Professional Documents
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MODELS OF
MORPHOGENESIS
'
RENETHOM
'
Professor, Tnstitut des Hautes Etudes Scientifiques,
Bures-sur-Yvette, France
Translated by
W. M. BROOKES, University of Southampton
D. RAND, University of Warwick
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I. Morphogenesis - Mathematical m<
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Table of Contents
CHAPTER 2 MATHEMATICS
2.1 Basic notions: a recapitulation ........................ 39
2.2 Some references from differential topology: differentiable
mappings; differentiable manifolds ..................... 40
2.3 Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.4 Structural stability: dynamical systems and dlfferential
maps . ......................................... 50
2.5 Gradient blfurcatlons and singular points of functions ........ 53
2.6 Hamiltonian systems .............................. 57
CHAPTER 9 BIOLOGY
9.1 Expla.irung space forms: reductionism v. PJa10nism ......... 139
9.2 The notion of archetype In biology and its modem
successors .................................... 153
CHAPTER 14 SEMIOTICS
14.1 From icon to symbol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
14.2 Genesis of the image .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 262
14.3 Death of the image: physical pregnaoce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
14.4 Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 267
145 Symbolism in man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 269
14.6 Localisation and meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
14.7 From animal to man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
The English language reader knows Catastrophe Theory principally through the
books of Zeeman, Poston and Stewart, and Gillmore (see below). All these
works, particularly the last two, are inclined to give C. T. a utilitarian aspect.
Reading the present collection of papers, he will be struck by a palpably differ-
ent viewpoint, at once more speculative and philosophical, and hence, less
preoccupied with pragmatic results. The reader will consequently be in a position
to ask himself whether the considerations offered here are susceptible of experi-
mental verification, or even whether they are rrue. I must admit that the prob lem
of trutht has not concerned me directly. ] am, however, convinced of one point:
as weD as the truth of a theory ,or of a model, one must also consider its interest. If
we are to believe Karl Popper, PSYchoanalysis is not 'falsifiable ', and hence must
be placed outside science. And yet psychoanalysis offers infinitely more interest
than many scientific th.eories whose truth is indisputably assured. lt is in ll1is
spirit that T offer here these models, not so much as testable hypotheses or as
experimentally controllable models but as a stimulus to the in1agination which
leads to the exercise of ihough.t and tllus an increase in our understanding of the
world and of man.
The papers translated here date from 1967 to 1981. Many of them might
weD be revised in the light of our present perspective. It is for this reason that
each is preceded by a short introduclion which sets tllcm in the contex t of
contemporary problematics, such as I conceive this to be.
lt is my aim and my hope that my readers might find, in discovering these
models, even a small part of the pleasure thutl felt myself in conceiving them.
Rem) Thorn
tAs in the celebrated dialogue between Jesus and Pontius Pilnte (John 18:38) Is it not
necessary to repeat with the tuner: 'What is truth?', 'Ti est/a All!theill• •• ?'
, 10 Foreword to the English translation
REFERENCES
E. C. Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory, Addison-Wesley, 1977.
T . Poston and l. Stewart, Catastrophe Theory and irs ApplicatiOIIS, Pitrnan, 1978.
R. Gillmore, Catanrophe 17teory for Sciemists afld £ngifleers, Wiley, 1981.
,
,
TRANSLATORS' NOTE
CHAPTER I
Wrlrten In 1966, this paper ca11 be comidered as the germinal source paper of
catastrophe theory. The ideas lmroduced here a little rapidly will be repeated
and explalntd in Qwpcers 2 and 4 We ·will observe chat the notion of 'chreod ',
v.-fth wlllch we are manifoldly concerned here, lws hardly, been accepted illlo
usoge. Without doubt the definition of the word was too IYigUe for the concept
to lend itself to a fomwl COIIStrucrlon. in most cases we Clln substitute for it
the more precise technical notion of 'morphogenetic field'. 111e exchange of
co"espondence between myself and C. 11. Wadding ton who in this period has
given a 1•ery favourable reception to my Ideas, and to whom I owe a great deal -
is wlmess to the too well-known dlfftcultles which hinder rlre dialogue between
biologist and mathematician. The biologist rarely sees the necessity for a rigorous
definition of the concepts he uses, ond considers the tiiOthemarician demanch s
for precision as a rhetoric without imeresr. It is neceSS111')1 to say that here, we
rome up against a key problem of C. T.: how to define o 'stoble o:;ymprotic
l'fglf/11!' of o dy110mic. 1J1is concept, fundamental to our modelling, has still not
rece1vtd a sarisfoctory mathematiCill definition in the general Cllse. On this point
see paragraph 4.6 in Chapter 4.
dynamical and mathematical justifications that recent research alone will be able
to provide. To illustrate this relative independence of morphogenesis with regard
to our knowledge of the substrate, I will offer the two following examples.
(1) Let us consider first a frog's egg, fertilised, which we allow to develop in
optinlUm conditions. By consulting works on Embryology, we shall be in
a position (barring accidents) to predict with a great measure of precision
all the changes to be undergone by this organism, and the whole morphology
of its development.
(2) Let us consider on the other hand , a cliff laid bare at a specified date (t 0 )
by a landslide. Let us suppose that we know the geological nature of the
cliff and the whole micro-climate subsequent to the landslide (winds, rain,
temperatures, etc.). Can one foresee the form that the cliff will ultimately
take under the action of the agents of erosion?
In case {2), our knowledge of the substrate and the forces at work is excellent;
nevertheless, it would be a very clever geomorphologist indeed who could
predict with any precision the shape into which the cliff will ultimately be
carved by erosion. In the first case, the possibilities of our predictions being
correct are very great and yet our knowledge of the substrate and of the morph·
ological mechanisms (with the exception of a few biochemical generalities on the
synthesis of proteins) could hardly be more sketchy. In morphology, therefore,
there is only a very small correlation between the possibility of our prediction
on the one hand and our knowledge of the substrate on the other.
The objection will be made that 1 have compared things which are not
comparable, setting on the same level a biological process and one from inanimate
nature. In fact, this comparison wiU serve to underline an important point of
whlch few people are aware: that the phenomenon of morphogenesis in inanimate
nature is less well known, and quite as little understood as morphogenesis in
living things. The latter has attracted the attention of biologists for centuries
but on the contrary, in Physical Chemistry morphology has been more or less
permanently scorned by the academics. For instance, a typical and important
problem is that of the geometrical diStnoution of a substance between two
phases. Now, on this question, very little is known, for example, to my knowledge
there exists no theory to explain the dendritic growth of crystals. The disda.in
of physical chemists for this type of question is easily explained. 1t is that here
we are concerned with extremely unstable phenomena, difficult to reproduce
and resistant to mathematisation. Indeed the essentiality of any forn1 of any
morphology has to be expressed by a discontinuity with the properties of its
surround.ings. Now, nothing makes a mathematician more ill at ease than a
discontinuity, because any usable quantitative model is based on the use of
functions which are analytic and hence continuous. lf you want to know w.b.a t
happens when you throw a stone into a pond, it is infmitely better to do the
experiment and fllm it than to try to formulate a theory about it: the ftnest
16 A dynamic theory of morphogenesis (Ch. I
1.1.3 Determinism
In principle, there are two types of mechanical model: the classic determinist
model and the quantum model, fundamentally indeterminate, whose determinism
can only be expressed statistically. lt is normally considered tltat phenomena on
the sub-atomic scale fall into the category of quantum models (and are thus
indeterminate), whilst macroscopic phenomena come into the category of
classical models and are therefore subject to a rigorous determinism. This booklsh
view of things is, I believe, fundamentally wrong. I shall not discuss indetcrminis·
tic quantum theory here, but at the macroscopic level, numerous phenomena
present a certain type of instability, due to the fact that initial symmetry dis-
appears. Thus a homogeneous disc allowed to fall freely through the air from a
horizontal position will fall in a spiral. If one takes a cylindrical bath, full of
water, and drains it tluouglt a central plug-hole, the liquid will drain with a rotary
movement the sense of which is a priori unknown and unpredictable. ln all cases
of this type, minute variations in initial conditions may lead to very great
variations to subsequent development. In all these cases it is quite possible to
postulate that the phenomenon Is determined, but this is properly speaking a
metaphysical position, impossible to verify experimentally. If we are only going
to be happy with experimentally controllab le properties, we shall be led to
replace the unverifiable hypothesis of determinsim by the empirically verifiable
property of 'structural stability': a process {P) is structurally stable if a small
variation In Initial conditions leads to a process (P') isomorphic to (P) (ln the
sense that a small transformation in space·lime, an E-homeomorphism in geometry,
will bring the process (F') back to the process (P)). This leads us quite naturally
to Waddlngton's notion of 'chreod', and of 'morphogenetic field' in general. A
morphogenetic field on an open set of space-time resides in the speciflcutlon of
a 'uruversal model' from which the given process IS copied. By this fact such a
process is structurally stable. There is therefore no mystery in the notion of
morphogenetic field; this notion s.imply expresses the fact that n process happens
in conformity with a model given a priori, and in a structurally stable manner. In
every natural process, one !lr$t tries to ISOlate those areas \\here the process is
structurally stable. the 'chreods' of the process; islets of determinism separated
by zones where the process is indetemtinate or mucturally unstable. By Intro-
ducing dynamic models one then tries to break down each chreod into elementary
catastrophes, and then to bring the organisatioi' of these elementary chreods
back to a stable global form by the action of an implicit singularity of the
dynamics, the 'organising centre'. As to the organisation of the separate chreods
Sec. 1.2] Description of the Model 17
tThls Idea of Interpreting cellulnr differentiation in terms of a '1l.llbte metabolic regime'. I.e.
en onractor or blochcmlc kinetics. Is often auributcd to Dclbruck and S:dlard. In het. it
wu stated in Its local form. which is the only correct one. in C. U. Waddin8ton,/nrroductlon
to .lfodun G•n•ticl I 940.
18 A dynamic theory of morphogenesis [Ch. I
That being so, we now 'localise' the preceding construction; if (x) designates
a system of coordinates in the domain U, the seat of our process, the concen·
trations Cf will be a function of the coordinates (x, r) and will satisfy in principle,
a system of partial differential equations of the form:
oc
- i (x, t)j = X1 (c;. x, t) + K l::..c; /:;: Lap lace operator
or
where the term K t;cl expresses the equalisation effect of the diffusion . ln fact,
in all that follows, we shall assume this term to be small with respect to Xt and
we shall treat it as a perturbation of Xt. [f the vector field X is structurally
stable (a t least in the neighbourhood of the autractor controlling the local
regime), it has no qualitative effect on lhe development. At all points x of U is
lhus found an associated vector field on Rk, otherwise called a dynamical system.
The properties of such a field of vectors for all x of U constitute what will be
called a ·field of local dynamics' on U. We will defme an atlractor of the local
dynamic, for all points x where the local dynamic has already reached a 'limit
state'. This atlractor, being structurally stable, rules over an open set of nei&h·
bouring points of x. The open set U is thus partitioned into domains U;, associated
with attractors A;. These domains are separated by shock wave surfaces, which
form what we call the set of catastrophe points of the process. The properties
of this set constitu te the morphology of the process.
It is in practice impossible, without a more precise hypothesis, to specify
the position of the shock waves separating the domains of diverse attractors.
Even in the theoretically simplest cases, hydrodynamlcs in particular, this
prob lem has only partial solutions. Nevertheless, if one is interested, not in the
quantitative development, bu t only in the qualitative (topological) structure of
the separating surfaces, the problem becomes more accessible. Stipulating
'MaxweU's convention', a hypolhesis of general character, which expresses in
some way the equality of 'local potentials' relative to each attractor on both
sides of the separatrix, it is possible to show that separating surfaces present
only a small number of stable singularities, and always the same ones. at least,
in the case where the local dynamic is a dynamic o f gradient, X= grad V. For
this case, I have drawn up a complete list of these singularities, which are the
'elementary ca tastrophes' on space-lime R 4 • ln fact these singularities become
apparent when the local dynamic X = grad V is itself in a ·critical" situation,
for example when an attractor A is destroyed or divides itself into several
attractors (a p henomenon which H. Poincarc has called 'bifurcation'). We ean
form a picture of each of the singularities of the potential V which presents
itself in a structurally stab le manner on R 4 , and give the algebraic model corre·
spending to the surfaces of the catastrophe. For guidance, the list is as follows :
Sec. 1.2] Description ofthe Model 19
These last three singuladties are associated wiU1 the singuladties of potential V
of a more complicated type (those of 'eo-rank' 2). They lead in hydrodynamics
to the morphology of the breaking of waves; in Biology, very probably, they
direct the organogenesis of the processes of captures (phagocytes in Unicellulars)
and of sexuality (formation and emission of gametes).
In all these cases, the geometric schema is as follows: at a point (x, r) of U,
the local dynamic presents a singularity of a given algebraic type (s). The follow-
ing property of differential analysis is then applied: all deformations of the
critical dynamic (s) correspond to a point of euclidean space W, associated with
the singularity (s), this space which parametrises all the possible deformations
(up to a local homeomorphism) of the singular dynamic (s), constitutes what I
call the 'universal unfolding' of the singularity (s); the fmal development of the
process from an initial situation where the local dynamic is in a critical state (s)
in (X 0 ) is then qualitatively defmed by a mapping F 1 of U in W, the growth
wave; the fmal catastrophes are then defined by the intersection of F 1(U) with
a universal catastrophe set associated with the singularity (s) in (W). We thus
find a mathematical justification for the idea of 'epigenetic landscape·, suggested
20 years ago by Waddington.
rn carrying this model to the extreme, we could say that the adult organism
is only a portion of the 'universal unfolding' of the germinal dynamic that rules
the egg. The 'elementary catastrophes' of which a list has been given, correspond
to the singularities of the dynamic of codimenslon 4. The associated space W
20 A dynamic theory of morphogenesis [Ch. I
is of a dimension less than 4. These are the only singularities, associated with the
dynamics of gradient, which can occur in a stable manner in our tin1e-space.
They are also found in inanimate nature as weU as in living beings.
But H is clear that they would not be sufficient to account for all the
development of a living being; a primary problem rests in the stable configuration
presented by 'chreods', a priori independent of each other. We can sometimes
explain this association by the existence of a singularity, an ·organising centre',
of codimension greater than 4, which is not dealt with by the growth wave
F1;U-+ W. But then such a development would already require the setting in
motion of homeostatlc mechanisms which maintain the 'wave' F1 in a weU-
defined region of (W). 1n fact, it is indeed this which represents the developmen t
of the embryo: there, as in an epigenetic primitive, one only finds singularities
of the 'elementary catastrophe· type. The more refined organogeneses, which
like those of the eye or the bones, require a certain metric control, only appear
much later.
In adcUtion, the singularities associated with the dynamics of gradient are
of a very simple type , and it is certain that, even in inanimate nature, one can
have local dynamics which present 'recurrence' (closed or 'almost closed' trajec-
tories). Unfortunately, the mathematical study of 'bifurcations' presented by
these multi-dimensional anractors, and the topological nature of the ctuastrophes
that result has hardly been attempted (and is in any case extremely difficult).
But one thing is certain: where the catastrophes associated wiU1 the dynamics
of gradient are defmed by sets of a polyhedral type the catastrophes associated
with the diminution of dinlension of an attractor (due to the phenomenon of
resonance, for example), lea<l in general to catastrophe sets of a considerable
topological complexity, of the type wiU1 arborescent or dendritic form. So we
see that the dynamic origin common to the dendritic forms observed in inaninlate
nature (solidification: growtlt of crystals) and in living nature (trees; blood
circulation; the 'classification schemas' observed in the organisation of memory)
demands the same treatment. Generally speaking, the appearance of a new
'phase' in an initially homogeneous milieu leads to an appearance of this kind,
which we call a ·generalised catastrophe'. Every process in which there is a
rupture of an initial symmetry is thereby, structurally unstable, and leads 10 a
generalised catastrophe. Such processes cannot be formalised; bul it must be
noted, that even if the process itself is structurally unstable, its fmal outcome
may be well determined.
Thi.s explains that life uses, as a matter of course, generalised catastrophes
in Embryology, (compare the gastrulation of amphibians following ordinary
catastrophes, to the gastrulation of birds or mammals, a generalised catastrophe).
The death of a Jiving being is shown by the fact that the dynamic of its local
metabolism passes from a recurrent configuration to a gradient configuration
and that is, typically, a generalised catastrophe.
Sec.I.J) E>.perimcntal Control 21
I J EXPERIMENTAL CONTROL
We will not pursue the description of our mode l further since it would require
a considerable technical development with little to be gained In the clarification
of the essential. I will tackle the question which is obviously on everybody's
tips. Are these models susceptible to experimental control? I must, at least
for the moment, reply in the negative.
In fact, where (P) is the natural process bemg studied, two cases are possible.
(I) (P) structurally stable and wholly contained in n 'chreod'. ln this case
IS
(P) allows a qualitative model given once and for all and it is difficult to
see what further experience could bring other than a confirmation of the
structural stability of the chrcod. Of course one can try to study the interior
of the chreod. By separating it into 'elementary catastrophes' and then by
relating the configuration of the elementary catastrophes to the action of
an 'organising centre' (eventually exterior to the support of the chreod), we
can strive to analyse the dynamic process which ensures the stability of it.
But this analysis is often arbitrary; it often leads to several models between
wluch we can only choose for reasons of economy or because of mathematical
elegance. Besides, catastrophe theory is not sufl1ciently advanced to allow
the const ruction of a quantitative model: the only case known is that of the
elementary catastrophe defined by the growth of a shock wave in Fluid
Dynamics. This single example demonstrates the difficulties of the problem.
(2) (P) structurally unstable, and contains several chreods (for example two
IS
chreods (C1 ). (C2 ) separated by zones of instability or indeterminacy). In
this case, we could in principle, relate the indeterminacy to the effect of a
generalised catastrophe, not formalisable in itself. The only hope of extract·
LDS o model from it is to make it statistical. We wiU have to consider, not
only a single process, but o whole ensemble of processes on which we wiU
make a statistical artefact of the morphological characteristics. This is the
method followed in Quantitative Biology. But here still, the theory of
generalised catastrophes is not sufnciently advanced to allow the construction
of a model. I think, per~nally, that what is usually understood as quantum
mechanics is in this view, only a statistical artefact of Hamiltonian catastro·
phes.
In face of the fact of our inability to control our model by experiment, strictly
empirical minds, foUowing Bacon, will be templed to reJect it as vain speculation.
In terms of standard sclentiOc Ideology 1 can only agree with lhem. But In the
long term, lt seems to me that there are two reasons which should prompt
scholars to give the model some credit:
(I) l11e fltSt is that each experimenter works within a given specialised field. we
accept as given a priori these divisions, tlus taxonomy of the experience of
22 A dynamic theory of morphogenesis (Ch. I
(2) The second reason is that the ultimate aim of science Is not to amass
undJfferentiated emplricaJ data, but to organise this data in a more or less
formaJJsed structure, wruch subsumes and explains it. To this end, we must
have ideas a priori on the manner in which these things come about , we
must have models. Up till the present, the construction of models in Science
bJls been maJnJy a question of chance, of the 'lucky guess' . But the time will
come when the construction itself of models will become, if not a science.
at least an art. My endeavour, which consists of trying to describe the
dynamic models compatible with an empirically given morphology, is a first
step In the construc tion of this ·General Theory of Models' tlut will have to
be built one day.
I will add, with customary phllosophical solicitude, that our model offers interest-
ing perspectives on mentaJ processes, and on the mechanism of knowing itself. In
effect, from tltis point of view, 01u psychic life is none other than a sequence of
catastropl1es between at tractors of the dynamic constituted by the stationary
activities of our neurones. The intrinsic dynamic of our thought is not then
fundamentally diiTerent from the dynamic acting on the outside world. We can
say that the modelled structures of exterior forces can, by coupling, be constituted
in the very interior of our mind; this is precisely the act of knowing.
In the same range of ideas, it will be shown how our model enables us to
contemplate afresh an old problem , that of biologicaJ fmaJJty.
13 .I Finality in biology
lt is currently accepted thJlt there is no 'living state of mauer'; life cannot be
indefinitely divided; the cell constitutes, as is well known, the irreducible unit
of living matte.r. We are then led to make a global structure of life, expressed by
the simultaneous presence of elementary sub-systems in one coherent and stable
Sec. 1.3) Experimental Cont rol 23
the release of a great number of degrees of freedom, in such a way that the
dimension of the attractor (v0 ) increases and becomes a 'manifold' (V) of a
sufficiently large dimension. This is the phenomenon of 'silent catastrophe' ,
without immediate morphogenetic effect, but which is expressed in Embryology
by 'gain in competence' . Our fundamental hypothesis is as follows: on the
ectoderm of the you ng gastrula, this attractor (V) is not itself fixed, but under·
goes numerous fluctuations, between the states (s) of large din1ension and the
states (r) of lesser dimension. In other words, the topology of the functional
space of the states (s) and the states (r) into which they become degraded, is
such as to give effect to a model of the global conrrol form of the species, in
particular by the mapping (s) ... r(s). This being so, this form is too complex
to be stable: certain cells speci:lllse in losing the states (s) and keeping only the
states (r). Jt is at first the endoderm (wh.ich only conserves the states (r) relative
to alimentary reflexes); then the mesoderm, which only conserves the states (r)
relative to the reflexes of movement and of biochemical control. Some other
cells, on the contrary, lose the states (r ) in order to conserve only the states (s):
these are the nerve cells. Indeed, the nerve cells having lost the capacity to
regulate their metabolism, conserve the trace of all that happens to them, a very
precious quality for the fu ture organ of memory. (In fact, it is well known that
regulation takes place but in a catastrophic and undifferentiated manner, by the
discharge of a nervous inlpulse). Other cells (those of the epidermis) develop by
ageing towards an attractor situated midway between (s) and (r), and lose their
competence. The attractor (M) of the mesoderm contains the group of euclldean
displacemems (D). Through one subsequent degeneration, certain cells lose this
group completely. they will become the bone cells (osteoblasts). In other cases,
the degeneration will be less complete, and the attractor will contain a one·
parameter subgroup of the group (D). They will become the muscular cells
(myoblasts). The geometry of this degeneration, transposed into a chreod of
a metric character, describes the formation of the bones and muscles which are
attached to them. The foonalion of the sensory organs is very sintilar. The field
(S) decomposes into a direct product of fields (S.), {S0 ), (S1), etc. visual, auditory,
tactile .. . , and each of these fields imposes a definite form on a preferred zone
of neural tissue . In the case of the visual field (Sv) for exantple the group (D) of
displaccments operates equivariantly in (S,,). A subsequent degeneration leads to
the formation of a metrically con trolled 'chreod' which is the ocular globe. The
action of the group (D) is manifest by the presence of mesenchyme ln this
chreod which will lead to the forma tion of the choriode and the sclerotic, to
which will be attached the three pairs of muscles which ·symbolise' decomposition
into three one-parameter sub-groups of the domain of (D) which act on (S).
This action of th.e group (D) is found again , acting in a compensatory manner.
in the field of the stationary neurone activities on which the field {Sv) approxi·
mately reconstitutes itself, once tbe organogenesis of the brain is complete.
There is in th.is, a general fact : a regular field (s-> r(s)) undergoes in the
Sec. 1.3 I EKperimental Control 2S
1.3.2 Conclusion
The synthesis thus glimpsed of the 'vitalist' and 'mechanist' thoughts in Biology
will not be developed without a deep modification of our conceptions of the
inanimate world. Ln Biology (and particularly in Molecular Biology) we employ
without too many apparent scruples, anthropomorphic words such as: informa·
lion, code, message, programme. In pure Physical Chemistry, the use of these
words would be considered as a manifestatJon of a raving anthropomorphism.
Our model attributes all morphogenesis to a conflict, to a struggle between two
or several ·auractors'. It thus appears as a return to the ideas (2500 years old!)
of the leading Pre.SOCratics, Anaximander and Heraclltus. These thinkers have
been taxed with 'primitive confusionism' because they made use of words of
humart or social origin, such as 'confllct' and 'injustice', to explain appearances
in the physical world. According to us such criticism is false because they IUJd
had this profoundly apposite intuition: the dynamic situations governing the
evolution of natural phenomena are fundamentally the same as those that
govern the evoluuon of man and socteties and thus the use of anthropomorphic
words in Physics is thoroughly justified. In so far as one makes use of 'conflict',
a term expressing a weU-defmed geometric situatJon m a dynamic system, there
is no objection to making use of this term to describe rapidly and qualitatively,
any given dynamic situation. Let us 'geometrise' in the same way the words
'information', message·, 'planning' (as we try to do in our model) and all objec·
tions to the use of these words will fall. Modern Biology makes natural selection
the exclusive principle, the deus ex machina, of all biological explanation. The
only fault in this is to treat the individual (or species) as an irreducible functional
entity. In reality the stability of the individual, or the species, relies Itself on
competition between 'fields', between 'archetypes' of a more elementary charac·
ter, from which struggle emerges the geometric configuration, structurally stable,
which assures control, the homeostasis of the metabolism and the stabUlty of
reproduction. It is by analysing these underlying and more deeply hidden
structures, !hot we reach a better understanding of the mechanisms which
determine the morphogenesis of the individual and the evolution of the spec1es.
The 'struggle' takes place. not only between individuals and species, but also at
every point of the individual organism. Let us recall the words of lleraclitus.
it is necessary to kno111 tlrat conflict is Wliversal, tlrat justice is a struggle, 1111d
that everything llli/1 develop according to struggle and necessity.
general lhan yours. I have the impress1on that, for you, chreod can be identified
with 'developmental pathway' 111 t.he sense that a chteod will be associated 10 an
allractor of the local biochemical kinetics. lt would have no sense, in that case,
10 consider chteods In which several allractors might be in competition. After
there had been a 'switching point' (bifurcation, in my tenninology) there would
be nothing left of the chreod, properly speaking. Further, since the organogenesis
of the greater part of the organism requires the interaction of tissues of different
types (for example an epithelium nod a mesenchyme) controlled by different
attractors, the fonnation of such an organ such as the kidney, for example,
would never be described by a single chreod.
Personally, I have a tendency 10 employ chteod as a synonym for ·support
of a morphogenetic field', without restricting the number of attractors in corn·
petition or the morphology of the domains which they control within this
support. I should be glad if you would tell me if you approve of this use of the
word chreod. lf not,l'U have 10 gtve it up and use only the term ·morphogenetic
field'.
3. Waddingron to 'n10m.
Edinbt1rglz, 4 February 1967.
Thanks for your letter of J anuary 27th. J thJnk your suggestions about how
to deal with the Delbruck- Szilard references are probably quite all right. I
confess, however, that I am not very sure of the distinction you are making
between 'eta! local' and 'etat global'. The dJstinction 1 want to make Is between
a reginne (fiux equilbrium) which remams unchanging throughout a period of
time and a reginne which ls,at any moment,stable. but which changes progressively
as time passes. Thus when you suggest that your sentence on page 18 should
read •... rtgime stable du mhabolisme local', I feell should like to say something
like ' ... regime stable m a is evoluant du metabolisme local'. But my grasp of
French is very weak, and this may not be necessary.
J am sending you Xeroxes of Delbnlck's remarks which are the source of
the reference to him. I am not sure where the S1.ilard reference is to be found .
I also send you a Xero.x of the pages in my Inrroducrion. You wiU see from the
boltom of page 181 that I knew I was trying to talk topology but had not the
technical tralnJng to do so (see pp. 169- 196).
About the meaning of 'chreod'. I think your expanded use of its absolutely
justified; indeed, I would have enlaJged it in a slmilar way myself, except that I
have always been trying to get the basic idea across 10 an audience of bioi08J,Il$
who could hardly understand even the simplest applications of it .I have, however
written about the ectoderm of an amphlbian gastrula being switched mto the
alternative chteods of epidermal, neural, or mesodermal dJfferentiation; and 1111
obvious that within each of these 'gross chteods' there are a number of sub·
Stc. 1.4) Correspondence between Waddington and Thorn 29
chreods - within the mesodermal, for instance, there will later be switching into
muscular. mesenchymal, glandular - epithelial, and so on; and that there will be
interactions between the regions of tissue which have taken one chreod with
ihose which have taken others. I think my usage has therfore implied that a
chreod such as 'the mesodermal' may at a later stage in time come to include a
nwnber of d1fferent (and imeracting) attractors (such as those for muscle,
dermiS, connechve tissue, et c). What I am not sure of is whether, at the time of
a catastrophe which brings about a bifurcation into chreods A and B (neural
and mesodermal, let us say), there can in any sense already be more than one
mractor included with each of the chreods A and B - or do these contain only
one attracior at the time, which either is inherently unstable so that it
gives rise later to two or more attractors, or is unstable with respect to influences
impinging on it from geographically other parts of the system, which induce
ihe appearance of new chreod,?
A1 A2
0) )t"
I
92 03
' /
';,
bl
}L
/
' 'b2 b3
B1
l'lg. l
Let us now add the hypothesis that there exht mutual interactions between
the two series of enzymatic reactions. Let us specify this hypothesis by supposing
that the metabolical product a2 exercises on the catalytic reaction rate of enzyme
8 1 , an influence such that for all large concentrations of a, , this reaction be
inhibited .t Similarly we suppose an action of the metabolic product b 2 on the
enzyme A 1 • These interactions are expressed in the diagram by dotted arrows.
With this new model. it is again true that in constant conditions, the cell will
all am a state of stable flow. But now there are three possible equilibria for the
same conditions of the surroundings, two stable and one unstable. Let us consider
for example. the conditions defined by the equality of concentration of sub·
stances a 1 and b 1 • The fiow equilibrium which will be discovered will depend on
tlle order in which the substances have been introduced into the surroundings.
Following each case, the equilibrium will be characterised by
(a) a large amount of 3'j, and little of b 2 , if a1 has been Introduced ftrst ; this
equilibrium is stable and we will call it state (a);
(b) little of a2 , a large amount of b1 if b 1 has been introduced ftrst ; this equlh·
brium is equally stable; we will call it state (b);
(c) low and equal concentration of 3'j and b, if both substances were Introduced
together in equal quantities; there is flow equilibrium but it is unstable and
one m whlcb weak perturbations provoke the passage from state (a) to
state (b).
The passage from state (a) to state (b) could be provoked by strong transitory
perturbations. For example, if the initial state is (a), a momentaneous interrup-
tion of the inhlbition of B 1 by a 2 will provoke a passage from stage (a) to state
(b).
tSuch a p<Operty could be due to • reversible dlmerisation of a, , only 1he dimer lnblbitil!l
the reaction of 81 •
Sec. 1.4 J Correspondence between Waddington and Thorn 31
AA
Ao
~
u
w
....
u..
00
w 0
o oo Ao AA
T IM E D 0 SE
w ild
cinnabar
' ' ....
' ....
mahogany
- -- - - vermilion
-- - ~
carmine
~~---------------------------------claret
rig. 3 Diagram o r the dew:lopment processes or pigment formation in the eye!
or Drosophila . The developmental process moves Crom left to right nlon~ the
branching tracks. The points marked CA, V, and QV, >ymbollzc the alternatives
dependent on whether the claret, vermilion, and clnnabSJ substances are produced.
There mun be very many more tracks "''hlch "• 01nnot yet fit into the picture.
Thus it is known that carmine has no, or little, vermilion substance, and maho&any
little cuu'labar substMce , but we do not yet know whether the de>elopmcnul
proeeucs in flies homozyaous for these genes branch orr from the norm..r track
before the vermilion and cinnabar forks, or are sccon<bry branches, as indicated
by the dotted lines.
a facet-forming 'substance' is formed a.nd lhat lhe Bar gene sets going reactions
which break down this substance; then a third set of processes determine that
facet formation shall actually begin, and a number of facets are formed propor-
tional to the amount of substance still present. The temperature effects, which
only occur when the Bar gene is present, presumably affect the breakdown
process for which Bar is responsible. In this example the end-product which is
the 'effect' in the time-effect curve is not a single substance like a pigment, but
is a relatively complicated tissue, the eye facets. The facet-forming substance,
however, may be a single chemical compound, since Ephrussi has recently shown
tlut the number of facets formed in Bar eyes may be increased by the injection
of suitable extracts from normal pupae. We know nothing about the mechanism
of action of the substance; it might either increase some son ofinductivestimulus
£O facet formation or lower the threshold of reaction to such a stimulus. The
substance is probably related in some way to the vermilion substance, and may
be identical with it; it is known that Bar inhibits the formation of vermilion
substance in the rest of the body.
In considering development from an embryological point of view we can, as
with Bar, not yet express the characters in which we nre interested in _terms of
quantities of definite substances, but must t:Uk instead of histological types such
:u neu ral tissue, eye facets, etc. But experimental embryology leads to the
formulation of exactly the same kind of system of alternative possibilities as we
1\ave had to develop to describe the genetical results. For instance, the ectoderm
of the amphibian gastrula has two alternative methods of change open to it; it
may become epidermis, or, if the evocator is added to it, it may become neural
ttssue. The case is exacdy parallel to that of the pigment system in Drosophila
at one of its branch points. Both the methods of approach to the study of
development fomJUiate the main problems in lhe same kind of way, and we may
1\ope that genellcs nod embryology can collaborate in finding the answers.
We must now consider certain genetical problems in the ilght of the scheme
of thought which has just been developed.
4. Tlzom ro Waddingto11.
Bures, 20 February I 967.
Many thanks for your letter of February 4th, and the enclosed texts of
Oelbnick and yourself; both are , I believe, of fundamental importance for
the history of ideas about cellular differentiation. But I must confess that I have
not been able to grasp the difference you seem to make between DelbrUck's
'flux equilibria' and your own 'chreods or developmental pathways'. You seem
10 imply that in Delbrilck's model, some alternative has been taken which, at
least for some time, determines the metaboli~ into a fixed steady state. I do
not think that Delbrilck himself would have accepted this interpretat ion; first
there is the distinction made by Delbrtlck: 'dans le cas des systemes en equilibre
36 A dynamic theory of morphogenesis (Ch. I
de nux (mais non des syst~mes en equttibre).. .' (hne 8 from the bouom, page
171 ). This seems to mean that 'flux equilibria' may move to some e>.tent, whJJe
simple equlllbrla do not. But, of course, the terminology is rather obscure.
