Rupp, L Women, Class and Mobilization in Nazi Germany PDF

Guilford Press
Women, Class, and Mobilization in Nazi Germany

Author(s): Leila J. Rupp
Source: Science & Society, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Spring, 1979), pp. 51-69
Published by: Guilford Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40402148
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WOMEN, CLASS, AND MOBILIZATION IN
NAZI GERMANY*
LEILA J. RUPP
NAZIS, ACCORDING TO THE OLD standard im-

age, efficiently reduced the number of women in th
labor force during the Depression, then quickly
mobilized women during the war - the former in accordance
with ideological principles, the latter to meet the inexorable de-
mands of a wartime economy. This image has come under much
attack in recent books and articles on women in Nazi society.1 We
now know that the Nazis did not successfully mobilize women
even after finally enacting a registration decree in 1943. The
explanation for this situation, however, is still a matter of debate.
Both Jill Stephenson, in her recent book, Women in Nazi Society,
and Tim Mason, in his two-part article on women in Nazi Ger-
many, argue that popular opposition to the mobilization of
women was a major cause of the regime's reluctance to conscript
women. In contrast, Dörte Winkler, in the first comprehensive
account of Nazi policies toward the employment of women, de-
scribes the popular response to mobilization but concludes that
the Nazis never implemented general conscription of women for
war work because Hitler was ideologically opposed to the em-
ployment of women. Winkler does not ignore women's re-
sponses, but places the major responsibility for the lack of
mobilization on Hitler's staunch belief in "woman's place."
* The research for this paper was made possible by a grant from the National Endow-
ment for the Humanities.
1 Jill Stephenson, Women in Nazi Society (New York, 1976); Timothy W. Mason,
"Women in Germany, 1925-1940: Family, Welfare and Work," History Workshop:
Journal of Socialist Historians, 1 (Spring 1976), 74-113; 2 (Autumn 1976), 5-32;
Claudia Koonz, "Mothers in the Fatherland: Women in Nazi Germany," in Renate
Bridenthal and Claudia Koonz, Becoming Visible: Women in European History (Boston,
1977), pp. 445-473; Dörte Winkler, Frauenarbeit im "Dritten Reich" Historische Perspek-
tiven 9 (Hamburg, 1977); and Leila J. Rupp, Mobilizing Women for War: German and
American Propaganda, 1939-1945 (Princeton, 1978).
51
52 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
That the Nazis did not succeed

agreed; the reason for Nazi policy is
Hitler's ideological opposition to the e
paper will first of all argue that the
primarily the consequence of the la
to the demands of the regime. That
belongs on the attitudes and actions o
than on the traditional bourgeois v
upper class women stayed out of em
the registration decree of 1943, as th
Women, then, are central - yet
women opposing conscription and t
effort. The nature of women's resp
Mason points out in his most recen
under Nazism, classes did not cease
proclaimed that they had.2 But it wa
tion that kept the Nazis from con
working class dissatisfaction with
mobilization policies played a signif
mobilization. While middle and upp
ployment, working class women f
women already employed would on
that would force non-employed wo
the war effort. The extensive public
the regime make clear that women al
legal controls bitterly resented the la
measure. This paper will also argue, t
ure to mobilize women must be understood as a failure to
mobilize women not of the working class, and that this revealed and
deepened class conflict, belying the Nazi ideal of Volks-
gemeinschaft, a classless people's community.
* * *
The first issue is the

zation policies played i
2 Timothy W. Mason, Arbeiter

lished a revised version of th
Arbeiterklasse und Volksgeme
"Class Struggles in the Third
138-159.
WOMEN IN NAZI GERMANY 53
engage in total war. That the female p

partially mobilized throughout the wa
puted.3 The female labor force increase
during the war. This tiny increase was
level of mobilization in the prewar per
participation rate (the percentage of th
the labor force) was 35.6, the same as i
result of a sufficient supply of labor: th
ingly serious labor shortages that even th
workers and prisoners of war could not
pled with the problem of mobilizing wom
Despite the impression of early observ
sessed "a system of regimentation of lab
such as the world has never seen . . . ,"
effectively implemented conscription.
Nazi officials had available a number of measures with the
potential to mobilize women even before the outbreak of war. A
law of 1935 introduced the Labor Book, a required permanent
record of an individual's employment designed to control and
mobilize labor.6 Legislation a few months later made a term in
the Labor Service, originally a public works program designed to
ease unemployment during the Depression, compulsory, but this
did not become binding on women until the outbreak of war in
1939; even then its numbers never increased beyond 1 50,000. 7
In 1938, the Office of the Four Year Plan introduced the Duty
Year, a compulsory year of labor in agriculture or domestic ser-
vice for young single women seeking jobs for the first time.8
3 See Winkler, Frauenarbeit', and Rupp, Mobilizing Women.

