INFERENCE, INTUITION, AND IMAGINATION On tha Methodology and Method of the First Jena Wissenschaitslehre Daniel Breazeale S- after his departure from Jena, Fichte speculated that the reason Inardly anyone. seeihed to have understood his philosophy was “because no one yet kniows what Lam trying to acomplish:”* Convinced that this two-hundzed-year-old complaint still remains all too valid, [ have sade several recent efforts to explicate the various “tasks” —both “prac- ” and “theoretical”—of the Jena ‘Wissenschafislehre. Among the philo- sophical tasks of Wisenscaflehre i that of explaining or déduing ordinary our consciousness of a system of “representations accom~ pf necessity”) while simultaneously afieming human ural standpoint of ordinary consciousness, and that if a ‘deduction” of the laser is possible at al it will have to be conducted from No sooner does one answer the question concerning what philosophy is supposed to accomplish, however, than one faces'a new and far more dif- ficult question: namely, precisely how does the philosopher propose to secomplish his self assigned tasks? Even grinted that he can somehow ele vate himself to the requisite standpoint, what precisely is it that he is sup- ——)eo 1. AN OveRviEw oF FicHTe’s GroxpLace ‘Posed to be doing once he bas atrived there? Another way to ask this same ques What method or methods does philosophy employ in “explaining” ordinary consciousness and in “describing” the originary acts of the mind, and how do such methods difier fiom the familiar methods of on the one hand, logical inference and conceptual analysis and, on the other, introspective psychology? Ironically enough, the difficulty of answering such questions about the method of the Wlsenschafslehte offen seems compounded rather than facilitated by Fichte’s own speciically “methodological” or “critical” trea ‘ses and remarks. Convinced that Kant had “philosophized far too little about his own philosophizing.”? Fichte seems to have been determined not to commit the same error and missed few opportunities to comment pon the special requirements and methods of his own philosophizing. Even during the eight years comprising what I am calling the “period of the Jena Wissenschajslere”"—a period that actually begins in Zurich in late 1795 and ends in Berlin early in 1801—he published no less than three full-scale methodological weatises: Ueber den Begriff der Wssenschafselve (1794), the two “Introductions” to the unfinished Verswch einer néven ig der Wissonschafsleve (1797), and the Sonnenklarer Bericht (1801), ious philosophical methods prescribed in these works and in the many passing methodological remarks contained in other writings of the period offen, however, seem at variance with one another. I is for exampl {ar from clear how the emphasis upon “derivation from a single principle fhat one finds in ster den Begriff is to be reconciled with the appeal to “intellectual intuition” that one finds im the “Introductions” or with the method of quasi-mathematical construction elaborated in the Sotnentlarer Barth, Moreover, its often dificult to see how the methodology presented in these treatises corresponds to the method actually employed in such sys= tematic works as the Grundlage der gesamten Wistenschafisiere, What follows is an attempt to clarify both the declared methodology of the Jena Wissenschafislee and the relationship between the latter 2nd the actual method of the same. But its only a Gist step, since I shall scetly limit my investigation to what Luigi Pareyson and others‘ have described 4s the “Est exposition” of the Jena system, which I understand to include everything written between the fll of 1793 and the end of 1795—that is (o s8y, prior to the eat etures on Wissenschafislere nova methodo, In this paper, therefore, will be mainly concerned with Ueber den Begriff and the Cran. lage of 1794-94, By limiting the scope of my inquiry in this manner I will Breazeale: Inference, Intuition, and Imagination @) e 2 the methodological questions that most interest me ioe havog Greece ge withthe difcle question con- cerning the apparent development of Fichte's thought during over ourse of his tiod. : a wink di eanposed limitation i i ell no sinple mater to dcermine precisely how Fiche though philosophy should proceed an precisely what iti thatphlowophers ate sapped eo be doing when they Bly their exotic ae, As we ll soon see even the eas of 1794 95 cone tin what at lest eto bs & somber of jnenpaesecouns of transcendental philosophy, and it is by no jous how a aoe sree get the method: clogy and method of the fs Jens Wows, cesar 1 sal pr ceed as follows: Fs I wil cossder the explici pilosophicl method clogy outlined by Fichte in Ueber den Bef and ote writing» of tis peti, ncding the invaluable 1794 lectures “Ueber den Unterichied des Geistes and des Buchstabens in der Philosophie’ Then I will ec sera philoophicl method--or beter, methode—employed in the ro systematic treatises published during this same period, the Grund ; ei f and the Grandi der Eienthilchen der Wiehe» Rc ef das theese Vemigen. Finally wil compare the methodology pe, scribed inthe former works with te method employed inthe Iter and ‘will proved an overall description of what I shall call the “mixed met of the fist Jona Wiser, to which 1 wll append a fw commens concerning the advantages and problems of such a method. 