Moreover, remember that tills discussion took place about 'plasmagenes' or
cytoplasmic heredity. Now, how could this so.c;alled .steady state survive the
tremendous metabolic changes undergone by any ceU in mitosis, sporulation, or
gametogenesis?
When Delbrl.lck exhibits Ws local model with substrates a 1 , b 1 , a2 , b1 ,
enzymes A1 , B1 , A2 , 8 2 , etc., quite clearly he does not claim to describe the
whole metabolism of the ceD. His only hope is 10 specify a subsystem (S) of
metabolites one might reasonably consider as independent - or at least weakly
coupled - to the remaining part (R) of the metabolism, involving reactions with
other substances than that of the system (S). The 'stable solutions', the 'attrac·
tors' of the subsystem (S) - provided they are structurally stable - wW stay
qualitatively the same or vary very httle for a relatively long period of tune.
(Note that th is observation applies to all models in biochemistry, llke the regula·
lion models a la Jacob-Monod.) But the remaining part (R) of the metabolism
may ttself vary in large amounts, producing very large phenotypic effects.
Eventually this large variation may, through a weak coupling with (S), cause the
destruction by catastrophe of the given altractor in (S), destroyil1g the validity
of the model.
'ow, in your 'chreods' or developmental pathways, the only conceivable
way of ensuring the stability, the 'canalization' of the chreod is to assoctate to
the chreod a subsystem (S) of the DelbrUck type. Thu is in fact what you express
ut the bottom of page 174 of your text when you refer to the sides of the
valley as defrned by the action of antagonistic genes (or sets of genes). Now, we
have to take into account the fact that the coordinates of this local split factor
(S) of the metabolism may not be, as in Delbruck's model, concentrations of
metabolites, but very complicated functions of them (so that a simple biochemical
interpretation of (S) will be difficult to explicate). Moreover, there may be, at il
given time, several such split factors (S 1 ), {S1 ), ••• , each provided with a certalO
set of attractors; this will give the most likely interpretation of the notion of
'homologous chreods' in embryology. Finally, I do not think that there is a
fundamental difference between Delbnlck's model and yours, except that yours
is more general. The main merit of Delbnlck, in that matter, is to have put tlus
idea in a more specialized form, more easily acceptable to standard biochembts
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that such expressions 11.1
·nux equilibria', 'local stable regime', 'steady state', etc., can be made precise
only through the use of a geometric model - even if it is not explicit. In lhe
correction you suggest in my text; 'regime stable, mals evoluant,du metabolisme
local', I would like to say: 'un attracteur de la cin~tique biochirnique tangente au
point considere'. This would be the only correct statement, but who, arnons
blolog.ists, could understand such a language?
Sec. 1.4) Comspondence between Waddington and Thorn 37
As I am not sure to know :ill your work, may I ask you to give me lhe
references you would consider best for:
I. The word chreod.
!. The epigenetic landscape.
3 The concept of homeorhesis as opposed to homeostasis.
\!any thanks in advance .
.5 Waddington to Thom.
Edinburgh, 23 February 1967.
Many thanks for your teller. You ask: what difference do I see between
what Delbruck was saying. and what 1 had said. Now I admit I may have mis·
understood Delbriick, but what I understood him to say was as follows. He
drew an enclosed space, into which there flowed certain things (labelled a1 , b 1 )
and out of which there came certain other things (a 3 , b3 ). Inside the space was
his switch mechanism. When he spoke of 'systemes en equilibre de flux (mais
non des systemes en equilibrc)' m the last paragraph of his remarks, I took him
to mean, by the ftrst phrase, 'systems which are in equilibrium even though
material is continually passing into and out of them, i.e. are in steady states', in
contrast to the second phrase, which J took to mean 'systems in equilibrium
with no nux through them' . This is, I think, the usual way in which the terms
'flux equUibnum' are interpreted in English. Now in both these phrases lhe
meaning of 'equilibrium' whether 'flux' or not would normally be that the
concentrations of the substance inSJde the box remained constant. You ask
how could they, throughout such profound changes as ceU division, etc.? I
mould point out that the Delbrtlck model was proposed as an altenwtive to
the postulation of genetically continuous 'plasmagenes', and was specificaUy
designed to account for the transmission of an unchanging character through
many ccU generations. lt was implied, I think, that lhe turmoil of cell division
was a transtcnt fluctuation m some system only loosely coupled with the character·
preserving system he was describing.
This is, I think, the way m which most biologists have interpreted DelbrUck,
e.g. Jacob and Monod , 'Genetic Repression and Allosteric Inhibition, in Cyto-
differentiation and Macromolecular Synthesis, 21st Grwoth Symposium, Acad.
Press, 1963, on page 53, wrote 'Conservation implies differential functional
activity of nucleotide sequences, resulting, for instance, from the establishment
of steady state systems capable of clonal perpetuation,as pointed out by DelbrUck
(1949)'.
My point is that progressive differentiation is nor clonal propagation.
So we come to the difference between Delbrtlck's system - as I interpret
tt and mine. In his system the cha~cter of the cell which is In one of its altem-
altve states remains constant in time the conceot~tions of substances are in
38 A dynamic theory of morphogenesis [Ch. I I
Mathematics
The equations (E) define on the domain (D) of states of (s) a vector field with
components X 1 , X 2 , •• • , X,. (E) is an 'autonomous' differential system, and,
when the functions X1 are sufficiently regular (for instance given continuous
partial derivatives of order one or two), we can, locally, integrate this system.
That is to say we can deduce the laws of growth of the form Cf(l) = I!; (t; c0 ) , c/
deftning the initial concentrations of the substances Si at the instant t = 0.
Tbe initial constant cl being fixed, the functions c; = h; (r;;c0 ). define in
our domaln (D) , a differentiable curve, the trajectory issuing from the initial
point (c0 ). We have here the most general schema in scientific determinism; that
whlclt Laplace has so eloquently described in his Essai plzilosphique sur les
40 Mathematics [Ch. 2
Zk = gk (!,(xi))
is also of class cm.
2.2.1 Local mappings: germs and jets
A mappmg F from a part of a space X on to a space Y is called loCtii at 0 eX
if there eXJslS a neighbourhood U of 0 m X on which F is defmed. Suppodn&
then 0' to be the mtage F(O) in Y; If V is a neighbourhood of 0' in Y which
contains the unage F(U), we shall denote this situation by writing:
1-"
(U; 0) ... (V; 0')
G
(U'. 0)- (V,O')
Sec. 2.2) Some References from Differential Topology: 41
Jets of order r
Let there be two local mappings F, G on 0 from X c R" on to Y C RP defined
for local coordinates (xi) in X, (yi) in Y by the equations:
a<w)
If the functions fj, Ki are of class C', and if the partial derivatives fj,
ax<w)
a<w>
a:xf.wJKi (w is a monomial inx1, lwt = deg w <O; r ) have equal values at 0 , we say
that F and G are equivalent on 0 to the 111 order. Such an equ ivalence class
between local mappings from R" on to R" is called a jet of order r from R" on
to R". Such a jet, uniquely defined by the values of the partial derivatives
atwJ
( )fi is a point in a vector space with coordinates eeL). We denote this
ilx w
by l'(n, p) . The point 0 of R" is called the source of the jet, the image 0 ' eR"
is called tbe target.
The diagram
(m)
J' (n, p) X J' (n, q) J' (n, q)
p~ p~ p~
(m)
f - k (n, p) X J' A(p,q) J'-k(n, q)
Examples offen
TANGENT VECTORS
When n = I, a jet ofJ 1 (1, p) is interpreted as an equivalence class (of order one)
of germs of curves starting from the origin 0' of R.l'. Such an equivalence class is
caJled a tangent vector on 0' to RP. These vectors form a vector space on R of
dimension p.
COVF.CTORS
When p ~ I, for any n, a jet of J 1 (n , 1) is interpreted as the linear part of the
Taylor expansion of a functlon J, IR'' _. R . This is a covector , the scalar
product of n vector and a covector being the mapping (m) associated with
s J'
the composite mapping R ... R'' -+ R.
Vectors, in this formulation, should be considered as 'curve germs', and not
as line segments, as one is taught at an elementary level ....
Where U is an open set of R", with co-ordinates (x 1 ,x,, ... ,x11 ), we can
constder the totahty of tangent \'ectors at points x e U, as a large topological
space of dimension 2n, with coordinates (x;,a1), a, forming the components of
the velocity of the germ representing the vector. Tbis space is caJled the tangent
bundle of domam U, written as T.(u). We will give a more precise definition
later.
There exists a 'canontcal proJection' p of the fibre T.(U) on U def'med by
p(x/ ,Df) =(xi) E U. A sectwn of the fibre is a mappings: U- T.(U) such that
p os= identity.ln thiS case, s associates to every point u e U a vector (s(u))
tangent at that pomt. We recognise here a 'vector field' on U. In the same Wl}
we shall defme the covector space r• (U) on U. A section s' of r• (ll)- {.;
associates to every point u E U a covector at that point, which we can write
classicaJly as a linear co mbination of differentials with coordinates r a1 dx1
I
where the ats are differentiable functions of (x;). We recognise in expressions
such as l: a;(x)dxJthose which are usuaJly called differential forms.
I
Sec. 2.2] Some References from Differential Topology: 43
l
Then we can replace t by du , whence/(u • (t)) = (du) . From this is immediately
deduced the invariance of the differential umler a mapping: when we have a
sequence of mappings
F g
X-+Y-+R
then
. .
d(g o F) = F o g (du)=F"' (dg).
DEFINITION
An n-<limension di{{erentillble manifold V is a space which can be represented
locally as a closed subset of the euclidean spaceR"+k, so that at every pomt x or
lhis set there exists a local representation or V by a system of k equatiolll
F 1 = F 2 = ... = Fk = 0 where the differe ntials dFt,i = I, . .. , k are linearly
independent in x.
Sec. 2.2] Some References from Differential Topology: 45
lt follows from this definition that at each point x of V, we can find a 'local
chart' in which V is a linear manifold o f dimension 11 and of eo-dimension k. In
general there are many such charts. rn the common part of two such charts we
pass from one map to the other by a change of coordinates, h 21 •
EXAMPLE
In the Oxy pla.n e, the curve with equation x 2 + y 2 = J (circle) is embedded.
Take the coordina tes y as local coordinates, except at point x = O,y = + I and
x = O,y =-I, where we will take x.
The manifolds of dimension zero are points, those of dimension one, curves
and those of dimension two, surfaces. The manifolds of dimension three are
parametrised by the usual R 3 space .... The sphere S 3 , defined in R 4 (x 1 , x 2 ,
x 3 ,x.) by the e~uation x1 + x~ + x~ + x~ = I is a three-dimensiona l manifold.
In the R"+ space, we cnll every 11-dimensional space defined locally by a
single equation F(x 1, ... ,x2 , ... ,x;, ... ,x11 ) = 0, a hypersurface.
A differentiable manifold can be compact. This is the case when it can be
embedded in a Euclidean space as a bounded set (i.e. of fmite size). The circle
is a one-dimensional compact manifold; the straight real line R is non-compact
(but it Is paracompac1,a denumerable union of comracts). Besides these manifolds,
we consider also manifolds with boundary: M"+ is a manifold with boundary
Jl', Jl" being a manifold, when the complement M"+l -V" is a manifold
of dimension (n + l}= the i11terior of M. At each point v of V', there is a neigh·
bourhood U c R11 + (local chart) such that the intersection M n U Is defined by
the inequality Xn+! ;;;. 0 (half space of Rn+l).
A non-compact paracompact manifold may be, but is not necessarily,
diffeomorphic to the interior of a compact manifold with boundary.
In practice, we defme a differentiable structure of an 11-manifold M by an
atllls, that is, a system of charts U;, open sets of R11 , with connecting diffeomor·
pllisms hjk on the intersection U; n Uk . Thanks to these local maps we can
deftne the notion of a differentiable mapping of a source manifold S into a
target manifold 0. In the same way we will be able to define the tangent space
T.(M) to the manifold M as the union of T.(Us) with the connection h;k
extended to the tangent vectors. Similarly for the covector cotangent space
r• (M): a sections of the canonical projection r• (M)~ M is a differential form.
46 Mathematics [Ch. 2
SARD's THEOREM
For a C'' mapping F from M" Into Y" k, m > k, the set of singular values
F(C) is of (n- k) measure zero. {This is to say that when a point is chosen 'at
random' in Y, this point is most likely to be a regular value.)
Tx(X)~
1,1 T1• ( R11 ) ...
"
T_,. ( R11 }/Ty(V)
tbe cumpoSJtc mapping ;>. · j 1f is suljective. This is to say that when at y we
have for V a local coordinate system such that V is defined by u 1 = ul = ... =
uq = 0 about Y (with the dutlinearly independent in y), then lhe transversality
byptll.hesis implies thar at x. r.he functions Uf o f have independent differentials.
Consequently the pre-image / 1 (V) is locally at x, a submarufold W of co-dimen·
sion q. And further /~ 1 (V)= W is globally a sub manifold of X , of eo-dimension
q. The importance of the tral1Sversal1ty property is seen in the rwo following
results:
When /:X- R" ::> 1'11 - q is transversal to vn-q every mapping/ sufficiently
near iO f ( in the Cm topology, m> q, defined by the difference of the partial
derivatives D/- DJ' of order E:;; m) is equally transversal on V.
Each mapping f can be approximated in the cmtopology by a mapping g
transverse to V. In other words the transversal mappings form a dense open set
in the function space L(X;R'') of mappings f:X-> R" endowed by the cm
topology. As we say, the transversality property for a mapping is generic.
In another co nnection it is easily shown that, in all one-parameter families
of mappings, / 1 :(X)-+ R" where each ft is transversal on V, the pre-images
Jll1 = fi 1 (V) are all diffeomorphic (by a global diffeomorphlsm h1 :X-+ X, so
long as X is compact). Thus the transversallty entails the topological stability o f
the pre-images. All these properties were well known to the older Italian geome-
ters at the beginning of l11e century, who often used r.he mer.hod 'della piccolo
variazione' in order to simplify a configuration.
2.3 DYNAMJCS
2.3.1 Dynamieol Systems: Asymptotic States, At tractors
Definition 1: A dynamical system (M, X) is a differentiable action of the group
of real numbers R on a marufold M,thatts, a differentiable mapping~: R X M -+ M
such that for all t tn R, the rnapp111g ~~ :x-+ «t. x) is a diffeomorphism and for
all t to t 1 tn R and m tn M ~0. m)= m , 4>1, (~1 , (m)) = 91, +r, (m). The manifold
M is called the phau space. By differentiation such an action deftnes a vector
field X on M via the following equalJty:
•
d
4>(t, m)= X(m)
dJ t•O
2.3.2 Examples
(a) Polnr artrocror
In this case A Is reduced to a single point (a). This point a is an at tractor if all
the eigenvalues of the matrix of the linear part of X in A (denoted j 1 (X) (a),
called the one·jet of X at (a)) have negative real parts. Such a point attractor
is then called 'generic' (or hyperbolic). In fact the field around a is locally
structurally stable, in the sense that for every field X' near enough to X (in the
C1 ·topology) there are neighbourhoods U of a and V ofa' and ahomeomorphism
II:U-+ V such that h(a) =a' and h sends every orbit of X in U onto an orbit of
x'.
(b) Closed trajectory
Let c be such a trajectory, homeomorphic to a circle S1 . Let H be a germ of a
hypersurface transverse to c at a point q of c. The trajectory through a point m
of H cuts H again for the first time in m'. The Poincan!·Fioquet mappingh:H-+ H
defined by h:m-+ m' is a germ of diffeomorphism for which q is a fixed point.
lf the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix j 1 {lz) (q) have modulus less than one
then the closed orbit is a generic (hyperbolic) artractor. Then for all fields X'
near enought to X, there will exist a closed trajectory c' in a neighbourhood
of c, and a homeomorphism g which sends a neighbourhood of c onto a neigh·
bourhood of c' and such that the image under g of an orbit of X is an orbit of
x' (structural stability property).
So far as the topology of attractors is concerned these two examp les are the
simplest bUI there are others which are far more complicated. R. Wllliams and
M. Shub have given examples of attractors with very complex topological natures.
The description and classification of attractors which are locally structurally
stable, in a weakened sense that is specified below, is without doubt one of the
major problems of contemporary Qualitative Dynamics.
Recent work has been carried out on the structure of these so-called 'strange'
allractors, in which the topological nature can be specified only in particular
cases, S\tch as the systems referred to as Smale's 'Axiom A' for which there exists
a decomposition of the tangent fibre r.(M) into a 'contracting' component, an
expanding component and the trajectory. For these it is possible to show the
existence of invariant measures on the attractor which extend over the basin and
for which there is a true thermodynamics. But the general nature of these
attractors is as yet little understood, and we do not know how they behave in their
'bifurcations'. ln this regard we can make the following observations:
DEFINITION
If the only attractor of X isM itself we say that X is ergodlc on M.
index k. With the help o f this cellular subdivision of M", we can calculate the
topological invariants {homology, homotopy) of M . Tnversely, the presence of
every topological feature of M is manifested by the presence of critical points.
Here we have the principle referred to as Morse Theory.
We caJJ the gradient cells which finish at or start from a critical point of
index k, ·stable cells' or 'unstable cells' respectively: We show that in order that
a gradient field be structurally stable, it is necessary and sufficient that all its
critical points be non-degenerate, and that the stable and unstable cells associated
to these critical points intersect transversally.
Let us apply the preparation theorem to this formal series in (x; c1 ), writing it
as the product of a non·zero function at (O;O)with the distinguished polynomial
Then the critical set of this family is defined In the auxiliary plane (X: b) by tht
parabola (P).
'Ne see that this region is obtained as the pre-image of the parabo la (P) by the
auxiliary mapping:
X=x - a b'=-b + a 2 •
v~ x 3
Fig. 2.J
(4)
x'
(O) V ,. 4
(1)
(6)
(2 )
(3) (7 )
Fig. 2.2
Sec. 2.6] Hamiltonian Systems 57
I
CHAPTER3
p \
(U, O)
I p·
60 The theory of the universal unfolding [Ch. 3
Fl {(Rn,O) X {O}}= I
id g 1 id g
(V,O)
I \
(Rn , 0) X (V, O) -p RP X (V, 0)
of the fonn H(x , u) = (h 11 (x), k(u)), H'(y, u) = (J1 11 (y), k(u)) where k:(U, 0)-
(V, 0') is a local diffeomorphism for which the following diagram commutes:
(V,O)
/
( Rn,O)X (V,O') '
G RP X (V,O')
Sec. 3.1} The Universal Unfolding of the Germ of a Function 61
The aim of me theory is to show mat, if the genn f satisfies a certain algebraic
condition of finiteness (which is almost always realised in the case of functions,
i.e. when p = 1), then there exists an unfolding F ofI that one can call verso/ in
the sense that all other unfoldings off are equivalent to an unfolding induced
from F by a suitable (C"') mapping of the parameter space of F. We also aim to
show that two versal unfoldings of minimal dimension are equivalent, in which
case we have defmed a Wliversol
. unfolding, at least up to equivalence.
TN I • • Tf I • TP
\!I N
I
p
c = f,.(X)
F
NXUXJ~PXUXI
!
UXJ--+ UXJ
l
/rX idr
Y(x.fu(x), u) + U (u)
Fe == H; o F o H1
where H1 and Et, are diffeomorphisms of N X U and P X U which project onto
the san1e diffeomorphism of U:
Sec. 3.1) The Universal Unfolding of the Germ of a Function 63
HI
NX UXI NX UXI
l
UX I ·
/1 X id 1
1
UXJ
P X U X I - - P X UX/
H'I
NXU
!/ l
PXU
~u~
can be written in the form
where X11 is of theform X(x, u) + U(u) and Yu is of the fonn Y(F(x, u)) + U(u).
annihilating k independent linear forms on H(lf). If there are multiple roots the
argument is the same except for the additon, for a root c of orders, of the s
independent conditions :f(c) = f (c)= .. . = j<s- 1) (c) = 0. Generally, the remain·
der
n-·l
R(z) = . E a/
]=0
thus appears as a complement R to the ideal l(P) in H(lf), and the division rule
expresses the fact that each vector in H(u) is the sum of a vector in J(P) and a
vector in the complement R.
Suppose now that P(z) has the fom1
where the uis are sufficiently small that every root of P11 is in U. Then the space
R of polynomials of degree k - J which is complementary to the ideai/{P0 ) = l
is also a complement to each of the ideals l(P11 ) for u sufficiently near to zero.
Thus there exists a projection Pu depending upon u , such that
!{c)- f(c')
z
c'f(c) -c{(c')
+ _:....:._::....___:_.:......:.. 'i
c - c'
,
c - c I
Sec. 3.1] The Universal Unfolding of the Ge.n n of a Function 65
But the two functions in the numerator are zero on the diagonal c - c' = 0
which is a smooth submanifold. They are therefore multiples of (c - c'), the
quotient being holomorphlc in both cases and symmetric in c-c' (thus even in
the co-ordinate le - c'[ oormal to the stratum), It therefore follows that the
coefficients a;(u) are holomorphic on the eo-dimension-one strata of the dis-
criminant variety of the polynomlal P(u) and consequently are so everywhere
(i.e. on the strata of larger codimension) by Harlog's Theorem.
Continuity ofpu extends to functionsofseveral variables. If U is a neighbour·
hood of the origin in C"(z~o . . . ,Zn) and g1{z;) is a system of 11 holomorphic functions
on U such that the ideal of the Kl defines 0 with mulitplicity k (this
means that for almost all sufficiently small (3 the system g;(z;) = {3 defmes k isolate
near to 0) . Then (for the same reasons as those given above), the ideal l(g;)
generated by the Ki is of eo-dimension k in the space H(U) of holomorphic
functions on U. If we consider the algebra q [z; Jl of formal power series, the
ideal generated by the g; in C[(z; J contains a power of the maximal ideal, and
the quotient algebra C[[z;) ]/f(g;) is of dimension k. Let b., . .. , bk be a system
of polynomials which form a basis for this quotient algebra. Then the complex
vector space R generated by the b 1 , • • • , bk is a complementary subspace to the
ideal I(gi) in H(U) . Thus there exists a projection p sending H(U) onto R and
such that for nil f eH( U)
gf = Ki + 1: Ujl!}
I
where the lt} are holomorphic and the UJS are so small that the ideal of g;s only
has k zeros in U. Then the space R remains a complement to the ideals of the
gis and we have a projection f-. Pu(J) into R which is holomorphic in u. We
observe that if we introduce the u as new coordinates, the algebra of formal
power series C[[z, u IJ divided by the ideal (g/, u) is a free-module of finite type
on the generators b 1 , b1, ... , bk.
P(x) = xk + 1: rtpl,
/~k- 1
the ideal l(P) i& of maximum codimension (equal to k) when all the roots are
real; it has strictly smullerco-dimensicm when some roots are imaginary conjugates.
The projection Pu is defined by the Lagrange interpolation polynomial on the
set of u where all the roots are real. The Differentiable Preparation Theorem
asserts that it is possible to extend this projection, dlfferentlably in u, to all of a
neighbourhood of the origin in the space u.
This theorem is a profound result which has roused the interest of the finest
analysts. After the first proof of B. Malr.range (Seminaire Cnrtan, 1961 [5]),
came that of J. Mather; next another due to S. Lojasiewicz [3) and also one of
L. Nirenberg, TPD [9]. We restrict ourselves here to presenting an idea of the
nature of the difficulties encountered.
We return to the example given in the preceding section of the interpolation
polynomial for two roots c and c':
After division this takes the form ft (c, c') X + f, (c, c') where ft and /2 are
symmetric. It is then a question of establishing that / 1 and / 2 are c- funclions
of the elementary symmetric functions s = c + c' and p =cc'. This is covered by
the 'Differeniiable Newton's Theorem' proved by G. Giaeser [I) before the
Preparation Theorem, and which, as the proof due to Lojasiewicz shows, Is
practically equivalent.
An essential tool of the proof is the complex extension of a C'" function:
we embed ~ in C both for the source and the target. By the Whitney Extension
Theorem, we can show that every C"' function f; 1R -+ ~ can be extended to a
function F: C -+ C, so that the jet of the real part IR C C coincides with that of
f, and such that F(x - iy} = F(x + iy}. Clearly, F cannot satisfy the Cauchy-
Riemann equations in a neighbourhood of the real axis y = 0 iff is not analytk.
Thus, if we define the remainder Pu(/) by the Lagrange interpolation polynomial
applied to the extension F, we must expect to have some discontinuilies on th~
strata of complex multiple roots since a quotient oftheformF(c)- F(c')/(c-c')
does noi have a limit us c and c' tend towards the same value. To escape this we
may make a suitable adjustment in a tubular neighbourhood of the strata ul
multiple roots (Malgrange's method), or choose an explicit extension given by tht
Fourier transform (Mather's method), so that U1e discontinuities compellS.ltl
lhemselves if we act simultaneously on the conjugate points ....
The theorem generalises to functions of several variables in the foUowing
way , which we shall need: let f:(R~ . 0)-+ (IRj! , O) be a germ of a differentiable
mapping. Assume that this mapping is of finite type, i.e. the quotient of !M
Sec.J I j The Universal Unfolding of the Germ of a Functjon 67
algebra of formal po\\-er series R[ [x1Jl on Rn, divided by the ideal generated by
they, f (taken formaUy) is an R·algebra of finite dimension having for a basis
k generators b 1, b1 , •• • , bk (polynomials inx). Let
Ea} A~ Xf = Cj A{ = B;(t)
TI1e function Bt(t) is zero on the manifold t::.1 defined by t::.(t) = O.lt thus suffices
to show that we can divide B;(t) by t::.(t).
F(x, u) = f(x) t
M dh! , ~
- (x, 1) = :E Fx 1(h1(x),g(t)) - (x) + F11 g (t) + -
dr 1 dt de
defined by
y; = -
oF
-
of
+ ~ u· ob;
cOX{ ox; /=0 I ibt
Given this we return to our function A(x') defined in terms of df/dt and the
transformation 11(1 • This is written as follows
Since x' = ll,(x) we have finally to solve the ordinary differential equations which
define 111 and g 1 :
Suppose that the mappmg t/1 is not of maximum rank k at 0, then in the
quotient algebra,
Definition 8. A local fib ration p :Jt" -> Jt"-111 Is sald to be adapted to the
~trm /{x),lf the restriction off to the leaf F0 = p - 1 (p(O)) has the origin as a
non-dtgenerate quadratic critical point.
lt is clear that the maximum dimension of such an adapted fibration is equal
10 the rank k of the quadratic form q(x). Henceforth. all of the fibrations we
ooruider are of maximal dimension.
72 The theory of the universal unfolding [Ch. 3
then we have
f(x , y) = q(x) + f(c{y))
The function g(y) = f(c(y)) is called the residual singulariry of f(x); the
Taylor series of g{y) begins with a term of order three; if it was not thus one
could add to q(x) a quadratic term tn a linear function (yf) which is independent
of x, and the form q(x) would not be rank k , but (k + 1).
We now show that the residual singularity is well-defined up to equivalence.
Consider another foliation adapted to the singularity f(x): it is given by a
system of equations of the form
4 i ily ax
"hich, when we substitute x in the functiony and solve (W') for x, is an element
of the square of the ideal of the partial derivatives agjay. But we have the following
theorem due to J. C. Tougeron [14] (p. 57, Theorem 3.2).
Theorem 2. Let f(x;) be a function such that
lftht square of the ideal J generated on (x) by tire fx; contains G(x), then there
aim a local diffeomorplrism h:x-. x, such that !(x) + G(x) = !(h(x)).
i'rr>of. Consider the deformationf(x) + rG(x). Since the ideal J1 of partial deriva-
tives off+ tG is independent oft, we can express the infinitesimal deformation
d'dt (/ +tG) = G off+ tG in the form
3
G(x) = ~ - (/ + rG) X;(x, t)
1 3x;
V=xl 0
V= x 3 1 x 3 +ux Fold
V=x 4 2 x 4 + uxl + vx Cusp
V=x 5 3 x 5 + ux 3 + vx 1 + wx Swallowtail
V=x6 4 x 6 + ti.X4 + vx3 + wx 1 +IX Butterfly
2. Co-rank Two TI1e Taylor series ot f(:x) srarts w1th J cubt.: 1urm H(.r. l' 1 in the
two variables (x,y). The linear pencil H...-(x,y) + kHy(x.y) o.ldines :lll hl\'l'lution of
the projective line, which in general is non degenerate.
Firstly, suppose that the double points of this involution are distinct and
real, for example x = O,y = 0 ; then H = x 3 + y 3 • Tills singularity, of which the
uruversal unfolding is
V = x3 + y3 + wxy - ux - vy.
H = x3 - 3xy1
V= xly + y 4
We can show that two such fourth degree terms wbtch are nut divisible by x
lead to equivalent singularities (T. Lu (4] ).
The transition between elliptic umbilic and hyperbolic umbilic is caUed thl
parabolic umbilic.
We will st udy the catastrophes corresponding to these singularities (element·
tuy catastrophes) in the next chapter.
Sec.3.1] The Universal Unfolding of the Germ of a Function 75
Proposition 1. The set o[germs which are equisingu/ar with a given gem1 g [om u
a fmooth submani[old in the universal unfolding ofg.
ln the product Rn X U which Is the global space of the universal unfolding
,ff(x). we consider the algebraic subset A of critical points(inx)ofthe following
functions:
(We can, in fact, suppose that /(x) is a polynomial, since the ideal of fx 1 contains
a power of the maximal ideal m , say ms; then, by a change of coordinates we can
remove all the terms of degree> 2s tn the Taylor series, using Theorem 2).
From the definition of the un iversal unfold ing, every point a has a neighbour·
hood in Rn X U which Is a 'versa!' unfolding of the germ of F(x, u(a)) at the
point a. But every algebraic subset such as A can be stratified in such a manner
that two points of the same strata have 'isomorphic' neighbourhoods under a
bomeomorphism compatible with the stratification. It is said that an algebraic
IUbset defines a 11wrphology of finite type when the 'elemen tary chreods' are
p1en by the local algebraic models M , ,M 2 , ••• • M~.-, each model corresponding
10 a stratum. We have a relation of inclusion between these morphogenetic
fields: M1 c M1, if and only if the stratum Xj of centre M! contains the stratum
Xt of centre Mt in its closure; we can only have MJ C M1and M1C M; if M1 and
M1 are identical (this will only be so because if M1 C Mf, then dim X1 <;;dim Xf).
Thus if g' is contained in the uruvcrsal unfolding of g in U, then there exists a
Dtighbourhood about the corresponding point of Rn X U, which is a versa!
unfolding of g' Because of dunenston, thts neighbourhood Is also universal so
that the local model of the set A at g' is a submodel of the model defmed by A
it 0 But we also have the reciprocal rei:Hlon, the model of g Is a submodel of
thlt of g' . Thus g and g' are in the same stratum. On the other hand, we can
llppose that the local models M1 have been defined to take account of the position
76 The theory of the unh-ersat unfolding [Ch. 3
trlvialisations under the action of the group. (A vector field on a stratum can be
embedded in the ambient space in a manner compatible with the stratification.)
11 thus follows that the mappings which. in a chrcod, define the catastrophe set
liS the prc·image of a standard semi-algebraic subset can always be assumed to be
globally differentiable.
f: Rk .... R"
are transversa l ro V and that the pre·imagc W(j) = } 1 (V) Is then a submanifold
of eo-dimension q in Rk. Moreover, If g is a mapping sufficiently close to fin the
C1·topology then the pre·lmage submanlfolds W(f) and W(g} are isotopic under
w isotopy of R"' compatible with a deformation F1 off mto g. The same
property is true, almost immediately. if instead of a sub manifold V, we consider
a system of submanifolds in general position or. more generally a manifold with
oomm diffcrentiably embedded in R" .
The basic idea of the theory of stratified sets is to establish an analogous
properly for nny subset A of R" which is a compact semi·lllgebraic or semi·
analytic set. We try to encapsulate the set A in a one·parameter family of regular
neighbourhoods T,(A) which for r small are diffeomorphic to manifolds with
oomcrs. With a suitable defutiuon of trariSversalny, if f:Rk ~ R'' is transversal
to A./Is transversal to all the manifolds with t."'rners T,(A) for sufficiently small
r We then have an isotopy theorem for those mappings F1:R X Rk -> R" X R
78 The theory of the unh•ersal unfolding (Ch. 3
llm
X f.)'(- X,
-
Angle (X;)';, T.yt(Xj)) = 0
The existence of such a decomposition for affine analytic sets has been proved
by Wh.itney, and for semi-analytic sets by LoJasiewicz. Such a decomposition,
whic!!_ we henceforth_ call a 1tratificatlon, possesses the frontier property· if
X n Y -#.then X c Yand dtm X< dim Y.
Denote this situation by X < Y (X incident to Y). A chain of strata is a
sequence X., X 1 , • • • , Xk such that Xt < x,. I· A central property of stratified
sets Is this: we can defme for each stratum X a family of tubular neighbourhoods
(in the usual sense of Differential Geometry) T,(X) such that the boundaries of
the tubes T,(X;) of a chain of strata Xt cut each other transversally.
Then we can form the family of global tubular neighbourhoods of the set
A by taking the union of these tubes (taking radU r of the form r = e' , where s
is the dimension of the stratum X).
In Thorn (EMS) [11] there is a sufficiently complete version, good but
difficult to read. of the theory of stratified sets. J . Mather has since given a
complete version (TS) [7] . There exists a purely formal theory of stratified
sets Thorn (SMA) [10] , (LM) [13]: the mcidence schema of the sets is given and
considered as an ordered graph, to each chain (c) of strata are associated a mam·
fold.M(c) with boundary and corners (the maximum 'eo-dimension' of the corners
is the length of the chain, i.e. the number of strata contained in the chain). Jf c'
is a sub-<:hain of c there is a surjection kc(c' of the manifold M(c) onto the
manifold M(c') which is a differentiable fibration with well-defined local models
on the corners of the boundaries of the source of a target. We then impose
obvious conditions of transversality upon these suljections. The global stratified
set E can thus be obtained as the disjoint union of these M(c) with the identinca·
tions defmed by the sutjections.
of the kernel Rk of p. When we pass from a cham c' to a subchain c" we have a
mapping of the corresponding kernels Rk - Ker p which is expressed by a surjec·
tion of the strata of Ker(c') onto the strataofKer(c").The identification mapping
thus defined is therefore of the type of those obtained by collapsing to a stratum
one of Its tubular neighbourhoods. A precise defmition can only be given using
the local models. In particular it thus follows that in the attaching map of a
'flag' of Y on X, X< Y , the restrictions to the kernels ky x: Ker piX- Ker plY
are surjective.