4 Calculated from statistics in Statistisches Reichsamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch jür da
deutsche Reich, 1941-1942 (Berlin, 1942), p. 33; U.S. Strategie Bombing Survey
(USSBS), The Effects of Strategie Bombing on the German War Economy, Overall Economic
Effects Division, October 31, 1945, pp. 202-207.
5 Ludwig Hamburger, How Nazi Germany Has Mobilized and Controlled Labor
(Washington, 1940), pp. 57-58. See also "The Employment of Women in Germany
Under the National Socialist Regime," International Labour Review, 44 (Dec. 1941),
617-659; and Judith Grünfeld, "Mobilization of Women in Germany," Social Research
(Nov. 1942), 476-494.
6 Reichsgesetzblatt (RGB), 1935, I, p. 311; RGB, 1939, I, p. 602. A law of 1939 extended
the coverage of the Labor Book; see RGB, 1939, I, p. 824.
7 RGB, 1935, I, p. 769; RGB, I, p. 1693. See Frieda Wunderlich, Farm Labor in Germany,
1810-1945 (Princeton, 1961), p. 322.
8 Reichsarbeitsblatt (RAB), 1938, I, p. 46; RAB, 1938, I, p. 48.
More direct measures included

drawn up in 1935, that called f
women and men in case of war, an
the conscription of women and m
for specific tasks.9 A final decree
ing women, issued in February
ment offices to conscript individu
tance.10
Despite these measures, the Na
the war not to mobilize women
fices called up women in certain
clusively women who had previous
non-employed. The Labor Minist
employment offices not to ca
worked.11 Winkler reports that
women had been called up, and m
(i.e., had been employed sometim
In this atmosphere of hesitati
engaged in a debate in 1940 ove
service obligation. Despite widesp
ure, Hermann Goring, in accord
fused to sign the proposed decre
specifically empowered the emplo
who had left work since the outbreak of the war.14
The leadership waited until January 1943 to enact the
much-discussed general registration decree. The Law for the De-
fense of the Reich ordered the registration of women 17 to 45
and men 16 to 45. 15 It granted exemptions for those who
worked at least 48 hours a week, those who employed five or
more persons, those employed in agriculture or health services,
students, pregnant women, and women with one child under six
or two children under fourteen. Further legislation extended the
9 RGB, 1935, I, p. 609; RGB, 1938, I, p. 652; RGB, 1939, I, p. 206.

10 RGB, 1939, I, p. 206; RGB, 1939, I, p. 403: RGB, 1939, I, p. 444.
11 Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BA), R 41/159.
12 Winkler, Frauenarbeit, p. 89; Winkler cites Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 9 (1940), 731, as the
source of this information.
13 BA, R 43 11/652.
14 Meldungen aus dem Reich (MadR), No. 210, Aug. 11, 1941, BA, R 58/163; Arbeit-
seinsatz familienunterhaltsberechtigter Frauen, June 30, 1941, BA, R 43 11/652.
15 RGB, 1943, I, p. 67. A second decree appeared in 1944: RGB, 1944, I, p. 133.
provisions of the registration decree, but

successful mobilization, as the statistics show
no clear allocation of responsibility for labo
enforce the registration of women could
of several officials. Hitler, whose persona
layed the introduction of the registration d
communicated his opposition to the conscri
Plenipotentiary General for Labor Supply
Sauckel took office in 1942.16 Advocates of total mobilization,
especially Albert Speer, complained repeatedly, even after the
1943 registration law, of the lack of mobilization.17 In February
1944, the government, despite the 1943 decree, called once
again for the voluntary mobilization of women.18 Joseph Goeb-
bels' appointment as Plenipotentiary for Total War in July 1944
and his desperate attempt to shut down all inessential activities
came too late. Despite the extension of the age limit for women
in the registration order to 50, the situation did not improve.19
German retreat and defeat, combined with Allied bombing,
created such chaos that evaluation of this last period of the war is
difficult.20 Nothing like total mobilization was possible in the
confusion. In spite of Speer's warning, Germany went down to
defeat with a partially mobilized female labor force.
The failure to mobilize enough women to keep up the
strength of the civilian labor force while the armed forced con-
sumed men at an increasing rate involves a number of factors.
The decision early in the war not to conscript women reflected
the strength of traditional attitudes held by some of the Nazi
leaders, especially Hitler.21 In addition, Hitler was convinced
that the war could be won without an all-out effort. He decided
in 1941 that the mobilization of women would be necessary only
16 Interrogation of Sauckel, International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Crim-
inals Before the International Military Tribunal, XIV (Nuremburg, 1947-49), pp. 621-
622; U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy
and Aggression, III (Washington, 1946-68), p. 53.
17 Trial of the Major War Criminals, XLI, pp. 460, 468, 486, 487, 488. See Albert Speer,
Inside the Third Reich, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York, 1970), pp. 294-
295. On the conflict between Sauckel and Speer, see also Edward L. Homze, Foreign
Labor in Nazi Germany (Princeton, 1957), pp. 204-229.
18 SD-Berichte zu Inlandsfraeen (SD-BzI), April 20, 1944, BA, R 58/193.
19 RGB, 1944, I, d. 168; Bormann to Lammers, lulv 29, 1944. BA. R 43 11/654.
20 USSBS, Effects, pp. 38-39. See Winkler, Frauenarbeit, pp. 142-153.
21 See Rupp, Mobilizing Women, ch. 2, for an analysis of Nazi attitudes toward women.
if the United States entered the

