LLENADO v. EDUARDO

LLENADO, JORGE LLENADO, FELIZA GALLARDO VDA. DE LLENADO and
REGISTER OF DEEDS of Valenzuela City, Metro Manila
G.R. No. 145736, March 4, 2009
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Cornelio leased the subject lot to his nephew, Romeo Llenado (Romeo), for a period
offive years, renewable for another five years at the option of Cornelio. On March 31, 1978,
Cornelio, Romeo and the latter’s cousin Orlando Llenado (Orlando) executed an Agreement
whereby Romeo assigned all his rights to Orlando over the unexpired portion of the aforesaid
lease contract. The parties further agreed that Orlando shall have the option to renew the lease
contract for another three years commencing from December 3, 1980, up to December 2, 1983,
renewable for another four years or up to December 2, 1987, and that “during the period that
[this agreement] is enforced, the x x x property cannot be sold, transferred, alienated or
conveyed in whatever manner to any third party.”
Shortly thereafter or on June 24, 1978, Cornelio and Orlando entered into a
Supplementary Agreement amending the March 31, 1978 Agreement. Under the
Supplementary Agreement, Orlando was given an additional option to renew the lease contract
for an aggregate period of 10 years at five-year intervals, that is, from December 3, 1987 to
December 2, 1992 and from December 3, 1992 to December 2, 1997. The saidprovision was
inserted in order to comply with the requirements of Mobil Philippines, Inc. for the operation
of a gasoline station which was subsequently built on the subject lot.
Upon the death of Orlando on November 7, 1983, his wife, Wenifreda Llenado
(Wenifreda), took over the operation of the gasoline station. Meanwhile, onJanuary 29, 1987,
Cornelio sold the to his children, namely, Eduardo, Jorge, Virginia and Cornelio, Jr., through
a deed of sale. Several months thereafter or on September 7, 1987, Cornelio passed away.
Sometime in 1993, Eduardo informed Wenifreda of his desire to take over the subject lot.
However, the latter refused to vacate the premises despite repeated demands. Thus, on
September 24, 1993, Eduardo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rights arising from lease contract transmissible.
RULING:
Yes. Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, the heirs are bound by the contracts entered
into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations therein are not
transmissible by their nature, by stipulation or by provision of law. A contract of lease is,
therefore, generally transmissible to the heirs of the lessor or lessee. It involves a property
right and, as such, the death of a party does not excuse non-performance of the contract. The
rights and obligations pass to the heirs of the deceased and the heir of the deceased lessor
is bound to respect the period of the lease. The same principle applies to the option to renew
the lease. As a general rule, covenants to renew a lease are not personal but will run with the
Page 35 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
land. Consequently, the successors-in-interest of the lessee are entitled to the benefits, while
that of the lessor are burdened with the duties and obligations, which said covenants conferred
and imposed on the original parties
Page 36 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
SAN AGUSTIN v. CA
G. R. No. 121940, DECEMBER 4, 2001
FACTS:
On February 11, 1974, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) sold to a
certain Macaria Vda. De Caiquep, a parcel of residential land.
On February 19, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in the name of Vda. De
Caiquep, TCT No. 436465 with the following encumbrance annotated at the back of the title:
This Deed of Absolute Sale is subject to the conditions enumerated below which shall be
permanent encumbrances on the property, the violation of any of which shall entitle the vendor
to cancel x x x this Deed of Absolute Sal and reenter the property;
x x x the vendee shall not sell, convey, lease or sublease, or otherwise encumber the
property in favor of any other party within five (5) years from the date final and absolute
ownership thereof becomes vested in the vendee, except in cases of hereditary succession or
resale in favor of the vendor.
A day after the issuance of the TCT in favor of Vda. De Caiquep, the latter sold the lot
to private respondent, Maximo Menez, Jr., as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. For being
suspected as a subversive, Menez was detained for two years and he hid for another four years
after his release.
In December of 1990, he discovered that the subject TCT was missing. Menez filed a
petition to replace the lost one and the same was granted by the court.
On October 13, 1992, herein petitioner, Jesus San Agustin, received a copy of the
abovecited decision. He claimed this was the first time he became aware of the case of her aunt,
Macaria who, according to him, died sometime in 1974. Claiming that he was the present
occupant of the property and the heir of Macaria.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Menez which was
executed during the five-year prohibitory period was binding upon San Agustin
HELD:
Yes. The Court held that the GSIS has not filed any action for the annulment of the
subject Deed of Absolute Sate, nor for the forfeiture of the lot in question. Thus, the contract of
sale remains valid between the parties, unless and until annulled in the proper suit filed by the
rightful party, the GSIS. The said contract of sale is binding upon the heirs of Macaria,
Page 37 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
including petitioner who alleges to be one of her heirs, in line with the rule that heirs are bound
by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest.
Page 38 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Milagros Manongsong v. Felomena Jumaquio Estimo et al

G.R. No. 136773
June 25, 2003
FACTS
Spouses Agatona Guevarra and Ciriaco Lopez had six children and five were
represented by the parties in the case. Manongsong claimed that Guevarra was the original
owner of the property and her five children inherited it. The respondents were in possession of
the property, and the petitioners are the only descendants not occupying any portion of it. Due
to this, they filed a case for its partition, praying that they be given an area equivalent to 1/5 of
the property.
Then Manongsong entered into a Compromise Agreement with some of the

respondents agreeing that each would receive an equal share in the property. The Jumaquio
sisters opposed the petition, contending that Justina Navarro sold the property to Enriqueta
Lopez Jumaquio, one of the heirs of Guevarra and their mother. This was evidenced by a duly
notarized Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lupa.
The RTC ruled that the sale was void since it was a conjugal property and it deprived
Guevarra of her legitime. On appeal, the sale was declared valid and that the property was
paraphernal.
ISSUE
Is Manongsong a co-owner of the property?
HELD
No. The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public
document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution. To assail it, the
evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. Otherwise the
authenticity and due execution of the document should be upheld. No countervailing proof was
adduced by Manongsong to overcome or impugn the documents legality or its validity.
There is also no basis to declare that the sale embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the
compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by
lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the estate
of the seller. In a sale, there is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values,
that is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration. Thus, there is
no legal basis for the partition of the property.
Page 39 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Spouses Joaquin v. CA
GR No. 126376 November 20, 2003
FACTS
Spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs Consolacion,
Nora, Emma and Natividad, as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas,
Fe and Gavino. Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real
property executed by defendant parents in favour of their co-defendant children. The plaintiff
children are claiming that no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale were made and that
the purported sale was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the
rest of the compulsory heirs of their legitime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deeds of sale by the parents to their co-defendant children valid
HELD:
The right of children to the properties of their parents, as compulsory heirs, is merely inchoate
and vests only upon the parents’ death. While still alive, parents are free to dispose of their
properties, provided such dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors. Compulsory heirs
have the right to a legitime but such right is contingent since said right commences only from
the moment of death of the decedent. There can be no legitime to speak of prior to the death of
their parents. In determining the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the
testator shall be considered. The legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the
death of the decedent. Plaintiffs cannot claim an impairment of their legitime while their
parents live. The testimony of the defendants, particularly that of the father, will show that the
Deeds of Sale were all executed for valuable consideration. Petitioners failed to show that the
prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely simulated
Page 40 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
J.L.T. AGRO, INC., vs. ANTONIO BALANSAG

G.R. No. 141882. March 11, 2005
FACTS:
Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena
(Antonia), and after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros Donio). Don Julian had
two children with Antonia, namely: Josefa Teves Escao and Emilio Teves. He had also four (4)
children with Milagros Donio, namely: Maria Evelyn Donio Teves, Jose Catalino Donio Teves,
Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves.
When Antonia died, an action for partition and damages was instituted where the parties
entered into a Compromise Agreement which was approved by the CFI and declared the land as
property owned by Don Julian and his two (2) children of the first marriage. The property was
to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa and Emilio likewise were given
other properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the movie property, the commercial areas,
and the house where Don Julian was living. The remainder of the properties was retained by
Don Julian, including Lot No. 63.
Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of
Liabilities which transferred ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of
petitioner. On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, petitioner was able to register
the subject lot in its name.
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the
subject lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. They entered into a yearly lease
agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday, respondents herein.On Lot
No. 63, respondents temporarily established their home and constructed a lumber yard.
Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real
Estate where Lot No. 63 was allotted to Milagros Donio and her two 2 children. Unaware that
the subject lot was already registered in the name of petitioner, respondents bought the lot
from Milagros. However, they were not able to register the lot in their name as it was already
titled in the name of petitioners.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior
to the death of the decedent?
2. Whether or not the Supplemental Deed was tantamount to a preterition of the
decendent’s heirs from the second marriage?
3. whether or not there was a valid transfer effected by Don Julian to petitioner.
HELD:
1. Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the
commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is that no contract
may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the
exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to
Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally operative only upon the death
of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to
him under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of
Page 41 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
succession to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest
by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related
was at the time nonexistent and might never exist.
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in
favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the
subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus,
as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his
lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that
it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.
2. NO.
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir
in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not
instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of
the properties.[44] It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from
inheritance.[45] It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir,
omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him
anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is
mentioned in the will in the latter case.[46] But there is no preterition where the testator
allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime, since there was no total omission of a
forced heir.[47]
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a
partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement.
Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in
the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties
which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. A
couple of provisions in the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julians desire along this
line.[48] Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julians heirs from the second
marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.
3. Petitioner is a family owned corporation. Don Julian was also the president and
director of petitioner, and his daughter from the first marriage, Josefa, was the
treasurer thereof. There is of course no legal prohibition against such a transfer to a
family corporation. Yet close scrutiny is in order, especially considering that such
transfer would remove Lot No. 63 from the estate from which Milagros and her
children could inherit. Both the alleged transfer deed and the title which necessarily
must have emanated from it have to be subjected to incisive and detailed examination.
The truth, however, is that the replacement of OCT No. 5203 in the name of Julian by
T.C.T. No. T-375 is marred by a grave irregularity which is also an illegality, as it contravenes
the orthodox, conventional and normal process established by law. And, worse still, the
illegality is reflected on the face of both titles.
The court struck down the alleged deed in this case as it was found out to be a nullity on
its face.
Page 42 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Page 43 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
BLAS ET. AL. VS. SANTOS ET. AL.

G.R. No. L-14070 March 29, 1961
FACTS:
Sometime before 1898, Simeon Blas married Marta Cruz with whom he had three children. He
also had grandchildren from his children with Marta Cruz. In 1898, Marta Cruz died. In 1899,
Blas married Maxima Santos (they had no children) but the properties he and his former wife
acquired during the first marriage were not liquidated.
In 1936, Simeon Blas executed a will disposing half of his properties in favor of Maxima the
other half for payment of debts, Blas also named a few devisees and legatees therein. In lieu of
this, Maxima executed a document whereby she intimated that she understands the will of her
husband; that she promises that she’ll be giving, upon her death, one-half of the properties
she’ll be acquiring to the heirs and legatees named in the will of his husband; that she can select
or choose any of them depending upon the respect, service, and treatment accorded to her by
said legatees/heirs/devisees.
In 1937, Simeon Blas died. In 1956, Maxima died and Rosalina Santos became administratrix of
her estate. In the same year, Maria Gervacio Blas, child of Simeon Blas in his first marriage,
together with three other grandchildren of Simeon Blas (heirs of Simeon Blas), learned that
Maxima did not fulfill her promise as it was learned that Maxima only disposed not even one-
tenth of the properties she acquired from Simeon Blas.
The heirs are now contending that they did not partition Simeon Blas’ property precisely
because Maxima promised that they’ll be receiving properties upon her death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs should receive properties based on the promise of Maxima.
HELD:
Yes. The promise is valid and enforceable upon her death. Though it is not a will (it lacks the
formality) nor a donation, it is still enforceable because said promise was actually executed to
avoid litigation (partition of Simeon Blas’ estate) hence it is a compromise.
It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason
that the conjugal properties of his first marriage had not been liquidated. It is an obligation or
promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal properties
acquired with her husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal properties in
the will of the husband.
Page 44 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Ferrer vs. Sps. Diaz
G.R. No. 165300, April 23, 2010
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed that on May 7, 1999, the Diazes, as represented by their
daughter Comandante, through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), obtained from him a loan of
P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract. Petitioner further
claimed that prior to said loan, Comandante, for a valuable consideration of P600,000.00, which
amount formed part of the abovementioned secured loan, executed in his favor an instrument
entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided). The
Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by Comandante were
dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said respondents still failed and
refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money
Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and Comandante.
ISSUE:
Is a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while theparents
are still living valid?
HELD:
No. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be
entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the
inheritance to be considered “future”, the succession must not have been opened at the time of
the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited
under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:(1) That the
succession has not yet been opened.(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the
inheritance; and,(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of aright
which is purely hereditary in nature.
In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of
her parent’s properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect
to the other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject
matter of Comandante’s waiver concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to
Page 45 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts,
is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature. From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante
and petitioner entered into a contract involving the former’s future inheritance as embodied in
the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed
by her in petitioner’s favor
Page 46 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Imperial vs CA
G.R. No. 112483
October 8, 1999
Facts:
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 200, also known as Lot 45 of the Cadastral Survey of Albay. On July 7, 1951,
Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who then acquired
title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner and private respondents
admit that despite the contracts designation as one of Absolute Sale, the transaction was in fact a
donation.
On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the
said Deed of Absolute Sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 1177, in the then Court of First Instance of Albay,
on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner herein into signing the said document. The dispute,
however, was resolved through a compromise agreement, approved by the Court of First Instance of Albay
on November 3, 1961[3], under which terms: (1) Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the
rights of petitioner to the land donated; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter
portion of the donated land, and to deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of
Leoncio. In case of Leoncios death, it was agreed that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by
petitioner to defray burial costs.
On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died, leaving only two heirs
--- the herein petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural son, and an adopted son, Victor Imperial. On
March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the above-mentioned case, and it was he
who moved for execution of judgment. On March 15, 1962, the motion for execution was duly granted.
Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and without issue, survived only by his
natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of the disputed land. Four years hence, or
on September 25, 1981, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa
Villalon.
Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of the
donation with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as Civil Case No. 7646. Petitioner
moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise judgment rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Albay. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial courts order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
On October 18, 1989, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the same case, Civil Case No.
7646, for Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession with the Regional Trial
Page 47 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Court of Legazpi City, seeking the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale affecting the above property,
on grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the amended complaint, it was alleged that petitioner
caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking undue advantage of the latters physical weakness and
mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner impaired the legitime of
Victor Imperial, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest.
Issue:
1.) Whether or not private respondents had a right to question the donation
2.) Was the donation made by Leoncio Imperial in favor of petitioner Eloy Imperial inofficious and
should be reduced?
Held:
1.) Only those who at the time of the donors death have a right to the legitime and their heirs
and successors in interest may ask for the reduction of inofficious donations. As argued by
petitioner, when Leoncio died on January 8, 1962, it was only Victor who was entitled to
question the donation. However, instead of filing an action to contest the donation, Victor
asked to be substituted as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1177 and even moved for execution of the
compromise judgment therein.
No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing acts. It must be remembered
that at the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the compromise agreement has
already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the compromise
judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreement.
More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of inheritance.
Rather, it requires an express act on the part of the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil
Code:
The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by

petition presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate
proceedings.
Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the latters death, his act of
moving for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation
of his legitime. He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the
reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victors heirs, upon his death, precluded
from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly recognized under Article 772, and also in
Article 1053: If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his
right shall be transmitted to his heirs.
Page 48 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Be that as it may, we find merit in petitioners other assignment of errors. Having ascertained
this action as one for reduction of an inofficious donation, we cannot sustain the holding of both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the applicable prescriptive period is thirty years,
under Article 1141 of the Civil Code. The sense of both courts that this case is a real action
over an immovable allots undue credence to private respondents description of their complaint,
as one for Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of Property,
which suggests the action to be, in part, a real action enforced by those with claim of title over
the disputed land.
2.) No. Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to a claim of title. In
the recent case of Vizconde vs. CA, we declared that what is brought to collation is not the donated
property itself, but the value of the property at the time it was donated. The rationale for this is that the
donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or
any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir of the donee
Page 49 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D.

QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE
DOROTHEO, respondents.
G.R. No. 108581
December 8, 1999
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter.
Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of
Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and
testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private
respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion To Declare The Will
Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion and issued an order.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation
since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not
married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within the
extended period granted. This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a
corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16,
1989.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 setting aside the final and executory Order
dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on
the ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in character. The court
added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the estate of
the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
in an Order dated February 1, 1991.
ISSUE:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an
order that has become final and executory still be given effect?
HELD:
No. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no
matter how erroneous it may be. It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally
with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, particularly on three aspects:
1. whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
2. compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
3. the testamentary capacity of the testator; and
Page 50 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
4. the due execution of the last will and testament.

Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator
was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the
will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is
genuine and not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person
not expressly prohibited by law from making a will.
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be
raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an
extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. The only instance where
a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is
left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence, which circumstances do not concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of
the will, as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and
executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only
heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the
testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate
proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that
would amount to forum-shopping. It should be remembered that forum shopping also occurs
when the same issue had already been resolved adversely by some other court. It is clear from
the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed
according to the laws of intestate succession.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional
rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. But before there could be testate distribution, the
will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the
deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the
fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to
give — Nemo praesumitur donare. No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and
unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is
extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is
extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity — that is whether the
provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had
ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were
void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
Page 51 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Francisco v. Francisco
G.R. No. 138774 March 8, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio
Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased.Petitioners, on the other hand, are
daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom
he begot seven (7) children. Gregorio Francisco owned two parcels of residential land, situated
in Bulacan. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his daughter Aida
that the certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and
Zenaida Pascual.
After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half
sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983. After
verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina
Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a "Kasulatan sa
Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to Regina Francisco
and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-
59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual. On April 1, 1991, Aida filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale
with damages.
ISSUE:
May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a
simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children?
RULING:
The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to

whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether the property was bought
below or above its supposed market value. They could not even present a single witness to the
kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase price. Since there was no cause or
consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and hence, null and void.
According to Article 888, Civil Code:"The legitime of legitimate children and descendants
consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother."The latter may
freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the
surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."
Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters20
at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso
Page 52 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a
change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.
Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were
the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in
her father's estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate
child.
Page 53 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Testate Estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez vs. Marcelle d. Vda. De Ramirez, et al.
G.R. No. L-27952
February 15, 1982
Facts:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez was a Filipino national who died in Spain on December 11, 1964
with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed
administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of the estate. On June 23,
1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the
deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in
satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto
Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with
the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the
provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's
usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to
Wanda's usufruct were invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda survived the
testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions were also invalid because the
first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided
in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the
Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violated Section 5, Article III of the
Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the
Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violated the
testator's express win to give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the
project of partition in its order dated May 3, 1967.
Issues:
1. Whether the legitime of the widow is in accordance with the law

2. Whether the fideicommissary substitution is valid
Held:
1. No. Marcelle’s one-half share of the estate was valid. However, what is not valid was
the giving of the one-third usufruct over the free portion. Such award by the lower
court was void since it was more than what she is given under the will. She was not
entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her
legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his
dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
2. Under the Civil Code, there are two principal classes of substitution: the simple and
the fideicommissary.
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
Page 54 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the
heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should
not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall

comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has
otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or

first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit
to a second heir the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and shall take
effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the
second heir are living at time of the death of the testator.
The fideicommisary aspect of the will was void. The substitutes (Juan Pablo
Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) were not related to Wanda, the heir originally
instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided
such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
Also, there was no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the
substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code.
Page 55 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Concepcion vs. Sta. Ana

G.R. No. L-2277, December 29, 1950
FACTS:
An action was instituted by Monico Concepcion vs. Paciencia Sta. Ana to annul the sale made
by the late Perpetua Concepcion, sister of the plaintiff, of three parcels of land with the
improvements thereon to the defendant. The complaint alleges that Perpetua Concepcion, in
connivance with the defendant and with intent to defraud the plaintiff, sold and conveyed three
parcels of land for a false and fictitious consideration to the defendant, who secured transfer
certificates of title of said lands issued under her name; and that the defendant has been in
possession of the properties sold since the death of Perpetua Concepcion, thereby causing
damages to the plaintiff in the amount of not less than two hundred (P200) pesos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decedent, Perpetua Concepcion, has transmitted to the plaintiff any right
arising from the contract under consideration in order that he can bring an action to annul the
sale voluntarily made by her to the defendant with a false consideration.
HELD:
No. Appellant quoted Manresa in his comment on Article 1274 to 1277 Vol. 8, p. 623, where
“it was held by the Supreme Court of Spain that a fictitious contract, or contract entered into
with false consideration does not confer any right or produce any legal effect, citing the
judgments of the Supreme Court of Spain of October 31, 1865, of March 21, 1884, and of
November 23, 1877.”
The court held that Appellant’s conclusion is not correct because by stating that contracts with
false consideration confer no right and produce no legal effect, Manresa does not mean to say
that they are null and void per se or non-existent as contradistinguished from annullable, for
the effects of both non-existent and annullable contracts that have been annulled are the same:
they confer no right and produce no legal effect.
What Manresa says on page 700 of the same volume, commenting on article 1301, is that “The
expression of a false cause or consideration in the contract does not make it non-existent, and it
shall only be a ground for an action for nullity“ as provided by article 1276 and confirmed by
article 1301 of the Civil Code. It is very clear therefore that the effect of a false consideration is
limited to making the contract voidable.
The plaintiff therefore cannot file an action to annul the contract as a representative of the
deceased, because Perpetua Concepcion has not transmitted to the plaintiff any right arising
from the contract of conveyance or sale of lands to the defendant. Therefore, as the plaintiff in
the present case, not being a forced heir of the late Perpetua Concepcion, cannot institute an
action to annul under article 1300 or to rescind under article 1291 (3) of the Civil Code the
contract under consideration entered into by the deceased with the defendant.
Page 56 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Sps. Nicanor Tumbokon, et. al. vs. Apolonia Legaspi

G.R. No. 153736, August 4, 2010
FACTS:
The parcel of land subject in this case was originally owned by the late AlejandraSespeñe, who
had had two marriages. The first marriage was with Gaudencio Franco, by whom she bore
Ciriaca Franco, whose husband was Victor Miralles. Thesecond marriage was with Jose Garcia,
by whom she bore respondent ApoloniaGarcia, who married Primo Legaspi. Alejandra died
without a will in 1935, and was survived by Apolonia and Crisanto Miralles, the son of Ciriaca
(who had predeceased Alejandra in 1924) and Victor Miralles.
A case was filed by the petitioners for the recovery of ownership and possession of real property
with damages against the respondents. The former alleged that petitioner Rosario
SespeñeTumbokon purchased the land in question from Cresenciana Inog. Cresenciana Inog, in
turn, acquired the land by purchase from Victor Miralles, son-in-law of decedent Alejandra,
who had represented that heinherited the land from his mother-in-law. The RTC rendered a
decision in favor of the petitioners, holding that the spouses were able to establish the purchase
of the land. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the
complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale made by Victor Miralles was valid.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals that Victor’s claim of being
the sole heir was false and erroneous for Alejandra had more than one intestate heir, and Victor
Miralles as a mere son-in-law could not be one of them. A decedent’s compulsory heirs in
whose favor the law reserves a part of the decedent’s estate are exclusively the persons
enumerated in Article 887 of the Civil Code. In the present case, only two forced heirs
survived Alejandra upon her death, namely: respondent Apolonia, her daughter, and
CrisantoMiralles, her grandson. The latter succeeded Alejandra by right of representation
because his mother, Ciriaca, had predeceased Alejandra. The petition was denied.
Page 57 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Lauro Vizconde v. CA
G.R. No. 118449, February 11, 1998, 256 SCRA 217
FACTS:
Spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas have five children, namely: Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde (wife
of herein petitioner LauroVizconde); Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de
Leon; and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. On June 30, 1991, Estrellita and her two daughters
were killed. In an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita, Rafael and
Salud, together with petitioner Vizconde, inherited from Estrellita’s estate.
Subsequently, when Rafael died in 1992, an intestate estate proceeding was instituted by one of
the heirs of Rafael. Private respondent Ramon, among other things, averred that petitioner
should be impleaded as one of Rafael’s children “by right of representation as the widower of
deceased legitimate daughter Estrellita.” Pursuant to the order of the probate court, petitioner
filed a Manifestation contending that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of
Rafael and he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. The trial court granted Ramon’s
motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the inclusion of petitioner Vizconde in the intestate estate proceeding
regarding Rafael’s estate is proper.
RULING:
No. The enumeration of compulsory heirs in Article 887 of the Civil Code is exclusive, which
negates the rulings of the RTC and CA that Lauro shall be included in the proceeding as a
compulsory heir for he is only a son-in-law of decedent Rafael. Thus, petitioner who was not
even shown to be a creditor of decedent is considered a third person or stranger. Petitioner may
not be dragged into the proceeding herein instituted; neither may he be permitted to intervene
as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding. Thus, petition is granted.
Page 58 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
ELEUTERIO RIVERA, as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Rosita L. Rivera-

Ramirez vs. ROBERT RAMIREZ and RAYMOND RAMIREZ
G.R. No. 189697
June 27, 2012
FACTS:
Adolfo Ramirez and Rosita Rivera were married in 1942. Their only child died in infancy.
They acquired during their lifetime the Sta. Teresita General Hospital and other properties.
Rosita died in September 1990, followed by her husband Adolfo in December 1993. Eleuterio
claimed that he was Rosita’s nephew, being the son of her brother Federico. Eleuterio
submitted to the intestate court a list of the names of the decedent’s other nephews and nieces
all of whom expressed conformity to Eleuterio’s appointment as administrator of her estate.
He filed for administration of the estate of Spouses Ramirez which was approved by the RTC.
Later on, Eleuterio submitted an initial inventory of her properties. He also filed in his capacity
as administrator a motion with the court to compel the examination and production of
documents relating to properties believed to be a part of her estate, foremost of which was the
Sta. Teresita General Hospital that Robert Ramirez had been managing. Robert claims,
together with Raymond Ramirez and Lydia Ramirez , that they were children of Adolfo by
another woman. Robert opposed the issuance of the subpoena.
Thus, RTC suspended the proceedings in the case pending the resolution of a separate case
involving the properties of the estate. Meantime, administrator Eleuterio moved for the joint
settlement in the same case of the estates of Rosita and her husband, considering that the
spouses’ properties were conjugal. Eleuterio expressed willingness to co-administer the late
spouses’ estate with Adolfo’s heirs, namely, Raymond, Robert, and Lydia Ramirez. Robert
agreed to the joint settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses but insisted that the court
also probate the deceased Adolfo’s will of October 10, 1990 which Robert presented.Afterwards
Eleuterio, as administrator of Rosita’s estate, reiterated his motion to compel examination and
production of the hospital’s documents in Robert’s possession. the RTC granted the
administrator’s motion and ordered Robert to bring to court the books of account, financial
statements, and other documents relating to the operations of the Sta. Teresita General
Hospital.
ISSUE:
Whether Eleuterio and heirs have legal right to inherit from Rosita’s estate?
RULING:
None, based on the CA fndings that on the article Women Physicians of the World found in the
record of the case before it, the late Rosita, a physician, had adopted Raymond as her child. An
adopted child and is deemed a legitimate child of the adopter. This being the case, Raymond’s
presence barred Eleuterio and Rosita’s other collateral relatives from inheriting intestate from
Page 59 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
her. A further consequence is that they also did not have the right to seek the production and
examination of the documents allegedly in Robert’s possession.
Page 60 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR v. EDNA G. SIASAT

G.R. No. 200169
28 January 2015
FACTS:
Spouses Aguilar died intestate and without debts. Involved in this case were two parcels of land
disputed between petitioner Aguilar and respondent Siasat. Petitioner alleged that he is the
only son and sole surviving heir of spouses Aguilar. When he found out that the two titles of
the subject lots were missing, he filed a case for injuction against respondent. To prove his
filaiation, he submitted the following documents: school records, SSS form, Income Tax Return
and a Certification from the Civil Registry that since the records during 1945 to 1946 were
destroyed, he cannot present the true copy of his Certificate of Live Birth
On one hand, respondent averred that the petitioner is a mere stranger who was raised by the
Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart. That petitioner is not a natural or
adopted child of the Aguilar spouses. That the husband predeceased his wife the latter inherited
the conjugal share of the former.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is a legitimate son of the spouses.
HELD:
Yes. The petitioner is a legitimae child of the spouses Aguilar. The filiation of illegitimate
children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a
ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval.
Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be concluded that petitioner
– who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage of Spouses Aguilar and before their
respective deaths – has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses.
Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship
to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document
constitutes an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned."
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the records
covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed,
which necessitated the introduction of other documentary evidence – particularly Alfredo
Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") – to prove filiation. It is evidence of filiation under the
first paragraph thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public instrument.
Page 61 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Spouses Balonos v. Bernarte

G.R. No. 180997
November 17, 2010
Facts:
Roman Zuiga, Sr. during his lifetime married twice: Flavia and Ceferina. He had seven children
in his first marriage with Flavia, and four children with Ceferina. Both wives died ahead of him.
He declared the lot in question for taxation purposes in the name of Flavia A. Zuiga, brothers
and sisters . Roman Zuiga, Sr. having passed away on 9 August 1976, the lot in question now
forms part of his estate.
Flavia A. Zuiga sold the lot to her sister Cresencia Zuiga-Echague on 20 June 2001. On the
same day, Cresencia Zuiga-Echague sold the same lot in favor of the spouses Mariano and
Emma Bolaos, the petitioners.
On October 30, 2001, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of partial nullity of deeds of
transfer and sale with prayer for preliminary injunction against petitioner-spouses before the
RTC. They alleged that Flavia, without authority from the co-owners of the lot, executed a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over it in favor of Cresencia; Cresencia, in turn, also without
authority from the said co-owners, executed on the same day a notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of petitioner-spouses.
The petitioner-spouses asserted that they had acquired Lot No. 1-P in good faith and for value,
without any knowledge of the adverse claim of Roscef, et al. or that the property did not fully
belong to Cresencia.
The RTC ruled that the sale is limited only to the ideal shares belonging to Flavia A. Zuiga
and Cresencia Zuiga-Echague constitutive of an ideal share equivalent to 2/11 portion of such
lot. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC judgement.
Hence, the petition to the SC.
Issue:
Whether all the children, both in the first and second marriage, are co-owners of the lot in
question.
Ruling:
The court ruled in the affirmative.
Page 62 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Roman Zuiga, Sr., while still a widower in the year 1948, years after her first wife dies and
prior to his second marriage. acquired Lot No. 1-P. Clearly such lot was his capital property.
Roman Zuiga, Sr. having passed away on 9 August 1976, the lot in question now forms part of
his estate.
The curt ruled that in the absence of whatever evidence that he executed a will his legitimate
children by his first and second marriages inherit such lot in equal share[s] as intestate heirs
(Article 980, The Civil Code). It follows that the lot in question has to be divided among them
into eleven equal shares.
Until such time that the lot has been partitioned among Roman Zuiga, Sr.’s eleven legitimate
children, as co-owners being co-heirs their shares remain ideal (Article 1078, The Civil
Code). Not one of the eleven children can claim as his or hers a specifically identified portion of
the lot. The lot rightfully belongs to the 11 children of Roman, seven (7) from his first marriage
with Flavia and four (4) from his second marriage with Ceferina, in equal shares. As there was
no partition among Romans children, the lot was owned by them in common.
As to the deed of sales, the court also ruled that the deed of absolute sale that Flavia A. Zuiga
executed was valid and effective only to the extent of her ideal share in the lot. The validity of
the other deed of absolute sale Cresencia Zuiga-Echague executed in favor of the spouses
Mariano and Emma Bolaos is limited to her ideal share and the other ideal share she acquired
from Flavia A. Zuiga. In effect, the spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaos acquired the ideal
shares of the sisters Flavia A. Zuiga and Cresencia Zuiga-Echague.
The claim by the spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaos that they were purchasers in good faith
has little relevance. The lot appears as an unregistered lot, and thus they merely step into the
shoes of the seller. They cannot acquire a property interest greater than Cresencia Zuiga-
Echagues.
And inasmuch as Flavia did not successfully repudiate her sale of her aliquot share to Cresencia,
the transfer stands as valid and effective. Consequently, what Cresencia sold to petitioner
spouses was her own share and Flavias share in the property that she acquired by virtue of the
notarized deed of sale, which is only 2/11 of Lot No. 1-P. Therefore, the restitution of the
property in excess of that portion by petitioner spouses is clearly warranted.
Page 63 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA

ALMONTE
G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005
Facts
Petitioner and private respondent were married. Both had a child named Jose Gerardo.
Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa be annulled on the ground
of bigamy. Ma. Theresa never denied she had first married Mario Gopiao, which marriage was
never annulled, but averred that such marriage was a sham.
The trial court granted the annulment, ruling that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario
was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an
illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while
Gerardo was granted visitation rights.
Feeling betrayed and humiliated, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the
above decision, arguing that there was nothing in the law granting "visitation rights in favor of
the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further maintained that Jose Gerardo’s surname
should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, for an illegitimate child
shall use the mother’s surname. Gerardo opposed the motion. Applying the "best interest of the
child" principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresa’s motion.
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court initially
denied the petition and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. But upon reconsideration,
the appellate court reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma.
Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage. It ruled that under the law, Jose
Gerardo is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and
Mario; hence, he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent
‘marriage’ between Ma. Theresa and Gerardo. Thus, Gerardo can claim neither custody nor
visitorial rights over Jose Gerardo, and cannot impose his name upon the child. Shocked and
stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied.
Issue
Is Jose Gerardo the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario or the illegimate child of
Ma. Theresa and Gerardo?
Held
Jose Gerardo is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
Article 167 of the Family Code provides: The child shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. An
assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a
child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Ma. Theresa and Mario were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose
Gerardo’s conception and birth. The impossibility of physical access was never established
beyond reasonable doubt.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family
provides that a child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. A
mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, Ma.
Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy.
Finally, Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation
of a child. The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity.
It also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.
Page 64 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Joaquino vs. Reyes, et al.

GR No. 154645; 434 S 260
13 July 2004
Facts
Rodolfo and Lourdes are legally married and they had four children. Rodolfo, however, had an
illicit relations with Milagros Joaquino with whom he begot three children. During his lifetime,
Rodolfo and Milagros bought a house and lot, the title of which was issued in the name of
Milagros. Milagros authorized Rodolfo to secure a loan to finance the purchase price. Rodolfo
paid the monthly amortization of the loan using his salaries and benefits as Vice-President of
Warner Barnes & Co. Rodolfo even acquired a life insurance policy, the proceeds of which shall
be used as payment of the balance of the loan. When Rodolfo died, his children with Lourdes
sued Milagros for recovery of the house and lot as these were conjugal properties. Milagros
opposed the complaint arguing that she bought the house and lot using her own funds.
Milagros also submits that her children are entitled to a share in the disputed property, because
they were voluntarily acknowledged by Rodolfo as his children.
Issues
1) Are the house and lot considered conjugal properties of Rodolfo and Lourdes?
2) May matters relating to filiation and heirship be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action?
Held
1) Yes.
Under the Civil Code, conjugal properties include that which is obtained by the industry, or
work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them. It further provides that all properties of
the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal property. In cases of cohabitation, when
parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownerhisp shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party which
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited.
In this case, it was proved that the funds used to buy the house and lot registered in the name
of Milagrosa were the salaries and benefits of Rodolfo as Vice-President of Warner Barnes &
Co. Records also show that Milagrosa was not financially capable to buy such properties. Thus,
the house and lot are presumed to belong to the conjugal properties of Rodolfo and Lourdes.
2) No.
It has been ruled that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated
in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
determining such rights. Thus, the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a
decedent’s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action.
The action in this case is for recovery of property which is an ordinary civil action. Thus, the
court where the action was filed cannot rule on whether Rodolfo’s illegitimate children are
entitled to the house and lot.
Page 65 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Rivera vs. Heirs of Villanueva

G.R. No. 141501
July 21, 2006
FACTS:
Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage because the latter
was married to Amanda Musngi. Gonzales died without leaving a will, hence, Villanueva and
Angelina, the alleged illegitimate child of Gonzales and Villanueva, executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition.
It then led the petitioners (Gonzales’ half- brothers, etc.) to file a case to annul said
partition as Angelina was not Gonzales’ illegitimate daughter and sole heir. Both the trial court
and the CA ruled that respondent Angelina was the illegitimate daughter of the decedent, based
solely on her birth certificate. The birth certificate discloses that Pacita Gonzales was the
mother of Angelina Villanueva while Municipal Treasurer Villanueva was denominated therein
as the father. It was found out that it is an adequate proof of Angelina’s filiation as illegitimate
child.
ISSUE:
Is Angelina an illegitimate child of Gonzales and is entitled to inherit?
HELD:
No. A closer examination of the birth certificate reveals that Angelina was listed as
adopted by both Villanueva and Gonzales. But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his
birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer
upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even
amounts to a simulation of the child’s birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which
is a public document. Respondents should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the
contents of the birth certificate. However, the records are bereft of any such evidence. As she
was neither an illegitimate nor adopted child, she cannot inherit from Gonzales. The said
partition, then, was invalid.
Page 66 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
229 S 468
Facts:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially in Laguna.
Vicente's sister and nephew,prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's
estate. Petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased
Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the
only legitimate child of the spouses. She submitted documentary evidence, among other her
Certificate of Live Birth. The elder sister of the late Vicente declared that petitioner was not the
biological child of the said spouses who were unable to physically procreate.
Issue:
Are Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code applicable in favor of the petitioner.
Held:
No. A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation,
like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child
of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs)
denies as his own a child of his wife.
Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by
proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2)
that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in
case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or
ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or
undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive
period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the
legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply
these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late
Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission
is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel.
Page 67 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
LEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND ASCENDANTS
Babiera v. Catotal
G.R. No. 138493. June 15, 2000
Justice Panganiban
Facts: Private respondent Presentacion B. Catotal sought for the cancellation of entry of birth
of petitioner Teofista Babiera. Presentacion is claiming that she is the only surviving child of
the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa. That petitioner Teofista was
delivered by ‘hilot’ in their house and without knowledge of the spouses Babiera, Flora Guinto,
the real mother of the Teofista and a housemaid of the spouses, caused the registration of the
birth, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses. They made Hermogena appear as the
mother by forging her signature. Hermogena was then 53 years old at that time.
Petitioner Teofista file a motion to dismiss contending that Presentacion has no standing to sue
because Art. 171 of the Family Code states that the child’s filiation can be impugned only by
the father or, in circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not subject to
a collateral attack.
Also, Teofista contends that the action to contest her status as a child of the late Hermogena
Babiera has already prescribed citing Art. 170 of the Family Code: "Art. 170. The action to
impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the
birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs,
should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.”
Lastly, Teofista argues that the evidence presented by Hermogena’s testimony that Teofista
was not her child, cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the birth
certificate.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Art. 171 of the Family Code is applicable.
2. Whether or not Art. 170 of the Family Code is applicable.
3. Whether or not the Birth certificate of Teofista superior than the oral testimony of
Hermogena.
Ruling:
1. No. A close reading of the provision shows that it applies to instances where the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child
was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that
Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner Teofista. In other words, the prayer herein is not to
declare Teofista as an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that Teofista is not
Hermogena’s child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn Teofista’s filiation to
spuses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the
first place.
2. No. the argument of the petitioner is anchored on Art. 171 stating that the action to impugn
the legitimacy of the wife’s child is 1 year from knowledge of such fact. But it is already clear
that the present action involves the cancellation of petitioner’s Birth Certificate which does not
Page 68 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
impugn her legitimacy. Thus A. 171 of the Family Code is inapplicable. Also, the action to
nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio.
3. No. Although the presumption of regularity exists for official documents, specific facts in the
case as well as the totality of evidence sufficiently negate such presumption. First, the
document already suffers from irregularity – it not being signed by the local civil registrar and
the stark difference between the signatures of the mother in the Birth Certificate and other
documents. Second, there was no evidence of pregnancy, no witnesses to attest to the
pregnancy. And assuming that there was indeed labor at the time, given the late age of
Hermogena it would require medical attention but the alleged birth occurred at home. Lastly,
the deposition of Hermogena Babiera is clear that petitioner Teofista is not her child.
Page 69 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Geronimo v. Santos
GR No. 197099
September 28, 2015
Facts:
On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased
Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and recovery of
possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her
father. She alleged that with the death of her parents, the property consisting of one-half of the
parcel of land located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan and belonging to her parents was passed
on to her by the law on intestacy; that lately, she discovered that defendants executed a
document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of
spouses Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating to themselves the property in question; and that
consequently they took possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject
property to their names.
The defendants denied the allegation that plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their
brother. They disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and
took in as their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad's sister. They claimed
that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. It was allegedly impossible
for Rufino and Caridad to have registered the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they
had never lived or sojourned in the place and Caridad, who was an elementary teacher in
Bulacan never filed any maternity leave during the period of her service from August 1963
until October 1984. Believing that in the absence of a direct heir, his brother Emiliano and he
should succeed to the estate of their brother, they executed in 2000 an extra-judicial settlement
called Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman.
The plaintiff took the stand and testified that her parents were Rufino and Caridad
Geronimo. The defendants Eugenio and Emiliano were the half-brothers of her father Rufino,
being the children of Rufino's father Marciano Geronimo with another woman Carmen San
Juan. Rufino co-owned Lot 1716 with the defendants' mother Carmen, and upon his death in
1980, when the plaintiff was only 8 years old, his share in the property devolved on his heirs. In
1998, some 18 years later, Caridad and she executed an extra-judicial settlement of Rufino's
estate, whereby the plaintiffs mother Caridad waived all her rights to Rufino's share and in the
land in question to her daughter the plaintiff. Be that as it may, in 1985, guardianship
proceedings appeared to have been instituted with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos by
Caridad in which it was established that the plaintiff was the minor child of Caridad with her
late husband Rufino. Caridad was thus appointed guardian of the person and estate of the
plaintiff.
Page 70 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiffs alleged birth certificate. It had irregular
features, such as that it was written in pentel pen, the entry in the box date of birth was erased
and the word and figure April 6, 1972 written and the name Emma Daño was superimposed on
the entry in the box intended for the informant's signature.
Two more witnesses were adduced. Atty. Elmer Lopez, a legal consultant of the DECS in
Bulacan brought the plaintiffs service record as an elementary school teacher at Bulacan to
show that she did not have any maternity leave during the period of her service from March 11,
1963 to October 24, 1984, and a certification from the Schools Division Superintendent that the
plaintiff did not file any maternity leave during her service. He declared that as far as the
service record is concerned, it reflects the entry and exit from the service as well as the leaves
that she availed of. Upon inquiry by the court, he clarified that the leaves were reflected but the
absences were not. Testifying on the plaintiffs birth certificate, Exhibit 14, Arturo Reyes, a
representative of the NSO, confirmed that there was an alteration in the date of birth and
signature of the informant. In view of the alterations, he considered the document questionable.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is a legitimate heir.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied
upon by both courts a quo does not sufficiently establish the one crucial fact in this case: that
respondent is indeed a child of the deceased spouses. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that
respondent is a legitimate child of her putative parents because she was allowed to bear their
family name "Geronimo", they supported her and her education, she was the beneficiary of the
burial benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy, Caridad applied for and was appointed as her legal
guardian in relation to the estate left by Rufino, and she and Caridad executed an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of Rufino as his legal heirs.
In the case of Rivera v. Heirs of Romnaldo Villanueva which incisively discussed its
parallelisms and contrasts with the case of Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the
presence of a similar set of circumstances - which were relied upon as secondary proof by both
courts a quo in the case at bar - does not establish that one is, a child of the putative parents.
Our discussion in the Rivera case is instructive, viz.:
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, Marissa Benitez-Badua, in attempting to prove that she

was the sole heir of the late Vicente Benitez, submitted a certificate of live birth, a baptismal
certificate, income tax returns and an information sheet for membership in the Government
Service Insurance System of the decedent naming her as his daughter, and her school records.
She also testified that she had been reared and continuously treated as Vicente's daughter.
Page 71 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
By testimonial evidence alone, to the effect that Benitez-Badua's alleged parents had been
unable to beget children, the siblings of Benitez-Badua's supposed father were able to rebut all
of the documentary evidence indicating her filiation. One fact that was counted against Benitez-
Badua was that her supposed mother Isabel Chipongian, unable to bear any children even after
ten years of marriage, all of a sudden conceived and gave birth to her at the age of 36.
Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted
child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or
falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document, Furthermore, it is well-
settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is
not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested
parties. Following the logic of Benitez, respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in SD-857
should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate.
The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
There are several parallels between this case and Benitez-Badua that are simply too compelling
to ignore. First, both Benitez-Badua and respondent Angelina submitted birth certificates as
evidence of filiation. Second, both claimed to be children of parents relatively advanced in age.
Third, both claimed to have been born after their alleged parents had lived together childless
for several years.
There are, however, also crucial differences between Benitez-Badua and this case which
ineluctably support the conclusion that respondent Angelina was not Gonzales' daughter,
whether illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales, unlike Benitez-Badua's alleged mother Chipongian,
was not only 36 years old but 44 years old, and on the verge of menopause at the time of the
alleged birth. Unlike Chipongian who had been married to Vicente Benitez for only 10 years,
Gonzales had been living childless with Villanueva for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we
hold that it was not sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological
daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales. Since she
could not have validly participated in Gonzales' estate, the extrajudicial partition which she
executed with Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was invalid.
Page 72 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Bartolome vs SSS
GR No. 192531
12 November 2014
FACTS:
John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar on board the vessel Maersk. As such, he
was enrolled under the government’s Employees Compensation Program. Unfortunately, on 2
June 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led
to his untimely death.
At the time of his death, John was childless and unmarried. Thus, Bernardina Bartolome, John’s
biological mother and, allegedly sole remaining beneficiary filed a claim for death benefits
under PD 626 with the SSS. The SSS denied the claim stating that Bernardina is no longer
considered as the parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol.
ISSUE:
Are the biological parents of the covered employee, but legally adopted, considered secondary
beneficiaries and, thus, entitled in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?
HELD:
Yes. The petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent.
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC
extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefits by
equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental authority.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that “legitimate parents” pertain
to those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. True,
when Cornelio, in 1985 adopted John, then about 2 years old, petitioner’s parental authority
over John was severed. However, it was missed that aside from Cornelio’s death, John was still
a minor, at about 4 years of age. John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a
significant factor in the case. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to
have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Article 984 of the NCC provides that, in case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no
children or descendants, his parents and relatives by consguinity and not adoption, shall be his
legal heirs.
Thus, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of
their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS
covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on
legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents
and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.
Page 73 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Sayson v. CA
GR Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
FACTS:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15,1976.
Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years
later. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed
Sayson, who claim to be their children.
Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's
mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson. Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the
couple's four surviving children.
Both cases filed on the Lower Court were decided in favor Delia, et al. on the basis of
practically the same evidence. The Lower Court declared that Delia and Edmundo were the
legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption.
Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate. Consequently, the
three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated.
The appellate court affirmed that Delia, et al. are entitled to the intestate estate of
spouses Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. However, Delia and Edmundo are disqualified from
inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson.
ISSUE:
WON CA is correct in holding that Delia and Edmundo are disqualified to inherit from
the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson.
HELD:
A different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be
a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents
and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children
and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their
exclusive
heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The
Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of
representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private
respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
Page 74 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
In the matter of the adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astoria Garcia

G.R. No. 148311
March 31, 2005
Facts:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his illegitimate child, Stephanie. He alleged that she
was on June 26, 1994; that her mother was Gemma Garcia; and, that she had been using her
mother's middle name and surname. He also alleged that he was already a widower and is
qualified to be the adoptive parent of Stephanie. The trial court granted the petition. A motion
for reconsideration was filed by Honorato to let Stephanie use the surname of her mother as her
middle name which the trial court denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Stephanie can use her mother's surname as her middle name.
Held:
A man's name is the designation by which he is known by the community. It is made up of the
proper or given name and the surname or family name. However, the law is silent as to the use
of a middle name an adoptee may use. What the law expressly allows is for the adoptee to bear
the surname of the adopter upon the issuance of the decree of adoption.
Adoption is a juridical act which creates a relationship between two persons which is the same
as legitimate paternity and filiation. One of its effects is that the adoptee is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes. It follows also that Stephanie is
entitled to the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the name of her father and mother. Thus, Stephanie can assert or
claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future. Since there is no law
prohibiting Stephanie from having the surname of her mother as her middle name, the Court
allowed her to do so.
Hence, the Court granted the petition and modified the decision of the trial court.
Page 75 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM, LIM BIAK CHIAO and CALASIAO BIJON FACTORY
v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-69679 October 18, 1988
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
This is a contest over the estate of the late Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat. The petitioner
Violeta who claims to be her only child and respondents are the sisters of the doctor and the
children of her deceased brothers. The IAC found Violeta not to be the offspring of Dra and
hence, not a legal heir. Respondents allege that Violeta is merely a ward of the Spouses
Esperanza and Proceso, without benefit of the adoption proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Violeta can inherit from the late Dra. Esperanza.
RULING:
No. She is not the decedent’s child. Being neither legally adopted, nor an acknowledged
natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased
because there was no record that Esperanza was admitted to the hospital where Violeta was
born on the day of her birth; no certificate of live birth in the hospital and in the
civil registrar; certification from Violeta’s school that the spouses were listed as guardians and
not as parents; and there was a testimony of a person who met a patient
named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth to a baby girl who grew up to be Violeta. The
following are proof of her non-filiation thus not entitled to inherit at all.
Page 76 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
VICENTE B. TEOTICO vs. ANA DEL VAL

G.R. No. L-18753
March 26, 1965
FACTS:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 leaving properties worth
P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her residence. She affixed
her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in
the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their
signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page of the will
in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before Notary
Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A.
Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. On July 17, 1955, Vicente B.
Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the
testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the
same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the
following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was
physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the
will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on
November 10, 1960, admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of
Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment
should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene in this proceeding?
2. Whether or not the will in question has been duly admitted to probate?
3. Whether or not the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the
nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico
HELD:
1. No. Oppositor has no right to intervene.

Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in
the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any
property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her
as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either
Page 77 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate
because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo
building located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the
adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the
adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created
between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted
is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and
does not extend to his other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted
child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting
parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption, except that the
law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of
the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively
between the adopter and the adopted, and does not extend to the relatives of either
2. Yes, the will is properly admitted.

The mere claim that Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to
exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several years prior to the
execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was
virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove
what the instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with
full consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion executed the will under consideration. The
exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence
and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to
destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather than her own (Coso v.
Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The burden is on the person challenging the will that such influence was
exerted at the time of its execution, a matter which here was not done, for the evidence
presented not only is insufficient but was disproved by the testimony of the instrumental
witnesses.
3. No. The Court a quo improperly looked into the validity of the will in the probate
proceeding.
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be
entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will
has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law.
The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of
the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes
for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficiency of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding
Page 78 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may
be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given
an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this
proceeding
Page 79 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
NUGUID v. NUGUID
G. R. L-23445, JUNE 23, 1966
FACTS:
Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
legitimate parents- Felix and Paz, and six brothers and sisters. Remedios, one of the sisters,
filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the
sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and
that letter of administration be issued to her. Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will
on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors-
who are compulsory heirs in the ascending line- were illegally preterited and that in
consequence, the institution is void.
Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir. Petitioners’ contention is that the present is a case of
ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 284
does not apply in the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the institution of one of the sisters of the deceased as the sole, universal
heir preterited the compulsory heirs
HELD:
Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line- her parents, and her holographic will does not
explicitly disinherits them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of
preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance. Preterition “consists in the
omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited”. Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory
heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.” Where the one sentence will
institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and
it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is
void. And intestate succession ensues.
Page 80 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Lolita D. Enrico v Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli

G.R. No. 173614
September 28, 2007
FACTS
Three months after the death of his wife, Trinidad, and six months before his death,
Eulogio married Lolita in 2004. Claiming that the marriage was entered into without the
requisite marriage license and that there was no marriage ceremony, the respondent heirs filed
an action for the declaration of its nullity. They said that the license exemption under Article
34 of the Family Code cannot be applied to them since there was a legal impediment, namely,
the subsisting marriage of Eulogio.
In her answer, Lolita maintained that they were exempted since they lived together as
husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly, and that there was a
marriage ceremony. She also sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that only the
contracting parties can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Initially, the case was dismissed but the RTC reversed itself when it considered the
ruling in Ninal v. Bayadog, where the heirs have standing to assail a void marriage even after
the death of their parent.
ISSUE
Can the heirs file for the declaration of nullity of marriage of their deceased father?
HELD
No. The ruling in Ninal v. Bayadog cannot be applied in this case. The case belongs to a
different milieu, since the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code.The rule as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly
provides that it covers marriages under the Family Code and that only the husband or wife can
file for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. The petition cannot be filed by compulsory
or intestate heirs of the spouses because they have only inchoate rights prior to the death of
their predecessor.
However, the heirs are not left without any recourse under the law. As provided in the
rationale of said rule, such, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses, in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse
filed in the regular courts.
Thus, respondent heirs can still challenge the validity of said marriage in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of Eulogio.
Page 81 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Catalan v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 167109
February 6, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,

Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April
1988. On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy?
RULING:
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife. Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot
be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it.
After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the
divorce decree becomes absolute. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her
complaint that they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a
judicial divorce decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
and mere allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary
to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the
foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then
the trial court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.
Page 82 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
FE D. QUITA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124862.
December 22, 1998
FACTS:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18
May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. where she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks
thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also
ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died intestate. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to
as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis,
Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as
surviving children of Arturo Padlan, appeared in court alleging that they are heirs of the
decedent. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased
Arturo, intervened.
Private Respondent however questions the right of petitioner to inherit as a surviving
spouse alleging that Quita and Padlan were divorced and that she is the surviving spouse of
Padlan.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had
secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried.
HELD:
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao] which held that "a foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act
386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"] disregarded the divorce
between petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage
subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972.Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial
settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. On the other hand, it opined
that there was no showing that marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much
less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as
his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo.On 27
November 1987 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of
Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the
two intestate heirs.
The Supreme Court affirmed this decision further stating that Private respondent and
Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo
was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning
under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can
inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.
Page 83 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
ARUEGO JR, VS. CA

GR NO 112193 March 13, 1996
FACTS:
The late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian
sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born
Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963,
respectively. A complaint for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights
was filed by the minors, private respondent Antonia F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F.
Aruego, represented by their mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. The complaint
prayed for an Order praying that herein private respondent and Evelyn be declared the
illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr; that herein petitioners be compelled to
recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that
their share and participation in the estate of their deceased father be determined and ordered
delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged open and continuous
possession of the status of illegitimate children. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of
Antonia Aruego. A petition for certiorari was then filed alleging that the Family Code of the
Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988 shall have a retroactive effect thereby the trial
court lost jurisdiction over the complaint on the ground of prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether the Family Code should be given retroactive effect.
HELD:
No. The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and
enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must
be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code ( in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action
before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; x x x
The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its
application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under
Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action
under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that
the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative
father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed,
an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial
court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost
jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code
of the Philippines.
Page 84 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Page 85 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
De Jesus vs. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon
G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during
this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners,
were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and
Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon
died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of
stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with
Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon,
including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the
case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the
spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina
de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to
dismiss and subsequent motion for reconsideration. Respondents assailed the denial of said
motions before the Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered the
case to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not children born out of lawful wedlock can claim to be illegitimate children on the
basis of a notarized document that they are such of the deceased thus making them compulsory
heirs of the deceased
HELD:
NO. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of
their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their
father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. this presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living
Page 86 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration
of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code
(which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no
longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable.
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon,
petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus
and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes
the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The
presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,
or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy
of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully
impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes
petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any
relevance in this instance. Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate
offspring of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first
instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount
declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated
or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such
wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.
Page 87 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Guy vs. CA
FACTS:
In the year 1997 the minor respondents Karen and Kamille, both surnamed Oanes Wei and
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for the letters of administration
for the disputed Intestate Estate of Sima Wei.
Petitioners Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed
Guy, all representing themselves as the legitimate children of the deceased argued that there is
no need for a letter of administration for the fact that they have already settled with Remedios
and the children regarding their shares in the estate of their father. The legitimate heirs filed
their own joint motion to dismiss headed by Michael Guy. They alleged that the certificate for
non-forum shopping should have been signed by the private respondents and not by their
counsel guardian of the two minors, was capable of waiving their rights simply by signing a
document.
The Regional trial Court denied both the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied. Guy filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court
in its assailed Decision dated January 22, 2004, hence this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondents' petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with the
rules on certification of non-forum shopping
2. Whether or not the Release and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios released and
discharged the Guy Family and the estate of Sima Wei from any clais or liabilities.
Held:
1. No. Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum
shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply
with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case. However, a liberal
application of the rules is proper where the higher interest of justice would be served. So
it is in the present controversy where the merits of the case and the absence of an
intention to violate the rules with impunity should be considered as compelling reasons
to temper the strict application of the rules.
2. No, such waiver is invalid. Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim does not bar private
respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must
be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a
party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be
attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to
abandon a right.
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and
Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states
Page 88 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters
"by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever
nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim."
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private
respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code,
provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate
an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents
or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards
only by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons
designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or
in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards
without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of
property which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the
ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the
instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as
heirs of the deceased.
Page 89 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Cruz vs Cristobal
G.R. No. 140422
August 7, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro
Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura
Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private
respondents Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal are also the
children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez.
On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an area of 535
square meters located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10878-2 (the subject property).
Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six
decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial
partition of the subject property and transferred its title to their names.
Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case between them
and private respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus, a Complaint for Annulment of
Title and Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private respondents to
recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. In their prayer, they sought
the annulment of the Deed of Partition executed by respondents on 24 February 1948; the
cancellation of TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, No. 165134 and No. 165135 issued in the
individual names of private respondents; re-partitioning of the subject property in accordance
with the law of succession and the payment of P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory
damages; P300,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal
certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were presented. In the case of Mercedes
who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the
years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear
and tear.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a judgment on 11 July 1997,
dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary
value and that petitioners’ inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches.
Not satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which, in its Decision
dated 22 July 1999, ruled that they were able to prove their filiation with the deceased
Page 90 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Buenaventura Cristobal thru “other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,” but
affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover their share of the subject
property because of laches.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are able to validly prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal
HELD:
Yes. Article 172 of the Family Code provides
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
“Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws,” may consist of the
child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the child’s name has
been entered, common reputation respecting the child’s pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
In the present case, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro
were presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary evidence to prove
filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who
was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the
years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear
and tear.
Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that petitioners
enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they reside as being the children of
Buevaventura Cristobal with his first wife. Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to
prove filiation by continuous possession of the status as a legitimate child.
In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were unable to present any
proof to refute the petitioners’ claim and evidences of filiation to Buenaventura Cristobal. The
Page 91 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are, indeed, children of
the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
Considering that the Deed of Partition of the subject property does not affect the right
of petitioners to inherit from their deceased father, this Court shall then proceed to divide the
subject property between petitioners and private respondents, as the rule on succession
prescribes.
Page 92 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Heirs of Maramag v. Maramag

G.R. No. 181132 June 5, 2009
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
The case stems from a petition filed against respondents with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
29, for revocation and/or reduction of insurance proceeds for being void and/or inofficious,
with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition alleged that: (1) petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto
Maramag (Loreto), while respondents were Loreto’s illegitimate family; (2) Eva de Guzman
Maramag (Eva) was a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the latter, thus, she is
disqualified to receive any proceeds from his insurance policies from Insular Life Assurance
Company, Ltd. (Insular) and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife); (3) the
illegitimate children of Loreto—Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie—were entitled only to
one-half of the legitime of the legitimate children, thus, the proceeds released to Odessa and
those to be released to Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie were inofficious and should be reduced;
and (4) petitioners could not be deprived of their legitimes, which should be satisfied first.
In support of the prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners alleged, among
others, that part of the insurance proceeds had already been released in favor of Odessa, while
the rest of the proceeds are to be released in favor of Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie, both
minors, upon the appointment of their legal guardian. Petitioners also prayed for the total
amount of P320,000.00 as actual litigation expenses and attorney’s fees.
Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and Odessa, Karl Brian,
and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, and that they filed their claims for the insurance
proceeds of the insurance policies; that when it ascertained that Eva was not the legal wife of
Loreto, it disqualified her as a beneficiary and divided the proceeds among Odessa, Karl Brian,
and Trisha Angelie, as the remaining designated beneficiaries; and that it released Odessa’s
share as she was of age, but withheld the release of the shares of minors Karl Brian and Trisha
Angelie pending submission of letters of guardianship. Insular alleged that the complaint or
petition failed to state a cause of action insofar as it sought to declare as void the designation of
Eva as beneficiary, because Loreto revoked her designation as such in Policy No. A001544070
and it disqualified her in Policy No. A001693029; and insofar as it sought to declare as
inofficious the shares of Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, considering that no settlement
of Loreto’s estate had been filed nor had the respective shares of the heirs been determined.
Insular further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies designating the
children of Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code.
Page 93 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
ISSUE:
Are the members of the legitimate family entitled to the proceeds of the insurance for the
concubine?
RULING:
In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are
the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies
issued by Insular and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners’ claim is that Eva, being a concubine of
Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the
insurance policies, and that Eva’s children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled
to a lesser share of the proceeds of the policies. They also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of
the Insurance Code, Eva’s share in the proceeds should be forfeited in their favor, the former
having brought about the death of Loreto. Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and portions
of the shares of Loreto’s illegitimate children should be awarded to them, being the legitimate
heirs of Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes.
Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds
are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon
the maturation of the policy. The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance
contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of
favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim
from the insurer.
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are
not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no
legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a
beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment
considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s
insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries
the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds,
whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the
Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be
awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of
petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when
the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance
policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.
Page 94 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II vs. PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS
G.R. No. 129505.

January 31, 2000
Facts:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a
petition for probate of his will in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that
he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that
he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00;
and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent
Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.
Dr. Arturo de Santos was examined by the Court to determine the state of his mind.
Eventually, the Court was convinced that petitioner is of sound and disposing mind and not
acting on duress, menace and undue influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last Will
and Testament on his own free and voluntary will and that he was neither forced nor
influenced by any other person in signing it.
Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996. On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S.
Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos
(testators sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest
of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner
thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of
administration in his name.
After numerous changes as to who shall hear the case, On November 4, 1996, Judge
Abad Santos granted petitioners motion for intervention. Private respondent moved for a
reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1997, rendered a decision setting aside
the trial courts order on the ground that petitioner had not shown any right or interest to
intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner can inherit from the testator
Ruling:
No, the petitioner is not considered as an heir of the testator. t is a fundamental rule of
testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his
entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it
in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. Manikan
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not
contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.
Page 95 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators -
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in
the testators will.
Page 96 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Mendoza v Delos Santos

GR No 176422, March 20, 2013
FACTS:
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria,
Bulacan are presently in the name of respondent Julia Delos Santos (respondent). Lot No. 1646-
B, on the other hand, is also in the name of respondent but co- owned by Victoria Pantaleon,
who bought one-half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga).
Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of Placido and Dominga’s properties that were
subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it
passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonor’s death, her share
went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They claimed that after
Gregoria’s death, respondent, who is Leonor’s sister, adjudicated unto herself all these
properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the
properties should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf and must now revert back
to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.
The RTC granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of
TCT and Reconveyance. CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the
complaint filed by petitioners. CA also denied their motion for reconsideration. Hence this
petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the subject properties are reservable properties, therefore subject to
Reserva Troncal
(2) Whether or not Petitioners Mendozas have a right to the subject properties by virtue of the
law on Reserva Troncal
HELD:
(1) NO. Reserva Troncal is not applicable to the case at bar. Julia, who now holds the properties
in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code
Reserva Troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable
property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally
came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from
Exequiel’s as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom
Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such
ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the property. What is pertinent
is that Exequiel owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in
dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who received the
properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title
Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant or
prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by
gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return.
Page 97 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
What was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute were owned by
Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties
as inheritance.
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant
(also known as the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not
Gregoria’s ascendant; rather, she is Gregoria’s collateral relative.
(2) NO. Petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives
within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositus―the one
at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved
by descent. In the case at bar it should be reckoned from Gregoria. Petitioners are Gregoria’s
fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree
relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article
891 grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from
whom the reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews
and nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and
mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within the third degree.
Page 98 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Gonzales vs. CFI, Legarda

G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
Facts: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died. He was survived
by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: (Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and
Filomena, Benito, Alejandro and Jose). The real properties left by Benito were partitioned in
three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son
Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda. Filomena died
intestate and without issue. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races. Mrs. Legarda
executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena. As a result, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter
Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held pro indiviso by her other six children. Mrs.
Legarda executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties,
which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro
and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned
the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which
the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz. Mrs.
Legarda died. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will. The decree of probate
was affirmed by the CA. In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the
testatrix, filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties
which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties
are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and
three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose. That motion was opposed
by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda. Without awaiting the resolution on that motion,
Beatriz filed an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her
mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable
properties. Lower court dismissed the action of Beatriz.
Issue: whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal under Art 891.
Held: In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from
an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another
ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said
ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said
property came.
3 transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation)
from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission,
by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de
la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions
precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of
the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the
third degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother
or sister of the deceased descendant .
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other
Page 99 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the
reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the
(line o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by
the reservor.
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship

by affinity are excluded. Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the
recipient gives nothing in return such as donacion and succession.
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to
reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the property came.
The properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs.
Legarda. She was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death
the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living
or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the
reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot make a
disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the
reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs.
Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given
and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable
properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees
in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition
cannot be allowed.
Page 100 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Aglibot v. Mañalac
G.R. No. L-14530, April 25, 1962, 4 SCRA 1030
FACTS:
The subject parcel of land belonged to the conjugal partnership of Anacleto and Maria. They
had a daughter named Juliana. When Maria died, she was survived by her husband, daughter,
and 2 sisters. Her ½ portion of the conjugal property was inherited by her daughter.
Subsequently, Anacleto contracted a second marriage with Andrea, with whom he had 6
children. Thereafter, Juliana died intestate without any descendant, thus living to her father the
property she inherited from her mother. Years later, Anacleto died.
ISSUE:
Who is entitled to the land that Anacleto inherited from his daughter, as between the sisters of
Maria on the one hand, and Andre and their 6 children, on the other hand?
RULING:
The land in question is reservable property in accordance with the provisions of Article 811 of
the Spanish Civil Code (Article 891 of the New Civil Code). In accordance with law, therefore,
AnacletoMañalac was obliged to reserve the portion he had thus inherited from his daughter
for the benefit of the Aunts of Juliana on the maternal side and who are, therefore, her relative
within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came.
Page 101 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
FACTS:
Esteban Javellana, Jr., is an author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the
Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or
nieces. His only surviving relatives arehis maternal aunt, Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-
sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased
father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months
after his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr.
was born.Salustia and her sister, Celedonia brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal which she had inherited from her mother,
Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife but no conjugal property was acquired during her
short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.,
including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due
time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some
close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor
but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on
February 26,1977 without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's
properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation
to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping
indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased.
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the
formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed
for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. Later, she
filed an amended petition praying that letters of administration be issued to her and that she be
declared sole heir of the deceased and that after payment of all claims and rendition of
inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her.
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was
declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr because the properties of the estate had
come from her sister, Salustia Solivio and that she is the decedent's nearest relative on his
mother's side and with her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the
foundation would be facilitated. Later on, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because
she too was an heir of the deceased
Page 102 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
ISSUE:
Whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his
relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them
RULING:
No
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the ascendant who

inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the

reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree counted from the
descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died

without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692,
Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for
Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from
whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject
to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third
degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant
from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not
apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation
covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the
distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a

surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Page 103 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA v. MANUELA ALCALA
and JOSE DEOCAMPO
G.R. No. L-13386
27 OCTOBER 1920
FACTS:
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married
Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born.
Julian Nieva died intestate and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate,
the parcels of land subject of this complaint. When the son died, the two parcels of land passed
to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo
married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the
other defendant herein.
When Francisco Deocampo died, the widow and son took possession of the lands claiming that
the son inherited the same ab intestate from his deceased father. Based on that, herein plaintiff
Segunda Nieva filed the present action to recover the properties from the defendants.
The records show that Juliana Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on March 29,
1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as her natural daughter, of unknown father. The
said mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter. The
plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva is an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva
ISSUE:
Whether an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal provided
for by Article 811 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
No. As provided in Article 811, “Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property
came.”
While the said Article uses the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives,"
without specifying whether or not they have to be legitimate, the Court adopted the
interpretations of eminent commentators on the Spanish Civil Code. The opinion is that Article
811 applies only to legitimate relatives since “the legitimate relationship forms the general rule
and the natural relationship the exception”.
Whether the provision is due to the desire that the properties should not pass, by reason of new
marriage, out of the family to which they belonged, or is directly derived from the system of the
so-called "reserva troncal," and whether the idea of reservation or that of lineal rights
(troncalidad) predominate the patrimony which is intended to be preserved is that of the
legitimate family. The object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family. Hence, the
properties of the legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the natural family.
Page 104 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo
Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the express provision of the
foregoing article (943).
Page 105 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Tioco De Papa v. Camacho
G.R. No. L-28032
September 24, 1986
Facts:
Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel
Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt
and granduncles. Plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a common
ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of
plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant. Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously
donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco. Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5,
survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon
and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-
mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-
indiviso shares.In 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by his
wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and
Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land were adjudicated as the
inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the
said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and
Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso shares. In 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and
without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land
above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said
property subject to a reserva troncal. In 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her
rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate
child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho. On June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate,
survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho. Defendant
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
Issue:
Whether all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed
without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that not all relatives of the praepositus (the one from which the
reseved propeerty came from) within third degree succeeds to the reservable property upon the
death of the reservista.
Page 106 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Under Article 881 of the civil code, the reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to
assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line
from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the
relatives of the inheriting ascendant. However , In the relations between one reservatario
(reservee) and another of the same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer;
wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the
ordinary rules of intestate succession.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives reservatarios to
whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the
property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art.
891 does not specify otherwise.
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the
plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles,
respectively, of Faustino Dizon (thepraepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his
niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the
latter.
It held that, in case of intestacy nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals
(aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession.
Under Article 1009 of the Civil Code, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the
succession.It ruled that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed.
Therefore, the court ruled that Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the
reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
Page 107 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COCONUT

COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and
AMADEO, SANCHO, DONATO, LUIS, ERASTO, LUISA, JOSE and DOLORES, all
surnamed BALANTAKBO
G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991
Facts
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two different ascendants the two sets of properties: 1) a
one-third interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land described in the complaint in Civil Case No.
SC-956 from his father; and 2) A one-seventh interest pro-indiviso in ten parcels of registered
lands described in the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 from his maternal grandmother.
Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin
Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir. Subsequently, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself
the mentioned properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del finado Raul
Balantakbo".
Consuelo sold the property described in Civil Case No. SC-956 to Mariquita H. Sumaya.
The same property was subsequently sold to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc.,
which the latter transferred and assigned its rights over the property in favor of Agro-
Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. Consuelo also sold the properties described in the
complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc., which in
turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial
Coconut Cooperative, Inc. The certificates of titles covering the above described properties do
not contain any annotation of its reservable character.
Consuelo died. Henceforth, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, brothers in full
blood of Raul, and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, surviving children of a deceased brother of Raul,
filed the civil cases to recover the subject properties which they claimed were subject to a
reserva troncal in their favor.
The trial court rendered a joint decision in favor of the Balantakbos. It further ruled
that there is no need to register the reservable character of the properties, if only for the
protection of the reservees, against innocent third persons. This decision was affirmed in toto
upon appeal.
Issue
Is there no need to register the reservable character of the properties?
Held
No.
The purpose of the notation is nothing more than to afford to the persons entitled to the
reservation, if any, due protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it
ineffective.
In another ruling decided by the Court, the reservable character of a property may be
lost to innocent purchasers for value. Hence, the obligation is imposed on a widowed spouse to
annotate the reservable character of a property subject of reserve viudal. Such obligation is also
applicable in reserva troncal.
The rule is consistent with the rule provided in the second paragraph of Section 51 of
P.D. 1529, which provides that: “The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or
affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned.”
Page 108 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Edroso v. Sablan
25 Phil 285; GR No. 6878
September 13, 1913
Facts
Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan are married and they had a son name Pedro.
Victoriano died and his two parcels of land were inherited by his son, Pedro. When Pedro died,
unmarried and without issue, the two parcels of land were inherited by his mother Marcelina.
Marcelina applied for registration of the parcels of land in her name. The application was
opposed by Pablo and Basilio who are the two legitimate brothers of Victoriano and also the
uncles Pedro. Pablo and Basilio argued that Marcelina’s application for registration should be
denied since the parcels of land are required by Article 811 of the Civil Code to be reserved in
their favor for they are relatives within the third degree, to wit: “The ascendant who inherits
from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from
another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has
acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the
line whence the property proceeded.”
Issue
Can Marcelina register the properties in her name although they are reserved by law in favor of
Pablo and Basilio?
Ruling
Yes.
The ascendants required under Article 811 of the Civil Code to reserve the property acquires
the legal title and dominion under a condition subsequent. He has the right to the use and
usufruct of the property and can alienate or encumber the same whether or not there exist
relatives within the third degree. If there exist no relatives within the third degree or they die
before the ascendant, the ascendant is the absolute owner of the property and may freely
dispose the property. If there exist relatives within the third degree, they acquire ownership
only at the death of the ascendant. While the ascendant is still alive, he may alienate the
property but the acquirer will receive a limited and revocable title because the relative within
the same degree will in their turn have an expectation to the property while the ascendant lives,
an expectation that cannot be transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third
degree. When the ascendant dies, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the property and
they will complete ownership in fee simple.
In this case, Marcelina, who inherited the two parcels of land from his descendant, has the legal
title over the parcels of land even though she is required by law to reserve them in favor of
Pablo and Basilio, the relatives within the third degree. Having legal title over the land,
Marcelina may register them in her name. Pablo and Basilio have no title of ownership over the
properties but they only have the expectation while Marcelina lives.
Page 109 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Sienes, et al vs. Esparcia

G. R. No. L- 12957
March 24, 1961
Facts:
The lot subject of the dispute is originally owned by Saturnino Yaeso. With his first
wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana. With
his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son, Francisco. Upon Saturnino’s death, the
property was given to his children according to their respective shares. When Francisco died,
without descendant, his mother, as his sole heir acquired the property. Andrea then sold the
said property to the plaintiffs. Also, Cipriana and Paulina sold their share in favor of Esparcia
and Yaeso. The lower court held that the property is reservable and that Andrea is under
obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which said property came.
Issue:
Is there a reservable property?
Held:
Yes. In connection with reservable property, the reserve created two resolutory
conditions: 1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve; 2) the survival at the time of his
death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came.
The reservista may alienate the property but subject to reservation; the rights acquired by the
transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of the reservatarios at the time of the
death of the reservista.
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of the plaintiffs was, therefore, subject to the
condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only
if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property.
Inasmuch as when Andrea died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes
inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of the plaintiffs became of no
legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to
Cipriana. It is also clear that the sale executed to Esparcia and Yaeso was subject to a similar
condition.
Page 110 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Chua vs. CFI
G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977
Facts: During the intestate proceedings which settled Jose Frias’ estate, the probate issued an
order imposing upon Juanito and Consolacion the obligation of paying Standard Oil the amount
of P 3,971.20. Hence, it was conceded that the property in question was not acquired
gratuitously by Juanito but for a consideration, thereby departing from the requisite that the
property, in order to be reservable, must have been acquired by gratuitous title by the
prepositus from an ascendant or a brother or sister.
Issue: Whether or not the transfer was gratuitous
Held: Yes. The transmission of property is gratuitous when the recipient does not give
anything in return. It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any
prior charges what is essential is that the transmission is made gratuitously, or by an act of
mere liberality on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or
does nothing in return. The transmission of the property in question to Juanito was by mean of
hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. The obligation to pay Standard Oil was not
imposed by Jose but by order of the court. As long as the transmission of the property to the
heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out
of pure generosity, it is gratuitous.
Page 111 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Rabadilla v CA
334 SCRA 522, June 29, 2000
Facts: Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, in a codicil (a supplement to a will; an appendix) of Aleja Belleza,
was instituted devisee of Lot No.1392 with an area of 511,855 square meters with the
obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to private respondent Maria Marlena every year
during Marlena's lifetime. The codicil provides that the obligation is imposed not only on the
instituted heir but also to his successors-in-interest and in case of failure to deliver; Maria
Marlena shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's "near descendants."
Dr. Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife and children, one of whom is petitioner
Johnny Rabadilla. Maria Marlena, alleging failure of the heirs to comply with their obligation,
filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the reconveyance of the subject property to the
surviving heirs of the testatrix.
During the pre-trial, a compromise agreement was concluded between the parties
wherein the lessee of the property assumed the delivery of 100 piculs of sugar to Maria
Marlena; however, only partial delivery was made.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action stating that, “While
there may be the non-performanceof the command as mandated, exaction from the petitioners
simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in
question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint.”
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that the institution of Dr.
Rabadilla is in the nature of a modal institution and a cause of action in favor of Maria Marlena
arose when petitioner Johnny Rabadilla failed to comply with their obligation under the codicil,
and in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of testatrix.
Issue: Whether or not Maria Marlena has a legal demandable right against the petitioner, as
one of the compulsory heirs of Dr. Rabadilla.
Ruling: Yes. The heir Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was instituted under a modal substitution. In a
modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or
application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon
the heir.
A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the
efficacy of his rights to the succession. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with
the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants.
Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but
also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-
fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-
interest. The testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Page 112 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said
instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the
herein private respondent, Maria Marlena, during her lifetime. The manner of institution of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge
upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by
operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate
parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.
Thus, petitioner Johnny, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further
proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of
the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. Whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject
Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations
imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his
compulsory heirs upon his death. Since the obligation was not complied with, the property shall
be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
Page 113 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Reyes v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124099
October 30, 1997
Facts:
In 1992 Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament declaring therein in part,
to wit:
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion Oning R. Reyes the following properties to wit:
a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting among others of jewelries, coins,
antiques, statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all the real estates I own in common
with my brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog, Guinsiliban, Sagay all
in Camiguin; real estates in Lunao, Ginoong, Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc,
Kinoguinatan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines, Caesta, Talisayan, all in the province of Misamis
Oriental.[3]
The will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence of
three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent
Julio A. Vivares was designated the executor and in his default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan
S. Vivares.
Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for
probate of the will before the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin. The petitioner was
set for hearing and the order was published in the Mindanao Daily Post, a newspaper of general
circulation, once a week for three consecutive weeks. Notices were likewise sent to all the
persons named in the petition.
On July 21, 1992, the recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes with Estebana
Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila, and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and the deceaseds natural
children with Celsa Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an opposition. with the
following allegations:
a) that the last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and attested in accordance
with the formalities of law; and
b) that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator
at the time of the execution of the will.
The opposition further averred that Reyes was never married to and could never marry
Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because the latter was already
married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their marriage was never annulled. Thus
Page 114 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Asuncion cannot be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with Reyes was violative of
public morals.
Issue:
1. Whether the findings and conclusion of the Court of Appeals was contrary to law,
public policy and evidence on record.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only
upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on
its due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the
testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge
the validity or efficacy of the wills provisions. The intrinsic validity is not considered since the
consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are,
however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as when the
defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will may become a useless
ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon
because practical considerations demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the
testamentary provisions are doubtful legality. Where the parties agree that the intrinsic
validity be first determined, the probate court may also do so. Parenthetically, the rule on
probate is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is
not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of
the will.
The lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator that Asuncion Oning Reyes
was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of
the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the
wills intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by the probate court.
Thus, the very tenor of the will invalidates the legacy because the testator admitted he
was disposing of the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
Testator Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he was bequeathing some of his personal
and real properties to his wife, Asuncion Oning Reyes. There was never an open admission of
any illicit relationship.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court relied on uncorroborated
testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still married to another during the time she
cohabited with the testator. The testimonies of the witnesses were merely hearsay and even
uncertain as to the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the supposed husband of
Asuncion. Thus, the foregoing testimony cannot go against the declaration of the testator that
Asuncion Oning Reyes is his wife. In Alvarado v. City Government of Tacloban the Supreme
Page 115 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Court stated that the declaration of the husband is competent evidence to show the fact of
marriage.
Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent evidence, documentary or
otherwise during the trial to show that Asuncion Oning Reyes marriage to the testator was
inexistent or void, either because of a pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship, the trial
court gravely erred in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and
Testament, as void for being contrary to law and morals. Said declarations are not sufficient to
destroy the presumption of marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very declaration of the
testator that Asuncion Reyes is his wife.
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same
force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making
the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of
the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to
speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to
do so. xxx All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testators having meant just what he said.
Page 116 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Castaneda vs Alemany
3 Phil 426
19 March 1904
FACTS:
Appellants contested the validity of the will of Dona Moreno on the ground that although the
attestation clause in the will states that the testator signed the will in the presence of the 3
witnesses, the will was not also actually written by the testator.
ISSUE:
Is it necessary that a will be personally written by the testator?
HELD:
No. The Civil Code requires that the will be in writing and either that the testator sign it
himself or, if he does not sign it, that it be signed by someone in his presence and by his express
direction. Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The
fact, therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the
testatrix is of no consequence.
Page 117 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Dacanay v. Florendo
GR. No. L-2071 September 19, 1950
FACTS:
Spouses Isabel V. Florendo and Tirso Dacanay executed a reciprocal will on October 20,
1940. Isabel V. Florendo having died, her surviving spouse Tirso Dacanay is seeking to probate
said joint and reciprocal will, which provides in substance that whoever of the spouses, joint
testators, shall survive the other shall inherit all the properties of the latter, with an agreement
as to how the surviving spouse shall dispose of the properties in case of his or her demise.
Relatives of the deceased Isabel V. Florendo opposed the probate of the said will on various
statutory grounds.After receiving from counsel for both parties written arguments, the trial
court ordered dismissing the petition for probate on the ground that said will is null and void
ab initio as having been executed in violation of article 669 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the joint and reciprocal will executed by the spouses may be probated in
view of the prohibition in article 669 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
Yes. The court agrees with Tirso Dacanay‘s view, that the prohibition of article 669 of
the Civil Code is directed against the execution of a joint will, or the expression by two or more
testators of their wills in a single document and by one act, rather than against mutual or
reciprocal wills, which may be separately executed.
The provision of article 669 of the Civil Code prohibiting the execution of a will by two
or more persons conjointly or in the same instrument either for their reciprocal benefit or for
the benefit of a third person, is not unwise and is not against public policy. This is to prevent
the more aggressive spouse to dictate the terms of the will for his or her own benefit or for
those third persons that he or she desires to favor.
And where the will is not only joint but reciprocal, either one of the spouses who may
happen to be unscrupulous, wicked, faithless or desperate, knowing as she does the terms of the
will whereby the whole property of the spouses both conjugal and paraphernal goes to the
survivor, may be tempted to kill or dispose of the other.
Considering the wisdom of the provisions of article 669 and the fact that it has not been
repealed, at least not expressly, as well as the consideration that its provisions are not
incompatible with those of the Code of Civil Procedure on the subject of wills, the court
believes and rules that said article 669 of the Civil Code is still in force.
Page 118 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Paula De La Cerna, et al. vs. Manuela Rebaca Potot, et al.

G.R. No. L-20234
December 23, 1964
Facts:
Spouses Bernabe and Gervasia executed a joint last will and testament where they willed that
the two parcels of land they acquired with all the improvements therein would be given to
Manuela Rebaca who they had cared for and that if one survives the other, he or she will
continue to enjoy the fruits of the properties. When Bernabe died, Gervasia and Manuela
submitted the will for probate. Upon the death of Gervasia, another petition was filed where
Gervasia was concerned. The petition was, however, dismissed because Manuela and her
counsel did not appear. The trial court also ordered that the will was null and void as it was
executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills. The CA reversed the decision. Hence, this
appeal made by the heirs of Bernabe.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the will executed by Bernabe and Gervasia is null and void.
Held:
No. The decision of the probate court, even an erroneous one, is binding upon the whole world
upon its finality. The will had become valid upon the finality of the judgment of the probate
court. However, such decision only affects the portion of Bernabe, since, at the time of the
probate, Gervasia was still alive and her interest over the property could not have been covered
by the Court. Since joint wills and testaments are prohibited by law, upon the death of
Gervasia, her estate would pass upon her heirs intestate and not exclusively to the
testamentary heir unless some other valid will is shown or Manuela is the only heir intestate.
Hence, the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
Page 119 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
IN RE: PALAGANAS v. ERNESTO PALAGANAS

G.R. No. 169144, 26 January 2011
Abad, J.:
FACTS:
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized

United States citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in
California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas, as the executor of her will for she
had left properties in the Philippines and in the US.
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas, another brother of Ruperta, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will
and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. On October 15, 2003, however,
petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas, nephews of Ruperta,
opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the
Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming
Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been
executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences of
such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on
separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with
the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC
directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Ruperta’s U.S.
will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will;
(b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-
based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to
Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to
the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in
the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision, affirming the assailed order of the RTC,
holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernesto’s
submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting
of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not
require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be
probated in the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which
refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules
or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.
Page 120 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P.

RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCE, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE,
FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO
ALSUA, respondents.
FACTS:
On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doña Florentina Rella together
with all their living children entered into a duly notarized agreement, Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial (Exhibit 8), over the then present and existing properties of the spouses Don
Jesus and Doñ;a Florentina enumerated in a prepared inventory.
On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doña Florentina separately executed their
respective holographic wills. Their holographic wills similarly provided for the institution of
the other to his or her share in the conjugal properties, the other half of the conjugal assets
having been partitioned to constitute their legitime among their four living children in the
Extrajudicial Partition of 1949.
Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but similar holographic will on the same day, Jan.
5, 1955 in exactly the same terms and conditions as the above will of his wife.
Upon the death of Doña Tinay on October 2, 1959, Don Jesus was named executor to
serve without bond in an order issued by the probate court on October 13, 1959. Thereafter in
the early part of November, 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will.
This notarial will and testament of Don Jesus had three essential features: (a) it
expressly cancelled, revoked and annulled all the provisions of Don Jesus' holographic will of
January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it provided for the collation of all his
properties donated to his four living children by virtue of the "Escritura de Particion Extra.
judicial" of 1949, and that such properties be taken into account in the partition of his estate
among the children; and (c) it instituted his children as legatees/devisees of certain specific
properties, and as to the rest of the properties and whatever may be subsequently acquired in
the future, before his death, were to be given to Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as
executrix to serve without a bond.
On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.
On May 20, 1964, petitioner herein Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix named in the
will of November 14, 1959, filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua.
She then filed with the Probate Court an inventory of the properties of the estate which,
according to the oppositors therein (the private respondents now) did not include some
properties appearing in the agreement of November 25. 1949 or in the inventory attached
thereto as Annex "A" and in the "Escritura de Particion" of December 19, 1959 as belonging to
or should pertain to Don Jesus.
ISSUES:
Page 121 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
1. Whether or not the respondents (oppositors) are in estoppel to question the competence
of testator Don Jesus Alsua
2. Whether or not Don Jesus Alsua can revoke his previous will
HELD:
1. No. The issue of estoppel is of no moment. The principle of estoppel is not applicable in
probate proceedings.
Probate proceedings involve public interest, and the application therein of the rile of estoppel,
when it win block the ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances surrounding the
execution of a testament, would seem inimical to public policy. Over and above the interest of
private parties is that of the state to see that testamentary dispositions be carried out if, and
only if, executed conformably to law.
'The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to establish the existence of the right of any
living person, but to determine whether or not the decedent has performed the acts specified by
the pertinent statutes, which are the essential prerequisites to personal direction of the mode of
devolution of his property on death. There is no legal but merely a moral duty resting upon a
proponent to attempt to validate the wishes of the departed, and he may and frequently does
receive no personal benefit from the performance of the act.
2. Yes. The new will and testament is a valid revocation of the Extrajudicial Partition
since the latter is null and void.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or by will,
such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs. ...
Art. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not excluded from the commerce of man, may be
the subject-matter of contracts.
Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritances, except those the object of
which is to make a division inter vivos of an estate, in accordance with Article 1056.
All services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be the subject- matter of contract.
Article 1056 specifically uses the word "testator" from which the clear intent of the law may be
deduced that the privilege of partitioning one's estate by acts inter vivos is restricted only to
one who has made a prior will or testament. In other words, Article 1056 being an exception
cannot be given a wider scope as to include in the exception any person whether he has made a
will or not.
In Legasto vs. Verzosa, supra, the Supreme Court categorically declared the necessity of a prior
will before the testator can partition his properties among his heirs.
Both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned and authoritative commentator, Manresa, are
of opinion that a testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first
make a will with all the formalities provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for
without a will there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of the partition inter
vivos made by a testator of his property, it necessarily refers to that property which he has
Page 122 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
devised to his heirs. A person who disposes of his property gratis inter vivos is not called a
testator, but a donor. In employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish
between one who freely donates his property in life and one who disposes of it by will to take
effect after his death.
We rule, therefore, that the respondent court erred in denying probate to the will of Don Jesus
dated November 14, 1959; it erred in holding that Don Jesus being a party to the extrajudicial
partition of 1949 was contractually bound by the provisions thereof and hence could not revoke
his participation therein by the simple expedience of making a new will with contrary
provisions or dispositions. It is an error because the so-called extrajudicial partition of 1949 is
void and inoperative as a partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it
involved future inheritance; it may only be given effect as a donation inter vivos of specific
properties to the heirs made by the parents.
Considering that the document, the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949, contained
specific designation of properties allotted to each child, We rule that there was substantial
compliance with the rules on donations inter vivos under the old Civil Code (Article 633). On
the other hand, there could have been no valid donation to the children of the other half
reserved as the free portion of Don Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay which, as stated in the deed, was to
be divided equally among the children for the simple reason that the property or properties
were not specifically described in the public instrument, an essential requirement under Article
633
Page 123 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
LLORENTE v. CA
G. R. No. 124371, NOVEMBER 23, 2000
FACTS:
Llorente, enlisted as a serviceman of the US navy, was married to a Filipina. He was

later on admitted as a US citizen. When he went back to the Philippines, he filed for divorce
since he found out that his wife was having an adulterous relationship with his brother.
Thereafter, he married his second wife. In 1981, Llorente executed a will and bequeathed all his
property to Alicia and their three children.
ISSUE:
What law should be applied?
HELD:
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit form Lorenzo are issues
best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed
in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. The will
was duly probated.
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children is
glaringly shown in the will be executed. The Supreme Court does not wish to frustrate his
wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status,
condition and legal capacity.
Page 124 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC,
Bulacan, respondent.
G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994
FACTS:
Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing
provisions on presumption of survivorship where in the event that it is not known which one of
the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife. Later, the
entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in
Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.
Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael
opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that
since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. For her part, Salud
said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance
with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the
reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills.
ISSUE:
Should the reprobate of the wills be allowed?
HELD:
Yes. The wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be
effective in this country upon compliance with Article 816 of the Civil Code which requires that
it shall be made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which the
Code prescribes. Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New
York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been
probated outside of the Philippines are as follows:
1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws;
2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines;
3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country;
4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and
5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills.
Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed
evidence. She should be given the opportunity to present them.
Page 125 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Suntay vs. Suntay
GR No. 132524
December 29, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabel’s Petition for Letters of
Administration over the estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The
decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabel’s father Emilio, had
predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been decalred by the CFI as “null and void.”
Federico anchors his oppostion on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel
has no right to succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court
had denied Federico’s Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari. Federico contends
that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the the decision declaring the marriage of Isabel’s
parents “null and void” be upheld.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Isabel is a legitimate child?
HELD:
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of
Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be

considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural
children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by the
second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that “children
conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered
legitimate.”
Page 126 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,

DECEASED ADOLFO C. AZNAR vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California but he
was domiciled in the Philippines at the time of his death. He executed a will declaring MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN as his only child. However, he bequeathed the sum of THREE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00) to MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN
whom he stated in his will as someone not related to him. The will further devised and
bequeath ., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of his property and estate, real,
personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I
may be possessed at his death and which may have come to him from any source whatsoever,
during her lifetime.
Helen Christensen Garcia filed an opposition to the partition insofar as it deprives her (Helen)
of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by the court as an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen.
ISSUE:
Which should apply the rules of California or the rules of Philippines?
HELD:
ART. 16 of our civil code provides that Real property as well as personal property is subject to
the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form
and manner he desires. However, under Article 946 of the Civil Code of California ,If there is no
law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the
person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in its
internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle should apply to
citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of
the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or
rights which follow the person of the owner.
Page 127 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child,
the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of
the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
Page 128 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
BELLIS VS. BELLIS

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States."
By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A.
Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and
Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had
three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that
after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate
should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items
have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A.
His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15,
1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to
the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or
a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting
partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project
of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children
and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
ISSUE:
Which law shall apply to the will- Texas law or Philippine law?
HELD:
Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi,
applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is
usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In
the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
Page 129 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law
rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would
not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since
the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as
to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor
even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the
Civil Code.
Page 130 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, March 29, 1974
FACTS:
In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In May
1957, while she was domiciled here in the Philippines she died.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie
however also stated in her will that should her husband later die, said estate shall be turned
over to her brother and sister.
In December 1962, Charles died in the Philippines. Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of Charles
filed a motion before the probate court while the probate on the will of Linnie is ongoing so
that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was
the trusted employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that
Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the
meantime, he’d like to have Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin
approved the motion.
Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since
said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed
the said petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was granted. Eventually still, the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused
to turn over the estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s
brother and sister and since that is her will, the same must be respected. Magno also contended
that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death ; that under Article 16 of the Civil Code,
successional rights are governed by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas law, Linnie’s will
shall be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes.
PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie
was domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death applying the renvoi doctrine.
ISSUE:
Whether the distribution of the estate should be governed by the laws of the Philippines or of
Texas.
RULING:
The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties failed to adduce
proof as to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the
Page 131 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the
probate court. The Supreme Court however emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnie’s
death is the law applicable and not said law at any other time.
Page 132 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Ortega vs. Valmonte
G.R. No. 157451
Facts:
Two years after Placido’s arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed
Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on
February 5, 1982. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October
8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR PULMONALE.
Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testator‘s will,
testified that it was in the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the three
witnesses of the will went to his house cum law office and requested him to prepare his last will
and testament. After the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the
will, the notary public told them to come back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it.
On August 9, 1983, the notary public explained every term in Ilocano. He likewise explained
that though it appears that the will was signed by the testator and his witnesses on June 15,
1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of town, the formal
execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the
typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty. The
notary public also testified that to his observation the testator was physically and mentally
capable at the time he affixed his signature on the will.
Issues:
Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by
fraud or trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never intended that the instrument should be his
last will and testament.
Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly
executed the subject will.
Held:
As to the first issue, petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in
the execution of the will, but maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of
the existence of fraud. However, in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of
petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented. The allegation that the testator was tricked
into signing it was not sufficiently established.
More importantly, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not
invalidate the document, because the law does not even require that a notarial will be executed
and acknowledged on the same occasion. In addition, the will must be subscribed by the
testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the
presence of the testator and of one another. Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must
acknowledge the will before a notary public. The Court also agrees with the CA that the
Page 133 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily
and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses
Page 134 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
JULIANA BAGTAS vs. ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-6801
March 14, 1912
FACTS:
The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some fourteen of fifteen years
prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few
years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of speech.
Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his
mouth. He retained the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well.
Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other
members of his family.
Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to
the disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to Señor Marco, who
transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon
which the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read
them to the testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator
assented each time with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had
been thus written by the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator and
the witnesses; that Señor Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking
over it, signed it in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed
it in the presence of the testator and each other.
One of the attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the execution of the will the
testator was in his right mind, and that although he was seriously ill, he indicated by
movements of his head what his wishes were. Another of the attesting witnesses stated that he
was not able to say whether decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or not, because he
had been ill for some years, and that he (the witnesses) was not a physician. The other
subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court as a witness for the opponents.
He was unable to state whether or not the will was the wish of the testator. The only reasons
he gave for his statement were the infirmity and advanced age of the testator and the fact that
he was unable to speak. The witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he verified his
own signature as a subscribing witness.
Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that the
testator had suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some mental disorder. He does not say
that the testator was not in his right mind at the time of the execution of the will, nor does he
give it at his opinion that he was without the necessary mental capacity to make a valid will. He
did not state in what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he had
noticed that the testator did not reply to him on one occasion when he visited him.
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer was in
reply to a hypothetical question as to what be the mental condition of a person who was 79
years old and who had suffered from a malady such as the testator was supposed to have had
according to the testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He
replied and discussed at some length the symptoms and consequences of the decease from
which the testator had suffered; he read in support of his statements from a work by a German
Physician, Dr. Herman Eichost. In answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he
Page 135 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
would be unable to certify to the mental condition of a person who was suffering from such a
disease.
ISSUE:
Was the will duly made?
HELD:
Yes.
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and
the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent
jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to
overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do.
There are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have
repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not
render a person incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall
continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to
execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of wills
that could meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are
universal in statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are
many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of
diseased mentality which are denominated as insanity and idiocy.
The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the last
years of his life may have led some of those who knew him in his earlier days to entertain
doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the statements of the
witnesses to the execution of the will and statements of the conduct of the testator at that time
all indicate that he unquestionably had mental capacity and that he exercised it on this
occasion. At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear that his conduct was
irrational in any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of the
business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that the writing and execution of
the will occupied a period several hours and that the testator was present during all this time,
taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly
reasonable and its dispositions are those of a rational person.
For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be and the same is
hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants.
Page 136 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Abquilan v. Abquilan
G.R. No. L-24665 13 October 1926
STREET, J.:
FACTS:
This court refused to legalize an instrument purporting to be the last will and testament of
Isidra Abquilan, the deceased. It appears that the deceased left no forced heirs, and her only
heirs, in case of intestacy, are her brother, Atanasio Abquilan, the proponent of the will, and
Feliciana Abquilan, a sister, who is the opponent.
The denial was based on the finding of the trial court that the document propounded as the will
of the deceased is apocryphal, that the purported signatures of the deceased to the supposed will
are forgeries, and that the instrument in question was not executed by the deceased. He
therefore denied probate, and the proponent appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the purported last will and testament was executed by the deceased.
RULING:
A clear preponderance of the evidence shows that on November 6, 1924, the date when the will
purports to have been executed, the supposed testatrix was not in a condition such as to enable
her to have participated in the act, she being in fact at that time suffering from paralysis to
celebral hemorrhage in such degree as completely to discapacitate her for intelligent
participation in the act of making a will. A careful comparison of the name of the testatrix as
signed in two places to the Exhibit A, with many of her authentic signatures leads to the
conclusion that the signatures to the supposed will were made by some other person.
Furthermore, the combined testimony of Juan Serato and Alejandro Genito completely
demonstrate in our opinion that no will at all was made on November 6, the date attributed to
the questioned document, and that, instead an attempt was made on the night of that day to
fabricate another will, which failed of completion because of the refusal of Alejandro Genito to
be party to the making of a will in which the testatrix took no part. The instrument before us
was undoubtedly fabricated later, probably on November 7, at a time when the condition of the
deceased was such as to make rational participation on her part in the act of making a will
impossible.
Page 137 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Page 138 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Catalina Bugnao VS. Francisco Ubag
G.R. No. 4445 September 18, 1909
Facts:
Catalina Bugnao submitted a purported will of Domingo Ubag for probate. She claimed
that she is the sole beneficiary under the will. Such probate was contested by appellants who
were brothers and sisters of the deceased and who would be entitled to share in the distribution
of his estate, if probate were denied, as it appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct
ascending or descending line.
Appellants contend that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the
execution of the alleged will in the manner and form prescribed in section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure; and that at the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, Ubag was
not of sound mind and memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will.
The instrument propounded for probate purports to be the last will and testament of
Domingo Ubag, signed by him in the presence of three subscribing and attesting witnesses, and
appears upon its face to have been duly executed in accordance with the provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure touching the making of wills.
Two of the subscribing witnesses, Victor J. Bingtoy and Catalino Mariño, testified in
support of the will, the latter being the justice of the peace of the municipality wherein it was
executed; and their testimony was corroborated in all important details by the testimony of the
proponent herself, who was present when the will was made.
Issue:
Whether the deceased was of sound mind during the execution of the will
Held:
Yes. The subscribing witnesses swore positively that at the time of the execution, the
testator was of sound mind and memory. It is true that their testimony discloses the fact that
he was at that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe
intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he needed
assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of asthma to
which he was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in no wise
establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of
the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the will, and
his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various parcels of land
set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote
the will clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property,
is strong evidence of his testamentary capacity.
Page 139 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
In matter of estate of Tomas Rodriguez. Manuel Torres, special administrator

Luz Lopez De Bueno v Margarita Lopez
G.R. No. L-25966 , November 1, 1926
FACTS:
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament, in the second
clause of which he declared: “I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my
cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno.”
Prior to the execution of his will, Tomas Rodriguez had been judicially declared incapable of
taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin, Vicente Lopez (Vicente)
as guardian. Only Four days after the will had been made Vicente died; the Testator
(Rodriguez) died on February 25, 1924. At the time the will was made Vicente had not
presented his final accounts as guardian and no accounts had been presented at the time of his
death.
Appellant Margarita Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of decedent. Appellant argues that
there has supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the half of the estate intended for
Vicente and that such half had descended to the her (Margarita) as next of kin or sole heir at
law of decedent. Appellant relies on Articles 764 and 912 of the Civil Code.
Article 764 states among other things, “that a will may be valid even though the person
instituted as heir is disqualified to inherit”. Article 912 declares among other things, “that legal
succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also when the heir instituted is
disqualified to succeed”. Upon these provisions an argument points to the conclusion that the
will of Tomas Rodriguez was valid, notwithstanding the fact that one of the individuals named
as heirs in the will was disqualified to take, and that as a consequence Margarita Lopez s
entitled to inherit the share of said disqualified heir.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case of Vicente Lopez makes a case for accretion (Article 982) rather than
intestate succession (Article 912).
HELD:
YES it is a case for accretion under Artilce 982 of the Civil Code.
The legal problem presented should be discussed with article 753 of the Civil Code which in
effect declares that, “no testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his
guardian before the final accounts of the latter have been approved”. This provision is of undoubted
application to the situation before us; and the provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in
favor of Vicente F. Lopez was not any general incapacity on his part, but a special incapacity
due to the accidental relation of guardian and ward existing between the parties.
In connection the court held that the right of accretion as defined under Article 982 is that
accretion takes place in a testamentary succession when:
1) the two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or the same portion thereof
without special designation of shares;
2) and, when one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the
inheritance or is disqualifying to receive it.
Page 140 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
In the case at bar we have a will calling Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de
Bueno, to the same inheritance without special designation of shares. In addition to this, one
of the persons named as heir has predeceased the testator, this person being also
disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the testator's death.
Thus Article 982 is therefore also of exact application to the case in hand; and its effect is to
give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided half which she would have
received in concurrence with her father if he had been alive and qualified to take, but also
the half which pertained to him. There was no error whatever, therefore, in the order of the
trial court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.
NOTE: The Supreme Court discussed that under paragraph 4 of article 912, intestate
succession occurs when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed (incapaz de
suceder), while, under the last provision in paragraph 2 of article 982, accretion occurs
when one of the persons called to inherit under the will is disqualified to receive the
inheritance (incapaz de recibirla). A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to succeed
and incapacity to take, and it is contended that the disability of Vicente F. Lopez was such
as to bring the case under article 912 rather than 982. We are of the opinion that the case
cannot be made to turn upon so refined an interpretation of the language of the Code, and at
any rate the disability to which Vicente F. Lopez was subject was not a general disability to
succeed but an accidental incapacity to receive the legacy, a consideration which makes a
case for accretion rather than for intestate succession.
Page 141 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
In re will of the late Matea Abella. MONS. SANTIAGO SANCHO, applicant-appellee,

vs. MARCIANA ABELLA, opponent-appellant.
G.R. No. L-39033 13 November 1933
VILLA-REAL, J.:
FACTS: Testatrix Matea Abella of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, went to San Fernando, La Union
accompanied by her niece, to consult a physician. While in San Fernando, she stayed in a
convent under the charge of Father Cordero. After two consultations with the physician, it was
found out that Matea was suffering from dyspepsia and cancer of the stomach.
Thereafter, Matea talked to Atty. Reinoso to whom she expressed her desire to make a will. She
was then interviewed by the lawyer twice on separate days in the presence of four persons at
the convent where she was staying. During the interview, the testatrix even directed her niece
to bring her the documents in her trunk which she delivered to Atty. Reinoso.
After the will has been drafted in Ilocano, Macario Calug, one of of the witnesses, read the same
to her and she approved. The will was then copied clean and was again read to her and she
expresses her approval thereof but inasmuch as it was rather late at night, she did not care to
sign the same suggesting that it be postponed to the following day, April 29, 1932, which was
done in the presence of each and every one of the instrumental witnesses thereto and of other
persons, including Father Cordero. After the signing, Atty. Reinoso delivered the original
copies of the will to the testatrix.
On July 3,1932, Matea died of senile debility at the age of 88 years. Thereafter, a petition for
probate of Matea‘s will was filed. The petition was opposed by Marciana Abella, one of the
grounds cited was that the testator lacked testamentary capacity since the she was 88 years old
and was suffering from senile debility at the time she executed her will.
The probate court admitted the will to probate.
ISSUE: WON Matea Abella possessed the mental capacity at the time she executed her will.
Page 142 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
RULING: The Supreme Court believed that based on the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the will of the deceased showed that the testatrix was not so physically weak, nor
so blind, nor so deaf, nor so lacking in intelligence that she could not, with full understanding
thereof, dispose of her properties and make a will. Neither senile debility, nor blindness, nor
deafness, nor poor memory is by itself sufficient to incapacitate a person from making his will.
The mere fact that in her will Matea Abella disposed of properties, which she had already
donated to other persons at a prior date, is not an indication of mental insanity. At most, it
constitutes forgetfulness or a change of mind, due to ignorance of the irrevocability of certain
donations.
Page 143 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Ramirez vs Ramirez
G.R. No. L-19910, May 31, 1971, 39 S 147
FACTS
Maria Gamier Garreau, widow of Ramon Ramirez, was a native of Asnier Paris, France, but a
Filipino citizen residing in Madrid, Spain, where she died childless at the age of 84 on January
11, 1959. The will in question was an "open" one, executed before a notary public in Madrid on
May 24, 1958, and instituting her niece Lirio (Lily) Pfannenschmidt now appellant, as sole and
universal heir. Lirio is one of the four children of Jose Ramirez, brother of the testatrix husband
Ramon, the other three being Elsa, Esperanza and Horacio. Ramon had a half-brother, Jorge P.
Ramirez, whose son, Jose Maria Ramirez, now appellee, opposed the petition for probate filed
by Urio on February 20, 1959, alleging in his opposition, inter alia, that there was a prior will
executed by the testatrix in Manila in 1949. The photostat copy of that will, marked in the
record as Exhibit D and Exhibit 2-J, shows that the testatrix instituted her husband as her
universal 'heir, and in the event that he should predecease her (which he did), named her niece
Lily Ramirez and her nephews Horacio Ramirez and Jose Ma. Ramirez as substitute heirs to all
her properties in equal shares. This previous will, however, is not involved in this case, and has
been referred to by the parties only in relation to the background circumstances concerning the
execution of the "open" will in 1958.
ISSUE
Whether or not the testator possesses testamentary capacity to make the will valid.
HELD
No.
The order of the trial court denying probate is based in no small part on a number of letters
written by the petitioner herself, in which she used quite strong terms to describe the mental
infirmity of the testatrix. Those letters were written by her in 1956 and 1957 to her uncle, Jose
Eugenio Ramirez de la Cavada, another brother of the testatrix husband, Ramon Ramirez. He
arrived in Madrid in 1954 and his niece Lily who was then residing there, came to him and said
that she could not accept the fact that Jose Maria Ramirez (herein oppositor-appellee) had been
named as heir in the will of her aunt, not being a member of the same family group. When he
arrived in Madrid he found his sister-in-law "ya una mujer muy incapacitada."
But from his own observations, Jose Eugenio Ramirez declared that his sister-in-law was even
then mentallyincapacitated, citing by way of example her attitude and personal reaction when
her husband died in 1956. She was present at his death and saw his body just before he was
buried; but when she went to her room after the funeral and saw that his bed was no longer
there she came out crying asking where her husband was and saying that she was going to look
for him.
Page 144 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
She had totally forgotten that he had passed away. Apart from that, she was easily susceptible
to any suggestion from others, particularly those close to her and after doing what she was told
would promptly forget all about it. Another deponent, Julio Escribano Langa, a resident of
Madrid who had known the spouses Ramon Ramirez and Maria Gamier Garreau for about nine
years, testified to the same mental condition of the testatrix: her susceptibility to another
person's influence; her lack of memory for recent events, her lack of understanding of, or
volition for deciding, certain matters such as the making of a last will.
Page 145 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-SANSON

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 76648
February 26, 1988
Facts:
Matilde Montinola Sanson the only surviving sister of the deceased but who was not named in
the said win, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will of Herminia Montinola who died single,
parentless and childless on March 29,1981 at the age of 70 years, devised in this will several of
her real properties to specified persons. alleging inter alia: that the subject will was not entirely
written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and the same was falsely dated or antedated;
that the testatrix was not in full possession of her mental faculties to make testamentary
dispositions; that undue influence was exerted upon the person and mind of the testatrix by the
beneficiaries named in the win; and that the will failed to institute a residual heir to the
remainder of the estate. Matilde alleges that her exclusion from the alleged holographic will
was without rhyme or reason, being the only surviving sister of the testatrix with whom she
shares an intimate relationship, thus demonstrating the lack of testamentary capacity of
testatrix.
Issue:
Whether Herminia was not of sound mind when she made her will.
Ruling:
Article 842 of the Civil Code provides that one who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by
will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
It is within the right of the testatrix not to include her only sister who is not a compulsory heir
in her will. Nevertheless, per testimony of Asuncion Gemperle, the latter had reserved two
boxes of jewelry worth P850,000.00 for petitioner. Furthermore, petitioner's son Francis was
instituted as an heir in the contested will. However apparently they were removed by Herminia
as heirs. Nevertheless, the fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither
fraud or undue influence. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a
testament, otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate.
Page 146 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
In Re WILL OF ANA ABANGAN v. ANASTACIA ABANGAN, et al.

G.R. No. L-13431
12 November 1919
FACTS:
The dispute started when the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate the will of
Ana Abangan executed July 1916. The appellant Anastacia Abangan averred that the said
document consists of two sheets, the first of which contains all of the disposition of the
testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction
of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation
clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is
signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and
these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will
should have been denied. It has been alleged that the testatrix did not know the dialect in which
the will was written
ISSUE: Whether the will should have been denied.
HELD:
No. The will was duly admitted to probate. As regards the marginal signature, such is only
applicable when the will is written on several sheets. The object of which is to avoid the
substitution of any of the said sheets, thereby changing the testator’s dispositions. In the case at
bar, the marginal signatures of the testator and three witnesses would be completely
unnecessary for involved here was a two-paged will only.
The contention the requisite of pagination and numbering was also untenable. Act No. 2645
requires such in order to know whether any sheet of the will has been removed. However, when
all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute
disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.
The issue on the language or dialect was also untenable. The circumstance appearing in the
will itself that same was executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of the locality where the
testator was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that
she knew this dialect in which the will is written.
Page 147 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Acop v. Piraso
G.R. No. L-28946
January 16, 1929
Facts:
This appeal was taken from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Benguet, denying
the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Piraso.
The will was written in English which the supposed testator Piraso did not know thus the
proponent-appellant contends that the will is not valid for it was not written in a dialect
understood by the testator. The proponent-appellant further contends that the will should
have been in the Ilocano dialect, the dialect that is known to the testator.
The proponent-appellant assigns the following as alleged errors of the lower court:
1.
In holding that in order to be valid the will in question should have been drawn up in
the Ilocano dialect.
2. In not holding that the testator Piraso did not know the Ilocano dialect well enough to
understand a will drawn up in said dialect.
3. In refusing to admit the will in question to probate.
The fundamental errors assigned refer chiefly to the part of the judgment which reads as
follows:
The evidence shows that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although
imperfectly, and could make himself understood in that dialect, and the court is of the
opinion that his will should have been written in that dialect.
Issue:
Whether or not the will herein is valid
Ruling:
No. The fact that the will was written in English which the supposed testator Piraso did not
know, is sufficient to invalidate said will according to the clear and positive provisions of the
law, and inevitably prevents its probate.
Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly provides that:
"No will, except as provides in the preceding section" (as to wills executed by a Spaniard or a
resident of the Philippine Islands, before the present Code of Civil Procedure went into effect),
Page 148 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
"shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be
written in the language or dialect known by the testator," etc.
Moreover, the presumption in favor of the will established by this court in Abangan vs.
Abangan
(40 Phil., 476), to the effect that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality
where he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary, can not be applied in this case because,
in the instant case, not only is it not proven that English is the language of the City of Baguio
where the deceased Piraso lived and where the will was drawn, but that the record contains
positive proof that said Piraso knew no other language than the Igorot dialect, with a
smattering of Ilocano.
Page 149 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
PRIMITIVO GONZALEZ Y LAUREL vs. JOVITA LAUREL Y TAPIA

G.R. No. L-19079 January 15, 1923
Facts
In an order by the Court of First Instance, it allowed the document, Exhibit A to
probate as the last will and testament of the deceased Maria Tapia, thus granting the petition of
Primitivo L. Gonzalez and overruling the opposition presented by Jovita Laurel.
Jovita Laurel appeals to the Supreme Court alleging the errors of the lower court.
Issues
1. Is Exhibit A, the supposed will of the deceased Maria, executed with the solemnities
prescribed by the law, notwithstanding that there was no proof of the dialect known by the said
deceased and of the fact that it was the same in which said Exhibit A was written?
2. Did the testatrix act voluntarily and with full knowledge in executing and signing
the will?
Held
1. Yes. The deceased was a resident of the Province of Batangas, a Tagalog region,
where she had real properties for several years. It also appears that she requested Modesto
Castillo to draw her will in Tagalog. From the record taken as a whole, a presumption arises
that Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect, which presumption is now conclusive for not
having been overthrown nor rebutted.
2. Yes. The preponderance of evidence in this respect is that said document was
executed and signed by Maria Tapia voluntarily and with full knowledge, without fraud, deceit,
surprise, or undue influence or machinations of anybody, she being then mentally capacitated
and free. Such is the fact established by the evidence, which was carefully examined.
Page 150 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Suroza v. Honrado
A.M. No. 2026-CFI; 110 SCRA 388
December 19, 1981
Facts
Marcelina, an illiterate, supposedly executed a notarial will which was written in English and
thumbmarked by her. In her will, she bequeathed all her estate to Marilyn who was a child
entrusted to her by the girlfriend of Agapito, a boy she reared with her husband. Marina, the
laundrywoman and executrix in her will filed a petition for the probate of Marcelina’s will. This
was opposed by one Nenita, wife of Agapito, alleging that the will is void because it is written
in English not known to Marcelina. Still, Judge Honrado, the one assigned to the case, denied
Nenita’s opppostiona and the testemantary proceeding was closed. Nenito then charged Judge
Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina.
Issue
May Marcelina’s will be probated even though it is written in a language not known to her?
Held
No.
Article 804 of the Civil Code requires that every will must be executed in a language or dialect
known to the testator; otherwise, the will is void. In this case, the will of Marcelina is written in
English. Considering that she is illiterate and that the English is not known to her, her alleged
will is void and should not have been probated.
Page 151 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Noble v Abaja
450 SCRA 265
January 31, 2005
FACTS:
Abada died sometime in May 1940. His widow Paula Toray died in September 1943.
Both died without legitimate children. Alipio C. Abaja filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a petition for the probate of the last will
and testament of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his natural children
EulogioAbaja and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of Eulogio. Alipio filed another petition
before the RTC-Kabankalan for the probate of the last will and testament of Toray. Caponong,
Joel Abada, et al., and Levi Tronco, et al. opposed the petition on the same grounds. The RTC-
Kabankalan designated Belinda Caponong-Noble Special Administratrix of the estate of Abada
and Toray. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution of the RTC-Kabankalan.
ISSUES:
1. What laws apply to the probate of the last will of Abada? 2. Whether or not the will
of Abada requires acknowledgment before a notary public. 3. Whether or not the will must
expressly state that it is written in a language or dialect known to the testator. 4. Whether or
not the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation clause
complies with the requirements of the applicable laws.
HELD:
1. Abada executed his will on June 4, 1932. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of
1889 or the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure which governed
the execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code.
2. No. The Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code
of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any will.
Therefore, Abada’s will does not require acknowledgment before a notary public.
3. No. There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the
language or dialect used in the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof
aliunde. Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In
Page 152 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
these gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish language. This
sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language.
4. Yes. The attestation clause clearly states that Abada signed the will and its every page in the
presence of the witnesses.
Page 153 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
MACAPINLAC vs. ALIMURONG
G.r. No. L-5149 March 22, 1910
Facts:
Simplicia de los Santos died on June 19, 1907. Her surviving husband. Gregorio submitted her
will for probate. Macario, a nephew of the deceased, opposed the proceedings because the will
was not executed and signed by the witnesses in accordance with the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure now in force and because it was executed under duress and undue and illegal
influence on the part of the persons benefited thereby or of a person acting in their interests.
The trial court admitted the will into probate. Six oclock on the evening of June 17, 1907,
Simplicia was sick but was in full possession of all her faculties, executed her will. She died
early on the morning of the following Wednesday. As a preliminary act, a rough copy of the
said will was made up, which rough copy was read to the testator, and the latter ordered an
additional clause to be added thereto, in connection with a legacy that she desired to make in
favor of some of her old servants who and rendered good service. A clear copy thereof was
made up and was again read to the testator, who approved it in all of its parts, and as she was
unable to sign, she requested Amando to sign for her. Immediately afterwards and also in the
presence of the same testator and of each other, the witnesses signed at the bottom of the will.
Petitioner alleges that inasmuch as the law requires that when a person signs in place of the
testator, he should write the name of the later in the will as the signature; this was not done by
Amando in the will in question, as he did not sign it with the name of testator.
Issue:
Whether the posterior insertion of the words “For Simplicia de los Santos” can affect the
validity of the will.
Held:
No. Although the words “For Simplicia de los Santos” be considered as inserted subsequently,
which we neither affirm nor deny, because a specific determination either way is unnecessary, in
our opinion the signature for the testator as if she signed the will and also the signature of the
witness who, at her request, wrote the name of the testator and signed for her, affirming the
truth of this fact, attested by the other witnesses then present. And this fully complies with the
provisions of Section 618 of the Act.
Page 154 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
TOMAS GUISON vs. MARIA CONCEPCION

5 Phil 551 January 19, 1906
Facts:
Jacoba Concepcion Salcedo made her will in Manila, on January 3, 1904. The witness Feliciano
Maglaqui, instead of writing the name of the Jacoba on the Will, he wrote his own.
Probate of the will was refused in the court on the ground that the name of the testatrix was
not signed thereto.
Issue:
Whether or not the Will must be refused because the name of the testatrix was not signed
thereto.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that under the law in force, the witness should have written at the bottom
of the will the full name of the testator and his own name in one of the forms. Witness Feliciano
did not do so, and this failure to comply with the law is a substantial defect which affects the
validity of the will and precludes its allowance, notwithstanding the fact that no one appeared
to oppose it.
Page 155 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
LEANO vs. LEAÑO

G.R. No. 9150, March 31, 1915
FACTS:
Cristina Valdes, deceased, placed her cross against her name attached by some other
person to the instrument offered for probate which purports to be her last will and testament,
in the presence of the three witnesses whose names are attached to the attesting clause, and
that they attested and subscribed the instrument in her presence and in the presence of each
other.
ISSUE:
Is the placing of the cross sufficient to be considered as a signature?
HELD:
Yes. The right of a testator to sign his will by mark, executed animo testandi, has been
uniformly sustained by the courts of last resort of the United States in construing statutory
provisions prescribing the mode of execution of wills in language identical with, or
substantially similar to that found in section 618 of our code, which was taken from section
2349 of the Code of Vermont.
Page 156 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Garcia vs La Cuesta
90 Phil 489
Facts:
The will in question appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote
the name of Antero Mercado, followed by “A reugo del testator” and the name of Florentino
Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to have written immediately a cross after his name.
According to the CFI, the attestation clause failed to certify that the will was signed on all the
left margins of the 3 pages and at the end of the will by Atty. Javier at the express request of
the testator in the presence of the testator and each and every one of the witnesses. It also failed
to certify that after the signing of the name of the testator by Atty. Javier at the former’s
request said testator has written a cross at the end of his name and on the left margin of the
three pages of which the will consists and at the end thereof. Finally, the will failed to certify
that that the three witnesses signed the will in all the pages thereon om the presence of the
testator and of each other.
Issue:
Whether or not the will should be disallowed
Held:
The will should be disallowed since the attestation clause is fatally detective for failing
to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty Javier to write the testator’s name under his express
direction. It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the actual signature of
Antero Mercado or even one of the ways by which he signed his name. The Court is not
prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark, and the reason is obvious. The
cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.
Page 157 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Yap Tua v. Yap Ca

G.R. No. 6845, September 1, 1914
FACTS:
Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a petition for the
probate of the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong. Accompanying said petition and attached
thereto was the alleged will of the deceased. It appears that the will was signed by the deceased,
as well as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez.
When called to testify, Severo Tabora testified among others, that he was not sure that
he had seen Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong sign the will because there were many people and
there was a screen at the door and he could not see; that he was called awitness to sign the
second will and was told by the people there that it was the same as the first; that the will was
on a table, far from the patient, in the house but outside the room where the patient was; that
the will was signed by Paez and himself; that Anselmo Zacarias was there; that he was not sure
whether Anselmo Zacarias signed the will or not; that he was not sure whether Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong could see the table on which the will was written at the time it was signed
or not; that there were many people in the house; that he remembered the names of Pedro and
Lorenzo; that he could not remember the names of any others; that the will remained on the
table after he signed it; that after he signed the will he went to the room where Tomasa was
lying; that the will was left on the table outside; that Tomasa was very ill; that he heard the
people asking Tomasa to sign the will after he had signed it; that he saw Paez sign the will, that
he could not remember whether Anselmo Zacarias had signed the will, because immediately
after he and Paez signed it, he left because he was hungry; that the place where the table was
located was in the same house, on the floor, about two steps down from the floor on which
Tomasa was.
During the trial, the protestants made a strong effort to show that Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong did not sign her name in the presence of the witnesses and that they did not sign their
names in their presence nor in the presence of each other.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was signed by the testator and the witnesses in the presence of
one another
HELD:
YES. A plan of the room or rooms in which the will was signed was presented as proof
and it was shown that there was but one room; that one part of the room was one or two steps
below the floor of the other; that the table on which the witnesses signed the will was located
upon the lower floor of the room. It was also shown that from the bed in which Tomasa was
Page 158 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
lying, it was possible for her to see the table on which the witnesses signed the will. While the
rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the same in the presence of the witnesses
and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the
one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signatures made is not
necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of the necessary
parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon the will.
During the trial of the cause the protestants made a strong effort to show that Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong did not sign her name in the presence of the witnesses and that they did not
sign their names in their presence nor in the presence of each other. Upon that question there is
considerable conflict of proof. An effort was made to show that the will was signed by the
witnesses in one room and by Tomasa in another. A plan of the room or rooms in which the
will was signed was presented as proof and it was shown that there was but one room; that one
part of the room was one or two steps below the floor of the other; that the table on which the
witnesses signed the will was located upon the lower floor of the room. It was also shown that
from the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was possible for her to see the table on which the
witnesses signed the will. While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the
same in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each
other, as well as in the presence of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing
of the signatures made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is
possible for each of the necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed
upon the will.
In cases like the present where there is so much conflict in the proof, it is very difficult
for the courts to reach conclusions that are absolutely free from doubt. Great weight must be
given by appellate courts who do not see or hear the witnesses, to the conclusions of the trial
courts who had that opportunity.
Upon a full consideration of the record, we find that a preponderance of the proof shows
that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right
use of all her faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909.
Page 159 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Serapia De Gala vs. Apolinario Gonzales and Sinfroso Ona

G.R. No. L-30289
March 26, 1929
Facts:
Severina executed a will in which Serapia was designated an executrix. Severina died without
heirs by force of law. Serapia presented will for probate. Apolinario opposed stating that the
will was not executed in conformity with the law. Serapia was appointed as special
administratrix and made an inventory of the estate. She also made several demands to the
husband of Severina to deliver the properties which were in his possession. The trial court
ordered the husband to deliver the properties to which he filed a motion that he be made as the
special administrator instead of Serapia which the court granted. The will was declared valid
and admitted to probate. All the parties appealed.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Severina's will is valid.
Held:
Yes. When the law states that the will shall be signed by the testator, the law is fulfilled not
only by the customary written signature but by the testator's thumb mark. Severina's thumb
mark appears on the center of her name on all the pages of her will. The attestation clause also
had sufficiently conformed with the law. Standing alone, it does not quite meet the
requirements of the law but taken together with the last clause of the body will, it leaves no
possible doubt about the authenticity of the will. The witnesses had also signed the will as
stated by the clause.
Page 160 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN CABALLERO,

et. Al v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special
Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero
G.R. No. 103554 May 28, 1993
FACTS:
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in
the twilight years of his life, executed a last will and testament at his residence before 3
witnesses. He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad.
In the will, it was declared that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises
his real and personal properties to several people all of whom do not appear to be related to the
testator.
4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case seeking the probate of his last will and
testament, but numerous postponements pushed back the initial hearing of the probate court
regarding the will. On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could finally
be heard by the probate court.
Thereafter one of the legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought his appointment as special administrator
of the testator’s estate. Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the
testator, instituted a second petition for intestate proceedings. They also opposed the probate of
the testator’s will and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate.
Benoni Cabrera died and was replaced by William Cabrera as special administrator and gave an
order that the testate proceedings for the probate of the will had to be heard and resolved first.
In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the allowance of the testator’s will on
the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already in poor state of
health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Also the genuineness of the
signature of the testator is in doubt.
On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the notary public testified that the
testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing
mind and that the testator was in good health and was not unduly influenced in any way in the
execution of his will.
Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and
testament of the late Mateo Caballero.CA affirmed the probate court’s decision stating that it
substantially complies with Article 805. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the attestation clause in the will of the testator is fatally defective or can
be cured under Article 809 of the Civil Code.
Page 161 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
RULING:
No. It does not comply with the provisions of the law.
Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Arts. 804 to 809. The will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the attesting witnesses. The
attestation clause need not be written in a language known to the testator or even to the
attesting witnesses.
It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of

execution and once signed by the witnesses it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with
the essential formalities required by law has been observed. The attestation clause, therefore,
provides strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity
thereof.
It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in the will failed to specifically
state the fact that the attesting witnesses witnessed the testator sign the will and all its pages
in their presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page thereof in
the presence of the testator and of each other. And the Court agrees.
The attestation clause does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said
witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and
of each other.
The phrase, “and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the space provided
for his signature and on the left hand margin,” obviously refers to the testator and not the
instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words” as his last will and
testament.”
Clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another. That the absence of the statement required by law
is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will
that is here sought to be probated.
Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because the attestation clause totally
omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other. The defect in this case is not only with respect to the
form or the language of the attestation clause. The defects must be remedied
by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself which is clearly lacking in this case. Therefore,
the probate of the will is set aside and the case for the intestate proceedings shall be revived.
Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it does not pertain to the
form or language of the will. This is because there is not substantial compliance with Article
805.
Page 162 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
SAMUEL PERRY vs. VICENTE ELIO

29 P 134
January 5, 1915
FACTS:
Sotera Barrientos was the wife of Samuel Perry in her third marriage. After her death, two
documents were for probate which were allegedly the last will and testament of the said
deceased.
The first document was filed by Vicente Elio, son of her first husband, and the second by
Samuel Perry, her surviving husband. Perry opposed probate of the first document, and Elio, in
turn, that of the second. By agreement of both parties the two petitions were heard jointly, in
order that the evidence introduced to support the one might be used to impeach the other. The
court said said that the two wills were true and authentic, but that the one being submitted by
Samuel Perry was already revoked by the one subsequently executed which is being submitted
by Vicente. The court denied the probate of the one executed in favor of Samuel Perry, and
ordered that the second will, in favor of the other petitioner, Vicente Elio, be probated as the
last will and testament of the said Sotera Barrientos.
In the will, Santos Matayabas was allegedly authorized by the deceased to sign the document in
the presence of all the witnesses, as she was seriously ill.
The will is being assailed by the petitioner, as it was executed during the serious illness of the
deceased. Moreover, the authority allegedly given to Santos Matayabas to sign the document is
being questioned.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the testator had the mantal capacity when the will was executed; and
2. Whether or not the signature made by Santos Matayabas was authorized by the
testator.
HELD:
1. No. The testator was not mentally capacitated when the will was executed.
The testimonies presented to the court are sufficient to conclude that the weakness of the
testatrix was so great that not only was she unable to sign the said instrument, all the means
employed for that purpose having been in vain, but she had also lost the power of speech, for,
according to Matayabas, what she said could no longer be understood, nor were the signs that
she made well understood. According to Sabido, she was no longer able to talk; she merely
made movements with her head, although, as all these witnesses testified, she gave it to be
understood that the document that had been read to her was her will and expressed her wishes,
because she replied to the questions which were put to her ascertain whether such it was, by
saying yes; but, according to the witness Rivera, this reply was made with great effort.
The only proof that the document, the probate of which as the will of Sotera Barrientos was
requested by Vicente Elio, is an expression of the real wishes of the testatrix, consists,
according to those same witnesses, in that she replied to Isidoro Sabido with the monosyllable
"yes" when Santos Matayabas read the said document and she was asked whether it expressed
her wishes. However, it is very doubtful whether the sick woman, in the condition in which she
was, understood that Matayabas read to her, nor can the fact of having said "yes" be accepted as
Page 163 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
an absolute proof that she understood what was read, for, as the same witnesses testified, she
made this same reply to all the questions that were then put to her, an answer which could be
interpreted as being either approval and agreement in regard to those questions or indifference
to all that was happening about her.
2. No. The signature made by Santos Matayabas was not authorized by the Testator.
At first, the witnesses alleged that the testator pointed to Santos Matayabas to indicate that she
authorizes the latter to sign the document for her. However, in the will, the following
stipulations was already included:
“I likewise authorize Santos Matayabas to write and draw up the present will, as I am unable to
do so.
As it is impossible for me to sign the present will with my own hand and in my own writing, by
reason of my advanced age and debility, I authorize and beg Santos Matayabas, who is present,
to do so at my request.”
So then, it appears from this testimony of Arcadio Rivera that when Vicente Elio, in company
with Santos Matayabas and the witnesses, presented himself in the house of Sotera Barrientos
in order that she might execute her will, bringing with him as such the document Exhibit A,
there had already been written in the said document the second of the two paragraphs above
quoted; and that in this second paragraph the statements appears that, as it was impossible for
the lady to sign the will in question with her own hand and in her own writing, on account of
her advanced age and her debility, she authorized and begged Santos Matayabas, who was
present, to do so at her request, or, what amounts to the thing, Rivera's testimony shows that
that particular paragraph, as well as all the first part of the said document, had been written by
Santos Matayabas himself in Vicente Elio's house, that morning, a few moments before their
arrival at the house of Sotera Barrientos.
This clearly indicates that when Vicente Elio prepared the aforementioned will by having it
copied in his house and under his own direction by Santos Matayabas, he was convinced that
Sotera Barrientos could not sign the said document on account of her advanced age and her
debility, and that he already knew the woman's condition, she being almost speechless,
incapable of making herself understood even by means of signs and only able to articulate the
word "Yes;" for that document was written that same morning, a few moments before he
appeared with the witnesses at the house of the sick woman and there tried to have her execute
her will. This fact also conclusively proves that the designation of Santos Matayabas to sign the
said will at the request of the testatrix had been made by Elio before he went with the witnesses
to Sotera Barrientos' house, and that the statement of himself and the witnesses as to what
occured as regards their efforts to obtain from her the designation of a person who should sign
at her request on that occasion, even granting it to be true, was no more than a mere form to
set forth what Elio himself had in view, so as to give to the said document the character of a
will, for he well knew that, by reason of the condition of the patient and her inability to
manifest her wishes, she could not make the designation which was necessary for the purpose
intended by him.
Page 164 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
JABONETA v. GUSTILO
G. R. No. 1641, JANUARY 19, 1906
FACTS:
On the 26th day of December, 1901, Macario Jaboneta executed his will in the residence
of Arcadio Jarandilla. He ordered that the document in question be written, and calling Julio
Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses. They were all together, and were in
the room where Jaboneta was, and were present when he signed the document, Isabelo Jena
signing afterwards as a witness, at his request, and in his presence and in the presence of the
other two witnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena then sighned as a witness in the presence of the testator,
and in the presence of the other two persons who signed as witnesses. At that moment, Isabelo
Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his hat and left the room. As he was leaving the house,
Julio Javellana took the pen in his hand and put himself in a position to sign the will as a
witness, but did not sign in the presence of Isabelo Jena; but nevertheless, after Jena had left the
room the said Julio Javellana signed as witness in the presence of the testator and of the witness
Aniceto Jalbuena.
ISSUE:
Whether the signature of Javellana was signed in the presence of Jena in compliance
with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure
HELD:
Yes. The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand
and pen in the act of affixing his signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the
remaining witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name to the
will, convinced the court that the signature was affixed in the presence of Jena. The fact that he
was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the name of the
witness was being written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses and the testator,
had assembled for the purpose of executing the testament, and were together in the same room
for that purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he was
actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Javellana that he could see
everything which took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction and without any
physical obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the document was
in fact signed before he finally left the room.
The purpose of a statutory requirement that the witness sign in the presence of the
testator is said to be that the testator may have ocular evidence of the identity of the
instrument subscribed by the witness and himself, and the generally accepted tests of presence
are vision and mental apprehension.
Page 165 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
TRINIDAD NEYRA, plaintiff-appellant, versus.