The fundamental property of these morphis!m is expressed in the 'second'
isotopy theorem: If A'!. B!.. R is such that p and t o pare sofl morphisms, and
a and bare two pointsofthe same stratum of R. then the corresponding morphlsms
of sections A~ ... 8 11 and Ab - Bb are of the same topological type.
'Generic' differentiable mappings are soft morphisms. On this subJect see
my article (LM) [13].
denote the canonical projection. Then there exists a true submanifold s. V (the
'symbol' of V) such that every jet z e p- 1 (V)- s. V has the following property:
if I is a local realisation of z then i'l is transverse to V at 0 and , moreover, the
local restriction of 1 to the manifold i'ifr 1 (V) is of maxima.! rank (a local
embedding).
Tilere the J(g;) are the Jacobians obtained from the equations of D;(f) by
repeated application of the preparation theorem and elimination of the coordin·
ates of the source. That is to say that the jet of g depends only on the jet off.
Thus if we have an inequality of type (e) for[, we then have the same
inequali ty for all germs [ 1 such that[-/1 is soft at 0 to a sufficiently high order.
By induction the same inequali ty holds for all images of the critical strata
Xj = D1(f), at the price of including as the second member of (e) a system of
generators for the image of the symbol of Dj (if these are nor already contained
in the self-intersection).
This reasoning allows us to stabilise the Images of critical strata: an argument
analogous to U:mma 3 (but sin1pler)allows us to stabilise the saturates/1(f(D;(I)))
of crit ical strata, and thus their transversal intersections.
For a complete proof see C. G. Gibson er al. [2].
defined by a germ of the manifold Rq which is transverse to the stratum off at/.
Two universal unfoldings off are isomorphic as stratified morphisms, il1t
isomorphism being compatible with a stratified homeomorphism of the parametet
space Rq. Two germs S of G 1 belonging to the same suatum have isomorphic
unfoldings (in the above sense). In particular, we can talk about the universal
unfolding of a jet, provided that the jet defines a stratum of G, of fmite oo- l
dimension.
Sec. 3.2] Stratified Spaces and Morphisms: Topological Theory 83
REFERENCES
[I] Glaeser, G., Fonctions composees differentiables, Ann. of Matll., 77, I,
1963, pp. 193- 209.
[2] Gibson, C. G., er al., Topological stability of smooth mappings, Springer
Lecture Notes 552, Berlin, 1976.
[3] Lojasiewicz, S., Whilney fields and Malgrange- Mather preparation theorem,
Uverpool Singularities Symposium, August 1970, Springer Lecture Notes
192, pp.106- 115 .
[4] Lu, Y. C., Sufficiency of jets in !''(2, I) via decompositon,Jnventiones
Mach., 10,1970, pp.119- 127.
[5] Malgrange, B. (1. D.), Une remarque sur les ideaux de fonctions different!·
abies, lnventiones Matlt., 9, 4, 1970, pp. 279- 283.
(6] Martinet, J ., These, Les singularites des formes differentielles (Ann. lnstitut
Pourier,l970).
(7] Mather, J . (LTS), Lectures on topological stability. Harvard University 1970.
(8] Malher, J . (SSM), Stability on c!"' mappings {1-VJ) (Pub!. Math. IHES,
en particulier).
(9] Nirenberg, L. (TPD), A proof of the Malgrange preparation theorem.
Liverpool SinguJarities Symposium, August 1970, Springer Lecture Notes
192, pp. 97-105.
[10) Thorn, R. (SMA), La structure locale des morphlsmes analytiques. Congres
International de Nice, 1970.
[11] Thorn, R. (EMS), Ensembles at morphlsmes stratifies, Bull. Amer. Matll.
Soci., ?S, 2,1969, pp. 240- 284.
84 The theory of the universal unfolding [Ch. 3]
Catastrophe theory
What is catastrophe theory? it is 110t easy to reply to tire questio11. 011 the o11e
ha11d, we ore hard put ro see a clear disti11crion between catastrophe theory 011d
earlier work on the applications of bi/urcatiOII theory and, on the other, the
principal procagonisu of this theory (refe"ed to as C. T. for convenience), that
is Orristopher Zeeman and myself. have palpably divergent views on the content
and ultimate aims of the theory. Taking the fmt point fvst: quite basic well
established classical problems CDIJ be considered os relevant to C. T. The work of
Euler on the buckling of beo11u w11s already part of catastrophe theory! On the
second point, it is importam to point out that Zeeman is responsible for the
plvase 'catastrophe thi!Ory: In my book, Structural Stability and Morphogensis.
I i11troduced 110 11l()re than the temli110/ogy 'poims of catastrophe·. By not
hesitating to place tiJfs theory in the framework of o 'systems theory' Zeei'1Uln
has cxmsiderobly enlarged the possible field of applications of C. T. lt is tills
systemic approach which will be adopted here. Notwillrstonding this my poillf of
view remains sufjiciemly different from that of Zeei'1Uln, in the sense that the
methodological aim of C. T. is for Zee11Uln oriented towards the pTIICtical and to
concrete results while for me it is more theoretical and speculative. There is 110
doubt that these differences, which spring from the individual points of view of
the authors, carry with them something of the di$llgreemellfs on the very nature
ofC. T.
spoon constituting a set place at table, is not a system according to this definition.
ln the majority of cases. the domain (D) (or its cut in space at any instant) is not
simply connected, but contractable, in fact, topologicaUy a ball.
Such will be the case if (D) is the contents of a paraUeleptped box. The
boundary of the domain (D) constitutes lhe outer face of the sytcm. If we wish
to have a system whose development will be rigorously 'autonomous',indepedent
of that of the rest of the universe, it would be necessary to render the outer
face impenneable to aU physical mfluences (the flow of matter and energy in
all their fonns) emanating from the outside world, or coming from the domain
(D) itself. Such a system would effectively be the ideal black box. lt would,
however, be unobservable.
This ideal complete isolation can clearly not be attained (nothing is tmpenneable
to gravitation, for exantple). Furthermore, If we study a system, it is in order to
be able to say something about it. It is hence necessary that we can observe
something and hence to extract from the data that which we can describe . This
simple fact shows that it is illusory to wish to separate our system from the rest
of the world . The outer face will hence aUow the passage of inflows and out·
flows of which we try to keep as accurate an account as possible. There is
nothing to prevent the suggestion that the outer face of our domain (D) is purely
fictional, providing that we can assure a satisfactory control of the flows which
cross it.
In the end, we will be able to suppose thatlhe inflows are, at least partially,
at the discretion of lhe experimenter and that at least some of the out flows will
be measurable by the observer. So we arnve fmally at the definition of a system
as an entity susceptible of 'dialogue' with the experimente r, who gives it 'inputs'
and to whJch the entity responds by 'outputs'. Hence the second defmition:
Definition 2 of a sys1em
A system Is an entity in which every input u e U responds by an outpu1 ye Y.
llere we will suppose that input and output are defined respectively by real
parameters· the input u by k real numbers (u 1, u1, .. . , Ilk), the output y by m
real numbers (y., Yl· . .. , Ym ). Input and output are then Eucl!dean vector
.spaces U and Y of dimensions k and m respectively.
If lime Is taken as discrete, having integer values, the sequence 11(11) o f
inputs with the oorresponding sequence y(n) of outputs constitute a ltisrory o(
the system. lt will be convenien t to represent these two sequences jointly as one
de numerable sequence (u(n ). y(n)) of points (u. y) in the product space U X Y.
In oontinuous time we would have a trajectory-curve in U X Y.
Sufficiently often, this limit Ill llllts the integral over 111 ul' ~ measure jl(ll. ")
over U X Y. which usually pos$esses some re~tulanty proper11e>. w1d whtch is
often independent of the htstOI) under ~:onstderauon and 1hus uf all .tnlenor
histories of the system If such a measure e'ms m L X Y \\e \\ill c:ill it the
characrerlsric of the system.
In certain particularly simple systems. the characterisu.: i~ \lngular. It has
LIS support \:Cntred on certain submamfolds of the sp1ce 1.: X Y. The following •
cases are of such u nature·
F(uo,Y) = 0.
Let us suppose that the system replies with the value Yo on the higher
branch. If at the poim (u0 , y 0 ) this root is simple, that is to say the partial
derivative aF{ay (u 0 ,y0 ) =fo 0 at this point, then by applying the implicit function
•
theorem we can solve F(u0 ,y) locally by y = op(u), withy0 = op(u0 ).1t is reasonable
to allow that if we vary the input u m a neighbourhood of u 0 , then y varies with
respect to a neighbourhood ) u 0 - 17, u 0 + 11 [ according to the rule y = 'P(u):
this is by continuity of the 'internal states' of the system.
y Yo
a· u
•
Fig. 4 .I
normally cease to exist we shall call 'a catastrophe (under the meaning according
to C. T)'. The 'catastrophe' Is thus a 'survival manoeuvre' of a system called on
to leave its normal characteristic state. lt is thus that the benign appearance of
the 'catastrophes' of C. T . are manifest.
Once on the higher branch (y 1), in making u moving from b' towards a', it
will stay on the higher branch as far as a, from which it will return to a 1 by a
catastrophe on to the lower branch.
Tlus example shows again that access to the Intermediate part of the S.shape
is more difficult than to the lower and higher branches. Moreover, only these
latter can be described according to the hysteresis cycle described above.
'
• a' Uo b
Fig. 4 .2
Classically, we have the hypothesis that for all inputs (u),lhe local systems are
systems of finite type (B), and that their characteristic is a differentiable submanl·
fold of (U = R4 ) X Y. We shaD say that for the process (u) a point xis regular
If at this point the outputg(u, x) = y is a dlfferentlable function of (u, x). Where
there Is a jump from one sheet of the characteristic to another, there is a
'catllstrophe' which will be immediately apparent as a carrier form of the dls·
contsnuity of the observables. For example, let us suppose that (Mx) offers two
possible responses a red window or a blue window. The catastrophe set (K) of
the process will be thus a surface (shock wave) separating the 'red' regime from
the 'blue' regime. The form provides for the confltct between the two stable
regimes which partition the substrate space (D).
I
Y;(u) = Af C(y; u) d~; (A1)
IJ(AJ)
where the function V IS proper. The attractors are thus the minima of the
potential V(s). If the function V(s) is generic, these minima are isolated points
which , in general, depend dlfferentiably upon the variables u. This case is the
one we call elementary catastrophe theory (E.C.T). This model offers the
advantage of leading to a complete mathematical theory (see Chapter 5). Further,
we can deftne a catastrophe theory Gumping from one minimum to another)
with the help of appropriate conventions.
r.tax-o·s con'l'elltion
lt prescribes that at all pomts u of U the dominant regime is that which corre-
sponds to the lowest minlminJUm.
The catastrophe set (K) is thus the set of u for which the function V(s: u)
attains its absolute minima in two points at least (or in a unique degenerate
minimum). Here again the hypotheses of transversallty (of 'genericity') allows
the description of the generic (stable) singular! ties of the catastrophe set. For
example if U is a plane, the only singul.arities are- the simple line, the point at
which the line stops and the triple point.
Or because, for a certain value of the parameter, the attractor allows a first
integral. For example the family of linear fields dy = k.dx on the torus T2 has
the property that for every rational value of k, the corresponding field, for
which all trajectories are closed, allows a fibration q:'J'l -+ S 1 as frrst integral.
This is the unstable situation, which ca.n be stabilised by lifting to T 2 a field Z
on S 1 near to zero. but which is itself stable (for example a gradient field). There
is then an implosion of the twO dimensional attractor tl into a finite number of
attracting fibres of one dimension (called a Morse-Smale field). We conjecture
here that every attractor implosion takes place more or less according to the
preceding model. It is known from Milnor and Thurston 's 'kneading coefficient'
that this is what occurs for endomorphisms of 1t into ~t.
I.n the neighbourhood of every attractor A of a field X in a manifold M
there is a Liapunov function wJ:ich is positive and decreasing along the trajectories
and va.nisbi.ng on A. Let L = a be a level variety of the function L where a is
positive and small. The field X enters the tube L .;;;; a in every point of L = a .
Thus every field Y sufficiently close to X in the C0 topology will also enter the
tube L .;;;; a, and Y will have one or more atlractors. (The attractor may implode,
but not explode.) Let us then suppose that the field X depending on the control
parameters u , be similarly perturbed by a 'noise' Z of which we shall have a
deterministic model. Z is parametrised by a compact manifold Ill. Then at every
point m of the tube L.;; a. the mapping W .!4 T111 (M) is o f modulus< E I X(<P(w))l
(we suppose that X is nowhere zero in L .;;; a). it follows that no trajectory of
the perturbed field X+ Z can leave the tube L, even if Z varies in Ill. Further we
ca.n admit that the mapping W .!4 Tm (M) is suljective on the ball of radius
eiX(V'(w))l. We suppose then that in the variation of X as a function of u, we can
'theoretically' create first integral fields, leading to a possible implosion of the
at tractor. Between two implosive sub-attractors we will have then a threshold
hypersurface, invariant under X(u 0 ) or in any case making with X(u) an angle
less than e/4. In these conditions t11e noise Z allows the thresho ld hypersurface
to be overcome, and as a consequence the basins of the two sub-attractors
become mixed ....
The integration of the Geld X(u) + Z(w) allows us, though integrating over
W, to define a measure m(x; y) which is the density in y of the images h1(x)
Under the action of Lhe field X(u) + Z(w), and tbis at the end of a sufficiently
long, but fiXed, time T. We seek a density c(x; y) invariant under convolution
With the transformation h1 , t E [0, Tj .
We are led to look for the fiXed point of a positive linear transformation on
the densities c(x: y) (x fixed and arbitrary). Following the Perron-Frobenius
theorem, such a density exists and is, in general, unique. Such a density has its
94 Catastrophe theory [Ch. 4]
interior support in L on what we wiU eaU the srochasric attractor A. This measure
will allow us to calculate every observable y through the integral on the attractor
A. it is necessary only to assure ourselves that in the attractor almost any
trajectory is dense, and that it is not split in two or more disjoint components.
The transitivity of the noise across the threshold hypersurfaces assures that it is
certainly the case.
Finally, the intuitive idea to which is it is necessary to hold fast is the
following: it is not so much the nttrnctor itself which is important but the
hypersurfaces which encapsulate it; the sub-attractors into which the attractor
may implode bY bifurcation wiU be able to form a new mixture as a consequence
of a noise sufficiently strong to sweep away the thresholds between the sub·
nttractors, but not strong enough to leave the given encapsulating hypersurface.
•
CHAPTERS
In this chapur Wl! shall considl!r a field of local dynamics dl!/ined as the gradient
of a potential. The term elementary catastrophe is used to designate every COli·
flier situation berween local regimes, minima of tire potential which can occur in
a stable manner on 4-diml!nsional space-rime.
By an ab~JM of fanguagl!, we shall sometiml!s use tire name catastrophe {or
the morphology that it makes appear.
We distinguish two types of catastrophe: catastrophes of conflict, and
catastrophes of bifurcation.
5. 1 CATASTROPHES OF CONFUCT
Here it is a question of determining the topological type X of the shock wave
surface which separate the different domains where the competing attractors
rule.
In order to resolve this problem we must adopt a rule such as the so-called
'Maxwell's Convention': at a given point x of the support, the regime which
rules Is that corresponding to the lowest minimum. Such a rule makes it easy to
determine the configurations of the catastrophe set engendered by these conflicts.
In a general manner let there be a system of 11 + !linear forms Lo, L11 ••• , Ln
deftned on ~n, which are in general position. Thls means that every subsystem
of n forms is a basis for the dual of ~n. The domain of each attractor Is defined
by the Inequalities Lt > Lfo I =F j. On ~n th.ese domains constitute the barycentrlc
subdivision of the n-simplex. (For example, for n = 2 we have the triple point
Y; on ~ 1 , the quadruple point ... etc.)
It is this rule that constitutes the deep motivation for Gibb 's Phase Rule· at
n point of ~" there are at most 11 +I local regimes in a state of local equllibrium. In
a later chapter, I have given a proof of tltis rule in the more general case of
catastrophes of bifurcation (Chapter 12, p. 225).
96 Elementary catastrophe theory [Ch. 5
5.2.1
The simplest catastrophes of bifurcation are given by the potentials V = x 4
(cusp), V= x 6 (butterfly) and V= x 8 each of eo-rank one and V= (x4 + y 4 )
(double cusp) of eo-rank two .
Only the first two are generic on a space of dimension 4 . On the other hand,
the last. although non-generic. seems to play a part in linguistics because it
makes possible the description of the conflict of four regimes; of four 'actants'.
We shall see later an illustration ln a neighbourhood of the parabolic umbilic,
which is 'incident' to this singularity.
Generic plane
Name Singulari Iy Universal unfolding section
Minimum V = x1 V= x 2
Fold V=x3 V == x 3 + ux
Crease
•
Swallowtail V= x 5 +ux3
+ vx2 + wx
The Maxwell set corresponding to each singularity has been put on the
diagram. For example, for V = x 6 , lhe butterfly, the Maxwell set is a plane
shock wave exfoliated by a triple edge along its boundary. If V= x" the plane
curve section defmed by the discriminant of lhe polynomial Vx possesses k- 3
cusp points. For example, for the butterly V= x 6 , k = 6 and there are three
cusps.
The catasrrophes of eo-rank one play a considerable role in our conceptual
organisation of reality. The Riemann- Hugoniot catastrophe is al the base of the
catastrophes of capture and emission. The 'butterfly' is the organising centre of
the actantial schema: Source - Message - Receiver in communication. On the
other hand, the slngularities of odd degree are only seen in connection with the
hypothesis of perfect delay. They are li.nked to the transient states (start-finish)
or unfinished (e.g. 'to fail' for V=x 5 ).
In all lhese cases we have used lhe quotient R[[x, y] )I(Vx. Vy) as a base for
defining the universal unfolding. ll should be noted that in order to stabilise
V= x 2y lhe form (c) is unique. olher stabilisations being equivalent. The elliptic
and hyperbolic umbilics are relatively weU known. The discriminant for the
elliptic umbilic is, in the plane Ouvw, a tapered double cone whose section is a
hypocycloid wllh three cusps. One may see here the organising singularity of
those means or instruments involving 'points'.
For lhe hyperbolic umbilic, the sequence of plane sections (for w increasing)
of the discriminant manifold has the appearance shown in Fig. 5.1.
F~&. S.l
The shaded interior is the domain of a minimum (with the perfect delay conven-
tion). This succession describes qualitatively the breaking of a wave. The middle
section, consisting of two cusps, corresponds to the limiting angle observed on a
wave at the moment it breaks.
v= x1 +y 3 + 2wy.
This defines a family of mappings, parametrlsed by (w, -s), of the plane Oxy
into the plane Ouv . The critical curve of such a mapping is defmed by:
2(y + s) 2x
=0
2x 3y 1
+ 2w
giving = (y + s) (3y 2 + 2w).
The manifold thus defmed has an image Z In Ouws. To define the topo·
logical type of Z In the neighbourhood of the origin we cut Z with a sphere of
radius sufficiently small that the topological type of the Intersection with
every sphere of smaller radius Is the same. Now we delete from this sphere the
'polar regions' corresponding to u = v= O,retaining only a tubular neighbourhood
of the equator w = x = 0. Draw this equatorial circle io the plane Osw. Then one
can mark a sequence of sixteen points on it, numbered 1, 2, . . . , 16, each
corresponding to a topological type for the discriminant curve io Ouv; that is
the section In Z by the plane nonnal to the equator at the particular point.
Figure 5.2 gives the sequence of sixteen kinds of corresponding curve.
lw
1--------:;-::--::;~~~==-------t-+
14
Beak to beak
Up / 2 - ' ,
' 3 , '""" ', 13
~
I
I
Umbllic / /4 I Axial conteC1
5
Hyperbolic - _ \ 11
6 I 10 Elliptic umblllc
\
I
I
Fig. 5.2
•
Qualitatively, at (1) (see Fig. 5.3) there is a curve having a cusp pointing
downward; then , at (2), a new point appears at the origin, where the lip formation
begins; this grows (3), pierces the cusp (4), and crosses it (5) to form the 'phallic'
mushroom curve characteristic of the parabolic umbilic. Next, at (6). the cusp
meets the lower branch of the lip in a hyperbolic umbilic, and then the two
branches cross (7) to form a curvilinear triangle piercing laterally a convex
curve. The triangle shrinks , first touching the curve (8) and then shrinking
inside it (9) to form a hypocycloid with three cusps, and finally vanishes, in an
elliptic urnbilic {I 0), reappearing immediately with the same orientation (11 ).
Then its lower cusp meets the curve (12) and pierces it (13); at ( 14) the curve
and the upper edge of the triangle touch in a beak-to-beak singularity which
separates (15), producing two symmetric swallow-tails which are reabsorbed in
the curve (16) to lead to the original configuration.
1 . 2
5
FJ&. 5.3 (continued next page)
•
6 7
8 9 10
11 12 13
14 15
16
F~. 5.3
Sec. 5 .4] The Umbilics and the Morphology of the Breaking of Waves 103
•
•
CHAPTER 6
The app/ic:ations of C. T. divide into two totally distinct c:ategories. 11re fust
cotiCems "rigorous' applic:ations of the theory. The application ofprecise quanti·
tative laws provides the model to which one con apply formal catastrophe theory
(physics and mechanics). When using C. T. in thiscasethereisaquick ·qualitaJive'
interpretation of the global belwviour of soiutiom, and of their sfngularities.
Properly used in these circumstances a precise quantitative calculation is then
possible in principle, and as a consequence the model has predictive CXJpacities.
On the other hand, models of the second kind (used in biology and the
socwl sciences) :start from an empirical morphology which is a matter ofinterpre-
tation. One consm1cts thus a field of dl/ferentiJJI systems on a comrol space,
and one endeavours to make the observed morphology coincide 11-'ith the catas·
trophe set of the model. In general, these dif[erenrlal systems are only defined
up to an approximate smooth equivalence, and as a comequence quantitative
prediction is IIOt possible. Their imerest is in providing a global view of the
situation, interpreted in terms of conflicts of regimes. They also allow an analo·
go us classification of the dynamic which Is supposedly generating the experimental
morphology.
The concern of these qualitative models is thus essentiJJI/y hermeneutic,
imerpretative. One CXJn say, apropos of the:se two kinds of model, that the first
is a hard-edged theorisation, while those of the second are 'soft' theory.
As a general rule, the scientific community has accepted wlthow too many
reservations applications of the first kind. On the o ther hand, it is with great
difficulty that it sees the virtue of tire second kind of application. Orristopher
Zeeman :S book Catastrophe Theory (Addison Wesley) is a veritable :storehouse
of all kinds of models of both kinds. 11re more rece/11 book ofStewart and Poston
Catastrophe Theory and its Applications (Pimran) confines itself to models of
the {ust rype.
In a work like rills one, I shall limit myself to giving a list ofapplications of
the fust type. As one can see in tile following chapters, I am convinced tlrat rhe
essenrfal originality of C. T. and its furure fruitfulness lies in 'applicarions ' of
the serorrd kind. So all tire last part of tire book will be devored ro models of
a hemreneuric kind.
•
whether 'almoSt all' attractors are structurally stable from the point of view of
their local topology in the ambient space. The poss.lbility of having a reasonable
theory of morphogenesis based on an arbitrary dynamic X appears very limited ....
Without doubt there is no great ilifference between a gradient dynamic
and a dynamic allowing a Liapunov function. We know that in the neighbourhood
of every attractor, the field has a Uapunov function but the singula.rities of such
a Liapunov function are not those that the theory of universal unfoldmg of the
critical points of functions predicts. We find here J. Guckenheimer's objection
that the universal unfolding of a gradient field in the set of 'gradient like' fields,
is In general larger than the universal unfoldlng of the initial potential function.
In fact. for a general dynamic Takens's counter-examples have shown that there are
jets of vector fields not stabilisable by addition of terms of higher order; indeed
the theory of universal unfolding loses all validity in this case. Thus the theory
leads very rapidly to the appearance of 'generalised catastrophes', and therefore
n complicated morphology; ramlfied sets, Cantor sets. Such a morphology,
however, cannot be excluded, because th.ere are very likely to be some. Accord·
ing to some authors, empirical manifestations are exemplified by the circulation
of the blood in animals and the 'cantorian' structure of gusts of turbulence in
fluid dynamics. See also B. Mandelbrot: Fracrals: Form, Orance and Dimension,
W. H. Freeman & Co., San Francisco, 1977.
lastly, let us add that Hamiltonian dynamics have no attractors (because of
the conservation of Uouville measure); consequently we can scarcely see how we
can adapt the schema to the case of local Hamiltonian dynamics. That is perhaps
why quantum mechanics does not present a morphology, strictly speaking.
However, one should not exaggerate the importance of these reservations.
Very probably the only processes that one can consider empirically as determined,
the only problems weU posed, are ruled by a principle of optlrmsation - or at
the very leaSt an extremal principle. This fact is particularly noticeable in the
Hamllton-Jacob1 theory of equations. 1t has, in effect. been shown that the
local theory of singularities of lagrangian projections (i.e. projections of a
Lagranglan submanifold of the cotangen t bundle of a manifold onto the manifold)
identifies with elementary catastrophe theory provided the dimension n < ll,
according to V. I. Arnol'd. The only difference with the general case is that
when certain of the internal variables have a direct interpretataon as derivatives
of a section of the cotangent bundle with respect to the coordinates of the base,
this leads to restriclions on the nature of possible slngularilies, restrictions which
make generic singularlties wh.ich are not normally so.
This phenomenon is also met with in the case of singularities satisfying the
conditions of symmetry which will be considered in paragraph 6.2.4.
The controversy
evidence for it, for the cases are very rare where the mode of action of a medi·
cament has received a satisfactory explanation at the 'fundamental' level, that is.
In terms of molecular biology.
Different methodologjes are found corresponding ro these two opposed
visions of science. 'Action' aims essentilllly to resolve local problems, whereas
'understanding' seeks th.e universal, hence the global . .By an apparent paradox.
local problems require non-local means for their solution, whereas intelligjbility
requires the reduction of the global phenomena to typical local situations, the
pregnant character of which renders them immediately comprehensible. ln
effect, in an action , there is always an aim beyond the phenomenon, since one
is always searching to make possible that which does not occur spontaneously.
To break the constraints of space- time: such is the ultimate aim of man ; to
exploit all modes of non-local action which can be easily controlled. !t is this
which compels the human being to make his journeys, develop his transport
and establish his communications. In the biological sense, he will seek, as far as
possible, to survive, that is to say to extend the duration of life beyond its
natural limits for either the individual or the species. Conversely, for that medila·
tion which is pure thought, intelligibility requires a reduction of the phenomenon
to its immediately comprehensible components (for example, collision of atoms
in ancient atomic theories). I have explained elsewhere [4] how the greatest
scientific successes In history (Newtonian gravitation, electromagmetism after
Maxwell, quantum mechanics) have been non·locallheories, so that subsequent
theoretical effort was needed to make them local (successfully for the first two,
but with little success for the latter).
To sum up, the totality of human scientific effort (and in one sense, philo·
sophic effort) will be represented in its relations with locality by the foUowing
table:
Local Non·local
Understanding Yes No
Action No Yes
Basically the human mind only understands non-locality in the form of the
predicate (linguistically, by the adjective). A colour, for example is not referred
to any specific place in space. All effort towards Intelligibility has been to
reduce the qualities (secondaries) to those primary qualities which are spalio·
temporal coordinates (in a word, replacing the adjective by the verb). This
process is clearly not being achieved at the present time, and as we shall see,
C. T. models are moving in this direction.
Now, this bipolarity In the scientific field Is reflected in the manner in
which m.athematics is used In science. We have seen that the 'action' pole demands
•
an extension of the data, for all action aims to extend our innuence. This is to
say that there is a need above all to have methods of propagation which allow
the extension of local knowledge obtained on a domain D of the substrate space,
w a greater domain D'. There exists, in mathematics, a procedure which allows
such an extension, and it is in practice the only one which enables it to be done
in a canonical manner. I refer to analytic continlllllion which allows development
of a germ of an analytic function (defmed by a Taylor series at a point) to all the
domain of existence (holomorphic domain) of this function. This is to say that
pragmatically efficient mathematical models, permitting prediction, involve
the analyticity of the functions involved, together with their solutions of evolu·
tion in time. This requires as a consequence that the substrate space on whlch
one works is provided with a natural analytic structure.
On the other hand , we have seen that inteWgibitity, requires the focusing
of non-local onto a local structure. There exists a mathematical entity which
fits well enough th.is requirement and that is the notion of sfnlularity. Let us
g~ve a typical example : tbe conical point , vertex of the cone of revolution with
equation z 2 = x 2 + y 2 in three-dimensional Euclidean space relative to a tdhedral
rectangular coordinate system Oxyz. In effect, this singular point may be con-
sidered as arising from a smooth surface when a continuous mapping 41 takes the
meridian circle x 2 + y 2 = =
I, z 0 of the cylinder with equation x 2 + y 2 = I
into the origin (Fig. 7 .1). Jt Is a general fact that a singulari ty can always be
considered as arising from a regular space E by the collapsing of a point of a
global figure embedded in this space£. Jt IS hence not surprising that C. T. in the
'elementary' form of fields of gradient dynamics, makes regular use of the
notion of singularity (of a function).
There is no doubt that Rutherford's famous saying 'Qualitative is nothing
but poor quantitative' is a sadly faithful reflection of the scientific ideology
which was inf1uent.ial at the end of the nineteenth century. But there was some
truth in it at least; if a model needed to be pragmatically eff1clent, then, necessarily,
tlus model must contain a quantitative component permitting the spatia-temporal
localisation of the phenomena which it describes. A purely qualitative prediction,
which is not pinned down to time or place, is of little practical interest. I can
predict, with all oenainty that every political regime , in whatever society, will
ultimately break down. If I am incapable of saying when (even with some
imprecision), my prediction will be only a triviality. When seismologists tell
us: the town of Bale will be destroyed by an earthquake' their statement does
no t disturb the people of Bale when there is no specified period in time for the
implementation of their prediction. This is to say that in the pragmatic sense,
the only models to be considered are those which permit the spatio·temporal
IO<:alisation of phenomena. They are hence necessarily quantitative at least as
far as th1s localisation is concerned. We are thus led to the following conclusions:
for a model to lead to useful predic tive possibility, and , consequently of action,
it is necessary that this model be quilntitative, that it be defined by analytical
•
,---- ............
"
, ''
0
l'lg. 7.1
The substrate spaces introduced into the models of our sciences are of two
types. Firstly, there is the space-time of everyday IJfe, on our own scale. In the
sense that all phenomena are , in the last analysis, perceived by our senses, it is
fair to say that space time is the ultimate substrate to which aU the others
must be reduced by explJctt mathematical constructions.
Secondly, there are abstract spaces, the definition of which cartnot be
immediately related to space-time. Statistical frequency spaces which measure
the frequency with which a phenomenon of a specific nature appears, are of this
kind. ln a scientific theory, the notion of phenomenon cart clearly take on a
•
valid on one side of the singularity and which carries with it a discontinuity of a
derivative of Pt(u). This excludes the possibility of a global analytic dependence
of [on u.
It is clearly possible to object to the detennin.istic character of this example.
In regularising by convolution the boundaries of the open setsPu andB; we will
clearly be able to restore the analycity of ).lf(U). But then the function willr
totaliy change in character (notably from the point of view of its moments). Can
we believe, however, in the present state of qualitative dynamics, that there exists
a difference in nature between deterministic dynamical systems and stochastic
systems? A stochastic system is one, where clarification of deteuninism is
avoided, replacing such a hypothesis by statistical hypotheses on the noise,
which are in general very difficult to justify . . ..
Finally, we shall draw the following conclusion from this study: the scientific
domain in which we may construct certain quantitative models, allowing
prediction and, as a consequence, action, is more constrained than is generaliy
thought. There is a little halo round fundamental physics, but its frontiers
become more imprecise, the more statistical considerations come into play.
cations, or on the other hand to exploit as much as possible the intrinsic potential
of the mathematics. r have defined for example, certain natural dynamics in U
with the help of a hyperbolic metric on the product by U of the space states. In
the same spirit, we will note that the Hamiltonian dynamics associated to
potential polynomials in E. C. T. lead, with an appropriate linear dynamic in U,
to some of Painleve's transoendental functions.
It seems to be true in aD cases that the sole means of making C. T. pragmatically
effective is in the referring of the unfolding U (built on its dynamics) towards the
substrate S. Thus the catastrophe will deftne a spatial propagation In the support
space S. Such will be the case when we can generalise an existing situation in the
unfolding of slngularities of projections of Lagrangian manifolds (wave fronts) in
Hamilton- Jacobi theory. There then exists in U a differential form oc with values
in the tangent space to the substrate (here the space has configuration with
coordinates Q/), called dq, such that the integral f oc along a trajectory r of s
.,
restores the corresponding spatial displacement in S. This spatiAl propagation,
relatively well controlled in its metric state, will be able to play the role of the
non-existing analytic continuation. Furthermore if it existed these trajectories
of s jommg a stratum of unfolding associated to the singularity SJ> could explain
why the catastrophe &f can spatially generate the catastrophe Sj at a later
date. We could thus broach the problem of the artlculatlon of catastrophes
between themselves , a problem whlch has much biological interest (especially in
embryology). lt is appropriate here to preserve the notion that C. T. ls still
in its infancy. Only a systematic appeal to experimental material, coupled
With an open use of known or created analytical tools, will allow us to progress
in thls obscure, but essential. field of the 'dynamic synthesis' of catastrophes.
With the lack of such progress then C. T. may meet the abortive fate of cyber·
netlcs....
Yet, the purely analogical usage of C. T. raises a clear objection: if. through
these 'catastJ:ophe' models we can geometrise the analogy, what have we gained
in this modelling in relation to immediate intuition linked to the natural language
or to a meaningful word? Do we nol risk making a gratuitous mathematisation
for its own sake, eventually becoming otiose? Certainly the danger is real, and
the reading of certain 'applications' of catastrophes conf1tm its imminence.