declaration of war on the U.S.
conscription of women.22 The
government permitted the bloc
points, so that even after the p
of January 1943, local officia
sometimes ignored the order o
of antagonizing sections of th
the regime to implement mea
and upper classes meant that t
forcing the registration of wom
and encouragement through p
effort failed to remedy the situ
pinned its hopes on the expectat
to the Nazi image of the dedic
her own interests for the good o
zation, then, was primarily th
from women to the demands m
* * *
The second issue in th

en's responses. Mason
legal compulsion out o
ing widespread resist
this hesitancy was not
the well-founded fear
extremely unpopular,
examination of the a
more complicated s
markably well-inform
vice (SD) of the SS, in
22 Sept. 23, 1941, BA, R 43

11/652. On Hitler's belief th
Klein, Germany's Economic Pr
Labor Force in War and Trans
1952): Alan S. Milward, The G
23 Trial of the Major War Cr
Nov. 3, 1943, BA, R 43 11/6
land to Reichsarbeitsministe
24 See Rupp, Mobilizing Wome
25 Mason, "Women," p. 21.
on the attitudes of the population, circulat

government agencies every few days.26 Th
SD reports came from voluntary reporters
paid informers and attempted to include m
The reliability of these reports is suggested b
present, not one the government would ha
tated the results in advance. Mariis Steinert, who used these re-
ports extensively in her book on public mood and attitude dur-
ing the war, indicates that a comparison of local reports and the
final reports shows some moderation in the final product, so that
the rather grim situation emerging from the reports may even be
understated.27 But, probably most telling of all, the truth ulti-
mately seemed dangerous to the Nazis; in 1944, Martin Bor-
mann and Robert Ley forbade all functionaries of the Party and
the Labor Front to cooperate with the Security Service.28 As a
result, the last regular SD report appeared in July 1944. Other
branches of both Party and state kept careful watch over public
opinion as well. All these records provide a clear picture of the
responses of German women to labor mobilization.
It is certainly true that the voluntary recruitment of German
women was a disastrous failure. As early as February 1940, the
Security Service reported that it was no longer possible to recruit
the women needed in agriculture, domestic service, and industry
through voluntary means.29 The failure of voluntary mobiliza-
tion provided a constant theme in the population reports. Non-
employed middle and upper class women ignored the appeals,
while women called up by the employment offices and women
already working under strict legal controls, as well as non-
26 These reports, called Meldungen aus dem Reich (MadR), are located in the Bun-
desarchiv Koblenz (BA), R 58/144-194; they are also available on microfilm in the
Records of the Reich Leader of the SS of the German Police (T-175), Rolls 258-266,
National Archives Microcopy. See Heinz Boberach, Meldungen aus dem Reich: Auswahl
aus den geheimen Lageberichten des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 1939-1944 (Neuwied und
Berlin, 1965); and Ursula von Gersdorff, Frauen im Kriegsdienst 1914-1945 (Stuttgart,
1969). Dörte Winkler's section on public opinion is excellent and we agree in many of
our conclusions. I believe, however, that the responses of women are central to an
understanding of Nazi mobilization and that a fuller consideration is warranted.
27 Mariis G. Steinert, Hitler's War and the German: Public Mood and Attitude During the
Second World War, ed. and trans. Thomas E. J. de Witt (Athens, Ohio, 1977), pp.
14-18.
28 Boberach, Meldungen, p. xxvii- xxviii.

29 MadR, No. 55, Feb. 19, 1940, BA, R 58/148.
employed working class women

conscription measure.
The Nazi aversion to Marxist te
euphemism led to the developm
that obscures the real status of in
documents. The Security Servic
to the resentment of women of
"so-called better circles" or "soci
often the reports talk about th
probably means the working clas
"poorer circles" or "lower occupa
tainly refer to workers. This t
relationship women have to the
cation with class through a husb
as well as through their own - cr
Occasionally the reports identify
sharing the resentment of the
women. It is clear that employed
women of whatever class, and th
working class and lower middle c
upper middle and upper class w
leisure. It is unfortunately im
status of the anonymous indiv
reports; one would like to know
ground, especially something abo
fore 1933. Certainly not all wo
were all employed women worki
clear that working class women
vored conscription as a measur
class and certainly upper class w
often avoided employment.
The first question to conside
why non-employed women fail
voluntary mobilization. A major
centive. Women complained ab
months of the war; they comp
than the men they replaced ha
30 MadR, No. 27, Dec. 11, 1939, BA, R 58

