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1
Books by the same author
Forthcoming
2
M. N. Roy’s New Humanism
and Materialism
Dr. Ramendra
Ph.D., D.Litt.
Reader, Department of Philosophy,
Patna College, Patna University
Buddhiwadi Foundation
Patna
3
This publication has been made possible by a
grant from Rationalist Foundation, Mumbai
First Edition
Price: Rs.100
ISBN 81-86935-00-2
4
Contents
Foreword 7
Introduction 9
5
6
Foreword
Kawaljeet
Managing Trustee
Buddhiwadi Foundation
8
Introduction
M. N. Roy (1887-1954) is one of the greatest, if not
the greatest, Indian philosopher of twentieth century. Un-
like some other Indian thinkers of twentieth century, Roy
has made a clear distinction between philosophy and reli-
gion in his thought. This alone, I think, entitles him to be
recognized as the foremost Indian philosopher of twenti-
eth century. According to Roy, no philosophical advance-
ment is possible unless we get rid of orthodox religious
ideas and theological dogmas. On the other hand, Roy has
envisaged a very close relationship between philosophy
and science.1
Secondly, Roy has given a central place to intellec-
tual or philosophical revolution in his philosophy. Ac-
cording to Roy, a philosophical revolution must precede
a social revolution.
Besides, Roy has, in the tradition of eighteenth
century French materialist Holbach, revised and restated
materialism in the light of twentieth century scientific de-
velopments. If we wish to place Roy’s philosophy in the
context of ancient Indian philosophy, we may place Roy
in the tradition of the ancient Indian materialism, Lokayat.
However, compared to the ancient doctrines of Lokayat,
Roy’s “physical realism” is a highly developed philoso-
phy. Roy not only takes into account the then contempo-
rary discoveries of physics in reformulating “materialism”
as “physical realism”, but also gives an important place to
ethics in his philosophy. Moreover, Roy’s philosophy has
an important social and political component.
Roy started his political career as a militant national-
9
ist. He went on to become a communist of international
rank. Finally, he propounded his own philosophy of new
humanism or radical humanism.
The essence of Roy’s new humanism is contained in
the “Twenty-Two Theses on Radical Democracy”. In a
speech explaining new humanism to the members of
Radical Democratic Party in 1947, Roy says:
Notes
1
See, “Roy’s Conception of Philosophy” in the first chapter.
2
M. N. Roy, Beyond Communism (New Delhi: Ajanta
Publications, 1981), p. 28.
3
Ibid., p. 43.
12
I. M. N. Roy’s New Humanism
“New humanism” or “radicalism” is the name given
by M. N. Roy to the “new philosophy of revolution” which
he developed in the later part of his life.
The philosophy of new humanism has been summa-
rized by M.N. Roy in the “Theses on the principles of
Radical Democracy” or the “ Twenty-Two Theses of Radi-
cal Humanism”. He further elaborated it in his New
Humanism - A Manifesto, first published in 1947. As Roy
himself points out in his preface to the first edition of his
book, “the background material” on the development of
new humanism is to be found in his books New
Orientation and Beyond Communism, first published in
1946 and 1947 respectively. However, before coming di-
rectly to a brief exposition of Roy’s new humanism, it
would be worthwhile to take a synoptic look at Roy’s bi-
ography, particularly his intellectual development, and his
conception of philosophy.
Biography
M. N. Roy was not inclined to write his autobiogra-
phy. However, after much persuasion he started writing
his Memoirs in the last part of his life. Sadly, he was not
able to complete it. This incomplete autobiography cov-
ers only a period of seven years from 1915 to 1922.
The following brief life-sketch of M. N. Roy is based
mainly on V. B. Karnik’s M. N. Roy, Sibnarayan Ray’s
introduction to Selected Works of M. N. Roy (Vol. 1) and
V. M. Tarkunde’s Radical Humanism. I have also derived
13
some help from Essence of Royism, compiled by G. D.
Parikh, and M. N. Roy Philosopher Revolutionary, edited
by Sibnarayan Ray. Besides, I have drawn from M. N.
Roy’s Scientific Politics, New Orientation and Beyond
Communism for tracing his intellectual-political develop-
ment.
M. N. Roy, whose original name was Narendra Nath
Bhattacharya, was born on 21 March 1887, at Arbelia, a
village in 24 Parganas district in Bengal. His father,
Dinabandhu Bhattacharya, was head pandit of a local
school. His mother’s name was Basanta Kumari. From
school going age, Roy lived in Kodalia, another village in
24 Parganas.
14
States of America.
Roy’s attempts to secure arms ended in a failure. In
fact, Roy concluded that Germans were not serious about
giving arms to the Indian revolutionaries. Besides, police
repression had shattered the underground organization,
which Roy had left behind. He had also come to know
about the death of his leader, Jatin Mukherji, in an en-
counter with police.
Towards Communism
15
Roy wonder whether exploitation and poverty would cease
in India with the attainment of independence. Roy began a
systematic study of socialism, originally with the intention
of combating it, but he soon discovered that he had him-
self become a socialist! In the beginning, nurtured as he
was on Bankimchandra, Vivekanand and orthodox Hindu
philosophy, Roy accepted socialism except its materialist
philosophy.
Later in Mexico in 1919, Roy met Michael Borodin,
an emissary of the Communist International. Roy and
Borodin quickly became friends, and it was because of
long discussions with Borodin that Roy accepted the ma-
terialist philosophy and became a full-fledged communist.
Roy was also instrumental in converting the Socialist Party
of Mexico into the Communist Party of Mexico.
In 1920, Roy was invited to Moscow to attend the
second conference of the Communist International. Roy
had several meetings with Lenin before the conference.
He differed with Lenin on the role of the local bourgeoisie
in nationalist movements. On Lenin’s recommendation, the
supplementary thesis on the subject prepared by Roy was
adopted along with Lenin’s thesis by the second confer-
ence of the Communist International. The following years
witnessed Roy’s rapid rise in the international communist
hierarchy. By the end of 1926, Roy was elected member
of all the four official policy making bodies of the
Comintern − the presidium, the political secretariat, the
executive committee and the world congress.
In 1927, Roy was sent to China as a representative of
the Communist International. However, Roy’s mission in
China ended in a failure. On his return to Moscow from
China, Roy found himself in official disfavor. In Septem-
ber 1929 he was expelled from the Communist Interna-
16
tional for “contributing to the Brandler press and sup-
porting the Brandler organizations.” Roy felt that he was
expelled from the Comintern mainly because of his claim
to the right of independent thinking.1
17
(1940), Heresies of the 20th Century (1939), Fascism
(1938), The Historical Role of Islam (1939), Ideal Of
Indian Womanhood (1941), Science and Philosophy
(1947) and India’s Message (1950) are among the books
that were made from these handwritten notebooks.
These writings show that Roy was not satisfied with
a primarily economic explanation of historical processes.
He studied and tried to assess the role of cultural and idea-
tional factors in traditional and contemporary India, in the
rise and expansion of Islam, and in the phenomenon of
fascism. He was particularly severe on the obscurantist
professions and practices of neo-Hindu nationalism. Roy
tried to reformulate materialism in the light of latest de-
velopments in the physical and biological sciences. He was
convinced that without the growth and development of a
materialist and rationalist outlook in India, neither a ren-
aissance nor a democratic revolution would be possible.
In a way, seeds of the philosophy of new humanism, which
was later developed fully by Roy, were already evident in
his jail writings. M. K. Haldar, in his preface to the 1989
reprint of Roy's major work Reason, Romanticism and
Revolution goes to the extent of saying that “the germs of
Roy’s monumental work or, even the first rough draft of it
can be discerned in these notes”. However, he adds that
the “ideas took a long time to crystallize as Roy was al-
ways willing to revise his ideas in the light of criticism by
others or self-criticism.”2
18
League of Radical Congressmen. However, in December
1940, Roy and his followers left Congress owing to dif-
ferences with the Congress leadership on the role of India
in the Second World War. Thereafter, Roy formed the
Radical Democratic Party of his own. This signaled the
beginning of the last phase of Roy’s life in which he de-
veloped his philosophy of new humanism.
After Roy’s release from jail in 1936, Ellen Gottschalk
joined Roy in Bombay in March 1937. They were married
in the same month. Subsequently, Ellen Roy played an
important role in Roy’s life, and cooperated in all his
endeavors.
In 1944, Roy published two basic documents, namely,
People’s Plan for Economic Development of India and
Draft Constitution of Free India. According to V. M.
Tarkunde, who played a role in drafting People’s Plan,
these “documents contained Roy’s original contributions
to the solution of the country’s economic and political
problems”.3 The Indian state, according to the draft con-
stitution, was to be organized on the basis of countrywide
network of people’s committees having wide powers such
as initiating legislations, expressing opinion on pending
bills, recall of representatives and referendum on impor-
tant national issues. According to Sibnarayan Ray, another
prominent associate of Roy, “the Plan and the Constitu-
tion anticipated several of the principles which were to be
formulated and developed as Radical Humanism in 1946
and the subsequent years.”4
According to M. N. Roy, his books Scientific
Politics (1942) along with New Orientation (1946) and
Beyond Communism (1947) constitute the history of the
development of radical humanism.
In fact, Roy had rejected some communist doctrines,
19
such as the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
as back as 1940. In his lectures delivered at a study camp
of the League of Radical Congressman in May 1940, pub-
lished subsequently under the title Scientific Politics in
1942, Roy had said:
20
power, and therefore could be remade by human
efforts [emphasis mine].8
21
authority.”12
Outlining the salient points of his new philosophy,
Roy says, “a philosophy, to be a guide for all forms of
human action, must have some ethics, some morals, which
must recognize certain things as permanent and abiding in
humanity.”13
According to Roy, “what the world needs is a phi-
losophy of freedom… Without a philosophical revolution,
no social revolution is possible.” The “cardinal principle
of our philosophy,” adds Roy, is that “man is the maker of
his destiny.”14
Roy had come to the conclusion that “the modern
State is too powerful to be overthrown as at the time of
the French Revolution or of the Russian Revolution; the
modern weapons and the modern technique of military
operations have rendered the old technique of revolution
− seizure of power through insurrection − impossible.”
That is why he advocates “the new way of revolution:
revolution by consent or persuasion.”15
Roy also makes a distinction between Marxism, which
according to Roy, is a philosophy, and communism, which
is “only a political practice”. Roy’s critique of commu-
nism goes farther then that of Marxism. “The history of
Soviet Union”, says Roy, “makes one doubt whether Com-
munism will lead to the ideal of freedom.”16
The radical change in Roy’s assessment of the Soviet
Union, as pointed out by Sibnarayan Ray, “took place over
a period of time and is recorded in the substantially en-
larged edition of his book The Russian Revolution (1949)
which incorporated his earlier book of the same title pub-
lished in 1937 plus his writings on the Comintern and the
Soviet Union during the 1940s.”17
Thus, by 1946, when he delivered these lectures, Roy
22
had come to believe that “revolution can no longer take
place under the banner of Communism, and that Marxism
as vulgarized by its orthodox exponents can no longer give
us strong enough inspiration. We shall have to set up higher
ideals and find a nobler philosophy of life.”18
However, even at this stage of his thinking, Roy did
not totally disown Marxism. Though he insists that Marx-
ism and radicalism are “not identical”, he also added that
they are “not mutually exclusive”. He describes radical-
ism as an attempt “to rescue Marxism from degeneration
into orthodoxy” and as a “revision of Marxism”.19 He
mainly differed from Marxism in emphasizing the role of
ideas in human progress, and in stressing the fundamen-
tal importance of ethics as a basis of political action. In
words of Roy, “organized thought is the condition for
planned action” and “we must learn to think, then only we
can work systematically”. Or, to put it differently, “there
can be no political revolution without a philosophical revo-
lution”.20
23
and his circle of friends, were adopted at the Bombay
Conference of the Radical Democratic Party. Roy’s
speeches at the conference in connection with the Twenty-
Two Theses were published later under the title Beyond
Communism.