3 OF THE I. THE DECLARED METHODOLOG First Jena WIsseNSCHAFTSLERRE A. Logical inference and conceptual analysis y in which “all its proposi- in describing philosophy as a systematic science in tomar Solved vogemer in 2 single ist procple in which they unite to form a whole”’ Fichte seems to imply that the proper method of science is Smply that of loge inference (olen), which is pres the tem hae employs in sections 1 through 4 of Ueber den Begrif'to describe how the truth of one philosophical propostion is “transferred” to the next in accor dance with univer ls of thinkng?”® This charctesization of phos ‘ophy as a kind of conceptual or logical analysis is repeated in the well-vart 1. v1 . ® T 1. AN OvERvIEW oF FickT="s GrunDiacs Breazeale: Inference, Intuition, and Imagination ® cient for this purpose, for which some sort of intuition is clearly required. The philosopher has to observe “acts of the mind” to which atleast some of his propositions are supposed to conespond,!2 for philosophy itself, according to Fichte, is nothing less than a Darstellung ot “presentation” of something frown lester to BV: Reinhard of January 15, 1794, where Fichte follows nt in contrasting the methods of ynathematics and of philosophy? ‘Whereas mathematics is “able to constict cepts in into” rie Fichte, “philosophy can and shoul inking i order t9 deduce i ing when he wrote, in a l Tam trying to communicate is some~ thing that can be neither said nor grasped conceptually; it can only be intuited My words are only supposed to guide the reader in such 2 way that the desired intuition is formed within him. I advise anyone who wishes to study iy writings to let words be words and simply try to enter into my series of intuitions at one point or anothes:” Thinking about the inferences through which the propositions of the Wisenschafslehre are inferred is thas not ‘enough for, as Fichte explained to'his own students, one cannot understand a single one of these forgnulas “so long as one does not have the intutuition to which the formula in question refers?" But if the of intuitions” obtained by the philosopher are to constitute any sort of explanation of original consciousness, they must zelate to one another in a quasi-logical manner as ground and consequent. ‘The philosopher therefore not only must oberserve the way the mind acts, but must do so in a manner that permits him to describe how each suc- transferable from one proposition to another must first be contained in the Grundsatz from ices proceeds. Since such a first principle itself pe derived fiom anything higher, ts tuth muse be unprowble® Brus: be Verue in itself" or selevidenty certain. But how is one supposed {0 discover and to recognize such a principle? The philosopher has to recom- = the boy Ki 7 prlacile fnmeditely ie, he bas to ita tauen) oF observe tn) it, for only in this way is an epistemi subject immediately related t is object. coe aeucees lence Fichte’ second point con hilosop! concerning philosophical methodology, a Poin essed in section 7 of Ucher den Bepiff where the philosopher is cher. acterized as an “observer” of a peculiar sort of object, namely “the system of hhuman knowledge.” or “the human mind’s modes of a reliance upon the method of observation is thus not limited 1g of Fichte’s frequently misunderstood assertion that hilosophers are “historians of the human mind—not, of course, journa]~ 3s, but rather, writers of pragmatic history:”!5 As Fichte’s own notes make plain, he employed the phrase “pragmatische Geschichte” (a phrase he ap- propriated from Ernst Platnes) to:designate a critical and systematic account of the genesis of something—in this case, of the ori acts of the :man mind and hence of the system of experience that is its product.{6 ory” therefore, is just another name for “transcendental “Pragmat deductio: C. Reflection and imagination Inference and observation are combined in the charactestic act of the observe the content in question. Mere is is @ Mere logical inference, however, is insuffi~ philosopher, that is, the “act of reffection.”