I think that in this field. there is no general reply and that it is all a question
of the context. Very often, the geometrisation promotes a global view while the
inherent fragmentation of verbal conceptualisation permits only a limited grasp.
And the analogies can be more or less banal, more or less surprising; since the
properly striking effect that we observe in certain poetic metaphors, could be
justified, if all the analogies were obvious. It is why these qualitative models
can neither be appreciated nor judged as anything but subjective. In the end
it is the intellectual satisfaction of the feeling for the model which is the ultimate
criterion of itS validity. This return to an evaluation of stylistic character,
quasi-literary or aesthetic, will no doubt be severely criticised by 'orthodox'
scientists. There will be no lack of them saying that these models 'are not
science'. Doubtless they have reason for their point of view, but it would be
highly presumptuous to believe that there exists a defined strict and clear
frontier between science and non-science.
The global attempt to geomelrise thought holds nevertheless, an immense
theoretical interest, and for the following reason. Concepts are used in a number
of scientific disciplines, the meanirlg of which are not clear and cannot be
formalised. ln biology, for instance, concepts are met such as: complexity,
order, disorder, orga.nisation, information (genetic), message, code, ... , etc.,
which all specify a certain non-local property of the field of study. lt can be
asked whether these concepts, after the style of a number of philosophical
concepts, can be univocally rranslated into all the languages of the world, and
legitimately carry a scientific label. The day will soon come when a systematic
critique of these questionable conceptual tools will become necessary. lf it is
desired to pursue with respect to these concepts a form of Hilbert programme,
similarly reductive, eliminating dependence on sense, then the geometrisation
stage by C. T. may appear as a very vital intermediary. Thus semantic intuitions
with its immediately subjective character, is replaced by geometric intuition,
which spatlalises its object, and distances it from the thinking subject.
C. T., in that it is basically a local theory, eliminates tlte non-local, trans-
spatial, quasi-magical character of these notions. There is nothing to prevent us
supposing that we will be equally able, in the light of the preceding paragraph, to
endow C. T. with generatlvity, with propagating properties. lt will thus be able
to provide a .model of deduction as in the ax:iomatics of a formal system. But
the non-local propagating properties are strictly controlled. Taking the preceding
metaphor, it will be noticed that the axioms of a fom1al system in general allow
•
to~»c~e that m P'neul.ln a formal syl!ern !he oxioms are amcrll11rlon lilwr.
•
identifying (P) and (p) (Fig. 7.3). From this fact the topology of the space takes
on an 'excited" form, and tends by Itself, through physico-chemical regulation, to
return to normal. This retum to normal can be effected in two ways: normally,
by the spatial capture of the prey by the predator (this corresponds to the
creation in space-time of a critical point of Index one, which destroys the
handle) {Fig. 7 .4); or the handle is destroyed by a critical point of index three,
interior to the full handle (Fig. 7.5) and there is a return to the situation anterior
to the perception ea t.astrophet . fM)
(Pp)
Fig. 7.2
space
(p)
I
(P)
Fig. 7.3 -Symbolic handle betv.een predator Cl') and prey (p ).
hn olher words: !he predator loses sl&ht of the prey. The fl~t of !he prey cm be effectively
ipati&l or on !he other hand 'imaginary': the =• where lhe prey camoull~s itself In the
natunal environment in order to avoid bein& se"n by the predator.
•
----- ',
(p)
(PJ
Fig. 7.4 - Destruction of the handle by Lhe capture of the prey (p) by the
predator (P).
(PJ
(PJ
Fig. 7.5 - Destruction of the handle by the flight of the prey (P).
Thus, this imaginatively idealistic model justifies the behaviourist thesis according
to which the capture of the prey by the predator (or the flight of the p rey) are
mechanisms of physico-chemical regulation, imposed by the topological regula·
lion of space- time! Subjectivity will appear then as an actantiallocalisation of
an excited state of the universe, the choice of a return to normal. lt will be
linked to the dichotomous situation of conflict between reality and the imaginary,
between repose and tension. However, in the designation of 'excited' there
remains as a subjective connotation: the mark of the imaginary. This is a case of
threshold stabilisation. It is with tWs, passably Bergsonian, observation that I
Wish to end this study.
•
REFERENCES
[1] ZeeiiWl, E. G. Catastrophe Theory, Addison Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1978.
[2] Siissman, H. J. and Zahler, R. S. Catastrophe theory: mathematics misused,
in The Sciences (October, 1977), 17 , No. 6 The New York Academy of
Sciences).
[3] Thorn, R., Role et limites de la matht!matisation en Sciences, in La Pensee
(October, 1977), pp. 36-42 (an article from which I have reproduced a
few lines).
[4] Thorn, R., Espace, Science et Magic, in Circe (1978), No. 89, pp. 605-617
(Les BeUes Lettres, Paris), (see Chapter 8).
[5]1>elattre, P, L 'evolution des systemes moleculaires. Maloine, Paris, 1971.
[6] Kossak, J. J. and Benham, C. J ., Denaturation: An Example ofa Catastrophe,
Proc. Nat. A cad. Sci. USA, 71, (1974), 1977-1981.
[7] Thorn, R., L 'evolution tempore/le des catastrophes, Publication of the
Mathematical Institute of tbe University of Utrecht. 1973.
[8] Thorn, R.,Structural Stability and Morphogeltesis, Benjamin, 1975.
•
CHAPTER S
The presem paper· Space, Science and Magict is a response to o11e o[ the major
objections made to C. T.: If the pri11ciple of structural srabiliry truly applies to
scie11ce, from whe11ce come the major continuous quonritorive lows: Homilronum
forma lism in mechanics, quantum meclronics, which ore expressed by 11011·
structurally stable differential systems? I suggest here the ideo that space-rime
loses its ontological validity 011 the :rubquantum SCille, to the profit of more
basic e11tities with 'explosive' ciiiUtlcten. lt clearly remains to complete this
programme by on explicit formalism . ..
I
larites of space- time, itself the only materia prima, an indifferent ether.
Between these two kinds of models, quantum theory offers little possibUJty of
choice, for it adopts both points of view, which it superimposes in a rather
redundant manner. Starting from a particular conception, di.scontlnulties In
space, it associates to it the transformation reference group, the continuous Ue
group which regenerates Euclidcan (or Minkowski) space-time as a homo-
geneous svacc. Two distinct observers can always compare the results of their
observations thanks to a transformation (linear) which depends only on the
relative positions and velocities of these observers (considered as macroscopic
entitles, in fact, solid bodies). Thus, we arc dealing with a sufficiently badly
defined 'internal' space (a HUbert space), in which the transfoonation reference
group acts by representation. The localisation of the particular phenomenon
Itself can only be obtained by a fluke (for example, in identifying the Uilbert
space with the square function space summable on a domain of the space, and
interpreting the module of this function as the probability of the presence of the
phenomenon at thi.s point). There is, it seems to me, a cenain incoherence in
affirming (as in the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics)
that a phenomenon cannot be dissociated from the perceptive act of a human
observer, on the one hand, and on the other, that the two observations of two
distinct observers are always equivalent by a linear equivalence and thus perfectly
comparable. Of course, this Last equivalence will only be recognised as valid
statisticaliy, but then that imposes statistical laws (rarely made explicit b1 the
literature) describing how the same phenomenon can be perceived by different
observers.
Einstein's thesis has an evident advantage over that of Mach (to the eyes of
a philosopher, if not of a physicist!): it is possible to imagine space empty of all
matter and of all radiation. On the other hand, it is difficult (if not impossible)
to conceive how non-extended elements of nature in themselves wiU be able to
engender , to consistute the continuous space which we intuitively know. How-
ever, it is not necessary to conceal that the numerous and diverse historical
attempts (de BrogUe, llei.senberg, etc.) to interpret elementary particles as
slngularities of a field def'med on all space did all fail. The interest being taken
at the present time in the theory of solltons, and which is motivated by the
same underlying ambition, does not appear to me to be able to go beyond the
dimension one as a dimension of space, and that i.s for the following reasons. In
every conceivable theory of slngularities, these must appear as 'hypersurfaces'
(of eo-dimension one) In the space under consideration (we can think of, for
example, the shock waves in fluid dynamics). Now elementary particles, In so
far as they are detectable, appear as points (curves in space-time) and hence
as geometric entitles with eo-dimension tlvee.t The only valid analogy wlU be
tlf Heuenberg'• unczrt.alnly pnnc:lple Is accepted, aparticle has no uajeccory srnsu stricto:
thtrt are then SUtceuf\'e localis,111oDS which conJ1hU1e the lin&uJarity (which IJ 1hUS Of
co.<Jlmen$Kin four, once h Is made or points).
•
8.2 PHYSIOLOCICALSPACE
It is now usual to accept that the essential function of the central nervous
system, m the animal, is to p rovide a local map of the spatial field surrounding
the organism; the field from which sensory activity provides biologically pregnant
bnages (for example, prey, predators, sexual partner,e tc). which, once recognised,
determine motor behaviour (pursuit of prey, filgbt from a predator, etc.).
Now these motor behaviours are structured. in a discrete manner, in 'fields',or
m 'chreods', according to C. H. Waddiogton's terminology. We can think for
example of a step as an elementary field of walking in humans. Each 'field' Is
defined by a well-defmed trajectory in the interior of a local map which is
associated with it. To each of these maps is associated a kind of 'local con·
seiousness'. We have no evidence that an animal has, in general, a pennaneot
sense of its own body Jocallsed at the centre of the local map, netther conse·
quemly, a 'continuous' subjectivity, even in a state of vigilance. But it can
arrive at a very efficient memory representation of its territory, by aggregating
the maps one with another to assist the indices of the natural senses (sigot,
lrnell etc.). According to the physiological state of the animal, it may be more
sensuive to certain indices than to others, in a manner which ensures that Its
spatial representation can be distorted to accommodate spec!Oc organic needs.
Of course. these dlstortions can only exceptionally affect the local map contain·
lng the organism as a whole, because the fidelity (geometrical, mechanical,
132 From physics to biology [Ch. 8
physical, etc.) of this map is a condition sine qua non of the efficiency of motor
displacements. But a certain plasticity remains possible (and probable) on the
global ierritorial scale.
If, we now pass from animals to man, we will find initially a not very
different situation. The territory of a human collective is, In general, divided into
sub-territories each having particular economic or cultural purposes. 1t is the role
of the traditional great myths to specify, most often through describing the
voyage of a founding ancestor, the spatial concatenation of these sub-domains,
each identified with a specific sacred centre. If, through social necessity, the
representation of the territorial collective is fixed, there is no doubt that this is
not the case at the level of individual consciousness. lt is here that we see inter·
venlng the quasi-universal phenomenon of magic.
This conc~ption of a flexible and individual space- time, which will cease
to be a universal frame valid for all men. clearly conflicts head on with the
basic postulate of all modem science that there exists a unversal space-time
vabd and isomorphic for all. lt is without doubt this essential difference that
Levy-Bruhi had wished to signify in speaking of 'pre.Joglcal mentality' -
unhappy words, for logic has in principle, nothing to do with the representation
of space.
1t was perhaps inevitable that, in our conceptual organisation of reality
(the organisation of our semantic universe), the independence and fixedness
of tllis universal base which is space was not recognised as a posteriori. In effect,
the purely geometric, indefmite extension of space conflicts with the presence
of local morphological accidents of which many have a pregnant, even alienating,
character. The Isomorphism between these pregnant forms , although spatially
distant, can be easily interpreted as a contact in a topology other than the usual
topology, and which can enter into conflict with this latter. The writer Gilbert
Simondon has given a striking description of magical thought.
L'univers magique est structure scion la plus primitive et la plus pn!gnante
des organisations: celle de la reticulation du monde en lieux privllegies. Un
lieu privilegie, un lieu qui a un pouvoir, c'est celui qui draine en lui toute
la force et l'efftcace du domaine qu'illimlte; 11 r6sume et contienr la force
d'une masse compacte de reaUttl; il la resume et la gouverne comme un
lieu eleve gouveme et domlnc une basse contn!e. Le monde magique est
fait ainsi d'un reseau de Iieux et de choscs qui ont un pouvoir et qui
sont rattaches aux autres choscs et autres lieux qui ont aussi un pouvoir
r ... J.PJ
(Translation. The magical universe is structured according to the most prim!·
tive and the most pregnant of organisations: that of the reticulation of the
world into privileged places and into privileged times. A privileged place, a
place which has a power, is one which draws in full the force and efficacy
from the domain which it governs; it concentrates and contains the force
from a compact mass of reality, it organises it and controls it as a piece of
high ground govelllli and dominates a lower region. The magical world Is
made thus from a net of places and things which have a power and wh1ch
are tied to other places and other things which also have a power [...]
W.M. B.)
n equal pans on to the given segment AB). (It is no accident that this construc·
tion of exceptional phllosophicaJ Interest has been eliminated from teaching
by the champions of 'modern mathematics'.)
A B
n= 4
The possibility of the indefinite division of space became clearer after the
juStification of a countable infinity. There is no doubt that this is the significance
of the Eleatic paradox of Achilles and the tonoise, in which a fmite segment
appeared as the infmite sum of segments of decreasing length. Let us observe,
however, that the mere existence of the quantum world is a challenge to the
invariance by dilatation of the physical world, sinceobjectsoftheorder 10- 13 cm,
for example, have very different propenies from macroscopic objects.
As a consequence, Greek geometry became the supreme example of the
scientific approach, replacing a non-local operation (for example, taking the
Intersection of two lines in a plane} by a verbal description, the formal analysis
of which became the demonstration that it was vinua!Jy autonomous, that is,
able to be rendered independent of the non-local Intuitive approaches which
described it. In this sense it can be nated that In replacing non-local spatial
intuition of the plane (or of space) by a formal discourse in literary symbols
empty of sense, the axiomatic approach realises this localisation of the trans·
local which is characteristic of science.
But, well before the appearance of Greek geometry, men had become
extremely conscious of the relatively inflexible constraints imposed by geometry
and mechanics in our ambient space. If space- time had been a fluctuating and
plastic entity deformable ad libitum, there would have been no need for those
5peciaJ gifts, the talents of the magician, to reveal the distonions. The fact that
SUch a distonion required speciaJ..Ist Intervention did show that even the 'averll8e
man' was fully conscious of the exceptional character ,lndeed properly miraculous,
•
of these actions at a distance. ln modem terms, it could be said that there was
established the concept of a relatively stable and regular space-time in its ground
state. but which exceptionally takes deviant , 'excited', forms.ln order to realise
these excited forms, it is necessary to breathe into the space a supplementary
'energy', or a 'negentropy' which will channel a multitude of local nuctuations
in a prescribed manner. Such was the aim of rituals and magical procedures,
which frequently involved the sacrifice of living animals. 1t is as if the brutal
destruction of a living organism could free a certain quantity of 'negentropy'
which the officiant will be able to use in order to realise the desired distortions
of space-time.
We can see here how little the conceptual body of magic differs basically,
from that of our science. Do we not know in the theory of the hydrogen atom
for example, that the energy level of a stationary state of the electron is measured
by the topologi.cal complexity of the cloud which this electron makes round the
nucleus? In the same way, certain quantum theorists such as Wheeler, tried to
interpret quantum invariants in terms of the topology of space- time. And, in
General Relativity, the energy density of the uruverse is interpreted as a geometric
curvature.
REFERENCE
fl] Simondon, G., Du mode d'existence des objets techniques, Paris, Aubier,
1969,p. 164.
t in such a picture of the world the pa.ulng of time will be fundamentally irrevmslble, by
reason of the continual bursting of panicles. The formal reversibility of quantum mechanics,
its llamUtonian character, are thw linked to the number of particles and to special nurncrico.J
properties of the opllmlsation principle which determines a new localisation as a function
of the older one.
•
CHAPTER 9
Biology
1\vo papers aregiven here, bearing on 'Theoretical Biololf)l '. The f'vstls a dls,ussion
of 'space forms' in an abstract sense, with applictztions to mitosis, while the
second is more concrete, the comparative embryololf)l of insects Olld verrebrrztes.
Tire problematic thus broached is completely Ignored in modem bfololf)l, and
while certain o[ these views appear highly specuhltive. they are nevertheless
extremely suggenive. Rt:aden -...1shing to find a more mathematicol model of
embryology could refer to my article 'A global dynamicol scheme [or ~ertebrate
embryololf)l' (A. A. A. S., /971, Some Mathematical Questions in Biology),
Lectures on Mathematics ill Life Sciences, edited by the American Mathematicol
Society, Providence, 1973. pp. 3 45.
n poin t in substrate space. We suppose that the local dynamic around any point
v E U is a gradien t dynamics defmed on a space X (x1 , X2o ••• , x 11 ), the 'internal
parameter' space, which describes the local sta te of the medium in U. The totality
of all possible local dynamics is then defined by a diffe rential system dx/dt =-
grad V(:~:; u ) on the product space X X U. We then write the conditon for local
(thermodynamical) equilibrium for such a local dynamic. At the point v e U,
the point x eX has to be a minimizing point for the potential V (x: v). If this
minimizing point Xm is non-degenerately quadratic, then the equilibrium point
-~m is a local smooth function of v {by the implicit function lheorem) By
definition, all points of U where the local dynamic is at such a stable minimising
point, xm(U), form a 'phase' in U. The mathematical theory of structural
stability can teU us now which configurations of 'phase diagrams' are stable. In
that case, the 'Platonic' origin of such patterns of phase contacts entails no
mystery, nor any metaphysical depth ....
Of course, tne conditions for applicability of Elementary Catastrophe
Theory are severely restricted (few dynamics are gradient dynamics). But tl1ere
are ways of taking care of more complicated situations, like lhe existence of
more complicated attractors than simple points, or the presence of dynamical
symmetries in the internal space. Even in tllese more complex situations, the
eonilict between phases always tends to be directed (at least qualitatively) by
patterns of the elementary theory, conveniently modified along some higher
singularities.
Jt should be clear, nevertheless, that general Catastrophe Theoy is not a
closed math ematical theory (as opposed to the elementary theory). The problem
of expressing cormections between neighbouring 'fields', in particular, is almost
entirely open.
If we suppose that S,/, U are smooth spaces (manifolds), and that the above
rnaps 1/1., 1/1 2 are also smooth, then, if, to any Input, there corresponds only a
finite number of possible outputs, we ate precisely In the situation of Elementary
Cat.ast:rOphe Theory, applied to the element itself ... .
Moreover, practically all forms in Biology Involving a large number of
elements have regulative properties (ate structurally stable). Any discrete model
defined by discrete counting of cells. of mitoses, . . . etc., is bound to fail when
co nfronted with regulation experln1ents. lt is only when the process involves an
obviously discrete type of evolution (like the ftrst synchronic mJtoses of the
blastula) that such models may be valid. To account for globally regulated forms,
it seems that only the following hypothesis may suffice: each element has, in Its
own internal spaceS, a model of the whole figure (W) to be constructed. Then
each element (cell) senses Its own position inside the already existing spatial
configuration (W 1 ), (through a mechanism of positional information, following
Wolpert) and compares it to the ideal position defined by an internal evolution
on S. Let D(t) be the discrepancy between these two positions. Then each cell
c will tend towards minimising this discrepancy (t), either by moving in W1 , or
by ch.anging its internal state. Such an evolution then will affect the internal
dynamics of nearby cells, which will tend to fill the empty places. As a result
the global form (W) will be very rapidly constructed. and in a very stable manner.
If such a view is correct, then all the difficulties of the structure of the
whole ate to be found in the element itself, which cannot be 'simpler' than the
total whole. (After all, in Biology, germinal cells are totipotent.) Hence the main
Interest of the reductionist approach (constructing a complex whole from simple
parts) breaks down. Some neurophysiologists hoped to unravel the functioning
of the central nervous system by studying some Invertebrates (Umnula) whose
neural system consisted only of a few neurons. They found (to their dismay, 1
suppose) that these animals had a sensorimotor behaviour by no means sub·
stantially simpler than the one observed ln animals with hundreds of thousands
of neurons . . . .
Of course. I realise that the standard reductionist attitude in Biology does
not take cells as primitive elements but molecules. But then the models become
unmanageable owing to the huge number of elements. Even so, it is not obvious
that some privileged molecules (the so-called biological molecules: DNA,
enzymes . .) may not have an Internal space of chemical interactions which, at
least partially, simulates the global shape and behaviour of the whole: dupUca·
lion of DNA, for Instance, simulates tile duplication of the cell. On a strict
methodological viewpoint, lt would be absurdly dogmatic to require that in any
modelling of biological processes, the biologist should always get back to mole·
cutes, even physicins do not do that! Would hydrodynamlclsts be forbidden the
use of Navier-Stokes equations because these equations cannot be given any
reasonable molecular uplanation?
•
c, I
. -·-····.
c,
cell 'knows where it is' in the cell. In a less metaphoric language: if we could
analyse (with sufficient accuracy and ingenuity) the nature of the local metabolism
around each point of a cell, then we could get local functions which would be
global coordinates in the cell. A remark apropos this postulate: whereas it
contradicts the simple-minded view of the cell as an 'enzyme bag' (a view which
apparently has been silently abandoned by molecular biologists in the last
decade), it does not entail by itself, any vitalist connotation. For, if we take a
mass of fluid moving inside a container C. then for almost any such flow in C, it
is possible to derive out of the study of the flow at a point in C (for instance
knowing sufficiently many space derivatives of the now) functions which may
be extended to global coordinates in C.
•\I;
"r:~~
Vt~
/ ••:
•
'•
"' ( c,
r (a) (b) J
Fig. 2
Let us consider our cell at the beginning of interphase (at a fiXed time 10 in
early C 1 -phase of the mitotic cycle). Denote by M the space of all possible
local metabolisms in the cell (considered as a smooth infinite dimensional space).
lf to any point of our cell Cat the time 1, we associate its Local metabolism and
its position in space - tinte we obtain in this manner (positional information
postulate) an embedding p of C1 into M X R 4 • The intage p(C0 ) is a three-
dimensional oeU which we can take as a reference cell for all subsequent times in
interphase, but the p mapping has to break down at the critical lime tc, time of
splitting. The restriction of p to the boundary i!C0 of the cell C0 has for image
in M a two-sphere S 01 , which can be provided with an orientation.
After duplication, C gives birth to two daughter cells C., c;. Owing to the
symmetry of the splitting process with respect to the equatorial plate, it is
natural to assume that if we provide the boundaries cl> a ac,
with orientations
compatible with the global orientation of the 'pants' P (i!P = C- C 1 - C 2 ), then
the embeddings p, (i!C1 ), p 2 (i!C2 ) into S 02 = oC0 are of opposite signs. The
situation can be described as follows: Form the product M X ~4 of the space M
of metabolic states with space- time, let 11:M X ~4 -+ J{4 , q : M X R~ -+M be
the canonical projections. So the map p embeds the pants (P) in M X J{ 4 and the
space M has huge dimensionality, we may suppose the composed map q o p
looks like Fig. 3 (n four-dimensional pretzel surface.) We consider here mitosis
as a periodic process In M . The metabolic state of the daughter cells C., C1 is
identical (in principle) to Co. Hence the need to identify after some time T
•
p( C 11
Qop(C 1 l
p c,
Fig. 3
(generation time) the maps PT(C1 ), PT (C2 ) with p 0 (C0 ). This occurs through
diffeomorphisms
Dl'"ce Hat
Fig. 4
..... "•
.. ~" "• "
a
....."., --
If -----· ----
-- ---
"'v..
b a
Interphase Metaphase
Fig. S Fig. 6
c
a End of mitosis
Fig. 7
suffers (prior to the boundary iJC) along the segment NG, the same kind of
transformation as described earlier for iJC1 along Gc (Figs. 8, 9 , 10). For -y,
runn ing along the segment NG. 11 is the S-period of duplication of the mitotic
cycle (Fig. 8(a) (b)). One has to look at the duplication of the chromosome as
the Insertion of a ·palindromlc' thread on both sides of NG (Fig. 9(a)-(c)).
e c
X
~~~· ,._ •
xJt _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - .,..,.
a b a Beginning of Si)hase
Early lnlerpllase
(8) (b)
• Si>hase
(c)
b
Fig. 8
When the extreme middle point NG n p('y) reaches G, then the splining catastro·
phe occurs, and the critical curve breaks in two parts, repelled by an unstable
(cell) mechanism at G (mecllanlsm of the mitotic spind le for animal cells (ana·
phase)). Once this separation has occurred {Fig. 9(c)- l O(a)) (in 1tt 1l)(Fig. 9(c)),
then the boundary p(iJC) may go upward along Gc (Fig. lO{a) (c)).
ISO Biology [Ch. 9
c c
G
X '<
.. +
... ....,.
~
~ ~N
J( X "" ,..
X---
.1!t- '
------
)(
,x "
-- ..._. ')l.
- _ ..
a b
Lale prophase
~>:! Jt!ase lbl
(aJ
+
..
+
--
'~---~
-
a b
Pro· merepllase
(C )
ln the full mitotic cycle, 0 < t < r, the image of the boundary line p(ilC1)
has to cross over the critical value line -y'(t) in the space A: for instance, in the
division C0 -+ Ct. if we start from vertex a, the critical value line ·/ is initially
above and to the left of the boundary line (Fig. 8(a)-(b)) and at the end of
mitosis in C1 , -y'(t) is to the right and below p(ilC1) (Fig. IO(d)). In a simplistic
semi·linear model, this passing over occurs at metaphase (Fig. 6), where both
lines p(ilC1) and -y'(t) coincide with the sides aG + Gb. This leads to a highly
degenerate map, which in fact has a biological interpretation; namely the very
peculiar state of the metabolism at metaphase: vanishing of any metabolic
activity, fibering (along the fibers of the projection p) of the cell by the tubilin
ftlaments of the mitotic spindle. If we want to make this degenerate situation
Sec.9.1] Explaining Space Forms: ISI
.I
/
/
/
/
l.lelaphase
(a)
\
G......_ \ ,
l( \
N ~ \
I( '
~ \
".. \
~
a Tllopllate
Daughter cel l s i n aatly
Interphase (C)
(d )
Fig. 10
generic by a small deformation (unfolding), then we have take Into account the
following facts :
(I) generically the fold line p(oCt) meets the critical value line ·! = p(-nr)) at
a point ll(r) of the type shown In Fig. I J, where ·r' cannot be eJctended beyond
the Intersection point v(t). This has been represented In Fig. 11 where the
Critical line r ' is progressively destroyed by the upward motion of the contact
point v(r) between ·/ and acl · this is Interpreted as the reduction of activity
states of the genome and the spatial condensation of the nucleic material.
•
(ii) in a full model, the boundary line p(3Ct) ha.s to be doubled (plane projec·
don of an annular nng, if the source is taken to be of dimension 2). The second
lower boundary curve undergoes at the end of prophase an inflexion which
creates a new component ·l' of the critical curve, oriented, as a fold, In the
reverse direction of the original r'. This leads to the situation shown in Fig. 12
as a tentative description of the available domain for the genetic material In
early anaphase. Perhaps the full counrerimage p - 1 (3C1) could be interpreted as
the nuclear envelope, which in eukaryotic mitoSIS is destroyed and somewhat
mysteriously reappears at telophase (as the extension of the new component r ''
of r).
~
, - -/ G
I + "f/
,..,.'~"'>
x1 "'
--
)C .K.,.,... I ""'
..t
x/" 1 r
-- 7
,... I' '" ...... I
I ,-/ I
,,
I /I /
" I /
/ I I "'/
/
/ I I .........,
/ I -- /
_, ,
/
--~~ ....-"'
/ . ~-
/ -~~ I
a /- I
1
f" J 1 Confinement zone
1 I nucleic omterlal
/1 1/ In metaphaSe
I /'
Fig. 12
/ I
I I
/
/
•
s
/~ VP
NP
V/ ~NP(O)
Art N !""'
Arl N
! I
The
I I mouse
Fig. 13
•
plural) which belong totally to the first level, that of the phoneme. Thus it is
possible to have a certain projection of the structure of the higher integrated
level onto certain 'coded' elements of the lower level.
Biological morphology reveals similar phenomena. The best structured pau,
say, 'organ- organism', can be described equally by a tree structure revealed
by embryologicaJ development (it is Waddington's 'epigenetic field'): Fig. 14.
Meloderm
Muacles
1\ Bone lntesllne
I
Ner\I(IUS
!
l
tlasue
Skin Blood
l I
Fig. 14
But here an essential difference appears from the linguistic examples quoted.
While linguistic morphology is unidimensional (as Saussure says, the linearity of
the signifler), the living being is a ball of three dimensions. A tree can thus not
describe on its own the spatial arrangements of different tissues and organs in
the organism.
the ageing Goethe took a great deal of lmerest.t The theme Is weD-known.
While Geoffroy Saint·Hilaire had, with the aid of a purely geometrical principle,
the con!lectivity pri11ciple (we would now say 'topological'), identified one with
anotJter organs of different 11nlmals, and had claimed thus to open up a unique
plan of organisation valid for all anlmals, Cuvier had only accepted as valid
the basic correlations on a functional homology. This relative priority of the
geometry (localisation) of the function still remains today one of the major
problems posed in theoretical btology. Many contemporaires, seduced by the
boldness of Geffroy Saint·Hilaire's ideas, saw in Cuvter's detailed objection the
work of a specialist who could not see the wood for the trees. Much later, on the
other hand , the ideas of Geoffroy Saint·Hilaire were rejected as prescientific
fantasies, i.n particular ltis assimUalion of the Insect as a 'Vertebrate which goes
on its back'. The idea of a unique plan of organisation for all animals has been
duly rejected; however, more than a score of fundamental plans for the animal
organism can be counted. Thus the Idea of a general plan of the organism retains
tts validity, even though it is necessary to reject the uniqueness of such a plan.l
shall show later how catastrophe theory permits us to envisage the fundamental
difference wltich separates the organisation of an insect (arthropod) from that of
a vertebrate.
The general schema of organisation of an organism can be considered , in the
first instance, as an 'archetype'. But it is lmportant to point out that , since
GoeUte and the Naturphilosophen, there has been a tendency to designate by the
term archetype, the primordial image (Urbild} of an organ or of a collection of
organs. Consequently there has been a bias towards favouring relatively concrete
structures, complete in themselves, endowed with an inunediate, fi.Jlalist character,
like paw, wing, leaf, ....
Tltis tendency to invoke the archetype for very elaborate and concrete uses
culminates in Jungian psychoanalysis, where the archetypes are treated as
individuals endowed with subjectivity, with a psycltism which is hardly inferior
in complexity to the human spirit Itself. It is clear that, if we wish to reinstate
the notion of archetype to a scientific status, we must first defme it in simple
( a) (b) (e)
-
(d)
ffl8. IS
Sec. 9.2) The Notion of Archetype in Biology 159
If this phenomenon does not appear and in particular if the regulauon has
instead released a compensating reflex, there "'ill appear In the curve of return
to equalibrium, a discontinuity in the derivative corresponding to the precipita·
uon of the reflex (Fig. 1S(c)). In this case the situation will be modelled by a
'cliff.Uke' regulation, found by folding as an overhang the walls of the primitive
potentia l well (Fig. IS(d)). A more refined analysis, implying a study of the
return to equilibrium after a multi-dimensional stimulus. will lead to the compli·
eating of the Ogure of regulation later on. But in addition to the analysis of the
restonng of equilibrium, there is need to account {before all other considerations)
for the genesis of the system, of ats origin and of the morphology and its Inter·
actions and conflicts with the other regimes which border it. If for example.
our regime splits itself in two by bifurcation, this transformation will be modelled
by the passage from a single potential well V= x~ /4 + x 1 /2 to a potential well
divided into two (Fig. I S(e)) V= x 4 /4 - x 2 /2,t.hrough the unstable singularity
V= x~ /4. (This is the first approach eventually suscepllble to being very corn·
plicated.)
When 'We wish to account for a complex morphology. we will seek to model
local features by the singularities of the potential V, chosen in a manner to
minimlse the arbitrariness after the fashion for example. of ensuring a certain
contlnuity of potentials in spite of a very varied morphology. Here, there is no
technique given a priori, and this explains why catastrophe theory requires
delicacy in its use . In biology, we shall be able to appeal,ln the choice of these
potentials, to those matters of character which are slmulataneously funcuonal
and ftoal.tst. And it is here that we rediscover tbe Cuvier- Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire's
'connectiVity principle'; but Cuvier's functional correlates are to be interpreted
as connections in the space of metabolic states, hence in fact by a cenain con·
tinuity of relatively local potentials, as internal parameters which specify the
local states of the metabolism (in my terminology 'internal variables'). In this
view. it is legit imate to associate a functional 'significance' to every sequence
of potcntlals (defined by a descending path of the tree-graph). This comes
back to postulating a spatial continuity, a geometric connection, but on an
'tnternal' space endowed wtth a metabol.tc or semantic interpretation. I propose
to give an example of an interpretation of this type in comparing the embry·
ology of vertebrates to that of msects.
role and will take place, uke the combinatorics of Leibniz.. as a pure gnme of
forms ....
I
..- ·-·.
./
'
F~. 16
REFERENCES
[I) B. C. Goodwin, Temporal Organisation ill Cells: A Dynamic Theory of
Cellular Control processes, Academic Press, :-lew Yotk.
(2] Lindenmayer A., Growth functions of cell populallons with lineage control,
in Biomathematics and Cell Ki11etics. eds. A. S. VaUeron and P. M. Mac
Donald , Elscvier ~orth·Holland B10medicall'ress. 1978, pp. 117 131.
(3] Thom, Re ne, Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, Benjamin, 1975 .
[4) Thorn, R, La Unguistique, discipline morphologique exemplaire, Critique,
March 1974, p. 255.
CHAPTER 10
This chapter is composed of tWO differelll texts. n1e first gives the general
methodowgical reasons by which any theory of linguistic activity with any clllim
to depth caTUJot do without geometric continuity (tluis relatiVIsing allthelogicist
endtallOurs whid1 flourish amongst the Modems). The secofld, 'Topology and
meaning·. introduces rhe ·archetypal morphology' of verbal processes; which we
wlfl find developed in greater derail in Chapter 12. n1is SI!Ction also poses the
problematic of 'logo/': a noTion on which I must acceptrhar scarcely any progress
has been made since. •..