In 1947, Roy published New Humanism − A
Manifesto, which offered an elaboration of the Twenty-
Two Theses. Roy prepared the draft of the manifesto, but,
as Roy himself says, in the preface of New Humanism, he
derived help from valuable suggestions of Philip Spratt,
Sikander Choudhary and V. M.Tarkunde in improving his
draft. The ideas expressed in the manifesto were, accord-
ing to Roy, developed over a period of number of years by
a group of critical Marxists and former Communists.
Further discussions on the Twenty-Two Theses and
the manifesto led Roy to the conclusion that party-politics
was inconsistent with his ideal of organized democracy.
This resulted in the dissolution of the Radical Democratic
Party in December 1948 and launching of a movement
called the Radical Humanist Movement.21 At the Calcutta
Conference, itself where the party was dissolved, theses
19 and 20 were amended to delete all references to party.
The last three paragraphs of the manifesto were also modi-
fied accordingly. Thus, the revised versions of the Twenty-
Two Theses and the manifesto constitute the essence of
Roy’s New Humanism.
24
Movement.”23
Since 1937, Roy was editing a new weekly named
Independent India. In 1949, Independent India weekly
changed to The Radical Humanist weekly.24 The name of
another quarterly journal The Marxian Way, which Roy
had been publishing since 1945 in collaboration with
Sudhindranath Datta, was changed to The Humanist Way
in the same year.25
25
and Ethical Union (IHEU) was planned to be organized
in Amsterdam in 1952, and Roys were expected to play
an influential role in the congress and in the develop-
ment of the IHEU.
However, before going abroad, Roy needed some
rest. He along with Ellen Roy went up for a few days
from Dehradun to the hill station of Mussoorie. On June
11, 1952, Roy met a serious accident. He fell fifty feet
down while walking along a hill track. He was moved to
Dehradun for treatment. On 25 August, he had an attack
of cerebral thrombosis resulting in a partial paralysis of
the right side. The accident prevented the Roys from
attending the inaugural congress of the IHEU, which was
held in August 1952 in Amsterdam. The congress, how-
ever, elected M. N. Roy, in absentia, as one of its vice-
presidents and made the Indian Radical Humanist Move-
ment one of the founder members of the IHEU. On 15
August 1953, Roy had the second attack of cerebral
thrombosis, which paralyzed the left side of his body.
Roy’s last article dictated to Ellen Roy for the Radical
Humanist was about the nature and organization of the
Radical Humanist Movement. This article was published
in the Radical Humanist on 24 January 1954. On 25
January 1954, ten minutes before midnight, M. N. Roy
died of a heart attack. He was nearly 67 at that time.
Publications
Roy was a prolific writer. He wrote many books, ed-
ited, and contributed to several journals. The Oxford Uni-
versity Press has published four volumes of Selected Works
of M. N. Roy, edited by Sibnarayan Ray. We have already
mentioned some of his works related to the final humanist
26
phase of his life. Of these Materialism, Science and
Philosophy, New Humanism and Reason, Romanticism
and Revolution are of special interest to us.
27
the light of past experience, so that the solution
will give him an encouraging glimpse into the
future.30
28
reality and declaring it to be a figment of man’s
imagination. An inquiry, which denies the very
existence of the object to be enquired, is bound
to end in idle dreams and hopeless confusion.32
29
of nature, and is, therefore, limited by the laws of nature.
In this way, according to Roy, “as soon as the cause of the
phenomenal world is thus placed beyond the realm of hu-
man knowledge, the world itself becomes incomprehensi-
ble.”35
Roy is of the view that, “religion is bound to be liqui-
dated by science, because scientific knowledge enables
mankind to answer questions, confronted by which in its
childhood, it was compelled to assume super-natural forces
or agencies.”36
Therefore, according to Roy, in order to perform its
function, “philosophy must break away from religion” and
start from the reality of the physical universe.
30
explain existence as a whole. An explanation of existence
requires knowledge of existence; knowledge about the
different phases of existence is gathered by the various
branches of science. Therefore, in words of Roy:
New Humanism
New humanism, as presented in the Twenty-Two
Theses, has both a critical and a constructive part. The
critical part consists of describing the inadequacies of
communism (including the economic interpretation of his-
31
tory), and of formal parliamentary democracy. The con-
structive part, on the other hand, consists of giving high-
est value to the freedom of individuals, presenting a hu-
manist interpretation of history, and outlining a picture of
radical or organized democracy along with the way for
achieving that ideal.
32
for freedom back to human being’s struggle for existence,
and he regards search for truth as a corollary to this quest.
Reason, according to Roy, is a biological property, and it
is not opposed to human will. Morality, which emanates
from the rational desire for harmonious and mutually ben-
eficial social relations, is rooted in the innate rationality of
human beings. According to Roy, human beings are moral,
because they are rational.
How is search for truth, one may ask, a corollary to
the quest for freedom? Explaining this Roy says:
33
Humanist Interpretation of History
Inadequacies of Communism
34
subordinate the man of flesh and blood to an imaginary
collective ego, be it the nation or class, cannot possibly
be, in Roy’s view, the suitable means for the attainment of
the goal of freedom. Roy is opposed to sacrificing the in-
dividual at the altar of an imaginary collective ego. Any
social philosophy or scheme of social reconstruction, which
does not recognize the individual, and dismisses the ideal
of freedom as an empty abstraction, says Roy, can have
no more than a very limited progressive and revolutionary
significance.
The Marxian doctrine of state, according to which
the state is an instrument of exploitation of one class by
another, is clearly rejected by Roy. According to Roy, the
state is “the political organization of society” and “its with-
ering away under Communism is a utopia which has been
exploded by experience” (Thesis Nine).
Similarly, Roy rejects the communist doctrine of the
dictatorship of the proletariat. “Dictatorship of any form,
however plausible may be the pretext for it, is,” asserts
Roy, “excluded by the Radical-Humanist perspective of
social evolution”.45
Referring to the Soviet experiment, Roy says:
35
idle to say that a higher form of democracy has
been established.46
36
logical function on the level of consciousness.
Therefore, it is rational (Thesis Thirteen).
37
Radical Democracy
38
philosophers of the people rather than as their would-be
rulers. Consistent with the goal of freedom, their political
practice will be rational and, therefore, ethical. According
to Roy:
39
tative, in the nature of a utopia. The justification, accord-
ing to Roy, for outlining this picture is that human action
must be driven by an ideal or else there will be no incen-
tive for action.
As pointed out by Roy himself in his preface to the
second edition of the New Humanism, though new hu-
manism has been presented in the Twenty-Two theses and
the Manifesto as a political philosophy, it is meant to be a
complete system. Because of being based on the ever-ex-
panding totality of scientific knowledge, new humanism,
according to Roy, cannot be a closed system. “It will not
be”, says Roy, “a dogmatic system claiming finality and
infallibility.” Roy also declares, “the work and progress of
the Radical Humanist Movement will no longer be judged
in terms of mass following, but by the spread of the spirit
of freedom, rationality and secular morality amongst the
people, and in the increase of their influence in the State.”
According to Roy:
40
the people the way to solve their daily problems
by popular initiative, the Radicals will combat
ignorance, fatalism, blind faith and the sense of
individual helplessness, which are the basis of au-
thoritarianism. They will put all the social tradi-
tions and institutions to the test of the humanist
outlook [emphasis mine].50
41
mocracy to be realized [emphasis mine].52
42
We can conceive of the idea only when we know that all
gods are our own creation, and that we can depose
whomsoever we have enthroned.”54
Roy’s critical approach towards religion comes out
very clearly in the preface of his book, India’s Message,
where he asserts that “a criticism of religious thought,
subjection of traditional beliefs and the time-honored dog-
mas of religion to a searching analysis, is a condition for
the belated Renaissance of India. The spirit of inquiry
should overwhelm the respect for tradition.”55
According to Roy, “a critical examination of what is
cherished as India’s cultural heritage will enable the In-
dian people to cast off the chilly grip of a dead past. It will
embolden them to face the ugly realities of a living present
and look forward to a better, brighter and pleasanter fu-
ture.”56
Thus, Roy was opposed to an uncritical and vain glo-
rification of India’s so-called “spiritual” heritage. How-
ever, he did not stand for a wholesale rejection of ancient
Indian thought either. He favored a rational and critical
approach towards ancient traditions and thoughts. Roy
believed that the object of European renaissance was to
rescue the positive contributions of ancient European civi-
lization, which were lying buried in the Middle Ages ow-
ing to the dominance of the Church. Roy had something
similar in his mind about India. According to him, one of
the tasks of the renaissance movement should be to res-
cue the positive outcome and abiding contributions of
ancient thought − contributions which just like the contri-
butions of Greek sages are lying in ruins under the de-
cayed structure of the brahminical society − the tradition
of which is erroneously celebrated as the Indian civiliza-
tion.
43
Notes
1
Sibnarayan Ray (ed.), “Introduction” Selected Works of M.
N. Roy, Vol. I (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 33.
2
M. N. Roy, “Preface to the 1989 Reprint” Reason, Roman-
ticism and Revolution (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1989), p.
XV.
3
V. M. Tarkunde, Radical Humanism (New Delhi: Ajanta
Publications, 1983), p. 49.
4
Sibnarayan Ray (ed.), Selected Works of M. N. Roy, p. 41.
5
M. N. Roy, Scientific Politics (Calcutta: Renaissance
Publishers, 1947), pp. 210-11.
6
Ibid., p. 199.
7
Ibid., p. 196.
8
Ibid., p. 38.
9
Ibid., p. VII.
10
Ibid., p. V.
11
M. N. Roy, New Orientation (Delhi: Ajanta Publications,
1982), p. 98.
12
Ibid., p. XII.
13
Ibid., p. 19.
14
Ibid., pp. 19-20.
15
Ibid., pp. 35-38.
16
Ibid., p. 44.
17
Sibnarayan Ray (ed.), Op. Cit., p. 42.
18
M. N. Roy, New Orientation, p. 73.
19
Ibid., pp. XIII-XIV.
20
Ibid., p. 23.
21
In 1969, the movement was transformed into a member-
ship-organization called Indian Radical Humanist Association
−IRHA.
22
The Institute now functions from New Delhi.
23
Sibnarayan Ray (ed.), Op.Cit., p. 46.
24
The Indian Renaissance Institute presently publishes The
44
Radical Humanist as a monthly from Mumbai.
25
This journal has ceased publication. See R. M. Pal (ed.), Se-
lections from The Marxian Way and The Humanist Way (Delhi:
Ajanta Publications, 2000).
26
Sibnarayan Ray (ed.), Op. Cit., p. 53.
27
M. N. Roy, Materialism (Calcutta: Renaissance Publishers
Ltd., 1951), p. 1.
28
Ibid., pp. 1-2. Apparently, Roy has used the term "spir-
itual" in the sense of "mental-intelectual". However, the use of
term "spiritual" by Roy is misleading because Roy did not
believe in the existence of "soul" or "spirit".
29
M. N. Roy, Science and Philosophy (Delhi: Ajanta Publi-
cations, 1984), pp. 5-6.
30
Ibid., p. 6.
31
M. N. Roy, Materialism, p.2.
32
Ibid., p. 4.
33
M. N. Roy, Science and Philosophy, p.1.
34
Ibid., p. 3.