!7 Fichte’s description of phi-ex 1. AN OVERVIEW OF FICHTE’s GruxDLacE 2 losophy itelf asa five product of “the power of freely reflective judgment” ("die reflektierende Urteilskraft ... in ihrer Freiheit”) is clearly influenced by his reading of Kanes third Critique, with its sharp contrast between the “determinative” and the “reflective” powers of judgment. '8 Whereas the former operates under universal laws of the understanding and is thus sub- sumptive or criteriological in character, the latter proceeds from particulars to the universsl—not via inductive inference, of course, but rather via a Process of imaginative construction.19 Fichte, however, goes beyond Kant in treating as products of this power of reflective judgment not just judgments concerning aesthetic taste and natural purposiveness, but aio the judgments of philsophy ite: What pre Cisely is involved in philosophical reflection? Fizst of all, Fichte always asso cates philosophical reflection with an act of absiaction2® and, more specif. ‘cally, with that act through which the philosopher raises himself from the to the transcendental standpoint, Such an act is plainly an act of ing and not of intuiting. In this fist act of philosophical reflection one luntarily turns one’s attention auuy from objects of experience and reflects instead upon one’s own consciousness of these same objects, and only thereby does one finally obtain that concept of pure Ichheit of “I- ‘hood”" which will then serve as the starting point for a farther and very dif- ferent series of reflections, a series also governed by the laws logical infer _ ence.2! Philosophical reflection is manifestly a kind of thinking. ‘Yet there would be no point in engaging in such an act of reflective abstraction unless one carefully paid attention to the results of the same and thereby obtained an “inner intuition” thereof. Such “attentiveness” (Aufmer- sami) is thus described by Fichte as an essential ingredient in every act of philosophical reflection. The kind of self-intuition that must accompany reflection is not, however, some sort of superhuman power bestowed only upon artistic and philosophical “geniuses?” but is simply the power to pay attention to the products of one's own thinking and imagination,a power that anyone can acquire simply by “accustoming himself to disciplined, strict abstraction and by engaging in higher and higher levels of reflection,”23 OF course, no one can be required to develop his reflective capacity in this manner, just as no one can be required to philosophize in the fist place, Philosophical reflection always begins with a free act and continues only a5 series of free acts, and the latter series must always be distinguished care~ fully both from the necessary, originary acts of the mind that philosophy is trying to describe and fiom the acts and fiets of ordinary consciousness that are the products of the latter. Insofar as he simply attends to or observes Breazeale: Inference, Intuition, and Imagination, ® inary acts, the philosopher might seem to be a passive epistemic proba ag bay eeepc ope pers that he s supposed to be desrbing are nar presents sch within ord nary consciousness and are Gist mised f consioumese—and hence produce as representations—only by the act of philosophical reflection itself “Though philosophical selection may never violate the rules-of logical inference nor dispense with intuitive confirmation, there is more to such reflection than simply thinking and intuiting. Einbildungskrafi, the power of imgaination, is also required. First of all, i is required of the philosopher in the sense that without it he caninot freely propose explanatory hypo:h- ‘eses and solutions to specific problems: No alogorithm determines the direction of the philosopher's thoughts and inferences, for this depends upon the specific hypotheses and proof strategies he has decided to explore and to test. Tn this sense, philosophers are Verucem, frcover launching tral ons, and philosophical reflection is always experimental in character. always in- the book”: a certain amount of creative guesswork is ae ent that Fichte describes variously as “an obscure feel~ Indeed, philosophy itself is an know in advance whether the proposed experiment, since we can never “Gecucton of experience wil fara out to be posible at all. That a scien tific system such as the Wisenschafislehre is actually possible is, to begin in Fichte’ words, “depends upon the experiment (kommt auf den Ver- were ete get of the required science can be established a second, and equally fandamental, sense in, which image Se ee ee every act of reflection the attention of the philosopher is simultaneously directed away from certain objects (fom which he abstracts) and also turned toward another (upon which he reflects), and itis only in this manner that the latter become intentional objects of philosophy at al. Though pbilo- sophical xeflection is always “an act of representing,” it is unlike ordinary representational consciousness in that the objects in question in this case are not merely given to philosophical reflection, but are also produc: of the same, which is precisely why Fichte would eventually begin to characterize the method of philosophy as one of “construction” and emphasize rather than minimize the similarities rather than the differences between the methods of philosophy and of mathematicsx 1. AN OVERVIEW oF FICHTE’S GruNDLAGE In order to explain how intuition and thought can be intimately con te appeals to the third essen : namely, produltive Einbile ich, in his lectures on Geist wnd Buckstabe in der Philosophie, he describes as “spirit in the higher sense,” understood as