-- -------------------------
l lnttrn..Uonal SympoSIUm on ScmaniJCS, Urbino, July 1971.
•
functor will not be univocal but will nevenheless be relatively well defined. In
fact the possibilities of paraphrasing a text, that is to define all the 'synonymous'
expressions of a given text. are relatively limited in number. On the theoretical
level, this is perhaps one of the essential contributions of transformational
grammar.
Moreover, this hope of reaching a formalisation of the signified is the only
one available to us , because, very probably, there is no other conceivable solution,
given the present state of the technical means of communication between human
beings. But what seems to me probable is that, for this purpose, the notion of
formal system will have to be considerab ly modlfied. The alterations that it
will be necessary to make to the notion are heavy with philosophical implications.
Perhaps they will necessitate a radical revision of a common attitude with
respect to formalisation, an attitude entirely pervaded with 'wishful thinking' ,
if not idolatry pure and simple.
Akeady, at the level of 'surface' syntactical structures the adequacy of the
usual formal systems for the description of a corpus is severely limited~ lt is a
paltry subterfuge to lay. as Cbomsky does. the responsibility for the inadequacies
of the formal model on the inability of 'performance' to assume the generative
capacities of a tireless 'competence'. Ln what way does this convince us that
certain of these Inadequacies are not formaJJsable, not able to be described by
laws? On the other hand, the possibility that a language may generate an infinity
of sentences is much nea1er to the open character of vocabulary , rich in all the
possibilities of the semantic universe, than to the variety of syntacticaJ con~
structions, which is ·quickly exhausted, at least in their main outll.nes. it is this
self~limitation of the generative capacities of syntax which requires explanation.
Undue favour has been shown to mathematicians in their belief that the
generative quality of a formal stuctUie, justified by its form alone, must be
admitted a priori, and requires no explanation. From where comes the structure?
Tf by a veritable hypostasis, we allow that a structUie takes root on a substrate
by reason of its true form, how does it sometimes occur that, wishing to extra-
polate its domain, the efficacy of the model decreases, and its validity disappears?
And how do we approach the problem of the diachrony of those 'sudden catas·
trophes' which see a structure eliminated to make way for a completely different
other one. Let us recall the well known fact that there is not, in ordinary language,
a strict frontier between grammatical expressions and those which are not
grammatical, no more than between agrarnmaticallty and semantic unacceptability.
For all these reasons it seems necessary to re-introduce the continuity that
formalism has driven out. We could do it first in a rather vague and statistical
manner. For example, in the free mono id F generated by the alphabet x,, ... •xk ,
we could attach to each word Wof Fa reaJ number p(JV) between zero and one ,
which measures its acceptability. p( IV) = 0 will signify that W is excluded,
p(W) = I that it is well constructed. In a formal system, tbe function p(W) is
restricted so that the set p-• (I} of well constructed words can be generated by
Sec. 10.1 I The Role of Topology in Semantic Analysis 165
a finite number of axioms. But we could well conceive that p(W) was a function
not only of the Internal structure of Ill on Xf, but also of the context. or of the
en,ironment. In order to defme p/ 111 we can expect to give rules of an analyttc
or dtfferential nature, rules wluch will show a decreasing of the action of the
environment when we withdraw from W in the context. 1t would be a very
mteresting problem. by the way. to know if there exist functions p of this type
extending known formal systems. (cf. the recent theory of 'fuzzy sets'.)
But that will not suffice to tackle the problem of changing, of diachrony.
In thiS last case n seems inevitable that we endow the substrate with neutral
('indifferendes' dynamic properties (as with the ether in Maxwclllan physics),
and to make it the basis of a pennanent dynamic process, of which the formal
structure will only be the observable morphology which manifests the mean
'thermodynamic' state. The apparent formal dynamical structure will be hardly
more than the tip of the iceberg, which reveals the presence of a mass of sub·
merged ice nine limes greater than the visible part.
if lhe need to introduce, behind an apparently rigid structure, 'hidden'
parameters of a kinetic nature whlch explain (and sometimes measure) its
stabWty, has hardly been discussed, then the problem exists of building a coherent
theory for this kind of situation. 1t is not topology ttself, but an tntimate assocl·
at ion of topology with dynamics (understood m the most general sense as the
science of the actions of time on the states of a system) which can give it to us.
It is the qualitative theory of differential systems, the theory of 'Structural
Stability'. which alone seems able to ghre us a bne of attack m this kind of
problem. The theory of morphogenesis, or further, catastrophe theory. with
wluch I am concerned seems to be the most promising development in this
regard.
In Chapter 11, I have tried to show how Unguistic patterning of a spatiO·
temporal process can be explained by the theory of structural stabWty. If we
assume that a nuclear senrenoe Is essentially the statement ofa conflict between
local regimes (linguistically, between acronts) which. dispute a domain of space
tune of 4 dimensions IR4 , then the number of morphologles (In the sense of
topological equivalence) of these interactions is relatively small (roughly 16
archetypal morphologies}. Each of these morphologies defines what Whorf has
called a ·cryptotype' of verbal action, which allows us to anticipate a fmer
semantic classification of verbs than the purely syntactical one given by Tesniere's
notion of valency.
In thls model the spatia-temporal interactions, having a physiological or
biological nature, will play the role of universal patron for the interactlons
between actants of a nuclear sentenoe. There is Unle doubt, however, that the
semantic universe is infinitely richer and more varied. It is tempting, in con·
fonnity with the general methodology of science, to depict the semantic universe
as a morphology of whlcl:t the substrate would be a Euclldean space of a very
&reat number of dimensions, N (for example, the space of the activation stales
•
thinks of the Logos of Heraclltus, and of the themes of the Sophists and Plato's
Cratylus, it has reappeared after an apparenllyt long eclipse as one of the major
themes of contemporary thought. There is a pressure to establish, under the
name of Semanucs, or of Semiology, as an autonomous discipline, a general
theory of meaning, and of the correspondence 'signified - signifier' (signi/it
signl{llmt) common to any system of communication. But, up to the present,
this effort has been confined to the so-called 'human' sciences. The 'puie'
scientists, physicists, biologists, and even linguists of formalist inclinatioos,
seem to steer clear of such attempts which, In their eyes, are clouded by a
suspect subjectlvism. Will the notion of meaning remain inaccessible to objective
analysis? Corrupted from the start by its psychological origin, should it be
proscribed for all lime from scientific eyes?
t~'hy have the pre·Soc:ratiC$ from Heradhus to Plato left us, from the down of phnosophical
lhouJiht, so many views of such peat depth? 1t is tempting to think that at that time the
mind was stDJ In quasi-direct contact with reality, verbal and grammatical structures were
not Interposed :u a distorting screen between the thou(!ht and the world . With the lllrival of
the Sophists, Euclidean Geometry and the logic of Aristotle intulti~ thouJht gave way to
lnstrumenw thou(!ht , direct vision to the technique o f proof. Now,the mo•ll!f spirit of111/
loxtr11/ lmplietJrlon is the Ion rn rn{ormarional ~nttllt 'SottateS Is mortal' t•oche$ us teu
th;an 'Socrate$ 11 a man·. So it wu fated that the problem of meanlng faded before that of
the ruucture of deduction. The foci that the formal sy11ems of mathematics escaped thiJ
degradation of 'neaentropy' has been un i1111sion - In this respect an IUuslon from which
modern thought Is 11ill suffeJina: formaiiJ:ition. Jn Itself dbjolnt from •n intelligible content,
canno t be • sour<% of knowledge.
•
All history teaches us that a major source of error has been the Insuperable
power of the mind to hypostatise these structures and to establish them as
objective entities endowed with power and effect. We can think, for example,
of the figurative interpretation of the constellations which led to astrology and
all its vagaries.
What control should we set against this aU powerful tendency of the mind?
There is, in our eyes, but one possibility: lO create a theory of meaning whose
nature is such rhar the act itself of knowing is a consequence of the theory. in
other words, when an appearnnce appears to us a bearer of mearung, we will
know why and to what formal factor~ to attribute it. Provisionally neglecting
the subjective aspect of meaning, we wW strive to proVJde a model of objective
character having a geometric and dynamic nature. We shall find tills model In
the mechanical idea of rt'SOfltlTICe.
very long: it v.-eaves the torus C X C' m such a way that the new evolution is
barely distinguishable, thermodynamically speaking, from the initial evolution:
we say that we are dealing with a blurred resonance. On the other hand,ifp/q = I
or Is a simple rational, the att ractor will be very short so that the evolution will
be very different from the non-coupled evolution and show strongly the synchro-
nous character of the evolution obtained. We then have o very stable sharp
resonan«. This example shows at what point the effect of a resonance can be
varied .In some ClUeS we are concerned with a blurred resonance, fairly unstable and
fluctuatmg, whlch has only a weak effect upon the autonomy ofthe two systems.
In others, on the contrary, each system irre•'Ocably loses its independence by
gaining a unique dynarruc entity, the resonant system. And there exists a quasi·
•'Ontinuo us range of resonance between the two types. In the case of the two
cucles C, C', the sharp resonance is only possible if the rational pfq of th e periods
is equal to I or a simple rational (see App. 10.2.13 (2)).
We consider that this notion involves a phenomenon of a very general
character: two dynamical systems S, S' cannot exchange energy by resonance
unless they present vibratory modes having common qualitative traits.
We can also make the following point: for a global energy Ewe can accept
that the vibratory characteristics of the system S are entirely defined by the
speclncation, In some auxiliary Euchdean space R 4 , of a form T(E), the spectre
of the syste m, whlch is a funct ion of E. When two systems S and S' emer into
interaction, there is an identification of the two associated spaces R 4 : the
possibiluy of the two systems integnumg by resonance depends upon how nearly
the two 'spectres' T(E) and T(E') can be superimposed. The resonance will be
sharp tf, for a pair of values £, E' such that E + t:' = h, where h is the tota l
energy of two systems. the two 'spectres' can be exactly superimposed. ln
pantcular. we can superimpose the two 'spectres' exactly for
E= E' = lt/2
and this will give a very sharp peak to the resonance. We thlnk we can see here
the origin of coding in the phenomena of transmission. As all interaction rests,
in the last analysis, upon a phenomenon of resonance it is impor tant if one
Wishes this operation to be rehable and to involve the least possible 'noise',tbat
the resonances used should be very stable and sharp. Tlus requires the use of
isomorphic devices in the source and the receiver, and a repetitive morphology
or Ute message (see App. 10.2.13 ( 4)).
l:quaUy, the mathematical schema sketched above explains the well-known
and well-founded character of the analogy of the phenomenon of the resonance
associated with the metric correspondence between two figures, like the key
Whose indentations are adapted to those of the lock. In the same way, in structural
linguistics, the valency of a verb, in Tesniere's sense, and also, In Chemistry, the
Valency of an atom [3) has been compared to a hook carried by the 'nucleus.
•
tIn lhi! game one gives the player a series of simple orden such ns: lift the right ann, tap
the lefl leg •• . etc., of which certain ace preceded by saying 'Simon says'. Only the lnst must
be carried out. The player iJ faulted if be obeys the others.
tlf. lhiougb ill-will towards the person addressing us we do not wish to obey the order
which has been addressed to us and we prefer to apP<l<JI dlsuacted : "'"' hear the ordCJ
but we do no t undenlllnd it.
Sec. 10.2] Topology and MeJ~ning 173
certain poetic texts allows the mind to be more sensiuve to the true feeling,
through the phonetics of the text, which is habitually repressed by the attraction
of the sense in ordlnary language. It is not impossible that a message, initially
of little significance. becomes more and more so by repetition, tluough a phenomc·
non of memory. or by a facilitation analogous to the susceptibility observed in
the condition of anaphylaxia.
In the case of simple orders like: Come, Give. etc.. the motor tield which
define the execution of the order pre~xists in the structure of our motor activities.
It is found to be coupled by education to the phoneuc recognition of the corre-
sponding word. In the case of more complex sentences, it is very possible that
the understanding of the text entails the formation of a stable regime which
bas never been excited in the past history of the individual. Thus we foun new
tdeas in understanding sentences we have never heard before. In this case the
resulting resonance does pot exist as a consequence of a pre~x.istent oscillator of
the neural dynamic; it takes form directly by resonance from the oscillations
aroused by the inteliection of words.
Thus we are lead to postulate that 'meaning' expresses the possibility of a
system under the influence of ex ternal perturbations adopting corrector regimes
which nuliify the effect of the perturbations. This interpretation w1U be further
generalised in order to make it more objective.
which assures the uniqueness and the stability of this vibratory phenomenon,
amongst the incessant perturbations from the surrounding universe.
Here we fmd HeracUtus again. Physics, as we know it, offersusa vision of the
world quite compatible with rravro:pEt, universal change ('le mobiUsme ). The Unl·
verse is nothing more than a brew of electrons, protons, photons ... , etc.,all beings,
of ill-<leftned properties, in perpetual interaction. !low can this brew settle
down, on our scale, into a relatively stable and coherent form far from the
quantum-mechanistic chaos that the theory suggests? Although certain physicists
maintain that U1e order of our world is the inescapable consequence of elementary
disorder, they are still far from being able to furnish us with a satisfactory
explanation of the stability of common objects and their qualitative properties.
(How could they, Indeed, when even the foundations of their theory are so
insecure?) In this regard , I think that a cenaln reversal of point of view is necessary.
It is an illusion to wish to explain the stability of a form by the interactions
of the most elementary beings Into which it can be decomposed. As for our
linear oscillator above, the stability of a form, as of a whirlpool in the Heraclitean
•
Simple Minimum V = x1 V = x1
The Cusp r, V
(Rlemann ~
V = x• V = x 4 + ux 2 + vx
-Hugoniot
catastrophe) I -r, I'
The
V= x 5 V=x 5 +ux 3 T~
Swallowtail + vx 2 + wx
- I
*~
The 6 V = x 6 + ux4
V= x
Butterfly + vx3 + wx2 + tx
V = x 3 +y 3
0\~ .A
The V = x3 + y' +
Hyperbolic wx3 - ux - vy
The
V=x3 -3xy 2 +
Elliptic
Umbilic
V=x' - 3xy 2
1~(x 2 + y 2) - ux- ~ ~<1
r,
V=x 2 y + y 4
~fJ~ V
The -t-
. -- The boundaJ'}'
The end
The end- to
finish
The beginning
- to begin
To capture To engender
Tt I A fault To change- To become
T2
' (Geology) To break To unite
To snap
I
A needle To r111
To prick
~~ A pike
To penetrate
(a hole)
A hair To destroy
To break (for a I
jet)
To eject To bind
:z~ A jet (of water)
A mushroom
A mouth
To throw
To pierce
To cut
To open
To close
(the mouth)
To pinch
To take
178 Semantics and linguistics [Ch. 10
tWo proJIOSe 1sologous': the UJe of !be adjective homolopou•" nlrcady widespread.
*An Dllology in the usual sense of the term - should be oonsidered a; an Incomplete
iso)OJY .
Sec. 10.2) Topology and Meaning 179
fields wWch prepare the catastrophes of struggle and capture. The caudall.one is
the seat of the catastrophes of excretion, and also of all the catastrophes of
diminution and destruction of the animal. The preservation of the animal Is
assured by the regulatory devices (depending upon the genetic ancestry) wWch
constitute a geometric figure of some magnitude, called the f~gure of regulation.
This Is a particular unfolding of the logos Lo. We can regard the internal space I
of the logos Lo as a phase space of a dynamical system S which will descnbe the
instantaneous internal metabolic state of the otganisrn.
In the state of unexcited rest of the animal, this systemS can be represented
as the system defined by a billiard ball rolling inside a potential well with a
sufficiently flat and indecisive internal geography. Let us submit the animnl to
a stimulus s; then by resonance, the systemS stabilises itself; it hollows a local
minimum q in the landscape, which captures the systemS; the excitation of this
true mode brings about the execution of a reflex and a corrector of the stimulus.
Once the stimulus is corrected, and the excitation extinguished, the system S
returns to its initinl fluctuating state, and this leads to the cessation of the reflex
r. One can say that when the stimulus s has released the corrector reflex r by
resonance, the animal has 'understood • the stimulus. This mechanism of resonance
only exists in principle for the catastrophes of capture and of ingestion favourable
to the organism; the unfavourable catastrophes, where the animal is attacked by
a predator, will sometimes be the Object of reflexes of defence or flight. The
formation of the resonance is accompanied by a spatial morphology to which it
Is specifically associated (see App. 10.2.13(3)).
Among animals of more advanced type, there exists in the system S a
subsystem S' consisting of nervous activities. The essential object of S' is to
furnish a simulated copy of the exterior space T of the interesting objects which
are found there (prey, predatOrs) and of the position of the body in relation to
these objects. On this account, the large functional fields associated to essential
biological functions (sleeping, eating, ... etc.) very quickly have mental repre·
sentaUons, because they affect the Image of the body in S'. Such a system,
effecting a better copy of exterior conditions, obviously allows for a better
adapted response of the reflexes than the elementary behavioural automatism:
'stunulus..., response' in the simpler animals. From this theory we shall retain the
importance attached to sptitial representation, and to rparial comperirion as
primitive forms of mental activity. All this preamble is necessary for the under·
standing of the fundamental structure of the logos of a living being.
corresponding word existed. A cat certainly has a spatial and olfactory Image of
the mouse, endowed with structural stability and a logos partially isologous to
the logos of the mouse itself. For the cat clearly has an implicit knowledge of
the mouse's fiight reflexes, and perhaps also other physiologica.J reflexes less
immediately unportant to him. it IS hence reasonable to think that the primary
autonomous structures of psychic actiVIty have had a logos isologous to the self
itself: the logos of living beings. Consequently the logos of living beings has
served as a universal pattern for the constitution of 'concepts'. But the stabillty
of the logos itself rests upon the possibillty of adopting corrector regimes in a stable
manner, and of executing regulator reflexes. Thus, as a corollary, the con-
stitution of concepts needs the existence of catastrophes of regulation.
It is not necessary to see m this assertion the consequence that a concept
possesses a vitalist character. In fact every dynamic structure which presents a
very strong structural stability necessarily involves correcting discontinuities,
that is catastrophes of regulation. This a profound fact of qunliunive dynamics,
to which the logos of living being is necessarily accommodated.
However that may be, one can still accept that a concept of a particularly
concrete nature has a logos very similar to that of a lower animal. it has a
substrate space £ of dimension less than or equal to 3, a territory, a cephalic-
caudal gradientt Its structural stability is assured by the catastrophes of regulation
whose support is essentially in the ergative zone of this fictitious and stylised
organism. lt has also a caudal zone where the catastrophes of diminution and
death take root.
It will be noted that this description only applies to m actant of a very
concrete nature, a living being for example. Later on we will describe abstract
logoi such as the iogoi of the acts of speech. Indeed, in my opinion, the interaction
of logoi, which is explained in syntax with the help of grammatica.J categories,
draws its origin from schemas of spatial interaction linked to elementary catastro·
phes.
I 0.2.9 The elementary struct ure of ~ntences
Lf we judge by the language of anunals, our language seems to have a two-fold
origin; on the one hand it serves for the ritualisation of a certain number of
genetically derived functional biological fields. Thus, the bird sings to mark out
his territory and to attract a mate. On the oU1er hand, with animals living In
groups, it serves essentially to warn the group of a danger perceived by an
individual {alarm cry) or of any new happening judged important for the security
of the individual or the social group. 1t is reasonable enough to consider that
human language is derived rather from the second type of message, the need to
inform others of a change in the surrounding milieu, of a phenomenological
'catastrophe'.
tObJetve tluot the p~positions 'in front' and 'behind' c::lJl be u~ in front of the most
ab$tnct nounJ.
Sec. 10.2] Topology and Meaning 18 I
But, from the moment when we wished to specify the nature of the catastro·
phe perceived, it was natural that the structure of the sentence should reflect
the dynamic structure of the exterior catastrophe - or, at least, reflect the
dynamic Interpretation that the perception has provided. The part played by
subjectivity in the organisation of perceptive experience i.s often considerably
less than one believes. Take for example the sentence: 'The day ends'. This is of
the type: ... which we relate to the logos of the fold', like all the
catastrophes descnbing the end of a being. Science tells us that this particular
fold effectively exists as a curve of contact of the terrestrial sphere with the
cylinder of solar rays surrounding the Earth. The 'catastrophe' of 'the end of the
day' is the crossing of this curve fold from the lit hemisphere to the darkened.
Also, here we can see the contagious property of the logos in full play. Given
the extent to which mechanisms, very sensitive to exterior happenings, were
formed In the mind, it was inevltnble that the discontinuous changes in our view
of the world would be organised according to the dynamic sehemas appropriate
to the regime conflicts· on the space R3 • The following table, obtained by
assoctatmg an elementary interact ton graph to each type of sentence, seems to
reveal this .
Example:
( 1) Sentences of type: express a state.
Example: /r is raining.
(2) Sentences of type: or f - -
Examplc: The day ends.
This type expresses the start or end of a bemg: the verb is grammatically
neuter (uni-valent in Tesniere's sense (3]).
(3) Type: Subject-Verb-Object
apple
Eve
----------~--------------
or
Fig. I
acquisition of the object; bur to create and to destroy are standard tran-
sitive actions in which the structural form has taken over, or has captu red
the structure of the actions of a less simplistic geometry.
(4) Catastrophe of lhegift type: Tesniere's trivalent verbs.
Example: Eve gives an apple to Adam.
Eve
• Adam
l'lg. 2
0------------------~--------------
E --------~----------------------
•
All these examples raise the following question: of all the actantial schemas
predicted by algebraic theory, only certain of them are realised in biological
morphology , or In the syntax of a simple sentence. In the light of what criteria
is that 'choice' made?
11 must be noted that, in this respect, our algebraic theory gives actants
a 'quadratic logos' , that is to say the crudest algebraic structure which ensures
stability . 1t is clear that in concrete cases where the logos of the act ants is more
complex, only those configurations from the theory which are compatible with
the structure internal to each logos could occur. Hence, only certain types of
catastrophic configurations have taken on the status of archetypes. In tills
respect, syntactic structures form a set wbich is even more restricted than the
biological actantial structures. For example, a certain section of the swallowtail
singularity leads to the graph of Fig. 5 which can be analysed thus: a stable
regime is doomed to disappear, but before perishing it leaps, by a kind of deatll
spasm , into a metastable regime which will fare no better. lt can be imagined
that in so far as grammatical categories give clear evidence of a vitalist origin, this
schema could not be incorporated in the figure of regulation of a concept. Is not
our own death properly incomprehensible to us?
Flg. 5
space; these are 'abstract' concepts. In extreme cases, such as the word 'end' or
the word 'gift' for example, the spectre of regulation of the concept no longer
acts as a single verbal catastrophe in which one of the actants is singled out.
lt is a matter for some consideration whether, in thecouneoftheprehbtoric:
formation of language, concrete words preceded the abstract or vice versa. It
seems fairly clear that abstraction was born from the need to reduce to the state of
a word o concrete concept pre-existing as a stable autonomous structure of the
psyche (as in the idea of the mouse in the eat's psyche). We have seen that the
ngure of regulation of a concept is a sort of stylised animal. Now let us imagine
that following an invasion of the cerebral ncld by the genetic field, tills stylised
animal is also competent to reproduce and is fined with a gonad (genital gland).
In cenain conditions of excitation, the concept will make a 'gamete', a bearer of
the 'logos' of the concept. This gamete is none other than the 'word' uttered by
the speaker. In the mind of the bearer, the word, true seed of the concept,
gemtinates, and bursts out: the 'logos' of the concept unfolds and reconstitutes
the figure of regulation of the concept and thus its meaning.
Just as in gametogenesis, the reduction to zero of the metabolism of the
gametocytes brings about the condensation of the nucleic: material in linearly
ordered genes, so the passage of the idea to the word by reconstitution of the
'organising centre' of the logos necessitates the successive formation of dynamic
st ructures, transient and codified, which serve by successive bifurcations in a
ramified structure in the form of a tree, to evoke - to excite - the functional
motor f~eld corresponding to the word. Perhaps one could identify these transient
hypothetic structures to the c/Qssemes ('c/Qssemes} of the semanticists, (we may
occasionally attach an abstract noun to them, but this is without doubt, only an
approXIDlat ion). There remain traces of these c/assemes in diagrammatic writing
like that of the Chinese. In the origins of our Western languages there was
probably also a bi-univocal correspondence between semantic classemes and
phonetic letters (or syllables); but the phonetic system has rapidly shown itself
too poor to accommodate all the 'classemes', and the two systems have rapidly
diverged. Perhaps it is not completely Utopian to try to reconstitute (in terms of
general functionalllelds of the Uvlng being) the classematic value of the primitive
letters.
I0.2.12 Co nclusion
The invasion of the cerebral by the genetic, which is at the origin of (so rightly
named) oonceptual thought. u another aspect of the analogy between organ and
too l raised by Bergson. Our dynamic mode ls lead to n presentation of organo-
genesis in the course of evolution that one may schematise thus: every physio-
logical function corresponds to a 'catastrophic' regulation of the metabolism, a
veritable physiological 'shock wave'; the organogeneSIS is a sort of retroactive
smoothing of this shock wave, which gives finality to the organ, because its
186 Semantics and linguistics [Ch. 10
J0.2.13 Appendices
(I) Product of two spaces
Let A be a metric space: to each pair a, b of points of A is associated a positive
real number d(a, b) the distance from a to b. Thls function dissymmetric in a
and b, zero if and only if a = b and satisfies the triangle inequality: d(a, b).;;;
d(a, c)+ d(c, b).
Let A and B be two metric spacesrespectively provided with metricsd(a.,a2 ),
d'(b.,b~). Equip the product setA X 8 with a metricD,forexamplethatdefined
by Pythagoras Theorem
Dl(a 1 X b~.a 2 X b 2 ) = d 2 (a 1,a 2 ) + d'2 (b 1 ,b2 )
The product setA X B thus becomes a metric space whlch we call the product
space of A and 8.
Example: Let us be given the plane defmed by axes Oxy, the two segments
A and B defined respectively by 0 <x < l,y = 0 and x = 0, 0 <y < I (provided
with th.e metric defined by EuciJdean distance). We can then represent the
product A X B by the square 0 <; x .;;; 1, 0 <; y <; 1, where the usual Euclidean
distance is taken as a metric.
y
11------,
a c
1 •
•
A
Fig. 6
Suppose that in the segment A we Identify th.e origin x = 0 with the end
x = I ; we then obtain a circle A' (equipped with an induced metric). (This
first theorem of topology eau be traced back to Heraclitus: on the circle the
origin and end are but one.) Similarly Jet 8 ' be the circle obtained by identifying
the origin and end of the segment B. Then let us form the product A' X 8'; we
can define it directly from the square C, where we identify the points (p, p'),
(m, m') which correspond by a unit translation parallel to Ox or Oy.
y
p
l
a 'II
I
m ---r----- m
c
:
p A
Fig. 7 "
!88 Semantics and linguistics [Ch. 10
The space thus obtained which is the product of two circles, is a compact surface, a
torus. In fact we can bijecuvely map the interior of the square C onto the
surface of a ring of revolution where we have marked a meridian A ' and a parallel
B'.
y
y :I
/' ......
''
''
- a... - '\
'\
''
8
'
Xa1 X
'' \ ____Y•O
_t Y•l
t
y.. o ''
' •, ________ - - - - - - __ JI
Fig. 8
1962), that each neighbouring stable field has the following structure: it
consists of a finite number of closed attracting trajectories which all have the
same ·rotation number' pfq ; these trajectories are separated by an equal number
of closed repelling trajectories again with the same 'rotation number' pfq. Every
othe r (non-closed) trajectory spirals from a repelling closed trajectory towards
an attracting trajectory. See Fig. 9 where we have but one attracting trajectory
r and one repelling r'.
/
// .... -- ------
/
r
Fig. 9 -A sharp resona.noe p = q = l.
-- - 1 X
(3) Let us sum up here in terms of classical dynamics. Let us suppose that our
two systems S and s' are conservative hamiltonian system with phase spaces M
and ~( respectively with Hamiltonians Hand I(. The evolution In M is described
by a vector field X in M deduced from H with the aid of the Hamllton-J acobl
equations P = aHfaq, Q :: - aHjap, and the field X leaves invariant the hyper·
surfaces of constant energy, H = E, and also the volume defmed by the Uouville
measure m these hypersurfaces. This being so, suppose that besides the energy
our systems S, S' admit as first Integrals (at least approximately) a vectoriaJ
quantity taking Its value in a vector space V (such as the kinetic moment, for
example), in such a way that •he interaction between SandS' Is constrained to
satisfy the relation: E + E' = constant (conservation of energy) and V+ V' =
constant. Agree for the moment that In the hypersurfaces H = E, H = E' the
Uouville measure is ergodic. The relation V+ V'= constant allows the identifi-
cation of these two spaces V and V', whlch we make In mapping V' onto V. The
hypersurfaoe H = E projects itself onto V by the canonical projection 11: M- V.
To ea.ch open subset W of V associate the Liouville measure of the counter-image
11-1 (11-? n {H = £}. This allows us to define on V a density function of E that
we denote by JJ(E):
m( W, E)= f p(v) dv
V
v e V. We can then define an 'entropy of interaction'S by the formula
S(E, £') = f p(v; £). p(v; £') dv
V
The greater thls function is, the greater the possibilities of interaction
between the two systems. If there exists a value E such that S(£, h - E) is
•
maximised (maximally sharp) then the composed system S, S' evolves towards
this value which will constitute the energy of resonance between these two
systems. It is clear that there can be several maxima in such a way that there can
be competition between final resonances. The choice of the system is then, in
principle, determined by its initial position.
( 4) I would not wish to leave this schema without again pointing out an impor-
tant phenomenon: we ,have assumed that the Liouville measures are ergodic.
But such a hypothesis is not all established; in particular, it is very possible
that the hypersurface of energy H = £ 0 consists, for example, of two connected
components which join together in a saddle point for H = E 1 >Eo .In this case,
if the energy of resonance is close to the threshold E 1 we can expect coarse
phenomena characterised by a discontinuity of th.e entropy of interaction. Then
we say that we are deallng with a 'catastrophic resonance'. It will be manifested
by a harsh discontinuity of the behaviour of one of the systems (S, for example)
which will have an important and well-defined morphological effect in the inter·
action space V. This phenomenon plays, according to our schema, a fundamental
role in biological morphogenesis, and probably also in the verbal coding of
meaning.
Let us note a further generalisation of the schema: suppose that the position
of system S in relation to system S' can be parametrised by the points of a
topological space G. At every point g e G t.llere corresponds an identification of
V with V' that we designate by g: V-+ V'. Then the entropy of interactionS will
also depend on g by the formula
Here again the evolution, possibly violent, of the system towards a sharp
resonance can entrain a rapid variation of g in G with important morphological
effects.
REFERENCES
[lj Goldstein, K.,Der Aufbau des Organismus, La Haye,Jijoff, 1934.
[2) Uexkull, J. V., 1Morie de la signification, Paris, Gonthier, 1956.
[3) Tesniere, L., Elements de symaxe structurale, Paris, Klincksleck, 1965.
[4) Zeeman, E. C., Topology o[ the Brain, Mathematics and Computer Science
in Biology and Medicine, Medical Research Council, 1965.
[5] This follows from a theorem of Marston Morse, see M. Morse,17re Calculus
of Variations in the Large, American Matllematlcal Society, Colloquium
Publications, Vol. 18. New York 1934.
[6) This theory is developed in the author's book: Structural Stability and
Morphogenesis, Benjamin, New York, First English Edjtlon, 1975.
•
CHAPTER 11
1'1-inciple of isomorphism
There exists between the sets Q~, ~ a bi-unique correspondence which pre·
serves the meaning and which is, almost, compatible with the order: if the
ith atomic proposition ofT 1 is mapped into jth ofT1 , we have 1/- i I < 4.
We shall not dwell at length discussing the validlly of these Universals,
which most linguists would undoubtedly reject. There are those who, not
without reason, underline the arbitrary character of the notion of an atomic
sentence. Thus the Latin, Moriturl te salutam, requires, in English, two atomic
sentences. But the validity of our assumptions cartnot be denied at least as
hypotheses for practical work, notably in Iranslating. We do not insist, however,
that in the correspondence r/.-+ ~ the verbs correspond with each other in
meaning. Thus in English 'lt Is raining' is translated into Polish by an expression
of the type: 1'he rain falls'. There is then no equivalence of sense between 'to
rau,- and 'to fall· .
But, thanks to C. Zeeman's model [1], we have at our disposal a very general
mathematical representation of neuro-physiological processes. The space of the
states of neuronic excitation is a cube In of enormous dimensions. The evolution
therein of the psychic state is described by a vector Oeh.l X varying slowly with
time. An 'instantaneous psychic state', an 'idea', is described by a structurally
stable ·anractor' A of X, which exists isomorphically by itself for a short period
of tin1e. After a sufficiently large variation of the field, the attractor A is destroyed
by 'bifurcation' and gives way to a new atlractor which captures it. .. etc..
Thus we can hope to have a geomel!ic model of a succession of Ideas in
the ·nux of consciousness', associated with the philosophy of introspection.
Furthermore it will be noted that the use of such a differential model is not in
any way subordinate to n materialistic metaphysics (although suggested by it).
The meaning of an idea is then entirely defmed by the Internal topology of the
structurally stable attractor A, as well as by its position in the cube I".
But amongst all the PSYchic activities of man, there is one of prime impor·
tance: it is that wluch consists of organising the senses (sight, hearing and feeling)
into a representation of surrounding space including the body as a privileged
space, whose spatial integrity must be respected to the maximum. Such a repre·
sentation of exterior space is tn no way bound to the faculty oflanguage and it
exists wtth more or less OdeUty and precision for all arumals and even in a
certain sense for plant life. In the morphology (M) of the signifled there exists a
sub-morphology (E) describing faithfully the spatio-temporal processes that we
can perceive in the neighbourhood of our organism. Certain \\ell-intentioned
people will be able to question the fidelny of our spatial representation, or on
the conl!ary, invoke Kant to afftrm that we are projecting onto the external
reality of coneeptua.l frame a categorial which is genetically innate. At the
tinle when a man is sent to the moon, it is difficult to claim that the space of
Newtonian mechanics is no more than a form given a priori, of our sellSl"bility.