58/148; MadR, No. 107, July 22, 1940, BA
Frauenschaft, the Nazi women's organiz

policy meant little in a state that organiz
no real power.31 Despite the Security S
women should receive equal pay, wom
abysmally low wages.32 The regime, ha
wage controls in an attempt to control i
crease women's pay. To make matters w
allowances for dependents of men in th
disincentives for employment during the
Allowances were quite generous, induci
quit their jobs at the outbreak of war, s
their allotments without working.33 Even
originally reduced the allowances of wom
Security Service repeatedly recommende
revise its policy toward dependents' allow
penalizing women who kept working or e
the first time. In 1941 the governmen
amending the legislation to end the pr
portion of a woman's wages from her allo
tion even reduced a woman's allowance if she refused to work,
an action that met with mixed results.35
BA, R 58/157; MadR, No. 263, Feb. 26, 1942, BA, R 58/169; MadR, No. 338, Nov.
26, 1942, BA, R 58/177; MadR, No. 373, April 5, 1943, BA, R 58/182; Kreis-
frauenschaftsleitung to Kreisleiter, April 7, 1943, Records of the NSDAP (T-81), Roll
75, Frame 86374-86375, National Archives Microcopy.
3 1 On the Frauenschaft's support of equal pay for equal work, see Deutsches Frauenschaf-
fen: fahrbuch der Reichsfrauenführung, 1937, p. 50.
32 See Gerhard Bry, Wages in Germany, 1871-1945 (Princeton, 1960).
33 MadR, No. 55, Feb. 19, 1940, BA, R 58/148; MadR. No. 107, July 22, 1940, BA, R
58/152; MadR, No. 162, Feb. 13, 1941, BA, R 58/157; MadR, No. 181, Apr. 25, 1941,
BA, R 58/159; MadR, No. 189, May 26, 1941, BA, R 58/160; MadR, No. 194, June
16, 1941, Ba, R 58/161; MadR, No. 224, Sept. 29, 1941, BA, R 58/164; MadR, No.
263, Feb. 26, 1942, BA, R 58/169; Letter from Generalbevollmächtigte für die
Reichsverwaltung, May 9, 1940, BA, R 43 11/652; Letter from Reichsver-
teidigungskommissar für den Wehrkreis IV, May 27, 1940, BA, R 43 11/652; Letter
from Präsident des Arbeitsamtes Berlin, July 2, 1941, BA, R 41/162; Chef des OKW
to Beauftragte für das Vierjahresplan, Feb. 9, 1942, BA R 41/162. See Long, Labor
Force, pp. 41^13.
34 Verordnung über Kriegsfamilienunterhalt, Sept. 1938, BA, R 41/160; Kritische Be-
merkungen zur Verordnung, May 16, 1939, BA, R 41/161.
35 MadR, No. 224, Sept. 29, 1941, BA, R 58/164; MadR, No. 253, Feb. 26, 1942, BA, R
58/169; Letter from Reichsminister des Inneren, June 30, 1941, BA, R 43 11/652; Ley
to Goring, Sept. 10, 1941, BA, R 43 11/652; Dr. Suren to Goring, Oct. 2, 1941, BA, R
43 11/652; Letter from Reichsminister für Bewaffnung und Munition, Aug. 21, 1941,
Lack of financial incentive and,

ing dependents' allowances, actu
of the labor force. So too did
responsibilities and the failure o
services to help working wome
provision of special services fo
plained that they could not wo
care for their children.36 Wom
prompting the Security Servic
the work day and the institut
women to discharge their dom
included long commutes to and
culties.38 Working women co
women, who had all day to shop,
ing the only hours when they
to this problem, typically, was t
"be Comrades" and shop early i
Women who could afford to
force because there was little fin
their traditional double burden
addition, some women who ha
work - for middle class women,
employment - as well as the Labo
pected could keep them in the
emergency.40
BA, R 41/162; Bekämpfung der Arbeitsv
BA, R 41/162.
36 MadR, No. 30, Dec. 18, 1939, BA, R 58
58/151; MadR, No. 107, July 22, 1940, BA
Ba, R 58/157; MadR, No. 263, Feb. 26, 19
1943, BA, R 58/182.
37 MadR, No. 30, Dec. 18, 1939, BA, R 58/146; MadR, No. 55, Feb. 19, 1940, BA, R
58/148; MadR, No. 100, June 27, 1940, BA, R 58/151; MadR, No. 107, July 22, 1940,
BA, R 58/152; MadR, No. 162, Feb. 13, 1941, BA, R 58/157; MadR, No. 189, May 26,
1941, BA, R 58/160; MadR, No. 263, Feb. 26, 1942, BA, R 58/169; Präsident des
Arbeitsamtes Niedersachsen to Arbeitsminister, Nov. 24, 1939, BA, R 41/158.
38 MadR, No. 263, Feb. 26, 1942, BA, R 58/169.
39 Poster in Bundesarchiv collection.
40 Reichsverteidigungskommissar für den Wehrkreis XII to Goring, Feb. 10, 1941, BA,
R 41/162. In response to fear of the Labor Book, the Labor Ministry issued an order
on June 16, 1941 giving women voluntarily taking up employment during the war an
"Ersatzkarte" instead of a Labor Book; BA, R 41/162. Fear of factory work was much
commented upon in the Security Service reports and in the Nazi press; see Rupp,
Mobilizing Women y p. 111.
Non-employed women used ingenuit