35
M. N. Roy, Materialism, p. 5.
36
M. N. Roy, Science and Philosophy, p. 9.
37
Ibid., p. 28.
38
Ibid., p. 31.
39
M. N. Roy, Scientific Politics, p. 51.
40
M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution (Delhi:
Ajanta Publications, 1989), p. 493.
41
See appendix for a complete version of the Twenty-Two The-
ses.
42
M. N. Roy, Beyond Communism (New Delhi: Ajanta
Publications, 1981), p. 88.
43
Ibid., p. 31.
44
Ibid.
45
M. N. Roy, New Humanism − A Manifesto (Delhi: Ajanta
Publications, 1981), p. 41.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid., p. 35.
45
49
Ibid., p.36.
50
Ibid., pp. 76-77.
51
M. N. Roy, Beyond Communism, p. 65.
52
M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, p. 474.
53
M. N. Roy, Beyond Communism, p. 72.
54
M. N. Roy, Scientific Politics, p. 39.
55
M. N. Roy, India’s Message, p. XIV.
56
Ibid., p. XIII.
46
II. Materialism
In his book Beyond Communism, M.N.Roy has stated
that his philosophy of new humanism as expressed in the
“Twenty-Two Theses on Radical Democracy” is “deduced
from materialist philosophy”. Not only this, according to
Roy, “materialism is the only philosophy possible.”
In what sense Roy has used the term “materialism”?
How is Roy’s “materialism” different from traditional
materialism in general and Marxian materialism in par-
ticular? What logical connection, if any, exists between
Roy’s new humanism and materialism? I will try to an-
swer these questions in this book. However, in this chap-
ter I am only interested in exploring the nature of “mate-
rialism”, and that, too, without any reference to Marx or
M. N. Roy.
Concept of Materialism
What, then is the meaning of “materialism”?
Perhaps I should make clear in the very beginning
that in answering this question I have no intention of in-
flicting my own meaning of the word “materialism” on
unsuspecting readers.
As pointed out by John Hospers in his An
Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, “a word is an ar-
bitrary symbol which is given meaning by human beings.”
According to Hospers, when we indicate what a word
means “we are doing one of two things: either (1) we are
stating what we are going to mean by it, or (2) we are
47
reporting what people in general, more specifically those
who use the language we are speaking, or sometimes some
segment of those who use that language, already mean by
it. In the first case we are stipulating a meaning, and we
have a stipulative definition. In the second case we are
reporting the usage of others, and we have a reportive, or
lexical, definition.”1
So, to use Hospers’ terminology, I am not interested
in stipulating a definition of “materialism”. On the con-
trary, I am interested in finding out the sense in which the
word is already used. In others words, I am interested in
finding out the reportive or lexical definition of the word
“materialism”.
Now, the easiest way to find out the lexical definition
of a term is to consult any standard dictionary. Let us find
out what the dictionaries have to say about “materialism”
The Oxford Paperback Dictionary gives the follow-
ing meanings of “materialism”: "1. belief that only the
material world exists 2. excessive concern with material
possessions rather than spiritual or intellectual values.”2
Similarly, Webster’s New World Dictionary defines
“materialism” as: “1. the philosophical doctrine that eve-
rything in the world, including thought, will, and feeling,
can be explained only in terms of matter. 2. the tendency
to be more concerned with material than with spiritual
values.”3
These dictionary definitions of “materialism”, though
useful as a starting point, cannot be considered adequate
from a philosophical point of view. No doubt, the diction-
aries report what meanings are actually attached to a word
by an average educated user of the language, or a section
of those who use the language. However, more often than
not, this popular sense of the term is different from − even
48
if not totally unrelated to − the technical sense in which
the word is used in philosophy. Though I am not inter-
ested in stipulating a definition of “materialism”, yet I am
more interested in the way the word is used in philosophy
than in the way it is used in common language. In other
words, what I am looking for is a reportive definition in
the technical sense. And for this we could turn more prof-
itably to technical dictionaries, encyclopedias and stand-
ard textbooks of philosophy.
According to The Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
49
powers, no angels or devils, no demiurges and no gods (if
these are conceived as immaterial entities). Hence noth-
ing that happens can be attributed to the action of such
beings.”
Thus, according to the Encyclopedia, “the second
major tenet” of materialism is “Everything that can be ex-
plained can be explained on the basis of laws involving
only the antecedent physical conditions.”
“Materialists,” maintains the Encyclopedia, “have tra-
ditionally been determinists”. Thus, adding the claim that
there is a cause for every event. This claim, however, says
the Encyclopedia, “is not strictly entailed by materialism;
recently, it has apparently been weakened by development
of quantum theory, and some contemporary materialists
are opponents of determinism.”5
The New Encyclopaedia Britannica gives the follow-
ing exposition of materialism:
50
(A slight modification is to allow the void − or
empty space − to exist also in its own right.) These
objects interact in the sort of way that stones do:
by impact and possibly also by gravitational at-
traction. The theory denies that immaterial or
apparently immaterial things (such as minds) ex-
ist or else explains them away as being material
things or motions of material things.7
History of Materialism
51
teachings of materialism in following words:
52
were divided far enough, we should ultimately come to
indivisible units. These indivisible units are called atoms,
and, therefore, atoms are the ultimate constituents of mat-
ter. Empedocles, another pre-Socratic philosopher, had
assumed four different kinds of matter − earth, air, fire,
and water − but, according to atomists like Leuccipus and
Democritus all the atoms are composed of exactly the same
kind of matter.
Insofar it can be reconstructed, their doctrines, ac-
cording to The Encyclopedia of Philosophy consists of
the following theses:
53
atoms is the collision of two atoms, setting up a vortex.
In the vortex, motion is communicated from the periphery
towards the center. In consequence, heavy atoms move to
the center, light ones to the periphery. The vortex con-
tinually embraces new atoms, which come near it in their
random motion, and it thus begins a world.10
Epicurus (342-270 B.C.), the most famous and
influential Greek materialist, too, adopted the position of
the Great Diakosoms but gave a modified account of the
origin of worlds. There are, according to him, indefinite
numbers of atoms falling through an infinite space. In one
construction of the Epicurean system, the heavier, faster
atoms occasionally stride the lighter, slower ones obliquely,
giving then a slight lateral velocity. In another construc-
tion, the original deviation is actuated by something like
free will. From this point onwards, the development of
vortices, etc., proceed in much the same way as in
Democritus. Thus, Epicurean materialism differed from
that of Democritus in being indeterministic. Epicurean
philosophy also contained an important ethical part, which
was a sort of enlightened, refined, egoistic hedonism.
Epicurus’s philosophy was expounded by Roman phi-
losopher Lucretius (born 99 B.C.) in his long didactic poem
De Rerum Natura (English translation, On the Nature of
Things). Lucretius, who was a powerful influence in the
propagation of Epicurean philosophy among the Romans,
adopted the second account of the fall of atoms through
void and appealed to some form of voluntary action to
explain the original deviation from vertical descent. Like
Epicurus, Lucretius, too, was motivated by wish to free
men from the burdens of religious fear. He argued at length
against the existence of any spiritual soul and for mortal-
ity of human beings. These beliefs have been explicit fea-
54
tures of materialism since then.
Modern Materialism
55
and action.
56
existed and always been in motion, and different worlds
are formed from different distributions of matter and
motion. Matter is of four basic types (earth, air, fire and
water), and changes in their proportions are responsible
for all changes other than spatio temporal ones.
Holbach regarded mechanical causes of impact type
as only intelligible and real ones. Since human beings are
in nature and part of nature, all human actions spring from
natural causes. As in Epicurus and Lucretius, there is a
strong antireligious motive in Holbach’s work. The purity
of Holbach’s materialism is marred only by his admission
of relations of sympathy, antipathy, and affinity among
material particles, in addition to the primary qualities, grav-
ity and inert force.
So, this completes my brief historical survey of mate-
rialism up to eighteenth century. In this chapter, I am not
discussing Marxian materialism, which will be discussed
in the next chapter, or even contemporary materialism,
because right now I am more interested in materialism as
it existed before the advent of Marxism.
To sum up, “materialism” refers to metaphysical theo-
ries (theories about the nature of reality), which give to
matter a primary position and accord to mind (or spirit) a
secondary, dependent reality or none at all. According to
materialism, there are no incorporeal soul, gods, etc., (if
these are conceived as immaterial entities). Thus nothing
that happens can be attributed to the action of such things,
and everything that can be explained on the basis of laws
involving the antecedent physical conditions.
As pointed out in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
materialists have traditionally been determinists, though
determinism is not strictly entailed by materialism. As we
have seen in our brief historical survey of materialism, the
57
materialism of ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus was
indeterministic and he allowed for free will. In this con-
nection, the following comment in the Britannica is worth
taking note of, “… it is popularly supposed that Material-
ism and determinism must go together. This is not so...
Even some ancient Materialists were indeterminists, and a
modern physicalist Materialism must be indeterministic be-
cause of the indeterminism that is built into modern phys-
ics.”12
Another point worth nothing is that metaphysical
materialism has nothing to do with the ethical attitude,
which is popularly associated with materialism. This point
has been emphasized in both The Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy and the Britannica. According to The Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy:
58
An extreme physicalistic Materialist, for exam-
ple, might prefer a Beethoven record to a com-
fortable mattress for his bed; and a person who
believes in immaterial spirits might opt for the
mattress.14
59
ity, cheerfulness, moderation, temperance are, according
to Epicurus, the best means to happiness.
To conclude, the first meaning of “materialism” con-
tained in The Oxford Paperback Dictionary and Webster’s
New World Dictionary, quoted in the beginning of this
chapter, is largely correct, even if not adequate, but the
second meaning, is philosophically misleading. Material-
ism is a doctrine about the nature of reality and not about
which part of that reality we ought to prefer or how we
ought to live. It is true that metaphysical materialism is
logically incompatible with any spiritualistic ethics involv-
ing soul, life after death, heaven and god; but, on the other
hand, it is compatible with any this-worldly ethics, which
does not involve belief in such “spiritual” entities. In no
case, it necessarily entails a particular kind of ethics or
ethical attitude.
60
Notes
1
John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis
(New Delhi: Allied Publishers Private Ltd., 1975), pp. 32-33.
2
Joyce M. Hawkins (compiler), The Oxford Paperback
Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 392.
3
David B. Guralnik (ed.), Webster’s New World Dictionary
(New Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publishing Co., 1975), p. 462.
4
Keith Campbell, “Materialism” in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (ed. in chief, Paul Edwards), Vol. V (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press, 1972), p.
179.
5
Ibid.
6
J. J. C. Smart, “Materialism” in The New Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Vol.11 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc.,
1981), p. 611.
7
Ibid.
8
Quoted by Chandradhar Sharma in A Critical Survey of
Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1964), p.41.
9
W. T. Stace, A Critical History of Greek Philosophy
(London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1962), p.20.
10
Keith Campbell, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 5,
p. 180.
11
Finngeir Hiorth, Introduction to Atheism (Pune: Indian
Secular Society, 1995), p. 115.
12
J. J. C. Smart, The NewEncyclopaedia Britannica, Vol.
11, p. 611.
13
Keith Campbell, Op. Cit., p. 179.
14
J. J.C. Smart, Op. Cit., p. 612.
61
62
III. Roy’s Materialism and
Traditional Materialism
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, accord-
ing to M. N. Roy, the Twenty-Two Theses on Radical
Democracy are “deduced from materialist philosophy”, and
“Materialism is the only philosophy possible.”1
In this chapter, I will concentrate on Roy’s revised
version of materialism and its differences from traditional
materialism. Besides, I will briefly discuss the relationship
between materialism and new humanism as envisaged by
Roy.
In what sense Roy has used the word “materialism”?