the ability to become consciousness not just of the products of our own mental acts but of these very acts themselves. In order for us to be able to observe and to describe Such acts, however, we must first “think away” everything else and then convert what is lef into intuitiable representations or images (Bilder). This creative transformation of abstract thoughts into intuitable images—by virtue of which alone philosophy can become what, according to Fichte, ¥ Sooet 0 be namely “an accurate schema of the oman mind at such”—can be accomplished only by the power of productive imagina son obliging = power co form image Ne a The method of philosophy is described by Fichte as 2 kind of action in which the intellect directs its attention back upon its own acts and then observes and describes them. Such an action “is called reflection’"3! and it ‘annot be understood as an act of mere thinking or intuiting. Philosophy. is supposed “to expand the sphere of [the philosopher] consciousness into 2 new domain" and “usher us into a new and higher world?"S2 but this “new domain” or “higher world” is not anything that exists apart from the philosopher’ own act of reflection. It is, instead, a product of his own reflective activity—and, more specifically, of his creative imagination. And it is just this, admitted Fichte, “that makes my philosophy difficule, because ‘what is essential therein cannot be approached by means of the under standing, but only by the power of imagination”33 Once again, however, the imaginative power required for philospohical reflection is not some sort of divine or innate gift, but is something that anyone can develop simply by exercising and cultivating the powers he already possesses, A particularly effective way to cultivate the power of Philosophical reflection, according to Fichte, is to study geomerry, because this provides “the best cultivation of the power of imagination under the rule of reason." The student of geometry learns how to employ his imag ination to produce mental images, which he grasps by his power of inner ‘ition and fom which he then proceeds to draw universally valid con- clusions4—a will in good stead whe: 5 —s stand him in good stead when he progresses to Breazeale: Inference, Intuition, and Imagination @ Il. Tue Actuat METHOD OF THE GRUNDLAGE AND GRUNDRI The Grundlage begins with a tesk and an admission: "We have to see out the first and simply unconditioned principle of all human knowl inciple that can be neither proven nor determined."35 We do this by and reflecting until we have, first of all, discovered our. first in questions can be “thought together” without detriment to the originally postulated unity of consciousness. Parts 2 and 3 thus each begin by setting reflection the specific task of finding some way to think without contra~ diction the frst principle of the theoretical and practical portions ‘of the an experiment” and try out al the various ways of thinking the relationship between the limited I and the limited NotI, until “after having separated and set aside everything impossible and contradictory, the sought-for only possible way of thinking this relationship has ‘been found." Such an experiment in thinking proceeds according to what Fichte calls a““heuristic method” for selecting, which concepts need to be analyzed?” and for actively “seeking out” new synthetic unities. Such a method clearly involves both imagination and inference.*? Once the synthesis in question has been successfilly “sought out” via lalectical inference, however, the method of philosophical reflection seems to undergo a fundamental shift. In part 2 of the Grundlage, for example, we nally recognize that the opposition between the limited I and the limited NotI can be thought if and only if the T itself is originally limited. But this in turn is thinkable if and only if we admit the necessity of the Anstop cor"'check” as well as the necessity of ascribing to the mind itself the spon~ taneous power of “oscillating” (Schweben) between infinitude and Gnitude, thereby making it possible for the I itself to post for itself and ultimately to become conscious of its own limitations. The power in question is, of course, that of productive imagination; and since the necessity of ascribing sucha power to the I has now been logicaly inferred by means of an imag- ‘native, dialectical analysis of the very concept of the 1, the power of pro- ductive imagination can now be said to have been established as “a fact ([Fektin) that is originally present in our mind.”4? At this point philosophical reflection ceases to be primarily a mateer of inference and becomes instead one of intuition,*! and the philosopherQZ 1. AN OVERVIEW. OF FICHTE’S GrowprAcE Breazeale: Inference, Intuition, and Imagination, ‘© becomes an “observer” of the “original fact” he has just deduced and of the manner in which the latter is posited for itself by the I he is now sup- posed to be observing.