155. Centeno v.

Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 545 (1985)

Facts:
Lot 4, Block 11, involved in the 'Contract of Sale' (ANNEX 'B') executed by Pedro
M, Cruz in favor of plaintiff Nestor Centeno, was the subject of an earlier 'Contract of Sale'
executed by said Pedro M. Cruz in favor of Conrado P. Uy on May 26. 1969.

Subsequently, said Conrado P. Uy, for consideration paid to him by plaintiff Nestor
Centeno, assigned and transferred rights and interests on said Lot 4, Block 11 to the said
plaintiff, with the conformity of Pedro M, Cruz. Thus Pedro M. Cruz executed the Contract
of Sale in favor of plaintiff Nestor Centeno.

From February 1972 up to the present, plaintiffs have not paid the installments
specified under the 'Contract of Sale either to the spouses Pedro M, Cruz and Rosalina
Villar, or to the defendants. Plaintiffs have not made any tender of payment of the said
installments as they fell due to the spouses Pedro M. Cruz and Rosalina Villar or to the
defendants after consolidation of ownership of the foreclosed property in favor of the
defendants. Neither have the plaintiffs made consignation of the said installments as they
fell due with the court of proper jurisdiction, also after consolidation of ownership of said
property in favor of the defendants.

CFI: Court renders judgment directing defendants to respect, recognize and abide by
the terms and conditions of the K of sale and for the plaintiffs to continue the payments
of the installment due thereunder; For the defendants to credit plaintiffs for all the
installment payments heretofore made by them on their respective lots and for defendants
to pay plaintiffs the sum of P2,000.00 byway of attorney's fees. The rest of the prayer for
damages is denied for lack of sufficient basis.

CA: Revesed the said judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint. held that the
disclosure by the spouses Cruz to the Victorias of their intention to subdivide the property
into residential lots was merely simple talk on preliminaries attendant to a contract of
sale, and its non-compliance does not affect the rights and obligations embodied in their
contract; that the statement made by Cruz spouses that they were the attorney in fact of
Victorias was not at all binding upon Victoria, as it was expressly stated in paragraph 6
of the Stipulation of Facts that the Cruz spouses were never been appointed as such; that
when the spouses Cruz and the Victorias formally executed a deed of sale with mortgage
on March 1 1,1970, the contracts of sale in favor of the lot buyers were not mentioned in
the said deed considering that the contracts of sale were made prior to the execution of
the said deed, hence, the lot buyers could not compel the Victorias to recognize their
contracts with the spouses Cruz; that there is no stipulation and evidence that the lot
buyers upon the execution of the con-tracts in their favor took possession, openly and
publicly of the property in question so as to give notice to the Victorias of their prior rights;
that the separate titles issued on each lot were all in the name of Cruz with the mortgage
in favor of the Victorias annotated, but no notation was made as to the interests of the lot
buyers; that there is no evidence on record to show that the Victorias were in estoppel;
that there is no stipulation that any of the money paid by the lot buyers to the spouses
Cruz had been illegally appropriated by the Victorias and that the spouses Victoria were
clearly mortgagees with real right to foreclose the same when their mortgage credit was
not paid on time.

SC: We find no merit in the present appeal. The property in question was originally owned
by the Victories. On July 10,1969, they executed in favor of the spouses Pedro M. Cruz
and Rosalina Villar a contract to sell said property, which at that time was still
unregistered and was covered by Tax Declaration No. 5685, Under said agreement, it was
stipulated that while possession of the property shag be considered delivered to the buyers
Pedro M. Cruz and Rosalina Villar, the ownership thereof shall remain with the Victorias
until the downpayment of P70,000.00 shag have been paid, in which event the necessary
deed of transfer of ownership of the property will be executed together with a first
mortgage on the property in favor of the Victorias to secure payment of the balance of the
purchase price. On March 11, 1970, said deed of transfer with first mortgage on the
property was executed between the Victorias and Pedro M. Cruz and Rosalina Villar.
Thereafter the Cruzes registered the property and were issued Original Certificate of Title
No. 8626 with the mortgage constituted on the property in favor of the Victorias annotated
thereon.
156. Egao vs. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 484 (1989)