How is Roy’s materialism different from pre-Marxian
materialism, which has been discussed in the last chapter?
(The differences between Roy’s materialism and Marxian
materialism will be discussed in the next chapter). What,
according to Roy, is the relationship between materialism
and new humanism? I will be discussing these questions
in this chapter.
Roy had used his prison years in writing about ‘the
philosophical consequences of modern science’. Though
his ‘Prison Manuscripts’ have not been published in total-
ity, selected portion from them were published as separate
books in the 1930s and 1940s. Among the books that were
made from Roy’s ‘Prison Manuscripts’, Materialism and
Science and Philosophy are most closely related to the
subject matter of this chapter. In addition to these books,
Roy’s Beyond Communism and Reason, Romanticism
and Revolution, also contain some valuable material.
63
Roy’s Conception of Materialism
Materialism
64
exists − knowledge acquired through the con-
templation, observation and investigation of the
phenomena of nature itself.4
65
fers to the ancient Indian materialism of Charvak or
Lokayat. According to Roy, “The long process of the de-
velopment of naturalist, rationalist, sceptic, agnostic and
materialist though in ancient India found culmination in
the Charvak system of philosophy, which can be compared
with Greek Epicureanism, and as such is to be appreci-
ated as the positive outcome of the intellectual culture of
ancient India.”8
66
The “Crisis” of Modern Materialism: Roy has discussed
the “crisis” of materialism in the seventh chapter of his
book Materialism. According to Roy, in the last analysis,
the “crisis” involved the conception of matter; it did not
affect the existence of matter as such. The “crisis” simply
exposed the inadequacy of the old atomist theory. It sim-
ply showed that the atom was not the ultimate, irreduc-
ible, state of matter. The substance of the “crisis” was, in
words of Roy, “that it appeared to reduce matter from
mass to energy or radiation.” There was nothing particu-
larly new in the changed conception of the nature of mat-
ter, according to Roy, which could turn over all traditional
theories of physics and mechanics.12
Another result of the “crisis” − a corollary to the sup-
posed disappearance of matter − was, according to Roy,
the alleged destruction of the old theory of mechanics. In
the absence of mass, all traditional laws of mechanics
seemed to become untenable. Physics appeared to have
abolished the mechanistic conception of the universe.
Roy, as pointed out earlier in the first chapter, had a
very scientific conception of philosophy. He believed that
“metaphysical concepts must be constantly revised in the
light of empirical knowledge.” If the nature of the con-
tents of a priori metaphysical concepts, such as space,
time, substance and causality, could not be revealed a pos-
teriori by the advance of the empirical knowledge of ob-
jective reality, they should be discarded as empty abstrac-
tions. “Whenever”, says Roy, “any philosophical doctrine
is rendered palpably untenable by verified results of scien-
tific research, it must go. Otherwise, philosophy could not
claim to be the science of sciences − a logical system of
knowledge.”13
67
According to Roy, the revolutionary significance, in
the epistemological sense, of the twentieth century
physics is that is has acquired a body of experience which
cannot be fitted into the moulds of old concepts. New
conceptual moulds must be created to suit the new expe-
rience. Therefore, Roy was ready to discard the concept
of matter if it was exploded by scientific research. As he
says, “If it were true that modern physical research had
exposed the concept of matter to be a metaphysical ab-
straction, devoid of any empirical, physical, ontological
content, well, so much the worse for it.”14
However, according to Roy, the results of modern
physical researches, instead of contradiction materialist
philosophy, further strengthen it by giving it a positive
foundation.
Referring to the conclusions of W.Waubel, author of
standard works on physical chemistry, and other scien-
tists, Roy tries to drive home the point that, “The atom
has not disappeared. The old conception of it has been
modified in the light of a greater knowledge about it. The
atom has disappeared as the basic unit of matter. It has
been discovered to be a minute solar system, composed of
a large number of infinitesimally small particles of mat-
ter.”15
The sub-atomic particle electron, for example, points
out Roy, is not a mysterious entity. It has a mass of its
own. Energy, on the other hand, is not a non-material en-
tity, but a form of matter. Thus, according to Roy, the new
theories do not destroy the mechanistic conception of the
universe.
Roy also refers to Bertrand Russell’s view, expressed
in the introduction to the English edition of Lange’s His-
tory of Materialism:
68
The theory of Relativity, by merging time into
space-time, has damaged the traditional notion
of substance more than all arguments of philoso-
phers. Matter, for commonsense, is something
which persists in time, and moves in space. But
for modern Relativity Physics, this view is no
longer tenable. A piece of matter has become,
not a persistent thing with varying states, but a
series of inter-related events. The old solidity is
gone, and with it the characteristic that, to the
Materialist, made matter seem more real than
fleeting thoughts.16
69
dation of positive knowledge.”17
70
Science and Philosophy
71
The theory of relativity, says Roy, reduces the entire
cosmic scheme, including space, time, mass, motion, force,
energy to one single category. The ultimate units of that
fundamental reality are conceived as “events”, instead of
mass-points in order to lay emphasis on its dynamic char-
acter. The world is not a static being; it is a process of
becoming. Therefore, it should be interpreted in terms of
“events”, that is, of changes in the state of its ultimate
constituents. Because “events” are dynamic physical
magnitudes, intervals between them are spatial as well as
temporal.
Roy observes that as long as physics and philosophy
believed in absolute space and time, regarded these as
ultimate categories, logically antecedent to being and
becoming, the criterion for reality of matter was simple
location in space. Matter was conceived as minute parti-
cles of mass occupying discrete positions in space at given
moments of time. However, atomic physics has discov-
ered that matter does not possess those properties −
always in the absolute sense. The notion of simple loca-
tion in space must be abandoned.
These developments, points out Roy, has led some
philosophically minded scientists to the conclusion that
the old concept of substance must be discarded: matter
does not exist physically because its ultimate units are not
extended in space. However, says Roy, that conclusion
follows inevitably only if we hold on to the idea that exist-
ence is extension in space. The revolution in the concept
of space, brought about by the theory of relativity, ac-
cording to Roy, “compels rejection of the old definition of
existence. Matter does not exist in space. On the contrary,
space is a function of matter.”22
Roy insists that the concept of substance is affected
72
by the revolution in new physics only as far as it was
identified with mass. Mass is a property of matter, but it
is, says Roy, variable like all other properties. The abso-
luteness of mass disappears already in the theory of
relativity. Energy is a form of matter, and matter is vibra-
tory substance. In this way, atomic physics has reduced
matter to energy. However, that does not mean a denial of
matter, because, according to Roy, no quantum physicist
would deny the existence of atom and its constituents −
electrons and protons.
There cannot be any doubt about the fact, says Roy,
“that atomic physics deals with material realities which
exist objectively, outside the mind of the physicist.”23
“Thus”, concludes Roy, “the revolution in the con-
cept of matter, brought about by the discoveries of Quan-
tum physics, does not mean that all established physical
theories are upset, with the consequent downfall of the
mechanistic-materialist philosophical notions associated
with classical physics. The impending process is towards
a higher synthesis of ideas. Matter is not an inert mass
moved by a mysterious force. Matter and energy are the
dual manifestations of substance, which enters our expe-
rience as these manifested forms.”24
Science, according to Roy, has “proved the self-suffi-
ciency of matter.” “Matter”, says Roy, “is an objective
category. Self-sufficient objectivity is the ultimate reality.
Therefore matter is the only reality.”25
The basic principle of Materialism, as corroborated
and reinforced by modern scientific research, is, in words
of Roy:
73
there is nothing beyond and outside it; its being
and becoming are governed by laws inherent in
itself; laws are neither mysterious nor metaphysi-
cal, nor merely conventional; they are coherent
relations of events; consciousness, with its mani-
festations and derivatives is a property of that
which, in a certain state of organization, distin-
guishes existence from non-existence [emphasis
mine].26
74
knowledge, is the only philosophy possible.” Roy frankly
admits “materialism must be dissociated from certain no-
tions which have been rendered untenable by the latest
discoveries of science.”28
For these considerations, according to Roy, “all re-
ally scientific objections to the term Materialism should
be obviated if the new philosophy is called ‘Physical re-
alism’.”29
“Even so revised and renamed, to avoid confusion,
Materialism is vindicated as the only philosophy possible,
provided that philosophy is defined as a logical coordina-
tion of all branches of positive knowledge in a system of
thought to explain the world rationally and to serve as a
reliable guide for life.”30
According to Roy, ever since the dawn of civiliza-
tion, materialism has been “the most plausible hypothesis
for rationalist philosophical thought and fruitful scientific
investigation.”31 The alternative views of life − religious,
teleological, idealist, mystic − are not able to prove their
assumption and verify their postulates. Materialism is the
most plausible hypothesis, says Roy, because the catego-
ries of its metaphysics are not unknowable, even if un-
known yet.
75
In Materialism and Science and Philosophy, too, Roy
insists that the latest scientific theories do not destroy the
mechanistic conception of the universe.
However, Roy also considers it essential to revise the
conception of causality in the light of latest scientific
developments. In particular, he tries to show that deter-
minism and probability are not mutually exclusive con-
ceptions.
Roy also makes a distinction between the “rational
and scientific” concept of determinism and the “teleologi-
cal or religious” doctrine of predestination, and tries to
reconcile freedom of the will with determinism.
In his article “The Concept of Causality in Modern
Science”,32 published in The Humanist Way in 1949-50,
Roy refers to the view held by some physicists that
Heisenberg’s principle of uncertainty necessitates the re-
jection of the doctrine of determinism. Nevertheless, ac-
cording to Roy, no such drastic conclusion follows from
Heisenberg’s principle; only a modification of the tradi-
tional principle of causality is required.
Roy insists that the new conception of matter intro-
duced by atomic physics does not raise any doubt about
the reality of causal relations in nature. The question raised
by the new conception of matter is, according to Roy, about
the exactness with which causal relations, deep down in
the structure of the physical world, can be traced.
It has been discovered, says Roy, that the law of elec-
tronic movement cannot be stated in terms of causality,
because the light used for observing it disturbs the path of
an electron. As a result, it cannot be accurately predicted
where a particular electron will be the next moment. Only
the most probable position can be predicted. Thus, the
problem raised by the new quantum theory is, in words of
76
Roy, “how to reconcile the concept of causal relations with
the observed uncertainty of electronic movement.”
The application of the statistical method in the re-
searches of atomic physics, however, maintains Roy, does
not disprove causality. In his article “Probability and De-
terminism”33 published in The Humanist Way in 1950 Roy
draws our attention to Heisenberg’s statement that “there
exists a body of exact mathematical laws” which hold good
for quantum phenomena. The only difficulty is that these
laws cannot be interpreted as “expressing simple relation-
ships between objects existing in space and time.”
Roy is quick to point out, on the basis of Heisenberg’s
observation, that the sub-atomic world is not chaotic. In
words of Roy:
77
even upon a particular event can be possibly traced. In
such a situation, says Roy, determinism has to be inter-
preted in terms of probability. Nevertheless, according to
Roy, determinism still remains. The innumerable numbers
of possibilities of a given situation are all determined.
Even if the most improbable event happened, it would be
causally determined. There is no place for miracles in
nature. Rejection of the idea of causality − that there are
invariant relations in nature − will mean, according to Roy,
“blasting the very foundation of science.” As he says:
79
Change in the concept of “matter”
80
istence”. According to Roy, it is not very important what
name is attached to the “substratum of existence” − mat-
ter, energy, action, vibratory motion or field. However, he
insists that it is a physical reality. What Roy means by
calling it physical is that it exists objectively and that it is
measurable.
