FECUNDO v BERJAMEN

FACTS:

A petition for certiorari with prayer for a restraining order seeking to inhibit respondent judge Berjamen
from continuing with the trial of an election protest filed by private respondent Salcedo against
petitioner Fecundo, for alleged partiality and bias against Fecundo. Said acts maybe summarized as
follows:

a) Use of unbecoming language in the order dated 10 February 1988 stating therein. "that the
implementation of the order of this Court is being vehemently opposed by the municipal mayor (herein
petitioner) and his cohorts. Ours is a government of laws and not a government of rascals. To give in
to this kind of behavior of the respondent and his cohorts, we are just like savages in the jungle where
might is might [sic right (Emphasis Supplied)

b) Severely reprimanding and scolding in open court petitioner's secretary when the latter filed on
behalf of the petitioner a motion to dismiss the election protest, then angrily adding that non-lawyers/
couriers are not entertained by the court, thereby subjecting the petitioner's representative to the
mockery and ridicule of private respondent's supporters who jampacked the courtroom.

c) Personal interest of respondent judge shown by inquiring from Arcadio Hernandez (one of the
commissioners in the revision of ballots) about the procedural maneuvers of petitioner's counsel.

d) Respondent judge, beholden to Congressman Villareal whose life size (half body) pi is displayed in
the former's office. Villareal is a known supporter of private respondent who engaged the services of
the Villareal law office in the election protest before the respondent judge. Congressman Villareal
allegedly had worked for Judge Benjamin is appointment to the Bench.

e) Statement of respondent judge in open court that a motion for reconsideration (of the denial of the
motion to inhibit him) to be filed by petitioner will be denied.

Petitioner’s recourse is basically founded on the contention that Judge Berjamen’s conduct is not in
consonance with the standard of cold neutrality of an impartial judge, thus he cannot render a fair and
impartial decision in the case.

RESPONDENT’S CONTETION: Judge Berjamen imputed them to petitioner’s wild imagination,

political immaturity and childish mentality. Such that, some words used in the order were merely taken
from the letter of the municipal treasurer while the others were reminders and advice to petitioner to
respect and recognize the authority of the court.He further averred that said petion is only a scheme
to delay the disposition of the election case in violation of the Election Law, which Judge Berjamen is
seeking to uphold. He disclaimed any “utang na loob” to Congressman Villareal.

ISSUE: WON Judge Berjamen violated Sec 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

RULING:

Yes. While it is true that partiality and prejudgment may constitute a just and valid reason for the trial
judge to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case, it is enough that the same be merely alleged.
It is now settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties to the case is not
enough, there should be evidence to prove the charge. Second only to the duty of rendering a just
decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the
integrity of the judge. The true intention of the law is that no judge shall preside in a case in which he
is not wholly free, disinterested impartial and independent because however upright the judge, and
however free from the slightest inclination but to do justice, there is peril of his unconscious bias
prejudice, or lest any former opinion formed ex parte may still linger to affect unconsciously his
present judgment, or lest he may be moved or swayed unconsciously by his knowledge of the facts
which may not be revealed or stated at the trial, or cannot under the rules of evidence.

While bias and prejudice are not to be presumed especially if weighed against a judge’s sacred
obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to person, the Court has at the
same time admonished judges to so conduct themselves and exercise their discretion in a way that
the peoples’ and litigants’ all- important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary is ever nurtured
and upheld. The petition was GRANTED.

APARICIO v ANDAL

FACTS:

What are assailed here are the orders of the respondent judge in certain criminal and civil cases.
What the petitioner wrote on his Motion for Inhibition, as ordered by the Supreme Court through its
Deputy Court Administrator, is for the respective judge to inhibit himself from trying, hearing or any
manner acting on all cases, civil and criminal, in which the Movant or the herein petition is involved
and handling. However, considering the aforecited motion, Judge Andal still issued the substantially
identical orders assailed herein.

PETITIONER'S CONTENTION: There is between him and Judge Andal a state of hostility due to the
filing by him of petitions for certiorari and administrative cases against the latter before the SC prior to
the filing of the Motion for Inhibition. He avers that although the Motion for Inhibition did not explicitly
state on its face the valid grounds relied upon to support his motion, such grounds were known to
Judge Andal. Furthermore, Judge Andal violated his rights to due process, equal protection of the law,
access to the court and speedy disposition of cases, making Judge Andal civilly liable under Art. 32
NCC. He asserts that because of Judge Andal's refusal to inhibit himself, petitioner and his family
suffered mental anguish and incurred expenses for which they must be compensated.

RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION: The motion for inhibition did not cite any valid grounds to justify his
inhibition. He submits that when he denied the motion for inhibition, he was not aware that the
certiorari and administrative cases were filed against him. He contends that the petitioner's assertion
that in denying the Motion for Inhibition he was motivated by resentment because of the prior cases
filed against him. Lastly, he raises that he has neither reason nor time to entertain such a feeling
beause he is so preoccupied with his case load to even think of it nor does he know the petitioner
personally. He submits that the damages claimed is without basis and is purely speculative.

ISSUE: WON Judge Andal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdictionwhen he denied the
Petitioner’s Motion for Inhibition

RULING:

There is no valid ground relied upon to support petitioner's motion. The fact that the motion for
inhibition cited no valid ground was confirmed by the prosecuting fiscal and the counsel for the
accused in the criminal cases and the defendants in civil cases. The denial of said motion was not
whimsical nor capricious.

The Solicitor General states that the state of hostility is purely imaginary because there has been no
presentation of evidence to support pet conclusion. Having denied the Motion for Inhibition, Judge
Andal acted within his jurisdiction when he continued to take cognizance of all the cases pending
before him, there being no writ of injunction or a restraining order issued, enjoining him to cease and
desist from acting on the said cases.

It must be noted that it was only on February 16, 1989 that a restraining order was issued by this
Court. The Court has held that mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari commenced in
relation to a case pending before the lower court thereby, a mere pendency of a special civil action for
certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before the lower court does not interrupt the
course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. Mere filing of administrative cases
against respondent judge would not disqualify him from hearing the cases for if on every occasion the
party apparently aggrieved would be allowed to either stop the proceedings in order to await the final
decision on the desired disqualification, or demand the immediate inhibition of the judge on the basis
alone of his being so charged, many cases would have to be kept pending. Prejudice is not to be
presumed.
With regard to petitioner’s claim of damages under Art 32, the court held that the purpose of the
provision is to provide sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedom enshrined in the
constitution. The responsibility therein set forth in said article is not demandable from the judge unless
his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. Whenever a judge
of a court of superior jurisdiction exercises judicial functions, he will not be personally liable in civil
damages for the result of his actions, and the test of judicial liability is not jurisdiction, but such liability
depends wholly upon the nature of the question which is being determined when the error complained
of is committed by the court . If such question is one the determination of which requires the exercise
of judicial functions, the judge is not liable, even though there is in reality an absolute failure of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.

DOCTRINE: Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: (8) The right to the equal
protection of the laws (16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness
in his behalf. (19) Freedom of access to the courts.