Facts: The respondents filed a motion for quieting the title

andrecovery of possession and ownership against the petitioners. Apparently, they claim
they are the owners of the parcel of land by virtue of the deed of sale they entered into
with Roberto Marfori to whom the petitioners allegedly sold their land to. The Egaos
acquired their land title by virtue of a free patent and transferred their ownership in favor
of Marfori by virtue of a deed of sale. However, the Certificate of Title was not transferred
in Marfori’s favor. Upon purchase of the land from Marfori, the respondents introduced
improvements thereon and paid taxes for the property. However, the petitioners illegally
occupied portions of the land. Petitioner answers that they are the true owner of the land
by virtue of the Certificate of Title issued by the Register of Deeds pursuant to their Free
Patent. The lower court ruled in favor of Egao. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision
of the lower court on grounds that the main issue should be whether Egao can validly sell
the land to Marfori who subsequently transferred the ownership to the respondents. The
CA holds both Egao and Marfori to be in pari delicto for violating the 5-year restriction
provided by Commonwealth 141 against encumbrance
and alienation of public lands acquired thru free patent or homestead patent. They
cannot therefore obtain affirmative relief. It also declares the respondents as innocent
purchasers for value who the obtained the duplicate of the OCT still in the name of the
Egaos from Marfori and ownership was transferred to them by physical possession of the
property. It thus promulgated judgment holding the respondents the absolute owners of
the land in dispute, to cancel the OCT of the petitioner and its transfer thereof to the
respondents and to surrender peaceful possession of the land to the respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners validly transferred their ownership to Marfori to
resolve the rights of the respondents over the land in dispute?
Ruling: The SC holds that based on the adduced evidence, the Egaos sold the lot to
Marfori within the 5-year restriction period provided by law on Free Patent based on the
Deed of Sale entered into by the parties. Although the petitioners denied the validity of
the Deed of Sale the court held that it was notarized and a notarial document has in its
favor the presumption of regularity. When the land was sold to the respondents, they
know that the OCT is still registered under the name of the petitioners. Thus, they are
not considered to be innocent purchaser as contrary to the ruling of the CA. Where a
purchaser neglects to make the necessary inquiries, and closes his eyes to facts which
should puta reasonable man on his guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect
in his vendor's title, and relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of the
vendor, purchases the property without making any further investigation, he cannot claim
that he is a purchaser in good faith for value. A private individual cannot bring an action
for reversion or any actionwhich would have an effect of canceling a free patent andthe
certificate of title issued on the basis thereof since the land covered will form part again
of the public domain. Sec. 124 of the Public Land Act provides that deeds of sale of
patented lands, perfected within the prohibited five (5) year period are null and void thus
the Egaos have no title to pass to Marfori and nobody can dispose that which does not
belong to him. The respondents are not innocent purchasers for value with no standing
to question the rights of the petitioners over the land and to file an action to quiet the
title. The petitioners remained to be the registered owners and entitled to remain in
physical possession of the disputed property. Respondents are ordered to deliver the OCT
to the petitioners without prejudice to an action for reversion of the land to be instituted
by the Solicitor General for the State.
157. Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 336 (1995)
Facts:
Petitioners bought 2 parcels of land from Evelyn Mercado, with the latter acting as
attorney-in-fact of her brothers and sisters. The first parcel of land purchased adjoins a
lot measuring 100sqm which was offered to petitioners for 100,000.00 shortly after the
sale of the first lot. Petitioners paid the initial amount of 2,700 as earnest money with
balance to be paid in installments. After the vendor, Evelyn Mercado, received several
more payments, she turned over the owner’s copy of the Torrens title to petitioners. A new
title could not at the time be issued because Evelyn had the power of attorney only from
one sister Melita, she assured petitioners that she had full authority from her brothers
and sisters to sell the lot and promised to contact them. Two months before the deed of
sale was finally registered, Evelyn Mercado, sold the same parcel of land to respondent
Auilino Arevalo. No attempt to register the deed was made by respondent Arevalo. RD
informed petitioners that Arevalo filed an affidavit of adverse claim, and later on filed an
action for specific performance, cancellation of title, and damages against petitioners.
Petitioners in turn filed the two other cases which were consolidated with the case filed
by Arevalo.
Issue: Who has the superior right to a parcel of land sold to 2 different buyers at different
times by its former owners.
Held: The applicable provision of law is Article 1544 of the Civil Code. There is no need
to enter into a discussion of who between petitioners and respondent Arevalo first
recorded the sale in their favor. Unfortunately, for respondents, petitioners are the only
registrants — as indeed up to the present time Arevalo has not recorded the sale in his
favor. Too, petitioners have been issued a new certificate of title in their names. What
appears pivotal to us is the issue of whether petitioners were in good faith both at the
time of the acquisition or sale of the property and also at the time of the recording
or registration of the same. Good faith on petitioners' part was not found by respondent
court, thus its decision adverse to them.
The records show that petitioners are the first buyers of the disputed land. They are the
only party to obtain and take hold of the owner's copy of the Torrens title. They are the
only party to thereupon take possession of the property. They are the only registrants of
the sale for which they have been issued a certificate of title in their names. All these
circumstances and acts can only be indicative of good faith. It follows that their title to
the land should be upheld and remain undisturbed.
Petitioners Honorio and Estrelita Santiago are hereby declared owners in fee simple of the
disputed property whose Transfer Certificate of Title No. 113462 is recognized and upheld
as indefeasible.
158. Solivel vs. Francisco, 170 SCRA 218 (1989)
Facts:

Petitioners are the registered owners of two parcels of land in Municipality of Digos.
Frederico Tompong, a practicing lawyer, and Isias Ngoho obtained the petitioners’
agreement to sell their property to a certain Espinosa for 60,000.00. Giving the Solivels a
partial payment of P10,000.00 allegedly coming from Espinosa, Tompong and Ngoho
persuaded the Solivels to give them the certificates of title to the property, for which they
issued a receipt, and promised that the sale would be consummated and the balance of
P50,000.00 paid within six (6) months, failing which the partial payment would be
forfeited in the Solivels' favor and their certificates of title returned to them. Tompong and
Ngoho never returned to make good their promise. They could not in fact be located until
some months later when they were arrested by Philippine Constabulary on complaint of
a certain Atty. Hilario Mapayo to whom, it appeared, they had sold a portion of the Solivels'
property.

Tompong and Ngoho were confronted by Valentin Solivel and his son, Rafael, at
the PC Headquarters in Davao City. It uncovered the existence of other documents
relating to the Solivels' property. One was a deed dated September 8, 1972 acknowledged
before Atty. Peregrino Andres of Davao City, with Tompong as one of the instrumental
witnesses, whereby Isaias Ngoho, as alleged attorney-in-fact of the Solivels, sold the
property in question to Paulino Cagas for the price of P19,000.00. Two others were
receipts evidencing payment of the sums of P9,000.00 and P2,000.00 made by Atty.
Mapayo to Ngoho in the presence of Tompong. A fourth document was an affidavit of non-
tenancy executed by Ngoho and sworn to before Atty. Peregrino Andres.

Issue: Whether or not title to real property is passed to an innocent purchaser by a deed
of sale in his favor executed in the name of the owners by one falsely claiming to be said
owners' duly appointed and authorized attorney-in-fact.

Ruling:
The Court reverses and vacates the Amended Decision of the Trial Court insofar as
it divests the petitioners Valentin Solivel and Petra Mente of the ownership of the property
in question and modifies it insofar as it orders the defendants Federico Tompong and
Isaias Ngoho to pay said petitioners P19,000.00, plus interests from August 13, 1974,
said defendants being ordered to pay such amount instead to private respondent Paulino
Cagas.
The deed of sale of September 8, 1972 executed by Isaias Ngoho as purported
attorney-in-fact of the petitioners in favor of Paulino Cagas is declared null and void, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6064 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao del Sur in the
name of Cagas by virtue of said deed is cancelled. Paulino Cagas is ordered to reconvey
to the petitioners by registrable deed the property covered by said certificate of title.
The reckless and bare-faced deceits practiced by defendants Federico Tompong
and Isaias Ngoho on the petitioners and the private respondent are clearly evincive of
extreme bad faith, intent to defraud and criminal propensities which, in the mind of the
Court, the Trial Court's award of damages is inadequate either to punish or to discourage.
159. PNB v International Corporate Bank & CA, 199 SCRA 508 (1991)
Facts:

On December 16, 1966, a real estate mortgage was executed and registered on December
19, 1966 with the Register of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan. The corresponding
annotations were made on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 49020 and 49021 covering
the mortgaged parcels of land as entry No. 264514 therein.

On September 14, 1967, an amendment of mortgage was executed in favor of the

petitioner and registered on September 15, 1967 with the Register of Deeds of Alaminos,
Pangasinan. The corresponding annotations were made on the aforesaid Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 49020 and 49021 as entry No. 282423 therein.

