Vietnam People's Air Force (VPAF)

North Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF)

Although no formal navy or air force organizations

were supposed to exist under the 1954 Geneva
Agreement, the government maintained small navy and
air force elements within the Army. These components
probably were of about equal size and did not exceed
5,000 in total by 1965. In 1964 there was essentially no
North Vietnamese air force. The Vietnamese Peoples'
Air Force (VPAF), also termed the North Vietnamese
Air Force [NVAF] in the West, quickly grew from an ill-
organised rabble of poorly trained pilots flying antiquated communist aircraft into a
highly effective fighting force that more than held its own over the skies of North
Vietnam. Flying Soviet fighters like the MiG-17, and -19, the VPAF produced over a
dozen aces, while the Americans managed just two pilots and three navigators in
the same period.

The first MiG-15 and -17 fighters appearing in August 1964 probably came from
Communist China. After the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, flexing its air
muscle, North Vietnam immediately flew about thirty of its MiG–15s and MiG–17s
from bases in South China to Phuc Yen airfield near the capital. By the end of 1964
the North Vietnamese Air Force possessed only 34 fighter aircraft. These were
MiG-15s and MiG-17s based at Phuc Yen.

By late 1964 North Vietnam possessed a minuscule force of 117 to 128 Soviet
aircraft, of which only thirty-five were MiG–15 or MiG–17 fighters. The rest were
transports, trainers, liaison aircraft, and helicopters. The MiGs were based at Phuc
Yen airfield near the capital. Of the twenty-one airfields in the north, only Phuc Yen
was suitable for jet aircraft operations although several other airfields were being
readied for jets.

Transport helicopter Mil Mi-6 joined the Vietnam People's Air Force in 1965 in the
Air Transport Regiment 919. The principal activities of the Mi-6, including: cargo,
troop transport, large cranes bring weapons hidden away, preserving, serving for
flood prevention . In 1971, in order to defeat the Lam Son 719 Route 9 raiding -
Southern Laos. Coordinate with other units of our army, air force transport
helicopter used Mi-6 transport trailers 122mm guns and hundreds of rounds into the
front trunk South Zone 4. Serving the Ho Chi Minh Campaign in 1975, Mi-6 troop
participation, transfer of food, ammunition battlefield. In the Southwest Border
Campaign in 1979, and the crackdown on the red Khmer troops on Cambodian soil
later, the helicopter Mi-6 active duty transport, troop transport.

In 1965, the small North Vietnamese Air Force (also known as the Vietnam People's
Air Force or VPAF) was equipped with somewhat outdated, gun-armed MiG-17s.
The entry of missile-armed, supersonic MiG-21s in early 1966, however,
dramatically increased the VPAF threat . The USAF's primary counter to the MiG
was the F-4 Phantom II fighter.

By mid-June 1965 there were around 70 MiG-15 and -17 fighters, with the first MiG-
21's arriving in late December 1965. There were also 8 Il-28 jet bombers. As of
January 3, 1966, the North Vietnamese possessed 63 MiG-15/17 FAGOT/FRESCO
aircraft , 11 MiG-19/21 FARMER/FISHBED aircraft, 16 of which were radar
equipped, plus 15 MiG-15s and 50 MiG-19s in south China. This strength stayed
stable, with fighter strength at the end of 1966 still at 70 (15 MiG-21) (However, 29
aircraft had been lost in combat with the Americans, so replacements were
sufficient to offset losses.). In 1967, the North Vietnamese lost 75 fighters in air-to-
air combat and another 15 on the ground. While these were replaced, it appears
that all but about 20 fighters were withdrawn to China for retraining and regrouping.
By the end of Rolling Thunder in October 1968, the DRV had 75 MiG-21s, MiG-19s,
and MiG-17s.

Air Force Regiment 921 was organized Aug 1964 and Air Force Regiment 923 a
year later. Air Force Division 371 was formed 24 Mar 1967 with Air Force
Regiments 921 and 923. Fighter strength in-country remained at around 25 in the
beginning months of 1968. The 8 IL-28 bombers were organized into an operational
unit as late as Oct 1968. Two further regiments were formed: Air Force Regiment
925 was formed February 1969 and Air Force Regiment 927 in February 1972.
These may have come under Air Force Division 371.