So, in Roy’s “materialism”, “matter” is not made up
of hard and massy, stone-like atoms as in traditional “me-
chanical materialism”. The whole concept of “matter” has
been revised in the light of new physics. The “atoms” of
new physics are not only different from “atoms” of an-
cient Greek atomists Democritus and Epicurus, which are
all supposed to be made of the same stuff though end-
lessly varied in shape and size, etc., but also different from
the indivisible “atoms” of Newtonian natural philosophy.
Thus, according to Roy, materialist philosophy with the
more appropriate name physical realism is corroborated
by the latest scientific knowledge.
81
view of determinism by interpreting it in terms of prob-
ability. He admits plurality of possibilities and contingency
in the world, and tries to show that determinism and prob-
ability are not mutually exclusive. According to Roy, sta-
tistical methods presuppose determinism. In midst of chaos
it is not possible to say what is most probable to happen.
The universe is a law-governed system, and existence of
law pre-supposes causality. He is emphatic that the ele-
ment of uncertainty in the sub-atomic world is not to be
equated with indeterminacy. Rejection of the idea that
there are invariant relations in nature will, maintains Roy,
blast the very foundation of science.
82
referred back to the general laws of the world of dead
matter. The living matter grows out of the background of
dead matter; consciousness appears at a much later stage.
Therefore, human will, says Roy, cannot be directly re-
lated to the laws of physical universe.
83
else has been called “extreme materialism” by Campbell.40
Roy, we may say, is not an extreme materialist. Julian de
la Mettrie, an eighteenth century materialist had declared
man to be a self-moving machine, whereas, according to
Roy, “Man is not a living machine, but a thinking animal”.
Emphasis on Ethics
84
to ethics by Roy in his philosophy as a special feature of
his materialism. However, it is pertinent to note that, con-
trary to the popular impression, some ancient and modern
materialists, too, accorded an important place to ethics in
their philosophies. Epicurus, for example, as we have seen
in the previous chapter, not only allowed for free will but
also advocated an enlightened and refined variety of ego-
istic hedonism.
Among modern materialists, surprisingly, the princi-
ple aim of a “hard” determinist like Holbach was to
construct a system of ethical and political values on mate-
rialistic grounds. According to Holbach, happiness is the
supreme natural goal of human existence. However, as no
one can be happy without services of others, ethics, in
Holbach’s view, is the science of human co-operation to
promote the well being of the individual through that of
society. Ethics, therefore, is based, maintains Holbach, on
the positive knowledge of man’s reciprocal social needs.
If mankind has always been morally corrupt, says Holbach,
religion has been mainly to blame. Supernatural theology,
by falsifying man’s nature and linking man’s salvation to
the illusory notions of god and immortality, has entirely
subverted ethical truth. Holbach, thus, concludes that athe-
ism is “the prerequisite of all valid ethical teaching”.43
Therefore, Roy is not unique among materialists in
trying to give an important place to ethics in his material-
ism, though he does emphasize that the greatest defect of
classical materialism was that it did not seen to have any
connection with ethics. Roy rather resembles Holbach in
this respect, though he is not a “hard” determinist like
Holbach, and also the details of his ethical ideas are differ-
ent from that of Holbach.
85
Materialim and New Humanism
What, according to Roy, is the relationship between
materialism and new humanism? As mentioned in the be-
ginning of this chapter, Roy has stated in his Beyond
Communism that the “Twenty-Two Theses on Radical
Democracy”, are “deduced from materialist philosophy.”
In his preface to the second edition of New
Humanism Roy says that “the principles of humanist phi-
losophy of history and society outlined in the Theses …
are deducible only from a general philosophy of nature
and life, still to be elaborated on the basis of cosmological,
ontological, epistemological and ethical concepts and
propositions which are also stated in the Theses” [empha-
sis mine].
Further, according to Roy, “Though presented here
as a political philosophy New Humanism is meant to be a
complete system. Based on the ever expanding totality of
scientific knowledge, it cannot indeed be a closed system
claiming finality and infallibility.”
In his Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, Roy re-
iterates his view that, “Except on the basis of a philosophy
embracing the totality of existence, all approaches to the
problems of individuals as well as social life are bound to
be misleading … a sound social and political philosophy
must have a metaphysical foundation.”44
He further adds, “In so far it shows a way out of the
crisis of our time, New Humanism is a social philosophy.
But, as such, it is deduced from a general philosophy of
nature, including the world of matter and the world of
mind. Its metaphysics is physical-realist and its cosmol-
ogy is mechanistic.”
Thus, according to Roy, social and political philoso-
86
phy must have a metaphysical foundation, and new
humanism, which is presented in the Twenty-Two Theses,
as a political philosophy is deducible from a general phi-
losophy of nature and life, which Roy calls “materialism”
in Beyond Communism and “physical realism” in Reason,
Romanticism and Revolution.
87
Notes
1
M. N. Roy, Beyond Communism (Delhi: Ajanta Publica-
tions, 1981), p. 28.
2
Ibid., p. 38.
3
Ibid., p. 44.
4
M. N. Roy, Materialism (Calcutta: Renaissance Publishers
Ltd., 1951), p. 5.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid., p. 58.
8
Ibid., p.94.
9
Ibid., p. 184.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid., pp. 208-9.
13
Ibid., p. 217
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid., p. 213.
16
Ibid., pp. 213-14.
17
Ibid., pp.215-16.
18
Ibid., p. 218.
19
Ibid., p. 232.
20
M. N. Roy, Science and Philosophy (Delhi: Ajanta Publi-
cations, 1984), p. 18.
21
Ibid., p.63.
22
Ibid., p. 85.
23
Ibid., p. 97.
24
Ibid., pp. 88-89.
25
Ibid., p. 100.
26
Ibid., p. 189.
27
Ibid.
28
M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution (Delhi:
Ajanta Publications, 1989), p. 492.
29
Ibid., p. 493.
88
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid., p. 492.
32
M. N. Roy, “The Concept of Causality in Modern Sci-
ence”, The Humanist Way, Vol. IV, No. 2, 1949-50.
33
M. N. Roy, “Probability and Determinism”, The Humanist
Way, Vol. IV, No. 3, 1950.
34
Ibid., p. 244.
35
M. N. Roy, Science and Philosophy, pp. 104-5.
36
F. A. Lange, The History of Materialism (London: Kegan
Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1925), p. xii.
37
As Paul Edwards has pointed out in A Modern Introduc-
tion to Philosophy, philosophers have mainly taken three
different positions on the question of freedom and determin-
ism. Some philosophers have accepted determinism and
rejected freedom. Secondly, there have been philosophers
who, agreeing that determinism is not compatible with
freedom and moral responsibility, have accepted freedom and
rejected determinism. Thirdly, there have been philosophers
who have maintained that both determinism and our belief in
freedom are true, and that any appearance of conflict is
deceptive. Among pre-Marxian modern materialists, Holbach
belongs to the first category, whereas Hobbes belongs to the
third category. Roy, too, like Hobbes belongs to the third
category mentioned by Edwards. [Paul Edwards and Arthur
Pap (eds.), A Modern Introduction to Philosophy (Glencoe,
Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), pp.312-314.]
38
R. S. Peters, “Hobbes, Thomas” in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Vol. 4, p. 41.
39
M. N. Roy, Beyond Communism, p.32-33.
40
Keith Campbell, “Materialism” in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Vol. 5, p. 179.
41
M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, p.462.
42
M. N. Roy, Materialism, p. 234.
43
Aram Vartanian, “Holbach, Paul-Henry Thiry, Baron D”
in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 4, p. 50.
44
M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, p.487.
89
90
IV. Roy’s Materialism and
Marxian Materialism
In the previous chapter, I have enumerated the
important differences between Roy’s materialism and
traditional materialism in general. In this chapter I will
concentrate on differences between Roy’s materialism and
Marxian materialism in particular: how is Roy’s material-
ism different from Marxian materialism? However, before
discussing the differences between Roy’s materialism and
Marxian materialism, I will discuss Marxian materialism
in brief.
Marxian Materialism
The word “Marxism” has been used in different senses.
However, in its most essential meaning it refers to the
thought of Karl Marx, sometimes extended to include that
of his friend and collaborator Friedrich Engels. In this
chapter, I am mainly interested in understanding Marxism
materialism with reference to the works of Karl Marx and
Friedrich Engels.
Sometimes a distinction is made between “orthodox
Marxism” and “Western Marxism” or “neo-Marxism”. The
so-called “Western Marxism” or “neo-Marxism” derives
inspiration from the early writings of Marx and differs from
“orthodox” or traditional Marxism in emphasizing, not
historical materialism, but the description of conscious-
ness as the central component in Marx’s social analysis. It
will be worthwhile to make clear in the very beginning
91
that in this chapter I am not concerned with “neo-Marx-
ism” but with “orthodox Marxism” based on hitherto well-
known writings of Marx and Engels.
Marxian materialism in the sense mentioned above
may further be analyzed into (a) dialectical materialism
and (b) historical materialism. The view of the world as a
whole is called “dialectical materialism”, a title devised
by the Russian Marxist Plekhanov. On the other hand, the
view of human society is called “historical materialism”,
the name given to it by Engels.
Dialectical Materialism
92
Marx and Engels, was his Critique of Hegelian
Philosophy (1839) in which he argued that Hegelian meta-
physics is simply theology in disguise − “the last refuge,
the last rational support of theology”. In his Essence of
Christianity Feuerbach tried to show that theology itself
is a confused, fantastic way of depicting social relation-
ships. Man makes god, maintained Feuerbach, in his own
image.2
Ludwig Feuerbach, to Marx’s mind, successfully criti-
cized Hegel from the materialist standpoint, and destroyed
metaphysics and religion in a single blow, leaving only
“nature” as something to be studied by observation, not
deduced by “thought”. Thus, through the influence of
Feuerbach, Marx became a thorough going materialist,
and abandoned critically, what he considered the “mysti-
fying side of Hegelian dialectic”. However, in reacting
against Hegel, argued Marx, Feuerbach had failed to ap-
preciate Hegel’s great contribution to philosophy − his
dialectic method.
So, the philosophical efforts of Marx and Engels were
towards a combination of Hegel’s dialectic with
Feuerbach’s materialism. As Engels says in a preface to
Anti-Duhring, “Marx and I were pretty well the only peo-
ple to rescue conscious dialectics from German idealist
philosophy and apply it in the materialist conception of
nature and history.”3
Approving references to materialism are prominent
in the early works of Marx and Engels such as The Holy
Family (1845) and The German Ideology (1846). In The
Holy Family, for instance, they argued that one branch of
eighteenth century French materialism developed into
natural science and the other branch into socialism and
communism. Thus, they regarded “the new materialism”
93
as a source of the social movement, which they believed,
was destined to revolutionize human life.4
One aspect of Marxian materialism is rejection of ide-
alist attempts to undermine and belittle sense experience.
Hence, the Marxian view of knowledge is realist. Accord-
ing to H. B. Acton the author of The Illusion of the
Epoch, Marx’s materialism is “very wide in scope, com-
bining empiricism, realism, belief in the use of scientific
methods pragmatically conceived, rejection of
supernaturalism, and rejection of mind-body dualism”.5
94
John Passmore summarizes the meaning of “dialec-
tical materialism” in the following manner:
95
Historical Materialism
96
in following words:
Further,
97
Doctrine of Class Struggle: The Marxian doctrine of class
struggle is a part of its interpretation of history, or, in other
words, historical materialism. From Marxian point of view,
a class is a social group whose members share the same
relationship to the means of production. Thus, during the
feudal epoch, there are two main classes distinguished by
their relationship to land, the major means of production:
the feudal landowner who own the land, and the landless
serfs who work on land. Similarly, in the capitalist era,
there are two main classes, the bourgeoisie or capitalist
class which owns the means of production and the prole-
tariat whose member sell their labor power to the capital-
ist for wages.