On August 1, 1968, another real estate mortgage was executed and registered on August
2, 1968 with the Register of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan. The corresponding
annotations were made on Original Certificates of Title Nos. 18988, 18987, 19020, 19021,
19017, 19015, 18989, 19018, 19019, 19016, 18983, 18984, 18985 and 18986 covering
the mortgaged parcels of land as entry No. 302341 therein.

On October 31, 1968, a real estate mortgage was executed in favor of the petitioner and
registered on November 4, 1968 with the Register of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan. The
corresponding annotations were made on the Original Certificates of Title with numbers
as enumerated in the immediately preceding paragraph as entry No. 306445 therein

Annotated subsequent to the foregoing memoranda of the mortgage lien of petitioner on

the above-mentioned properties is a "Notice of Levy re Civil Case No. 69035, CFI-Manila,
Continental Bank vs. Archimedes J. Balingit and Ely Suntay Balingit".

For failure of the Balingit spouses to settle their loan obligation with petitioner, the latter
extrajudicially foreclosed under Act 3135, as amended, the sixteen (16) parcels of land
covered by the real estate mortgages executed by the said spouses in favor of petitioner.
The sheriff s certificate of sale was registered on April 3, 1972 with the Register of Deeds,
with a memorandum thereof duly annotated at the back of the aforesaid certificates of
title of the foreclosed properties. Upon the expiration of the one-year legal redemption
period, petitioner consolidated in its name the ownership of all the foregoing mortgaged
properties for which new transfer certificates of title were issued in its name. However,
the annotation of the notice of levy in favor of private respondent was carried over to and
now appears as the sole annotated encumbrance in the new titles of petitioner, that is,
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1228, 1229, 1230, 1231, 1232, 1236, 1237, 1238, 1239,
1240, 1242, 1243, 1244, 1216, 1217 and 1218.

Private respondent International Corporate Bank, as successor in interest of the defunct

Continental Bank, filed an opposition to the petition contending that, since it was not
informed of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, the new and consolidated titles over
the foreclosed properties issued in favor of herein petitioner are null and void.
Held: The rule is that upon a proper foreclosure of a prior mortgage, all liens subordinate
to the mortgage are likewise foreclosed, and the purchaser at public auction held
pursuant thereto acquires title free from the subordinate liens. Ordinarily, thereafter the
Register of Deeds is authorized to issue the new titles without carrying over the annotation
of subordinate liens. In a case with similar features, we had earlier held that the failure
of the subsequent attaching creditor to redeem, within the time allowed by Section 6 of
Act 3136, the land which was sold extrajudicially to satisfy the first mortgage, gives the
purchaser a perfect right to secure the cancellation of the annotation of said creditor's
attachment lien on the certificates of title of said land.
The contention of private respondent in its opposition that the extrajudicial foreclosure is
null and void for failure of petitioner to inform them of the said foreclosure and the
pertinent dates of redemption so that it can exercise its prerogatives under the law 18 is
untenable. There being obviously no contractual stipulation therefor, personal notice is
not necessary and what governs is the general rule in Section 3 of Act 3135, as amended,
which directs the posting of notices of the sale in at least three (3) public places of the
municipality where the property is situated, and the publication thereof in a newspaper
of general circulation in said municipality.

Finally, the levy in favor of private respondent's predecessor in interest arising from the
judgment in Civil Case No. 69035 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, appearing at
the back of petitioner's certificates of titles, is already without force and effect consider
that the same has been annotated in the certificates of title for more than ten (10) years
without being duly implemented. Properties levied upon by execution must be sold at
public auction within the period of ten (10) years during which the judgment can be
enforced by action.
160. Arrazola vs Bernas, 86 SCRA 279 (1978)

FACTS:

Elviro Bernas disinherited his adopted daughter Teresita and when he was 79 years old,
he executed a notarized will instituting his brother and sister as heirs to all his properties
including the lots which he had involuntary transferred to Teresita. In 1967, Elviro died.
On December, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register of deeds of Capiz a verified
notice of adverse claim. A copy of the will was attached to the adverse claim.

After the register of deeds had annotated the adverse claim on the transfer certificates of
title, Teresita filed in the cadastral and probate proceedings a motion for the cancellation
of the annotation of adverse claim. The motion was predicated on the grounds that she
was not served with prior notice" of the adverse claim and that there was "no petition for
approval or justification" filed with the court. Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio
opposed the motion. The lower court in its order of August 20, 1968 granted it and ordered
the register of deeds to cancel the annotation. The oppositors appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not expected hereditary rights do not constitute adverse claim

RULING:

Yes, the contingent, expectant and inchoate hereditary rights of the children of
a living parent do not constitute an adverse claim during his lifetime which could be
annotated on the titles covering the parent's land. That is an illustration of a frivolous or
vexatious adverse claim.