force. Young women of "known" fami
Year obligation by arranging to "work
quaintances.41 Getrud Scholtz-Klink, the
en's organization, criticized mothers w
daughters the rigors of the Duty Year b
tions with conveniences and no childre
women continued to avoid employment ev
istration order. They sought medical
portedly, hurriedly became pregnant in o
register.43 (One woman, the SD reporte
husband to urge him to come home quick
conceive a child.)44 The number of women
unknown destinations increased rapidly
lation reports.45 If none of the evasi
women demanded easy office jobs - anyth
factories. One individual wrote to the g
about women who entered the universities in order to avoid war
work: "There are young girls who, in wartime, studied first art
history, then law, and now psychology."46 The SD reported that
in Vienna "society women" declared that they would not be
forced to work and criticized the registration decree as "Bol-
shevist."47
Why non-employed middle and upper class women opposed
conscription, then, is not difficult to understand. (The ineffec-
41 MadR, No. 120, Sept. 2, 1940, BA, R 58/154.

42 Gertrud Scholtz-Klink, Tradition is Not Stagnation But Involves a Moral Obligation: Wom-
en s Conference at the National Congress of Great Germany (Nuremburg, 1938), p. 9. See
Rupp, Mobilizing Women, p. 110.
43 MadR, No. 356, Feb. 4, 1943, BA, R 58/180; MadR, No. 366, Mar. 11, 1943, BA, R
58/181; MadR, No. 373, Apr. 5, 1943, BA, R 58/182; Reichsverfügungsblatt, Feb. 17,
1943, Ausgabe B, BA, R 43 11/654; "Schluss mit den Scheinarbeitsverhältnissen!"
Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, July 28, 1944, pp. 35-36, BA, R 43 11/665; MadReichsgau
Oberdonau, Feb. 8, 1943, BA, NS 6/408; Auszüge aus Berichten der Gauleitungen
u.s. Dienststellen, Feb. 12, 1943, BA, NS 6/414; Stimmen zu dem Aufruf des GBA
. . . , March 7, 1944, BA, NS 6/407.
44 MadR, No. 358, Feb. 11, 1943, BA, R 58/180. See also Einfluss der Versorgung mit
dem Bedarf zur Kinderpflege auf die bevölkerungspolitische Lage, May 2, 1944, BA,
NS 6/244.
45 MadR, No. 366, Mar. 11, 1943, BA, R 58/181.
46 BA, R 43 11/665.
47 MadR, No. 358, Feb. 11, 1943, BA, R 58/180.
tiveness of Nazi propaganda is

and worth noting in passing.)
The responses of working class
standable. From the early month
vice reported that women of the
they were forced to carry the en
The SD, in fact, explicitly attr
mobilization to the resentment o
tion, citing complaints that wo
cles" still had servants, sat aroun
played tennis, and lay around i
citizens called the attention o
classified newspaper advertisem
for companions with free time
the Duty Year, since it applie
planned to enter employmen
employed wives of artisans and
children promised to take jobs
men in similar situations did.5
bring back into the labor force w
the beginning of the war pr
Dortmund:
We agree that it is necessary that we return to work. It will mean a

great deal of inconvenience for us, but it is wartime and so we want to
help. But why is Frau Direktor S. with her servants not called up? She
could certainly put her four-year-old son in the NSV [National Socialist
Welfare Organization] Kindergarten for the day just as we do. . . .
What has happened to the equal treatment of all folk comrades?53
48 MadR, No. 55, Feb. 19, 1940, BA, R 58/148. Also MadR, No. 100, June 27, 1940, BA,
R 58/151; MadR, No. 189, May 26, 1941, BA, R 58/160; MadR, No. 197, June 26,
1941, BA, R 58/161; MadR, No. 224, Sept. 29, 1941, BA, R 58/164; MadR, No. 263,
Feb. 26, 1942, BA, R 58/169; Dr. Naumann to Lammers, Jan. 2, 1943, BA, R 43
11/655; Gauleiter Ost-Hannover to Präsident des Arbeitsamtes Niedersachsen, Apr. 1,
1940, BA, R 41/158.
49 MadR, No. 107, July 22, 1940, BA, R 58/152.
50 BA, R 41/158.
51 MadR, No. 306, Aug. 6, 1942, BA, R 58/174; Kritische Stimmen zur Ableistung des
Pflichtiahrs, Nov. 12, 1942, BA, NS 6/243.
52 MadR, No. 146, Dec. 2, 1940, BA, R 58/156. Also MadR, No. 210, Aug. 11, 1941, BA,
R 58/163.
53 MadR, No. 210, Aug. 11, 1941, BA, R 58/163.
Voluntary mobilization, and especially

of avoiding compulsory labor, seemed
working under strict legal controls. W
could be punished - even imprisoned - f
work discipline. For example, the co
woman to prison for three months in 1
for a week for domestic reasons, a senten
sidered unusually harsh.54 Employers som
ployed women with the Gestapo.55
Men as well as women responded bitter
ceived as social injustice. The Security
front soldiers in particular objected to
wives while other women remained idle,
tion on the front could be extremely d
leave angrily criticized women crowdin
and flaunting their idleness in cafes and
One soldier summed up what the repor
I have forbidden [my wife] to work as long a