According to Marxism, any society develops through
four main epochs: primitive communism, slavery or an-
cient society, feudal society and capitalism. Marx further
believed that class struggle was the driving force of social
change.
In the famous words of The Communist Manifesto,
“The history of all hitherto existing society is the history
of class struggle”. According to Marx, the basic “contra-
dictions” contained in the capitalist economic systems
would lead to its eventual destruction. The proletariat
would overthrow the bourgeoisie and abolish private prop-
erty. Property would be communally owned and since all
members would now share the same relationship to the
means of production, a classless society would result. This,
stage of development is called “socialism”. Finally, be-
cause, according to Marxism, state is an instrument of
class-rule − oppression of one class by another − with the
abolition of class, the coercive power of state will no longer
be needed and state itself will disappear.
98
Roy’s Materialism and Marxian
Materialism
Marxian materialism, as we have seen earlier may
further be analyzed into (a) dialectical materialism and (b)
historical materialism. Out of these two, historical materi-
alism is clearly rejected by Roy in his Twenty-Two
Theses. However, in addition to this, Roy also had reser-
vations on linking materialism with Hegelian dialectics and,
accordingly, he tries to delink dialectics from materialism.
99
ism are marred by making its validity conditional upon
dialectics”16 [emphasis mine].
“Marx loaded his otherwise self-contained material-
ism with Hegelian ballast”, continues Roy, “because in his
earlier days his epistemology was unsound”.
“The ideal is nothing other than the material, when it
has been transferred and transplanted inside the human
head”. This “naïve theory of perception”, says Roy, “could
not be maintained except with the help of the mysticism
of Hegelian dialectics”. According to Roy, “It is not true
that Marx put Hegelian logic on its head. On the contrary,
he simply took it over, and called his philosophy dialecti-
cal materialism.”17
“Later on”, says Roy “Marx corrected his epistemol-
ogy. Thereafter his philosophy could be freed from the
handicap of Hegelian mysticism, called dialectics. But
that did not happen because the earlier epistemological
error of Marx somehow persisted in his philosophy”.18
The supreme emphasis laid on dialectics in the Marx-
ist theoretical system has been, according to Roy, “the
source of endless confusion”. All Marxist theoreticians,
says Roy, “talk tirelessly and tiresomely of dialectics and
dialectical laws without themselves having any clear idea
of what they talk about. The result has been like the blind
leading the blind − into the ditch”.19
Eduard Bernstein, says Roy, was the first Marxist to
point out that the errors of Marx and Engels were “due to
the disastrous influence of dialectics”. The basic error in
the philosophical thinking of the founders of dialectical
materialism, according to Roy, was “to confound logic
with ontology”. In words of Roy,
100
tal law of thought, and it is also a description of
the processes of nature, biological as well as
inanimate. The subject matter of a branch of
metaphysical enquiry is confounded with the in-
strument for conducting that enquiry. In Marxist
philosophy logic as well as ontology bear the iden-
tical label of dialectic. Confusion, therefore, is
inevitable.20
101
the validity of materialist philosophy. Therefore, Roy cat-
egorically asserts:
102
of established economic relations. They are also histori-
cally determined − by the logic of the history of ideas.
In Beyond Communism, too, Roy categorically re-
jects the view that ethical values, cultural patterns, move-
ment of ideas, are mere superstructures raised to justify
established economic relations. Roy points out that his
own materialism “differentiates itself from Marxist mate-
rialist determinism by recognizing the autonomy of the
mental world, in the context of physical nature.”24
Elaborating on his rejection of the economic inter-
pretation of history in his New Humanism − A Manifesto,
Roy says:
103
In trying to combine rationalism, that is, the view
that history is a determined process, with the romantic
view of life, which declares the freedom of will, Marxist
historiology, according to Roy, contradicts itself. The doc-
trine of Marx that “man is the maker of the social world”
contradicts materialist philosophy, unless the mechanistic
view of evolution is clearly differentiated from teleology;
and unless romanticism is reconciled with reason, and free-
dom of will is fitted into the scheme of determined evolu-
tionary process. That can be done, in words of Roy, “only
by recognizing the creative role of man, not as a mere cog
in the wheel of mechanistic process, determined by the
development of the means of production, but as a sover-
eign force, a thinking being who creates the means of pro-
duction.”27
The doctrine that social revolution is determined by
the development of the means of production, points out
Roy, begs the question: who created the first means of
production and how?
According to Roy, “Man is greater than any means of
production, which are his creation”.28
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Roy in his
revised version of materialism allows for the freedom of
will and the autonomy of the mental world. According to
Roy, man possesses free will and can choose. Human will,
says Roy, cannot be directly related to the laws of physical
universe. Similarly, Roy is also of the view that “once they
are formed, ideas exist by themselves, governed by their
own laws.” According to Roy, materialism needs to be
restated to “recognize explicitly the decisive importance
of the dynamics of ideas in all the processes of human
evolution…”29
Both these features of Roy’s materialism have an im-
104
portant bearing on his philosophy of history, and his con-
sequent rejection of historical materialism. In fact, Roy is
at pains to emphasize that there is no logical connection
between materialism and the so-called “historical materi-
alism”. The economic interpretation of history, according
to Roy, is deduced from a wrong interpretation of materi-
alism. It implies dualism, whereas materialism is a monistic
philosophy. Roy asserts:
Emphasis on Ethics
105
also noted that Roy is not unique among materialists in
emphasizing the importance of ethics in his philosophy.
The same is true of Epicurus, among ancient materialists,
and Holbach, among modern materialists. Nevertheless,
this, certainly, is an important difference between Roy’s
materialism and Marxian materialism, which seems to give
no place at all to ethics in its scheme of things.
Marx and Engels were primarily interested in social
change, as is evident from the oft-quoted statement of
Marx: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world
in various ways; the point, however, is to change it”.32
In their anxiety to make their theory of social change
“scientific”, Marx and Engels appear to have totally ne-
glected the ethical aspect of social change. Not only they
neglected the ethical aspect of social change, but, in fact,
they had nothing but contempt for such an approach, which
they condemned as “utopian”.
M. N. Roy, on the other hand, is highly critical of
such insensitive attitude towards problems of ethics. As
he says in Reason, Romanticism and Revolution:
106
According to Roy, Marx, under the influence of
Hegelian dialectics, rejected eighteenth century material-
ism as mechanical, and, at the same time, “disowned the
humanist tradition of the earlier advocates of social jus-
tice, ridiculing them as Utopians.”34
In Roy’s view Feuerbach could “throw off Hegelian
influence more completely than Marx”, and Marx made a
mistake by beginning the formulation of his dialectical
materialism with a criticism of Feuerbach. “That wrong
start”, says Roy, “put an indelible stamp on the entire
Marxist system”.35
Marxian materialism is, according to Roy, defective
in so far it disowns Feuerbach’s humanism. “The defect”,
says Roy, “divorces materialism from ethics, and conse-
quently opens up the possibility of its degenerating into a
carnal pragmatic view of life.”36
Roy himself believed that the problems confronting
the modern world leads to the conclusion that “the crisis
of our time calls for a complete reorientation of social
philosophy and political theories, so as to recognize the
supreme importance of moral values in public life.”37
Further, according to Roy, the inspiration for a new
philosophy of revolution must be drawn from the tradi-
tions of humanism and moral radicalism. Roy, as we have
seen earlier, finds fault with the Marxian interpretation of
history for disregarding moral problems and treating ethi-
cal values as merely superstructures raised to justify es-
tablished economic relations.
To sum up, Roy’s materialism is different from
Marxian materialism in three important ways. Firstly, Roy
considers the Hegelian heritage a weak spot of Marxism.
Making its validity conditional upon dialectics mars the
simplicity and scientific soundness of materialism. Accord-
107
ing to Roy, on the other hand, materialism, pure and sim-
ple, can stand on its own legs, and, therefore, he tries to
delink dialectics from materialism. The validity of materi-
alism, maintains Roy, is in no way conditional on dialec-
tics, as there is no logical connection between the two.
Secondly, Roy rejects historical materialism and ad-
vocates a humanist interpretation of history in which he
gives an important place to human will as determining fac-
tor in history and recognizes the autonomy of the mental
world. According to Roy, human will cannot be directly
related to the laws of physical universe. Ideas, too, have
an objective existence and their own laws govern them.
The economic interpretation of history is in Roy’s view,
deduced from a wrong interpretation of materialism.
Thirdly, Roy’s materialism is sharply different from
Marxian materialism in so far it recognizes the importance
of ethics and gives a prominent place to it. According to
Roy, Marxian materialism wrongly disowns the humanist
tradition and thereby divorces materialism from ethics. The
contention that “from the scientific point of view, this ap-
peal to morality and justice does not help us an inch far-
ther” was based, according to Roy, upon a false notion of
science.
Roy, before he formulated and expounded his own
philosophy of new humanism, was an orthodox Marxist.
In fact, Roy’s revision of materialism, which we have dis-
cussed in detail in the previous chapter, was carried on in
the context of Marxism.
This fact comes out very clearly in the issues of The
Marxian Way, where Roy repeatedly emphasizes the need
to revise Marxian materialism. For instance, in the July-
September, 1945, issue of The Marxian Way, Roy says:
108
Human knowledge has advanced considerably
since the days of Marx. The startling discoveries
of modern physics appear to have knocked off
the foundation of materialist philosophy. Some
hypotheses of nineteenth century physics have,
indeed, proved to be fallacious, and new facts
have been discovered. The Marxist materialism
must be accordingly revised, if its claim to be the
only scientific philosophy is to be vindicated.38
109
Notes
1
Neil McInnes, “Marx, Karl” in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Vol. 5, p. 172.
2
John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (Great
Britain: Penguin Books Ltd., 1978), p. 44.
3
Fredrick Engels, “Prefaces to the three editions of Anti-
Duhring” in On Dialectical Materialism (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1977), p. 58.
4
H. B. Acton, “Dialectical Materialism” in The Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 389.
5
Ibid.
6
John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 46.
7
Karl Marx, “Afterword to the Second German Edition of
the first Volume of Capital” in On Dialectical Materialism,
56-57.
8
John Passmore, Op. Cit., p. 46.
9
In his book Dialectical Materialism, Maurice Cornforth has
explained the three main laws of dialectics, namely, the law of
transformation of quantity into quality; the law of interpen-
etration of opposites and the law of negation are. The first
law, according to Cornforth, can be illustrated by the fact that
if water is being heated, it does not go on getting hotter and
hotter indefinitely, at a certain critical temperature, it begins
to turn into steam undergoing a qualitative change from liquid
to gas.
According to “the law of unity and struggle of oppo-
sites,” the internal content of the transformation of quantita-
tive into qualitative change consists in the struggle of oppo-
sites − opposite tendencies, opposite forces − within the
things and process concerned. In order to understand how and
why transition takes place from an old qualitative state to a
new qualitative state. We have to understand the contradic-
tions inherent in each thing and process we are considering,
and how a “struggle” of opposite tendencies arises on the
basis of these contradictions. For example, the “contradic-
110
tion” between socialized production and capitalist appropria-
tion is the basic contradiction of capitalism. It is because of
this contradiction that the struggle between the classes
develops. Moreover, it is from the struggle of opposite
tendencies arising because of the contradiction inherent in the
social system, that social transformation, the leap to a
qualitatively new stage of social development, takes place.
According to “the law of negation of negation”, in the course
of development, because of double negation, a later stage can
repeat an earlier stage, but repeat it on a higher level of
development.[Maurice Cornforth, Dialectical Materialism
(Calcutta: National Book Agency Private Ltd., 1984), pp.78-
80]
10
Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, Chapter IV, quoted by
Maurice Cornforth in Dialectical Materialism, p. 35.