#? This, presuniably, is why Fichte noted in the preface to the Grundlage that this isa text that “presupposes that one posses the fice power of inner intuition [das Vermagen der Frelit der inner Anschaswing)?® Furthermore, since what is supposed to be intuited or observed in this case is nothing less than the manner in which the I orig inally generates its own experience by positing for itself its own original limitation, the philosopher's discursive account of this process can be char- acterized as a “genetic” description or explanation of the latter and thus as “a pragmatic history of the human mind.”45 ‘Straighforward as all of this nay sound, there is nevertheless something very peculiar about the “descriptions” contained in the Gnundlage and Goundrif, for they are supposed to constitute an a prioti and universally valid account of subjectivity as such. Moreover, the object described in this case is explicitly conceded to have no existence on its own and apart from the philosophers activitiy of positing it through reflection, Neither the “Begciff des Ich” with which the Grendlage commences, nor the “Idee des Ich” with which it concludes, nor any of the “necessary acts of the mind” that fall between these nwo extremes ever appear as such within ordinary consciousness, though they “may appear indirectly. within philosophical reflection."4 Unlike the “given” facts of empixical consciousness, these “necessary facts” of philosophical reflection seem to depend for their “necessity”"—and hence for their very factiitp—upon the process of reflection through which they are “discovered.” This important point is summarized 4s follows at the beginning of the Grundrif: “The actions through which the T posits anything at all within itself are here ‘facts? because they are reflected upon. . . . But it does not follow ftom this that that they are are what we usually eal ‘facts of consciousness’ or that one actually becomes concsious of such facts ‘facts of (innet) experience’ .... One should not consider it an objection to the Wissenschafislefre that it establishes facts that are not to be found within (inner) experience. It does not claim to do this. Instead, it simply demonstrates that something corresponding to a certain thought is present in the human mind:"# ‘Without such reflectively established “facts” the Wissenschafislehre would be just one more empty FormularPhilesophie and not real thinking” that it claims to be.4® And yet itis thinking not int first establishes “that something is a fact"? and, as Fichte explains in his Spirit and Letter lectures, it is the task of the productive imagination to raise these “deduced” facts to the level. consciousness and thus to make them intuitable within philosophical reflection. Only then can. the philosopher become what he is supposed to be: the observer or pragmatic historian of the T's original activity. The power of productive or creative imagination thus proves to be no less necessary for the descriptive seties of observations that we find at the end of part 2 and in almost all of part 3 of the Grundlage than it was for the dialectical series of inferences that we encountered in the frst portion of part 2. Here too the philosopher may be described as “making an experiment”—though this time an “experi- sment in seeing” rather than an experiment in thinking 50 Productive imagination is therefore just as essential to the reflective positing of the Gnindlage and the Gnindrif as is the employement of logical thinking and inner intuition. Indeed, it appears to be the most essential ingredient of al, for, as Fichte remarks in the end of section 5 of the Grund- loge: “The Wissenschfislebre is not the soct of thing that can be communi- the mere leter; instead, it can only be communicated through ts basic ideas must be elicited in anyone who studies it by the creative imaginative itself, Nor could this be otherwise in the case of a sci- cence that penetrates to the ultimate grounds of human knowledge, for the entire enterprise of the human mind issues ftom the imagination, and the power of imagination can be grasped only by the power of imagination."5! Ill, Conciusions is clear from the preceding survey that the actual method employed in the systematic treatises of 1794-95 is indeed the same as that presented in the methodological writings of the same period: namely, the method"of philosophical reflection. To say that the method acconds with the metiod- olgy, however is not to claim that the method in question is particularly easy to grap or to apply. Indeed, a6 1 have tried to show in tis paper, the reflective method of the early Jena Wissenschafslehre is not in in fact any single method at all, but is instead 2 “mixed method?” a deliberate and exquisitely balanced combination of the several diferent methods of Iga inference, observtion-based description, and imaginative constuction. ‘The best way 10 appreciate the considerable virtues of such a mixed method is to. consider the limitations and dangers of any one of these ingredients taken by itself. Though logical inference and rigorous analysis are certainly necessary for