ENCARNACION NEYRA, defendant-appellee.
C.A. No. 8075, March 25, 1946
FACTS:
Sisters Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra had serious misunderstandings in

connection with the properties left by their deceased father. Encarnacion, who had remained
single, and who had no longer any ascendants, executed a will disposing of her properties in
favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" and her other relatives, making
no provision in favor of her only sister of the whole blood, Trinidad Neyra. The Congregation
refused to accept the property, which necessitated the making of another will.
Eventually, the two sisters got reconciled and executed a compromise agreement with
respect to the properties left by their father. Furthermore, in her new will and testament,
Encarnacion named Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries. The other instituted
heirs in the first will claimed that the will was void because Encarnacion did not sign in the
presence of the witnesses.
ISSUE:
Is the will valid?
RULING:
Yes. The court held that the witnesses were present, at the time of the signing and
execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix was lying on
her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw each other at the time of the signing of
the documents, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so;
and the attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this case.
Teodora and her principal witnesses are all interested parties, as they are children of
legatees named in the first will but eliminated from the second will. Their testimony that there
could have been no reconciliation between the two sisters, and that the thumb mark of testator
was affixed to the documents embodying the agreement, while she was sleeping in their
presence; and that her thumb mark was affixed to the will in question, when she was already
dead within their view, is absolutely devoid of any semblance of truth. Said testimony is
contrary to common sense. It violates all sense of proportion.
Page 166 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez
42 P 145
September 14, 1921
FACTS:
In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for probate of the will of one
Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the
capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. Upon the date appointed for
the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who
testified with details not necessary to be here specified that the will was executed with all
necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession
of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated by the person who
wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not
introduced, nor was their absence accounted for by the proponent of the will. When the
proponent rested the attorney for the opposition introduced a single witness whose testimony
tended to show in a vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the testator
was so debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was about. After the cause had been
submitted for determination upon the proof thus presented, the trial judge found that the
testator at the time of the making of the will was of sound mind and disposing memory and that
the will had been properly executed. He accordingly admitted the will to probate.
ISSUE:
1) whether a will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a
single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two
2) whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the
testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the
will instead of the left margin
HELD:
1) When the petition for probate of a will is contested, the proponent should introduce
all three of the attesting witnesses, if alive and within reach of the process of the court; and the
execution of the will cannot be considered sufficiently proved by the testimony of only one,
without satisfactory explanation of the failure to produce the other two.
2) The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution o will and testaments and to guarantee their
truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way
as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the
fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a
will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
Page 167 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and
frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to any
person, as attendant upon the actual deviation from the letter of the law, such deviation must be
considered too trivial to invalidate the instrument.
Page 168 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA

VILLACORTE.
CELSO ICASIANO vs. NATIVIDAD ICASIANO
G.R. No. L-18979
June 30, 1964
FACTS:
Testator Josefa Villacorte died in the City of Manila on September 12, 1958. On June 2,
1956, the she executed a last will and testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs.
Felisa Icasiano at Pedro Guevara Street, Manila, published before and attested by three
instrumental witnesses. The will was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three
instrumental witnesses on the same date before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in
and for the City of Manila.
The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously
with the filing of the petition and marked as Exhibit "A" consists of five pages, and while
signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting
witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to
the amended and supplemental petition and marked as Exhibit "A-1" is signed by the testatrix
and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original,
admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed
that page three (3) was signed in his presence.
ISSUE:
Is the will valid?
HELD:
Yes.
The court held that inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page
of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per
se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not
only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by
its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament
was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally
interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over
whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the
testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate
deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory
requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision
on reconsideration) "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the
attestation clause".
Page 169 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure
oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which
bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the
defect at the time.
Page 170 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
PAZ SAMANIEGO-CELADA VS. LUCIA ABENA

GR. NO. 145545
FACTS:
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celadawas the first cousin of decedent Margarita S.Mayores

(Margarita) while respondent was the decedents lifelong companion since 1929. In1987,
Margarita died single and without any ascending or descending heirs as her parents,
grandparents and siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first cousins Catalina
Samaniego-Bombay, Manuelita Samaniego Sajonia, Feliza Samaniego, and petitioner.
Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament of her real properties in favor
of respondent Margarita also left all her personal properties to respondent whom she likewise
designated as sole executor of her will. Petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration
of the estate of Margarita . Respondent filed a petition for probate of the will of Margarita
before the RTC of Makati.
RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of Margarita probated and
respondent as the executor of the will. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. Petitioner, in
her Memorandum, argues that Margaritas will failed to comply with the formalities required
under Article 805 of the Civil Code because the will was not signed by the testator in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses and in the presence of one another. She also argues that
the signatures of the testator on pages A, B, and C of the will are not the same or similar,
indicating that they were not signed on the same day. She further argues that the will was
procured through undue influence and pressure because at the time of execution of the will,
Margarita was weak, sickly, jobless and entirely dependent upon respondent and her nephews
for support, and these alleged handicaps allegedly affected her freedom and willpower to decide
on her own. Petitioner thus concludes that Margaritas total dependence on respondent and her
nephews compelled her to sign the will. Petitioner likewise argues that the Court of Appeals
should have declared her and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita since they are her only
living collateral relatives in accordance with Articles 1009 and 1010 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the will of testament complied with the formalities required by law.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held the RTC decision. With regard to the contention of the
oppositors [Paz Samaniego-Celada, et al.] that the testator [Margarita Mayores] was not
mentally capable of making a will at the time of the execution thereof, the same is without
merit. The oppositors failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, said allegation and
contradict the presumption that the testator was of sound mind. In fact, witness for the
oppositors, Dr. Ramon Lamberte, who, in some occasions, attended to the testator months
before her death, testified that Margarita Mayores could engage in a normal conversation and
he even stated that the illness of the testator does not warrant hospitalization. Not one of the
oppositors witnesses has mentioned any instance that they observed act/s of the testator
during her lifetime that could be construed as a manifestation of mental incapacity. The
testator may be admitted to be physically weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was
not of sound mind. The testimonies of contestant witnesses are pure aforethought.
Page 171 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Anent the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its
attestation clause states that the will is composed of three (3) pages while in truth and
in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only because the attestation is not a part of the
notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a
part of the will, the court, after examining the totality of the will, is of the considered
opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause
is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject
instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient
safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error must
have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument
consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the doctrine of
liberal interpretation enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads:
In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper

pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of
attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will
invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.
The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors that the signatures of the
testator were affixed on different occasions based on their observation that the signature
on the first page is allegedly different in size, texture and appearance as compared with
the signatures in the succeeding pages. After examination of the signatures, the court
does not share the same observation as the oppositors. The picture shows that the
testator was affixing her signature in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and
the notary. There is no evidence to show that the first signature was procured earlier
than February 2, 1987.
Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue influence was exerted on the testator
to execute the subject will. In fact, the picture reveals that the testator was in a good
mood and smiling with the other witnesses while executing the subject will.
In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally capable of making the will at the
time of its execution, that the notarial will presented to the court is the same notarial
will that was executed and that all the formal requirements in the execution of a will
have been substantially complied with in the subject notarial will.
Page 172 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Fernandez vs. Vergel
G.R. No. L-21151, February 25, 1924
FACTS:
In this case, the validity of the testator‘s will is questioned by the opponents of the will on the
following matters: (a) It was not sufficiently proven that the testator knew the contents of the
will. (b) The testator did not sign all the pages of the will. (c) He did not request anybody to
attest the document as his last will. (d) He did not sign it in the presence of any witness.(e) The
witnesses did not sign it in the presence of the testator, or of each other, nor with knowledge
on the part of the testator that they were signing his will. (f) The witnesses did not sign the
attestation clause before the death of the testator. (g) This clause was written after the
execution of the dispositive part of the will and was attached to the will after the death of the
testator. (h) The signatures of the testator on page 3 of the will are not authentic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with the requirements of law
HELD:
The evidence sufficiently shows that when Attorney Lopez Lizo read the will to the testator,
the latter's mind was perfectly sane and he understood it: that he signed all the pages of the will
proper, although he did not sign the page containing the attestation clause; that while he did
not personally call the witnesses, yet the latter were invited by Attorney Lopez Lizo to act as
such in his presence. The law does not require that the testator precisely be the person to
request the witnesses to attest his will.
It was also sufficiently established in the record that the testator signed the will in the presence
of the three witnesses and that the latter, in turn, signed it in the presence of the testator and of
each other; that the witnesses signed the attestation clause before the death of the testator; that
this clause, with the names of the witnesses in blank, was prepared before the testator signed
the will, and that the sheet containing said clause, just as those of the will proper, and that all
the four sheets of which the will was actually composed were kept together and are the very
ones presented in this case; and finally, that the signatures of the testator on page 3 of said will
are authentic.
As to the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause, it is true that it does not
appeal on the upper part of the sheet, but it does appear in its text. It is provided in the clause
that the will is ―of three sheets actually used, correlatively enumerated, besides this sheet . . .
.” It is clear that such a sheet of the attestation clause is the fourth and that the will, including
said sheet, has four sheets. This description contained in the clause constitutes substantial
compliance with the requirements prescribed by the law regarding the paging. The law does
not require that the sheet containing the attestation clause only, wholly or in part, be numbered
Page 173 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
or paged. Consequently this lack of paging on the attestation sheet does not take anything from
the validity of the will.
The judgment appealed from is reversed, and it is ordered that the lower court proceed with
the probate of the will in accordance with law.
Page 174 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Lopez v. Liboro
G.R. No. L-1787 August 27, 1948
Facts:
Appellant opposes the probate of what purports to be the last will and testament of Don Sixto
Lopez. The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on one side of a
separate sheet. The first sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals. This, the
appellant believes, is a fatal defect.
Issue:
Whether or not the will is invalid because the first sheet is not paged either in letters
nor in Arabic numerals?
Ruling:
No. The will is valid.
The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard against fraud, and to afford
means of preventing the substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its pages.
In the present case, the omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is
supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional numerical
words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal
sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning
and coherence, the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of
the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of
the preceding page. Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption
"TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full
use of his testamentary faculty, — all of which, in the logical order of sequence, precede the
direction for the disposition of the marker's property. Again, as page two contains only the two
lines above mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the testator and the signatures of the
witnesses, the other sheet cannot by any possibility be taken for other than page one.
Page 175 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL
AND TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ RICHARD B. LOPEZ vs. DIANA
JEANNE LOPEZ, MARYBETH DE LEON and VICTORIA L. TUAZON
G.R. No. 189984
November 12, 2012
Facts:
Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez (Lopez), and their
four legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard, Diana, Marybeth and Victoria as
compulsory heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a Last Will and Testament and
constituted Richard as his executor and administrator.
Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and Testament before
the RTC with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed
the petition contending that the purported last will and testament was not executed and
attested as required by law, and that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of Richard. Victoria also adopted the said opposition.
After submitting proofs of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, Richard

presented the attesting witnesses, namely: Reynaldo Maneja; Romulo Monteiro; Ana Maria
Lourdes Manalo (Manalo); and the notary public who notarized the will, Atty. Perfecto Nolasco
(Atty. Nolasco). The instrumental witnesses testified that after the late Enrique read and
signed the will on each and every page, they also read and signed the same in the latter's
presence and of one another. Photographs of the incident were taken and presented during
trial. Manalo further testified that she was the one who prepared the drafts and revisions from
Enrique before the final copy of the will was made.
Likewise, Atty. Nolasco claimed that Enrique had been his client for more than 20 years.
The latter consulted him in the preparation of the subject will and furnished him the list of his
properties for distribution among his children. He prepared the will in accordance with
Enrique's instruction and that before the latter and the attesting witnesses signed it in the
presence of one another, he translated the will, which was written in English to Filipino and
added that Enrique was in good health and of sound mind at that time.
Page 176 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the
Civil Code which requires a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used
upon which the will is written. It held that while Article 809 of the same Code requires mere
substantial compliance of the form laid down in Article 805 thereof, the rule only applies if the
number of pages is reflected somewhere else in the will with no evidence aliunde or extrinsic
evidence required. While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages
including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC
observed that it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such, it disallowed the
will for not having been executed and attested in accordance with law. This was affirmed by the
CA.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision to disallow the probate of will.
Held:
The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles 805 and 809
of the Civil Code provide:
ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last,
on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the
upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and
the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to
write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and
that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
ART. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure
and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used
therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and
attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the
attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the
Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages
including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written" cannot be
deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its
Page 177 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself
but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.
The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the
signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the
will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even
omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total
number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other
must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the
probate proceedings.
Page 178 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Azuela v. CA
G.R. 122880, 12 April 2006
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition with the trial court for the probate of a notarial will purportedly
executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on June 10, 1981 and notarized on the same day. The will
consisted of two (2) pages and was written in Filipino. The attestation clause did not state the
number of pages and it was not signed by the attesting witnesses at the bottom thereof. The
said witnesses affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will though.
Geralda Castillo opposed the petition, claiming that the will was a forgery and that the true
purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in several court cases filed by
oppositor against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry and usurpation of real property, all
centering on petitioner‘s right to occupy the properties of the decedent.3 It also asserted that
contrary to the representations of petitioner, the decedent was actually survived by 12
legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad. She also argued
that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that the
decedent‘s signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not
properly acknowledged.
Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that ―the number of
pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause‖ is merely directory, rather than
mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as ―the substantial compliance rule.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject will is valid.
RULING:
The court held that a will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on
which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the
instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does
not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects
is sufficient to deny probate.
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written
remains a fatal flaw. This requirement aims at safeguarding the will against possible
interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and thus preventing any increase or
decrease in the pages. In this case, however, there could have been no substantial compliance
with the requirements under Art. 805 of the Civil Code since there is no statement in the
attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the
will. The subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental
witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin
Page 179 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause. Art. 805 particularly
segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the
requisite that the will be attested and subscribed by them. The signatures on the left-hand
corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are
signing forms part of the will.
Page 180 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Testate Estate of the late Alipio Abada vs. Alipio Abaja
G.R. No. 147145
January 31, 2005
Facts:
Abada died sometime in May 1940. His widow Paula Toray (Toray) died sometime in
September 1943. Both died without legitimate children. On 13 September 1968, Alipio C. Abaja
(Alipio) filed with the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental) a petition for the
probate of the last will and testament (will) of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his
testamentary heirs his natural children Eulogio Abaja (Eulogio) and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is
the son of Eulogio.
Nicanor Caponong (Caponong) opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no
will when he died in 1940. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really executed it,
should be disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as required
by law; (2) it was not intended as the last will of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue
and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds
invoked by Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz,
Evangeline, Geronimo, Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada (Joel Abada, et al.), and Levi,
Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and Carmela Tronco (Levi Tronco, et al.), also opposed the
petition. The oppositors are the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray.
The RTC admitted to probate the will of Toray. Since the oppositors did not file any
motion for reconsideration, the order allowing the probate of Toray‘s will became final and
executory. Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state expressly
that the testator signed the will and it‘s every page in the presence of three witnesses.
Issue:
Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause
Held:
Yes. The attestation clause of Abadas will reads:
Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y

testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado en
nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del
mismo. Y en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de
nosotros y del testador al pie de este documento y en el margen izquierdo de
todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo, las cuales estan
paginadas correlativamente con las letras UNO y DOS en la parte superior de la
carrilla.
The phrase en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el
mismo which means in the left margin of each and every one of the two pages consisting of the
same shows that the will consists of two pages. The pages are numbered correlatively with the
Page 181 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
letters ONE and TWO as can be gleaned from the phrase las cuales estan paginadas
correlativamente con las letras UNO y DOS.
The English translation of the first sentence reads: Subscribed and professed by the
testator Alipio Abada as his last will and testament in our presence, the testator having also
signed it in our presence on the left margin of each and every one of the pages of the same. The
attestationclause clearly states that Abada signed the will and its every page in the presence of
the witnesses. While the attestation clause did not indicate the number of witnesses, the Court
applied liberal construction in the probate of the will. Abadas will clearly shows four
signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are
three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an
examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde.
Page 182 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Taboada v Rosal
G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982
FACTS:
A petition for probate was filed with the respondent court, the petitioner Apolonio Taboada
attached the alleged last will and testament of the late Dorotea Perez. The will was written in
Cebuano-Visayan dialect and it consisted of two pages. The first page contains the entire
testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone
and at the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page which
contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of the attestation
clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix.
No opposition was filed after the petitioner's compliance with the requirement of publication,
and such the trial court commissioned the branch clerk of court to receive the petitioner's
evidence. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted his evidence and presented one of the
subscribing witnesses to the will, who testified on its genuineness and due execution.
However the trial court, denied the probate of the will of Dorotea Perez for want of a formality
in its execution. In the same order, the petitioner was also required to submit the names of the
intestate heirs with their corresponding addresses so that they could be properly notified and
could intervene in the summary settlement of the estate.
Instead of complying with the order of the court, the petitioner filed a manifestation and/or
motion, ex parte praying for a 30 day period to act upon any step necessary, to resolve the
disallowance of the will. He also asked that the ten-day period required by the court to submit
the names of intestate heirs with their addresses be held in abeyance. Such motions were
denied.
The respondent Judge interprets the provision of law that, for a notarial will to be valid, it is
not enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end" but that the three subscribing witnesses
must also sign at the same place or at the end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one
another because the attesting witnesses to a will attest not merely the will itself but also the
signature of the testator. It is not sufficient compliance to sign the page, where the end of the
will is found, at the left hand margin of that page.
On the other hand, the petitioner maintains that Article 805 of the Civil Code does not make it
a condition precedent or a matter of absolute necessity for the extrinsic validity of the wig that
the signatures of the subscribing witnesses should be specifically located at the end of the wig
after the signature of the testatrix. He contends that it would be absurd that the legislature
intended to place so heavy an import on the space or particular location where the signatures
are to be found as long as this space or particular location wherein the signatures are found is
consistent with good faith and the honest frailties of human nature.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Article 805 of the Civil Code requires that the testatrix and all three
instrumental witnesses sign at the end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one
another?
HELD:
YES.
Page 183 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Article 805 of the Civil Code provides:

Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof
by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page
thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused
some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the lacier witnesses and signed the will and the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be

interpreted to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
Undoubtedly, Article 805 of the Civil Code states that the will must be subscribed or signed at
its end by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by another person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed Attestation consists in
witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those
things are, done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of
the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses'
names upon the same paper for the purpose of Identification of such paper as the will which was
executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill, 269 SW 2d 911). Insofar as the requirement of
subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this case was subscribed in a
manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification.
The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will
attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution
of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the
usual forms should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed.
(Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444, 449).
The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case
when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all
the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was properly Identified by
subscribing witness one of the instrumental witness to be the same will executed by the
testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order.
Page 184 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental,
ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HERMINIO MARAVILLA,
respondent.
G.R. No. L-18799, March 31, 1964
BARRERA, J.:
FACTS: Respondent Herminio Maravilla filed a petition for probate of the will of his deceased
wife Digna Maravilla. In the will the surviving spouse was named as the universal heir and
executor. Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla filed an opposition to the probate of the will,
on the ground that the will was not signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the
attesting witnesses and of one another.
Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for appointment of
Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator to protect their interests, on the ground that the will,
having been denied probate, they are the legal heirs of the decedent. They also filed with the
court a petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator, as he failed to file an
inventory within 3 months from his appointment and qualification as special administrator, as
provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court. To this petition, respondent filed an
opposition, on the ground that said provision of the Rules of Court does not apply to a special
administrator, and an inventory had already been submitted by him, before said petition for his
removal was filed.
Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul the
order appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator, and to prohibit the probate court
from further proceeding with the petition for the removal of respondent as special
administrator. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writs (certiorari and
prohibition) prayed for by respondent, and declaring null and void the appointment of Eliezar
Lopez as special co-administrator.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue
the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent, the same not being in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction is correct
Page 185 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
RULING: We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from,
assumed jurisdiction over the present case on the theory that "the amount in controversy
relative to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator to protect the interests
of respondents (herein petitioners) is only P90,000.00 more or less, i.e., one fourth of the
conjugal property" (of respondent and the deceased Digna Maravilla) which, is per inventory
submitted by respondent as special administrator is valued at P362,424.90. This theory is
untenable. The Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over said testate proceedings
cannot be doubted, considering that the properties therein involved are valued at P362,424,90,
as per inventory of the special administrator.
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated
in testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal
estate pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has already
held that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the
death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. In a number of cases
where appeal was taken from an order of a probate court disallowing a will, this Court, in effect,
recognized that the amount or value involved or in controversy therein is that of the entire.
Not having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings in probate, considering that the amount
involved therein is more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also have original
jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in the
instant case, which are merely incidental thereto.
Page 186 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Vda de Ramos vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-40804, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 393
FACTS
The late Eugenia Danila left a will wherein she instituted among others Adelaida Nista as one
of the instituted heirs. Nista petitioned before the court to admit the will to probate. The
petition was opposed by Buenaventura Guerra and Marcelina Guerra. The two oppositors
claimed that they were the legally adopted children of Danila; that the said will sought to be
probated by Nista was obtained through fraud.
The two parties talked and they came up with a compromise agreement which essentially
stated that Nista is admitting the invalidity of the will. The compromise agreement was
approved by the trial court BUT Rosario de Ramos et al – the other instituted heirs and
devisees – intervened. The trial court allowed the intervention and set aside the compromise
agreement. Rosario de Ramos et al alleged that the Guerras repudiated their shares when they
abandoned Danila and committed acts of ingratitude against her.
Eventually, the probate court admitted the will to probate. The decision was appealed by the
Guerras. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the probate court. The CA ruled that
there was a failure to prove that Danila was in the presence of the instrumental witnesses when
she signed the will – this was because two of the instrumental witnesses (Sarmiento and Paz)
testified in court that the will was already signed by Danila when they affixed their signatures.
HOWEVER, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas, the Notary Public before whom the will was executed
and who assisted in the execution, vehemently assailed the testimony of the two witnesses. He
affirmed Danila and the three instrumental witnesses were in each other’s presence when the
will was signed by them. Another lawyer, who was also present during the execution of the
will, corroborated the testimony of Atty. Barcenas.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in not allowing the will to probate.
Page 187 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
HELD
No. The attestation clause was signed by the instrumental witnesses. This serves as their
admissions of the due execution of the will and thus preventing them from prevaricating later
on by testifying against the will’s due execution.
The execution of the same was evidently supervised by Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and before
whom the deeds were also acknowledged. The solemnity surrounding the execution of a will is
attended by some intricacies not usually within the comprehension of an ordinary layman. The
object is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and
testament, and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. There is a presumption in the
regularity of the performance of a lawyer with his duty as a notary public. There has been no
evidence to show that Barcenas has been remiss in his duty nor were there any allegations of
fraud against him. In fact, the authenticity of Danila’s and the witnesses’ signature was never
questioned.
The attestation clauses, far from being deficient, were properly signed by the attesting
witnesses. Neither is it disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil
in the presence of each other and the testatrix. Both instruments were duly acknowledged
before a Notary Public who was all the time present during the execution.
Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know, saw, heard or did; they
may be biased and, therefore, tell only half-truths to mislead the court or favor one party to the
prejudice of the others. As a rule, if any or all of the subscribing witnesses testify against the
due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful
credibility, the will may, nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of
other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in
the manner required by law.
In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent
attorney, who has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the
instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to
participate in the act, supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should induce the
Page 188 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney being conversant of the
instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details, and he is more likely than other persons
to retain those incidents in his memory.
Page 189 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
In re will of Maria Roque y Paraiso, deceased.

CEFERINO ALDABA,
vs.
LUDOVICO ROQUE
G.R. No. L-17304
May 22, 1922
Facts:
Maria Roque y Paraiso, executed her last will and testament in the Tagalog dialect with
the help of Vicente Platon and in the presence of three witnesses who signed the attestation
clause and each of the four pages of the testament. Maria Roque died on December 3, 1919, and
when her will was filed in court for probate, it was contested by Ludovico Roque on the ground
that it had not been prepared nor executed in conformity with the requirements and solemnities
prescribed by law.
After due proceedings had been had, the Court of First Instance pronounced the testament in
question valid, and ordered its probate, appointing Ceferino Aldaba as the administrator of the
estate. Ludovico Roque appealed and contended that each of the folios of the said testament is
not paged correlatively in letters "one." "two," "three," etc., but only with the letters A, B, C,
etc. and that the said will lacks the attestation clause required by law.
Issue:
Whether or not Notarial will was valid.
Ruling:
The attestation clause provides as follows:
This document expresses my last and spontaneous will, and is my last will and
testament, which was drawn by the lawyer, Don Vicente Platon, at my direction, and
everything contained in this testament has been ordained and directed by me to said Vicente
Platon in order that it might be embodied in this testament, and after this testament has been
drawn up, I directed him to read it so that I might hear all its contents, and I have heard and
understood all the contents of this document which is my last will, wherefore, and not knowing
how to write, I have requested Don Vicente Platon to write and sign my name in my stead
hereon; I declare that this testament is composed of four sheets, actually used, that the sheets
are paged with the letter A, B, C, and d, and above my name I have placed the thumb mark of
my right hand in the presence of the subscribing witnesses, and that all the witnesses have
signed in my presence and of each other here at Malolos, Bulacan, this 9th day of the month of
July, 1918; and I also declare that at my request Don Vicente Platon has written my name on
the left margin of all pages of this testament, in the presence of the witnesses, and all the
witnesses have also signed all the pages of this testament on the left margin in my presence and
that of each other.
Page 190 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Page 191 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
BELLA A. GUERRERO v. RESURRECCION A. GUERRERO

G.R. No. 174144
17 April 2007
FACTS:
Felisa Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion
Guerrero, died at the Metropolitan Hospital in Tondo Manila. Petitioner filed a petition for the
probate of the last will and testament of Felisa. However, respondent opposed the petition on
the ground that the will did not comply with the requirements on acknowledgement. It was
alleged that the will of Felisa was “acknowledged” by the testator and the witnesses in the
testator’s residence in Quezon City before Atty. Macario Directo who was commissioned
notary public for and in Caloocan City. Petitioner admitted such averment but insisted that
such fact alone did not affect the validity of the notarial will.
ISSUE: Did the will “acknowledged by the testator and instrumental witnesses before a notary
public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of
the Civil Code?
HELD:
No. One of the formalities required by law in the execution of a notarial will is that it must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. It is one of the
indispensable requisites on the validity of a will. In other words, a notarial will that is not
acknowledged before a notary public cannot be accepted for probate.
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer and declaring it to be his act or deed. In the case of a notarial will, that competent officer
is the notary public.
A notary public’s commission is the grant of authority in his favor to perform notarial acts. It is
issued “within and for” a particular territorial jurisdiction and the notary public’s authority is
co-extensive with it. Outside the place of his commission, he is bereft of power to perform any
notarial act; he is not notary public. Any notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction is void
and has no force and effect.
Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City, he lacked
authority to take the acknowledgement of the testator and the witnesses. Therefore, the
testator and her witnesses could not have validly acknowledged the will before him. Thus,
Felisa’s last will and testament was, in effect, not acknowledged as required by law. Ineluctably,
the acts of the testator, her witnesses and Atty. Directo were all completely void.
Page 192 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Lee v. Tambago
A.C. No. 5281

February 2008
Facts:
Complainant Manuel Lee charged respondent Atty. ReginoTambago with violation of the
notarial law and the ethics of the legal profession for notarising a spurious last will and
testament.Complainant averred that his father, Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested
will. The signature of the two witnesses in the will are claimed to be spurious. In the said will,
the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife, save for a parcel of land which
he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half siblings of the complainant. Complainant
claimed that while the will was executed and acknowledged on June 30, 1965, the decedent’s
residence certificate noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.
Complainant also point out the absence of notation of the residence certificate of the two
witnesses in the will. Respondent answered that the complaint contain false allegations. He
claimed that the will and testament was validly executed and actually notarized by him as per
affidavit of Gloria Nebato, common law wife of the decedent, and corroborated by the joint
affidavit of the children of the decedent.
The RTC referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation. The
investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of the old notarial law. Also,
the violation constituted an infringement of legal ethics of the CPR. The commissioner
recommended the suspension of the respondent for a period of 3 months. The IIBP Board of
Governors, in its resolution, adopted and approved with modifications the recommendation of
the commissioner. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year and his
notarial commission was revoked and disqualified from reappointment as notary public for 2
years.
Issue:
Whether or not the will is valid.
Ruling:
The will is invalid.
The will was attested by only 2 witnesses and therefore it is considered void. A notarial will is
required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it
should be attested and subscribed by 3 or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
Page 193 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and
authenticity.
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witnesses. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in
going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. An
acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testator’s wishes
long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he
intends it to be done. The acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this requirement
was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. There was an absence of a notation of the
residence certificate of the notarial witnesses in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of
the testator’s old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the
law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by the law render the entire will invalid.
Respondent was suspended to practice law for a period of 1 year and his notarial commission is
revoked and he was perpetually disqualified from reappointment as a notary public.
Page 194 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
AGAPITA N. CRUZ vs. HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of

Branch I, Court of First Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY
G.R. No. L-32213 November 26, 1973
Facts
Petitioner-appellant Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving spouse of the late Valente Z. Cruz
opposed the allowance of the will (Exhibit "E"), alleging the will was executed through fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute without the
testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he
was disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance
with law.
Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr. is at the same
time the Notary Public before whom the will has been acknowledged. As the third witness is
the notary public himself, petitioner argues that the result is that only two witnesses appeared
before the notary public to acknowledge the will. On the other hand, Manuel B. Lugay, who is
the supposed executor of the will, following the reasoning of the trial court, maintains that
there is substantial compliance with the legal requirement of having at least three attesting
witnesses even if the notary public acted as one of them.
The Court allowed the probate of the said last will and testament.
Issue
Is the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz executed in accordance with
law, particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code, the first requiring at least three
credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator and
the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public?
Held
The last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance with law.
The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the
third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the
will. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow
assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he
cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his
participation in the making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be
sanctioning a sheer absurdity. He the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also
acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805 of the Civil Code.
Page 195 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Garcia v. Vasquez
GR No. L-25515, L-26884, L-27200; 32 SCRA 490
April 30, 1970
Facts
Gliceria died unmarried, without descendants, ascendants, brother or sister and leaving real
properties. Her niece Consuelo petitioned an alleged 1960 last will and testament of Gliceria for
probate. The witnesses of the 1960 will testified that Gliceria herself read the will silently
during the execution. This was opposed by several relatives of Gliceria and legatees under her
1950 will stating that the 1960 will should not have been admitted to probate since during the
time it was executed, Gliceria has poor eyesight and could not have read the provisions of the
will, contrary to the testimonies of the witnesses. Dr. Tamesis who is the ophthalmologist of
Gliceria attested to the eyesight condition of Gliceria saying that from 1960 to 1963, the vision
of Gliceria remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading print.
Issue
Should the 1960 will which was executed by Gliceria who was practically blind then be
admitted to probate?
Held
No.
Article 808 of the Civil Code provides that if the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him
twice; once by one of the subscribing witnesses and again by the notary public before whom the
will is acknowledged. This is for the purpose of insuring that the dispositions of the will are
properly communicated to and understood by the handicapped testator.
In this case, it was proved that Gliceria could not have read the 1960 will and that there was no
evidence that the will was read to her twice by any of the witnesses and the notary public.
Failure to comply with the requisites laid down in Article 808 of the Civil Code, the 1960 will
should not have been admitted to probate.
Page 196 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Alvarado v. Gaviola
GR. No. 74695,
September 14, 1993
FACTS:
The decedent, Brigido Alvarado, executed a notarial will entitled “Huling Habilin”
which contained provisions that disinherited the petitioner, his illegitimate son, and revoked a
previously executed holographic will. The execution of the notarial will was attended by three
instrumental witnesses, the notary public, and by private respondent, Bayani Ma. Rino, the
decedent’s lawyer. The final draft of the will was not read by the testator but instead was read
aloud by private respondent in the presence of the testator, the notary public, and the three
instrumental witnesses. Thereafter, the testator executed a codicil entitled “Kasulatan ng
Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na may Petsa Nobiembre 5,
1977 ni Brigido Alvarado” which amended some of the provisions of the will entitled “Huling
Habilin” in order to raise some money for his glaucoma operation, the other provisions of the
will however remained unchanged, specifically that of the disinheritance. Likewise, the codicil’s
final draft was not read personally by the testator but was read by the private respondent in his
presence and that of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. A petition for
probate of the notarial will and codicil was opposed by petitioner stating that the decedent was
already blind due to the glaucoma and that the reading of the respondent of the will and the
codicil was not that of the reading required by Article 808 of the New Civil Code which
provides that the will shall be read twice; once, by one of the instrumental witnesses and, again,
by the notary public before whom the will was acknowledged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reading of the will is in compliance with the reading provided by
Article 808 of the New Civil Code in cases where the testator is blind
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that there was substantial compliance with the provisions of
Article 808 when respondent read the will and the codicil in the presence of the testator, notary
public, and the three instrumental witnesses. Substantial compliance is acceptable where the
purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but
are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. It was
also shown that prior to the reading made by the respondent, the contents of the will and the
codicil were made known to the testator and attested to by the testator himself.
Page 197 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
GONZALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
90 SCRA 183
Facts: Petitioner Rizalina and Lutgarda, respondent are the nieces of the deceased Isabel
Gabriel who died a widow. A will was thereafter submitted to probate. The said will was
typewritten, in Tagalog and appeared to have been executed two months prior to the death of
Isabel. It consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and acknowledgment, with the
signature of testatrix on page 4 and the left margin of all the pages. Lutgarda was named as the
universal heir and executor. The petitioner opposed the probate. The court denied the probate
on the ground that the will was not executed and attested in accordance with law on the issue
of the competency and credibility of the witnesses.
Issue: Whether the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the validity of a will
Held: No. The law requires only that witnesses posses the qualifications under Art. 820 (NCC)
and none of the disqualifications of Art. 802. There is no requirement that they are of good
standing or reputation in the community, for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order
that his testimony is believed and accepted in court. For the testimony to be credible, it is not
mandatory that evidence be established on record that the witnesses have good standing in the
community. Competency is distinguished from credibility, the former being determined by Art.
820 while the latter does not require evidence of such good standing. Credibility depends on
the convincing weight of his testimony in court.
Page 198 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA.
DE MOLO vs. LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
Facts: Marcos Molo executed two Wills, one in August 17, 1918 and another in June 20, 1939.
The 1939 will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will he made in
August 17, 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein
petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.
In 1941, Juana filed a petition for the probate of the June 20, 1939 will. It was admitted to
probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the Juana failed to prove its due execution
because Juana failed to present the original copy of the will. Only the duplicate copy was
presented.
As a result, Juana filed another petition for the probate but this time of the August 17, 1918
will. The oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They
contended that despite the disallowance to probate of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is still
valid and thus it effectively nullified the 1918 will.
Issue: Whether or not the August 17, 1918 will is still valid despite the revocation in the
subsequent disallowed 1939 will.
Ruling: Yes. The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent
will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it
was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous
will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.
The 1918 will can still be probated under the Principle of Dependent Relative Revocation. The
doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended
to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the
old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.
In this case, there was no valid revocation. No evidence was shown that the testator
deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause
contained in the will executed in 1939.
Page 199 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
LABRADOR vs. CA
G.R. Nos. 83843-44, April 5, 1990
FACTS:
Melecio Labrador died on June 10,1972 and leaving behind a parcel of land designated
as Lot No. 1916 and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio,
Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will. The will
instituted Sagrado, Enrica and Cristobal as the owner of the property. The will was
subsequently filed for probate on July 28, 1975.
On September 30, 1975, Jesus and Gaudencio filed an opposition on the ground that the
will has been extinguished or revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on September
30, 1971, that is, before Melecio's death, for the consideration of Six Thousand Pesos, testator
Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale to Jesus and Gaudencio. Earlier however, in 1973,
Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five Thousand Pesos.
The trial court rendered a joint decision allowing the probate of the holographic will
and declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute sale. Respondents appealed the joint decision
to the Court of Appeals, which modified said joint decision of the court a quo by denying the
allowance of the probate of the will for being undated. The CA reasoned that the date indicated
in the wordings of the will is not in its usual place.
ISSUE:
Is the holographic will dated?
HELD:
Yes. The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance
with Article 810. To quote the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will, viz:
“And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the
partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said
fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year
1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be
followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than
MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.”
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the
will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of
the testator. These requirements are present in the subject will.
Page 200 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
In Re Estate of Calderon v. Eugenio

G.R. No. L-7856, December 26, 1913
FACTS:
The deceased was a Filipino citizen resident of the City of Manila where he owned real
properties assessed at P188,017.81. He traveled abroad for his health and temporarily resided in
France. Not feeling very well, but in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, he decided to
make his last will and testament on April 14, 1930, in Paris, France, with the assistance of
attorneys F. de Roussy de Sales, Gething C. Miller and Henri Gadd.
On July 15, 1930, he died in Switzerland. The herein petitioner-appellee, Francisco

Carmelo Varela, filed a petition praying that said will be admitted to probate. Said petition was
opposed by the deceased's brother Jose Miguel, Angel, Jesus, Trinidad, Paula, Pilar and Maria,
surnamed Varela Calderon, although, later on, the first mentioned opponent withdrew his
opposition giving as his reason therefor that it was out of respect for the testator's wishes
because the will was executed in his own handwriting.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the last will and testament of the deceased Francisco Varela Calderon,
was a valid holographic will made and executed, in accordance with the laws of the French
Republic.
RULING:
The original will was executed in the French language and had been written, dated and
signed by the testator with his own hand, with the exception of the attestation clause which
appears at the bottom of the document. This fact is proved by the testimony of the appellee and
his other witnesses, including the depositions, and is admitted by the appellants.
The petition for the allowance and probate of said will is based on the provisions of
article 970 of the French Civil Code which considers as a holographic will that which is made
or executed, dated and signed by the testator in his own handwriting without the necessity of
any other formality, and on section 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure in force in this
jurisdiction which provides that a will made out of the Philippine Islands in accordance with the
Page 201 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
laws in force in the country in which it was made and which may be allowed and admitted to
probate therein, may, also be proved, allowed and recorded in the Philippine Islands in the same
manner and with the same effect as if executed in the latter country. As we have already said, it
is an admitted fact that the will was written, dated and signed by the deceased testator, for
which reason, there is no doubt that it had been made and executed in accordance with article
970 of the French Civil Code were it not for the attestation clause which appears at the bottom
of the document.
The appellants contend that the addition of said of clause has entirely vitiated the will,
because it ceased to be a holographic will, neither does it possess the requisites of a public or
open will in accordance with the French law. The court which originally took cognizance of the
case decided that such circumstance does not invalidate the will.
The Supreme Court concurs in said opinion and hold that a clause drawn up in such
manner is superfluous and does not affect in any way the essential requisites prescribed for
holographic wills by the French law, and, consequently, it has not invalidated the will nor
deprived it of its holographic character. In reaching this conclusion, we base our opinion not
only on the clear and conclusive provisions of article 970 of the French Civil Code and on the
decisions of the French Court of Appeals cited in the appelee's brief, but principally on the fact
established in the depositions made by practicing attorneys F. de Roussy de Sales, Gething C.
Miller and Henri Gadd of Paris, France, who emphatically declared that the will in question did
not lose its holographic character by the addition of the aforementioned attestation clause and
that it may be allowed to probate in conformity with the French laws under which it had been
made and executed.
For the foregoing reasons we reverse the order of December 6, 1911, and declare that
Petronila Eugenio, Filomena Calderon, Encarnacion Gutierrez Calderon, Potenciana de la
Cruz, Basilisa Salteras, Candida Reyes, Benita Garcia, Maria Calderon, and Josefa Calderon are
entitled to receive pro rata the sale value of the property situated at No. 173, formerly No. 29,
Calle Anloague, now Juan Luna.
Page 202 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Rosa Kalaw vs. Hon. Judge Benjamin Relova and Gregorio Kalaw
G.R. No. L-40207
September 28, 1984
Facts:
Gregorio filed a probate of the holographic will of his sister, Natividad, claiming to be her sole
heir. Rosa opposed the petition as she was written as the sole heir of her sister in her sister's
first will. The probate court denied the probate of the will. The motion for reconsideration of
Gregorio was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not Natividad's will is valid.
Held:
No. The holographic will had only one substantial provision which was altered by substituting
the name of the original heir with the name of another which was not authenticated by the full
signature of the testator. The effect is that the entire will should be voided or revoked for the
simple reason that nothing remains in the will that is valid. Insertions, cancellations, erasures,
or alterations in a holographic will must not affect the essence and validity of the will itself
which is not the case herein.
Page 203 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO v. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND

CLEMENTE SAND
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
FACTS:
The instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand,
who died on November 25, 1982. Petitioners instituted a special proceeding for allowance of
decedent's holographic will and alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and
disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence. Private respondent opposed
the petition on the grounds that the will contained alterations and corrections which were not
duly signed by decedent. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the
disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed
that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole
owner.
The Court of Appeals found that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814
of the New Civil Code. It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned
and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and
cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
ISSUES:
Whether or not said will was executed in accordance with formalities prescribed in law
RULING:
Yes. The will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed in law. In the
case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally
autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New
Civil Code.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the
validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator
fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be
effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void, but at most only
as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on

the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the
will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that he requirements of authentication of changes and signing

and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Article 813 and 814) separate from that which
provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810).
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the
requirements of Article 810 of the NCC – and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 – are
essential to the probate of a holographic will.
Page 204 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Article 839 of the Civil Code enumerate the
grounds for disallowance of wills. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to
disallow a will.
In a petition to admit a holographic will, the only issues to be resolved are:
1. whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent’s last will and testament;
2. whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law;
3. whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was
executed; and
4. whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the
decedent.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud; accordingly, laws on this subject should be interpreted to attain
these primordial ends.
In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they
be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself. Failure to strictly observe other
formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionable
handwritten by the testator.
Anent the second issue, No. Decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will
that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand. Thus, as correctly
held by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares
with her father's other heirs.
Page 205 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY vs. EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY

312 S 333
August 12, 1999
FACTS:
Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas were the devisees and legatees of
the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal. They filed a petition for
probate of the said will which was allegedly executed on 30 August 1978.
Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was
a forgery. They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on the will after every
disposition, calling the same out of the ordinary. According to them, a third hand of an
interested party other than the true hand of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal executed the
holographic will.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on the will after every
disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will, and was
not forced, the dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as
regularly done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the
handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on
the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery.
Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence. They also
filed for a demurrer to evidence which was granted by the lower court. It was reversed on
appeal with the Court of Appeals which granted the probate.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses
explicitly declare the signature in a contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is
mandatory
2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the
deceased’s holographic will.
HELD:
1. YES. The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall”, when
used in a statute, is mandatory.
In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the
deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for
their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
Page 206 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the
deceased. An exhaustive and objective consideration of the evidence is imperative to establish
the true intent of the testator.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly that
they were familiar with the handwriting of the testator.
In the case of Augusto Neri, clerk of court, Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he
merely identified the record of Special Proceedings No. 427 before said court. He was not
presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic was that of the
deceased.
We cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the
testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to
declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the
respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms.
Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before
the death of the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the
deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only
chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of
petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the
deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former
lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the
holographic will.
2. NO. The court is not certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the
deceased.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when
compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some
of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the
will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, and the signatures in
several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980,
and a letter dated June 16, 1978, the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous
flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the
holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the
handwriting by the deceased.
Page 207 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support of their
opposition.
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE: EXTRINSIC VALIDITY
Jose Rivera v. IAC and Adelaido Rivera

G.R. Nos. 75005-06, February 15, 1990
FACTS:
A prominent and wealthy resident of Mabalacat, Pampanga, named Venancio Rivera, died on
May 30, 1975. Petitioner Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the
deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio‘s estate.
However, this was opposed by respondent Adelaido Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of
the decedent. Adelaido also contended that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but
has left two holographic wills, which were subjected to probate by the respondent. The trial
court found that Jose was not the son of the decedent but of a different Venancio Rivera. The
decision was affirmed by the IAC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not presentation of three witnesses is required.
HELD:
No, the presentation of three witnesses is not required because in the first place the authenticity
of the wills had not been questioned, and as such, it only requires that at least one witness has
to be presented. In this case, the Supreme Court sustained the ruling of the trial court that Jose
Rivera did not have legal personality to assail the authenticity of the will because he was not a
son of the decedent Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question. The testimony of Zenaida
and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by
their father, was sufficient.
Page 208 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
PROBATE OF WILLS
Jose Rivera vs. Intermediate Court of Appeals

G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990
FACTS:
Venancio Rivera died. Jose, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son filed a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio‘s estate. Adelaido opposed claiming that
Venancio is his father and that Venancio left two holographic wills. Adelaido then filed a
petition for the probate of the two holographic wills. Jose opposed. The two cases were then
consolidated. The trial court then rendered judgment in favor of Adelaido and also admitted
the will for probate. The trial court found them valid because it found them to have been
written, dated and signed by the testator himself. It also held that there was no necessity of
presenting the three witnesses required under Art 811 because the authenticity of the wills had
not been questioned.
On appeal, the trial court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was need for the presentation of the three witnesses required under Art
811 of the Civil Code
HELD:
The existence and the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by Jose. In both
proceedings, Jose opposed the holographic wills presented by Adelaido and claimed that they
were spurious. Consequently, it may be argued that the respondent court should have applied
Art 811.
The flaw in this argument is that Jose is not the son of the deceased, whose estate is in
question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his
opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony
of Zenaida and Venancio Jr was sufficient. An opposition made by a stranger did not have the
legal effect of requiring the three witnesses.
Page 209 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased. FAUSTO E.