11
Maurice Cornforth, Dialectical Materialism, p. 44.
12
F. Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1968), p. 15.
13
William Ebenstein, Modern Political Thought (New Delhi:
Oxford & IBH Publishing Company, 1970), p. 411.
14
M. N. Roy, “Editorial Notes”, The Marxian Way, Vol. II,
No. 4, 1946-47, p. 364.
15
M. N. Roy, “Editorial Notes”, The Marxian Way, Vol. I,
No. 3, 1946, p. 274.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid., pp. 274-275.
18
Ibid., p. 276.
19
M. N. Roy, “Editorial Notes”, The Marxian Way, Vol. II,
No. 4, p. 356.
20
Ibid., pp. 356-57.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
M.N.Roy, “Editorial Notes”, The Marxian Way, Vol. I, No.
3, 1945, p.276.
24
M.N. Roy, Beyond Communism, p. 43.
25
M. N. Roy, New Humanism – A Manifesto, p. 16.
111
26
M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, p. 478.
27
Ibid., p.410.
28
M. N. Roy, Beyond Communism, p. 66.
29
M.N.Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, p. 9.
30
M. N. Roy, “Philosophy of History”, The Marxian Way,
Vol.II, No. 3, 1947, p. 255.
31
Bertrand Russell, The Theory and Practice of Bolshevism
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1975), p. 59.
32
Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach” in On Dialectical
Materialism, p. 32.
33
M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, p. 405.
34
Ibid.,p. 418.
35
Ibid., p. 388.
36
M.N.Roy, “Philosophy of History”, The Marxian Way,
Vol. II, No. 3, p. 244.
37
M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, p. 451.
38
M. N. Roy, “Editorial”, The Marxian Way, Vol. I, No. 1, ,
1945, p. 80.
39
M. N. Roy, “Editorial Notes”, The Marxian Way, Vol. II,
No. 1, 1946, p. 80. Also see M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanti-
cism and Revolution, p. 416.
112
V. Materialism or Physical
Realism?
114
one may add, the fear of unfair and prejudiced criticism by
one’s political opponents.
In the second revised edition of Materialism, pub-
lished in February 1951, for instance, Roy says, “Although,
in light of the latest discoveries of atomic physics, the
term matter can no longer be used in the classical sense, it
cannot be abandoned until a more appropriate new term is
coined. The sense, however, remains unchanged: it is physi-
cal reality or the substance.”3
In the same book, Roy says, at another place, “The
substratum of the Universe is not matter as traditionally
conceived; but it is physical as against mental or spiritual.
It is a measurable entity. Therefore, to obviate prejudiced
criticism, the philosophy hitherto called Materialism may
be renamed Physical Realism” 4 [emphasis mine].
Similarly, in the eighth chapter of Materialism enti-
tled “Materialism and Twentieth Century Physics”, Roy
again says, “There is no question about the fundamental
fact that physics does describe processes in something
which actually exists − outside the mind of the physicist.
It is a measurable magnitude; therefore, it is physical.
Materialist philosophy, with the more appropriate name
Physical Realism, is corroborated by the latest scientific
knowledge”5 [emphasis mine].
Roy refers to this question of terminology in Science
and Philosophy, too, where he says, “Call this philosophi-
cal generalization of the various branches of scientific
knowledge, objectivism, naturalism or realism, or by any
other name you prefer to Materialism. That would make
no essential difference.”6
However, Roy’s preference for “physical realism”
which is evident in the revised version of Materialism is
even more apparent in Reason, Romanticism and
115
Revolution.
In Reason, Romanticism and Revolution Roy cat-
egorically declares:
116
such as “physical realism”, “monistic naturalism” and “ob-
jectivism”.
6. Finally, as the references from Materialism and Rea-
son, Romanticism and Revolution indicate, he settled down
for the term “physical realism”, because he thought that it
was a more appropriate term, and also because he believed
that it would prevent prejudiced criticism as well as all
really scientific objections to his philosophy.
117
Roy’s philosophy is to be treated as a variety of material-
ism, it clearly differs from the paradigm of mechanical
materialism, and is closer to what J. J. C. Smart, a con-
temporary materialist, refers to as “physicalistic materi-
alism”. To quote Smart:
118
the term. On the contrary, the above-mentioned two sen-
tences would suffice. In any case, the trouble is worth tak-
ing, particularly because Roy’s philosophy, in spite of be-
ing, broadly speaking, in the tradition of materialism, is
different from traditional and Marxian materialism in some
important ways.
Labeling of Roy’s theory of reality as “materialism”,
for instance, may lead even students of philosophy to sup-
pose (1) that like traditional “mechanical” materialists, Roy
considers “matter” to be a hard and massy substance, or
(2) that Roy subscribes to a rigid and “hard” variety of
materialistic determinism which rules out contingency,
probability and free will, or (3) that Roy believes in “ex-
treme” form of materialism which does not recognize the
objectivity of ideas or the autonomy of the mental world.
Again, in the Marxian context, labeling of Roy’s meta-
physics as “materialism” may lead the unwary to assume
(1) that Roy adheres to dialectic materialism, or (2) that
Roy accepts “historical materialism”, or (3) that he does
not give an important place to ethics in his philosophy. As
we have seen, the inference would be wrong in each of
the above-mentioned case.
Even from the point of view of the emotive impact of
the term “materialism”, the change made by Roy seems to
be justified, because, though the “emotive meaning” of a
term may vary from person to person, there is no denying
the fact that the word “materialism” has acquired, by and
large, an unfavorable “emotive meaning” in the popular
language, particularly in the ethical context. Much can be
said in defense of materialism on this point, but the exist-
ence of an unfavorable attitude towards materialism is a
fact, which cannot be denied. Therefore, it is better, in the
interest of clarity and objectivity, to substitute the term
119
“materialism” with an emotively neutral term. The emo-
tive language has, no doubt, its many uses and abuses,
but, as pointed out by Irving M. Copi, “… when we are
trying to ‘get at the facts’, to follow an argument, or to
learn the truth about something, anything which distracts
us from that goal tends to frustrate us … It follows that
when we are attempting to reason about facts in a cool
and objective fashion, referring to them in strongly emo-
tive language is a hindrance rather than a help”10 [empha-
sis mine].
Therefore, Copi rightly recommends in his
Introduction to Logic:
120
Tarkunde,12 is concerned, it certainly has the advantage
of bringing out the important monistic aspect of Roy’s
metaphysics, but the accompanying term “naturalism” is a
bit vague from ontological point of view, and it does not
bring out the essence of Roy’s theory of reality as clearly
as the term “physical realism” does.
Arthur C. Danto, for instance, has this to say about
“naturalism” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
121
ists, materialists, atheists, or nonatheists as the
case may be [emphasis mine].13
122
and inductive arguments. All arguments involve
the claim that their premises provide some
grounds for the truth of their conclusions, but
only a deductive argument involves the claim that
its premises provide absolutely conclusive
grounds. The technical terms ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’
are used in place of ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ in
characterizing deductive arguments. A deductive
argument is valid when its premises and conclu-
sions are so related that it is absolutely impossi-
ble for the premises to be true unless the conclu-
sion is true also.14
123
This argument is valid because if its premises were
true, its conclusion would have to be true also. Therefore,
the conclusion, “Aristotle is a philosopher” is deduced
validly jointly from the two propositions “All logicians
are philosophers” and “Aristotle is a logician”.
124
as we have seen earlier, in these theses Roy regards quest
for freedom and search for truth as the basic urge of hu-
man progress and traces them to the biological struggle
for existence. Apart from this, the central idea of the first
three theses of Roy is individualism: that the individual is
prior to society, and only individuals can enjoy that free-
dom.
Now, is it possible to validly deduce any of these con-
clusions from Roy’s metaphysical views? For example, can
we validly deduce the proposition, (1) “Collectivity pre-
supposes the existence of individuals” from the proposi-
tion (2) “The external world exists objectively” or the
proposition (3) “The reality is physical”, or from both of
them jointly?
It is obvious that we cannot. Because it is quite pos-
sible for the proposition (2) or/and proposition (3) to be
true, and the proposition (1) to be false. Whereas for the
relation of logical implication to exist between proposi-
tions (2) or/and (3) and proposition (1); and for proposi-
tion (1) to be deducible validly from propositions (2) or/
and (3), it should be absolutely impossible for (2) or/and
(3) to be true unless (1) is true also, or, in other words, it
should be impossible for (2) or/and (3) to be true and (1)
to be false.
That this is not case will become obvious if we con-
sider the following arguments:
125
existence of individuals.
126
proved independently: it requires independent support. If
a person asserts the truth of the premises, he is not logi-
cally bound to support the truth of the conclusion, and
vice versa. The truth and falsity of the premises and the
conclusion are logically independent of one another.
Let us now turn our attention to theses four, five and
six in which Roy presents a humanist interpretation of his-
tory. Is the humanist interpretation of history deduced
validly from “physical realism”?
While discussing the logical relationship between
philosophical materialism and “historical materialism” in
the fourth chapter, we referred to Bertrand Russell’s ob-
servation that “philosophic materialism does not prove that
economic causes are fundamental in politics”. Russell has,
in fact, drawn our attention to the fact that Buckle’s view,
according to which climate is one of the decisive factors,
and the Freudian view, which traces everything to sex, are
equally compatible with materialism. In Russell’s words:
127
“There is, therefore”, concludes Russell, “no logical
connection either way between philosophic materialism
and what is called the ‘materialistic conception of history’.”
[emphasis mine]
What Russell says about the logical relationship be-
tween philosophical materialism and “materialistic con-
ception of history” is equally true, I think, about the logi-
cal relationship between “physical realism” and the “hu-
manist interpretation of history”.
We certainly cannot deduce validly the proposition,
“Human will is the most powerful determining factor in
history” (Theses four), or the proposition, “The dynamics
of the ideas runs parallel to the process of social evolu-
tion, the two influencing each other mutually” (Theses six)
from the proposition, “The external world exists objec-
tively” or/and the proposition, “The reality is physical”;
just as we cannot deduce validly the propositions
“Collectivity presupposes the existence of individuals” or
the proposition “Quest for freedom and search for truth
constitute the basic urge of human progress” from them.
On the other hand, it is pertinent to note that Roy’s
humanist interpretation of history is logically compatible
with his physical realism. In other words, they can be true
together as no inconsistency is involved. Roy’s philoso-
phy of history would have become incompatible with his
physical realism, if he had, for example, invoked divine
intervention of any kind in his philosophy of history, which
he certainly does not. Similarly, Roy’s philosophy of his-
tory would have been inconsistent with his metaphysics
had he been a “hard” materialist of a rigid variety denying
human will, or an “extreme” materialist denying the au-
tonomy of the mental world.
What is true of the first six theses of Roy expressing
128
the basic tenets of new humanism is equally true of theses
seven to twenty-two, which are explicitly political, deal-
ing with Roy’s criticism of communism and formal parlia-
mentary democracy as well as with his ideal of radical or
organized democracy. Consider for example, the follow-
ing propositions:
129
whether new humanism can be validly deduced from physi-
cal realism, and my answer is categorical: no. On the other
hand, I assert that physical realism and new humanism are
logically compatible and consistent: both of them can be
true together, but their truth (and falsity) is independent
of one another. We need independent support for new
humanism. We cannot prove the truth of new humanism
by proving the truth of physical realism. As for as the logi-
cal relationship between physical realism and new human-
ism is concerned, my conclusions may be summarized as
follows:
130
Notes
1
M.N. Roy, Beyond Communism (Delhi: Ajanta Publica-
tions, 1981), p. 28.