any systematic philosophy, they are not, byot eee oe eevee themselves, enough. On the contrary, mere systematic thinking, unsupple- mented by some sort of “intuitive” access to content, will never produce an empty formal system. Like Kant, Fichte was de - vinced that that Sadedge cn Shots Bardilis’ Grundris der ersten, Logic)52 A philosophy of mere intuition, on the other hand, is no bettér— indeed it is even worse—than a system of pure thinking. The most ion result of the decision to base philosophy upon a method of sheer tion isthe sort of “commonsense philosophy” chat appeals to the pur- ‘merisch philosophies based upon allegedly superior powers of intu- ‘tion are also possible. To base philosophy upon any appeal to immediately given “cts of experience”—whether mundane or extramundane— etays 2 complete falure to understand that it is precisely the tak of phi- losophy to “account for" or to “deduce” the system of these very facts (This poine was forcibly made by Fichte in his 1796 “Vergleichune des v n Prof. Schmid aufgestelleten Systems mit der Wissenschaft is criticism applies equally to appeals to inner and to outer d thus it is a fundamental error to interpret the Wissenschafise Ihre as a species of “introspectionism.”To be sure, Fichte often the evidence of intuition, but, as we have seen, the objects i Wissenschafisehre are never simply given to the philosopher, but must be deliberately produced through an act of imaginatively charged philosophical reflection. This difference is precisely what distin Bs) in his “Antwortschreiben an Herm Professor Reinhold."*) On the other hand, a simple call to base philosophy upon products of the creative imagination can all too easily open the door to the most extravagant and arbitrary Setions—as the history of philosophical Roman. ticism so richly attests, What separates the Wissenschgfslehve fiom some. thing like Novalis’ “magical is precisely Fichte's acute awareness of such a danger and his attempt to avert it by insisting that the produce ‘ve imagination can play a valid role in philosophical reflection only in com- stant conjunction with inference and intuition. Fichte certainly believed that ‘Breazeale: Inference, Intuition, and Imagination ®Q imagination is required in philosophy, but without the iron discipline of analytic thinking and the “reality check” provided by careful observation, a mete philosophy of imagination would be an even greater monstrosity than a philosophy based upon “thinking qua thinking” or upon a dizect appeal to “the facts of consciousness.” ‘What is most characteristic of the method of the early Wisenschgf- slehre, hecefore, is precisely the way in which it balances the equally impor- tant contributions of thinking, intuition, and imagination and 2 check the excesses of each by the presence of the others. method” of the Wissenschafislehre might chus also be des method of checks and balances.” All three of these elements are cor in the concept of , transcendental deduction—of ordinary consciousness. A philosophical “deduction” is an attempt to explain and and to justify certain everyday claims concerning, e.g, the objectivity of the world or of the moral law, by revealing the a priori conditions of the same (which, for a philosopher such as Fichte, turns out to m of the I). Though logical inference and pure analysis are always ved in such a process of justification, a philosophical or transcendental by no means the same sort of purely formal “deduction” that ‘ounters within logic.55 In addition, a philosophical deduction also has to rely upon reflectively purified sel observation, as well as upon a cer- tain amount of creative guesswork. As such, the method of philosophy is 56 and doing philosophy has more in common. with , the inescapable circularity of all cranscendental, explanations, confine myself to those factors related directly to the method just ‘ingent and arbitrary is “thought away” from consciousness, along with the ‘ordinary empirical contents of the same, In Fichte words, “the more the deverminate individual is able to think hinaself way [5Ga ot noms cammuscr 2 the closer his empirical self-consciousness comes to pure self-conscious zess"58 Implicit in this assertion isthe assumption that whatever can with- stand such a reflective purge can be considered “universal” and “objective” in the sense that it is inseparable ffom consciousness as such and is hence “necessary.” This is why Fichte can claim that the genetic acts that are reflectively posited in the Grundlage and the Grundrif are not mental acts of any particular individual person, but are the very acts through which self-consciousness originally posits itself es such. A critic, of course, can always complain that such claims are ground- less and that the so-called transcendental deduction of the universal char- acter of subjectivity as such is no more than a “transcendental pretense," a contingent description of a particular empirical subject or of a particular kind of historical self—modern, Western, and male, for