are not called up to work as well. I am fighti
family, but for them as well . . . The wife of
for the state as the wife of a manufacturer.58
Another soldier wrote that he would not allow his wife to work
and asked the head of the employment office if his wife was
working, adding:
... I bet she isn't, because then you would not have an orderly house in
which to recuperate from your hard work. . . . Certainly there are men
in your office whose wives have no children and who don't go to work.
If I were in your place I would be ashamed to summon to work a
soldier's wife who has a six-month-old child. But there is no point in
54 MadR, No. 197, June 26, 1941, BA, R 58/161; Also MadR, No. 263, Feb. 26 1942,
BA, R 58/169; MadR, No. 320, Sept. 25, 1942, BA, R 58/175; Schwierigkeiten beim
Fraueneinsatz, Nov. 13, 1940, BA, R 41/159; Bekämpfung der Arbeitsvertragsbrüche
der Frauen, Aug. 27, 1941, BA, R 41/162; Bekämpfung der Arbeitsvertragsbrüche,
Dec. 11, 1942, BA, R 41/237a.
55 MadR, No. 263, Feb. 26, 1942, BA, R 58/169.
56 MadR, No. 162, Feb. 13, 1941, BA, R 58/157; MadR, No. 224, Sept. 29, 1941, BA, R
58/164; MadR, No. 263, Feb. 26, 1942, BA, R 58/169.
57 MadR, No. 263, Feb. 26, 1942, BA, R 58/169.
58 MadR, No. 263, Feb. 26, 1942, BA R 58/169.
writing you in this way, because you

You are only a bureaucrat, not a hu
Complaints from men were not lim

the SD reported that men of the
employment offices to object to th
There is, of course, more involv
men than class resentment. Dörte Winkler makes a distinction
between petit-bourgeois resentment and proletarian conscious-
ness expressed in the letters of soldiers.61 I am not convinced,
however, that such a distinction is meaningful. All of the men,
whether expressing hostility toward wealthy women or bureau-
crats, shared a recognition of unjust treatment, but also a patri-
archal assumption of their right to dictate what their wives
should or should not do. Gertrud Scholtz-Klink recognized that
men opposed the idea of their wives working not only because it
was a mark of status to have a non-employed wife, but also
because employed women could not devote themselves as fully to
providing domestic comfort for their men. In words that conjure
up the bureaucrat in his orderly house, Scholtz-Klink told men
that they could wait a little for their meals or warm up the food
themselves while their wives went out to work.62
The bitterness at obvious injustice continued as the war went
on; what legislation did exist seemed to working women to put
the entire responsibility for the war effort on their shoulders. As
early as 1940, while the debate over a general service obligation
went on among the top Party leaders, the SD reported that the
population knew and approved of the expected order.63 When it
did not appear, Party leaders and propagandists, forced to jus-
tify patently unjust policies, grew increasingly nervous. Angry
people demanded explanations from Labor Front leaders; even
the best speakers lost the trust of their audiences by either re-
maining silent on the question of conscription or giving conflict-
ing answers, causing the people to doubt the certainty of the
59 Transcript of letter to Arbeitsamt Görlitz, July 27, 1941, BA, R 41/162.
60 MadR, No. 146, Dec. 2, 1940, BA, R 58/156.
61 Winkler, Frauenarbeit, p. 111.
62 "Rede der Reichsfrauenführerin Frau Gertrud Scholtz-Klink im Sportspalast in Ber-
lin am 13. Juni 1940," N.S. Frauen- Warte, 9 (July 1940), 24-25. See Rupp, Mobilizing
Women, p. 107.
63 MadR, No. 107, July 22, 1940, Ba, R 58/152.
leadership.64 As a result, work morale sank an

