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While the acts of authoritarian regimes fighting for
their political lives may seem extreme to many in the Western world, what these episodes demonstrate is iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 962 1 that the very interconnectedness that people around the globe enjoy because of improvements in ICT can be swiftly denied, and that freedom of communication and political freedom are clearly linked. iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 963 2 1.6. iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 964 3 CONCLUSION Addressing a nation’s cyber security needs is no easy iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 965 4 task. Indeed, it is not even always apparent what those needs exactly are, or what protecting (or not iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 966 5 protecting) a nation’s cyber environment actually entails. Quite often there are different and competing iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 967 6 considerations within each nation’s approach. Yet each nation is faced with a steadily increasing level of cyber threat, and thus requires the nation’s iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 968 7 leadership to recognise the strategic problem and set forth goals and strategies to address it. In this section we have defined NCS as ‘the focused application of specific governmental levers (which iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 969 8 includes both incentives and regulation) and information assurance principles to public, private, and relevant international Hillary R. Clinton, ‘Internet Freedom [Speech at iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 970 9 Newseum in Washington, DC],’ Foreign Policy, 21 January 2010. Amrutha Gayathri, ‘Iran To Shut Down Internet iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 971 10 Permanently; ‘Clean’ National Intranet In Pipeline,’ International Business Times, 9 April 2012. Christopher Williams, ‘How Egypt shut down the iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 972 11 internet,’ The Telegraph, 28 January 2011. iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 973 12 {1}{2}{3}43 iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 974 13 Preliminary Considerations: iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 975 14 On National Cyber Security ICT systems, and their associated content, where these iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 976 15 systems directly pertain to national security.’ As nations and intergovernmental organisations set about developing and implementing measures to establish NCS strategies, they must balance the iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 977 16 economic and social importance of free flow of information to the security needs of government, industry, and citizens. The conceptual prism set forth in this section is iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 978 17 designed to assist in this development and debate. iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 979 18 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES & CONSIDERATIONS iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 980 19 Eric Luiijf, Jason Healey iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 981 20 Section 4: iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 982 21 Principal Findings Essentially, national cyber security (NCS) can be split iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 983 22 into five distinct subject areas or mandates. These ‘Five Mandates’ are Military Cyber, Counter Cyber Crime, Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) & iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 984 23 Crisis Management, Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence, and Cyber Diplomacy & Internet Governance. These mandates can be mapped along all stages of a cyber incident, as well as all four levels of government: iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 985 24 the political/policy, strategic, operational, and tactical/technical levels. Further, these Mandates connect with ‘cross- iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 986 25 mandates’: Information Exchange & Data Protection, Coordination, iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 987 26 as well as Research & Development and Education. While it is important to understand the uniqueness of each of the five mandates, it is even more important to iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 988 27 understand their commonalities, and their need for close coordination. A wide range of organisations engage in international iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 989 28 cyber security activities. The most relevant of these are often not state but non- iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 990 29 state groups. A lack of understanding of the mandates can lead to stovepiped app-roaches resulting in conflicting legal iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 991 30 requirements and friction bet-ween cyber security functions, organisations and capabilities. Assigning resources without a policy can be as iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 992 31 dangerous as drafting a policy without assigning the resources. iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 993 32 {1}{2}{3}109 iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 994 33 Organisational Structures & Considerations iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 995 34 4.1. iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 996 35 INTRODUCTION The purpose of this section is to review specific types of national cyber security (NCS) areas (also called iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 997 36 ‘mandates’) and examine the organisational and collaborative models associated with them. Before discussing the wide variety of organisational structures at the national and international levels, a decomposition model will be presented that delineates iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 998 37 both common and specific cyber security functions, capabilities, and responsibilities along three different axes (Section 4.2). On the one hand we will distinguish between five NCS iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 999 38 mandates. This section expands Klimburg’s{1>351<1} iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1000 39 segmentation and supplements it by three additional cross-mandates. Other axes are the cyber security incident response iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1001 40 cycle and the various levels of decision-making. iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1002 41 This decomposition model shall assist the reader in understanding the rationale behind the functions, responsibilities, and capabilities of organisations involved in cyber security as entities which, over the years, have been shaped by the specific division of tasks between the government, its