GAN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ILDEFONSO YAP, oppositor-appellee.
G.R. No. L-12190 August 30, 1958
FACTS:
Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan,
and in the City of Manila. Fausto E. Gan initiated a petition for the probate of a holographic
will allegedly executed by the deceased. Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso
Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her
lifetime.
The will itself was not presented. Gan tried to establish its contents and due execution
by the statements in open court of Felina Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and
Rosario Gan Jimenez.
ISSUE:
May holographic be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen
it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?
HELD:
No. Unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence
when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only
guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the
subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will
entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing
witnesses are available to authenticate.
The will having been lost — the forger may have purposely destroyed it in an
"accident" — the oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the error, because the
document itself is not at hand. And considering that the holographic will may consist of two or
three pages, and only one of them need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which
may be the most important ones, may go undetected.
Thus, the Court reached the conclusion that the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have
seen and/or read such will.
Page 210 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
RODELAS vs. ARANZA
G.R. No. L-58509
December 7, 1982
FACTS:
The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo Bonilla
in 1977. The petition was opposed by the appellee’s on the ground that the deceased did not
leave any will, holographic or otherwise.
The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the original will
was lost, a photo static copy cannot stand in the place of the original.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a photocopy
HELD:
A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because the authenticity
of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court with the standard
writings of the testator. A photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be
allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator and using
the provision of Art. 881, if uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no
witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying
witnesses are required. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any,
whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before
the probate court. Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic
will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be
determined by the probate court.
Page 211 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO vs. LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO
G.R. No. L-2538
September 21, 1951
FACTS:
Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay,
province of Rizal, without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line. He
was survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his
nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo,
who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator.
The testator executed 2 wills, one in 1918 and another in 1939. The latter will
contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. Only a carbon copy of
the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 will. It was
admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its
due execution.
As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this
time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will.
They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid
and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocatory clause in the 1939 will
which was disallowed for probate.
HELD:
Yes. The court rules that a subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous
will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law
cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause
is void.
There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator
deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause
contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle
of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will
or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for
some reason.
Even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator could be
presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have
the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the
mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would be given due effect.
The theory on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die
intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two different
Page 212 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
occasions and instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to
his intention of dying testate.
SAMSON VS. NAVAL

G.R. No. L-11823
February 11, 1918
FACTS:
On September 20, 1915, attorney Perfecto Gabriel presented in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila for allowance as the will of Simeona F. Naval, a document executed by her
of February 13, 1915, and in which he was appointed executor. It was denied on the ground
that said document was not duly executed by the deceased as her last will and testament,
inasmuch as she did not sign it in the presence of three witness and the two witnesses did not
sign it in the presence of each other. Thereafter the nieces and legatees of the same deceased
filed in the same court for allowance as her will, another document executed by her on October
31, 1914. The petition for allowance was opposed by Monica Naval, Rosa Naval, and Cristina
Naval on the ground that the will, the allowance of which is asked, could not be allowed,
because of the existence of another will of subsequent date, executed during her lifetime by
the same Simeona F. Naval, and because said will has been revoked by another executed
subsequently by her during her lifetime, and further, because sail will has not been executed
with the formalities required by existing laws.
ISSUE:
Whether the February 13, 1915 will revoked the October 31, 1914 will?
HELD:
No. In the case at bar, the document, executed by the deceased, Simeona F. Naval, as her last
will and testament, dated February 13, 1915, has been presented for allowance; it validity has
been proved by means of said procedure in the Court of Probate of Manila, and that court
denied its allowance, on the ground that the document in question had not been duly executed
by the deceased, as her last will and testament, because she did not sign in the presence of
three witnesses, and two of these witnesses did not sign in the presence of each other, or what
is the same thing, that said document has not be attested and subscribed in the manner
established by law for the execution of will, or, in other words, as provided by law in case of
wills, as stated by section 623 of said procedural law, and this resolution was acquiesced in, as
already stated, by the respondents in this case, and is, therefore, final and executory.
In conclusions, the doctrine laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
The syllabus of said decision says:
When a will revoking a former will is in existence, it must be established in the Probate Court;
but when it has been lost or destroyed, and its contents cannot be sufficiently proved to admit it
to probate, it may nevertheless be availed of as a revocation in opposition to the probate of the
will revoked by it.:
Page 213 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
And in the body of the decision there is a declaration, to which the appellant must have desired
to refer in her brief, which declaration says:
If it can be proved that a later will was duly executed, attested and subscribed, and that it
contained a clause expressly revoking all former wills, but evidence of the rest of its contents
cannot be obtained, it is nevertheless a good revocation; and it can be made available only by
allowing it to be set up in opposition to the probate of the earlier will,. . .
invoked by the appellant, Monica Naval, is in conformity with the provision of said section 623
of our procedural law and article 739 of the Civil Code, and the will executed by the deceased
Simeona F. Naval on October 31, 1914, not having been revoked, according to these provisions,
by the will presented and alleged as executed by the same deceased subsequently on February
13, 1915, the allowance of which was denied by the Court of First Instance of Manila, the
court below was not in error in ordering the allowance of said will, that is, of that of October
31, 1914, as the last will and testament of said deceased.
Page 214 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Gago vs. Mamuyac
G.R. No. L-26317, January 29, 1927
FACTS:
Miguel Mamuyac died on the 2nd day of January, 1922, in the municipality of Agoo of the
Province of La Union. It appears from the record that on or about the 27th day of July, 1918, he
executed a last will and testament. On January, 1922, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the
probate of that will. The probate was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa,
Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac. The petition for the probate of said will was denied
on the ground that the deceased had on the 16th day of April, 1919, executed a new will and
testament.
On February 21, 1925, an action was commenced to secure the probate of the 1919 will. The
oppositors alleged (a) that the said will is a copy of the second will and testament executed by
Miguel Mamuyac, (b) that the same had been cancelled and revoked during the Mamuyac‘s
lifetime and (c) that the said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased. The judge
denied the probate of said will on the ground that the same had been cancelled and revoked in
the year 1920.
The appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in not finding from the
evidence that the will in question had been executed with all the formalities required by the
law; that the same had been revoked and cancelled in 1920 before his death; that the said will
was a mere carbon copy and that the oppositors were not estopped from alleging that fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will in question was revoked by the testator.
HELD:
YES. There is positive proof, not denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that the will
in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation
or cancellation of a will to be preserved. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken
place must either remain unproved or be inferred from evidence showing that after due search
the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in
the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other
competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises
where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his
death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without
the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or
revocation by the testator is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was
not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
In view of the facts that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the
testator and the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, the Court concludes that the
Page 215 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a
proceeding to probate a will, the burden of proof is upon the proponent clearly to establish not
only its execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden
is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked.
Page 216 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Unson v. Abella
G.R. No. 17857
June 12, 1922
Facts:
Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella executed her last will and testament with an attached inventory
of her properties, Exhibits A and A-1, in the presence of three witnesses, who signed with her
all the pages of said documents. After Doña Josefa’s death, appellant opposed the application for
the probate of the will because the paging of the inventory, Exhibit A-1, is made in Arabic
numerals and not in letters.
Issue:
Whether or not the will is invalid because it was paged in Arabic numerals instead of in
letters?
Ruling:
No. The will is valid.
As held in Aldaba v. Roque, it might be said that the object of the law in requiring that the
paging be made in letters is to make falsification more difficult, but it should be noted that since
all the pages of the testament are signed at the margin by the testatrix and the witnesses, the
difficulty of forging the signatures in either case remains the same. In other words the more or
less degree of facility to imitate the writing of the letters A, B, C, etc., does not make for the
easiness to forge the signatures.
As in the present case there exists the guaranty of the authenticity of the testament, consisting
in the signatures on the left margins of the testament and the paging thereof as declared in the
attestation clause.
Page 217 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
TRILLANA, administrator-appellee, vs. CONSORCIA P. CRISOSTOMO, ET ALS,

petitioners-appellants.
G.R. No. L-3378
August 22, 1951
FACTS:
Damasa Crisostomo executed a will on August 16, 1948. However, she executed
another will on October 19, 1948 revoking the former will. The appellants contend that the
lower court erred in denying their petition for relief from the judgment of January 5, 1949,
admitting to probate the will of October 19, 1948. They submit to the Court three
propositions, to wit: (a) "The judgment of January 5, was obtained through fraud;" (b) "The
lower court failed to perform its legal duty to set a date for proving the will of August 16,
1948;" and (c) "The failure to set aside a date for proving the will of August 16 jointly with the
will of October 19 was entirely due to the lower court's fault or negligence."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the revoked will of August 16, 1948 should be included in probate of
the subsequent will of October 19, 1948.
HELD:
No. The petitioners-appellants failed to show that the judgment of the lower court
probating the October 1948 will of testatrix was obtained through fraud thus the lower court
did not commit any error in denying the appellants' petition for relief under Sec. 2, Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court, and therefore it is not necessary for the court to discuss and pass upon the
other propositions of the appellant.
"Where a will is duly probated after publication pursuant to section 630 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the order admitting the will is, in the absence of fraud, effective against all
persons. The fact that an heir or other interested party lives so far away as to make it
impossible for such party to be present at the date appointed for the probate of the will does not
render the order of probate void for "lack of due process."
Under Sec. 3 of Rule 77, the court shall set aside a date for proving a will even without
petition when it is delivered to the court having jurisdiction. The lower court was right in not
setting a date for proving the will of August 16, 1948, because this will was expressly and
Page 218 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
absolutely revoked by the subsequent will of October 19, 1948, executed by the same executrix,
which was filed for allowance on November 1, 1948, with the same probate court. According to
the attorneys for the appellant, the will dated August 16, 1948, was sent together with a
writing called "Manifestation" by registered mail on October 30, 1948, from Manila to the
probate court and said will must have been received by the Clerk of said Court on or after
November 1, 1948, the date when the subsequent will of October 19, was filed for probate. It
stands to reason that if two wills are presented for allowance but one of them revokes expressly
and absolutely the other, the revoked will cannot be included in the probate of the latter
subsequent will, because it would be a waste of time to allow the revoked will if the subsequent
revoking will is also allowed. The revoked will may be probated and allowed only if the
subsequent revoking will is disallowed.
Page 219 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Heirs of Lasam v. Umengan

G.R. No. 168156 December 6, 2006
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
The subject lots denominated as Lot 5427 and Lot 992 situated in Tugegarao City belonged to
the spouses Pedro Cuntapay and Leona Bunagan. The spouses sold the said lots to their
children Isabel and Irene Cuntapay. It was agreed that the disputed eastern portion shall
belong to Isabel Cuntapay as evidenced by a notarized partition agreement. Isabel was first
married to Domingo Turingan, they had four children named Abdon, Sado, Rufo and Maria.
When the first husband died, Isabel married Rosendo Lasam. She had two children by him
named Trinidad and Rosendo.
In 2001 Rosendo Lasam filed a case against the respondent who is the daughter of Abdon
Turingan, a son of Isabel Cuntapay, for unlawful detainer. The petitioner anchored their claim
on the disputed property on the purported will of Isabel Cuntapay whereby she bequeathed the
said property to Rosendo Lasam. The last will and testament relied upon was not probated.The
MTCC and RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner on the ground that they are the owners of the
property based on the alleged will of Isabel Cuntapay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will of Isabel Cuntapay could be relied upon to establish the petitioner‘s
right to possess the subject lot.
HELD:
No. The purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay could not properly be relied upon
to establish petitioners‘ right to possess the subject lot because, without having been probated,
the said last will and testament could not be the source of any right.
Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court…..
In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that: "[a] will is essentially ambulatory; at any
time prior to the testator‘s death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate,
it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit:
Page 220 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
“No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.‘"
Dr. Tolentino, an eminent authority on civil law, also explained that "[b]efore any will can
have force or validity it must be probated. To probate a will means to prove before some officer
or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that purpose, that the instrument offered to be
proved is the last will and testament of the deceased person whose testamentary act it is alleged
to be, and that it has been executed, attested and published as required by law, and that the
testator was of sound and disposing mind. It is a proceeding to establish the validity of the
will." Moreover, the presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public
policy.
Page 221 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Spouses Ricardo Pascual vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 115925 August 15, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner Consolacion Sioson and respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino are the niece
and granddaughter, respectively, of the late Canuto Sioson. Canuto and 11 other individuals,
including his sister Catalina and his brother Victoriano, were co-owners of a parcel of land.On
November 20, 1951, Canuto had Lot 2 surveyed and subdivided into eight lots. Lot 2-A and
Lot 2-E were placed under Canuto‘s name. Three other individuals took the remaining lots.
On September 26, 1956, Canuto and Consolacion executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Tuluyan. Under the Kasulatan, Canuto sold his 10/70 share in Lot 2 in favor of Consolacion for
P2, 250.00. The Kasulatan was duly notarized. Consolacion immediately took possession of
Lots 2-A and 2-E. She later declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding
real estate taxes.On October 23, 1968, the surviving children of Canuto executed an affidavit
affirming the Kasulatan in favor of Consolacion. They also attested that the lots their father had
sold to Consolacion were Lots 2-A and 2-E.
The Register of Deeds issued a transfer of certificate to Consolacion. On February 4,
1988, Remedios filed a complaint against Consolacion and her spouse Ricardo Pascual for the
annulment or cancellation of TCT and damages. Remedios claimed that she is the owner of the
lots sold by Canuto to Consolacion because Catalina devised these lots to her in Catalina‘s last
will and testament dated May 29, 1964. Remedios added that Consolacion obtained title to
these lots through fraudulent means. On the other hand, the petitioners sought to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of prescription.
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case and ordering Remedios to pay
petitioners. The complaint filed by Remedios had already prescribed. The trial court further
ruled that Remedios has no right of action against petitioners because Catalina‘s last will from
which Remedios claims to derive her title has not been admitted to probate.
Issue:
Whether probate should be had first
Held:
Yes. Remedios is not the real- party- in- interest. Article 838 of the Civil Code states
that [N]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. This Court has interpreted this provision to mean, until
admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder.
REMEDIOS anchors her right in filing this suit on her being a devisee of Catalina’s last
will. However, since the probate court has not admitted Catalina’s last will, Remedios has not
acquired any right under the last will. Remedios is thus without any cause of action either to
seek reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E or to enforce an implied trust over these lots.
Page 222 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Reyes v. CA
G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997
FACTS:
This case involves a 383 sq.m. parcel of land owned by pettitioner’s and respondents’ father.
Petitioner alleges that a Deed of Exrajudicial Partition (Deed) was entered into between him
and the respondents. Petitioner managed to register 335 sq.m. of the land under his name;
while 50 sq.m. of the land was registered under the name of his sister, Paula (one of the
respondents). After discovering the registration of the Deed, respondents denied having
knowledge of its execution and disclaimed having signed the same; nor did they ever waive
their rights, shares and interest in the subject parcel of land. According to respondents, subject
Deed was fraudulently prepared by petitioner and that their signatures thereon were forged.
They also assert that one Atty. Jose Villena, the Notary Public who notarized the said Deed
was not even registered in the list of accredited Notaries Public of Pasay City.
Thereafter, petitioner executed a Deed of Absolute Sale selling 240 square meters of the land to
his children. After the property was partitioned, petitioner, his children and private respondent
Paula allegedly executed a Deed of Co-owners’ Partition dividing the property among
themselves. This led the respondents to file a Complaint for “Annulment of Sale and Damages
With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order” before the RTC, which ruled that
private respondents’ signatures on the questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and
Settlement were indeed forged and simulated. The CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Deed was forged.
2. Whether petitioners had become absolute owners of the subject property by
virtue of acquisitive prescription.
HELD:
1. YES.
Petitioners cast doubt on the findings of the lower court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals
regarding the existence of forgery. Factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. Petitioners’
ludicrous claim that private respondents imputed no deception on his part but only forgery of
the subject Deed and the simulation of their signatures is nothing short of being oxymoronic.
For what is forgery and simulation of signatures if not arrant deception! The allegation made
by petitioner that the execution of a public document ratified before a notary public cannot be
impugned by the mere denial of the signatory is baseless. It should be noted that there was a
finding that the subject Deed was notarized by one Atty. Villena who at that time was not
commissioned as a notary in Pasay City.
2. NO.
Petitioners cannot justify their ownership and possession of the subject parcel of land since they
could not ave been possessors in good faith of the subject parcel of land considering the finding
that at the very inception they forged the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement which
they claim to be the basis for their just title. Having forged the Deed and simulated the
signatures of private respondents, petitioners, in fact, are in bad faith. The forged Deed
containing private respondents’ simulated signatures is a nullity and cannot serve as a just title.
There can be no acquisitive prescription considering that the parcel of land in dispute is titled
Page 223 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
property, i.e., titled in the name of the late Bernardino Reyes, the father of both petitioner
Florentino and the private respondents
Page 224 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
ALFREDO G. BALUYUT, petitioner,vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, ENCARNACION

LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUT, JOSE ESPINO and CORAZON ESPINO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42088 May 7, 1976
AQUINO, J.:
FACTS: SoteroBaluyut executed a notarial will on April 14, 1973. In that will he bequeathed to
Mrs. Baluyut his one-half share in certain conjugal assets and one-fourth of the residue of his
estate. The remaining three-fourths were bequeated to his collateral relatives named Irene,
Erlinda, Estrellita, Eliseo and Alfredo, all surnamed Baluyut, and Emerita, Emilio and
Benjamin, all surnamed Miranda. The testator designated Mrs. Baluyut as executrix. Espino is
not mentioned in that will. Alfredo Baluyot, filed in the CFI of Quezon City a verified petition
for letters of administration. He alleged that the deceased was survived by his widow,
Encarnacion Lopez, who was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedent‘s
estate.
Lopez argued and showed proof that the widow was declared an Incompetent by the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court.
The probate court instituted Mrs. Baluyut as the administrator of the estate, the lower court
ratiocinated that as the surviving spouse she has the preferential right to be appointed as
administratrix.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion when it appointed
Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix
HELD: Yes. While the probate court correctly assumed that the surviving spouse enjoys
preference in the granting of letters of administration, it does not follow that she should be
named administrator without conducting a full-dress hearing on her competency to discharge
that trust. Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person should
act as executor is not binding on the probate court and does not automatically entitle him to
the issuance of letters testamentary. A hearing should be held in order to ascertain his fitness to
act as executor. He might have been fit to act as executor when the will was executed but
supervening circumstances might have rendered him unfit for that position. It was held that a
hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to be appointed
administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording
oppositors a chance to contest the petition.
Page 225 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
It is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary

proceeding. The probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy.
After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be revoked and proceedings
for the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will should be conducted.
Page 226 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
CUENCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973, 53 SCRA 360
FACTS
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor
sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one
of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the
Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a
resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife (widow),
filed a petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the last will and testament,
where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI
Cebu but the said court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon City
shall have acted on the probate proceedings. CFI Cebu, in effect deferred to the probate
proceedings in the Quezon City court. Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI
Quezon City, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI
Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to
dismiss were denied.
Lourdes filed special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with
respondent CA. CA favored Lourdes holding that CFI Cebu had first acquired jurisdiction.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition against Quezon City court
ordering it to refrain from proceeding with the testate proceedings.
2. Whether or not CFI Quezon City acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in
pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate
over intestate proceedings.
HELD
Page 227 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
1. Yes.
The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition
against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and
annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to
probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow
as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of
the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject
matter but merely of venue. Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition
for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the
decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and
their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating
that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of
the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second
court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by
the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes'
intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the
exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts.
2. No.
Under the facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition
and deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City
court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting
on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take
cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all
other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said
rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court undisputably had at least
equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Page 228 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Page 229 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE AGUSTIN

DEL VALLE. ANTONIA VENTURA VS. MAURA VENTURA, MILAGROS P.
VENTURA, DEOGRACIAS P. VENTURA, AND JACINTA P. VENTURA
G.R. No. L-11609
September 24, 1959
Facts:
Antonia Ventura is the widow of Agustin del Valle, who died in Paniqui, Tarlac, on May 19,
1955. Soon thereafter, or on June 7 of the same year, she instituted Special Proceedings No.
912 of said court, with a petition for the probate of a document attached thereto, as the alleged
last will and testament of Agustin. On July 15, 1955, after the issuance of the corresponding
notice of hearing, the publication of said notice and the service of copies thereof upon all parties
concerned, Antonia filed a motion stating that the heirs had agreed to partition, among
themselves, the estate of the deceased, in accordance with the provisions of said instrument.
Thus, Antonia prayed that the probate proceeding shall be terminated and closed. The court
granted the motion upon submission of a signed copy of the corresponding deed of extra-
judicial partition, for which Antonia was given two (2) days which she seasonably complied
with thus said Special Proceedings No. 912 was "terminated, closed and archived" by an order.
However, on May 9, 1956, said Antonia Ventura filed another partition for the probate of the
probate of the aforementioned last will and testament of her deceased husband, Agustin del
Valle, which petition was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 970 of the same court. On June
22, 1956, the date set for the hearing of this petition, appellees Maura, Milagros, Deogracias
and Jacinta, all surnamed Ventura, moved for the dismissal of the case upon the ground that it
amounted to an attempt to reopen Special Proceedings No. 912, which had already been finally
and definitely closed, terminated and archived; that the present proceedings is unnecessary and
superfluous; and that the provisions of the will in question had " already been carried out" in
the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial partition. The lower court granted this motion upon
the theory that it " no longer" had "jurisdiction to entertain" the case, "because to do so would
be for the court to reopen Special Proceedings No. 912", notwithstanding the fact that it had
been "definitely declared terminated, closed and archived" by an order which has already
"become final and executory", no appeal having been taken therefrom. Hence, the present
appeal taken by petitioner Antonia Ventura.
Issue:
Whether the second petition for probate proceeding is barred by the termination of the first.
Ruling:
The order issue in Special Proceedings No. 912, directing that the same be closed, terminated
and archived, had filed a pleading or raised an issue, is deemed, therefore, to be "without
prejudice", the contrary not being stated either in said order or in the motion that prompted its
Page 230 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
issuance. Needless to say, the aforementioned order may not be regarded as a judgment,
barring a subsequent action upon the ground of "res adjudicata", said order not being an
adjudication on the merits. Furthermore, the law provides that it is the inevitable duty of the
court when a will is presented to it, to appoint hearing for its allowance and to cause notices
thereof to be given by publication. In other words, the lower court had, not only jurisdiction,
but, also, the duty to entertain appellant's petition for probate of the alleged will of Agustin de
Valle.
Page 231 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
ERNESTO M. GUEVARA v. ROSARIO GUEVARA

G.R. No. L-48840
23 December 1943
FACTS:
On August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will. He bequeathed some personal and
real properties to the petitioner, respondent and other heirs, legacies and devisees. He also set
aside a portion of the disputed parcel of land for the payment of his debts. Subsequently,
Victorino conveyed the land in favor of Ernesto in consideration of P 1.00 and some other
conditions such as the assumption of Victorino’s monetary obligations.
On September 27, 1933, Victorino died. His last will and testament, however, was never
presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted
for the settlement of his estate. In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her
father's last will and testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary
dispositions made therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural
daughter and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of the large
parcel of land described in the will. After four years from the testor's demise, she commenced
the present action against Ernesto for the sole purpose of recovering her legitime; and it was
only during the trial of this case that she presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of
having it probated but only to prove that the deceased Victorino had acknowledged her as his
natural daughter.
ISSUE: Whether the action instituted by Rosario was proper.
HELD:
No. Rosario did not comply with the mandatory rule of the probate of a will before it can be
given effect. The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to
the whole world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator. Although not contested, the due execution of the will and the fact that the testator
at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress,
menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and only
then may the will be legalized and given effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed
by the judge and attested by the seal of the court.
In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present litigants
had received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the
provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights
be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the
court for probate.
Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due
execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with
that will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court first because the law
expressly provides that "no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and
Page 232 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
allowed in the proper court". Thus, Rosario was ordered by the Court to present the will of
Victorino for probate.
Page 233 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Mendoza v. Pilapil
G.R. No. L-47931
27 June 1941
Facts:
Father Eleuterio Pilapil was a parish priest in Muaboal, Cebu. He died in 1935. In the absence
of a will, after his death, his brother Calixto filed a case for intestacy. After complying with the
requisite publication and notices, the court heard the case and the estate was declared intestate.
On March 4, 1939, just a few days after, a case was filed by Adrian Mendoza, a niece of the
testator, for the probate of the last will and testament of Fr. Pilapil. In the said will, Mendoza
was appointed administrator of the estate. In case, he would fail or be negligent, it was
stipulated that he will be replaced by another niece of the testator, Jose Cabatingan. The
probate of said will was opposed by the Pilapil and others, appellants to this case. The grounds
on which they rely their opposition include the following:
1 the documents contain erasures and alterations;

2 it was not been proven that the decedent possessed knowledge of the Spanish language in
which the documents were written;
3 the provision that prohibits the probation of the will in the courts;
4 that both documents had been prepared, signed and witnessed in accordance with the
provisions of Article618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Issue:
Whether or not the will should be probated.
Ruling:
Yes, the will should be probated.
The disposition of the testator that his "last will and testament not be heard by the court" can
not strip courts of their authority to determine whether the will is valid or not.
The law requires, under penalty, that wills made by a testator should be delivered to the Court,
after the person dies, by the person to whom custody has been entrusted, so that the court can
determine whether the will is valid and at the same time determine the disposition of the
testator to dispose of their property as instructed on the same if the contract be declared that
the testator died intestate, the will not being capable of legalization.
In the probation of a will, some defects in the will and testament should not be allowed to
obstruct the legal formalities x xx in consideration of wills and to frustrate the wishes of the
dead solemnly expressed in their wills, as to the granting of which there is not even a shadow
of bad faith or fraud.
Page 234 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
The important issue here is that whatever defects there are in the last will and testament of the
testator, as long as there is substantial compliance of the basic requirements of the law, the
same should be given effect in the absence of fraud. It can be gleaned in the poorly translated
original text, that the testator has given instructions as to how his property should be disposed
of. This could not be given effect unless the court has passed upon its validity in probate
proceedings because of the provisions of Article 838.
Page 235 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
NELSON NUFABLE, SILMOR NUFABLE and AQUILINA NUFABLE vs. GENEROSA

NUFABLE, VILFOR NUFABLE, MARCELO NUFABLE, and the COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 126950 July 2, 1999
Facts
Edras Nufable died and was survived by his children, namely: Angel Custodio,
Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable. An Order admitted to probate the last will
and testament executed by the deceased. The approved Settlement of Estate submitted by the
heirs contained that the subject parcel of land remains undivided for community ownership but
respecting conditions imposed in the will.
Subsequently, Angel and Aquilina Nufable mortgaged the entire property to the
Development Bank of the Philippines [DBP]. Said mortgagors became delinquent for which
reason the mortgaged property was foreclosed. Nelson Nufable, the son of Angel, purchased
said property from DBP.
Private respondents filed a complaint "To Annul Fraudulent Transactions, to Quiet
Title and To Recover Damages' against Nelson and wife, Silmor Nufable and his mother
Aquilina.
Defendants contended that Angel was the exclusive owner of said property, and as such
owner he mortgaged the same to DBP. Also, the plaintiffs never questioned the transactions
which were public, never filed any third party claim nor attempted to redeem said property as
redemptioners, and that said Deed of Sale, wherein allegedly spouses Angel and Aquilina as
vendors, sold 3/4 portion of the subject property to herein plaintiffs for and in consideration of
P1,000.00, is fictitious, not being supported by any consideration.
The Court of Appeals stated that the trial court failed to take into consideration the
probated will of the late Esdras bequeathing the subject property to all his four children. It
declared plaintiffs as the rightful co-owners of the subject property and entitled to possession of
3/4 southern portion thereof; and Nelson Nufable to 1/4 portion.
Issue
Are the Last Will and Testament of Esdras and its subsequent probate pertinent and
material to the right of ownership of Nelson who purchased the land in question from DBP?
Held
No.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only to passing upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, the due execution thereof, the testators
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.
Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provision of the will. The question of the intrinsic validity of a will normally
comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
It was the heirs of the late Edras who agreed among themselves on the disposition of
their shares in the Settlement of Estate. The probate court simply approved the agreement
among the heirs which approval was necessary for the validity of any disposition of the
decedent's estate.
Accordingly, for the purpose of transmission of rights, it does not matter whether the Last Will
and Testament of the late Esdras was admitted on March 30, 1966 or thereafter or that the
Settlement of Estate was approved on June 6, 1966 or months later. The probated will of the
late Esdras specifically referred to the subject property and it should remain undivided.
Page 236 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Page 237 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Gallanosa v. Arcangel
GR No. L-29300; 83 SCRA 675
June 21, 1978
Facts
Florentino Hitosis executed a will bequeathing his property to his wife, Tecla, to spouses
Gallanosa, and to his protege, Adolfo. Florentino died childless and a widower, leaving only his
brother Leon as the legal heir. A petition for the probate of the will was filed but was opposed
by Leon claiming to be the the only legal heirs entitled to the 61 parcels of lands left by
Florentino. The probate court approved the will and the partition was ordered. Leon and the
other legal heirs failed to appeal from the decree of probate trial which became final. Several
years after, Leon filed a petition for the annulment of the will of Florentino and for the
recovery of the 61 parcels of land on the ground that the execution of the will was through
fraud and deceit.
Issue
1) Is the action for annulment of a will sanctioned by law?

2) Will an action for annulment of the will prosper even if there exist already a decree of
probate of the will?
Held
1) No.
The procedural law does not sanction an action for the annulment of a will. In order that a will
may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary
proceedings. The probate of the will mandatory.
2) No.
It has been held that the probate of a will, where there is no objection or no appeal was taken, is
conclusive as to its due execution or formal validity of the will. This means that the testator
was of sound mind at the time when he executed the will and was not acting under duress,
menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of required
witnesses and that the will is genuine and not a forgery. These facts cannot be questioned in a
subsequent proceeding.
In this case, Leon failed to appeal the decree of probate and thus, it became final. Since there
was already a finality of the decree of probate of the will. Leon, the legal heir cannot anymore
question the validity of the will through an action for its annulment.
Page 238 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Palacios v. Palacios
G.R.No. L-12207
December 24,1959
FACTS:
Juan Palacio executed his last will and testament a. He filed before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas a petition for its approval. In said will, he instituted as his sole heirs his
natural children Antonio Palacio and Andrea Palacio.
Maria Catimbang filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging that she is the
acknowledged natural daughter of Juanand that she was completely ignored in said will
impairing her legitimate.
After the presentation of petitioner’s evidence relative to the essential requisites and
formalities provided by the Law for the validity of a will, the court issued an order admitting
the will to probate. The court, however, set a date for the hearing of the opposition relative to
the intrinsic validity of the will and after proper hearing concerning this incident, the court
issued another order declaring Maria to be the natural child of petitioner and annulling the will
in so far as it impairs her legitimate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the opposition to the intrinsic validity of the will is proper.
HELD:
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be
entertained in probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will
has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, much less if the purpose of
the opposition is to show that the oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who allegedly has
been ignored in the will for such issue cannot be raised in said proceeding but in a separate
action. This is especially so when the testator is still alive and has merely filed a petition for
allowance of his will leaving the effects thereof after his death.
Page 239 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
SANCHEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

September 29, 1997
Facts:
Rosalia is the only child of spouses Juan Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while Arturo, Evelyn
and Roberto are the legitimate children of Rosalia. Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and
Myrna all surnamed Sanchez, are the illegitmate children of Juan C. Sanchez. On October 30,
1969, however, Rosalia assisted by their counsel executed a compromise agreement wherein
they agreed to divide the properties enumerated therein of the late Juan C. Sanchez. This
compromise agreement was not approved by the probate court.
Issue:
Whether the compromise agreement partitioning the property of the estate without the
approval of the probate court valid?
Held:
Yes. In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a
valid compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their respective counsels, they each
negotiated its terms and provisions for four months; in fact, said agreement was executed only
after the fourth draft. As noted by the trial court itself, the first and second drafts were
prepared successively in July, 1969; the third draft on September 25, 1969; and the fourth draft,
which was finally signed by the parties on October 30, 1969, followed. Since this compromise
agreement was the result of a long drawn out process, with all the parties ably striving to
protect their respective interests and to come out with the best they could, there can be no
doubt that the parties entered into it freely and voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be bound
thereby. To be valid, it is merely required under the law to be based on real claims and actually
agreed upon in good faith by the parties thereto.
For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the
concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no
debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or
if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives;
and (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the
Register of Deeds. We find that all the foregoing requisites are present in this case. We
therefore affirm the validity of the parties compromise agreement/partition in this case.
Page 240 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
RODRIGUEZ vs. BORJA

G.R. No. L-21993 June 21, 1966
REYES, J.B.L., J.
Facts: Fr. Celestino Rodriguez, a parish priest died on February 12, 1963. He was buried in
Paranaque leaving real properties in Rizal and Bulacan.
On March 4, 1963, private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to
the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez. Through
counsel Apoloni and Adelaida filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the
alleged will but on March 11, 1963, before the Court could act on the petition, the same was
withdrawn.
On March 12, 1963, the petitioners Angela Rodriguez and Maria Rodriguez filed before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr.
Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Paranaque, Rizal,
and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special
Administratrix of the estate.
The petitioners Angela and Maria contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate
was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan of private respondents at 11:00 A.M. of
March 12, 1963, therefore the court of Bulacan has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
probate.
Private respondents Apolonia and Adelaida, on the other hand, take the stand that the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will
to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has
precedence over the case filed in Rizal.
Issue:
Which of the two courts will be entitled priority: the Court of First Instance of Bulacan or the
Court of First Instance of Rizal?
Ruling:
The Bulacan Court of First Instance is entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate of Fr.
Rodriguez because the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested
upon the delivery of the will of the late Fr. Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for
its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu
proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the
corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised
Rules of Court.
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. — When a will
is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having
jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such
Page 241 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time
appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been
filed by the testator himself.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the
allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit
therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed.
Therefore, where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is
deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr.
Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners
initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight
days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.
There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that their
commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's
will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith and the other reason is that, in our system of civil
law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only
takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.
Page 242 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
VDA. DE PRECILLA vs. NARCISO

G.R. No. L-27200, August 18, 1972
FACTS:
On December 29 1960, Gliceria del Rosario allegedly signed a will considering that she
was suffering poor eyesight and is considered as a blind woman for reading purposes.
The intestate heirs offered the testimony of Dr. Tamesis to bolster their claim that the
deceased could not have read the will and that the signature was secured through
misrepresentation. Therefore the testatrix was not possessed of a sound and disposing memory
on December 29, 1960.
The testimony of Dr. Tamesis is ambiguous as to the condition of the eyesight of the
deceased. As the attending physician of the deceased he could have given direct evidence rather
than merely the opinion of one professionally engaged as an expert witness. Dr. Tamesis based
his answers neither on present nor on past recollection but simply on "as far as my record is
concerned.”
ISSUE:
Should the case be remanded for additional evidence?
HELD:
Yes. The fundamental principles governing probate proceedings that there be more
definite, clear and unequivocal evidence, which we believe exists, as to whether or not Doña
Gliceria could read print on December 29, 1960.
Only the intestate heirs have attempted to overthrow the weight of this evidence of the
proponents by presenting Dr. Tamesis, but, as already demonstrated above, the good doctor
never referred to any personal knowledge of his that Doña Gliceria could or could not have
read ordinary print on August 30, 1960. and much less did he give any direct evidence that she
could not have read it on December 29, 1960. As a whole, as already demonstrated above, his
testimony on the facts most vital and material to the specific issue on hand leaves many
important and decisive questions unanswered.
On the other hand, while indeed some circumstances extant on the face of the document
in controversy to lend significance to the testimony of Dr. Tamesis, it cannot be denied that
there are also in the record circumstances tending to show that it is not improbable that Doña
Gliceria could have read the said document on the day of its execution as testified to by the
attesting witnesses.
What we are saying is that, all in all, in the state of the evidence before Us, the Court
does not find itself in a position to determine with fairness and justice to all concerned the
pivotal question — with the condition of her eyes on December 29, 1960, could Doña Gliceria
have read the will before she signed the same on that day? The evidence in the record is short
of what the nature of probate proceedings require.
Page 243 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Cuyugan vs Baron
63 Phil 827
Facts:
Vivencio Cuyugan filed for the probate of the will of Silvestra Baron. The petition was
filed on 1 February 1933 and recites that Silvestra died on 30 January 1933. She was 86 years
of age at the time of death and died of heart failure. The petition states that she left and estate
exceeding in value the sum of P80,000 which she disposed of by will dated 17 December 1932
and that she died single without forced heirs.
Guillermo Baron and Faustina Baron allege opposed the probate and alleged that at the
time of the execution of the alleged will, Silvestra was mentally and physically incapacitated for
the execution of a will and that her signature and alleged consent to the said will was obtained
and the attorney who prepared the document and the witnessed who affixed their signatures
thereto.
Issue:
Whether or not Silvestra Baron, a woman of advanced years and in a critical state of
health, possesses testamentary capacity to make a will
Held:
It is clear from the evidence that in her dazed physical and mental condition, Silvestra
had no adequate understanding of what she was doing at that time. She could even sign her
name to the original will properly or correctly and when this defect was noted by one of the
astute subscribing witnesses, she suggested that they have her sign another copy which was
done. She never saw the alleged will at any time prior to her death which occurred 40 days
later. It was immediately taken away by an attorney who kept it in his possession alleging that
she had instructed him to keep it secret.
The belief on her part that she had not made any will explains her failure to do any act
of revocation in the 40-days during which she lingered in this life. The doctrine that where the
testator has had an opportunity to revoke his will subsequent to the operation of an alleged
undue influence upon him but makes no change in it, the courts will consider this fact as
weighing heavily against the testimony of undue influence, has no application to cases in which
there has been an initial lack of testamentary capacity. It has no application, moreover, where
from the day of execution until the death of the testator his mental condition is such that he
cannot judge the propriety of revoking the will. Nor obviously does it apply to a case where the
alleged testator harbors the belief that he had not executed the will in question.
Page 244 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Coso v. Deza
G.R. No. 16763 22 December 1921
FACTS:
The will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to an illegitimate son had by the testator
with Rosario Lopez, and also provides for the payment to her of nineteen hundred Spanish
duros by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in taking care of the testator in
Barcelna when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness. It was shown that the testator,
a married man became acquainted with Rosario Lopez in Spain and that he had illicit relations
with her for many years. She followed him when he returned to the Philippines and in close
communication until death of the latter. There is no doubt that she exercised some influence
over him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the influence exercised by Rosario Lopez was of such character as to
vitiate the will.
RULING:
Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will;
to have that effect the influence must be undue; to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence
exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to
destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another, rather than his own. Such
influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of the
will. While the same amount of influence may become undue when exercised by one occupying
an improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some influence is exercised
by a person sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that
the influence destroys the testator‘s free agency.
While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it
does not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to destroy his
free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own. He was an
Page 245 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
intelligent man, a lawyer by profession, appears to have known his own mind, and may well
have been actuated only by a legitimate sense of duty in making provisions for the welfare of
his illegitimate son and by a proper feeling of gratitude in repaying Rosario Lopez for her
sacrifices she had made for him. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and
does not invalidate a will.
Page 246 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Onesima Belen vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands and Milagros Belen de Olaguera
G.R. No. L-14474
October 31, 1960
Facts:
Benigno Diaz executed a codicil. Thereafter, he died and the codicil was admitted to probate
together with his will. The probate was closed in 1960 and the administration of the estate
went under the BPI as trustee of the legatees. Filomena died leaving two legitimate children,
namely, Milagros and Onesima. Onesima filed a petition stating that the amount pertaining to
Filomena should be divided equally between her and Milagros, to the exclusion of the 7
illegitimate children of Milagros. The probate court denied the petition. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Onesima is correct.
Held:
No. The testator, Benigno, by indicating a class or group of legatees intended all members
thereof to succeed per capita. Filomena's original legacy should be divided among her children
and grandchildren. There was no proof presented by Onesima that Benigno intended to exclude
his grandchildren from inheriting from him.
Page 247 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
ASUNCION NABLE JOSE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, v. MARIA