example? The Proper response to such criticism is the same as Fichte’s response to his convemporay critics. The only way that anyone can become convinced of 42 reader or critic is willing to do—or at least to attempt to do—just this, then there will be literally nothing for him to “see” in Fichte’s writings. In the end, therefore, Fichte’ systematic treatises are no more than provocations designed to intice ot to incite his readers and critics to think, to ind to imagine for themselves. “The Wisenschafslehre is not that exists independently of us and without our help. On the contrary it is something that can be produced only by the freedom of our mind, tumed in a particular direction."6 These words written in 1794 have lost none of their force, for it is just as true now as it was then that “philosophy is not something that floats in our memory or is printed in books for us to read; instead, it is what has stirred and transformed our spirit and has ushered it into a higher, spiritual order of things. It is some- thing that has to exist within s™6t Nores |. From an unpublished fagment fom 1800, in J. G. Fidite-Geramtausgebe der Bayerichen Akadenie der Wisenchafien, eds. Reichard Lauth, Hans Gliviteky, and Brich Fuchs (Snungert-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 19648), 1V/ 438, 2. See Daniel Breazeale, "Philosophy and the Divided Selé On the the Eris ‘Breazeale: Inference, Intuition, and Imagination ® 1 FidueSuien 6 (1994 teal and Sees Tt of the Ja Wine” Fe Satn 6 ( "The y endpoint of Palosopy’in the 117-47 and “The ‘Standpoint of Life and The Standpoit of Jena Wisenchgh” in Tenendetphicphie als Sytem: Die cinders “ung swith 1794 und 1806 Alber: Mus (Hamburg Felix Meine, 1989), pp. si-iod . J. Gs Fichte, che den Bei der Wisenschfiseive (1794), in Gesamte, i jsonn Gated Pies Somme Meee LB. ee (Besa: Vie er einen Vernutf, A712/B740~A758/B708. ate, Ucler den Begriff der Wissenschafslehre, 113-15; Simmliche Werke, 5-6 and 5-62, (Gesomtcusgabe, V3: 317 and 3160; Sdmmliche Werke, TH, - 10. On the distinction between an empty Fermller-Philosophie and a “eine hische Wissenschaft” see Fichte, Natunecht, 313-18. . Fichts, “Rezension Aenesidemus.” in Gesamtauggabe, U2: 46; , Ueber den Begriff der Wisenschfislele, 47: Sammi Werke, 1,77. 16. See Ernst Planes, Philosophivhe Aphorimen, Exster Tel (Leipzig: im cm “pragmatische 1/45]. For Fichte’s comments on the meaning of the term “pragmat Geschichte” in this context, see Gesamtausgae, I1/4: 46, 52. Regarding the-de- scription of philosophy as the "the systemtatic history of the human mind in its uunivesal modes of acting,” see “Ueber den Unterschied, des Geistes und des Buch- stabens in der Philosophie,” 334. 17. Fichte, Ueber den Begriff der Wisenschafsehre, 142; Sarthe Werke, I, 72. See too Gesamtensgabe, 1/2: 146; Sanamalike Werke, 1, 7. 18, See § 4 of the inzoduction to the Kriit der Uneisiraft@Qx 4,_AN UVERVIEW OF FICHTE’s GRuNDLAGE Breazeale: Inference, Intuition, and Imagination, @) 19. See, egy Fichte, “Ueber den Unterschied, dee Geistes und des Buch- stabens in der Philosophie” 335~36. 20. “No abstraction is posible withéut reflection; and no reflection is ‘without abstraction” den Begriff der Wiesenschfilehre, © t00 Fichte, Gnundlage der gesarimien Wissen 72. Begriff der Wissenschafslehre, 142-48; Sin 38. For examples of Fichte's frequent use in Gnondlage der gesamsien:We- senschailelre of the term ayfuchen or “seeking out” to describe an essential part of of philosophy, see Gesamausgcbe, 1/2:255,275, 283-84; Sammiliche 2. See especially Fichte, “Ucber den Unterschied, des Geistss und des Buchstabens in der Philosophie.” 324-26. 25, Fichte, “Ueber den Unterschied, des Geistes und des Buchstabens in der M4, 123-24. Philosophie." 330. role of inference in this process, soe. Fichte, Grundlage der 24, See Fichte, Usher den Begrif der Wisenschaisleve, 142; Samtliche Werke, 1, Wissenshafslehe, 269, 279, 316, 342; Sammiliche Werks, 1,106, 107, 119 72. che, Grundlage der gesarien Wisenscafslelre, 262; Stmulche Were. 100. A corresponding power—and hence a corresponding “original fact of the rmind”"—is also deduced in part 3: namely, the Ps original striving to determine some posible object. ¢ Fichte, Grandlage der gesommten Wisenscafletre, 364, Sammuliche 1 che - "We place the previouisly derived fact at the foundation and then we see hhow the I might be able to posit within itself this same fact. The latter posting is fergleichung des vom Hercn Prof, Schmid aufgestelleten Sys- - Ao fit and it mut aio by pod by the [ within ie We eomine inthis issenschaftslehre” (Fichte, Gesameauygabe,1/3: 254; Sticke Werke, “Ueber den Unterschied, des Geistes und des Buchstabens in ‘Spirit as such is the same thing as ‘the power of produc ber den Unterschied, des Geistes und des Buchscabens in mnstation by means of genetic description. See Fichte, Grundrif, Gesamiausgebe, 1/2: 408 and 408; Sammliche Werke, 1,271 and 276, 43, Fichte, Grundlage der gestmmten Wisenschafsleie, 253; Sarmn Naturach316; Saomtcke Were, Tp. 5; und de