2
Ibid., pp. 28-29.
3
M. N. Roy, Materialism (Calcutta: Renaissance Publishers
Ltd., 1951), p. 5.
4
Ibid., p. 184.
5
Ibid., p. 232.
6
M. N. Roy, Science and Philosophy (Delhi: Ajanta Publica-
tions, 1984), p. 189.
7
M. N. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution (Delhi:
Ajanta Publications, 1989), p. 493.
8
According to Irving M. Copi, “For the sentence to formu-
late a proposition, its words must have literal or cognitive
meaning, referring to objects or events and their attributes or
relations. When it expresses an attitude or feeling, however,
some of its words may also have an emotional suggestiveness
or impact. A word or phrase can have both a literal meaning
and an emotional impact. It has become customary to speak
of the latter as ‘emotive significance’ or ‘emotive meaning’.”
[Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1982), p. 82.]
9
J. J. C. Smart, “Materialism” in The New Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Vol. 11, p. 611.
10
Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, pp. 93-94.
11
Ibid., p. 95.
12
See, V. M. Tarkunde, Radical Humanism (Delhi: Ajanta
Publications, 1983), p. 55.
13
Arthur C. Danto, “Naturalism” in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Vol. 5, p. 448.
14
Irving M. Copi, Symbolic Logic(New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co., Inc., 1979), p. 3.
15
Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific
Method (London: Allied Publishers, 1936), pp. 7-9.
131
16
Bertrand Russell, The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism
(London: Unwin Books, 1975), pp. 59-60.
132
Appendix
Principles of Radical Democracy
Twenty-Two Theses
Thesis 1
Man is the archetype of society. Co-operative social rela-
tionships contribute to develop individual potentialities.
But the development of the individual is the measure of
social progress. Collectivity pre-supposes the existence
of individuals. Except as the sum total of freedom and
well-being, actually enjoyed by individuals, social libera-
tion and progress are imaginary ideals, which are never
attained. Well-being, if it is actual, is enjoyed by individu-
als. It is wrong to ascribe a collective ego to any form of
human community (viz., nation, class, etc.), as that prac-
tice means sacrifice of the individual. Collective well-be-
ing is a function of the well-being of individuals.
Thesis 2
Quest for freedom and search for truth constitute the ba-
sic urge of human progress. The quest for freedom is the
continuation, on a higher level − of intelligence and emo-
tion − of the biological struggle for existence. The search
for truth is a corollary thereof. Increasing knowledge of
nature enables man to be progressively free from the tyr-
anny of natural phenomena, and physical and social envi-
ronments. Truth is the content of knowledge.
Thesis 3
The purpose of all rational human endeavor, individual as
well as collective, is attainment of freedom, in ever in-
133
creasing measure. Freedom is progressive disappearance
of all restrictions on the unfolding of the potentialities of
individuals, as human beings, and not as cogs in the wheels
of a mechanized social organism. The position of the indi-
vidual, therefore, is the measure of the progressive and
liberating significance of any collective effort or social
organization. The success of any collective endeavor is to
be measured by the actual benefit for its constituent units.
Thesis 4
Rising out of the background of the law-governed physi-
cal nature, the human being is essentially rational. Rea-
son, being a biological property, it is not the antithesis of
will. Intelligence and emotion can be reduced to a com-
mon biological denominator. Historical determinism, there-
fore, does not exclude freedom of the will. As a matter of
fact, human will is the most powerful determining factor.
Otherwise, there would be no room for revolutions in a
rationally determined process of history. The rational and
scientific concept of determinism, is not to be confused
with the teleological or religious doctrine of predestina-
tion.
Thesis 5
The economic interpretation of history is deduced from a
wrong interpretation of Materialism. It implies dualism,
where as Materialism is a monistic philosophy. History is
a determined process; but there are more than one causa-
tive factors. Human will is one of them, and it cannot al-
ways be referred directly to any economic incentive.
Thesis 6
Ideation is a physiological process resulting from the
awareness of environments. But once they are formed,
ideas exist by themselves, governed by their own laws.
134
The dynamics of ideas runs parallel to the process of so-
cial evolution, the two influencing each other mutually.
But in no particular point of the process of the integral
human evolution, can a direct causal relation be estab-
lished between historical events and the movements of
ideas. (‘Idea’ is here used in the common philosophical
sense of ideology or system of ideas). Cultural patterns
and ethical values are not mere ideological super-struc-
tures of established economic relations. They are also his-
torically determined − by the logic of the history of ideas.
Thesis 7
For creating a new world of freedom, revolution must go
beyond an economic reorganization of society. Freedom
does not necessarily follow from the capture of political
power in the name of the oppressed and exploited classes
and abolition of private property in the means of produc-
tion.
Thesis 8
Communism or Socialism may conceivably be the means
for the attainment of the goal of freedom. How far it can
serve that purpose, must be judged by experience. A po-
litical system and an economic experiment which subordi-
nate the man of flesh and blood to an imaginary collective
ego, be it the nation or a class, cannot possibly be the
suitable means for the attainment of the goal of freedom.
On the one hand, it is absurd to argue that negation of
freedom will lead to freedom; and, on the other hand, it is
not freedom to sacrifice the individual at the altar of an
imaginary collective ego. Any social philosophy or scheme
of social reconstruction which does not recognize the sov-
ereignty of the individual, and dismisses the ideal of free-
dom as an empty abstraction, can have no more than a
135
very limited progressive and revolutionary significance.
Thesis 9
The State being the political organization of society, its
withering away under Communism is a utopia which has
been exploded by experience. Planned economy on the
basis of socialized industries presupposes a powerful po-
litical machinery. Democratic control of that machinery
alone can guarantee freedom under the new order. Plan-
ning of production for use is possible on the basis of po-
litical democracy and individual freedom.
Thesis 10
State ownership and planned economy do not by them-
selves end exploitation of labor; nor do they necessarily
lead to an equal distribution of wealth. Economic democ-
racy is no more possible in the absence of political democ-
racy than the latter is in the absence of the former.
Thesis 11
Dictatorship tends to perpetuate itself. Planned economy
under political dictatorship disregards individual freedom
on the pleas of efficiency, collective effort and social
progress. Consequently, a higher form of democracy in
the socialist society, as it is conceived at present, becomes
an impossibility. Dictatorship defeats its professed end.
Thesis 12
The defects of formal parliamentary democracy have also
been exposed in experience. They result from the delega-
tion of power. To make democracy effective, power must
always remain vested in the people, and there must be
ways and means for the people to wield the sovereign
power effectively, not periodically, but from day to day.
136
Atomized individual citizens are powerless for all practi-
cal purposes, and most of the time. They have no means
to exercise their sovereignty and to wield a standing con-
trol of the State machinery.
Thesis 13
Liberalism is falsified or parodied under formal parliamen-
tary democracy. The doctrine of laissez faire only pro-
vides the legal sanction to the exploitation of man by man.
The concept of economic man negativates the liberating
doctrine of individualism. The economic man is bound to
be a slave or a slave-holder. This vulgar concept must be
replaced by the reality of an instinctively rational being
who is moral because he is rational. Morality is an appeal
to conscience, and conscience is the instinctive awareness
of, and reaction to, environments. It is a mechanistic bio-
logical function on the level of consciousness. Therefore,
it is rational.
Thesis 14
The alternative to parliamentary democracy is not dicta-
torship; it is organized democracy in the place of the for-
mal democracy of powerless atomized individual citizens.
The parliament should be the apex of a pyramidal struc-
ture of the State reared on the base of an organized de-
mocracy composed of a countrywide network of People’s
Committees. The political organization of society (the
State) will be coincident with the entire society, and con-
sequently the State will be under a standing democratic
control.
Thesis 15
The function of a revolutionary and liberating social phi-
losophy is to lay emphasis on the basic fact of history that
137
man is the maker of his world − man as a thinking being,
and he can be so only as an individual. The brain is a means
of production, and produces the most revolutionary com-
modity. Revolutions presuppose iconoclastic ideas. An
increasingly large number of men conscious of their crea-
tive power, motivated by the indomitable will to remake
the world, moved by the adventure of ideas, and fired with
the ideal of a free society of free men, can create the con-
ditions under which democracy will be possible.
Thesis 16
The method and programme of social revolution must be
based on a reassertion of the basic principle of social
progress. A social renaissance can come only through de-
termined and widespread endeavor to educate the people
as regards the principles of freedom and rational co-op-
erative living. The people will be organized into effective
democratic bodies to build up the socio-political founda-
tion of the post revolutionary order. Social revolution re-
quires in rapidly increasing number men of the new ren-
aissance, and a rapidly expanding system of People’s Com-
mittees, and an organic co-ordination of both. The pro-
gramme of revolution will similarly be based on the prin-
ciples of freedom, reason and social harmony. It will mean
elimination of every form of monopoly and vested interest
in the regulation of social life.
Thesis 17
Radical democracy presupposes economic reorganization
of society so as to eliminate the possibility of exploitation
of man by man. Progressive satisfaction of material ne-
cessities is the precondition for the individual members of
society unfolding their intellectual and other finer human
potentialities. An economic reorganization, such as will
138
guarantee a progressively rising standard of living, is the
foundation of the Radical Democratic State. Economic
liberation of the masses is an essential condition for their
advancing towards the goal of freedom.
Thesis 18
The economy of the new social order will be based on
production for use and distribution with reference to hu-
man needs. Its political organization excludes delegation
of power which in practice, deprives the people of effec-
tive power; it will be based on the direct participation of
the entire adult population through the People’s Commit-
tees. Its culture will be based on universal dissemination
of knowledge and on minimum control and maximum
scope for, and incentive to, scientific and creative activi-
ties. The new society, being founded on reason and sci-
ence, will necessarily be planned. But it will be planning
with the freedom of the individual as its main purpose.
The new society will be democratic − politically, economi-
cally as well as culturally. Consequently, it will be a de-
mocracy which can defend itself.
Thesis 19
The ideal of Radical Democracy will be attained through
the collective efforts of spiritually free men united in the
determination of creating a world of freedom. They will
function as the guides, friends and philosophers of the
people rather than as their would-be rulers. Consistently
with the goal of freedom, their political practice will be
rational and therefore ethical. Their effort will be rein-
forced by the growth of the people’s will to freedom. Ul-
timately, the Radical Democratic State will rise with the
support of enlightened public opinion as well as intelli-
gent action of the people. Realizing that freedom is in-
139
consistent with concentration of power, Radical Demo-
crats will aim at the widest diffusion of power.
Thesis 20
In the last analysis, education of the citizen is the condi-
tion for such a reorganization of society as will be condu-
cive to common progress and prosperity without encroach-
ing upon the freedom of the individual. The People’s Com-
mittees will be the schools for the political and civic edu-
cation of the citizen. The structure and function of the
Radical Democratic State will enable detached individu-
als to come to the forefront of public affairs. Manned with
such individuals, the State machinery will cease to be the
instrument in the hands of any particular class to coerce
others. Only spiritually free individuals in power can smash
all chains of slavery and usher in freedom for all.
Thesis 21
Radicalism integrates science into social organization and
reconciles individuality with collective life; it gives to free-
dom a moral-intellectual as well as a social content; it of-
fers a comprehensive theory of social progress in which
both the dialectics of economic determinism and dynam-
ics of ideas find their due recognition; and it deduces from
the same a method and a programme of social revolution
in our time.
Thesis 22
Radicalism starts from the dictum that “man is the meas-
ure of everything” (Protagoras) or “man is the root of
mankind”(Marx), and advocates reconstruction of the
world as a commonwealth and fraternity of free men, by
the collective endeavor of spiritually emancipated moral
men.
140
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