IGNACIA USON, ET AL.,
G. R. NO. 8927 10 MARCH 1914
MORELAND, J.:
FACTS:
The codicil to the will of Filomena Uson provided that all the property belonging to her
as conjugal property shall be the property if her husband; that in case the same exists at her
husband‘s death, her sisters and nieces named shall succeed her husband as heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property shall be divided equally between the living sisters and the
children of the deceased sisters.
RULING:
It was the intention of the testatrix to divide her property equally between her sisters and
nieces. The testatrix, in the second paragraph of the codicil, names and identifies each one of
her heirs then living, or each one of the persons whom she desires shall succeed her husband in
the property. Among those mentioned specifically are the nieces as well as the sisters. The
nieces are referred to in no way different from the sisters. The nieces are referred to in no way
different from the sisters. Each one stands out as the other under exactly the same conditions.
Moreover, in the last clause she says that she names all of the persons whom she desires to take
under her will by name ―so that they may take and enjoy the property in equal parts as good
sisters and relatives.
Page 248 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Austria v. Reyes
31 S 754
February 27, 1970
FACTS:
Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the respondents, all
have been declared by the former as her legally adopted children. During her lifetime, Basilia
filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was opposed by the petitioners who are the
nephews and nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will was allowed.
On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia died. The
respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor without bond by the same court in
accordance with the provisions of the decedent's will, notwithstanding the blocking attempt
pursued by the petitioner Ruben Austria.
In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they were the
nearest kin of Basilia and that the respondent had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, hence the latter were strangers with no right to succeed as heirs.
The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the institution of heirs. It
held that the testator was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will was executed
free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the institution of heirs made by Basilia in her will is based on false
cause, thus should be annulled.
RULING:
The falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary institution does not affect the validity or
efficacy of the institution.
An exception to the rule is that the falsity will set aside the institution if the conditions set
forth by Art. 850 are present. For this article to be applied, the following requisites must
concur:
1) The cause must be stated in the will;
2) The cause is shown to be false; and
3) It must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity.
Page 249 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
It can be inferred from the Will of Basilia that when she instituted her heirs, she was possessed
of testamentary capacity and the will was free from falsification, fraud, trickery or
undue influence. Also, in her will, she does not specifically state the cause of her institution.
Therefore, in the absence of proof that there exists false cause in the institution of heirs, testacy
must be favored from intestacy, and the will must be given full express.
Page 250 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Barrios v. Barrios
GR L-29789. 22 December 1928
FACTS:
The surviving spouse and the legitimate children of the decedent oppose the institution of an
adulterous child as an heir by the decedent to the prejudice of the legitimate descendants and
heirs of the deceased.
ISSUES:
1. Does the decedent have a right to dispose part of his estate by will in favour of his
adulterous son?
2. If so, has the decedent put his adulterous son in the same footing as his legitimate
children?
HELD:
1. YES.
While it is true that article 845 of the Civil Code provides that ―illegitimate children who have
not the status of natural children shall be entitled to support only and therefore cannot demand
anything more of those bound by law to support them, it does not prohibit said illegitimate
children from receiving, nor their parents from giving them, something more than support, so
long as the legitimate children are not prejudiced. If the law permits a testator to dispose of the
free third of his hereditary estate in favor of a stranger (art. 808 of the Civil Code), there is no
legal, moral or social reason to prevent him from making over that third to his illlegitimate son
who has not the status of a natural son. On the contrary, by reason of blood, the son, although
illegitimate, has a preferential right over a stranger unless by his behaviour he has become
unworthy of such consideration.
2. NO.
According to article 808 of the Civil Code, the legitime of legitimate children and descendants
consists of 2/3 of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother, the latter being allowed
to dispose of one of said two parts in order to give it as betterment to their legitimate children
or descendants. In the present case the testator has not disposed of any of the two parts
forming the legitime in order to give it as betterment to any of his children, and the said
legitime therefore remains intact, and according to A. 806 of the same Code, is by the law
reserved for the forced heirs and the testator cannot dispose of it in any other way. Thus, when
the decedent provided in his will that the 1/2 of the conjugal property belonging to him was to
be divided equally among his 9 legitimate children and 1 adulterous son, each to receive 1/20
part, he did not go beyond the limits provided by law for such cases, because, 1/20 for each of
his legitimate children is more than each of his legitimate children should receive as his
Page 251 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
legitime, which only amounts to 1/27. In other words, since the decedent could dispose of the
free 1/3 portion of his estate in favour of his adulterous son, and as he only gave a part of said
free 1/3 to the latter, he did not infringe any legal prohibition and his testamentary disposition
to this effect is valid and effective.
Page 252 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
TESTATE ESTATE OF FLORENCIA R. MATEO. PERFECTO GABRIEL,

PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. RITA R. MATEO, ET AL., OPPONENTS-
APPELLANTS.
G.R. No. L-26545 16 December 1927
FACTS:
Florencia Mateo executed her last will and testament on two used sheets of paper. It
was signed by her and three attesting witnesses. In the body of the will, she bequeathed all her
properties to her instituted heir, Tomasa Mateo, a niece. Nothing was instituted for her only
sister, Rita Mateo and to her other nephews and nieces.
Accordingly, Rita Mateo opposed the probate of the will, interposing that the testator
was affectionate to all her nieces and nephews during her lifetime, and that she, Rita Mateo,
was in good terms with her sister, thus must be instituted in the will.
ISSUE:
Is the will valid?
HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that there is nothing strange in the wishes of the testator
not to leave anything for her sister. It is reasonable that the entirety of her estate was left to
Tomasa since according to evidence, Tomasa was taken by the testator when the former was
only three years old and had never been separated from her ever since.
In addition, as can be inferred, Florencia Mateo has no compulsory heirs; thus, she is
free to dispose of her property. Collateral relatives are merely intestate heirs.
Page 253 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Dizon-Rivera vs Dizon 33 SCRA 554 (1970)
FACTS:
In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven compulsory heirs: 6
legitimate children and 1 legitimate granddaughter. Marina is the appellee while the others
were the appellants Valdez left a w ill executed in February 1960 and written in Pampango.
The beneficiaries were the 7 compulsory heirs and six grandchildren. In her will, Valdez
distributed and disposed of her properties (assessed at P1.8 million)which included real and
personal properties and shares of stocks at Pampanga Sugar CentralDevt Co.During the
probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was name the executor of the deceased‘s Estate.In her
will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in accordance with hertestamentary
disposition where she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising almost her
entire estate among her heirs. Based on the partition, Marina and Tomas were to receive more
than the other heirs.
Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate as follows: a. the
legitime computed for each compulsory heir was P129,254.96, which was comprised of cash
and/or properties specifically given to them based on the will ; b. Marina and Tomas were
adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash/properties to complete
their respective legitime.
The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-partition on the estate where
Marina and Tomas were to receive considerably less .The lower court approved the executor‘s
project of partition citing that Art 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that
when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed. The court cited that if
the proposition of the oppositors was upheld, it will substantially result in a distribution of
intestacy which is a violation of Art 791 NCC
ISSUE:
Whether or not the last will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in this case
HELD:
Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary disposition admits of different
interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative
shall be preferred" and "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to
every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions
inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy."
The intentions and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the
fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and
fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of
the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise."
Page 254 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when expressed
clearly and precisely in his last will, amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively
be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and
neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the
testator's will. Thus, the oppositors’ proposition for partition cannot be given effect.
On partition
The testamentary disposition of the decedent was in the nature of a partition. In her
will, the decedent noted that after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well
as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for the probate of her last will
and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly
provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with
the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in
her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven
other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her estate,
as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC,providing that "Should
a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
Effect of Partition:
A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
adjudicated to him", from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the
latter, and, she cannot be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by
law.
Page 255 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
IRIS MORALES v. ANA MARIA OLONDRIZ

G.R. No. 198994
February 03, 2016
FACTS:
Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (the decedent) died on June 9, 2003. He was survived by his
widow, Ana Maria Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children
Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition with the
Las Piñas RTC for the partition of the decedent's estate . However, Iris Morales filed a separate
petition with the RTC alleging that the decedent left a will dated July 23, 1991. The RTC
disallowed the will as it omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an illegitimate son
of the decedent.
ISSUE: Can a will still be probated despite omission of an illegitimate child in the will?
HELD:
Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he is
not named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor
assigned any part of the estate without expressly being disinherited - tacitly depriving the heir
of his legitime.5Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also
receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime.
In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the
testator's inheritance without the heir's express disinheritance.
In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir,
legatee, or devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the
direct line. Unless Morales could show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to
the conclusion of his preterition.
The decedent's will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco's preterition
annulled the institution of heirs. The annulment effectively caused the total abrogation of the
will, resulting in total intestacy of the inheritance.12 The decedent's will, no matter how valid it
may appear extrinsically, is null and void.
Page 256 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
SEANGIO VS. REYES

G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
FACTS:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the late Segundo Seangio and praying for the appointment of private respondent
Elisa D. Seangio–Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng
Seangio.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo. They likewise
reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence because testate proceedings take
precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings
primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo
does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the
definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the
will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and
nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or
legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private
respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the
extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the
same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is
clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
HELD:
Yes. The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated,
signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition,
private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundo’s

intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he
cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be
effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the
reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes
that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by
his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child
or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written,
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be
made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Page 257 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and
signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced
from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the
latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In
other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator
Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in
the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in
succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention.
It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it
cannot be given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as
illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an
expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and
the intention of the testator. In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if
captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last
testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic
will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the
direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last
expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of
Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs.
The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not
operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the
altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors testacy
over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides
that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may
be rendered nugatory
Page 258 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Acain vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. L-26317, January 29, 1927
FACTS:
Constantitno, herein petitioner, filed for probate of the will of his decased brother Nemesio and
for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary on the premise that Nemesio
Acain died leaving a will bequeathing all his shares from the conjugal property to his brother
Segundo Acain. However, since Segundo predeceased Nemesio, the former‘s children are
claiming to be heir, with Constantino as the petitioner. The spouse and adopted child of the
decedent opposed the probate of will because of preterition.
ISSUE:
Whether there was preterition.
HELD:
YES. Preterition consists in the omission of the forced heirs because they are not mentioned
there in, or trough mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
As for the widow there is no preterit ion because she is not in the direct line. However, the
same cannot be said for the adopted child whose legal adoption has not been questioned by the
petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he was a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir hence, this is a clear
case of preterition.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to
a declaration that nothing was written. No legacies and devisees having been provided in the
will, the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his
brothers and sisters.
Page 259 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Eleuterio Neri, et al., petitioners vs. Ignacia Akutin and her children, respondents
G.R. No. L-47799 13 June 1941
MORAN, J.:
FACTS:
Agripino Neri contracted two marriages. In his first marriage he had six children while
he had five in his second marriage. He died on December 12, 1931 and was survived by six
children. In his testament, which was admitted to probate on March 21, 1932, he willed that his
children by the first marriage shall have no longer any participation in his estate, as they had
already received their corresponding shares during his lifetime.
The RTC found that contrary to the testator’s will, that all his children by the first and
second marriages intestate heirs of the deceased without prejudice to one-half of the
improvements introduced in the properties during the existence of the last conjugal
partnership, which should belong to Ignacia Akutin, his second wife. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision with the modification that the will was "valid with respect to
the two-thirds part which the testator could freely dispose of.
Issue:
Whether or not there is preterition
Held:
Yes.
The court held that “x x x [p]reterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of
the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.(Cf. 6 Manresa,
346.) In the instant case, while the children of the first marriage were mentioned in the will,
they were not accorded any share in the heriditary property, without expressly being
disinherited. It is, therefore, a clear case of preterition as contended by appellants. The omission
of the forced heirs or anyone of them, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the
purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or is not at least manifest.”
Page 260 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Rafael E. Maninang and Soledad L. Maninang, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-57848
19 June 1982
FACTS:
Soledad Maninang, petitioner herein, filed for probate the holographic will of the
decedent Clemencia Aseneta who died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. Said will
left all her property to the petitioner and contained a provision stating: “I do not consider
Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do things against my will.” Meanwhile, respondent
Bernardo Aseneta “Nonoy”, the adopted son mentioned in the will, claims to be the sole heir of
decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings. He filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only
compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the adopted son was preterited or disinherited.
RULING:
There is no preterition but valid disinheritance in the present case. Preterition and
disinheritance are two diverse concepts. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's
will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or,
though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his
share in the legitimate for a cause authorized by law. Disinheritance is always "voluntary",
preterition upon the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntary".
Moreover, the effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different.
Pretention under Article 854 of the New Civil Code shall annul the institution of heir. This
annulment is in toto, unless in the wail there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the
form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code,
such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", but only "insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition.
Otherwise stated, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which
the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
Page 261 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Aznar v. Duncan
GR No. L-24365 30 June 1966
MAKALINTAL, J.:
FACTS:
Edward Christensen, whose estate is the subject of the present case, is a Californian citizen
domiciled in the Philippines, died leaving a will. The will was admitted for probate by the
Davao CFI where it has also declared that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia was a natural child
of the deceased. As to the partition of the deceased‘s estate, the Court of Appeals, upon appeal of
Helen, ruled that the validity of the provisions of the will should be governed by the Philippine
law, and returned the case to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as
provided by the said law.
A project of partition was submitted by the executor which was approved by the CFI, wherein
the properties of estate were divided equally between Maria Lucy Christensen, whom the
testator had expressly recognized in his will as his daughter, and Maria Helen Christensen
Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death. The said order was based on
the proposition that since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will, the institution of Lucy
Duncan as heir was annulled, and hence, the properties passed to both of them as if he died
intestate.
ISSUES:
1. Was Helen preterited?
2. Should the estate pertain to her and to Helen in equal shares after deducting the legacies, or
whether the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent
necessary to cover the legitime of Helen equivalent to ¼ of the entire estate?
Rulings:
1. No, Helen is not preterited. Preterition is the omission of the heir in the will at all or, while
mentioning him as father, son, etc., but not instituting him at all as heir without disinheriting
him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the testator‘s estate.
Whether the testator gave a legacy to a person whom he characterized as not related to him,
but later this person was judicially declared to be his acknowledged natural child, the case is
not a case of preterition but a case of completion of legitime. The institution in the will would
not be annulled, consequently, intestacy should not follow.
2. The inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary
to cover the legitime of Helen. In order that the rights of a forced heir may be limited to the
Page 262 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
completion of his legitime (instead of annulment of the institution of heirs). It is not necessary
that what has been left to him in the will ―by any title‖, as by legacy, be granted to her in his
capacity as heir. As successional rights are vested as of the moment of death, the forced heir is
entitled to the fruits and increments of his legitime from the testator‘s death.
Zonia Solano, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals et al. respondents
GR No. l-41971
29 November 1983
FACTS: Bienvenido and Emetria Garcia, claiming to be illegitimate children of Dr. Meliton
Solano, filed an action for recognition against him where the latter in his Answer, denied
paternity. During the pendency of the case, Solano died. Petitioner Zonia Solano was ordered
substituted for the decedent as the only surviving heir mentioned in his Last Will and
Testament probated on March 10, 1969, or prior to his death. Zonia entered her formal
appearance as a substitute defendant claiming additionally that she was the sole heir of her
father, Solano, and asking that she be allowed to assume her duties as executrix of the probated
will with the least interference from the Garcias.
The Garcias, private respondents herein, filed their Reply to Zonia‘s Appearance Supplemental
Cause of Action impugning the recognition of Zonia as an acknowledged natural child with the
prayer that she be declared instead, like them, as an adulterous child of the decedent.
The trial court also declared that the Garcias are the illegitimate children of Dr. Solano.
Issue:
Was the institution of Zonia as sole heir by Solano null and void as there was preterition of the
other heirs?
Ruling:
Yes. The Garcias and Zonia were in the same category as illegitimate children; that Zonia‘s
acknowledgment as a natural child in a notarial document executed by Solano and Trinidad
Tuagnon was erroneous because at the time of her birth in 1941, Solano was still married to
Lilly Gorand, his divorce having been obtained only in 1943, and, therefore, did not have the
legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of Zonia‘s conception. That being the
compulsory heirs, the Garcias were in fact, preterited from Solano‘s Last Will and Testament;
and that as a result of said preterition, the institution of Zonia as sole heir by Solano is null and
void under Article 854 of the Civil Code.
Page 263 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
As provided in the provision, the disposition in the Will giving the usufruct in favor of
Trinidad Tuagnon over the five parcels of land is a legacy, recognized in Article 563 of the
Civil Code, and it should be respected in so far as it is not inofficious.
Contrary to the conclusions of the court holding that the entire Will is void and intestacy
ensues, the preterition of the Garcias should annul the institution of Zonia as heir only insofar
as the legitime of the omitted heirs is impaired. The Will, therefore, is valid subject to that
limitation. It is plain that the intention of the testator was to favor Zonia with certain portions
of his property, which, under the law, he had a right to dispose of by Will, so that the
disposition in her favor should be upheld as to the one-half portion of the property that the
testator could freely dispose of. Since the legitime of the illegitimate children consists of ½ of
the hereditary estate, the Garcias and Zonia each have a right to participate therein in the
proportion of 1/3 each.
Zonia‘s hereditary share will, therefore be ½ + 1/3 of ½ or 4/6 of the estate, while the Garcias
will respectively be entitled to 1/3 of ½ or 1/6 of the value of the estate.
Page 264 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
HILARION, JR. and ENRICO ORENDAIN, represented by FE D. ORENDAIN,

Petitioners,- versus – TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF DOÑA MARGARITA
RODRIGUEZ,
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doña Margarita Rodriguez, died without issues in Manila,
leaving a last will and testament. The will was admitted to probate by virtue of the order of the
CFI Manila and said court approved the project of partition presented by the executor of Doña
Margarita Rodriguez‘s will. As provided in her will Doña Margarita Rodriguez‘s testamentary
dispositions contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the income from her properties for
distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will.After almost 40 years later, herein petitioners
Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned in Clause
24 of the decedent‘s will, moved to dissolve the trust on the decedent‘s estate, which they
argued had been in existence for more than twenty years, in violation of the the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trusteeship over the properties left by DOÑA MARGARITA
RODRIGUEZ can be dissolved .
RULING:
YES. The will of the decedent provides for the creation of a perpetual trust for the
administration of her properties and the income accruing therefrom, for specified beneficiaries.
The trust, only insofar as the first twenty-year period is concerned should be upheld however
after 20 years the trust must be dissolved. Petitioners were correct in moving for the
dissolution of the trust after the twenty-year period,but they are not necessarily declared as
intestate heirs of the decedent. The last will and testament of the decedent did not institute
heirs to inherit the properties under the void clause.Hence the case is remanded to the lower
court for the determination of the heirship of the intestate heirs of the decedent where
petitioners, and all others claiming to be heirs of the decedent, should establish their status.
Page 265 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
G. de Perez v. Garchitorena
G.R. No. L-31703, February 13, 1930, 54 Phil 431
FACTS
Ana instituted Carmen as her heir with the following stipulations in her will: (a) Should
Carmen die, the whole estate should pass unimpaired to Carmen’s children. (b) The estate
should never pass out of the hands of Carmen and her children as long as this was legally
possible. (c) Should Carmen die after Ana while Carmen’s children are still minors, the estate
would be administered by the executrix. It should be noted that in the will, no express mention
was made of a fideicommissary substitution. Neither was there any statement as to whether
Carmen was to die before or after Ana. It was thus alleged that no fideicommissary substitution
was made, and so, after Carmen’s death, the property belonged to her estate and not to the
children as substitutes, and therefore, creditors could attach the same.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was a fideicommissary substitution
HELD
Provision in the will that the whole estate shasll pass “unimpaired” to the children of heiress in
the event heiress should die after the testatrix, was held a fideicommissary substitution. It
implied an obligation to preserve and to transmit. Necessary consequence derived from the
nature of fideicommissary is that second heir does not inherit from fiduciary but from testator.
The properties belonged to the children, and not to Carmen’s estate. This is because all the
requirements of a fideicommissary substitution are present here, and consequently, the
creditors cannot go against the property. The requisites for a fideicommissary substitution are
present because the first and second heirs exist, in the proper relationship, and were both alive
at the testatrix’s death. The phrase “shall pass unimpaired” and the phrase “should never pass
out of the hands,” show an obligation to preserve and transmit. Finally, the phrase “should
Carmen die after Ana” anticipates a situation where a first heir, Carmen, will later die after
having enjoyed the inheritance.
Page 266 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.

DR. MANUEL SINGSON, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-13876 February 28, 1962
DIZON, J.:
FACTS: The spouses Consolacion Florentino and Francisco Crisologo commenced an action
for partition against Manuel Singson in connection with a residential lot located at Plaridel St.,
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an area of approximately 193 square meters, and the improvements
existing thereon, covered by Tax No. 10765-C. Their complaint alleged that Singson owned
one-half pro-indiviso of said property and that Consolacion Florentino owned the other half by
virtue of the provisions of the duly probated last will of Dña. Leona Singson, the original
owner, and the project of partition submitted to, and approved by the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur in special Proceeding No. 453; that plaintiffs had made demands for the partition of
said property, but defendant refused to accede thereto, thus compelling them to bring action. It
is admitted that Dña. Leona Singson, who died single on January 13, 1948, was the owner of
the property in question at the time of her death. On July 31, 1951 she executed her last will
which was admitted to probate in Special Proceeding No. 453 of the lower court whose decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in G.R. No. 3605-R. At the time of the execution of the
will, her nearest living relatives were her brothers Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, her
nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.Defendant appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testamentary disposition provided for what is called substitucion
vulgar or for a sustitucion fideicomisaria.
Page 267 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
RULING: The last will of the deceased Dña. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion
vulgar, the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective
or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the
testatrix.The substitution of heirs provided for in the will is not expressly made of the
fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during
her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked
ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely
provides that upon appellee's death — whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix
— her share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.The appealed judgment is affirmed,
with costs.
Page 268 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED REV. FATHER

TEODORO ARANAS ET AL. v. VICENTE B. ARANAS AND HON. LUIS B. MANTA
G.R. No. L-56249
29 MAY 1987
FACTS:
Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, died on January 19, 1953. He
executed on June 6, 1946 his Last Will and Testament which was admitted to probate on
August 31, 1956. The administration of the remainder of his estate was contained in the
following provision:
Fourth. It is my will that the lands I had bought from other persons should be
converged and placed under a "special administrator." The special administrator of
these lands, for his office, should receive one half of all the produce from which shall be
deducted the expenses for the administration, and the other half of the produce should
be received by the Roman Catholic Church and should be spent for my soul, Vicente B.
Aranas (Tingting), because he is a faithful and serviceable nephew, should be the first
special administrator of said properties, without bond, until his death or until he should
not want to hold the said office anymore. Anyone of the sons of my brother Carmelo
Aranas can hold the said office of special administrator, and none other than they. Their
father, my brother Carmelo Aranas shall be the one to decide who among them shall
hold the said office, but upon the death of my said brother Carmelo Aranas, his said sons
will have power to select the one among them ourselves. The special administration is
perpetual.
ISSUE: Whether the institution of Vicente Aranas was valid.
HELD:
Yes. The institution of Vicente Aranas was valid. There was the sincere intention and desire of
the testator to reward his nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and unselfish services by
allowing him to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the testator's third group of properties until
Vicente's death and/or refusal to act as administrator in which case, the administration shall
pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas among his sons and upon Carmelo's death, his sons
will have the power to select one among themselves. Vicente Aranas therefore as a usufructuary
has the right to enjoy the property of his uncle with all the benefits which result from the
normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's property, with the obligation to return, at the
designated time, either the same thing, or in special cases its equivalent. This right of Vicente
to enjoy the fruits of the properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as there is a
limitation namely his death or his refusal.
The proviso must be respected and be given effect until the death or until the refusal to act as
such of the instituted usufructuary/administrator, after which period, the property can be
Page 269 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
properly disposed of, subject to the limitations provided in Art. 863 of the Civil Code
concerning a fideicommissary substitution, said Article says:
A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is
entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of
the inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go
beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further, that the fiduciary
or first heir and the second heir are living at the time of the death of the testator.
Page 270 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Vda. De Villanueva v. Juico
G.R. No. L-15737
February 28, 1962
Facts:
On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a
will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona
Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving the other half to his
brother Don Fausto Villaflor. Clause 6th, contained the institution of heirs. The 12th clause of
the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be deemed annulled from
the moment he bore any child with Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. Don Nicolas Villaflor died on
March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The
latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of First
Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's estate and in that proceeding, she was
appointed judicial administratrix.
On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage,
and without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now
being settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with the defendant Delfin N.
Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial administrator. The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor
Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas
Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor". Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted
the present action against the administrator of the estate of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on
February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said plaintiff became vested with
the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to
clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position, adopted by the trial
court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became absolutely vested in the widow upon
her death, on account of the fact that she never remarried.
Issue:
How should the will of the Testator be interpreted.
Ruling:
Page 271 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed
law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and
fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of
the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. ART. 790. The
words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention
to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained." .
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly
indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely
by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense. In this case the
testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided that his widow should
have the possession and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily
follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should pass to
the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if the widow never
remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the
aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for their return,
unless they had been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent
third parties have intervened.
Premises considered, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant Vda. de
Villanueva is declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties described in clause
7 of the will or testament, from the date of the death of Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The records
are ordered remanded to the court of origin for liquidation, accounting and further proceedings
conformably to this decision.
Page 272 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, vs. ANDRE

BRIMO
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Facts
Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of
the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The opposition is based on the fact that the partition in
question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance
with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or
article 10 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to
the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property
or the country in which it may be situated.
The court, however, approved it.
Issues
1. Is the approval of the scheme of partition erroneous?
2. Is the denial of his participation in the inheritance as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one

of the persons designated as such in will proper?
Held
1. No. The oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what
the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
2. No. Such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will. The
institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees
must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law because it
expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to Article 10 of the Civil Code,
such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered
unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid
and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
Page 273 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Santos v. Buenaventura
GR No. L-22797; 18 SCRA 47
September 22, 1966
Facts
Rosalinda filed a petition for the probate of the last will of her aunt Maxima. Under the will, a
specific devise, a fishpond, was bequeathed to Flora, who is not related by blood to Maxima but
was very close to her. Knowing that there was a previous will where she stood to receive more
and having reasonable doubts as to the validity of the execution of will, Flora opposed the
probate of the will. However, after realizing her mistake in contesting the will, Flora withdrew
her opposition. When the probate of the will became final, Flora asked that the fishpond be
delivered to her. Rosalinda opposed Flora on the ground that the specific devise in favor of
Flora was forfeited pursuant to the “no contest and forfeiture” clause also contained in the will,
to wit: “any one of the heirs, devisees and legatees who contests or opposes the probate of the
will shall lose any right to receive any inheritance or benefit under the will.”
Issue
Is the act by Flora of opposing the probate of the will but later on, withdrawing her opposition
considered a violation of the “no contest and forfeiture clause” of the will?
Held
No.
The “no contest and forfeiture” clause in a will was held to be a valid provision. There is said to
be a violation of said clause when the legatee or devisee contested or opposed to the probate of
the will and the carrying out of its provisions resulting to the impairment of the true intention
of the testator.
In this case, the act by of Flora of contesting the probate of the will was made in good faith as it
was based on reasonable ground and her act of withdrawing her opposition to the probate of
the will resulted to the fulfillment of the true intention of Maxima, the testator. Thus, it cannot
be said that Flora violated the no contest and fofeiture clause of the will but rather subserved
the testatrix’ intentions.
Page 274 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Morente vs. Dela Santa

Gr. No. L- 3891
Facts:
In a will executed by Consuelo Morente, cedes upon Gumersindo de la Santa, her

husband all of her real estate. The will also contained the following provision:”that my said
husband shall not elave my brothers after my death, and that he shall not marry anyone; should
my said husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left
by me, except the one- third part thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain for
my brother Vicente or his children should he have any” and after my death I direct my
husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located, which is one of the properties
belonging to me.
Gumersindo dela Santa, married again within four months of the death of the testatrix.
Elena Morente, sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding relating to the probate
of the will of Consuelo in which the alleged marriage of Gumersindo and asked that the legacy
to him abovementioned be annulled. She claims that by mere act of marriage the husband at
once lost all rights acquired by the will.
Issue:
Is there a condition imposed through the will?
Held:
None. It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall
not leave her sisters. It is provided in the third clause that he must continue to live in a certain
building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry again. To no one of these
orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the legacy
given to him by the first clause of the will. It is nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the
testatrix’s sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the will, he shall
forfeit the property given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if he
marries again he shall incur such a loss.
In other words, there being no express condition attached to that legacy in reference to
the second marriage, we cannot say that any condition can be implied from the context of the
will. The law provides that in order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such
condition must fairly appear from the language used in the will.
Page 275 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
UNION BANK vs. SANTIBANEZ
Facts:
On May 31, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim Santibanez entered into a loan agreement in the
amount of P128,000.00. It was intended for the payment of one unit Ford 6600 Agricultural
Tractor. Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favour of the FCCC. The
principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations. FCCC and Efraim entered into
another loan agreement. They executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty
Agreement for the later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. During the
pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence
Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement dated, wherein they agreed to divide between
themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund
and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late
father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. Demand letters for
the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to
Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988,
the petitioner filed a Complaint[11] for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez,
Edmund and Florence.
Issue:
Whethere there is a valid partition.
Held:
None. In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until
after the will has been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which
contained the provision which reads as follows:(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I
own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion
indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my
children. The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left
by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and
other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors.
This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint
agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is
invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding
for the probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the said tractors.
Page 276 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
NAZARENO vs. CA
G.R. No. 138842 October 18, 2000
Justice Mendoza
Facts: Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife, Aurea died on April
15, 1970, while Maximo, Sr. died on December 18, 1980. They had five children, namely,
Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. are the
petitioners in this case, while the estate of Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno
are the respondents.
After the death of Maximo, Sr., Romeo discovered that his parents had executed several deeds
of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad. One of the deeds
involved six lots in Quezon City which were allegedly sold by Maximo, Sr., with the consent of
Aurea, to Natividad on January 29, 1970. By virtue of these deeds, TCTs were issued to
Natividad for lots 3-B, 3, 10, 11, 13 and 14. Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B, which
had been occupied by Romeo, his wife and Maximo Jr.
Romeo presented the Deed of Partition and Distribution executed by Maximo Sr. and Aurea in
1962 and duly signed by all of their children, except Jose, who was then abroad. However, this
deed was not carried out. In 1969, their parents instead offered to sell to them the lots. Romeo
testified that, although the deed of sale executed by his parents in their favor stated that the
sale was for a consideration, they never really paid any amount for the supposed sale. The
transfer was made in this manner in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.
Allegedly, it was only Natividad who bought the lots in question because she was the only one
financially able to do so.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring the nullity of the Deed of Sale dated January 29,
1970, except as to Lots 3, 3-B, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third persons.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was modified in the sense that titles to Lot 3 (in the
name of Romeo Nazareno) and Lot 3-B (in the name of Maximo Nazareno, Jr.) as well as to
Lots 10 and 11 were cancelled and ordered restored to the estate of Maximo Nazareno, Sr.
Hence, the present petition.
Issues:
1. Whether the restoration of the titles to the lots in question to the estate of Maximo Sr. was
proper.
2. Whether or not it was the intention of Maximo Sr. to give the subject lots to Natividad.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Nazareno spouses transferred their properties to their children by fictitious sales in
order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Facts and circumstances indicate badges of a
simulated sale which make the January 29, 1970 sale void and of no effect. Natividad never
Page 277 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
acquired ownership over the property because the Deed of Sale in her favor is also void for
without consideration.
2. Yes. It cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr. intended to give the six Quezon City lots to
Natividad. As Romeo testified, their parents executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Natividad
because the latter was the only “female and the only unmarried member of the family.” She was
thus entrusted with the real properties in behalf of her siblings. As she herself admitted, she
intended to convey Lots 10 and 11 to Jose in the event the latter returned from abroad. There
was thus an implied trust constituted in her favor. Art. 1449 of the Civil Code states:
“There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that although the legal
estate is transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or only a part
thereof.”
There being an implied trust, the lots in question are therefore subject to collation in
accordance with Art. 1061 which states:
“Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate
any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of
the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.”
As held by the trial court, the sale of Lots 13 and 14 to Ros-Alva Marketing, Corporation will
have to be upheld for it is an innocent purchaser for value which relied on the title of Natividad.
Page 278 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA ENRIQUEZ-ZARAGOZA vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALBERTA ZARAGOZA MORGAN
G.R. No. 106401.
September 29, 2000
Facts:
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land situated at the
Municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara, Province of Iloilo. He had four
children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9,
1964, he died intestate, survived by his four children.
On December 28, 1981 Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan, filed a complaint against Spouses
Florentino and Erlinda for delivery of her inheritance and damages. She alleged that her father,
in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties among his four children. The shares of her
brothers and sister were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid
consideration, while her share, which consists of lots no. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way
of deed of sale then. She averred that because of her marriage, she became an American citizen
and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this
reason, no formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering these lots during her
father's lifetime. Petitioners, in their Answer, admitted their affinity with private respondent
and the allegations on the properties of their father. They, however, denied knowledge of an
alleged distribution by way of deeds of sale to them by their father. They said that lot 871 is
still registered in their father's name, while lot 943 was sold by him to them for a valuable
consideration. They denied knowledge of the alleged intention of their father to convey the
cited lots to Alberta, much more, the reason for his failure to do so because she became an
American citizen. They denied that there was partitioning of the estate of their father during
his lifetime.
Issue:
1. Whether there was a valid partition inter vivos.

2. Whether collation can be done where the the original petition for delivery of inheritance
share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs.
Held:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court held that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as
legitimes are not prejudiced pursuant to Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this. The
legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in Article
1061, ―Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the
Page 279 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
2. No. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into
the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the
Unfortunately, collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition for
delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The
petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new
proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination
of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter
vivos.
Page 280 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Lahom vs Sibulo
14 July 2003
FACTS:
The spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom decided to file a petition for
adoption of Jose Melvin Sibulo. Subsequently, an order granting the petition was issued. Thus,
the civil registrar of Naga City, changed the name of Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
Eventually, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption for the
reason that respondent, despite the pleadings of said spouses, refused to change his surname to
Lahom to the frustrations of the spouses. In all the dealings and activities he is Jose Melvin
Sibulo. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone, has yearned for the care and
show of concern from a son, but respondent remained indifferent and would only come to Naga
to see her once a year.
Prior to the institution of the case, RA No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption
Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a
decree of adoption. To this Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition contending that the
petitioner had no cause of action.
ISSUES
Whether or not the adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
always, for a valid reason cause the forfeiture of his inheritance.
RULING:
It was months after the effectively of RA 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to
revoke. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under
the Civil Code. Consistently, the court held that the action for rescission of the adoption decree
no longer could be pursued. However, an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for a valid reason cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise
accruing to an undeserving child. Upon the grounds provided for by law, an adopter may deny
to an adopted child his legitime, and, by will, may freely exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate for the testatrix is of no consequence.
Page 281 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Baritua v. CA
G.R. No. 82233 22 March 1990
FACTS:
Bienvenido Nacario, driving a tricycle along the national highway figured in an accident
with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated by petitioner
Jose Baritua. As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his passenger died and the tricycle was
damaged. No criminal case arising from the incident was ever instituted. Subsequently, on
March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of the matter negotiated by
the petitioners and the bus insurer Philippine First Insurance Company, Incorporated (PFICI
for brevity), Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, received P18,500.00.
In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed on March 27,1980 a "Release of
Claim" in favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them from all
actions, claims, and demands arising from the accident which resulted in her husband's death
and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise executed an
affidavit of desistance in which she formally manifested her lack of interest in instituting any
case, either civil or criminal, against the petitioners.
About one year and ten months from the date of the accident on November 7, 1979, the
private respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages
against the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. In their
complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, the
petitioners through their representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as
extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for the funeral
expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle the purchase price of
which they (the private respondents) only loaned to the victim.
The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and settled
their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the petitioners' payment, is
entitled to it.
Page 282 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
RULING:
Yes. Alicia and her son with the deceased are the successors in interest referred to in
law as the persons authorized to receive payment. It is patently clear that the parents of the
deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand,
the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been established that
Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private respondents are not
successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs.
The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the
widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia
had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the
disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.
The private respondents could not also, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief
and compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents
loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses
for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims against the estate of
their deceased son.
Page 283 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Filomena Pecson vs. Rosario Mediavillo

G.R. No. 7890
September 29, 1914
Facts:
Florencio Pecson's last will and testament was presented for probate. Tomas Lorayes opposed
stating that the will was not signed nor authorized by the deceased. The judge found the will as
valid and denied the opposition. Thereafter, another motion was filed by Lorayes representing
Basiliso and Rosario. The probate court held that Rosario is the heiress of Teresa and is
entitled to one-half of Teresa's share. Filomena appealed.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the probate court was correct.
Held:
Yes. Rosario was disinherited without cause. The law provides that disinheritance shall only
take place when one of the causes expressly fixed by law is present and such disinheritance
must be in a will. Considering the factual antecedents following the disinheritance of Rosario,
she could not be faulted for her tender years and the fact that she became insane shortly
thereafter.
Hence, the case was remanded to the probate court for further proceedings.
Page 284 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF BENIGNO DIAZ Y HEREDIA, DECEASED

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, TRUSTEE. SOLEDAD ROBLES v. ISABEL
MANAHAN DE SANTIAGO AND NESTOR M. SANTIAGO
No. L-10111 31 August 1960
BARRERA, J.:
FACTS:
Benigno Diaz Y Heredia, in his will, created a trust estate out of the properties not
otherwise disposed of. After the death of his wife, Diaz caused the preparation of a codicil. The
testator died and his will and codicil were accordingly probated. The Bank of the Philippine
Islands was appointed Trustee of the trust created by the testator in the will and the codicil, for
the purpose of paying the monthly and yearly legacies of the legatees named therein.
The trustee then petitioned the court, with the consent of all the legatees, for authority
to sell all the properties and liquidate the estate. This petition was granted. The property
located at Rosario, Binondo, Manila was sold to legatee Isabel Manahan de Santiago.
Legatees Soledad Robles and her children filed a motion praying that the trustee be
ordered to deliver to them, in accordance with the will, 90% of the rentals collected from the
property in Rosario; which the trustee refused to deliver contending that upon authorization of
the court of the sale of the properties, the trusteeship ceased already and the rentals collected
thereafter not only from the Rosario property but also from all the other properties of the
estate, constitute the mass of the residuary estate to be distributed among the legatees in
accordance with the terms of the codicil, that is, only 30% and not 90% to the heirs of Domingo
Legarda.
The motion was granted by the court and directed the trustee to deliver to Soledad
Robles and her children, their shares in rentals
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said legatees-appellees still demand their share of the rentals?
RULING:
Yes. From the testamentary provisions of the will, the testator intended the enjoyment
by the legatees, of their respective legacies for the entire duration of the trust estate, even when
the specified properties are sold, the proceeds of which have been directed to be invested in
mortgages with interest, or in the purchase of other rental-bearing properties. The legacies
should therefore be viewed as one whole, continuing obligation based upon a judgment (the will
becomes binding upon probate) and the prescription period is ten years. The fact that the
rentals are to be delivered monthly, did not make each delivery a separate, distinct prestation.
Considering that the obligation terminated upon the sale of the said property on March 18,
1955, the demand for complete delivery of the inheritance has not yet prescribed.
Page 285 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
DEBUQUE V. CLIMACO
99 S 363
AUGUST 27, 1980
FACTS:
On June 22, 1962, Rosendo Javelona, Sr. died intestate and left set of heirs. The first consisting
of his widow and their seven legitimates children and the second set consisting of his
illegitimate children.
To avoid a protracted and expensive court litigation, the parties entered into an amicable
settlement compromise agreement whereby they agreed that the first set of heirs will receive
71.66% of the decedent’s net estate which shall be equally divided among them, while the
second set of heirs will receive 28.38% of the net estate, likewise to be equally divided among
them. This was in accordance with the amended project of partition drawn by the judicial
administrator and the second set of heirs and approved by respondent Judge.
Brenda Javelona Debuque, the youngest legitimate heir, appealed the order after her
emancipation by virtue of her marriage to lawyer Jorge Debuque; the former had acquired most
of the interest of the other legitime. She prayed that the remaining balance belonging to the
estate be proportionately divided between the first and second set of heirs, alleging that because
the total balance exceeds the remaining cash deposit of the estate, payment to the two sets of
heirs should be proportionately reduced.
ISSUE:
Who between the two sets of heirs are liable for the estate’s loss?
HELD:
The members of the first set are solidarily liable for the estate's losses due to the amounts they
have taken and have not restored to the estate, pursuant to Article 947 of the New Civil Code.
The Special Administrator petitioner Arturo, the second eldest legitimate heir and the widow
belong to the first set. The proceeds of the sale of Hacienda Anangui were admittedly received
by the legitimate heirs as seen in the Deed of Absolute Sale and in the Petitioners' Reply and
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.
The pertinent provision of the law provides:
Art. 927. If two or more heirs take possession of the estate, they shall be solidarily liable for the
loss or destruction of a thing devised or bequeathed, even though only one of them should have
been negligent.
Page 286 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
This solidary liability should be understood to cover not only negligence (culpa) but also fraud
(dolo) and delay.
Although the Code Commission says that this Article is for the protection of devisees and
legatees, it may be applied in relation to Article 1087, which provides as follows: chanrobles
virtual law library
Art. 1087. In the partition the co-heirs shall reimburse one another for the income and
fruits which each one of them may have received from any property of the estate, for any useful
and necessary expenses made upon such property, and for any damage thereto through malice
or neglect.
Certainly, the share in the P12,604.31 profit realized from the sale of the decedent's 1/3 interest
in Hacienda Anangui represents income of the estate.
Although the Code Commission says that this Article is for the protection of devisees and
legatees, it may be applied in relation to Article 1087, which provides as follows:
Art. 1087. In the partition the co-heirs shall reimburse one another for the income and
fruits which each one of them may have received from any property of the estate, for any useful
and necessary expenses made upon such property, and for any damage thereto through malice
or neglect.
Certainly, the share in the P12,604.31 profit realized from the sale of the decedent's 1/3 interest
in Hacienda Anangui represents income of the estate.
Page 287 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Vera v. Navarro
G.R. No. L-27745
October 18, 1977
FACTS:
Elsie M. Gaches died on March 9, 1966 without a child. The deceased, however, left a last will
and testament.Respondent Judge Tan filed with the CFI a petition for the probate of the
aforesaid will and Judge Tan was appointed as executor of the testate estate of Elsie M. Gaches
without a bond. In the proceedings, the probate court, on motion of the parties authoritized the
executor to give a monthly allowance to the voluntary heirs Abanto and Eribal from the month
of May, 1966 until "the receipt of the recommended advance of inheritance of P100,000.00 each
recommended by the Executor in his motion of June 6, 1966 and/or final distribution has been
made to said heirs of their respective shares in the estate." The Commissioner advised Judge
Tan to Pay to the BIR the sum of P1,398,436.30 as estate tax and P7,140,060.69 as inheritance
tax. the Commissioner filed with the probate court a proof of claim for the death taxes stated in
the assessment notice sent to Judge Tan. On the same date, the Commissioner also submitted
to the probate court for its resolution a motion praying for the revocation of the court's orders
granting the payment of advance inheritance,allowances and fees.Judge Tan paid to the Bureau
of Internal Revenue the amount of P185,286.93 as estate tax and, on April 24, 1967, the amount
of P1,055,776.00 as inheritance tax. These payments were based on a tax return filed by Atty.
Medina with the Bureau of Internal Revenue.Judge Tan then submitted to the probate court for
approval a final accounting and project of partition of the testate estate which was granted.On
the same day, the Commissioner, having been informed in advance about the foregoing order
by certain undisclosed sources, issued warrants of garnishment against the funds of the estate
deposited with the Philippine National Manila, the overseas Bank of Manila, and the Philippine
Banking Corporation, on the strength of sections 315-330 of the National Internal Revenue
Code.Atty. Medina filed in the probate court a petition for the discharge of the writs of
punishment issued by the commissioner. On June 8, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order
lifting the wants in question.On June 9, 1967, the Philippine National Bank filed a motion in the
probate court praying that it be authorized to deposit with the said court the money in its
hands in view of the conflicting claims of the parties over the funds in dispute. Atty. Medina
was consequently able to withdraw the sum of P2,330,000.00 from the PNB.
ISSUES:
WON the respondent heirs be required to pay first the inheritance tax before the probate court
may authorize the delivery of the hereditary share pertaining to each
of them.
Page 288 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
HELD:
YES. Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides that the distribution of a decedent's
assets may only be ordered under any of the following three circumstances, namely, (1) when
the inheritance tax, among others, is paid; (2) who bond a suffered bond is given to meet the
payment of the tax and all the other options of the nature enumerated in the above-cited
provision; or (3) when the payment of the said tax and at the other obligations mentioned in the
said Rule has been provided for one of these thru camar as the satisfaction of the when tax due
from the estate is were present when the question orders were issued in the case at bar.
Although the respondent Judge did make a condition in its order that the distribution of the
estate of Elsie M. Gaches (except the cash deposits of more than P2 million) shall be trusted to
Atty. Medina for the payment of whatever taxes may be due to the government from the estate
and the heirs them to, the Court cannot subscribe to the proposition that the payment of the tax
due was thereby adequately provided for. In the first place, the order of June 5, l967 was, for all
intents and purposes, a complete distribution of the estate to the heirs. The executor who is
supposed to take care of the estate was absolutely discharged the attorney's fees for the lawyer
who presumably acted as legal counsel for the estate in the court below were ordered paid as
were also the fees for the executor's the cash funds of the estate were paid to the cash and the
non-cash (real property and shares of stock) properties were likewise ordered delivered to Atty.
Medina whose participation in the said proceedings was in the capacity of an attorney-in-fact of
the herein respondent Eribal and Abanto. In short, the probate court virtually withdrew its
custodial jurisdiction over the estate which is the subject of settlement before it. In the second
place the respondent Judge, in the distribution of the properties of the estate in question, rely
solely upon the mere manifestation of the counsel for the heirs Eribal and Abanto that they
were affiant of the estate with which to pay the taxes due to the government. There is no
evidence on record that would show that the probate court ever made a serious attempt to
determine what the values of the different assets the correctness of that such properties shall be
preserved for the satisfaction of those case In the third place that main of pesos taxes were
being called by the BIR, the least reasonable thing that the probate court should have done was
to require the heirs to deposit the amount of inheritance tax being claimed in a suitable
institution or to authorize the sale of non-cash assets under the court's control and supervision..
Page 289 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners, vs.

ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
G.R. No. L-23638. October 12, 1967
FACTS:
Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to the CFI a petition for the probate of
the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930. The will
instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was set for
hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month
later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs
intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds advanced for the
opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent
and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made
by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally
set aside by the Supreme Court.
The CFI found that the will genuinely executed but deferred deciding on the issue of
estoppel and revocation until such time that the opportunity is presented. Oppositors
Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that the issues
of estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved but were denied. The CA later ruled that
the case had become final and executor due to failure to appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Are the issues of revocation necessary to be immediately resolved by the CFI?
2. Had the 1930 will by Benedicta Reyes been impliedly revoked?
HELD:
1. The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the
testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the
testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is
denied, all questions of revocation become superfluous in law, there is no such will and hence
there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the oppositors-
appellants is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix
allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the
properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the
particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the
revoked testament (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.).
2. As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure from the
original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the
circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the
legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision
annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that point by this Supreme Court inReyes vs. Court of
Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620, promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no consideration
whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it
Page 290 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely
intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an
alteration or departure therefrom. Revocation being an exception, in the circumstances of the
particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at
bar.
Page 291 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Bagunu vs Piedad
G.R. No. 140975
December 8, 2000
FACTS:
Augusto H. Piedad died intestate without any direct descendants or ascendants. The trial court
awarded the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad. Pastora Piedad is the maternal aunt of
Augusto. Petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No.
3652, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Proceed ings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad.”
She contends that she has a right to succession given that she is the daughter of the first cousin
of Augusto H. Piedad. She contends that the proceedings were tainted with procedural
infirmities, including an incomplete publication of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice
to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals
by the administrator of the estate. The RTC denied the motion, prompting petitioner to raise
her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis
that the issues brought up on appeal only involved pure questions of law. Finding merit in that
argument, the CA dismissed the appeal, citing Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules
on Civil Procedure which would require all appeals involving nothing else but questions of law
to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with
Rule 45 thereof and consistently with Circular2-90 of the Court.Still unsatisfied, petitioner
contested the resolution of the appellate court in the instant petition forreview on
certiorari. The Supreme Court set aside the alleged procedural decrepitude– there was none -
and took on the basic substantive issue.
ISSUE:
Can petitioner Ofelia Bagunu, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside
respondent Pastora Piedad, a collateral relative of the third civil degree?
HELD:
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent
and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of
representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:
"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones,
saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
Right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending line. In the
collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.
Page 292 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil
degree who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and
descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children
and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews
and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and
nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in
Article 962, afore quoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of
relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives
direction.
"Article 966, In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is
made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees
removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his
first cousin and so forth."
Respondent Pastora Piedad, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto
H. Piedad excludes petitioner Ofelia Baguna, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab
intestate to the estate of the decedent. The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the
Civil Code
"Article 1009, Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters,
the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate."The latter shall succeed without
distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood."
"Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of
relationship in the collateral line."
-invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only that among the
other collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall
be observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit
alongside a paternal uncle, and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a first
cousin of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative, excludes the
cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth-degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would
have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative. The Supreme Court denied the instant
petition.
Page 293 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL vs. ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-

BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 84240
March 25, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of
the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres
PascuaL.
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate,
acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by his spouse; 6 children
of his full blood brother, Wenceslao Pascual,Sr.; 7 children of his half blood brother Pedro-
Bautista; 2 acknowledged natural children of full blood brother Eligio Pascual; and Intestate of
Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased represented by Dominga
Pascual,et al.
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual filed for
administration of the intestate estate of her late husband . She also filed a Supplemental Petition
expressly stating that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres
Pascual.
The RTC issued an order denying the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual, the
acknowledged natural children of the brother of the decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether acknowledged illegitimate children may inherit to a legitimate brother of their father.
HELD:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is
not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in
turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former,
and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate
child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does
no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children. Hence, due to
the Iron-barrier rule, the illegitimate shildren cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in
Page 294 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood
brother of their father.
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate
or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be
represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this
matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done
by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by
virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would
allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or
mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is
inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestatobetween the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother. It may not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the
exception.
Page 295 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
LEONARDO VS. CA
G.R. No. 125485. September 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Restituta Leonardo is the only legitimate child of the late spouses Tomasina Paul
and Balbino Leonardo. Private respondents Teodoro, Victor, Corazon, Piedad, as well as the late
Eduvigis and Dominador, all surnamed Sebastian, are the illegitimate children of Tomasina
with Jose Sebastian after she separated from Balbino Leonardo.
In an action to declare the nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Tomasina
Paul and Jose Sebastian petitioner alleged that, on June 24, 1988, at around 5:00 p.m., private
respondent Corazon Sebastian and her niece Julieta Sebastian, and a certain Bitang, came to
petitioners house to persuade her to sign a deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of
Tomasina Paul and Jose Sebastian. Before signing the document, petitioner allegedly insisted
that they wait for her husband Jose Ramos so he could translate the document which was
written in English. Petitioner, however, proceeded to sign the document even without her
husband and without reading the document, on the assurance of private respondent Corazon
Sebastian that petitioners share as a legitimate daughter of Tomasina Paul was provided for in
the extrajudicial partition. Petitioner then asked private respondent Corazon and her
companions to wait for her husband so he could read the document. When petitioners husband
arrived, however, private respondent Corazon and her companions had left without leaving a
copy of the document. It was only when petitioner hired a lawyer that they were able to secure
a copy and read the contents thereof. Petitioner also claimed that her consent was vitiated
because she was deceived into signing the extrajudicial settlement.
ISSUE:
Whether the consent given by petitioner to the extrajudicial settlement of estate was given
voluntarily.
HELD:
No. The essence of consent is the agreement of the parties on the terms of the contract, the
acceptance by one of the offer made by the other. It is the concurrence of the minds of the
parties on the object and the cause which constitutes the contract. The area of agreement must
extend to all points that the parties deem material or there is no consent at all.
To be valid, consent must meet the following requisites: (a) it should be intelligent, or with an
exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (b) it should be free and (c) it should be
spontaneous. Intelligence in consent is vitiated by error; freedom by violence, intimidation or
undue influence; and spontaneity by fraud.
In determining the effect of an alleged error, the courts must consider both the objective and
subjective aspects of the case which is the intellectual capacity of the person who committed
the mistake.
Page 296 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Mistake, on the other hand, in order to invalidate consent should refer to the substance of the
thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved
one or both parties to enter into the contract.
According to Arturo M. Tolentino, the (old) rule that a party is presumed to know the import
of a document to which he affixes his signature and is bound thereby, has been altered by Art.
1332 of the Civil Code. The provision states that [w]hen one of the parties is unable to read,
or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the
person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to
the former.
Therefore, the presumption of mistake under Article 1332 is controlling, having remained
unrebutted by private respondents. The evidence proving that the document was not fully
explained to petitioner in a language known to her, given her low educational attainment,
remained uncontradicted by private respondents. We find that, in the light of the circumstances
presented by the testimonies of the witnesses for both parties, the consent of petitioner was
invalidated by a substantial mistake or error, rendering the agreement voidable. The
extrajudicial partition between private respondents and petitioner should therefore be annulled
and set aside on the ground of mistake.
Page 297 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Landayan vs. Bacani
G.R. No. L-30455 September 30, 1982
FACTS:
In his lifetime, Teodoro Abenojar owned several parcels of land located in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, and a house and lot in Manila. The said properties were all covered by Torrens
Titles in his name. He died intestate in Urdaneta, on March 20, 1948.
On February 3, 1949, private respondents Maxima Andrada, the surviving spouse of Teodoro
Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar, executed a public document, entitled "Extra-Judicial
Agreement of Partition" whereby they adjudicated between themselves the properties left by
Teodoro Abenojar. Severino Abenojar represented himself in said document as "the only forced
heir and descendant" of the late Teodoro Abenojar.
Petitioners Maria, Segundo, Marcial and Lucio, all surnamed LANDAYAN, alleged that they
are the legitimate children of Guillerma Abenojar, then already deceased, who was the only
child of Teodoro Abenojar with his first wife named Florencia Bautista; and that while Teodoro
Abenojar contracted a second marriage with Antera Mandap and a third with private
respondent Maxima Andrada, he did not have any offspring in any of the said second and third
marriages. They aver that private respondent Severino Abenojar is an illegitimate son of
Guillerma Abenojar. They accordingly pray that they be declared as among the legal heirs of
the deceased Teodoro Abenojar entitled to share in his estate.
ISSUE:
Was the execution of the extra-judicial partition valid?
HELD:
NO. Although the principles relied upon by the respondent Judge are legally correct, he had
unqualifiedly assumed the extra-judicial partition to be merely a voidable contract and not a
void one. This question may not be resolved by determining alone the ground for the
annulment of the contract. It requires an inquiry into the legal status of private respondent
Severino Abenojar, particularly as to whether he may be considered as a "legal heir" of Teodoro
Abenojar and as such entitled to participate in an extra-judicial partition of the estate of said
deceased. This is a most material point on which the parties have asserted conflicting claims.
Understandably so, inasmuch as the question of whether the question document is void or
merely voidable depends largely on such determination.
As stated above, petitioners contend that Severino Abenojar is not a legal heir of Teodoro
Abenojar, he being only an acknowledged natural child of Guillerma Abenojar, the mother of
petitioners, whom they claim to be the sole legitimate daughter in first marriage of Teodoro
Abenojar. If this claim is correct, Severino Abenojar has no rights of legal succession from
Page 298 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Teodoro Abenojar in view of the express provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads
as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.
The right of Severino Abenojar to be considered a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar depends on
the truth of his allegations that he is not an illegitimate child of Guillerma Abenojar, but an
acknowledged natural child of Teodoro Abenojar. On this assumption, his right to inherit from
Teodoro Abenojar is recognized by law. He even claims that he is the sole legal heir of Teodoro
Abenojar inasmuch as the petitioners Landayans, who are admittedly the children of the
deceased Guillerma Abenojar, have no legal successional rights from Teodoro Abenojar, their
mother being a spurious child of Teodoro Abenojar.
Should the petitioners be able to substantiate their contention that Severino Abenojar is an
illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar, he is not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar. The right of
representation is denied by law to an illegitimate child who is disqualified to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. On this supposition, the subject deed of
extrajudicial partition is one that included a person who is not an heir of the descendant
whose estate is being partitioned. Such a deed is governed by Article 1105 of the Civil Code,
reading as follows:
Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be
void only with respect to such person.
It could be gathered from the pleadings filed by the petitioners that they do not seek the
nullification of the entire deed of extra-judicial partition but only insofar as the same deprived
them of their shares in the inheritance from the estate of Teodoro Abenojar; Should it be
proved, therefore, that Severino Abenojar is, indeed, not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar, the
portion of the deed of extra-judicial partition adjudicating certain properties of Teodoro
Abenojar in his favor shall be deemed inexistent and void from the beginning in accordance
with Articles 1409, par. (7) and 1105 of the Civil Code.
Page 299 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Vda. De Crisologo, et al., petitioners, v. CA, et al., respondents

137 SCRA 231, G.R. No. L-44051
June 27, 1985
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for ownership, annulment of sale, and delivery of possession
of various properties, with writ of preliminary injunction and damages against the private
respondent. They claim to be the legal heirs of the vendor, Lutgarda Capiao, who executed four
deeds of sale covering 17 parcels of land and a residential house, which they sought to annul, in
favor of the private respondent.
Petitioners allege that Lutgarda was the illegitimate child of Julia Capiao with
Victoriano Taccad, with whom she had an extra-marital affair with. Lutgarda and her husband
Raymundo Zipagan both died without any children and/or immediate forced heirs. Without
any will, inestate succession took place and the petitioners, as relatives within the fifth civil
degree to her, were consequently instituted as Lutgarda's legal heirs and were legally entitled
to inherit all the properties which were hers by virtue of the extrajudicial partition.
The private respondent, on the other hand, contends that the petitioners are not the real
parties in interest and have no cause of action much less personality to maintain the
proceedings since they are complete strangers to Lutgarda Capiao, the latter being the
illegitimate daughter of the late Julia Capiao, and given the circumstances, the respondent is
entitled to a summary judgement as a matter of law.
The respondent judge rendered a summary judgement dismissing the amended

complaint holding that the petitioners cannot inherit from Lutgarda, the latter being an
illegitimate child.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners, who are relatives of Julia Capiao, may inherit from Lutgarda
Capiao, the illegitimate child?
Held:
No, they may not inherit from Lutgarda Capiao. Under Article 992 of the Civil Code:
Art. 992. Illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit
in the same manner from the illegitimate child
Page 300 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
The prohibition is based on the clear and unmistakable provision of Article 992 of the
New Civil Code. Neither can Lutgarda Capiao inherit from the legitimate relatives of Julia
Capiao who are the plaintiffs in the instant case.
Page 301 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
GAUDENCIO BICOMONG vs. GERONIMO ALMANZA
G.R. No. L-37365
November 29, 1977
FACTS:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859 Of this marriage
there were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic, Igmedia Bagsic, and Ignacio Bagsic.
Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso. Of this second marriage
were born two children, Felipa Bagsic and Maura Bagsic. Simeon Bagsic died sometime in
1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only
heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19, 1944 survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino,
Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino.
Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945. Surviving her are her heirs, the plaintiffs
Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952
leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the
second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the
present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband,
the defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her father Geronimo Almanza.
The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half
undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land which she
inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso.
Page 302 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to Cristela
Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs
approached her and requested for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they were
prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last
illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition
of the same, the plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time
Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had already been paid.
Unfortunately, she died without the division of the properties having been effected, thereby
leaving the possession and administration of the same to the defendants.
ISSUE:
What provisions are applicable in the case at bar?
HELD:
We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are
applicable to the admitted facts of the case at bar.
In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,

Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her
husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving
collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of
her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the
New Civil Code.
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to
inherit in their own right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, I965, 14
SCRA 986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased."
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the
nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether
their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the
Page 303 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their
right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil
Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double
that of the nephews and nieces of half blood. Such distinction between whole and half blood
relationships with the deceased has been recognized in Dionisia Padura, et al. vs. Melanie
Baldovino, et al., No. L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065 (unreported) and in Alviar vs.
Alviar, No. L-22402, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 610).
The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa
Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood citing
Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual
assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true
as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.
Page 304 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Salao v. Salao
G.R. No. L-26699 March 16, 1976
AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal begot
four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885.
His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child. Valentin Salao.
There is no documentary evidence as to what, properties formed part of Manuel Salao's estate,
if any. His widow died on May 28, 1914. After her death, her estate was administered by her
daughter Ambrosia.
It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but notarized on May 22,
1919. The deed was signed by her four legal heirs, namely, her three children, Alejandra, Juan
and Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao, in representation of his deceased father,
Patricio.
To each of the legal heirs of Valentina Ignacio was adjudicated a distributive share valued at
P8,135.25. In satisfaction of his distributive share, Valentin Salao was given the biggest
fishpond with an area of 50,469 square meters, a smaller fishpond with an area of 6,989 square
meters and the riceland with a net area of 9,905 square meters. Those parcels of land had an
aggregate appraised value of P13,501 which exceeded Valentin's distributive share. So in the
deed of partition he was directed to pay to his co-heirs the sum of P5,365.75. That
arrangement, which was obviously intended to avoid the fragmentation of the lands, was
beneficial to Valentin.
The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio her
two children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of
the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names for a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at
Sitio Calunuran, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 14). It is also known as Lot No. 540 of the Hermosa
cadastre because that part of Lubao later became a part of Bataan.
The Calunuran fishpond is the bone of contention in this case.
Plaintiffs' theory is that Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his sister Ambrosia had engaged in the fishpond
business. Where they obtained the capital is not shown in any documentary evidence. Plaintiffs'
version is that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in that joint venture, that the
funds used were the earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and
that those earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is no
documentary evidence to support that theory.
Page 305 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Calunuran fishpond consisted of lands
purchased by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao in 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1908 as, shown in
their Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 13. But this point is disputed by the plaintiffs.
ISSUE:
Was there an implied trust created by the parties?
HELD:
There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on the part of
Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust. There was no
constructive trust because the registration of the two fishponds in the names of Juan and
Ambrosia was not vitiated by fraud or mistake. This is not a case where to satisfy the demands
of justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran fishpond " being held in trust by the heirs of
Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin Salao.
And even assuming that there was an implied trust, plaintiffs' action is clearly barred by
prescription or laches (Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284; Quiniano
vs. Court of Appeals, L-23024, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 221; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, 9,
February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503; Alzona vs. Capunitan and Reyes, 114 Phil. 377).
Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied trust in
this case, the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten year (Sec. 40; Diaz vs.
Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266).
The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand for its
reconveyance was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in 1952 or after the
lapse of more than forty years from the date of registration. The plaintiffs and their
predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept on their rights if they had any rights at all.
Vigilanti prospiciunt jura or the law protects him who is watchful of his rights (92 C.J.S. 1011,
citing Esguerra vs. Tecson, 21 Phil. 518, 521).
Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of the
Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer n to Pass upon the validity of the donation made by
Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two fishponds The plaintiffs
have no right and personality to assil that donation.
Page 306 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS:

FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,vs.GAUDENCIA FERRARIS
DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS, JUANITO FERRARIS and
CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter,
up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate,
she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years
having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively
dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the estate
of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was adjudicated to her
in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court.
The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but
was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and
half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and
Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only
brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes
of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said
Melodia Ferraris.
ISSUE: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived
only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him or
her? Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the
inheritance or will the former be excluded by the latter?
Page 307 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
HELD: We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the
nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of
relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then
descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that
nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless
concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and
nieces of the de cujusexclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the
succession.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the
succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that
immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386).
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces
inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after
the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a
par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering
the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals.
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and
aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and
are willing and qualified to succeed.
Page 308 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
MANUNGAS V LORETO
GR 193161
AUGUST 22 2011
FACTS:
On November 4, 2002, the RTC issued an Order reversing itself and ordering the revocation of
its earlier appointment ofParreo as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas while
appointing Diosdado as the Special Administrator.[13] Parreo and Loreto appealed the ruling
of the RTC to the CA. The CA issued its assailed April 30, 2009 Decision finding thatthe RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking its earlier appointment of Parreo as the
administrator of the Estate ofManungas and appointing Diosdado instead. The CA further
reinstated Parreo as the special administrator of the estate. Thedispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated November
4, 2002 settingaside the appointment of Florencia Parreo as special administrator of the estate
of the late Engracia Vda. deManungas, and denying the property bond posted by
Florencia Parreo [is] hereby declared NULL andVOID and SET ASIDE as having been
issued by Public Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court,Branch 2, Tagum City,
Davao del Norte with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction. SO
ORDERED.[14] Diosdado assailed the CA Decision in a Motion for Reconsideration dated
May 15, 2009[15] which the CA denied in the July 21,2010 Resolution. Hence, We have this
petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court a Quo committed a grave error when it ruled to annul the
appointment of petitioner, Diosdado Manungas as judicial administrator and reinstating
the appointment of Florencia Parreo as special administrator
HELD:
The RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
The lower court stated in its November 4, 2002 Order that:

After carefully scrutinizing the arguments and grounds raised by both petitioner and
oppositors, this Court finds merit in the contention of petitioner. In the case of Gonzales vs.
Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 324, the Supreme Court ruled:
The presence of illegitimate children precludes succession by collateral relatives to his estate;
Diosdado Manungas, being the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas inherits the latters
property by operation of law;
Page 309 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA

EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD, MARIAN H. ABAD and ROSEMARIE S. ABAD,
respondents.
G.R. No. 117740 October 30, 1998
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS: On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and
Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de
Mesa Abad, before the then Court of First Instance of Manila. In their petition, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 86792, petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de
Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972, petitioners amended their petition by
alleging that the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021, listed therein
as belonging to the decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the true owner
being their late mother, Lucila de Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the trial court appointed Cesar de
Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.
Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of

their late mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots covered
by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the
above-mentioned TCTs in the name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No.
108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina Abad Gonzales. The three promptly
executed real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs. Josefina Viola, the wife
of their counsel, Escolastico Viola.
ISSUE: Are respondents acknowledged children?
HELD: Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abad's filiation, submit the
startling theory that the husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when
Cecilia and Marian Abad were born in 1948 and 1954, respectively.
Page 310 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was
married to Jose Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and
Maria Nina, prior to the birth of Cecilia and Marian. But while private respondents claim that
Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners claim that the latter died sometime in 1971.
The date of Jose Libunao's death is important, for if he was still alive in 1971, and given that he
was legally married to Honoria Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and Marian
are not Ricardo Abad's children with the latter, but of Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado.
First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say
the least, far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that one's parent is
"deceased" is not necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form
was being accomplished. Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro
Ramos as to the supposed death of Jose Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the
latter's death at that time, being merely secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunao's death
certificate would have been the best evidence as to when the latter died. Petitioners have,
however, inexplicably failed to present the same, although there is no showing that said death
certificate has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Jose Libunao's death. More
telling, while the records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain Jose Bautista Libunao
was indeed buried there in 1971, this person appears to be different from Honoria Empaynado's
first husband, the latter's name being Jose Santos Libunao. Even the name of the wife is
different. Jose Bautista Libunao's wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos
Libunao was Honoria Empaynado.
Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert,
however, that the finding as to Ricardo Abad's "sterility" does not blacken the character of the
deceased. Petitioners conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose when the latter
contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that
society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the attendant embarrassment of
contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any
patient. We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And the same remains inadmissible
in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad.
Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish their
claim by the quantum of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the evidence presented
by private respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged natural children
of Ricardo Abad.
Page 311 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Page 312 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
MANUEL VS. FERRER

G.R. No. 117246
August 21, 1995,
247 SCRA 476
FACTS:
Spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling are the parents of the petitioners. During their
marriage, Antonio had an illicit relationship with Ursula Bautista where he had an illegitimate
child, Juan Manuel.
Juan Manuel, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter
nuptias over a parcel of land was executed by Laurenciana Manuel (wala sa case kung sino ito).
Two other parcels of land were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. Their desire to
have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their
fold and so raised her as their own "daughter".
In 1990, Juan Manuel died and two years thereafter, Esperanza died. An affidavit of self-
adjudication was executed by Modesta and the properties of Juan were transferred under the
name of Modesta. Subsequently, Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa
Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of
the land that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de
Retro. Thereafter, petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.
RTC: dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their
illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit.
Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the
other half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of
Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing thusly:
Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by
his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate.
Page 313 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces,
she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half. (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of
the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in
the same manner from the illegitimate child. (Emphasis supplied)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to one-half of the estate of Juan pursuant to Article
994?
RULING:
No. The respondent correctly argued that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with
Article 992.
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on
succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the
illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between
legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does
not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the
presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the
illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this
barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate
child. Consequently, when the law speaks of"brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal
heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the
children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters.
Page 314 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" 14 in the case, had neither the standing nor
the cause of action to initiate the complaint.
Page 315 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Ramirez v. Bautista
G.R. No. L-5075
December 1, 1909
FACTS:
Moises Ramirez, who died intestate, was married twice. In his first marriage, he had five (5)
children, named Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia. Under his second marriage,
he had three (3) children namely Cirila, Isabel, and Serapio, of whom Isabel alone survives. His
wives predeceased him and at the time of his death he left two fish ponds.
The children of the first marriage sold the two fish ponds, to Simeon Bautista
and Raymundo Duran for P1,100.00. The only surviving child of the second marriage, Isabel,
was not a party to said sale. A case was filed by the administrator of the intestate estate to have
the sale declared null and void and the fish ponds restored to the intestate estate of Moises.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fishponds are subject to intestate succession.
RULING:
Yes. It was determined by the Court that the status of the two fish ponds was of community of
property. The fishponds were acquired during the first marriage. Therefore the
conjugal gains on property should have applied.
The Court laid down the following rules:
When two or more heirs appear at the opening of a testamentary succession, or during the
progress of the settlement of an intestate estate, and each turns out to be an owner pro
indiviso of the inheritance, by reason of the share he may be entitled to receive, a community of
property then exists between the participants as long as the estate remains undivided and
nothing more tangible can be imagined than this necessary community, which arose at
the moment when the coheirs assumed the entire representation of the person of the deceased
with respect to all of his property, rights, and actions, both active and passive.
Every co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and in the fruitsand benefits derived there
from, and he therefore may alienate, assign, or mortgage it, and even substitute another person
in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question. But the effect of the alienation or
mortgage, with regard to the co-owners, shall be limited to the share which may be awarded
him in the division on the dissolution of the community.
Applying the said rules, the death of the mother vested in the children of the first marriage
their mothers half share. The death of Moises entitled his eight children to a share each in the
fishponds. Therefore, Isabella, being the lonesurvivor of her siblings, was entitled to a 3/16
share of the total property.
Page 316 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
The Court held that Rosa, Carmen, Francisco, Mauricia, and Ignacia Ramirez could have
lawfully alienated their respective shares in the joint ownership of the two parcels of land. The
sale to the defendants, Simeon Bautista and RaymundoDuran was the sale of 13/16 of the said
two properties and could not have been void. It was the sale of the 3/16 which belonged
to Isabela alone which was void.
Simeon Bautista and Raymundo Duran succeed to the vendors should have been validly
subrogated in the joint ownership of the two fish ponds sold and that the shares that redounded
to them were the same that were owned by the vendors, which was, 13/16 of the two
properties.
Page 317 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO

SANTILLON v.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES
G.R. No. L-19281
30 JUNE 1965
FACTS:
On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament leaving one son, Claro, and his wife,
Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land. About four
years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. However,
Perfecta was appointed as executor. As to the dispute on the share of each heir, Claro claimed ¾
of Pedro's inheritance based from Article 892 of the New Civil Code, while Perfecta claimed ½
based from Article 996 of the same Code.
ISSUE: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors
are the spouse and one legitimate child?
HELD:
Article 996 of the New Civil Code will apply. Article 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the
chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas Article 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or
Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Article 892 to
support his claim to ¾ of his father's estate. The provision merely fixes the legitime of the
surviving spouse.
Under Article 996, when the widow survives with only one legitimate child, they share the
estate in equal parts. Thus, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the
surviving spouse. It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the
singular. So Article 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower and
a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child."
Page 318 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Pisueña v. Heirs of Petra Unating
G.R. No. 132803
August 31, 1999
Facts:
The lot in dispute, known as Lot 1201, Cadastral 228 of the Cadastral of Ivisan, Capiz, located
at Barangay Cabugao, Municipality of Ivisan, Province of Capiz, is a registered land in the
name of Petra Unating married to Aquilino Villar. Petra Unating died on October 1, 1948
while Aquilino Villar died on January 14, 1953. The spouses had two [legitimate] children,
namely Felix Villar and Catalina Villar. Felix Villar died on October 24, 1962, while Catalina
Villar died on February 21, 1967. For the purpose of this case, Felix Villar is represented by
Dolores Villar Bautista, the eldest of his four children while Catalina Villar is represented by
Salvador Villar Upod, the eldest of her three (3) children, all as plaintiffs herein respondents.
Defendant Jessie Pisueña, is the son-in-law of Agustin Navarra who was once a municipal
mayor of the Municipality of Ivisan. Agustin Navarra died on October 30, 1958.
Plaintiffs respondents herein contend that during the lifetime of the registered owners, Petra
Unating and Aquilino Villar, they enjoyed the absolute ownership and possession of Lot No.
1201. However, sometime in 1950 (after the death of Petra Unating on October 1, 1948)
Aquilino Villar entered into an oral partnership agreement for ten (10) years with Agustin
Navarra involving the swampy portion of the lot in question consisting of around four (4)
hectares. On the other hand, defendant counters that the whole land in dispute was sold by
Felix Villar and Catalina Villar to Agustin Navarra on February 2, 1949. The contract in
Spanish captioned ―ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA‖ to evidence such sale was duly
notarized by Jose Villagracia, Notary Public, and was entered in his Notarial Register.
Issue:
Whether or not the lot belongs to the petitioners.
Ruling:
Yes. Cadastral proceedings are proceedings in rem; like ordinary registration proceedings, they
are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure and evidence. Thus, the finding of the
cadastral court that Petra Unating inherited the lot in question from her mother cannot be
dismissed as an obiter, which is ―an observation made by the court not necessary to the
decision rendered.‖ Thus the lot is her paraphernal property.
Page 319 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
As already shown, the disputed lot was paraphernal. Since Petra Unating did not leave any
other property, will or debt upon her demise in 1948, the property in question was thus
inherited by her children, Felix and Catalina Villar; and her husband, Aquilino Villar.
The two children were entitled to two-thirds of their mother‘s estate, while the husband was
entitled to the remaining one-third. By virtue of the Deed of Sale they executed, Felix and
Catalina effectively transferred to Agustin Navarra on February 4, 1949, their title over their
two-thirds share in the disputed lot. However, they could not have disposed of their father‘s
share in the same property at the time, as they were not yet its owners. At the most, being the
only children, they had an inchoate interest in their father‘s share.
When Aquilino Villar died in 1953 without disposing of his one-third share in the disputed
property, Felix and Catalina‘s inchoate interest in it was actualized, because succession vested
in them the title to their father‘s share and, consequently, to the entire lot. Thus, that title
passed to Agustin Navarra, pursuant to Article 1434 of the present Civil Code, which was
already in force at the time of Aquilino‘s death in 1953.
Consequently, upon the death of Aquilino Villar, the ownership of the whole of Lot No. 1201
became vested in Jessie Pisueña and his wife as successors-in-interest.
Page 320 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
JOVENCIO ARCENAS, NEMESIO ACAIN, and ROSA DIONGSON vs. HON.

ANTONIO D. CINCO, Presiding Judge, Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Cebu,
and TEODORA VDA. DE ARCENAS
G.R. No. L-29288 November 29, 1976
Facts
Alfonso Arcenas died intestate, leaving as his heirs his wife, Teodora Vda. de Arcenas,
and his only son, Jovencio Arcenas. He left three parcels of land located in (a) Cabangbang,
Bantayan, Cebu; (b) Sillon, Bantayan, Cebu; and (c) Poblacion of Bantayan, Cebu. The parcels of
land in Cabangbang and Sillon were sold, with right of repurchase, by Jovencio to Nemesio
Acain and Rosa Diongson without the knowledge and conformity of Teodora.
Teodora waived her right to the lot in the Poblacion of Bantayan in favor of Jovencio,
but sought to enforce her rights as heir on the properties in Cabangbang and Sillon. Jovencio
and spouses Acain agreed to return voluntarily the share of Teodora in the properties situated
at Cabangbang and Sillon.
Teodora contended that the surviving spouse is entitled to a share equivalent to 1/2 of
the estate, while her son is entitled to the other half, under Article 996 of the New Civil Code.
On the other hand, the herein petitioners claimed that since the surviving spouse survived with
one legitimate son, she is entitled to only 1/4 of the entire estate, while her son is entitled to
3/4 thereof.
The court a quo declared Teodora as the lawful owner in fee simple of an undivided 1/2
share of the properties in Cabangbang and Sillon, while Jovencio as the exclusive owner of the
land in Poblacion. Teodora moved for the issuance of a Writ of Execution but was opposed by
petitioners who contended that the decision is interlocutory as it did not finally dispose of the
action but left something for the parties to do—to partition the property and submit the
corresponding agreement of partition to the court for its approval.
Issue
Is the decision of respondent court in Civil Case No. P-118, dated June 9, 1967,
immediately executory and, therefore, not appealable?
Held
No.
If the parties to a litigation submitted a compromise agreement to the court for approval
and in the absence of opposition, the court renders judgment strictly in accordance with such
agreement, the judgment rendered is not appealable. It is immediately executory, except that in
case a motion to set aside the compromise on the ground of fraud, an order of the court denying
such motion may be appealed. The judgment rendered has the authority of res judicata from the
moment it was rendered and is conclusive upon the parties and their privies.
But, the decision of June 9, 1967 was not a judgment based on a judicial compromise but
one based on an agreed statement of facts. While the parties in the "Stipulation of Facts" were
in agreement that Teodora had a share in the said properties, they were in disagreement as to
the extent of the share of said widow. The statement of facts submitted by the parties did not,
therefore, put an end to the lawsuit because it did not definitely determine which specific
portion of the property sold by Jovencio to the Acain spouses should be returned to the
surviving spouse, which was the main purpose of the action instituted by the latter.
Page 321 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Moreover, the case is also an action of partition. The Order of the left something more
to be done in the trial court for the complete disposition of the case, such as appointment of the
commissioner and submission by the latter of his report which must be set for hearing. It is
only after said hearing that the court may render a final judgment finally disposing of the
action.
In Re: Chanliongco
A.M. No. 190; 79 SCRA 364
October 18, 1977
Facts
Atty. Mario Chanliongco died intestate leaving his widow, Dra. Fidel, his legitimate child
Mario II, two illegitimate children: Ma. Angelina and Mario, Jr. During his lifetime, Atty.
Mario filed an application for membership with the GSIS stating that the retirement benefits
shall accrue to his estate and will be distributed among his legal heirs. Upon his death, his
retirement benefits amounted to P78,140.10 and his net proceeds from his terminal leave pay,
unpaid salary and 10% salary adjustment amounted to P13, 505.45.
Issue
How will the monetary benefits of Atty. Mario be distributed among the his legal heirs.
Held
First, one-half of the net proceeds from the salaries should go to Dra. Fidel as her conjugal
share. Then the retirement benefits together with the other half of the net proceeds shall be
distributed as follows:
Retirement Net
Legal Heirs Share Total
Benefits Proceeds
Dra. Fidel (widow) 1) 1/2 (as conjugal 0 6,752.72
share) 19,535.025 1,688.18 27,975.93
2) 1/4 (as legal heir
Mario II (legitimate 1/2 39,070.05 3,376.36 42,446.41
son)
Ma. Angelina and 1/4; 1/8 each 19,535.025; 1,688.18 21,223.22
Mario Jr. or 9,767.51 844.10 10,611.61 each
(illegitimate each each
children)
Total 78,140.10 13,505.45 91,645.55
Page 322 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Portea vs Pabellon
Gr. No. L- 1367
August 16, 1949
Facts:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the CFI of Quezon holding that upon the death
of Pablo Luce, all his properties were inherited by his legitimate daughter Cristeta Luce who
survived him for at least half an hour, she having died about half an hour after the death of her
father.
In the notice filed by the petitioner, it was announced that the appeal was taken from
said judgment to the Supreme Court, on the ground that the question involved is one of law;
and in the record on appeal filed by him and approved by the trial court, it was prayed that the
case be certified and elevated to the Supreme Court, as only a question of law is involved.
The appellant insists that, since there is no proof as to the definite time of the death of
Pablo Luce and his daughter, the law applicable is that there is a presumption that, in the
absence of any showing as to which of two persons died first, the person between the ages of 15
and 60 is presumed to have survived the person under 15 or over 60. In this connection, it is
alleged that Pablo was 45 years old and Cristeta was only 13 years old.
Issue:
Whether or not the property of Luce is included in the intestate proceedings.
Held:
Yes. In the face of the factual conclusion of the trial court that Pablo Luce died half an
hour before Cristeta died, which finding the appellant is now estopped to controvert and which
is furthermore supported by the evidence, the rule cited by the appellant regarding the
disputable presumption of survivorship cannot apply.
The appellant contends that, even assuming Cristeta survived her father, her estate
should still be adjudicated to the appellant who is nephew of Pablo. Reliance is placed on
Article 925 of the Civil Code providing that the right to representation shall always take place
in the direct descending line but never in the ascending, and that in the collateral line, it shall
take place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters, whether they may be of the
whole or half blood. It is intimated that because the oppositors are not in the direct decending
line, but are only maternal grandparetns of Cristeta, they cannot inherit by representation.
Aside from the fact that the trial court correctly withheld any adjudications as to the estate of
Cristeta, because it is not included in the intestate proceedings instituted by the petitioner, said
oppositors are claiming inheritance from their grandchild in their own right as ascendants, and
not merely by right of representation, it appearing that the said Cristeta did not leave any
legitimate children or ascendants.
Page 323 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
BARANDA vs. BARANDA

Gr. No. 73275
May 20, 1987
Facts: An old woman dying without issue and without a will and her collaterals wrangling
over her properties. Before the owner's death, two of the claimants had already taken over her
properties by virtue of certain supposed transfers. A subsequent complaint filed by Paulina
Baranda against her nieces in which she alleged that she had signed the said deeds of sale
without knowing their contents and prayed that Evangelina and Elisa be ordered to reconvey
the lands subject thereof to her. This was withdrawn. In exchange, defendants obligated
themselves to execute absolute deeds of sale covering the properties in favour of the plaintiff.
Only, Elisa reconveyed the lot deeded to her. Evangeline never complied. Heirs of Paulina filed
a complaint for the annulment of the sale and the reconveyance of the lots,with damages.
Issue : Whether petitioners have the capacity to question the validity of the deed of sale, being
not the legitimate and compulsory heirs of Paulina Baranda nor were they parties to the
challenged transactions.
Held: Yes. As heirs, the petitioners have legal standing to challenge the deeds of sale
purportedly signed by Paulina Baranda for otherwise property claimed to belong to her estate
will be excluded therefrom to their prejudice. Their claims are not merely contingent or
expectant, as argued by the private respondents, but are deemed to have vested in them upon
Paulina Baranda's death in 1982, as, under Article 777 of the Civil Code, "the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." While they are not
compulsory heirs, they are nonetheless legitimate heirs and so, since they "stand to be benefited
or injured by the judgment or suit," are entitled to protect their share of successional rights
Page 324 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
ARMAS vs. CALISTERIO

G.R. NO. 136467 April 6, 2000
Justice Vitug
Facts: On April 24, 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died instestate, leaving several parcels of land
with an estimated value of P604, 750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, Marietta
Calisterio. Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to
James William Bounds. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on February 11, 1947.
Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on May 8, 1958, without Marietta
having priorly securing a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.
On October 9, 1992, Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the
Regional Trial Court a petition entitled, “in the Matter of Instestate Estate of the Deceased
Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos,” Antonia Armas claiming to be the sole surviving heir of
Teodorico Calisterio, and that the marriage between the latter and Marietta Espinosa
Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. Marietta opposed the petition,
saying that her first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter’s absence,
his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her second
marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought
priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent.
On January 17, 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia
and declared the latter as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos.
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals which
ruled in her favor.
Issue: Whether or not the second marriage, having contracted during the regime of the Civil
Code, should be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of James Bounds.
Ruling: Yes. The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and Marietta was solemnized on
May 8, 1958 and the law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which
took effect only on August 3, 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its retroactive
governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 (2) of the New
Civil Code which provides:
“Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without
the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for
less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time
of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390
and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void
by a competent court.”
Page 325 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Under the foregoing provisions a judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not
necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the
marriages in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed
valid “until declared null and void by a competent court.” It follows that the burden of proof
would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
Unlike the Family Code, the New Civil Code does not necessitate a judicial declaration of
absence of the absentee spouse as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. The second
marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the New Civil Code should thus be
deemed valid.
Page 326 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Halili vs Court of Appeals

12 March 1998
Facts:
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real properties
in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, defendant appellee Helen Meyers Guzman,
and his son, defendant appellee Rey Guzman, both of whom are also American citizens. On
August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim, assigning, transferring and conveying to
David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of
them inherited from Simeon. Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation which was
issued in the name of appellee David Rey Guzman. Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining
lot, filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, questioning the
constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances -- between Helen Guzman and David Rey
Guzman, and between the latter and Emiliano Cataniag -- and claiming ownership thereto
based on their right of legal redemption.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject lands in questions be the proper subject of succession.
HELD:
In view of the finding that the subject land is urban in character, petitioners have indeed
no right to invoke Art. 1621 of the Civil Code, which presupposes that the land sought to be
redeemed is rural. The provision is clearly worded and admits of no ambiguity in construction:
―ART. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of redemption when a
piece of rural land, the area of which does not exceed one hectare, is alienated, unless the
grantee does not own any rural land.
SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or

conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain. Non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of
the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. If land is invalidly transferred to an
alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Accordingly,
since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the
prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed.
Page 327 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES

vs. FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX
ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES
G.R. No. L-40789
February 27, 1987
Facts:
On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was
survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales
Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a
child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate
of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about P30,000.00.
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased. In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order
dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and
prescribing their respective share of the estate —
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales,
1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that
she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Issue:
Whether or not a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law.
Held
No. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their
own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. Restated, an intestate heir can
only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the
Civil Code, or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a surviving spouse is an intestate heir
of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit
from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The
provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession enumerate with
meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir.
The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the
deceased all the more confirms our observation. If the legislature intended to make the
surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Page 328 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Page 329 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Resureccion v. Javier
G.R. No. L-42539 ; October 23, 1936
FACTS:
Felisa Francisco Javier made a will instituting her husband Sulpicio Resurrection as her
universal heir and left a legacy in favor of her brother Gil Javier on October 18, 1932. She later
died on January 22, 1933 and her will was probated March 8, 1934. On October 12, 1933, the
probate court discovered that Gil Javier had already died prior to the making of the will. Thus,
it ordered that the legacy in his favor be reverted to the estate. The heirs of Gil Javier appealed
the court‘s resolution, claiming that they are entitled to receive the legacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a legacy made in favor of a person who was already dead before the will
was made is valid?
RULING:
No, upon the institution as a legatee by the testatrix, Gil Javier lacked civil personality
due to his death thus he may not be capacitated to inherit by will. Further, he may not also be
represented because it takes place only during intestate inheritance and no right could have
been transmitted because he was already dead at the time of the making of the will. The
Supreme Court also observed that even if the testatrix knew that her brother was
already dead, her intention cannot be explained why she still left the legacy in favor of her
brother and not of her children thus the court cannot admit that it was her intention to leave
the legacy to her children.
Page 330 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Sofia Nepomuceno vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. L-62952
October 9, 1985
Facts:
Martin Jugo died with a will. He named Sofia as his sole and only executor. He had two other
legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita from his first wife whom he had been estranged from.
Martin gave to his children and wife his whole estate and the free portion was given to Sofia.
The will was filed for probate. Rufina and her children opposed. The lower court denied the
petition. Petitioner appealed. The CA reversed but stated that the giving of the free portion to
Sofia is invalid. After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, this petition was filed.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the CA is correct.
Held:
Yes. The court acted within its jurisdiction when it declared the will to be validly drawn and
declared the devise in favor of Sofia to be null and void. There is no question that Martin was
validly married to Rufina and had two children with her. There was no good faith present when
Martin and Sofia go married before a Justice of the Peace. The will had expressly admitted that
there was an invalid marriage between Martin and Sofia. Furthermore, the Civil Code prohibits
a donation made by persons who are living in adultery or concubinage.
Hence, the petition was dismissed by the Court and the CA's decision was affirmed.
Page 331 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF

PETE ROXAS DE JESUS,a.k.a. PETER ROXAS DE JESUS OR PEDRO DE JESUS,
MARIA TERESA LAZATIN DE JESUS v. SALVE BARICAN DE JESUS, FRANCIS
GILBERT DE JESUS, MARIA JOVELYN DE JESUS AND JENIFER DE JESUS
G.R. No. 168733.
March 27, 2006
FACTS:
Pete Roxas de Jesus (Pete) married respondent Salve Barican on 4 September 1960.
Their union produced three children named Francis Gilbert, Maria Jocelyn, and Jennifer, all
surnamed de Jesus and all co-respondents in this case. Sometime in May 1977, Pete emigrated
to the United States of America. In December of 1977, he obtained a divorce decree against
Salve and married petitioner, Maria Teresa Lazatin de Jesus, in the state of Nevada. Notably,
however, he only became a citizen of the United States in 1988. He died in Daly City,
California, on 4 December 1994.
On 3 March 1995, petitioner instituted with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
33, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of the decedent, entitled "In the matter of
the Petition for the Probate of the Will of Pete Roxas de Jesus, a.k.a. Peter Roxas de Jesus or
Pedro de Jesus; Maria Teresa Lazatin de Jesus v. Salve Barican de Jesus, Francis Gilbert de
Jesus, Maria Jocelyn de Jesus, and Jennifer de Jesus." In his will, the decedent instituted
petitioner as his sole heir and disinherited the respondents. After trial, the probate court
rendered a Decision dated 26 October 2001 holding that even as the will is extrinsically valid,
i.e., duly executed in accordance with the requisites and solemnities prescribed by law, it is
intrinsically void for containing illegal dispositions and institution of an heir.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pronouncement of her marriage with the decedent as bigamous does
not detract from the fact that the testator had intended to leave something for her, entitling her
to at least the free portion of the decedent's estate.
RULING:
No. The argument is untenable. Under Article 739 of the Civil Code, donations made between
persons in a state of adultery or concubinage are void. Article 1028 of the same code mandates
that the same prohibition be similarly applied to testamentary provisions. Since the courts
below have made the factual finding that the marriage between petitioner and the decedent was
bigamous, necessarily, petitioner and decedent are considered as having been in a state of
concubinage in the context of Article 739. Significantly, a conviction for adultery or
concubinage need not be had before the disabilities mentioned in paragraph (1) of Article 739
may effectuate. Thus, in a case for the probate of a will where the testator bequeathed to his
bigamous wife the free portion of his estate, this Court ruled, inter alia, that the disposition is
void under Article 739 in relation to Article 1028 of the Civil Code
Page 332 of 364
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
REPUBLIC V. GUZMAN
G.R. NO. 132964
FEBRUARY 18, 2000
FACTS:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman
(naturalized American) and Helen Meyers Guzman (American citizen). In 1968, Simeon died
leaving to his heirs, Helen and David, an estate consisting of several parcels of land in Bulacan.
In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing
and adjudicating to themselves all of the property, and registered it to the RD a year after.
In 1981, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning, transferring and conveying her ½
share of the properties to David. But since it was not registered, she executed another Deed of
Quitclaim to confirm the first.
In 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the Office of Solicitor General and furnished it with
documents showing that David’s ownership of ½ of the estate was defective. He argued that
Art. XII of the Constitution only allows Filipinos to acquire private lands in the country. The
only instances when a foreigner may acquire private property are by hereditary succession and
if he was formerly a natural-born citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship. Moreover, it
contends that the Deeds of Quitclaim executed by Helen were really donations inter vivos.
Republic filed with RTC a Petition for Escheat praying that ½ of David’s interest be forfeited in
its favor. RTC dismissed the petition. CA affirmed the trial court’s dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether Helen validly repudiated her interest on the subject parcels of land
HELD:
No. The repudiation is not valid because Helen has already accepted her share of the
inheritance when she executed executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of Simeon Guzman on December 29, 1970, which divided and adjudicated
between Helen and David the two (2) of them all the property in Simeon's estate.
By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were registered in her and her
son's name in undivided equal share and for eleven (11) years they possessed the lands in the
concept of owner. As the Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides, the acceptance or
repudiation of an inheritance, once made is irrevocable and cannot be impugned, except
when it was made through any of the causes that vitiate consent or when an unknown will
appears. Nothing on record shows that Helen's acceptance of her inheritance from Simeon
Page 333 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
was made through any of the causes which vitiated her consent nor is there any proof of
the existence of an unknown will executed by Simeon.
Thus, pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot belatedly execute an instrument which has the effect
of revoking or impugning her previous acceptance of her one-half (1/2) share of the
subject property from Simeon's estate. Hence, the two (2) quitclaim deeds which she executed
eleven (11) years after she had accepted the inheritance have no legal force and effect.
Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto operate to convert the
parcels of land into res nullius to be escheated in favor of the Government. The
repudiation being of no effect whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to their private
owner, Helen, who, although being an American citizen, is qualified by hereditary
succession to own the property subject of the litigation.
Page 334 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
FELIX ADAN vs. AGAPITO CASILI and VICTORIA ADAN,

C.A. No. 299
March 18, 1946
FACTS:
Felix Adan filed for the judicial partition of the estate of his deceased mother Simplicia
Nepomuceno against his sister Victoria Adan and her husband Agapito Casili. The estate of
their deceased mother composed of parcels of land. The defendant interposed the defense that
the parcels of land in question was ceded by the decedent to her daughter Victoria as her share
in the inheritance and that the plaintiff has already received his share of the inheritance which
consisted of money, livestock, palay, and real property. The trial court held that during the
lifetime of their mother, Felix received various sums for his expenses while studying surveying
in Manila and that one-half of which should be brought into collation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not collation is proper in the present case.
RULING:
Yes, pursuant to Art. 1042 of the Civil Code, the expenses incurred by parents in giving their
children a professional or artistic career may be brought to collation if the expenses encroach
upon the legitime or if the parents orders that the expenses should be collated. In this case, the
Supreme Court found that the expenses incurred by Felix had encroached upon the legitime
thus the expenses should be collated, one-half of the amount of the expenses would be collated
because the other half would be considered as expenses of the parents had Felix lived in the
house and company of his mother.
Page 335 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
GLICERIA CARANDANG-COLLANTES and LUZ CARANDANG

vs. FELIX CAPUNO, LEONILA COSICO, LYDIA CAPUNO, DIOMEDES
ALCANTARA, SIMEON CAPUNO, DOMINGA COSICO, GERARDA COSICO,
MARGARITA COCOLE, ANICETO CAPUNO, ALBINA AQUINO and COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. L-55373 July 25, 1983
FACTS:
Josefa Capuno was survived by nephews and niece namely Felix, Lydia and Simeon, all
surnamed Capuno. They filed a petition for annulment of a donation inter vivos which was
executed on March 6, 1970 by the late Josefa in favor of petitioners. The donations consisted of
four parcels of real property located in San Pablo, Laguna. The petition was on the ground that
the thumb mark appearing in the deed of donation was not that of Josefa and that the same has
been secured through undue influence or fraud.
Petitioners however contended that the thumbmark was genuine and that the donation
was based on valuable consideration because the deceased has lived with petitioners and treated
them as her own blood relatives-in-fact as her own grandchildren. The trial court rendered a
judgment that the donations were null and void.
ISSUE:
Are the donations valid?
HELD:
Yes. There is no proof to support that the donations were a forgery and that the
thumbmark was fictitious, neither by an expert nor by comparison of the thumbprint of Josefa.
The Supreme Court held that the testimony of the witnesses for the respondents were
inherently weak, they being biased and stand to benefit from the annulment of the donations,
compared to the testimony of the notary public who notarized the deed of donation. Thus, since
the deed of donation is a duly executed public instrument, it is presumed to be valid absence
any proof of fraud alleged by respondents. Neither is there any allegation or proof of concrete
FACTS constituting the supposed fraud. In fact, private respondents have not pointed what
undue influence or fraud they have alleged or proved in the case, the mere allegation that the
donor and the donees have no relations does not constitute nor show undue influence or fraud.
Hence, the second ground for annulment is clearly non-existent.
Page 336 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
MATEO vs. LAGUA
29 SCRA 864
October 30, 1969
FACTS:
Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in
consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on
May 15, 1917 and thereafter the couple took possession of the lots, but the certificates of title
remained in the donor’s name.
In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant
daughter, who lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn undertook to farm on
the donated lots. At first, Cipriano gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots’ harvests, but in
1926 he refused to deliver to petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an
action and won for her possession of the lots plus damages.
On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his
younger son, herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when
Cipriano stopped giving to petitioner her share to the harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) was issued under respondent’s name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan.
The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and
ordered cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to
petitioner. In 1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the
donation of the two lots. While the case was pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed
for prescription, having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the CA in 1966
held that the donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11,888 sq. m.
exceeded by 494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have
freely given by will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of Cipriano’s other heir,
Gervacio. The donation was thus declared inofficious and herein petitioners were ordered to
reconvey to Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq. m. from any convenient part of the lots.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter nuptias for being
inofficious
HELD:
Decision of CA based on unsupported assumptions set aside; trial court’s order of

dismissal sustained.
Page 337 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value
of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the
compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a
donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for
being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the
disposable free portion plus the donee’s share as legitime in the properties of the donor. In the
present case, it can hardly be seen that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in any
position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction
and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.
Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of
the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those
imposed in the will.
To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the
testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.
Page 338 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
RAQUEL CHAVEZ vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-68282
November 8, 1990
FACTS:
The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner Manuel Buenavista who had six
(6) children, named Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion and Floserpina.
Manuela Buenavista, had assigned or distributed to her children, in equal pro-indiviso shares,
her paraphernal property situated at Sitio Langas, Barrio Calangcawan Norte, Vinzons,
Camarines Norte, with an area of 4.1163 hectares more or less under Tax Declaration No. 9303
and assessed at P1,630.00. The owner, however, reserved for herself the possession of the land
and the enjoyment of the fruits during her lifetime. Presentacion, Floserpina and Raquel, with
the conformity of their mother sold their shares totaling to 4/6 of the undivided land to their
sister Conception Chavez with Antonio and Rosario as owners of the remaining 2/6 shares.
Despite the transfers or assignments her children had executed with her conformity ten years
earlier, Manuela Buenavista signed a "Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa" of the entire property in
favor of her daughter, Raquel Chavez, and her husband, Gerardo Jimenez. Thereupon, Manuela
sold the entire property to Pepito Ferrer with right to repurchase.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent sale to Raquel Chavez and Pepito Ferrer were valid despite
previous partition intervivos of the property.
HELD:
Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate either by an
act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitimate of the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance,
the partition by the parent, as provided in Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by law. Art.
1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in making a partition of his estate;
either by an act inter vivos or by WILL. When a person makes a partition by will, it is
imperative that such partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on
wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such
partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided that the
partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.
In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale executed by
Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez (Exhs. A, B, and C) in favor of
Concepcion Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between
Manuela Buenavista and her children as she not only gave her authority thereto but also signed
the sales. The Deeds of Sale (Exhs. A, B, and C) are not contracts entered into with respect to
feature inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela
Page 339 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Buenavista who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos,
executed by the property owner herself, is valid.
It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the
sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to
execute a simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale
she made of the property she had received in the partition inter vivos; it would run counter to
the doctrine that "no person should be allowed to unjustly enrich herself at the expense of
another."
Page 340 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
HEIRS OF TEVES VS. CA
G.R. No. 109963. October 13, 1999
FACTS:
Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves had nine children, namely Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro,
Andres, Asuncion, Gorgonio, Cresenciano, Arcadia and Maria. Andres, however, predeceased
both his parents and died without issue. After Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died,
intestate and without debts, in 1943 and 1953. On June 13, 1956, Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro,
Asuncion, Gorgonio and Arcadia Teves executed a document entitled "Settlement of Estate and
Sale," adjudicating unto themselves, in equal shares, Lot 769-A and conveying their shares,
interests and participations over the same in favor of Asuncion Teves for the consideration of
P425.00. A similar deed denominated "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale" was signed by Maria
Teves on April 21, 1959. Under such deed, Maria conveys her own share over Lot 769-A in
favor of Asuncion Teves for the consideration of P80.00.
Plaintiffs-appellants Ricardo and Arcadia Teves filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
of Negros Oriental for the partition and reconveyance of two parcels of against the heirs of
Asuncion Teves. Plaintiffs-appellants alleged that defendants-appellees, without any justifiable
reason, refused to partition the said parcels of land and to convey to plaintiffs their rightful
shares. Maria Teves Ochotorena herself, denied having executed this Extrajudicial Settlement
and Sale over her share or interest in Lot 769 claiming that her signature in said document is a
forgery.
In answer to plaintiffs-appellants charges of fraud, defendants-appellees maintained that the

assailed documents were executed with all the formalities required by law and are therefore
binding and legally effective as bases for acquiring ownership or legal title over the lots in
question. Furthermore, it is contended that plaintiffs-appellants have slept on their rights and
should now be deemed to have abandoned such rights.
ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina
Cimafranca are legally valid and binding
HELD:
Yes. For a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid, the following conditions must
concur: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all
had been paid; (3) the heirs are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by
their judicial guardian or legal representatives; (4) the partition was made by means of a public
instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds.
Page 341 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
The extrajudicial settlements over both Lots 6409 and 769, having been prepared and
acknowledged before a notary public, are public documents, vested with public interest, the
sanctity of which deserves to be upheld unless overwhelmed by clear and convincing
evidence. The evidence presented by the plaintiffs to support their charges of forgery was
considered by the court insufficient to rebut the legal presumption of validity accorded to such
documents.
With regards to the requisite of registration of extrajudicial settlements, it is noted that the
extrajudicial settlements covering Lot 769-A were never registered. However, in the case
of Vda. de Reyes vs. CA, the Court, interpreting section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, upheld
the validity of an oral partition of the decedents estate and declared that the non-registration of
an extrajudicial settlement does not affect its intrinsic validity. Thus, despite its non-
registration, the extrajudicial settlements involving Lot 769-A are legally effective and binding
among the heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca since their mother had no creditors at the time of her
death.
An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine that the law does
not relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered into with all the required formalities
and with full awareness of what he was doing, simply because the contract turned out to be a
foolish or unwise investment. Therefore, although plaintiffs-appellants may regret having
alienated their hereditary shares in favor of their sister Asuncion, they must now be considered
bound by their own contractual acts.
Page 342 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Divinagracia vs. Parilla
G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015
FACTS:
Conrado, Sr. owned a parcel of land in Iloilo City. He had 2 children with his first wife,namely,
Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.; and 7 children with his second wife, namely, Mateo Sr., Coronacion,
Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo and Cebeleo Sr. He also begot 3 illegitimate children,
namely Eduardo, Rogelio and Ricardo. Both Mateo Sr. and Cebeleo Sr. predeceased Conrado
Sr. leaving children, namely: (a) for Mateo Sr. Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr.,
Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo Sr. Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Santiago, who allegedly
bought the shares of majority of the heirs of a property left by Conrado, Sr. He filed a complaint
for partition but did not implead Mateo Sr.’ children.
RTC found that through the subject document, Santiago became a co-owner of the subject land
and, as such, has the right to demand the partition of the same. However, the RTC held that
Santiago did not validly acquire Mateo, Sr.’s share over the subject land, considering that
Felcon admitted the lack of authority to bind his siblings with regard to Mateo, Sr.’s share
thereon.
CA, on appeal, dismissed Santiago0s complaint for judicial partition. It held the Mateo,Sr.’s
children are indispensable parties to the judicial partition and thus, their non-inclusion as
defendants would necessarily result in its dismissal.
ISSUE:
Is the action for partition proper without impleading Mateo Sr.’s children?
HELD:
NO. While it is conceded that Santiago bought the interests of majority of the heirs of Conrado,
Sr. as evidenced by the subject document, as a vendee, he merely steps into the shoes of the
vendors-heirs. Since his interest over the subject land is merely derived from that of the
vendors-heirs, the latter should first be determined as co-owners thereof, thus necessitating the
joinder of all those who have vested interests in such land.
In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant complaint for
judicial partition renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and void for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present.
The CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on account of Santiago’s failure to
implead all the indispensable parties in his complaint. In Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr.
the Court definitively explained that in instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties, the
proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case, to wit:
Page 343 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
“The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an

action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties
may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If
the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that
court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. “
In view of the foregoing, the correct course of action in the instant case is to order its remand
to the RTC for the inclusion of those indispensable parties who were not impleaded and for the
disposition of the case on the merits.
Page 344 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
HEIRS OF CESARIO VELASQUEZ vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 126996. February 15, 2000
FACTS:
Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate and were childless.
Leoncia de Guzman was survived by her sisters Anatalia de Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs)
and Tranquilina de Guzman (grandmother of the defendants). During the existence of their
marriage, spouses Aquino were able to acquire real properties.
The heirs of Anatalia de Guzman filed a complaint for annulment, partition and
damages against the heirs of Cesario Velasquez (son of Tranquilina de Guzman) for the latters
refusal to partition the conjugal properties of the Spouses Aquino. The complaint alleged that
Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, had a talk with the plaintiffs mother, Anatalia de
Guzman, Tranquilina de Guzman and Cesario Velaquez; that in the conference Leoncia told
Anatalia de Guzman et al, that the documents of donation and partition which she and her
husband earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all
the properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her sisters had
several children to support; Cesario Velasquez together with his mother allegedly promised to
divide the properties equally. Plaintiffs further claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants
forcibly took possession of all the properties and despite plaintiffs repeated demands for
partition, defendants refused. Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of any documents covering the
properties in question since they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses, to
order the partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and to
order the defendants to render an accounting of the produce of the land in question from the
time defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected.
Defendants filed their Amended Answer with counterclaim alleging among others that
during the lifetime of spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman, they had already
disposed of their properties in favor of petitioners predecessors-in-interest, Cesario Velasquez
and Camila de Guzman, and petitioners Anastacia and Jose Velasquez. They denied that a
conference took place between Leoncia de Guzman and plaintiff Santiago Meneses and his
mother Anatalia with Tranquilina (defendants grandmother) and Cesario Velasquez
(defendants father), nor did the latter promise to divide the properties equally with the plaintiffs
or to execute a deed of partition; that they did not forcibly take possession of the subject
properties since their possession thereof has been peaceful, open, continuous and adverse in
character to the exclusion of all others.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties mentioned in the complaint form part of the estate of the
spouses Aquino.
Held:
Page 345 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
No. A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title

over the property from the donor to the done and the donation is perfected from the moment
the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. And once a donation is accepted, the donee
becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
The court is unable to sustain the findings of the respondent Court that it has been
adequately shown that the alleged transfers of properties to the petitioners predecessor-in-
interest made by the Aquino spouses were repudiated before Leoncias death; thus private
respondents are still entitled to share in the subject properties. On the other hand, petitioners
were able to adduce the uncontroverted and ancient documentary evidence showing that during
the lifetime of the Aquino spouses they had already disposed of four of the six parcels of land
subject of the complaint starting in the year 1919, and the latest was in 1939.
The donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and
Anastacia Velasquez who were then nineteen (19) and ten (10) years old respectively was
accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was incorporated in the
body of the same deed of donation and made part of it, and was signed by the donor and the
acceptor. Legally speaking there was delivery and acceptance of the deed, and the donation
existed perfectly and irrevocably.
The donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760,
764 and 765 of the Civil Code. The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and
Camila de Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second parcel
became the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of donation propter
nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the other causes mentioned
in article 86 of the Family Code. The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e, that the
Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their properties since Anatalia (Leoncias sister)
had several children to support is not one of the grounds for revocation of donation either inter
vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation might be inofficious.
The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second parcel and the Deed of
conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the remaining
portion of the second parcel is also valid. In fact in the deed of sale dated July 14, 1939, the
Aquino spouses ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario Velasquez and Camila
de Guzman including the previous deeds of conveyance executed by the Aquino spouses over
the second parcel in the complaint and such deed of sale became the basis for the issuance of
TCT in the names of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman on July 25, 1939. The best
proof of the ownership of the land is the certificate of title and it requires more than a bare
allegation to defeat the face value of TCT which enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of
issuance. Notably, during the lifetime of Cesario Velasquez, he entered into contracts of
mortgage and lease over the property as annotated at the back of the certificate of title which
clearly established that he exercised full ownership and control over the property. It is quite
surprising that it was only after more than fifty years that private respondents asserted co-
ownership claim over the subject property.
The Aquino spouses had disposed the four parcels of land during their lifetime and the
documents were duly notarized so that these documents enjoy the presumption of validity.
Page 346 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Such presumption has not been overcome by private respondent Santiago Meneses with clear
and convincing evidence. Petitioners were able to establish that these four parcels of land were
validly conveyed to them by the Aquino spouses hence they no longer formed part of the
conjugal properties of the spouses at the time of their deaths. As regards the fourth and fifth
parcels, petitioners alleged that these were also conveyed to third persons and they do not
claim any right thereto.
In view of the foregoing, the court concludes that the action of partition cannot be
maintained. The properties sought to be partitioned by private respondents have already been
delivered to petitioners and therefore no longer part of the hereditary estate which could be
partitioned. After finding that no co-ownership exists between private respondents and
petitioners, there is no reason to discuss the other arguments raised by the petitioners in
support of their petition.
Page 347 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA vs. CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION,* ELENA
FIGURACION-ANCHETA,* HILARIA A. FIGURACION, FELIPA FIGURACION-

MANUEL, QUINTIN FIGURACION and MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ
G.R. No. 154322 August 22, 2006
FACTS:
On August 23, 1955, Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in favor of
his six children. When he died in 1958, he left behind two parcels of land in the name of
Leandro Figuracion. The dispute arose when a dispute between petitioner and her sister Mary
over the Lot 707. Lot 707 belonged to Eulalio Adviento and upon his death his two daughters,
Agripina Adviento and Carolina inherited the property. On November 28, 1961, Agripina
executed a quitclaim in favor of petitioner over the one-half eastern portion of Lot 707.
Agripina died on July 28, 1963, single and without any issue. Before her death, however,
Carolina adjudicated unto herself the entire Lot 707 which she later sold to respondents Felipa
and Hilaria.
In February 1971, petitioner and her family went to the United States where they stayed for
ten years. Returning in 1981, she built a house made of strong materials on the eastern half-
portion of Lot 707. She continued paying her share of the realty taxes thereon.
On May 23, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for partition, annulment of documents,
reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against respondent. On the other hand,
respondents took the position that Leandro‘s estate should first undergo settlement
proceedings before partition among the heirs could take place. And they claimed that an
accounting of expenses chargeable to the estate was necessary for such settlement.
ISSUE:
Can petitioner compel the partition at the moment of death of the decedaent?
RULING:
No. Partition is premature when ownership of the lot is still in dispute. In a situation where
there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate.
While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and
respondents are Leandro Figuracion‘s only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the
CA that ―certain expenses‖ including those related to her father‘s final illness and burial have
not been properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their
father‘s estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an
action for partition.
In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses
for which the estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or
Page 348 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
distributees of the properties may take possession thereof even before the settlement of
accounts, as long as they first file a bond conditioned on the payment of the estate‘s
obligations.
Page 349 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
De Jesus v. Manglapus
G.R. No. L-527, 28 May 1948
FACTS:
On April 12, 1944, Sixto de Jesus, from himself and as attorney-in-fact of his mother, Natalia
Alfonga, signed an instrument promising to sell their "interests and participation" in four
parcels of the land belonging to the testate estate of the deceased Gabino de Jesus and
"containing a total area of 730,652 square meters. On August 9, 1944, Sixto de Jesus and
Natalia Alfonga executed "a deed of absolute sale" of two of these parcels, then already allotted
to them as their shares in a plan of partition agreed upon among Gabino's heirs; and at the time
of the absolute sale the plan of partition had been submitted to the court for approval, and it
was approved on September 4, 1945.
The burden of appellant‘s argument is that before the partition was approved Sixto de Jesus'
and his mother's shares, lots Nos. 1292 and 1394, continued to be rights, interest and
participation in the estate subject to the right of repurchase by the other heirs under article
1067 of the Civil Code. They contend that the sale of these two parcels was a sale of right and
interests.
That Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga sold their rights, interests and participation in the said
Testate Estate of the late Gavino de Jesus (before the partition of the Estate), particularly, the
two parcels of land covered by O.C.T. Nos. 1292 and 1344 issued by the office of the register of
deeds of the Province of Batangas and referred to and described in the original complaint, to
the herein defendant, Justina S. Vda. deManglapus, for the sum of P106,997.87, in Japanese
War Notes.
That the plaintiffs only learned of the sale of the aforesaid rights, interests and participation of
Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga on September 4, 1945; and that upon learning thereof, the
plaintiffs demanded upon the defendant Justina S. Vda. deManglapus, within the period
provided for by law, to be subrogated to the rights, interests and participation purchased by
said Justina S. Vda. deManglapus from Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga; but said defendant
refused and continues refusing the demands of the herein plaintiffs for subrogation.
ISSUE:
Whether the conveyance made is in accordance with Art. 1067 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
Page 350 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
No. The allegation that the property in question consists of rights and interests of the vendors
in the estate is a conclusion of the general import. It is, the Court thinks, a mistake to suppose
that the insertion of this allegation brings the case within the provision of article 1067. A
conveyance by a tenant in common property marked out by metes and bounds in a partition
does not operate, contrary to the expressed declarations and intention of the parties, to convey
an estate in common instead on an estate in severalty. A general conclusion and allegation
cannot overcome the outstanding FACTS that the subject matter of the sale were two parcels
of land which has been segregated from the mass of property as the vendors' shares. In the face
of this FACTS the words "rights and interests" cannot be considered more than as a
description or statement of the source of the sellers' title to the two lots conveyed. After all,
rights and interests have a broad signification, and rights and interests in an hereditary estate
may mean separate as well as undivided shares therein.
In the second assignment of error, the appellants object to the defendants' statement in this
motion to dismiss, "that the deed of absolute sale was consummated or confirmed by the lower
court on September 4, 1945." It is said that this statement is not in the complaint and "was
imported by them (defendants) from the probate proceedings." It is alleged that the court below
made use this circumstances as a basis for dismissing the action. This error, if error it be,
however does not vitiate the general conclusion at which we have arrived, based alone on the
fact that a partition had been made and that the lost sold by Sixto de Jesus and his mother
specific parts of the estate adjudicated to them in the agreement.
The allegation that the property in question consists of rights and interests of the vendors in
the estate is a conclusion of the general import. It is, we think, a mistake to suppose that the
insertion of this allegation brings the case within the provision of article 1067. A conveyance by
a tenant in common property marked out by metes and bounds in a partition does not operate,
contrary to the expressed declarations and intention of the parties, to convey an estate in
common instead on an estate in severalty. A general conclusion and allegation can not
overcome the outstanding FACTS that the subject matter of the sale was two parcels of land
which has been segregated from the mass of property as the vendors' shares. In the face of these
FACTS the words "rights and interests" can not be considered more than as a description or
statement of the source of the sellers' title to the two lots conveyed. After all, rights and
interests have a broad signification, and rights and interests in a hereditary estate may mean
separate as well as undivided shares therein.
Page 351 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
ZOSIMA VERDAD, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

SOCORRO C. ROSALES, AURORA ROSALES, NAPOLEON ROSALES,
ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA ROSALES
AND VIRGINIA ROSALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 109972
April 29, 1996
VITUG, J.:
FACTS: Private respondent, Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise a right of legal
redemption over the subject property against petitioner Verdad who bought a residential lot
from the late Macaria Artega whom the former her traces title the latter being her mother-in-
law, who died intestate. At the time of her own death, Macaria was survived by her son Ramon
A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela Lozada of the
first marriage and her children of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales, Justo Rosales,
Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales.
Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, some time after Macaria's death,
died intestate without an issue.
In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, namely, his widow Manuela
Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold to petitioner Zosima Verdad (their
interest on) the disputed lot supposedly for the price of P55,460.00. Upon learning of the sale,
Socorro tendered the amount of Php 23,000 to redeem the property. Petitioner,however,
refused to accept alleging that the current value at Php 80,000 should be paid instead of the
offered payment. There was failure to reconcile so it was submitted to the courts for decision.
The trial court dismissed on account of prescription. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the RTC and recognized the right of private respondent to redeem the property.
Petitioner averred that Socorro Rosales has no right to redeem the inheritance right she being
merely the wife of the decedent‘s son.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is entitled to right of redemption of the inheritance right
RULING:
The SC ruled that Socorro can. It is true that respondent, a daughter-in-law (or, for that
matter, a mere relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law; 3 however,
Socorro's right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria's
Page 352 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share
in his mother's inheritance.
David Rosales, irrefutably, survived his mother's death. When Macaria died on 08 March 1956
her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon
became co-owners of the property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own estate,
which included his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to
his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession. On the other hand, Art.
1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the
other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is
grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. Thus , Socorro may
redeem the property sold to third persons by her co-heirs.
Page 353 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
GARCIA V. CALALIMAN
G.R. NO. L-26855
APRIL 17, 1989
FACTS:
On February 11, 1946, one Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of unregistered land.
On his death the property was inherited by his nephews, nieces, grandnephews who are the
descendants of his late brothers, Pedro, Simeon, Buenaventura and Marcos.
The heirs, Juanita Bertomo, Joaquin Garcia, Porfirio Garcia, Dioscoro Garcia, Flora Garcia,
Consolacion Garcia, Remedios Garcia, Trinidad Garcia, Baltazar Garcia signed a document
entitled, “Extra-judicial Partition and Deed of Sale”.
The heirs, Juanita Bertomo, Joaquin Garcia, Porfirio Garcia, Dioscoro Garcia, Flora Garcia,
Consolacion Garcia, Remedios Garcia, Trinidad Garcia, Baltazar Garcia signed a document
entitled, “Extra-judicial Partition and Deed of Sale”.
Heirs Francisco Garcia, Paz Garcia, and Maria Garcia, petitioners herein, filed against the
spouses Jose Calaliman and Paciencia Trabadillo, private respondents an action for legal
redemption of the 3/4 portion of the parcel of land inherited by the heirs from the late Gelacio
Garcia, which portion was sold by their co-heirs to the defendants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners took all the necessary steps to effectuate their exercise of the right
of legal redemption within the period fixed by Art. 1088 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
Yes. Written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other
manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written notice, as
exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to
quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive.
The law not having provided for any alternative, the method of notifications remains exclusive,
though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any
distinctive method for written notification of redemption
Page 354 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
JOSEFA CH. MAESTRADO, as substituted by her daughter LOURDES MAESTRADO-

LAVIÑA and CARMEN CH. ABAYA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, Ninth Division and JESUS C. ROA, JR., RAMON P. CHAVES and
NATIVIDAD S. SANTOS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 133345. March 9, 2000
JOSEFA CHAVEZ MAESTRADO and CARMEN CHAVES ABAYA, petitioners, vs.

JESUS C. ROA, JR., RAMON P. CHAVES and NATIVIDAD S. SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 133324. March 9, 2000
DE LEON, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves died intestate in 1943 and 1944 respectively. They were
survived by the following heirs, namely: Carmen Chaves-Abaya, Josefa Chaves-Maestrado,
Angel Chaves, Amparo Chaves-Roa, Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores and Salvador Chaves. In A
partition was agreed upon under the administration of Angel Chaves. At the time of the actual
partition, Salvador Chaves had already died. His share was given to his only son, Ramon.
Subsequent to the partition, Concepcion sold her share to Angel, while Ramon sold his share to
Amparo. Hence, one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 3046 went to Angel and the other half to Amparo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid oral partition
RULING:
The most persuasive circumstance pointing to the existence of the oral partition is the fact that
the terms of the actual partition and distribution of the estate are identical to the sharing
scheme in the oral partition. No one among the heirs disturbed this status quo for a period of
twenty-seven (27) years.
Since the oral partition has been duly established, the notarized quitclaims confirmed such prior
oral agreement as well as the petitioners‘ title of ownership over the subject Lot No. 5872.
More importantly, independent of such oral partition, the quitclaims in the instant case are
valid contracts of waiver of property rights.
Page 355 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, RTC-9, CEBU CITY, and LICERIO P. NIQUE
G.R. No. 114151
September 17, 1998
FACTS:
The late spouses Alejandrino left their six children named Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco,
Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio a lot in Cebu City. Upon the death of the spouses, the
property should have been divided among their children, however, the estate of the Alejandrino
spouses was not settled in
Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased portion of the lots from her
brothers, Gregorio's, Ciriaco's and Abundio's share. It turned out, however, that a third party
named Nique, the private respondent in this case, also purchased portions of the property from
Laurencia, Abundio and Marcelino.
However, Laurencia (the alleged seller to Nique) later questioned the sale in an action for
quieting of title and damages. The trial court (Quieting of title case) ruled in favor of Nique and
declared him the owner of the lots. Laurencia appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals but
later withdrew the same.
Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portion of the property that had been declared
by the trial court (Quieting of title case) as his own by virtue of purchase. The trial court
segregated the property on the basis of the Extra-Judicial Settlement between Mauricia and
Laurencia.
Issue:
Whether or not partition of the lot was validly made
Held:
Yes.
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate
has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of
ownership over such inchoate right.
Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso share. The legality of
Laurencia's alienation of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was upheld in the
Page 356 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Quieting of title case which had become final and executory by Laurencia's withdrawal of her
appeal in the CA. When Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portions of the property
that were adjudged in his favor, he was in effect calling for the partition of the property.
However, under the law, partition of the estate of a decedent may only be effected by (1) the
heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the
course of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third
person designated by the testator.
Extrajudicial settlement between Mauricia and Laurentia became the basis for the segregation
of the property in favor of Nique
However, evidence on the extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered before the trial court
and it became the basis for the order for segregation of the property sold to Nique. Mauricia
does not deny the fact of the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate. She
only questions its validity on account of the absence of notarization of the document and the
non-publication thereof.
A partition is valid though not contained in a public instrument.
Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate reflected
the intention of both Laurencia and Mauricia to physically divide the property. Both of them
had acquired the shares of their brothers and therefore it was only the two of them that needed
to settle the estate. The fact that the document was not notarized is no hindrance to its
effectivity as regards the two of them. The partition of inherited property need not
be embodied in a public document to be valid between the parties.
Page 357 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
EUSEBIO QUIZON and FLORDELIZA QUIZON v. MODESTO CASTILLO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 49286
16 AUGUST 1947
FACTS:
Petitioners seek the annulment of the two orders of the CFI of Batangas. The second order
issued on August 18, 1944, amended the first one issued on June 26, 1944 to the effect that
petitioners should deliver 2/3 of the estate of Gregorio Mayo Villapand to Josefa Mayo
Villapando, and Amando, Ciriaco, David and Jose Morada, unless they file a bond in the amount
of P2,000, pending the decision of the Supreme Court. Petitioner filed a petition to the court to
approve the appeal bond of P60. Respondent judge fixed the appeal bond at P2,000. On appeal,
the SC declared the said bond excessive and arbitrary. On May 9, Josefa filed a motion for
execution upon the ground that the appeal bond at P2,000 having been rejected, her share in
the fruits of the estate was left without guarantee. Respondent judge issued an order on July
26. On August 2, the Morada brothers filed a motion to amend the order of July 26. The court
rendered a decision on August 18.
The petitioners complained that the orders of July 26 and August 18 were sought to execute
the dispositive part of the decision of October 25, 1943
ISSUE:
Whether a decision of the court declaring the heirs and their respective shares would now
warrant the delivery of such shares even before the filing and approval of a project of partition.
HELD:
No. The respondent judge acted in excess of its jurisdiction when he issued the orders of July
26 and August 18, 1944. Said orders, purportedly to execute the decision of October 25, 1943,
provided for the delivery, at first, of one-third of the estate to Josefa Mayo and later of two-
thirds of the estate to Josefa Mayo and to the Morada brothers, unless petitioners should file
bond in the amount of P2,000. Neither law nor legal authority has been mentioned in
respondent's answer in support of said orders and none can be cited. The decision of October
25, 1943, provided only for the declaration of heirs and of the shares each set of heirs was
entitled to. Nothing was provided in said decision as to the delivery of shares from one person
to another. The orders of July 26, and August 18, provided for the execution of something
supposed to be executed by the decision of October 25, 1943, which in fact is not provided
therein. Besides, it was premature to order the delivery of shares to the heirs, when no project
of partition has as yet been filed and approved.
Page 358 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
RESENCIA HERNANDEZ, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ZACARIAS ANDAL, defendant-

appellant.
QUIRINO DIMASACAT, MARIA HERNANDEZ and AQUILINA HERNANDEZ,

intervenors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-273
March 29, 1947
FACTS:
Plaintiff Cresencia, intervenors Maria and Aquilina, and Pedro and Basilia are brother and
sisters who acquired in common by descent from their father a parcel of land known as lot no.
120073 in Batangas. The intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel to Zacarias Andal,
the defendant, and Andal's wife in consideration of P860. This portion purports to be the
combined shares of the intervenors in the larger parcel, allotted to them in a verbal partition
alleged to have been made (time not stated) among the five brother and sisters. After the sale,
the plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal but Andal, it is alleged, refused to
part with the property. He instead resold the land to the intervenors.
The lower court ruled that the resale of the land by Zacarias Andal in favor of Maria and
Aquilina Hernandez was illegal and in bad faith.
On January 23, 1944, the intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel, a portion which is
particularly described in the deed of conveyance Exhibit A, to ZacariasAndal, the defendant,
and Andal's wife in consideration of P860. This portion purports to be the combined shares of
the intervenors in the larger parcel, allotted to them in a verbal partition alleged to have been
made (time not stated) among the five brother and sisters.
After the sale, on a date as to which the evidence is in disagreement but which is not now
important, the plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. According to her
original complaint, dated February 3, 1944, she offered the purchasers P150 as price of
repurchase, this being, according to that complaint, the amount Andal had paid for Maria
Hernandez's and Aquilina Hernandez's shares, but Andal, it is alleged, refused to part with the
property.
On April 8, the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint. She alleged that when the cause was
called for trial on March 8, she announced in open court that she was willing to repurchase her
sister's share from Andal for P860 and reimburse Andal for his expense; that Andal asked for
continuance until the 29th stating that he had made other expenses; that on 29th she brought
P860 to repurchase the land in question but the case was again postponed because the plaintiff's
sisters had intervened; and that meanwhile, on the 26th, Andal resold the land fictitiously to
the vendors for P970.
ISSUE:
Whether the partition was valid despite being not in public instrument.
Page 359 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
RULING:
Yes.
As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are required to be
reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a means of providing evidence to
prove the transactions.
However, Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the required
public instruments is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element of its
effectiveness as between the parties. The requirement that a partition be put in a public
document and registered has, in the Court‘s opinion, for its purpose the protection of creditors
and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means notice to others. It must follow
that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not
come into play when, as in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not
affected. No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter
into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided
by law.
The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has, in our opinion,
for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts and
creditors. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means notice to
others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed
formalities does not come into play when, as in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of
creditors are not affected. No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of
an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from
those provided by law.
Page 360 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
GREGORIO FAVOR vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRUDENCIO

FAVOR HEIRS: EUFEMIO FAVOR and AGUSTIN FAVOR
G.R. No. 80821 February 21, 1991
FACTS
The deceased Regino Favor left three sons and several parcels of land. Before the
property could be divided among the three brothers, one of them died with neither wife nor
children. The surviving brothers, Gregorio and Prudencio, had a dispute as to the partition of
the properties they had inherited from their father.
Prudencio moved to dismiss the complaint filed by Gregorio for lack of a cause of action,
as the properties had already been partitioned under a Compromise Agreement concluded
between Gregorio and him and was acknowledged before the justice of the peace of Luzuriaga,
Negros Oriental. The motion to dismiss was denied.
Gregorio filed an amended complaint in which he prayed, in addition to the partition,
for the invalidation of the Compromise Agreement, claiming he had signed it under the
mistaken impression that it was a mortgage receipt for P150.00 and not a partition. He alleged
that he could not read or speak English and that he was defrauded into signing the document
by the defendant.
The Regional Trial Court declared the Compromise Agreement null and void, ordering
partition of the disputed properties. On appeal, this decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals.
Issues
1. Is the CA wrong for upholding the Compromise Agreement?
2. Is the CA wrong for not applying the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code sustaining
the right of the petitioner as co-owner to the partition of the properties in dispute?
Held
1. No. The Compromise Agreement must be upheld.
A public instrument enjoys the presumption of validity that has not been overcome by
the petitioner. The document seems to have been duly notarized, and by the then justice of the
peace, and ex officio notary public, of the town where it was executed. Although written in
English, we can suppose that its contents were sufficiently explained to the parties thereto, who
both claimed to be illiterate. That claim is believable in Prudencio, who declared he was a
farmer and merely affixed his thumbmark to the document, but it is not as credible with respect
to Gregorio, who actually signed the agreement. Gregorio was in fact a businessman and even
ran for the position of barangay captain, for which the ability to read and write is prescribed as
an indispensable qualification.
2. Yes. There still remain two parcels of land that have not yet been partitioned: Lot
4114, which by agreement of the brothers "shall remain our property," and the lot at Barrio
Bongao, which was not included in the Compromise Agreement. Partition of these lots is
mandatory under Article 494 of the Civil Code. And as the Compromise Agreement was
entered into in 1948, the provision therein for the co-ownership of Lot 4114 is deemed to have
expired in 1958, no extension thereof having been established. Hence, these two lots must now
be the subject of a separate partition.
Page 361 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
FELICIANO V. CANOZA
GR NO. 161174
SEPTEMBER 1, 2010
FACTS:
When Antonio Feliciano died he left behind his only parcel of land. Leona, Maria, Pedro and
Salina, claiming to be only surviving heirs of Antonio, executed an extrajudicial settlement of
Antonio’s estate to the exclusion of the other surviving heirs, Esteban and Doroteo. Leona,
Maria, Pedro and Salina sold the land in favor of Jacinto, Felisa and Pedro Canoza who
obtained Free Patent over the same on 1977 and were able to register in their name the land on
1979. In 1993, the surviving heirs of Esteban and Doroteo filed an complaint against Pedro
Canoza, Salina, Felisa and the heirs of Jacinto praying that the extrajudicial settlement be
annulled. Pedro Canoza and the other respondents argued that the action is based on fraud and
that it has already prescribed.
ISSUE:
Has the action for the annulment of extrajudicial settlement prescribed?
HELD:
Yes.
It has been held that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the
heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Hence, an
action to set it aside on the ground of fraud could be instituted. Such action for the annulment
of the said partition, however, must be brought within four (4) years from the discovery of the
fraud.
In this case, the action was filed in 1993 which is 16 years after a Free Patent was issued over
the land and 14 years after the land was issued an original certificate of title. Thus, the action
was beyond the prescriptive period of 4 years.
Page 362 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
NON VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 137287
15 FEBRUARY 2000
FACTS:
Spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned several pieces of property, among them a house and
lot located in Quezon City. When their parents died, petitioners and respondents, children of
the spouses, shared, since 1977, a common residence at the Quezon City property. Soon,
however, tension would appear to have escalated between petitioner Rebecca and respondent
Alicia after the former had asked that the property be equally divided between the two families
to make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute ownership
over the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the
latter. Hence, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question, filed a case for
partition.
Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject property on two
documents — a deed of donation executed by the late Julian covering his one-half conjugal
share of the property. Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the
foregoing instruments, contending, among others, that the exclusion of her retardate sister,
Delia, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its
annulment.
ISSUE:
Whether there was preterition in the partition which would warrant its rescission.
RULING:
No. The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of their
execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance alone be
indicative of fraud. The registration of the documents was a ministerial act and merely created
a constructive notice of its contents against all third persons. Among the parties, the
instruments remained completely valid and binding.
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial
settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the
absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the
effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be
rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her.
Page 363 of 364

WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
Page 364 of 364

Case Book On Succession

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case Book On Succession

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Submitted To: 12/07/2016

Atty. Ma. Lulu G. Reyes

Arellano vs. Pascual

G.R. No. 189776, December 15, 2010

Is the property donated subject to collation?

Del Rosario vs Ferrer

G.R. No. 187056

September 20, 2010

Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the equivalent of a

A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:

MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S. CABATINGAN,

G.R. No. 131953

Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Basilisa Comerciante is a mother of five (5) children, namely, Rosario Austria,

Heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-6600

July 30, 1954

NO. It is a donation intervivos

The characteristics of a donation mortis causa are:

None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation, Exhibits 1 and 2,

The agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal partnership by "mere

Under Article 2010 of the Code:

Pasco v. vs. Heirs of De Guzman

NATALIA CARPENA OPULENCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ALADIN SIMUNDAC

The preamble of the contract reads:

JOSE C LEE and ALMA AGGABAO v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

G.R. No. 146006

ISSUE: Whether the sale of the shares of stock was valid?

G.R. No. 168970

January 15, 2010

Petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.

Hence, the petition to the SC.

BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED, LUISITO E. DELA MERCED, BLANQUTIA M.

No. There is a perfected contract.

Rioferio vs. Court Appeals

GR No. 129008 January 13, 2004

1. The executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit

TRANSMISSION/ACQUISITION THROUGH DEATH

EMILIO EMNACE v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-770

April 27, 1948

Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial personality.

Alvarez v. IAC and Yanes

Rufino Lim vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

ESTATE OF ORLANDO LLENADO and WENIFREDA T. LLENADO v. EDUARDO

Whether or not the rights arising from lease contract transmissible.

G. R. No. 121940, DECEMBER 4, 2001

Milagros Manongsong v. Felomena Jumaquio Estimo et al

Then Manongsong entered into a Compromise Agreement with some of the

Is Manongsong a co-owner of the property?

GR No. 126376 November 20, 2003

J.L.T. AGRO, INC., vs. ANTONIO BALANSAG

BLAS ET. AL. VS. SANTOS ET. AL.

Ferrer vs. Sps. Diaz

G.R. No. 165300, April 23, 2010

G.R. No. 112483

The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by

LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D.

G.R. No. 108581

4. the due execution of the last will and testament.

The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to

1. Whether the legitime of the widow is in accordance with the law