We can assert ai the very most that genetically we have at our disposal cerebal
mechanisms that simulate, with a very good approximation in most practical
situations met wtth in ordindary life, the 'rtal' laws of Mechanics.
Whatever idea one has of the origin of language in man, it is almost imposs·
ible to doub t that the social life of a primitive human group needed an exchange
of information between its members. Amongst the themes of communication
required for the 5afety of the individual or the social group, the presence of
danger in the vicinity certatnly constituted an intmediate need for communi·
cation (in fact social groups of animals also make use of a.la:rm cries). It is thus
reasonable to affirm that the description of spatio-temporal processes taking
place in the neighbourhood constituted one of the first functions of language.
To clarify the nature of the comspondence: Signified -+ Signifier, we will
make a restriction. To start with we will only consider texts and discourses
describing spario-rempora/ processes. This procedure has the great advantage of
breaking the closure of the linguistic universe ; in fact a spatia-temporal process
•
~~ is of little use. In other respects we can show that, in every coupling between
IWo dynamic systems (M, X), (M , X') presenting first integrals M ... P, M'-+ P' ,
and which are expressed by an identification between P and P' Oike the relation
E + E' = constant, for energy), every 'catastrophe' defined on P by a local poten-
tial V admitting a singularity of the type given (S) will give on P' a singularity of
a like type (S), if the system (A() has a weak potential before the potential of
Interaction. But that is exactly the situanon with regard to the sensory organs in
onlmals, which ore always in a situation of 'threshold', ready to be triggered
under the effect of an external stimulus, even of weak Intensity. That is to say
that these are precisely the structurally stable catastrophes which ore a priori the
best fitted to survive in the coupling: Reality .. Mind, denned by perception. ln
other words. the 'catastrophes' present a contagious character, and, when they
find, by coupling, a competent substrate they implant themselves, thereby exciting
a singularity isomorphic to themselves.
For the only weU known gradient singularities we can show thotlf a eo-dimension
not greater than 4 is required, then the internal dimension Is I or 2. There are
four stable singularities of internal dimension I: the [old. the cwp, the ~'Illlow·
tail and the bunerfly: there are three of dimension 2; the three umbilics; elliptic,
hypt!Tbolic, fJf.lTtlbobc.
First we will consider the universal unfolding of these singularities and the
catastrophe sets which are defined by Maxwell's convention. We shaU identify
each stnblc domain as an actant, and will thus obtain a graph of Interaction. This
study will only be made for singularities of internal dimension I; the complex
catastrophe set of the umbilic is unknown to me. h is weU known that the
morphology thus obtained depends, in pnnciple, on the direction chosen for the
time axis in the universal unfolding W1 • We will point out the various topological
types that can be obtained by varying the direction.
Following thls we shall show the graphs dertned by noteworthy plane sections
of the universal unfolding (of dimension I or 2): we tl:tus obtain rmaUy aU the
morphologies which are associated with the natural physical processes. Thus we
find the morphology of capture and the morphology of giving, which we can
consider as fundamental .
In n second stage, renouncing MaxweU's convention, we take a plane section
of dimension I (a straight line) of the universal unfolding W, and associate it
wilh its counter·image in the set Vx1 = 0 of the space X of Internal variables.
Tl:tus are deftned the so-called 'biological' graphs, because they account for the
most delicate manner of interaction between living beings. The action of an
animate being on an inanimate object can be considered s!mllarly.
This lime the straight lines must be taken in the universal unfolding of the
umbilics, if one wishes to obtain a non-trivial spatial morphology because the
actants are well ordered for dim X = I. (Always with the exception of the
morphology of capture associated with the section 1211 of the cusp (see 11 .5,
A (ih')).
What justification can we give for thls procedure? It must be obserYed that
in all animals there is an Internal psychic process E isomorphic to the space that
surrounds it. Mechanisms of spatial regulation dermed on E, genetically innate,
ensure the integrity of the spatial form of the organslm. It comes to the same
thing as saying that, for an animal, the surrounding space is at least partiaUy an
•
lllternal space; the living being acts in the substrate in such a way as to ensure,
if it can, the spatial integrity of its organic form. There exists from this point
of View a real affinity between liviD& beings and solid bodies, which also maintain
their spatial integrity as well as they are able. ln this we can see the origin of
skeletons (external in Insects, internal in vertebrates). It is also the reason for
Which the mechanics of solids is infinitely better known to us than the mechanic$
or fluids.
We could also question the choice of linear sections of universal unfolding.
1 thtnJc that in this connection linear sections provide the most typically irrevers-
•
V=x3 +ux
On the u ·axis one has the morphology of a half.Jine as domain of the stable
attractor: - -- - --4 ...
u<;O
V= x 4
/4 + ux2 /2 + vx.
In the (u, v)- plane of external coordinates, the apparent contour of the
cusp is defined by the semi-cubical parabola 4u 3 + 27v2 = 0 . The applica·
tlon of "MaxweU's convention' leads to the formation of a shock·wave line
I$$Uing from the origin which separates the domains of the two competing
stable regimes. Whence the "physical' morphologtes.
Sec. I 1.5] Algebraic Description of Slngul.arities 201
/ or _../'
~ IJ b ) -
V = x 2 y+ l/4(x4 +y4 )
We can consider tl1e elliptic deformation ofthls umbilic defined for example,
by
V = x 2 y -y 3 /3 + wy 2 /2 - we - vy + (x4 +y 4 )/4
y
(a)
V=x1 y + y 3 /3 + wy 2 /2 - ux - vy
and we then add, as before the stabilising terms of fourth order such asy4 /4.
(vili) Singulariries 'of transition: lt remains to describe the singularities obtained
when a pair of cusps is born or annihllated.
' 11,1
the physical singularity: --~-"-"'\..,--- and the two sections 131i,i31i' give rise to
Reflection Refraction
~ I.J.\
........
~/m
In synlax, it is expressed by the trivalent verbs ofTesniere: Donner, dire, montrer
(to give, to tell, to show: something to someone). A verb of movement like
'aller' (to go') is also susceptible to Lbis morphology: in the sentence: I go from
Paris ro Rome, 'Paris ' and 'Rome ' are the actants.
•
To start with there are tluee actants, the subject S, the object 0 , the messenger
M. M comes towards S, on contact with M the actaot S splits and emlts an actant
(m) which finds itself captured by the actaot M in a bound metastable (M, m):
this complex system goes towilrds D; on contact with D, the actaot m leaves the
messenger M and is captured by D; the messenger M is free and moves off.
Examples: Peter sends John a letter by post. James goes from Paris to Strasbourg
by train.
On a strictly dynamic plane, this morphology is the outcome of the morpho·
logy of gift ( 14). The presence of a messenger as instrument, hereby expresses
the difficulty in realising the connection between S and D (due to distance or
the difficulty of terrain).
These difficulties are overcome because of the global involvement expressed
by the communication. The involvement need only be that of U1e subject S, as
for instance, when it is a question of sending a projectile over to D to destroy it,
the messenger M then being a fi.rearm. In this last case, in the conflict between
the 'message' m and the destination D, it is the first that prevails .. .. 2313 w
positive: The grasping ('La prelze.tiSiOII '), (cf. Note ll .9. J p. 21 J).
To start with there are three actants: a subjectS, an ln.s trument l , an object
0 (in fact the instrument I is an emanation from lh.e subjectS). I approaclles 0,
and forms with it a metastable complex (1- 0); then this complex approaches
S, forming a triangul.a r chain S- 0-1; by collision of the central unstable regime
J.l with the saddle>., this chain opens between 0 and I and S captures 0.
(Trans.: 'John put on his hat' or 'John puts his bat on' or 'John puts his hat on
his head'.)
0
(23yl
s
There are three actants to start with; the subjectS, the object 0, the target
T. An instrument 1 issued from S goes towards 0, forms with it a me tastable
complex I -+ 0 stabilised by joining with the target T. Example: Perer ties his
a
goat to the rree with a ro~. ('Pierre attache sa chevre l'arbre avec une corde'.)
All the verbs of the semantic form 'tie' or 'bind' (F. 'tier~ arise frome this
morphology. We can also connect with it verbs of the type ·compare· (F.
'comparer~. The comparison between two objects is a klod of qualitative conflict
between these objects, artificially provoked.
I ~
s
This morphology is that of sexual reproduction: S is the father, I the male
gamete, 0 the mother. It is clear that the catastrophe of excision is the source of
a plentiful morphogenesis in Biology. The majority of animals cut their prey
In to pieces before swallowing it.lnSYOtax it is also weU represented.HecUT of!his
n
head with a blow of his sword (F. lul a coupe la tete d 'un coup de sabre),JoJm
extorted money from me with his revob·u. (F. Jean m a extorque de /'arge11t
avec so11 revolver.) Cw. slice, tear, extract, exca~-ate, pierce, (F. WUPI'f', 11an·
cher, arracher. exrraire, creuser, pucer) arise from this morphology.
Si11gu/arities of Transition
The graph of type L3-y (The Lip) is the same type as for reflexive morphologjcs.
•
The singularity 136 (Refraction) all those of the type cross over (F. traverser).
with his axe (F. Jean [end la bGche avec $11 hache) and John splits the log with
force (F. Jean fend la Bilche avec force). Seen in this way the 'force', the kinetic
energy transmitted to a mobile object, is likened to an actant, the message - the
messenger being the instrument. The verb to hit (F .{rapper) for example, is then
susceptible to the morphology 23a.
The limitation to four of the number of actants in anatomic sentence fmds
ultimate justification in Gibbs phase rule, which limits the number of phases,
that is, of stable regimes, which can be in equilibrium at a point of three-dimen-
sional Euclidean space to four (cf. Conclusion 11.9).
cases are possible; either the object is entirely destroyed and assimilated by the
subject (For example: The cat etJtS the mouse) of the object continues to exist in
the manner of a vassal satellite of the subject. The system Subject-Object
constitutes a metastable 'bound state'. This occurs if, after the capture of the
object, the subject (animate) adds it to its range of possessions. To have, as it were,
to hold (Latin: habere), can be cons.idered as the perfective of the verb 'to
take'. lt is also the inceptive of the verbs to give and eo emir. This explains why
the verb 'to have' is in English and French the auxiliary of the past tense of
transitive verbs; also in French by means of a suffLxial form, it is that of the
future. Ln this analysis, the verb to have contains two elements of meaning;
on the one hand, it is a perfective of 'to take' , 'to capture', and on the other
hand it explains implicitly the incomplete character, theoretically reversible,
of the catastrophe. It all takes place as if the vertex of the graph of interaction
12~ found itself partially de-stabilised and that one part of the localised attractor
being initially at this point, flowed along the length of the branch which leaves
it in the direction of positive t. In French and in the majority of western Languages
which include a verb •to have' , it is the perfective aspect of 'to take' which
dominates the inceptive aspect of 'to give' and 'to emit'. I understand that in
Eskimo it is the reverse.
It remains for us to speak of the verb 'to be' as it occurs in the attributive
sentence: the sky is blue. This requires us to make a theory of the adjective. An
adjective describing a sensory quality can be considered as an actant in a space of
internal coordinates describing such types of sensory qualities. For example,
'red' describes a certain domain in colour impressions in lhtee-dimensional
space. The control mechanism of these actants is much simpler than that of the
nouns. Ln fact they are not compelled like living beings or solid bodies to a strict
spatial regulation and the frontiers of their basins are Imprecise and indeterminate.
Where does the red stop or the orange begin? Their control does not require
complex internal mechanisms as is the case for animate beings; a simple gradient
of potential can suffice.
To describe the dynamic of formation of an attributive sentence like 'the
sky is blue ', we will proceed as follows: the sky is represented as a spatial form F
in the product of a space R (mental representative of the exterior space) by the
three-dimensio11al space C of colour. This form is projected on the space C by
'excitation', coupling with a specific exicter (that which is expressed by the
genitive: 'colour of'); the projection p(F) is then situated in the 'basin' of the
'blue' attractor B; this at tractor excited by the re-absorption of the image p(F)
leads to the utterance of the syntagma 'is blue'. In the mind of the hearer. the
sound of the syntagma 'is blue' has the effect of exciting form F on to the space
C localising it in the cylinder p-I (B) where B is the blue basin in the colour
space C. ln doing this, it fixes the (virtual) configuration ofF in the Immediate
memory, although the global excitation is re-absorbed. It will be noted from
this point of view that the predication of a quality on a subject is always con-
•
11.9 CONCLUSION
The restriction we imposed on our atomic sentences only to describe a spatia-
temporal process, cannot be considered as excessive. Indeed we can wonder
whether, as Zeeman's model suggests, every psychic process is not a dynamic
process in a multi-dimensional space of high dimension. By adding 'internal
co-ordinates' to certain actants, there is in practice no expression for which
one cannot find a spatial interpretation. Thus a verb of feeling such as to fear,
to hope, expresses that an actant subject admits in internal co-ordinates, a
morphology of the future, which is accepted with repulsion or anra~tion . ...
This clearly supposes, that an a1clletypal morphology in a substrate space W can
play the part of an acl8Dt in another morphology of substrate U. This is the
phenomenon, known since Tesniere, by the name of ' translation'. It allows
the transformation of any verb into a noun by the infinitive form and any
sentence into a noun by the words: T11e fact that . .•• We can interpret this
process geomelrically as the concentration in one poin t (the organising centre
of the singulaiity) of ea.ch archetypal morphology. This is the origin of all the
nesting axioms introduced into formal languages. This procedure cannot be
employed many times ( 4 or 5 at most) without loss of intelligibility. Reverting
to Zeeman's model, we can assert, for evident functional reasons, that the
dynamics of our mentnl activities admit a fairly large number of first integrals
(approximately at least): the representation of external space, sensory qualities...
We can then form ideas of dynamic attractor structures associated to structurally
stable singularilies of co<limenslon N much higher than 4 . But if we wish to
'ex.press' this idea, we are obliged 'to unfold' this singularity, to make it a series
of local sections of dimension 4 at most, by a kind of local spatia-temporal
realisation. This leads to representation of all thought by graphs of interaction,
in which the vertices ("les somrnets') can embed themselves locally in archetypal
morphologies, and where certain actants can explode into second31Y morphologies
(like the bubbles in strip cartoons). We can ask ourselves whence comes so
speL;al a structure of formulated thought. We must see in it, probably, a conse-
quence of the three.<Jimensionality of lhe space in which we Uve.ln order that a
•
set can be perceived in a global form, a 'Gestalt', it is necessary that the different
elements a1 do not cease to exist individually in the global perceptive field. Now
this requires that their dynamic neuro-physiological representatives have spatially
disjoint supports, but nevertheless haVIng a point in common where the local
equilibrium between the systems Is manifest. According to Gibb's phase rule,
there can thus be at most four independent systems in equilibrium (susceptible
to being constructed genetically in embryology by a system of ·gradients' in
competition). Every genetically hereditary structure, recognised as global, contains
at most four elements. We will notice that in this way, in French and English
at least, a syllable comprises rarely more than four phonemes, a word more than
four syllables, and a sentence more than four actants! I will not dare to eleva te
this speculation to be universal for all languages, but I do not believe it less true
that the "double articulation' of language draws its origin from this spatial
COOS! rain t .
11.9.1 Note
As C. Zeeman pointed out to me, In order to obtain the graphs of excision and
liaison which make four actants intervene, it must necessarily invoh·e the inter·
vention of the "double cusp' singularity, with the equation V= x 4 + y•, and of
(topological) codimension equal to seven. Furthermore, it will be noticed that
all our archetypal morphologies (with the exception of 'messenger' defined by
the trajectory la I in the unfolding (I O) of the elliptic umbllic) can be obtained
by combination between two bifurcations of type r. The one in the form ~ .
associated with a subject, describes the emission of an instrument I by the subject.
The second in the form r<=. describes the splitting or the synthesis of the
object. (There can be identification between a partial object and the instrument
I, as in the morphology of gift.) Certain verbs have a morphology in which the
subject appears at the end as the victim of a catastrophe of capture. These verbs
of a non-ergative type are frequently represented in classical European languages
by verbs of the middle voice.
REFERENCES
[1) Zeeman. C., "Topology of the brain' Mathematics and Computer Scien~
in Biology and Mtdicine. Medical Research Council, 1965.
[2) Thorn, R., StTUctural Stability and Morphogenesis. W. A. Benjamln, 1975.
[3] Tesni6re, L., Elements de synra:ce structurale. Paris, Klincksieck, 1965.
[4] Jakobsoo, R., ESSDis de Linguistique Genuale, Clutp. lX, p . 176. Paris,
Editions de Minuit, 1963.
•
00 Being
Ila Unite
>- 12b Separate
12oc Become
0
126 Capture 0
s \ 12-y Emit s(
13a Fail l3o' Suicide s \\
13-y Wave [_ ~
13.5 Push \) 13.5' Cross over _....;\..:...._"\~-
14a Give
s s
•
CBAPTER I2
t Paper publiVIed in ProceedifllS of tht &hill Symposf11m for dy111lmii:IJI f)·mms, 1972,
Academic Pren, New York.
•
•
rdatlons between verbs and nouns In order that a sentence should be grammatically
correct.
sentence
/
Peter hits Paul NP VP
~ '\
V 0
1 ~ ~
Peter hits Paul
sentence
/"\.
NP VP
/\
The cat catches the mouse-
II V NP(o)
I '\
•
T
•
The cat
N
I T N(o)
I +
catches the mou5<
lt appears that only a few types of trees are necessary to account for the
structures of elementary sentences which are simply statements. The French
Unguist L. Tesniere chuacterised these structures by a natural number less
than three which he called the 'valence' of the verb.
ExAMPLES:
Zf!TO ~'0/ent lt rains (no subject)
uni~'Ole11t Peter sleeps (a subject- no object
complement)
divalellt Peter beats Paul (subject and direct obJect)
trivalent Eve gives an apple to Ad am (subject, object, Indirect
object)
The possibility of constructing all elementary sentences as a tree gave rise to
great hopes. The formal school (Bioomfield , Harrls) ha.d the quasi-Hilbertian
ambition to reach a complete formalisation of the rules of syntax founded only
on morphological criteria, independent of the meaning. Unfortunately, it became
necessary to abandon lh.is approach In the face of the difficulties which mounted
up.
We quickly see that certain sentences have an aberrant structure. instances
are Interrogative sentence which aim at obtalntng Information and not at trans-
mitllng lt, or, subordinate clauses, which oc::caSJonall)' have a different typology
from the main sentence. lt became the task of N. Cbomsky's transformational
grammar to try to plug the gaps. An active formal transformation on the tree of
Sec. 122] The syncactic Structure of Ele.m entary Sentences 217
the sentence is associated with these aberrant structures and the tree is trans-
formed m to a 'normal' tree. It is a matter of 'trees' being projected on the axls
of time, and it is not easy to define these transformations, nor to state reasons
for them which do not appear as so many ad hoc rules. In their desire to secure
formal universality, some linguists recognise but one fundamental graph, that of
the dichotornic division A (triple·point graph) and reconstruct all the graphs
of common practice through the ad hoc composition of these elementary triple
points. Obviously we can always do this, but the multipUcity and arbitrariness
of the transformation rules remove much of the benefit of this reduction.
One of the essential difficulties met with in structural linguistics rests in
the non-canonical character of an elementary sentence considered as a tree. In
particular, we distinguish classically two types of nouns in a sentence: the
'actants' and the 'circumstants'. WltUe 'subject', 'direct object', 'indirect object',
are undoubtedly actants, we transfer the complements of instrument or of
manner, like those of time and place, to being clrcumstants.
Personally, I should be tempted to employ semantic criteria in this distinc·
tion. ln the sentence 'Peter cuts the cord with his knife', the knife, by its decisive
role in the process, seems to me an actant, perhaps a second one, but still an
actant. ln the sentence 'Peter cuts the cord with for~ ·. it is more reasonable to
see in 'force', a clrcumstant, a qualitative locaUser of actlon.lf one adopted this
poin t of view there would only exJst two types of nouns in an elementary
sente nce , the act ants which would combine together in a weii.<Jefmed type of
tree and the localisers which place the action in space time or in certain spaces
with semantic qualities. Only the localisers attached to actants are grammatically
mdispensable; those attached to verbal global action can be dispensed with. In
the fundamental operation of localisation of action, we rarely make use of nouns
but rather of adverbs and anaphorlc words like pronouns wltich refer to actants
which have already appeared in earlier sentences.
It is necessary from the outset to make one important remark: the signifying
characteristic of a sentence is quite independent of the spai.lo-temporal localisa·
lion, either of the process described or of the enunciation Itself.
We can say that the group of dlsplacements operates in the semantic universe
m a manner compatible with the meaning. (It is understood that a spatia-temporal
translation effected on a sentence can affect its veracity or its usefulness: but
there we leave linguistics proper to enter into logic or psycholinguistics.) From
this one can infer the relative Independence of spatlo·temporal localisers in the
structure of the sentence.
While the high hopes of formal linguistics have been dashed, it actually
only prevents the possibility of the giving of elementary sentences the structure
of a tree centred on the verb, appearing to be a universal truth of linguistics. The
old problem is thus revived, that of the universality of grammatical categories,
such I$ verb, noun, adjective and adverb, borrowed traditionally from Latin
grammar.
•
Historically, the first linguists were the missionaires who, In the eighteenth
century, applied themselves to translating the Bible Into the most exotic languages.
In order to do this they had to know the grammar of a language, and they wrote
it most naively and naturally in the model of Latin grammar.It is a fact that one
still finds old English gramma rs where the rose 1s declined: Nom. the rose;
Ace. the rose: Gen. - of the rose; Oat. - to the rose, ... etc. Linguists of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries make fun of this naivety. However, it must
be noted that this way of proceeding leads to aberrations which are more formal
than real. I t has never in fact , prevented missionaries from accomplishing their
task of translating the relatively difficult texts of Holy Scripture into the most
diverse languages.
We shall now sustain the thes1softhe universality of fundamental grammatical
categories, such as verb , noun , adjective, adverb, with the aid of models of
topological dynamics. This is describing in the most intrinsic manner possible
the structural characteristics proper to each of these functions, considered as
a structurally stable element In a dynamic model of the language.
It appears perhaps more natural to suppose that the space M can vary ,
together with the dynamic without which the object would cease to exist. In
short, classical dynamics is never concerned with lhe genesis of the objects nor
with their end. (In the classic case of a system of solid bodies in contact, the
preparation of the system 1s given in ordinary language, thus it is not actually
a process of mechanics properly speaking.)
RI:.MARK I: The preceding property will be untrue for time discrete dynamics
(diffeomorphisms); in fact, the product of two Anosov diffeomorphlsms is an
Anosov diffeomorphism, split and structurally stable. The impossibility of
maintaining two recurrent systems m a state of dynamic ind.ependence thus
appears as a consequence of the continuous character of time.
RI:.\1ARK 2: Smale has given an example of a product (M, X) X (N, Y) such that
X is of gradient type, Y recw:rent and structurally stable and such that the
product (M X N, X + Y) is not structurally stable. But I do not know if that
affects the split chAracter of lhe product.
Ri.MARK 3: The quantum mechanics model avoids the first objection made to
the classical model. There is no well-defmed phase space for a quantum system.
The llllbert space of the states is a kind of 'hold-all' in which it is very doubtful
that all the points are effectively physically realisable (the principle of superposi·
llon of the States is not in general accompanied by any experimental procedure
to allow addition). Also, wilh the operators for creation and annihilation in field
theo ry , we have a formalism for the origm and the end of systems.
On the other hand, it does not avoid some objections to the unstable
character of split systems. In general, the state of a system is only split asympto·
llcally (1 = ± '"') in order to describe the particles entering and leaving a collision.
If we accept that the state is split for 1 = - oo by reason of the preparation of
the synem, it is difficult to see why this remains true, nearly always, fort =+ oo.
•
On the other hand, for general dynamics, we very probably have non·trivial
extensions. (For example, by a series of Hopf bifurcations, defming the fibres
as non·trivial circles.)
We will observe besides, that even in the case of the quadratic potential
there is a natural hierarchy of the terms given by the modulus of the real part
of the corresponding eigenvalue.lt is more reasonable to regard the fast oscillator
as defining the fibre, the slow oscillator defining the base dynamic.
Symmetries
To restrict the study to germ dynamics at a point is an excessive constraint. We
know from experience that, quite often, natural syrnmetries present a certain
stability. There will thus be occasion to study systematically the germ dynamic
invaria nt under a certain action of a Lie group in tite support space and in a like
manner, their bifurcations and thcu unfoldlngs, if they occur. A particular case
of synunetry is that where one takes the group of aU the diffeomorphisms, the
only invariant dynamic is then the null dynamic. The notion of extension on the
nuU dynamic leads then to the classic notion of Fust integrals. If (M, X) is an
extenston of (N, 0), then the fibration M-+ N is a system of fust Integrals for
(M. X). The problem of the stllbillty of SYTfllnetries, or that of their breaking, is
one of the most obscure in general dynamics.
In what follows we shall remark only upon the following fact: if two
Hamiltonian systems (M, X), (M, X') are both invariant under the action of a
Lie group G, and if the coupling between these two systems is G·invariant, then
we obtain for the first integrals defmed by the dual Lie algebra for each of these
systems, a vectorial identification defmed by addition (for example, the theorem
of the kmetic moment for systems of spherical or axial symmelries). Such a
situation occurs frequently for systems whose evolution is ruled by physical
laws, and which all observe spatial synunetry (the Galilean group or the Lorentz
group). Then, very frequenily, in the interaction of two systems provided by
first integrals, these spaces are identified vectorially. This generalises the theorem
of conservation of energy E = E1 + £ 2 in the Hamiltonian coupling of two
conservative systems.
in the nbre dynamic. These can be dynamic states which do not arise from the
global dynamic state of the inilial system (!.1, X). In general, the sections, or its
limit s , presents discontinuities, the set of which constitut~s the catastrophe set
K in8
The section s, dermed at each point b of 8, dermes on 8 a morphology, of
which K is the catastrophe set. We osswne that the qualitative properties of the
space 8 at the point b are entirely dermed by the asymptotic state of the local
dynamic defined by the sections.
The dynamical systems extended on a space always ensure that we have
some systems giving rise to a phenomenology on a support space: there is thus
an operation of localisation.
Usually, the support space B JS a metric space (for the morphologles of the
experimental sciences, it is the usual space- time). We consider that 1f the open
set U is the disjoint union of two open sets V. W far distant from each other
in 8, the local dynamic on U, (Mu . Xu) is very close to the split dynamic
(Mv, Xv) X (Mw, Xw). conforming to the axiom o[ locality of quantum
physics which excludes all action at a distance.
the true dynamics !0, that which gives the sections ,effectively reallsed in practice,
is intermediate between
Vll(x,,xl) =k(x1 - x 1) 2.
In considering the product system M 1 X M 2 as extended on B~, we have on
the fibre the dynamic defmed by
(this last null). We will obtain a minimum of the potential X' at a point where
- 2(x 1 - x 2 )+ X 2 =0
tTronJ!lnors note: The use of lhe word 'pr4nante'to describe such o morphology can only
bo Uarulated Into "pregnant'. 11 Is linked with the Gestalt phenomenon of 'prognanz', the
tendency to complelcneu ond permanence of form.
•
But for codlm z, > 3, we have (codim Zt + 1)/2)) < ZJ which extabllshes tlte
property. For eo-dimensions 2 nnd 3 we may have equality. For eo-dimension
one, the topology Imposes m - 2
Sec. 12.4] Regulation 227
12.4 REGULATION
DEFINITION: An object A is called a regulated system if its states can be parame·
trised by the points of a domain U of a Euclidean space, which is relatively
compact. In general the frontier of U consists of hypersurfaces H; in R", such
that when the representative point u of the state leaves U. crossing one of theH;,
the object A ceases to exist. If one subjects the object A to a stimulus of non-
excessive amplitude, the representative point leaves the interior zone of U to
approach the edge. lt is then subjected to a corrective force given by a vector
field X; transverse to H; re~ntering U.
·A ·8 0 B A
n~. 1
Sec. 12.4] Regulation 229
o•
Flj! 2
(3
0 12 3)
Fig. 3
•
Mathematically, we can say that IJ1e curve y = V(x) behllves like a wave
surface on the space Oxy: the curve is given b) S(x. y: r) = constant, where S
is the solution of a Hamilton- Jacobi equation of the fonn
We will not worry about being explicit about the Hamiltonian H necessary for
this evolution. We will merely assert that during, and at the end of this evolution,
the projection of the hypersurfaces S(x, y, r) = constant onto the x-axis has
only generic smgularilies associated with the wave surfaces. This type of evolution
can be defmed for any number of parametersx. In dimension two, the gastruJa-
tlon of amphibians demonstrates morphologically the formation of this cliff
on an annulus round the vegetative pole of the egg (with the complication that
the intennediate lining, the mesoderm, is not slow in stabilismg itself starting
from the dorsal meridian).
We conoetve that by a succession of folds of the hypersurface y = V(x~. we
cwt create by projection all the catastrophe hypersurfaces in the X·space on which
the reo{'ntraot corrector fields are triggered or terminated. We can even repeat
this process for the correcting dynamic itself. which is often of a discontinuous
type.
Fig. 5
The vertical u = -k,cuts the parabola at the pointJ, u = -k, v= -{4k 3 /27)1f1.
If this straight line is traversed in the direction v decreasing, this point J is the
point "'here the catastrophe capture of the metastable minimum by the loweSt
stable minimum O<:curs (there is destruction by amalgamation wilh another
mmimum (Fig. 6(a)) . In prwciple. all the processes described by such a 'programme'
correspond to a homotopy class of paths ( transversa.ls on the bifu.rcation set) In
Ute universal unfolding of a suitably chosen catastrophe. Thus we set out a
powerful algorithm for Lranscribing ideas of spatial behaviour into a geometric
fonn.
V( X)
a.
V(K) al poont J
b.
0 u
Prey
K Predator J"
I ig. 7
tWe are not speaking here of U1e direct motor meaning of certain words ~ucb as ihc '"'rbs
of mo,-emcnt in the lmperati,e.
*Tarublor"t I\Oit "L"aspecl "'cnu.!e"'" rdcrs IO the 00\\ tbroup.h lhe channcltnsrigatinJ tb<
production ol word
•
ou!'l>elves). Then on this space become grafted spaces with ~ccondary properllcs,
such as the space of colour impressions; or the absuact spaces deduced from
the Eudidean spa'e by tJ1e operatiOns of differentiation (such as speed. force );
or the spaces of qualities affecting human achviues {boldness, caution, . . .
etc.).
We establish the following very general phenomenon: the deeper the sub·
mate of a semantic form, that IS. the nearer 11 approaches physical space. the
more complicated is its figure of regulauon. On the other hand. if the subsuate
space is of ab~tract defimuon. the figure of regulation IS, m general. simple.
Whence the possibilit} of arranging the main grammatical types of words accord·
ing to the maximal semantic dep th of their substrate. In gcncrul, grammar offer~
canonical proc~es for transformmg an element of category X into an element
of category Y without affectnig the meamng (at most, tts operative use tn a
>cntence). Such a transformation of X mto Y 1S only possJble 1f Y is a deeper
category than X. If, in practlce. there 1S no constraint wi th respect to the nature
of lhe mechanisms of regulation the figure of Y. it will assimilate the constraints
of ~irnplicity imposed on the regulation of the figure of X wtthout difficulty
Having said this, let us pass on to the de~aiption of the 'logoi' of the main
grammatical categories m the order of decreasmg semantic profundlly.
TilL NOUN : We ore concerned here with a perfectly stable figure of regulation.
I he substratc space is arbitrary and the mechanism or regulation can be arbitrarily
1:omplicated. In general, there IS mtervenhon by cliiT·like corrector catastrophes
an !.I catastrophe~ of a b1ologicaltype mvolvmg other aclantS.t
The proper noun, by defimtion, mvolvcs 1ts own spatio·temporal locahsa·
t1un. The common now1 is not generally localised on space time.
1 he form of regulation Involves a genests (embryology) and an inverse
proc•'SS (gametogenesis) which leads to the elllJSSJon of the word.
1)11 VERB: ln general the verb must be represented as a trajec tory in the univer·
~:1 1 unfolding of a spatiaJ catastrophe together wi th a pomt of arrest. or
a zone
marked by a slowmg down of the dynamiC, when the trajectory transversaUy
llllcrsects the b1furcation set whKh produces In the internal space, the semanllc
expression of the catastrophe. The mechanism of embryology and of emission of
tih~ n<>un, bo""'cr, prossess..s un inlcn>e metaboli<m ltncrally cndo,.ed with o ccnoin
lndctermmi>m.
•
fonn has been explained earlier (Section 12.3): the trajectory becomes circular
and vanishes at the origin. But once this circle vanishes the genn potential at the
ongm is no longer stable; it becomes structurally stable again on leavmg the
origin along a well·defined trajectory. This leads to the formation of a maximum
number of aetants in the internal space. These actants then pass by means of
local attractors (case markers) which specify their function in Ule ca tastrophe,
that is, their postUon in the graph of in teracuo n of the verbal morphology.
We see lhat there are two sources of semantic instability in the verb: the
first ss associated with the structurally unstable cha racter of the point of arrest
J' on the programme trajectory. The second is due to the indefinite character
of the actants whicb intervene in the process.
TilE ADVERBS: We are concerned here with a fairly vaguely defi ned category.
It seems there are roughly two types of adverbs. On U1c one hand ther!l are
general adverbs, like the intensive (very and the quantitarives (much, few,
too much, enough). These adverbs arc expressed by singularities or well-defined
zones in certain very general types of figures of regulation in one dimension. Por
example, the pair: 'enougll' - 'too much', can be described by a potential
crater:
Then on Lhe other hand there are adverbs associated with adjectives. These
are essentially qualitative localisations of verbal processes. Try to recall the
adverbs of place and Lime which arc true spatio·temporallocalisers.
lL remains to explain how these categories function. Two types of process
must be considered: verbal production and verbal reception.
repressed talk, it no less remams 1rue that ways of non·verbal thought exist in
man which he shares with animals. Amongst these pnmary acllvities, the sensory
representation of the world about us Is fundamentaL In my opinion, it is from
tlus that the fundamental mechanisms of language anse.
As seen at the end of Section 12.3, thanks to language, a speaker L can
describe to a llitener A, a spatiO·tcmporul process that L sees, but that A cannot
see (an mdasperuable mechanism in the effecth-e regulation of the social group).