The North Vietnamese Air Force created its first MiG-17 unit, the 921st Fighter
Regiment, in February 1964, after its pilots had received training in communist
China. The VPAF also flew Chinese-built MiG-17s (called J-5s). U.S. Air Force
fighter pilots were careful to use their considerable speed advantage to shoot down
the more maneuverable MiG-17. Between July 10, 1965, and Feb. 14, 1968, USAF
F-105s and F-4s downed 61 MiG-17s.

The Chinese may well have attempted to ascribe to Soviet caution the initial failure
of the Soviet Union to ship MIG-19s or 21s to the DIW, the Soviets limiting
themselves instead in the spring and summer of 1965 to MIG-15s and 17s. Only in
mid-December 1965 did the first indications appear that Soviet MIG-19s or (more
probably) MIG-21s may have been sent to the DRV. The Chinese, of course, also
failed to give such fighters to the North Vietnamese throughout 1965, and this is
particularly relevant with regard to the MiG-19s, which the Chinese began to
acquire in fairly substantial numbers in 1964; but the Chinese could retort and
probably did retorted that the Soviets had far more high-performance aircraft to
give, and that the Soviets had in fact been quite willing to furnish MIG-21s not only
to the East European bloc states, revisionist Yugoslavia, and Cuba, but also to a
number of non-socialist states around the world, including "reactionary" India.

In the spring of 1966 the North Vietnamese Air Force began flying the MiG-21.
The MiG-21 quickly proved to be a worthy opponent of the USAF's F-4 Phantom.
Air combat carried out with the participation of MIG-21 fighters demonstrated that
this aircraft possesses high combat qualities. The Americans acknowledged that the
MIG-21 was not inferior in speed to the most modern multipurpose tactical fighter of
the US, the F-4C, and exceeded it in maneuverability. Well over 200 MiG-21s were
supplied to the VPAF.

By the time the US announced its total bombing halt against North Vietnam in
NOvember 1968 the PAVN Air Force had taken such heavy losses that it had
ceased to exist as an effective air deterrent. During the bombing halt North Vietnam
attempted again to increase the proficiency of its fighter pilots; meanwhile, with
generous Soviet aid, over three years it was able to almost triple its number of
combat aircraft. In addition, its fleet of 66 fixed-wing transports and three dozen
helicopters remained active , with occasional missions extending into Cambodia
during 1969.

In 1972 the US lifted its bombing halt and once again attacked targets in North
Vietnam. Meeting the challenge was a rebuilt PAVN Air Force, totalling 80 MiG-
17s, 33 MiG-19s, and 93 MiG-21s. The NVNAF had four fighter aviation regiments,
a fighter aviation training regiment and a military transport air regiment. These were
based on five airfields. The fighter aviation regiments were armed with the MIG-21,
MIG-19 and MIG-17 aircraft and were concentrated in the central and northern
provinces based on the airfields at Gia Lam, Hoi-Bai, Yen-Bai and Kep.
The NVNAF had 187 fighters in late 1972. Of these, only 71 aircraft were combat
ready, i.e. 38%. Of these, only 47 aircraft (31 MIG-21 and 16 MIG-17) could be
used for combat–or 26% of the military aircraft. The MIG-19s were made in China
and were not used in combat. The NVNAF fighter aviation flight crews were
primarily trained for daytime combat in pairs or flights in normal and difficult flying
conditions. Only 13 MIG-21 pilots and five MIG-17 pilots were trained for individual
night flight in normal and difficult flying meteorological conditions. Of 194 pilots, 75
(about 40%) were young.

The primary fighter aviation strength was concentrated to protect Hanoi, the nation’s
capital, the port of Hai Phong, military and industrial plants, and communications
located in the central and northern provinces of the DRVN. Their main mission was
to destroy B-52 aircraft. Considering the difficult situation in the DRVN during the
period when the USA was conducting its air operation, the actions of the fighter
aviation had a limited impact. As a result of this, fighter contribution to the repulse of
American aviation was insignificant. However, even with limited forces, they forced
the US high command to attach a substantial force of tactical aviation to cover the
strike group, that served to weaken the striking power of VNAF aviation while
attacking targets in the DRVN