increasingly lost respect for the authorities, acc
curity Service. Propaganda continued to call for
good of the state, but from as early as 1940 the
noted the hypocrisy and resulting ineffective
peals.65
It was against this background that the January 1943 regis-
tration decree appeared. The Security Service reported great
popular interest, tempered by a great deal of skepticism. Party
officials in Vienna warned that if the measure were not fairly
implemented, sharp criticism and passive resistance could be ex-
pected.66 In small cities especially, the SD found, people closely
observed the wives of prominent men, suspicious that they would
not actually go to work.67 Hitler issued a statement expressing
his expectation that the wives and children of prominent Party
leaders would take up employment; such prompting suggests a
basis for the population's suspicions.68 Non-employed working
class and lower middle class women explained that their re-
sponse depended on the "fine ladies," often named individually,
being placed in the factories.69 In general, it seemed that the
success of the measure would depend on the fairness of its im-
plementation.70
The worst fears of working women were confirmed by the
reports of widespread evasion of the registration decree by the
"better circles."71 Given the reluctance of women to register and
64 MadR, No. 263, Feb. 26, 1942, BA, R 58/169; MadR, No. 309, Aug. 17, 1942, BA, R
58/174.
65 MadR, No. 107, July 22, 1940 BA, R 58/152; MadR, No. 162, Feb. 13, 1941, BA, R
58/157; MadR, No. 263, Feb. 26, 1942, BA, R 58/169; MadR, No. 309, Aug. 17, 1942,
BA, R 58/174; Dr. Naumann to Lammers, Jan. 2, 1943, BA, R 43 11/655; Re-
gierungspräsident Magdeburg to Landrat des Kreises Jerichow II, Dec. 7, 1939, BA,
R 41/158.
66 Auszüge aus Berichten der Gauleitungen u.s. Dienststellen, Feb. 12, 1943, BA NS
6/414.
67 MadR, No. 356, Feb. 4, 1943, BA, R 58/180.
68 Anordnung des Führers über die vorbildliche Haltung der Angehörigen an hervor-
ragender Stelle stehender Persönlichkeiten bei dem umfassenden Kriegseinsatz, May
16, 1943, BA, R 43 II/655a. Also SD-BzI, Dec. 13, 1943, BA, NS 6/244.
69 MadR, No. 362, Feb. 25, 1943, BA, R 58/180.
70 MadR, No. 358, Feb. 11, 1943, BA, R 58/180; MadReichsgau Oberdonau, Feb. 2,
1943, BA, NS 6/408; MadReichsgau Oberdonau, Feb. 8, 1943, BA, NS 6/414; Aus-
züge aus Berichten der Gauleitungen u.a. Dienststellen, May 1, 1943, BA, NS 6/415.
71 MadR, No. 356, Feb. 4, 1943, BA, R 58/180; MadR, No. 357, Feb. 8, 1943, BA, R
the apparent ease of landing in an

enforcement measures could have made this a successful mobili-
zation measure. Despite provisions in the 1943 law for fines and,
as a last resort, legal proceedings, for women who did not report
to the employment offices, the authorities were unwilling to take
strong measures.72 Even before the 1943 decree, a woman who
suggested that the army take control of mobilization noted: ". . .
there is at present hardly an official prepared to take measures
against women unwilling to work or engaged in passive resist-
ance at work."73 Party records generally admitted the failure of
the registration decree, and the statistics make clear that even the
successful registration of two and a half million women by the
end of March 1943 actually added little to the labor force.74
* # *
The complaints reporte

Party and state agencies m
conscription from the w
hesitate on the question o
non-employed middle and
the reports of widespread
"working population," i
women provided there w
tributing the burden of t
58/180; MadR, No. 358, Feb. 11,

BA, R 58/182; Reichsverfügung
Sauckel to Gauarbeitsämter, Nov.
No. 210, July 28, 1944, BA, R
Arbeitskräften in Scheinarbeits
Oberdonau, Feb. 2, 1943, BA, N
BA, NS 6/408; Zum Bericht des
6/407; Zum Bericht des SD-Absch
Bericht des SD- Abschnittes Sch
72 BA, R 43 11/654. See Verordun
beitsverhältnissen, RGB, I, 1944
R 43 II/666b.
73 Irmgard Schäfer to General V. Bünau, Jan. 26, 1942, BA, R 41/162. See Winkler,
Frauenarbeit, pp. 96-101, on the punishment of women unwilling to work before the
1943 order. In general, as is clear from the failure of mobilization, women went
unpunished and took advantage of that fact.
74 MadR, No. 373, Apr. 5, 1943, BA, R 58/182; Sauckel to Gauarbeitsämter, Nov. 3,
1943, BA, R 43 11/654; Grundfragen der Stimmung und Haltung des deutschen
Volkes, Nov. 29, 1943, BA, NS 6/244; SD-BzI, Dec. 13, 1943, BA, NS 6/244.
The complaints about social injustice s

some people took seriously the Nazi pr
gemeinschaft. From Breslau, for example
individual who insisted: "The word Volksgem
for that very reason it seems suitable that
this concept as it applies to employment to
ring to the registration decree, the SD
population - and above all the working circl
implementation of this order exceptional jus
is what the regime promised; the official
example, carried an article about the reg
"Labor Mobilization According to the Prin
tice."77 The SD quoted a woman worker in
who summed up the unfairness of labor mo
"I don't call that Volksgemeinschaft."78
It is conceivable that these comments rep
ipulation of Nazi ideology by the population
view, arguing that the more the people s
ogy, the more they used it to advance th
would argue that it is simply impossible
individuals quoted in the SD reports were
Volksgemeinschaft as a weapon against its in
least a part of the working class, despite
mobilization policies, took the Nazi rhetoric
ously enough to complain when it was flagr
practice.
What is perhaps most significant about the popular response
to the mobilization of women is the clear indication it provides of
intense class conflict and hostility. Even the Nazi officials broke
down in the face of it and occasionally used the word "class" and
even "class conflict" (which had, according to Nazi ideology and
propaganda, been eliminated in the Third Reich). An SD report
in 1943 warned that unjust implementation of the registration
decree aroused "instincts of class conflict."80 Internal criticism
75 MadR, No. 210, Aug. 11, BA, R 58/163