1t as asserted that the hypothetical 'deep structure' of the hnguasts as constituted
essenllall} m our sensory representation of the external world, barely elaborated
by perception. On the other hand the surface structure will consist ofautomatisms
of language properly so called. They constitute a stratum of spaces superficially
coupled to the 'deep structure', nnd historically. in evolution, they arise through
a process or permanent exfoliation, as does our skin, consisting as it does of
strata of cells secreted b; the deep derm which, by hardemng, rise towards the
ex tenor where they disintegrate.
Now let us suppose that we wish to describe a spaliO·tcmporul process that
we are observmg. At each mstant t, the state of the process IS stored m the
immediate memory, where tt dismtegrates linle by httie into obhvion. But on
each temporal band of width t ~o maintained in memory, we ISolated the local
features with pregnant character: topological singularities of interaction between
uctams. Each of these local features rouses by resonance a verbal schema of the
~a me archetypal morphology (according to the terminology of Chapter I 1). This
dearly supposes a certain elaboration by perception of the rough visual data.
The identification with the archetypal morphology presupposes a checlong of
the con tacts between actants whach in this case are balls an space. lt will then be
necessar> to eliminate the accidental coincidence m the visual field. This happens
percep tively through a constant monitoring from the third dimension.
This Identification of the phenomenology with the configuration associated
wath the archetypal verbal processes, occurs as the result of competition between
diffeJent types of graphs. This eventually leads, after several parametrlscd
transformations (homeomorphlsms) by the adverbs, to a better superposition of
the morphologles, offering an 'entropy' maximum for the resonance thus defmed
(see Section 123.7) and consequen1ly the verbal oscillator extracts energy from
the dynamic (local memor;) associated WJth the deep structure. lt follows from
tlus transfer of energy thal the point of arrest .t disappears on the trajectory
programme, and the circle C is traversed with a uniform speed until 1t vanishes at
the organising centre 0 of the configuration. Then the associated unstable
potenlial evolves towards a stuble situation by the reappearance of mllllma of
the process type; hence tb.e actantS. Each of these quadratic actants proceed
by means of a well defined attractor in the illternal space which fixes its traJectory
(at leas1 at the start); thas wlll be the case mmker in languages I hat are declined.
Be)ide~ ahas. 1he vani~hang of circle Cat 0 has led to the muscu13r excitalion of
the motor field of the word, the verb. Usually, th1s emission JS repressed, or
240 Language and catastrophies [Ch. 12
rather retarded, because very few languages have a topology where the first
word of the phrase IS the verb (Arabic?).
Intuitively, we can say that excitation of the verbal osciUator led to llS
explos1on in a bundle of actants, which become 1dentiUed With the correspond·
ing actnnts of the deep structure (taken on a central section of the configurauon)
Each of these superficial actants begins to complicate itself: its figure of regula·
tlon undergoes an 'embryology' which tends LO facilitate to the maxtmum the
exchange of energy with the deep actnnt to which lt attad1es and toward which
it tends. When the superficial actant has reached a structure sufficie ntly isomorphic
to the deep actant, its embryology stops, and by transfer of energy from the deep
actant. the superficial actant forms a 'gamete': a cycle varushes to the organising
centre of the structure, and the energy of tlili O)ciUator excites the motor field
of the corresponding noun. This takes place for each of the actams ISSUing from
the destruction of the verbal node. Each of these nouns thus emitted receives the
case marker m the configuration of the verb with which 1t is topologically bound.
The order in which these nouns are em1tted depends essentially on the typology
of the language.
If the deep actant is a human individual, it does not need to be localised,
because the localisation is given by the proper noun. In the case of a common
noun, the situation is more complex, because the actant needs a spatio·temporal
localisation which allows the hearer to identify ii. That process is called 'de !xis':
the superficial actaot A flrst crosses the shock wave by which the Euclidean
space exfoliates the semantic spaces. This shock wave separa tes In rwo: the
actant A emits a dummy actant D whose trajectory is situated in the mental
space E representing Euclidean space. Now this space adheres to the space M of
the muscular motor fields which move our body. those which act in this space).
The actant D crosses anew the shock wa,·e wluch separates the space represented
by the muscular space M. lt sptits uself then as D' + D". D' inasmuch as the
muscular field is the emission of a demonstrative adjective such as 'this' etc .•
while D" induces a state of indeterminacy m the motor fields of the arm, allow·
ing it to take all possible directions in space. 1t is then that the real object 0,
which, as the thing perceived, is the deep actant B corresponding to A, which
will remove this indeterminacy. The finger, the extremity of the arm, tries to
reach the object 0, to minimise the distance between itself and the object:
'this hat'. So, the act of showing Is only the prolongation of the muscular
intention and, in real space, of the abstract process of attraction of the superficial
act ant by the deep actant.
When the deep actant has alread)' appeared in the world of discourse the
act of showing is muscularly repressed 110d one is content to emit a superficial
dummy actant. the defmite article, which expresses that the actant pre-exists
in the discourse. Finally, if one IS concerned w11h a recently arrived actanl,
which the speaker is unable to indicate wllh a fL,ger. he wiU use the indefinite
article.
Sec. 12.S] Theory of Grammatical Functions 241
J, - - - - -- - - - -
------------------------------------------------T•me
Fl;!. 8
Theory of the predicatil•e se111e11ce (the verb 'to be')· In an auributive pruase like
'The sky Is blue' we must consider the unfolding of the Riemann ll ugoniot
catnSilophe. The explosion of the verb liberates two superficial actants. 1n
general. one becomes a noun. attracted by a deep actant, and the other. becoming
an adjective, remains at a more superficial leveL But these actants are abandoned
in order to speak for themselves: the verb to be is thus a sort of semantic nothing·
ness. The equivalent of the zero stratum in the bifurcation space of the functions.
The realisation of such a stratum of mfinhe eo-dimension is not available in
every language. lt will be noted that the adjective epithet. 'the blue sky· can be
Sec. 12.5) Theory of Grammatical Functions 243
interpreted a.s the datum of an attractmg pomt S on the circle C of the verb
ro be (for exan1ple, the point situated on the axis of symmetry of the cusp
4u~ + 27v 2 = 0. v = O,u = k 2 ). At the emis~ion of the SYntagma.rhe blue sky,
th•s point is drawn towards the origin which leads to the dissociation of two
actants, without the emission of verb tcJ be (Fig. 9).
This pattern again furnishes a good example of the confusion of actan ts.
In 'the sky is bh1e ', the sky transfornts itself continually Into blue as the circle
C as gone round.
REFERENCE
( 1J Sebastiani, ~1 and Thorn. R .• Un resu/Jat sur la monodromie, lnvenr. Matlr,
August,l971.
•
CHAPTER 13
tGros, M., Halle, M., Sci1Uuenb<:rger, M.. L 'twalyu fomJtllt ties /angues llOturollts, Mou1on,
1973
[Sec. 13.1] Universals of Language 245
oscillatory figures, out of which there is a combmation. a synthesis, wh1ch
reconstitutes the fonn lC) in the mind of the hearer b)' resonance. Consequently,
all bnguistic communication mvolves two types of different operGtiOns. the one
inver:;e to the other with regard to their results. There IS an operation of analysis,
reducing the fom1 (C) of the meaning to a set of elements x,, separately trans-
missible because coded. Also there is an operation of sylllhesis reconstituting
in the hearer the fonn (C) from the elements emanating from the operauon of
Jnalysis effected by the speaker. Now it is far from being e\"ident that the orders
of the elements X1 most favourable to the accomplishment of these two types
of operations arc the same. It is an assumption of our model that m fac1 these
orders are inverse, In such a way that there arc fundamentally. two typologies a
t} pology of emiss1on and a typology of recepuon, in principle the one being
mverse to the oU1er.
since certain sen tcnces are ambiguous, contrary to what happens in a closed
chemical system.
(i) The critical value c corresponds to a saddle point of the function f . ln thts
case a connected component of the curve of level z = c. can after passing
through t he saddle, give rise to two connected components.
(ii) The critical value c corresponds to a mi11imum p.ln lllis case, when z tends
towards c, a small connected component of the line of the level z disappears
at p. li in this variation of z to z0 , a connected component of the energy
hypersurface Is identified at a point , we obtnin finally n graph whose vertex
(S) of maximum value corresponds to (C), with the vertices being associated
to the minima of the ternlinal points of the branches of the graph. We accept
that this graph is identified with the !Tee defined by the generative gramm(JJ'
for the sentence (S) with content (C). To the minima PI off correspond the
terminal elemeJtts (X/), the 'words' of the spoken sentence. To a sadd le q
corresponds a point where a branch spills dichotomously into two branches;
linguislicaUy, this is interpreted as t he fracture of a meaning into two
incomplete meanings, which become disjoint and independent, like the
annihilation of a resonance between two systems.
•
Sec. 13 .1] Universa1s of Language 247
This model thus postulates that general ive grammar Lrees have not only a
formal existence but describe an Important part of the topology of the mental
neurophysiological process associated with the emtsston (and reception) of a
sentence. Tius modelts mspired by an analogous model describing embryological
development (the hydraulic model o f the epigenetic landscape) (see R. Thorn ,
Structural stability and 11wrphogeneJiS, Benjamin , 1975, p. 216}. In this analogy .
the emission of a sentence is homologous to gametogenesis. The reception of the
same sentence corresponds to the excitation of the oscillator, to the flooding of
the epigenetic 'volcano' and so to the development of the embryo.
We wiU accept, as a first approximation, that the geography of the potential
well (F) of equation z = f(x, y) is a linguistic and semantic invariant associated
to (S). common to all speakers of the language under consideration. In order to
reconstruct this figure (F) from the words (Xt), the surest means is to sweep out
the potential well (F) according to z increasmg. Afterwards, it will be necessary
to arrange the X1 in the inverse order to that in which they appeared ln the
operation of analysis. (Each mimmum p; off corresponds to a 'vanishing oscilla·
tor' defined by the word Xt) .
This model cal ls for the following conmtents:
(2) T he model, such as the one presented here does not allow for the taking
into account of the facts of ambiguity. This overly static model should in
fact be replaced by a less naive 'metabolic' model. What is ln fact happening
is as if the local geography of the potenrial well depends on the state of
excitation of the ocillator. For example, let us suppose that the basins
associated to two minima P~o p 1 be separated by two different saddles.
When z grows, the union of two basins above the saddle is illterpreted as the
establishment of a resonance between two oscillators -independent up till
then and thence as the mental formation of partialmeanlng. When the two
SOiddles separating the two basms are perceptibly of equal height , there can
be indeterminacy in the choice of the saddle which will be reached fust.
This leads to a semantic ambigulty.lo fact this ambiguity could be removed ,
either by the order in which the words X 1 , X 1 , corresponding to p 1 , p,. are
emitted, or by factors m the context o f the situation. The amb1gu11ies of
which modem theoreticians have made great play. remain in ordinary
248 On the typology of natural languages: (Ch. 13
Adjective-> Verb are in general not defined. In the same way the adjective can
be nouned but the noun cannot be adjectivisedt.
Of course, it would not be necessary to assnnilate semantic density to a
quanutative parameter that one could try to measure. In the interior of the same
category different elementS can be of very different densiues, because of qualita·
tive differences. So an abstract noun of action (such as dance from to dance,
race from ro race) is hardly more dense than the verb from which it derives. The
more abstract the noun becomes, the less dense it is semantically. A noun such
as: end, edge, ... has no other semantic density than that defined by the mequaliry
x;;. 0 on its spatio-temporal content. Intermediate between the anlmates and the
abstracts are the mantmate beings. the solid bodies in parucular Their regulation
is of an exclusively spatial nature and only the verbs of movement are applicable
to them.
tAccor~ tu Tesni~re (1965) the 'gemtht' precisdy dlec:ts lh• in•·erse tr.msbtk>n of •
noun Into QJ1 adjective. ll is, a.s is wcU known, unc of the more criticisable puml ofTesnihe'>
S)'Siem. This antrrprclatlun howevet, does contain some uuth: thus as 15 explained in
§ 13 4.3, the ,.:nitl•e rtl<cu • scmantoe destruction of a concept, which replace. tlili con·
cepl by • !oel ot leu scm•ntocally dense concepts.
Sec. 13.3J Typologles of Elementary Sentences 251
stronger afftnity to the subject than to the object as is shown frequently by
'ellipsis of the object • (tfle cat eats) while there is never ellipsis of the subject.
Once given, the couple VO has the effect of precipitating in the mind the forma·
tion of a resonance which blocks the ultimate formation of the fundamental
resonance VS. Doubtless the use of Oexlonal ending (suffixes) (accusative for
0) allows, in pnnctple, this inconvenience to be avoided. Even in this case, the
maintenance of the object 0 at a ·semanlic potential' raised above the yawning
chasm created by the absence of the subjectS. unposes upon the mind a particularly
painful task. On the other hand, the transfer of the order of emission VOS to the
order of reception SOV, requires in languages of type Ill , a certain mnemonic
effort from the speaker. lt is here that we must bring into play a fundamental
factor in the dynamics of communication. As a general rule, the Interest that the
speaker has in being understood by the hearer exceeds the interest the hearer has
in understanding the speaker. To be convinced of this, it suffices in sorting through
one's daily mail to assess the proportion of diverse demands: publicity, in'oices,
requests for off-prints, manuscripts to read, ... etc., 111 comparison to the majl
which is really welcome or useful. Besides, the very process of communication is
initiated by the SPeaker: Is fecit, cui prodest. The result is that the bulk of the
task of reconciliation between the typology of emission and the typology of
reception wiLl be undertaken by the speaker.t Whence theprinciple ofdominance:
there is always dominance of the typology of recepiion over the typology of
emission.
In fact, a typology of pure emission does not exist. On the other hand,
mixed typologies do exist, and constitute 1n fact the large majority of languages.
By successively sliding the subjects to the beglnning of the sentence in the
emissh-e typology VOS, we obtain Greenberg's types: I.VSO and 11 SVO.
In type I, the hearer must from the start, evoke and keep present the
rather unstable forrn of the verb V; but this form is rapidly stabilised by its
resonance with the subject S, and the 'hole' left by the object subsists alone, to
be filled at the end of the sentence. Typology ll is even less demanding on the
hearer because the verb form can lean on the subject already given. lt rematns
suspended for a short time as a consequence of the absence of object 0 , but thJs
is rapidly filled. Indeed, it is difficult to say of the two typologies SVO or SOV,
which is the easier for the hearer.
As the typology of pure emission does not exist, we will call, by an abuse of
language, the mixed typologies of type I and fl emissive typologles, reserving the
term recepuve typology to type Ill only.
t n.u clominl.nce of the typology or rec:epuon o•cr the typology or cmi$Slon cloes not
cuntraclict the mt<m<nt disc..-cl in Noto I I§ 13.1.2), acc:orcling to whtch, receptk>n
b thermoclyruomocall) cuter than emi«oon. Wtth respect to the considerable energy required
I<>r the <l!X'fUtlon ofanalyslng the oontent to be sianlfiecl,lhe mnemonico.l effort ofre:ur:onglng
"'Ords (rom the cnussive urd<r to lhe receptive <>r~or Is ne&llilble.
•
Object of verb vo ov
Adjective AN NA
Gerutive GN NG
Pre· Post·
It might be to start with, that a language treats its adjuncts according to the
same typology as U1e nuclear sentence. Greenberg's table (1966) reveals to us
that this is not so: in typology l,the onJy coherent case is the Milpa Alta NahuatJ:
in typology 11, the Scandinavian languages; in receptive typology Ill there is no
example. This shows us that a powerful phenomenon IS present, wbich has the
effec t of rende1ing simultaneously in n language, both emisslve and receptive
typologies. The principk of the typology of adjuncts can be stated thus:
As a general rnk, tire bound adjuncts have a typology cvlrerenr wlrh rhe topolog)'
of tire Verb Object core, the free adjuncts have the opposite rypology.
Sec. 13.4] Adj«!ctives, Genitives and Affuces: Adjuncts 253
VO QV
NA AN
NG GN
Pre- Post·
This time these two types cover the majority of the languages m Greenberg's
list { 1966). There are indeed exceptions. of which the best known are those of
the Germanic languages: emiss1ve typology in English and German, probably
preserved from an earlier recepuve stuge, has order AN, and, in respect of
receptive typology, Basque-rype languages have the order NA.
The global classiOcation of langu~ges into cmisslve and receptive types
evidently bears on the notions of centrifugal and cen"ipeta/languages ( L Tesnil~re,
1965. 32 33). but if this author was aware of the universal (or nearly) character
of the fact of mitigation between the two typologies, he has not found an
explanation.
ow we will endeavour to motiralt the princ1ple of reversal of the typology
of free adjuncts, exemplifying by illustrations as we go along.
shows that the object 0 Is a short-lived act ant, since, emitted by the subject, it is
captured by the indirect object D. In order of decreasing 'volatility', r.he analysis
gives the order VODS as order of emission. The pure receptive order will then be
SDQy, which is the order that one generally Onds in Latin and in subordinates
in German. The most frequent milted order is SVDO: for example, In German,
Ill the principal sentence. Das Ki11d gab sfener Mutter eine11 kuss {17te child gives
his mother a kiss). It would be interesting to investigate this typology statistically.
In general, the core verb can comprise stiU more actants. for example a
'messenger' or an ·mstrument'. 1t Is reasonable to accept that from the typological
•
point of view, these secondary actants share the fate of the direct object 0; on
the other hand, the subject S as m general attached directly to the verb, with a
special status.
Having said this, it is advisable to specify what is, in English for example a
preposition. The essential function of a preposition is to wcalise all or pan of
the actantial verbal schema ut relation to certain actants taken as reference
points. In general, a preposition affectS the noun much less than it controls the
verbnl action. In tbe sentence. Jolm walks in from of the church, 'the church'
Is hardly affected by the process. A preposition Q governing a complement J
must then be considered as an operator whach localises the verbal action of the
verb V with relation to the actant J. Semantically and so structurally, the opera-
tor Q Inserts Itself between tlte core verb V and the actant J . In the emissive
typology. the natural order is thus VQJ, and in the receptive typology JQV .
From thence comes the coherence of the order VO with the prepositions, and o f
OV with the post-positions.
Unfortunately the situation cannot remain so simple; as always In linguistics,
the distinction between 'bound adjuncts' and 'free adjuncts' can be the object of
a quasi~ntinuous gradation of intermediaries. In the sentence: John walks by
the top of the ~'illage, we can consider 'of the vil/t)ge ·,either as a bound adjunct,
joined to the verb \valks' by the prepositional phrase by the top of, or as a
free adjunct of the noun actant, the top, a genitive. We could easily find situa-
tions where the prepositional phrase acquires a more and more independent
status as a group. Compare in French Jean a ete nommi general a la tete dr
l'armce, Jean a lance u11 vase a la tete de Pie"e. In order that a language may
coin new prepositions from nouns which empty themselves of their semantic
content, it is necessary that the typology of the genitive allows it. That is to say
that. the languages of typology - VO Pre (cmissives) must present the order
NG, and languages of type m; OV Post, the order G:-o. But this makes clear a
very complex phenomenon: the semamic reversal of the genitive, whJch we will
now study.
prepositioll de) thus: on hearing the word Y, the signified figure IYI of Y is
built up again in the mind, by combmahon of resonanoes from elementary
oscillators and codes S; (the scmes ("semes') of the scmanllcists). Once this
resonance n S, - IY l•s formed, the effect of the postposition ·s ('preposition de)
is to confer on it an excitation which tends to destroy it, by an inverse return to
the situation of the product IYI- ns,. h is then that one of the scmes S; enters
uno resonance with a seme S of X, a 'catastrophe of regulation' of the figure lX I
of the concept X. This resonance, if it is sufficiently sharp, has the effect of
sucking up all the energy of the other oscillators S; of Y , which hinders the
fom1ation of the form IYI in the mind of the hearer. At the same time the
fonnation of resonance localises the space support of form IX I in relation to the
space suJ)port of form IY I.
Let us try to illustrate what might appear as an excessively complicated
description. One of the clearest effects of the genitive is to spread the spatio-
temporal localisation of Y from Y towards X.
The deftnlte article le, let us recall applies in French, in normal non-gnomic
use, to an actant previously loe31ised in an earlier sentence. Thence one can
only with difficulty say: the X of a Y: le chien d'wt bergcr = Un chien de berger.t
In principle, the order NG, topic-comment, is a receptive order; so a
genitive IS normal if the semantic depth of the specified X exceeds that of the
specifier Y. Such is the case with genitives of quality (un homme de grand
caractbe), of matter (un che~YII de bois). But, strangely enough, there is a
number of abnormal and moreover 'well formed' genitives where the specified
X has a semantic depth much weaker than the specifier: the e11d of the road; the
top of the tree. And as in intermediate cases: le trou de la serrure: la tete de
Pierre.
In an expression like: the wp of rhe rree, the 'topic" is obviously rhe rree,
the ·comment': rhe top o{. F11rthermore it is so in Latin where the rop of rhe
tree is translated by summa arbor. Here the specified: the top of amounts to an
abstract geometric structure of insignificant semantic thtckness, which plays the
role of operator, of localiser. in the support space of the fonn IY ithe rree,
which essentially retains its semantic content. However, this association will not
Work without precautions when applied to n semantically very heavy being like
a man. It makes the top of rhe man (summus vir?) unacceptable. The semantic
structure of the concept man Is too complex to be wholly absorbed by the
operator the rop of. We say on the other hand, the rop of the body, because
the body is essentially o spatial object which we have semantically deprived of its
Psychism. On the other hand, we can say: the end of the man when the end of
the body is essentially a 5patial Object which we have 5emantically deprived of its
subject to the law of time (which penetrates the psychism like the organism)
whereas the body is always conceived in a spatial and Instantaneous (the linguists
would say synchronic) manner and never m ttS temporal evolution. We see
mcidentaUy what a powerfu.l means of semantic invesligation, the study of the
acceptabOity of genitives gives.
Let us turn now to the 5emantically balanced genitives: la tete de Pierre,
le 1rou de la sernue. Here it is difficul! to say which is the topic and which the
comment. In translation, one ma) have to rever5e the attribution: Subject
Predicate. For example, Latin: Ccmumella mated/cri can be translated Into
French as: Une Inftue blessante. Sometimes, it can have a conjunction in one
language and predication in another: spectator et test is: un rbnoin ocu/aire,
ratio et faculras: un ralenr oratoire, ... etc.t
In the ·two.subject sentence' in Japanese, such as: Nippon wa yama ga oi
(there art! many moumains in Japan} the 5emantic relation between the two
subjects, that followed by wa, and that followed by ga, Is practically that of a
balanced genitive.
lt would not be necessary however to conclude from this, that in a balanced
gcniti~-e. the order of the elements is arbitrary. In fact I do not know of an
example y. here the two expresstons: X of Y and Y of X have the same 5en5e
even if the verbal bond is lhe same In both cases: the clinics doctor; (le medecm
de la clinique); tire doctor 's clinic: (la cllnlqtle du ml!decin}. The asymmetry
factor in the relation bet\\>een X and Y is the localisation factor (spatio-temporal
or more abstract in a 5emantic space) which Is always ordered.
This fundamentally assyrnetrlcal character of the genitive explains that the
structure Y's X (X de Y) has been able to subsist, m E.ngllsh and French m
situations as srn~antically aberrant as: tlte tree top (le haut de l'arbre). Latin.
which is In the main of receptive typology (SOV, GN) has nevertheless the
discordance of making U5e of prepositions (in addition to those stuck on post·
positions wltich are the ending of the ca5es). This explains perhaps that Latin
has not pushed as far as French the imbalance of the gennive obtained by
emptymg N of its semantic content. Because one would then obtain post·
positions (Dei gr11ria) and not prepositions.
Thts mevttable phenomenon of the 5emantic reversal of the genitives explams
why, by contmuous deformation of a bound adjunct into a free adjunct. the
prepositions accord with the order NG, and the post·positions with GN. This
then impo5es on the syntax in the use of free adjuncts. a typology opposed to
that of the typology of the core verb.
13.4.4 The Subject-Object relation in a genitive
A difficult problem remains: does there exist a universal relation between the
tThese examples quut~-d b) Tuni~r~ ( 1965) are e~tracu frum Riemann and C,oc,t7.cr's
Grummolrt.• lat fnt
Sec. 13.4] Adjectjves, Genitives and Affixes: Adjuncts 257
tTnnsJalor's note; In Fnglhh the rc¥trsal " present In llte fll'>l eumple but not m llte
"'Cond. Paul"t dog= the dO$ which P•ul has.
tiron<lutor't note: In Fngtbh the two forms {tar of tlte tnem)' and tile enemy s{MT u<u>lly
carry this diJUncuon.
•
other factors of (G). Thus the semantic destruction of Y is assured, (g) finding
itself reduced to a mixed interaction quotient of the product (g) X (f) of which
V is external space. To sum up. in the interaction Y's X (X de Y), X operates
in the internal space of Y, where it reduces the significance of Y to a resonance
quotient of the complex X X Y; on the other hand, Y operates in Lhe external
space of X, where Y localises the signified form of X. FoUowing the scheme
(the semantic space) under considerabon, we will be able to make X the subject
and Y the object of the implicit bond linking X to Y, or reciprocaUy. This
reciprocal character of the relauon Subject-Object, particularly sensiuve in the
case of a transient reversible Interaction. between X and Y, ls at the he an of the
semanticism expressed by the middle voice in lndo-European {the Latin depon·
ents: lrascor ·anger grips me'). Cf. GuiUaume, 1964, 138 9; Benveniste, 1950,
168.
core of such nature, that tt hardly enters into competition with the central
verb. The general rule of dominance of the receptive typology c:.n then operate
for its adjuncts.
.•
13.7 A SPECULATlON ON THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGES
U I was asked to offer on the basis of the two principles given here, a general
vision of the diachronic evolution of languages, I should be tempted to say:
syntactical structures are, like our money, in a state of permanent inflation. The
nuclear sentence, with a taste for precision, tends to burden itself witJt bound
adjuncts and to capture neighbouring sentences by reducing them to the status
of free adjunctS. This process of syntactical overloading is pursued until the
moment when the semantic unity of the central sentence breaks down under
the number and weight of the adjuncts. These, having become independent,
organise themselves into nuclear sentences, inheriting their older adjunct typology.
This leads to a periodic conception of the evolution of languages, demarcated by
a dislocating release phenomena. A long period of syntactical enrichment is
followed by a relatively shon period, in catastrophe, where the central sentence
breaks up into its adjuncts and where the inversion of the typologies is produced.
This period of syntactical rupture clearly leads to a proliferation of anapboric
elements (personal and demonstrative pronouns), destined to re·establish the
continuity of the actants across this syntactical explosion. Later, in the long
period of condensation, where the nuclear sentence becomes heavy and is
enriched by adjuncts by the capture of neighbouring sentences, these anaphoric
elements, having bcomce useless, persist fomtaUy as affixes bonded to verbs and
adjectives. Thus the phenomenon of retzcrion, of syntactical agreement, could be
explatned.
The period during which languages have been observed (only about 3,000
years and involving very few languages) is so brief that it obviously allows little
more than speculation.
•
CHAYTER14
Semiotics
111e paper 'De !Yc(me au symbole 't is the Fvst represemin.g my imerest in
semiotics. fn a more recem paper ('L 'espace et les signes ') I have re-worked the
'spatio-temporal' interpretation ofPeirce sc/assifiaztion: icons, indices, symbols.
111/s article, which appeared in Semiotica is un[orrunately not included in this
collection.
f belitn't!, nevertheless. that the thoughts on iccmicity presented here are
valr1able.
(3) Symbols: these concern an arbitrary form, the relation to the signified object
of which, arises from a social convenuon of limited validity in space and
time. For example, a word is a symbol because its phonetic form has no
intrinsic relation to that of the object signified ('arbitrariness of sign·,
accordmg to Saussure).
Philosophers have a tendency to look upon the first category of signs, the icons
(or images) as of a banal nature and of liitlc Interest for the theory of symbolism.
1t is reasonable to believe that they are wrong and that a delicate analysis of the
dynamic process Involved in the production of the Images (the ·copy') poses
problems of a fundamental nature which are at the very heart of the relation:
signified .. stgnifier ( 'slgnifie ""signifiant'), wltich characterises the symbol In its
complete form.
each instant the pristine virginity indispensable to a total and permanent com-
petence. However, a certain plrnlclty exists since the sensations perceived are
stored in the memory.
To sum up, the formation of images from a model appears as a manifestation
of the umversal dynamic having irreversible character. There is a self-ramifying
of the model into an image isomorphic to itself. But very often thls process
utilises an interaction of reversible character. lt is there that the dynamic of
symbolism is so clearly exemplified. The thermodynamic wavers constantly
between two pointS of view: the conservative point of view which is manifest in
the presence of Hamiltonian dynamics, that is by the conservation of energy
(the first principle); and the Heraclitean notion of the irreversible flow of time,
which expresses itself as increase of entropy (the second principle). ReconciUa-
tion of these two points of view has only been possible by introducing the
creator and the first snap of his fingers (the big bang of ten thousand million
year ago ...). In the mteractlon "signifled-slgnifler', it is clear that, borne along
by the universal flux, the signifled generates the signifler in an uninterrupted
burgeoning ramification. But the slgnifler regenerates the signified each time
that we interpret the sign. And as Is shown by the example of biological forms, for
the signifier (the descendant)to become the signified (the parent) again, tbe
time-lapse of a generation ts sufficient.
It is through the subtle balance between two morphologles, through the
simultaneous demands of reversibility and irrevcrslbillly, that the dynamic of
symbolism carries withm Itself (and th1s in a local and concentrated form) all
the contradictions of the 5cientific vision of the world. And that Is the very
image of llfe.
evolution allows the appearance of forms, more rcfmed, more subtle, more
global, metrically charactcrlsuc, and by this fact, charged with more meaning.
The difference lies In the fact that the biological form suggests an 'action',
whereas the stable physical form only suggests Itself.
To illustrate these considerations, let us take the example of the symbolism
of the arrow. The mark • suggests, In our society, the direction of right to left.
Is this to do with a social convention or, on the other hand, is it an intrinsic
effect linked to the very fonn of the figure? I incline to favour the second
hypothesis. According to a theory of perception due to Harry Slum, every
perception of an object Implies an Immediate and implicit search for a better
manual grasp of the object. Now if one tries to grasp the two branches of the
arrow, the 'fictitious' fingers that will try can only slide towards the left, in a
vain search for n position of stable hold. This could be a biological explanation
of the symbolised direction. We can also consider (as remarked by Guy Hirseh)
that a mobile arrow in a fluid milieu will meet less resistance to its movement
UJ its 'normal' direction than in the opposite direction: because the 'wings' of
lhe arrow model the contours of the wake, when a stick is pushed along the
surface of a liquid along its axis. But lhe contour of a wake conf~rms certam
properties characteristic of unstable forms, according to Blum's theory. llere
then is coincidence (by no means accidental) of biological pregnance and of
physical pregnance.
Moreover we know that animals themselves are subject to certain 'classical'
optical illusions, which seems to suggest that we arc touching here on mecharusms
of a very elementary nature, infra-psychic, If we can say that!
Perhaps one of the most striking experimental proofs of the e.ldstence of
'archetypal' forms bes UJ tile existence in animal psychology of 'supranonnal
re leasers'. Thus, in a fledgling, newly hatched, the reflex to open its beak can be
more effectively released by the sight of an artificial beak of a red colour and
pyramidal form (the 'archetypal' beak) than by the biologically normal form of
the beak of one of its parents. We might possibly think that the determination and
theoretical explanation of these 'archetypal' fonns will disclose the secret of
human symbolism. The response to this is, I believe, as follows: it is correct that
these forms are going to play an important role in the ex teroal morphology of
the sign, in the 'How' of symbolic activity. But it does not explain the 'Why' of
the symbol, its initial motivation. As we shall see further on, the source of
symbolism is to be found in the complex mechanisms of the regulation of living
organisms and of society. We could, I believe, defend the following idea: the
more a message is 'disinterested', the less strong is the affective thrust that
generated it, the more lt Is subject to the demand of physical prcgnance, the
more it reveals the formal structure of the archetypal origin. On the other hand,
if the message is 'interested', If it responds to a biological or immediately urgent
sociological necessity, it IS then very unstable morphologically. Its 'excited'
strength convolutes 1tself locally sometimes to the pomt of defying all formalism;
Sec. 14.4) lnclices 267
every rule of good imemal organisation. The misuse, so often, of rules of syntax
in exclamations, orders, lnteljections and in poetry is a striking example of it.
We can in effect accept that the rules of syntax in natural languages are the
temporal transcription of archerypal morphologies in space-time, as they owe
their origin to the need to preserve physical pregnancc.
14.4 INDICES
When we consider a being (a) as defined by a noun (A) of a natural language, we
shall be able to observe the following fact: in order that the being (a) exists with
the same meaning, it must be the seat of recurrent acllvJties whlch are essential
either to its physical permanence or to the spatlo·temporal realisation of its
meaning. For example, an animal, must, in order to subsist, be committed to a
$pCCtrum of physiologi.cal activities: move, eat, dnnk. breathe, etc. An inanimate
object itself participates In a series of movements that we normally expect as a
consequence of the function of the object: a broom sweeps, a car moves, a stone
falls, the fire bums, etc. So to each noun is attached in a canonical manner, a
'spectrum' of verbs' whlch specify the activities Indispensable to the reallsation
of the meaning. But each verb itself describes an 'archetypal' morphology where
beings other than the given being intervene. For example, to eat requires a prey,
or a food, to drink requires a liquid taken as a drink, and In consequence a
receptacle containing the liquid . . . the fire, during burning, emlts smoke, etc.
Every bemg intervening in such a morphology, and whlch linguistleally is described
by either the direct or indirect object of the verb wiU be called an index (a) of
the being (a). fn classical languages, the relation between a being (a) and its
index (a) is usually expressed by the genitive: a of a. For example, the smoke of
the fife, the beak of the duck. the tail of the squirrel. Or, alternatively in English:
a's a as in 'the fire's smoke', 'the duck's beak', 'the squirrel's tail'.