hte, “Die von Fichte gehaltene Schul6vorlesung," in Gesamtause Grundlage der gesrmten Wisnschailere, 285; Samick Wore, 3, Grandri® der Exgenthmlichon der Wissenschfilere in Ricksche igen, in Geramtausgebe, 1/3, 143; Sdrumiice Werke, 48, Fichte, Grindlge der geiammton Winsenshafsleie, 362-635 Stimmiiche Werke, 1, pp. 219-20,(GYPART 1 AN Ovznview oF Fioure’s GaunpLace DEDUCTION IN THE Cart D GRUNDLAGE ips to explicate the purely logi s0 spectacularly to capture the true term to describe Fichteb philosophical method; seé ind SelstbewuStein. (Kila: Dinter, Methodological Primacy in New Perspectives on FickNEW ESSAYS IN FICHTE’S FOUNDATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCTRINE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE EDITED BY DANIEL BREAZEALE AND Tom ROCKMORE 1 D Humanity Books au inpt ef Promees ook "™ dau lean ee, mer Ber Br 28-2197‘Peblshed 2001 by Humanity Books, an imprint of Prometheus Books Nev Bios in Fikes Foundation ofthe endiion othe Ene Doce of Sele Kamm sent of Seti Keowndge, Copy ConTENTSs Allrighs roerved No parcof oe é e z z 3 i A z | 2 & F Tague hou be adres to | : ‘Humanity Books Invoduction 5 ohn Glen Dee Tom Rockoore ashes New Yore 142-2197 VOICE: 716-891-0155, e0 297 Part 1. AN OVERVIEW OF FICHTE’s GRUNDLAGE FAX 716-560-2711 wwwrromeraey ROMETREUSEOOKS. Con, | t: Inference, Intuition, and Imagination: On the Methodology 05 04 05 oa : and Method of the Fist Jena Wisenschefstere Maaas Daniel Breazeale 19 Sony of Congres Cssogngvn-Pubiation Dat New ese in Pht Foundiion ofthe ent Parr 2, DEDUCTION IN THE GRUNDLAGE Sf tee deen of sent noma / dies by Dane Beale and Tom Reckmore, 2, Fichte’ Deduction of Representation in the 1794-95 Grundlige = Includes bib Steven Hoelezel 39 es bibcgrophialseizences, 7592-PLEK (alk. paper) 3. Fichte on Deduction in the Jena Wissenschafislehre He Johann Goulet, 1762-1814. Grundlage ‘Tom Reckamore al 2. Racwlige Theron g* der geamten Winenchidee, reszele, Daniel, I. Rockmore, Tem, 19a. 52824 N69 2001 Part 3. SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE GRUNDLAGE 193—deat 2001024655 4, Self-Measure and SelfModeration in Fichte's Wissenschafislehre Michael Baur 81 5. Reflective Judgment and the Boundaries of Finite Human Knowledge: The Path Toward Fichte’s 1794/95 Wissenschafslehve Amold Farr 103 | ———_____—_© nt in the United Stites of Amecies on aieséne PaperNew Essays in Ficute’s FouNparion ©. Imagination and Time in Fichte's Grundlage C. Jeffry Kinlew 7, Positing and Determining in Fichte's Foundation of the Entire Wissenschajtslelre Ginter Zaller Part 4. Comparative Stupres 8 = ane Until in Ken's Critical Philosophy and Tichte’s Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaft Jere Paul Surber eee 9. The Paradox of Primary Reflection Pierte Kerszbery Vows Ich als Princip der Philecophie as a Read of Fichtes Grundlage der gesnten Wisenchgfslone carton Wis hy Michael G.Vater a 11. Between Kant and Fichte: Fichte’s Foundations of the Ente Science of Knowl Vladimir Zeman cece 12, Jacobiis Philosophy of Faith and Fichte’s Wissenschafislehre o€ 1794-95 Curis Bowman Part 5. ON THE RECEPTION OF THE GRUNDLAGE 15. The Early Critical Reception of the 1794 Wissenschafilehre Ze 14, Hegels Early Reaction to the Wisenschfilehve: The Case of the Misplaced Adjective George Seidel Contributors 122 155 165 183, 197 210 INTRODUCTION ‘Tom Rockmoze I his volume is the third in a series culled from the conferences orga- nized by the North American Fichte Society. It contains a carefully selected series of ffesh essays presented at a conference in Shakertown at Pleasantville, Kentucky, May 15-19, 1995, organized around J. G. Fichte’ Foundation of the Entire Wissenchafislehre (Grundlage der gesamten Wise senschafsiehre, 1794).1 Fichte’s Grundlages der gescmten Wissenschafislehre (1794) is the first of ‘many versions, some sixteen in all, chat he published during his lifetime or that were later found in his Nathlass. It is triply interesting as the first major text in the corpus of a philosopher of the first rank, asthe first major text of what as the result of Fichte’s intervention in the debate was to become post-Kantian German idealism, and as a work brimming with insights that even today tetains much of its original inrerest: ‘There is probably no typical scenario for the emergence of an impor- tant philosophical theory. The positions of the major philosophers arose in very different ways: for Plato through the reporting of the discussions led by his teacher, Socrates; for Kant through series of writings composed over many years as 2 result'of which he discovered the central insights of his mature theory; for Berkeley as early as his first important text when he was still in his early twenties, and so on, We know that Fichte’ position arose when, while still a young man, he was mistakenly identified as the author of Immanuel Kant’ long-awaited work on religion, which led to him being awarded a professorship at the University of Jena, at the time the most important German-speaking university. nT oy