In the instant case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of the adverse claim because
the will of Elviro Bernas had not yet been probated. It reasoned out that before the probate
Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio are merely presumptive heirs with a
"contingent, expectant and inchoate" interest in the two lots.

The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed land is to apprise
third persons that there is a controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve
and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy. It
is a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to
the outcome of the dispute.

It has been said that the annotation of an adverse claim should not be confused with its
validity which should be litigated in a proper proceeding and that the registration of an
invalid adverse claim is not as harmful as the non-registration of a valid one
161. Lozano vs. Ballesteros, 195 SCRA 681 (1991)

Facts:

Maria Nieves Nunez Tuazon, deceased mother of the plaintiffs, was the original registered
exclusive owner of the land in question comprising Lots Q, B and O as evidenced by
Original Certificate of Title No. 46076. However only Lot Q is the subject of this present
action. On March 6, 1958, by virtue of a deed of absolute sale, Tuazon sold the land in
question to Marciana de Dios.

On June 2, 1958, Augusto, Dario, Jaime, Cresencia, Lourdes and Alicia, all surnamed
Lozano, together with Marciana de Dios filed a verified petition before the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan seeking the approval of the consolidation-subdivision plan and
for the annotation of several documents at the back of the Original Certificate of Title No.
46076. Acting on the verified petition, the court approved the consolidation-subdivision
plan and directed the inscription, among others, of said deed of sale at the back of the
title. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26537 was issued in the name of Marciana de Dios
who later mortgaged the land to Kaluyagan Rural Bank in San Carlos City, Pangasinan.

On January 22, 1963, plaintiffs caused the annotation of their adverse claim at the back
of the title of the said lot. Thereafter, a petition for the settlement of the estate of Augusta
Lozano was filed by the plaintiffs in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. On
November 18, 1965, plaintiffs through the administrator filed an inventory which
included said lot Q. De Dios sold lot Q to defendant Ignacio Ballesteros and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 63171 was later transferred in his name.

On September 21, 1966, plaintiffs filed an action for reconveyance against De Dios in Civil
Case No. D-1953, alleging that the estate of Augusto Lozano is the absolute owner of Lots
Q, O and B. On June 8, 1967, the court rendered a default decision in favor of the
plaintiffs. However, the judgment was not satisfied on the ground that De Dios was
insolvent and did not have any registered property.

HELD: The applicable law in the case at bar is still Section 110 of Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act despite the modification introduced by Section 70 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. The said section particularly deals with adverse claim.

Hence, for the purpose of registration and as required by the abovequoted provision, as
amended, the following are the formal requisites of an adverse claim:

1. the adverse claimant must state the following in writing:

a. his alleged right or interest;

b. how and under whom such alleged right or interest is acquired;

c. the description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed, and

d. the certificate of title number

2. the statement must be signed and sworn to before a notary public or other
officer authorized to administer oath; and

3. the claimant should state his residence or the place to which all notices may
be served upon him.
The lower court quoted in part the adverse claim filed by the plaintiffs, to wit:

That this adverse claim is being filed prior to the filing of a court action because
all the properties above-described formerly belong to my husband, the late
Augusto Lozano.

However, the lower court noted that "the adverse claim filed and annotated on
the back of the title of Marciana de Dios and later to the title of the herein defendant,
did not meet the requirements provided for in Section 110 of Act 496, that is setting
forth fully how or under whom the heirs of Lozano acquired the property.

We adhere to the lower court's findings and find appellee's position meritorious.
A cursory reading of the aforequoted adverse claim filed by the plaintiffs shows that the
same has failed to comply with the formal requisites of Section 110 of Act 496, more
specifically the appellants' failure to state how and under whom their alleged right or
interest is acquired. Thus, the effect of such non-compliance renders the adverse claim
non-registrable and ineffective.