agencies, public organisations, associations, and private companies. Section 4.3 provides an overview of the stakeholders iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1003 42 involved in the provision of cyber security. Taking the decomposition model as the point of departure, Section 4.4 strives to determine the main iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1004 43 focus of analysis along the five mandates mentioned in Section 1 and three cross-mandates. Building upon this framework, Sections 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1005 44 introduce the common set of national and international organisations. It is important to note that these sections also pay due attention to the special tasks which may be recognised by, and assigned to, various organisational subunits or iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1006 45 organisations all belonging to one and the same mandate, or to a single service organisation in one of the mandates with the aim of supporting the other mandates. Finally, Section 4.8 will discuss some organisational iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1007 46 pitfalls and lessons identified when addressing cyber security at the national level. iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1008 47 4.2. DELINEATING ORGANISATIONAL FUNCTIONS, iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1009 48 CAPABILITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES To position the many cyber security functions, capabilities and responsibilities at the national and iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1010 49 international levels, an analytical framework can be useful for further discussion. While there are certainly a number of methods that can be employed, the approach applied here focuses on three closely connected building blocks: the NCS iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1011 50 mandates and cross-mandates; a generalised tool to analyse organi-sational conduct at large, and the incident management cycle. See Klimburg in Klimburg and Mirtl, Cyberspace and iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1012 51 Governance – A Primer (Working Paper 65). iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1013 52 15-9. {1}{2}{3}{4>Delineating Organisational Functions, iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1014 53 Capabilities and Responsibilities<4} iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1015 54 {6>110<6} A first decomposition is to split the functions across the five perspectives (called mandates) as described at iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1016 55 more length elsewhere{1>352<1} and in Section 1.{2>353<2} These mandates include: (1) Internet Governance and Cyber Diplomacy, (2) Cyber Crisis Management and Critical Infrastructure iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1017 56 Protection (CIP), (3) Military Cyber Operations, (4) Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence, and (5) Counter Cyber Crime. This approach is supplemented by three additional iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1018 57 cross-mandates that work across all the mandates equally. They include (1) Coordination, (2) Information iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1019 58 Exchange and Data Protection, and (3) Research and Education. iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1020 59 4.2.1. iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1021 60 Across the Levels of Government An obvious, second way of decomposition is a vertical iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1022 61 one, perpendicular to each of the mandates and cross- mandates. Along four distinct levels of analysis, this approach iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1023 62 combines both a military and a political understanding of war. The two probably most succinct (and opposing) notions on the nature of war equally address the most important relationship between the act of war and the political sphere: either ‘[w]ar is a mere continuation of policy’,{1>354<1} or ‘[p]olitics is the continuation of war’.{2>355<2} It is long understood that it is necessary to combine the military and the political perspective into a more comprehensive approach of understanding iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1024 63 conflict, such as was done in the US military construct of state-conflict.{3>356<3} By adding a ‘political’ or ‘policy’{4>357<4} level on top of the traditional war- fighting triangle (which is composed of the strategic,{5>358<5} operational{6>359<6} and tactical{7>360<7} levels),{8>361<8} this model goes beyond a purely military understanding of military operations. iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1025 64 See ibid. iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1026 65 See Klimburg in Section 1.5.4. iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1027 66 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1028 67 Penguin Books, 1982 [1832]). iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1029 68 119. iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1030 69 Michel Foucault, ‘Society must be defended’: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976 (New iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1031 70 York: iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1032 71 Pan Books Limited, 2003). iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1033 72 15. David W Barno, ‘Challenges in Fighting a Global iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1034 73 Insurgency,’ Parameters 36, no. 2 (2006). Defined as: ‘principle or course of action’ (see Policy, iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1035 74 Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press, 2012)). Defined as: ‘the art of projecting and directing’ (see iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1036 75 Strategy, Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press, 2012)). Defined as: ‘a planned and coordinated activity involving a number of people’ (See Operation, Oxford iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1037 76 English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press, 2012)). Defined as: ‘skilful in devising means to ends’ (See iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1038 77 Tactical, Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press, 2012)). iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1039 78 In the civil context, the operational and tactical levels of decision-taking are often reversed. In this section, however, we will use the military iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1040 79 naming order: strategic, operational and tactical. iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1041 80 {1}{2}{3}111 iZtTXRngob4wCLxm_ dc2: 1042 81 Organisational Structures & Considerations
Katja Kruckeberg, Wolfgang Amann, Mike Green-Leadership and Personal Development - A Toolbox For The 21st Century Professional-Information Age Publishing (2011)