As every verbal morphology describes a process of interaction where th.e
actaots enter into contact, the result is that the index Is always an actaot which
Is, or has been, In contact with its object, lf it is not actually part of it. (In
passing I add that in general the index i5 not in place of the actant subject in a
verbal ~tasuophc; there exiSt precise morphological criteria for the topology of
interaction which enables us In many cases to specify what the actant subject is.)
Very often, we replace a being by one of its Indices, an act whlch confers on the
laner a symbolic value. In language, th.is procedure is at the root of many tropes
(metonymy in partlculllf: taking the part for the whole).
But it is important to see clellfly that in the pair (a, a) of a being and one of
its indices, the index (a) has no value or symbolic function in itself. lt will only
be so
(I) if the being (o) is itself an index of an actant (b) taken as subject of reference,
and if the catastrophe linking (a) to (b) is of great importance (blologicaJJy
or semanticaJJy) for (b);
•
(2) if the being (b) comes accidentally into relation with (er), the verbal catas·
trophe which makes (ex) an aclant in a catastrophe of (b) is not itself indis-
pensable to the semantic stability of (b). (In other words (ex) is not in
itself an 'index' of(b).)
Example 1. (a) is a gazelle; (b) a tiger. The cnlastrophe a ... b is predation
and of great biological importance for (b). The index (ex) of (a) could be the
tracks of the gazelle on the ground, or a dropping. In this case the catastrophe,
ex - a, would be a standard catastrophe of emission. If the tiger accidentally
perceives the index (a), il will be apparent that he will be deeply affected, so
that ll is legitimate to say that (ex) is for him a gazelle 'symbol'. The 'rejected'
becomes the 'projected'.
Fxample 2. (a) Is a drink, tt mtght be of wine for example, (er) the bottle
that contains it, (b) an in"eterate drinker. Here the catastrophes arc obvious;
note that the empty bottle still has a symbolic value for (b) but not quite so
obviously as a full bottle.
Pavlov's well known experiments show that o fulse index (o<') can have a
symbolic value for an animate being (b). For that to be it is sufficient that the
catastrophe a ... b is biologically important, such as predation (er being the true
index). Then er'- a need be no more than a simple spatio·temporal contiguity
(the sound of a bell at the arrival of a meal). 1t will be seen by some that this
hypostatsls of spatio-temporal contiguity to causality is the index of animals'
typical inferiority wtth respect to man. This would be to forget that according
to the empiricism of Hume, or modem elementary particle Physics, it is in
practice nu possible to dissociate causahty and spalio-temporal contiguity.
Finally, we can see In these humble, but real, manifestations of the symbolic
function, a kind of smoothness in a catastrophe which has considerab le biological,
or semantlc, importance. That (b) accidentally comes to meet (c:t) is of little
importance in itself, but if (b) knows that (a) is semantically or biologically
linked to (a), which is an indispensable index of (b), then (c:t) has a tendency to
become itself also an 'index' of (b), as if the relation (a)- (b) acquires through
the existence of the intermediary (a) an Intrinsic importance. This comes about
as if the relation: (c:t) Is an index of (a), becomes on order relation.
This analysis shows that symbolic activity is, in its origin, linked in an
essential manner to btological control systems: or more exactly, as said by
older thinkers who were not afraid of words, to biological finality (rmaliu!':
ultimate purpose). IL is so in two ways: on the one hand, it is an extension of
the efficacy of complex control mechanlsms (an extension of the basin of
catastrophes favourable to (b) and a duninution of the unfavourable ones): on
the other hand, lt postulates the possibility of the actant (b) simulating in its
own appropriate state of being (psychlsm), the relation linking (a) to its index
(er): thus being a form of intelligence. The fact that Initially, as in the Pavlovian
schema, this stimulaiion is no more than a simple association, does not stop us
•
we see inunediately that there will be two types of signs: attractor signs, aimed
at increasing the efficacy of favourable catastrophes and repelling signs(inhibitors)
aimed at the prevention of unfavourable catastrophes.
Thus from its very genesis any symbol has an imperative characteristic, a
characteristic which remains largely unconscious, linked to a feehng of trust
and to the onginal hypostasis of the symbol which will be expl3.111ed below.
There equally we find the syntactical and semantic autonomy of the verb taken
in the imperative(/!).
Thls being accepted, it remains, and here an principle is the very aim of
'semiology', to cxpbin how the teleological ('f"malisce) motivation of the Sign
can generate Its true morphology, its rules of Internal structure. lt is possible
m this regard to give a rule, at once simple and of wide generality: the principle
of the inverse path. Properly speaking this principle does not determine the true
form of the sign (icon, index or symbol): but it determines its spatlo-temporal
localisation. It must not be forgotten that above all signs are forms In space
time, and that consequently theu spauo-temporal localisation is one of the ftrst
factors to consider.
To state this principle some vocabulary of differential topology wiU be
necessary. Given a domain of Euclid can space of n dimensions, let U be the
space of states of a system. Very frequently, the set of ·catastrophe· points
(In the usual sense) of the system which lead to n local or total destruction
of the system form a space of dimension (n - k), n sub-manifold ofco-dimension
k. The appearance of unfavourable or dangerous catastrophes in the development
is necessarily rebtively rare, without whlch fact homeoStasis could not be
preserved.
We express this fact by saying that these catastrophe points form a sub·
manifold J of fmite eo-dimension: it is a matter of rare, but not exceptional,
facts. Then we consider the set r, of the trajectories bordering on J. This set
of Initial anterior positions to the catastrophe, forms a sort of cone r1. In the
same way the set of the possible outcomes of the catastrophe forms a cone of
trajectories r 0 • Furthermore, in general, the fmal states of the catastrophe
constitute a well-defmed subset W0 , compact in the space U (which explains the
well-known adage: For good or Ill, things always work out in the end). An
important fact is the indeterminacy in practice of ihe catastrophe. A very smaU
variation of these initial conditions can bring about a very great variation of the
effects, as Is the case In the neighbourhood of a threshold, of a critical point.
For example. ihe collision at a crossroads referred to in Chapter I 5. Let us
suppose two roads cut each other at right angles in a point 0 of the plane. We
take as axes Ox, 0y of the plane the directions of the two roads. Suppose that
two vehicles nre moving on these two roads each with a coordinate (x, speed x')
and (y, speedy'). There will be a collision if at the tnitial instant to we have
x'0 /x0 = y'0 fy 0 • The equation x'oJio - x 0 y'0 = 0 then represents the cone r,
of entry into the catastrophe.
Sec. 14.5) Symbolism In Man 271
'To
Flg.l
with prey (A), we can easily see that an index of (A) is ipso facto an index of B
without the intervention of the property of transitivity of the relation: index of.
(Indeed this can be true even at the level of organic morphology: when an animal
such as the lamprey has the tip of its tongue like a worm, :llld uses it as bait to
aurae! small fiShes which are itS prey, we can say that in this case the bait is a
morphological mdex of the predator.)
(J) The enthralment of things has become merged into human psychism. Very
probably, symbolic activity und the appearance of language have played an
essentia.l role in this development. Man is freed from the enthralment of
thtngs by giving them names. Human psychism did tlllfold in some way· the
primitive representation of space, half-conseious, unfolds itself, and creates
one or more spaces of the same type: the semantic spaces, where the 'actants'
are installed · the concepts. The control of these actants in their true semantic
space is accomplished by mech:llllsms of a 'renex' type, analogous to the
control of tJ1e organism itself. By an unfolding pushed more towards the
surface, automatisms of language are created. These are kinds of universal
actants which intervene in the control of concepts.
(2) Thus freed from the enthralment of things, the ego has been able to constitute
itself in a permanent manner by taking as support the representation of the
true body In space.
{3) Human psychism is capable of integrating the primitive functlonu l maps
the one with the other, in order to constitute the global representation
of the geometry of space. (For example, the notion of an infinite straight
Sec. 14. 7] From Animal to Man 275
Of the original alienations there remains only a certain feeling of the sacred
attached to certatn objects (taboos, fetiches, etc.).
A long lime after the global mental reconstruction of space, man became
capable of perceiving that the foundation of the identity of things is their
spatial localisation: 'Two things occupyrng simultaneously two dlsjoint domains
could not be identical'. This postulation took a long time to establish itself and
'primitive' (or magic) thought, participation (in the sense of Levy.Bruhl), represents
the last connection with primitive alienation. From this postulate, of which
modern man is hardly conscious, we shall easily deduce that since the identity of
a thing has its principle in its spatial localisation, all ontology, all sertumtics
rtectssari(v depends on a study of space - geometric or topofogical.
We know that the period of the first three years is critical in a child's
development. If the child does not hear his parents (or those around him) speak·
ing during this period, the acquiring oflanguage and intellectual deviopment will
be irremediably compromised. The relative immaturity of the newborn human
enables him to keep the primitive representation of space very plastic and
flexible for a long time. The major motor schemata form only slowly, with the
beginnings of language. l t 1s quite reasonable to consider that, according to the
law of recapitulation, the child passes through a period of primitive alienation
where certain beings and objects exercise a total enthralment of him. The
presence of external verbal stimuli linked to the appearance of these beings plays
an fnductor role (In the embryological sense) in this competent structure, that is
the prinlltlve spatial field. These forms nnd their true space from primitive
space, by unfolding, by finding support in the auditory and articulatory schema
of the corresponding word, wblch frees the subject from their enthralment.
Then, the same schema of unfolding, of branching out, continues for semantic
spaces, leading eventually to the formation of the semantic space of the adult.
For a newborn animal forced to move about while very young, such an immaturity
of the primitive spatial field is impossible: motor activities structure and harden
it before: the inductor effect of a hypothetical exterior language can come into
play.
Freed from the tyranny of IJ1ese alienating forms, the space in human
psych ism can become the open framework for Geometry and for Mechanics. The
group of spatio-temporal translations then operates in semantic space and so
human language allows the description of a distant process (in space and lime)
and frees the mind from the tyranny of the 'here and now' to which the animal
remains subject.
Perhaps in this, life is only pushing one of its fundamental mechanisms to
the limit. As soon as it makes an egg, a living organism mitiates the prOJect of
•
colonising space and time and it is subjected to the 'here and now'. The essential
function of the human intellect, to simulate the laws and structures of the
external world is hardly more than the extension or the making clear, of this
primitive design.
Perhaps it is not absurd to see in the most elaborate acts of human psychism,
for example, in mnthcmaUcnl discovery, a direct extension of this mechanism of
symbolic creation. Indeed, while exploring a new theory, while juggling with this
new material, the mathematician someumes sees an expression, or a relation,
turning up again and again with an embarrassing insistence. He will then be
tempted to introduce a new symbol to condense this expression Into a single
form ond so continue the work on a new basis. This sin1ple procedure may some·
times lead to success. More often he will be struck by the Idea of new expressions
to condense, new figures to construct and name through suspecting a priori their
properties. To introduce a new symbol, that is, injecting a new letter on to the
paper, promotes a kind of tearing away, wit.h the establishing of a new semantic
field which will be the support of the new actant and so free the mental move-
ment from the obsesslonal presences which impede it.
We know that around 18 months, the ne11. ly born child begins ltis babbling;
he becomes aware of artjcuJatory possibilities and, so the specialists say, in this
period forms phonemes of all tbe languages of the world. The parents answer hint
in their own language, and soon after the baby produces only the phonemes of
this language, the vocabulary and syntax of which he will master some months
later. I would willingly see in the mathematician a perpetual newbom baby who
babbles before nature. Only those who know to liSten to the response of Mother
Nature will come later to open a dialogue with her and to master a new language.
The others will only babble and buu. 111 the votd, bombinans in vacua. And
where, you may ask, will the mathematician be able to hear Nature's response?
The voice of reality is in the significance of the symbol.
REFERENCES
[I] C. Lejeune, Pictu res taken form Memaire de rien (ed. Le Corcuer, Brussels,
1972), obtained 111 the rust place from photographs of plantS.
[2] W. Kohler, See any source book for Gestalt Psychology (for instance, Katz.
D., Cesrall Psychology, 1951, Methuen, London).
CHAPTER IS
tWrltt~n at the nquesr of J. d'Ormesson for a Uncsco colloquium, Venice, Ma} 1973.
+Trarulator's note h is relevant that there an: limits to the poSSibility of tramlauna &om
the French 'une Information' and 'des Informations' into the EngJJsh 'n piece oflnformotion',
'the information', 1111d 'lnfornutlon'. The vt:f) theoretical exploration which is the subject
uf this chapter aprlies to the wu<S of uarubtion conl2in«<ln tbe.e necemry lnfehcities
•
desired
act•on
lt
/
/
/
x~--~--------------~--~-----
Graph 1
tTransluor's note: The dtscussion ~More on the morphology of actants auociated with N1l
paniclpanu Indicated by the author as,. dentllldeur' and "le donneur"ls better understood
if we Ullllslate these two very directly as 'seeker· and ·~tVIlr'. 11 I! clear that the author,
deaUna with the increased complexiry when two actants ore lnvolved,ls concerned to keep
the comple>dty to the neoessary maximum.
Sec.l5.2] The Notion of Information 279
We caJIDOl fall to be struck by the relative complex.lty of this graph. It is
much more complex than the elementary morphologtes described in Chapter 11,
p. 000. We notice that the graph shows a marked actant {1), the message of the
giver to the seeker. lt is on this actant that, strictly speaking, the meaning of the
term •information' focuses; the rest of the graph constitutes a kind of ambience
of presupposition which surrounds the nucleus formed by the transmission of
the message (0 from (Y) towards (X). lr Is this complexity which expkzins the
semantic imtability of the word 'information': incapable of perceiving in its
totality a process so complex, the rttind has a tendency to reject in a fog of
increasing density, all or part of the ambience of presupposition, in order to
focus the vision on to the essential· the transmission: giver .1. seeker. The distor-
tions of sense that we shall point out are gomg to depend in an essential manner
on that part of the presupposed which finds itself annihilated.
We know in fact that in an interaction process descnlled by a verb, the
corresponding interaction graph is extemely simple (one of the 16 archetypal
morphologles of A (Chapter 11, Section 11.5)). The result is that these morph·
ologies exercise a power of attractJon in the simplification of the presupposed.
Already, the use of the verb 'to inform' in English ('informer' in French) marks
a quasi-d.isappearance of the seeker of the information, even that of the demand
itself. Very frequently, one informs someone of a situation which is dlsagreeable
or disadvantageous to him. it goes without saying that the use of the word
•information' in the sense of the act of informing (as a verb noun), is not involved
in the uses studled below. lt is imponant to note this.
Y----------~~~~~--------~--
socially
desirable
Ktion
\I
I
""
Graph 2
•
V----------~~~~----------------
,.
'"
I
/
/
Graph 3
V--------------~~--------~----~
action ;'"'
profitable 1
10 V '/
I
I
"
X ----------------------~--~'------
"
Graph 4
This limited list demonstrates some of the common non-technical uses of the
word information. We pass now to the scientific uses.
X----~~~-=~----~~~----~~-
Graph S The mtogge i• effected through the eh1nnel. C
Sec. IS. 2) The Notion of Information 281
In the second part we will discuss the probabilistic sense of the word infor-
mation and its relation to the thermodynamic notion of negentropy.
iln oth<r "'0tdJ, Information theor} tn Its classical form or. theory or inforrmtlon rrnns·
mission, can be appUcd to biological systems in considering thal there exists a uansmission
of information between the O~JaniJm and the ob~rver following lbc method of D:uu:orr and
Quanler u ,..• hue indocated on CMptet S: but In thu uansmiuiun we must consider each
order~ element 01 urpanic body (moeromolecules, O'lanelles, cells, orga.nisms) os the
output of u communlcauon path, the Input of which we hove no need to specify. 11. Atlan.
L "()rpniJzzt/qn blol~qu~ et!Jithtorie de l'informlltion p. 255, HermaM. Parts. CTranslatlon
by prcttnt tnnsLuor .)
•
Thus lhis integer q measures the rarity of the catastrophe, and in the simuJ.
taneous realisation of two such independent catastrophes, the eo-dimensions (of
two manifolds which intersect transversally in the product) add together like
the loganlhms of probabilities. Now, we know in mathematics that in a catastrophe
governed by a potential function at a single isolated point, there is an equality
between the eo-dimension of the singularity and the topological complexity of
the stabtlised function resulting from this catastrophet.
Thence results the equality (in this 'pure' situation) between the maximum
topological complexity of the form born of the catastrophe and a multiple of
the logarithm of the volume of the domain of the initial conditions leading to
the catastrophe. Becoming a little speculative, we can perhaps describe the
mental behaviour of an observer taldng note of the development of a fact. At the
start there is the ignorance or the observer; an ignorance he wishes to dispel.
With respect to his mental state this amounts to saying that the mental
dynamic is unstable like the significant point at the summit of a potential crest,
whlch can fall to one side or the other, and which symbolises the choice to be
made. The mind then projects this dynamic instability, in an imaginative manner,
onto reality. This amounts to saying that the mind interprets its actual ignorance
as a return of the real to a primitive indefiniteness (which can moreover be
present even if the event, due to talcc place, has not already talcen place, when
the die is still immobile at the bottom of the dice box ...). Whether the event
effectively takes place (the die Is thrown), whether the mind talces note of the
state of the fact through a better observation (for example, by the contribution
of information by others), the psychologccal result is the same. There Is resolution
of instability, passage from the virtual to the actual, and a formation In the mind
of a permanent form (the choice is made), of which the true morphology is
bounded above in complexity by the improbability of the Initial event. Let us
make no mistake, the very notion of information implies the possibility for each
of us, be he near or far from the event, to ·comprehend' it; that Is to say to
reconstitute its genesis mentally. 1t is also to say that lhis notion implicitly
harbours the old idea of the analogy of microcosm with macrocosm, of the
possibility for the mind to simulate the facts of the real world.
Thls notion also implies the possibility of the mind developing algorithms,
models of very general dynamic situations, which malce possible a certain predic·
tion of the facts (the upper bound of the complexity of the resulting morphology).
t We are concerned here wllh the following rheorcm : Let /()cf) be a function havina• point
of sin~;ularlry belated ar the oraln . Tkn the quotlenr algebra of the algebra for the formal
•equenoes In 0, [(/ Rx/)J, by the ideal J of the partial derivatl~ ff, 1$ on alj:ebn of fmite
dimension q . This number (\lilnor's number) can be considered as the cu-<limcnsion of the
&ingularity (in formal or analytic theory). Thls number q 11 alto the muunum number of
non-degcnerare a:ltlcal pomts pre5ented by a oUtblc deformation of the gorm/()cf). Now this
number or critical points can be taken as a measure of the topolot~•cal complexity of the
cerm of the function er Olaptcr 3.
•
In fnct, the 'pure' Situation described earlier in this mathematical analogy is only
rarely realised in practice. So the problem arises as to whether this type of
situation can be generalised; of whether we can create in some way a thermo-
dynamics of form, which would generalise to open local situations, some of the
concepts developed in classical thermodynamics. Only the future will tell of such
a scientific Utopia ....
lt is no exaggeration to suggest that at the very heart of the sense of the
word mformation there is the belief (at the same time magical and rational) in
the provision o[ [omt. lt Is an area where the power of the form is evident; it is
that of mental and spiritual activities. Give an order and the next man will obey
you; in the field of thought, formal deduction takes place, as everyone knows,
vi [ofml1e. By contrast in the physical world, the concept of provision of form
arouses very serious reserves. lt Is clear that to realise a physical event there are
constraints to respect of spatio-tempora.l, energetic and physico-chemical natures;
and that it is not possible to effect such a realisation through a single formal
invocation by itself alone. But once these constral.n ts have been repsected, it is
no less clear that the geometric form by itself alone, can have considerable
influence upon the realisation of a physical event. Such Is the case in Physics.
For example, a lens concentrating the sun's rays in its focus, can agnitcinflamm-
able material; a good illustration of the power of the geometric form of
lhe dlopter. ln Biology, the power of the form Is still more martlfest, for
example in animal organogenesis: the form of an organ lherein is very often,
dictated by its mechanical or metabolic efficacy. To determine the cases where
this provision of form can be shown In a natura.! milleu should be the chief aim
of this thermdoynamlc of forms which we wish to develop. To forget lhe con·
slralnts, spatial, energetic and physico-chemical, which must be respected in
order that an analogy of forms may be realised, is truly to flounder In magic, or
rather In delirious thought. I very much fear that the extensive use of the term
'information' in biology, as in the expression 'genetic informati.o n', is accompanied
by little indication, on the part of those who use it (being, as the majority of
molecular biologists arc, resolutely materialistic and reductionist) of an awareness
of the implicit appeal to that ancient and deep magic, which,perpetually invoking
the power of form, does not cease to condition our language and our thought.
CHAPTERI6
Logos Phoenix
language: with its virtually pure syntax, it generates meaning U1rough its own
constructions. We can experience anew the dream of Leibniz: to find the answer
to any question, let us go to the blackboard and calculate.... In the genesis of
the Leibnizian dream, probably not sufficient recognition has been g~ven to the
important part played by Newtonian mechanics. There we had a situation where,
effectively, every question, at least theoretically, could be resolved by calculation.
Certain people are of the belief that the formal logic arising from the work
of Boole in the nineteenth cenrury offers a realisation of a universal language.
This is a most profound error for this example Itself demonstrates why the
Leibnltian dream attempts the impossible. Logic, in constituting itself as a
formal language wiU1 absolute rigour, breaks its links with the real world .lndefmite
iteration of its operations creates illusory objects as can be seen in Cantor's
theory of the transfmites. To wish to maintain in language an unfettered genera-
tivity, formal expressions lose all contact with that which they signify, in fact,
lose all sense [I]. 1 have explained this state of things with a maxim, in which
may be seen an unusual form of the ·complementary' principle d.e ar to quantum
mechanics, 'All which is rigorous is insignificant' [2).
A universal language, if it is to be more than a game, must necessarily be
significant and consequently there will be exceptions to the principle. But can there
actually be such exceptions to principle? Is it possible to have rigour and meaning
at one and the same time? In particular, must mathematics itself be accused of
meaninglessness? The professional mathematician left in me finds it difficult
to accept that mathematics is only a gratuitous const ruction bereft of all connec-
tion with the real world. There is, after all, the 'miracle' of physical laws, the
'unreasonable accuracy' of mathematics in describing the physical world, accord-
ing to E. Wigner's apposite expression. But then, how do we explain that mathe·
matics can represent reality?
The reply, I believe, is given to us through the intuition of continuity.
lndeftnite Iteration can occasionally lead to an IDlmediately graspable object like
the act of infinity. l t is from here,lthink, that we find an interpretation approp-
riate to the Elcatic paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise. The paradox allows a
1 I I I
concrete sense to be given to the infinite sum - + + + ... + - + ... as the
2 4 8 2n
actual dutance at which Achilles overtakes the TortOise. Geometric continuity
also offers the possibility of giving a meaning to eollties requl.ring an infinity
of operations (Like giving a real number all its decimals). 1t happens that this
miracle of geometric intuition is compounded with another micraclc, that of the
physical laws, which 11 extends, and hence produces the quantitative science of
mechan1cs and of physics. At the level of geometric space on the macroscopic
scale of our human environment, there IS a quast-perfect equivalence between
our geometrico-mechnn!cal intuition and the effective motion of objects, governed
by classical laws of dyn11111ics. This is not a miracle , for any excessive imbalance
in our intuition leads mevitably to the revelation of latent inhibitors. guaranteeing
Sec. 16.2) Mathematics: A Universal Language? 289
~ -xo) { ~ -xor
f(x)=f(xo)+(x-xe)((xa)+ ... + . J 1>(xo)+ ... +Am(x) .;___..;;,;._
1! m!
where the function Am(x) can be estimated above by the norm of the derivative
rm.
It Is typical that ln these two theorems, aglobal,and non-specific, knowledge
of the functionf(f(x, y) in the ftrst case;f(x) in the second} is exchanged for a
more specific local knowledge about the point x 0 • Apparently, Information has
been lost and one has struck a bad bargain. In fact, we have here the most funda·
mental two theorems of analysis, whose immense productivity is weU known. It
is the introduction of the opposition: local- global, which gives these theorems
their force, and in the end provides all their meaning. 1t will be possible for
example to reconstitute the global behaviour of the set of zeros f(x, y ) = 0, in
the first case, by an iterative application of the local theorem, possibly changing
the direction of proJection there in order lo avoid' points where/>'= 0.
The theorems in mathematics wblcb are expressed m the existential form:
'In the interval [ab] there exists x such that ... ·,are countless. This is because
mathematics has en tered a world which has retreated to a semantic disengage·
rnent created by the automatisation of algebraic operations [3).
tln f:act.the lav.s of Calilellft mechunoct (or NeWionian} are not rcaUy visible In the bandlil\j\
of Objects at our normal sc•le. Immediate technoto,teal needs led rather to th~ struggle 10
O\'eu:omc friction, and hence the Atlsto•clian law F : k V (force is proportlonallo •"doclty).
There is no doubt that the more nptd movement of •niltcry shell< brought 10 consciousnes.s
the phenomena of inertia, ond later the taw F =m.,. (force is propomonalto accelention).
Sucl! a bw, in the reneralisation "hoc:b laplace and liamilton mode, has the supplementary
advant"ie of altowtl\ll lln intersub;ecth"r d•><:riptlon of the stotes of motton, that is lo say
offerins a permanent seometricnl framework for the descnption of motion allowing the
re't'rsibibty of the arrov. of ttm•.
•
t AfterI<Jint, only the profoundly origin<~ I mind which dro>-e C. S. Pelrce seemed to I.Jik• on
the problem of unl•er$41J.
•
REFERENCES
(1] Thorn, R., Les mathematiques modernes: une erreur pedagogique et philo-
sophique?, /0-18,848, pp. 57- 88.
(2) Thorn, R., La science malgre tout, Organum, vol. XVll, ~;·ncyclopocdia
Universalis, L 'homme et son savoir, pp. 5 11.
[3) On this notion of semantic disengagemeni,see the article 'Lesmathematiques
modemes .. .'(Ref. [I]).
(4] Delanre, P., Report io C.N.R.S.,A.T.P .,Analyscdessystemes, 1978.
[5) Greenbeig, J. Ji., Some Universals of Grammar in Universals of Language,
M.I .T . Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1966, pp. 73- 113.
[6) See on this point, EntretJen sur les catastrophes, in Omicar, No. 16, 1978,
pp. 73-109.
(7) Benviniste, E., Categories de pensee et categories de languc , Les Etudes
Philosoph~ques, 4, 1958.
(8 ] Vuillemin, J ., De la /ogiquea la tMohJgie, Nouvelle Bibliotheque Scientiflque,
pp. 75- 80.
CB..o\PTER 17
doubt, because it has successfully gambled with the environment. There is little
to be gained from fatalism except, perhaps, a 'death in the faith'.ln an incomple-
tely understood situa(jon, any applied strategy, involves risk. Here appears the
moral side of gaming, notably the point of view of responsibility. Should those
who believe they are doing it for the best but who take an action which triggers
a catastrophe, suffer sanctions for their stupidity or their bad luck?
This points to the prknordial interest in techniques of estimating risks.
An exploratory strategy, initially prudent, then more bold, illustrates well, the
localisation of 'catastrophic' inputs of the system, those for which a small
variation in the input leads to an abrupt, dispropomonate variation in the
output. The current controversies about nuclear power are ittvolved in this
problematic, with aggravating circumstances where in thls case, according to
every probability, it will not be we who suffer from present decisions but our
grandchildren or great-grandchildren. finally, in certain particularly perverse
cases, the player finds himself, without suspecting it, in the situation of a mine-
clearirlg squad which, probing the soil, may inadvertently explode a mine. This
is a situation for which we readily find analogues in certain experimental pro-
cedures: notably in medicine.
That which, in the last analysis, justifies the gaming attitude is the fact that
the only conceivable way of unveiling a black box, is to play with it. All the
major technical and scientific achievements of humanity consist of unveiled
black boxes. Let us take, for example, the 'GalUean epistemological revolution',
which is at the origin of modern science and which has ensured its massive
success. It is foolish to go on saying that this was the advent of the experimental
method. For insofar as experimentation is a game, man .has played it, and highly
effectively, well before Galileo: notably with stone, fire and metal. it was a purely
mathematical step; that of recognising the notion of function. Unknown to the
ancient mathematicians the notion of function was forged among the sixteenth
century I talian algebraists, Uten lost sight of during the seventeenth century, not
to appear in its modem form until made explicit by Leibniz.
This notion accounts perfectly for a particularly simple type of black box:
those where each input u e U completely (and uniquely) determines the output
ye Y. In other words systems for wb.icl1 the passage of time has no effect on the
output, are systems without memory, and hence without an 'internal state'.
Once this idea is established in the mind, it remains only to search out those
phenomena which permit such a description (for example the motion of heavy
bodies). Thus this description develops more by 'thought experiment' than by
experimentation proper. In t11is case, the black box is reduced to a pure transition
mechanism: input -> output, yet still is no less capable of great complexity.
Even so, for a general system, the output is not a univocal function of the
input. All that happens to the system contributes to U1e value of an output: to
one input, there can correspond an infmityofpossibleoutputs.ln an intermediate
position there are black boxes where only a finite number of ou tputs corresponds
I
I Sec. 17.3] The Hermeneutic Approach 299
to one particular input. Such is the case of the black boxes governed by elemen-
tary catastrophe theory.
Faced with this programme, we could protest its irrationality, its abandon·
ment, apparently, of all the power of modem science. To this. it could be replied
that Galilean physicism has not done away with the Aristotelian 'qualities',
but has obscured them will mathematical formalism. If heavy bodies fall to the
ground, it may be either because they have a tendency to move to their natural
place, the centre of the earth, or because they arc subject to the potential
V = + gz (where z is height and g is the constant of gravitation). The two
explanations are as verbal as each other, the second having the advantage of
being quantitatively precise. Particle physicists who, classically, starting with the
trajectories after coUisions (diffusion) , determine the interaction potential (the
inverse problem) are doing no more than disclosing the 'deep tendencies' under·
lying every such collection of phenomena. A simple potential such as that of
gravity, V = gz , can be interpreted as the intentionality of a psychism: the
tendency of a body to seek its natural place, according to Aristotle. So, where
the tendencies are numerous, conflicting and tangled, it is quite natural to try
to organise them into a unique subjectivity, of which they will be the instantan·
eo us components. At bottom, it is necessary to resolve the problem of synthesis,
and then when mathematical synthesis fails (synthesis is deftned in general by
those mathematical instruments which are analytic continuation or the analytic
action of groups) there remains only 'subjective synthesis': as Comte himself
discovered.
In the face of a puzzling local situation, universal reason, the logos, is not
sufficient. it is necessary to have recourse to that skill, a form of artful intelli·
gence, which the classical Greeks caJled the 'Metis' [ l) . Ll is typical that all the
major achievements of mathematicians are due at the outset, to 'artfulness'; a
paradoxical situation, for in mathematics, a science of exemplary rationality,
progression is accomplished more by tricks than by general methods of great
weight.
Now ruses play a fundamental part in games; it is by artful thinking that
winning strategies in a game are determined. The herrneneutlc task, in the
face of a particularly enigmatic black box, is to be able to associate itself to a game,
in which the interpreter and 'the spirit in the box' will be the players. The
interpreter will h.ave won when he has seen through the strategy of the system's
internal demon and then the black box will be unveiled ....
This brings us to another justification for this 'subjective' synthesis. In
effect, the semantic study of language reveals that the most complex semantic
concept is that of the individual human (localised by a proper noun). Thus
while there exists. for a given situation, a hope of rendering it Intelligible, this
will be by seeing it in terms of the behaviour of human psychism [2]. Should
this identification fail, there remains little hope of having at our disposal psycho·
logical means which allow the internal simulation of mechanisms interior to the
system.
That such a 'psychologising' interpretation of the bermeneutic task is weU·
Sec. 17.4] Aermeneutics and the Theory of Games 301
founded, even in pure science.! require only proof the following fact: two kinds
of blacks boxes, not counting the straight functional relation, are practised in
science; the elementary catastrophe model, on the one hand, and statistical inter·
pretation, on the other, are particular cases of them. In order to prove this, let
us invoke the general schema of the theory of two person games (cf. I. Eke land
[3 J .•.).
tTnnmtor's note: )cux de la nature' in r rench is more appo~te then 'fruk or nature' in
l' ngllih The word '•pon • IJ used In cenaln circumstances. 'Caprice' Invokes ' uncertainty'
nther than 'pme·.
•
One step more, and we will arrive at those socially organised, pure conllict
situations which are games of chance. There, the possible outcomes (like numbers
in a lottery) are equiprobable and completely interchangeable. One does not
identify as 'agent' so abstract an object as a number than by the procedure of
'betting', which consists of depositing part of one's wealth on the place attributed
to the corresponding outcome: like the gambler staking on a number in roulette.
There is hardly any question that behind the psychological mechanism of the
laying of a bet, there is in the gambler the quasi-magical desire to affect the
outcome of the process. (In a football match,lhe supporters of a club can act on the
morale of their team by their noisy manifestations of support).
17.8 SCJENCEANDGAMES
But let us return to the game as a hermeneutic function, that which unvells
black boxes. It is a matter of discovering the strategles of variations in inputs
which are most likely to reveal significant behaviours of the outputs. In the
absence of pre-existing theory, we are reduced to pouering about, without
any great internal motivation. Here is the major vice of a modern experimental
science like biology. The scientist tinkers with his system, without any precon·
ceived ideas: 'lf I do this, the system does that'. On this count, we will be able
to experiment on a system quasi-indeflllitely, without every demonstrating
significance in the behaviour of the outputs. Consequently, the putting into
Sec. 17 .8] Science and Games 305
REFERENCES
(I I On the 'Met is', see the work of M. Detienne, I .-P. Vernant, Les Ruses de
I'Jnrelli'gence: la Miuis des Grecs, Flammarlon.
[2 j Recall in references to this, the reply of Oedipus to the riddle of the Sphinx:
'Man. Will he not be the paradigmatlcal reply to aU riddles?·
[3j Ekeland, 1., Topologic differenrielle et theorie desjeux, Pub/. Math.IHES,
13, 4, 1974, pp. 375-388.
[4 I Thorn, R., D'un modele de la science a une science des modeles. .S:vmhese,
3,1975, pp. 359 379, Reidel.
(5J Thorn, R.,Srructura/ stability and morphogenesis, Benjamin, 1975.
(6J Caillois, R., Les Jeux etles hommes, Gallinard, 1958.