In a case where the adverse claim filed for registration did not fully comply with
the formal requisites of Section 110 of Act No. 496, or more specifically, there being no
description of the land in which right or interest is claimed nor the place to which all
notices may be served upon the adverse claimant given, such adverse claim could not be
registered.
162. Leviste & Co. vs. Noblejas, 89 SCRA 520 (1979)

Facts:

The property involved, situated in Parañaque, Rizal has a total area of

approximately 1.6 hectares and is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 108425 of
the Province of Rizal in the name of Z. Garcia Realty, Inc, (Garcia Realty, for short), a
corporation duly organized and existing under our laws. On a date that does not appear
of record, the property was converted into a subdivision called the Garville Subdivision.
This subdivision has blocks and certain lots and the controversy in this case centers
on Lot 6, Block 4 (subsequently Lot 16, plan (LRC) Psd-56800).

The title under the name of Garcia Realty carries with it several encumbrances,
liens and lis pendens. However, on May 29, 1967, respondent Villanueva and Garcia
Realty consummated a contract of sale over the disputed lot.

Respondent Villanueva sought to have the sale registered and title issued in her favor,
free of any encumbrance, but petitioners Leviste and Berthelsen objected alleging that
they had registered adverse claims and attachments. RD refused to issue a new title to
Villanueva without carriying over the annotations registered prior to Villanueva’s adverse
claim.

Upon the request of respondent Villanueva, the Register of Deeds elevated the matter en
consults to the Land Registration Commission which held that the deed of sale may be
registered and a new TCT be issued to Villanueva free of any encumbrance.

Petitioner’s MR having been denied, they interposed this appeal by certiorari. That the
registered adverse claim or lien of J. Antonio Leviste under Entry No. 55209 involving Lot
5 of Block 5 of the Garville Subdivision, according to the deed of assignment executed by
Leticia Ramos is prior to and superior to that of petitioner Maria Villanueva (herein
respondent). Hence, the hen annotated in favor of Leviste holds preference over that of
Maria Villanueva. The agreement to sell in favor of Maria Villanueva was not registered.
Hence, the rights of a lienholder established by law cannot be invoked in favor of petitioner
(herein respondent).

Held: The rule is that between two involuntary documents, the earlier entry prevails.

Ordinarily, therefore, the notice of lis pendens entered on September 7, 1964, and
Leviste's adverse claim annotated on April 28, 1966, both registered prior to respondent
Villanueva's adverse claim, which was entered on May 6, 1966, are entitled to precedence
over the latter.

The basis of respondent Villanueva's adverse claim was an agreement to sell executed in
her favor by Garcia Realty. An agreement to self is a voluntary instrument as it is a wilful
act of the registered owner. As such voluntary instrument, Section 50 of Act No. 496
expressly provides that the act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and
affect the land. And Section 55 of the same Act requires the presentation of the owner's
duplicate certificate of title for the registration of any deed or voluntary instrument. As
the agreement to see involves an interest less than an estate in fee simple, the same
should have been registered by filing it with the Register of Deeds who, in turn makes a
brief memorandum thereof upon the origin al and owner's duplicate certificate of title.

It does not appear that Villanueva attempted to register the agreement to sell
under Section 52 of Act No. 496 and that the registered owner, Garcia Realty, refused to
surrender the duplicate certificate for the annotation of said instrument. Instead,
Villanueva merely filed an adverse claim based on said agreement to sell Considering
that Section 62 of the Land Registration Act prescribes the procedure for the
registration of Villanueva's interest less than an estate in fee simple on the disputed lot
and there being no showing of her inability to produce the owner's duplicate certificate,
the remedy provided in Section 110 of Act 496, which was resorted to by Villanueva, is,
therefore, ineffective for the purpose of protecting her right or interest on the disputed
lot.

Inasmuch as the adverse claim filed by Villanueva was not valid, the same did
not have the effect of a conveyance of her right or interest on the disputed lot and could
not prejudice any right that may have arisen thereafter in favor of third parties.
Consequently, the attachments of Berthelsen, Leviste, and that in Civil Case No. 2489-P
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal covering the disputed lot are superior to that
acquired by Villanueva and will have to be carried over to the new title to be issued in
her favor. Thus, Section of Act 496 provides that:

If at the time of any transfer there appear upon the registration book
encumbrances or claims adverse to the title of the registered owner, they
shall be stated in the new certificate or certificates, except so far as they
may be simultaneously released or discharged.

The attachments of Nita U. Berthelsen (Entry No. 62224). Leviste & Co. (Entry No.
62748) and that in Civil Case No. 2489-P of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Entry
No. 73465), must have to be carried over to the new transfer certificate of title to be
issued to respondent Maria Villanueva.
163. Director of Lands v Ababa, 88 SCRA 513 (1979)