76 MadR, No. 356, Feb. 4, 1943, BA, R 58/180.
77 "Arbeitseinsatz nach dem Prinzip der sozialistischen Gerechtigkeit," Völkischer Beobach
ter, Feb. 5, 1943, BA, R 43 11/654.
78 Zum Bericht des SD- Abschnittes Schwerin, Mar. 14, 1944, BA, NS 6/244.
79 Winkler, Frauenarbeit, p. 114.
80 MadR, No. 366, Mar. 11, 1943, BA, R 58/181.
of Goebbels' famous Total Wa

argued that the propaganda di
the German population's attitud
mistrust.81 Sauckel released a m
1943 that called, among other th
"last tendencies of class conflict,
tional levels" took malicious ple
persons employed in the munitio
ing manual labor.82 And, probab
leadership, the Security Service r
ers were beginning once again to
speak of those who were exploiti
Mobilization measures thro
brought no satisfaction to disg
the regime ultimately depende
the failure of non-employed w
expectations was crucial. The
mobilization policies reveal that
gime was unable or unwilling
women, despite desperate labo
somewhat paradoxical view of th
collect detailed information ab
talitarian enough to suppress p
enough to enforce conscription a
and upper classes, the mainsta
discontent with the injustice of
worry Nazi officials, but the
monopoly of force not to fear
ures taken in the first months
Communists, Social Democrats, a
In order to enforce the registr
have had to be willing to impri
tion. Although the government
and punished some working wom
1943, the population reports m
81 Dr. Fritz Michael to Lammers, Feb. 21, 1943, BA, R 43 II/639a.
82 Manifest des GBA an alle Dienstellen des Arbeitseinsatzes und der Reich-
streuhanderverwaltunc, Apr. 20, 1943, R 43 II/652a.
83 Grundfragen der Stimmung und Haltung des deutschen Volkes, Nov. 29, 1943, BA,
NS 6/244.
for women who did not register. The c

Reich is here laid bare, as it is in the statements of Hitler and
others that women (meaning, of course, upper class women)
should be spared the rigors of employment - statements made in
complete disregard of the millions of women already working. It
is important to understand that, in the face of middle and upper
class women's reluctance to go to work in the factories, only
decisive mass action could have succeeded in mobilizing them.
This suggests a kind of limit to the power of the authoritarian
regime, a limit imposed by the extent of passive resistance to
governmental policies.
But it would be mistaken, I think, to idealize the passive
resistance of middle and upper class women, or the resentment
of working class women, as conscious political resistance to
Nazism. Women forced by economic need to work for low wages
and women subject to unfairly enforced legislation resented the
ostentatious leisure of middle and upper class women and re-
fused to take seriously talk of sacrifice and Volksgemeinschaft while
labor mobilization was unjustly enforced. This was class resent-
ment, but not necessarily ideological hostility to fascism. In the
same way, the resistance of middle and upper class women to the
registration decree was not grounded in opposition to Nazism,
but represented a response to an unfavorable employment situa-
tion. Women realized that participation in the war effort was a
question of economics (how much they could earn) and politics
(how they could minimize government control in an author-
itarian system with theoretical totalitarian powers). What the
government expected of women depended, before the war and
during the war, on the needs of the state. How German women
responded to the demands of the regime depended on their
perceptions of individual and class interests. Women's responses
to mobilization, differentiated according to class, are central to
an understanding of the failure of mobilization, and give the lie
to the Nazi pretense of class consensus in the Third Reich.
Ohio State University

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Guilford Press

Women, Class, and Mobilization in Nazi Germany

NAZIS, ACCORDING TO THE OLD standard im-

That the Nazis did not succeed

The first issue is the

2 Timothy W. Mason, Arbeiter

engage in total war. That the female p

3 See Winkler, Frauenarbeit', and Rupp, Mobilizing Women.

More direct measures included

9 RGB, 1935, I, p. 609; RGB, 1938, I, p. 652; RGB, 1939, I, p. 206.

provisions of the registration decree, but

if the United States entered the

The second issue in th

22 Sept. 23, 1941, BA, R 43

on the attitudes of the population, circulat

28 Boberach, Meldungen, p. xxvii- xxviii.

employed working class women

30 MadR, No. 27, Dec. 11, 1939, BA, R 58

Frauenschaft, the Nazi women's organiz

Lack of financial incentive and,

Non-employed women used ingenuit

41 MadR, No. 120, Sept. 2, 1940, BA, R 58/154.

tiveness of Nazi propaganda is

We agree that it is necessary that we return to work. It will mean a

Voluntary mobilization, and especially

I have forbidden [my wife] to work as long a

writing you in this way, because you

Complaints from men were not lim

leadership.64 As a result, work morale sank an

the apparent ease of landing in an

The complaints reporte

58/180; MadR, No. 358, Feb. 11,

The complaints about social injustice s

75 MadR, No. 210, Aug. 11, BA, R 58/163

of Goebbels' famous Total Wa

for women who did not register. The c

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