Professional Documents
Culture Documents
- In 1984, Alfredo Almeda et al sought to register a parcel of land in Rizal, claiming that
they had been in possession of the lot in a manner that was public, peaceful,
continuous, and adverse to the whole world since 1918, or for a period of more than 30
years
- The trial court granted their petition
- The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, on the ground that the subject lot was
released from its forest classification only in 1968, giving the Almedas only 16 years of
possession over it as alienable land
- According to the Republic, their possession of the land before 1968 shold not be
counted, because then it was inalienable land belonging to the public domain
- The CA reversed the lower court and denied the registration
HELD: The Almedas had not qualified for a grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
because their possession of the land while it was still inalienable forest land, or before it was
declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain in 1968, could not ripen into
private ownership, and should be excluded from the computation of the 30-year open and
continuous possession in concept of owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141.
Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership
Director of Lands v. Kalahi Investments, Inc, GR No. 48066, January 31, 1989
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v KALAHI INVESTMENTS
The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area
from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim
and the right to a patent therefore upon compliance with the terms and conditions
prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of the mining claim, the area becomes
segregated from the public domain and becomes the property of the locator.
Issue: Does mere location of mining claims mature to private ownership that would entitle the
claimant to the ownership thereof?
HELD: NO. Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the
located claim. It merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring
other would-be locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals
found therein. To rule otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and
maintain rights over a located mining claim.
Republic v. Enciso, GR No. 160145, November 11, 2005
REPUBLIC v ENCISO
- Pedro Enciso filed a petition for land registration before the RTC of Iba, Zambales
- Enciso claimed that the subject lot was originally the property of the Municipality of
Masinloc, and was reclaimed land
- In the process of building a shoreline road, lot owners were asked to give up part of
their land; in exchange the Municipality of Masinloc sold to these lot owners reclaimed
land
- One of the buyers of the reclaimed land was Honorato Edao, the half-brother of Vicente
Enciso (Pedros father)
- Honorato sold the lot to Vicente, and Pedro inherited it when Vicente died
- The RTC approved the petition for registration
- The Republic appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTC decision; the Republic argued
that Enciso failed to show that the land was part of alienable and disposable land of
public domain
ISSUE: W/N Enciso should be allowed to register the land given that it is reclaimed
1) The land had been classified as alienable, since reclaimed land is generally part of the
inalienable public domain; and
2) That he (the claimant) acquired the property through some means, e.g. prescription
However, it is important to note that inalienable land cannot be acquired by prescription, so
since Enciso failed to prove the first element above, no period of time can result in private
ownership over the subject land.
Chavez v. PEA, GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002
CHAVEZ v PEA
President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, tasked with the developmen
t, improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. He also transferred to
PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project.
Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then, years later,
PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI for the construction of the Freedom Islands project.
Later, a privilege speech was given by Senate President Maceda denouncing the JVA as the
grandmother of all scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that the lands
that PEA was conveying to AMARI were lands of the public domain.
ISSUE: W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of the lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
HELD: YES. The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in
the Regalian doctrine, which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public
domain.
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all
natural resources are owned by the State and except for alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated.
The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of
the public domain, waters and other natural resources and consequently owned by the
State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be
alienable unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesnt convert
these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. There must be an act of
Congress officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable.
Likewise, any legislative authority given to PEA to sell the reclaimed lands should only benefit
private individuals, and not corporations, as the Constitution prohibits corporations from
acquiring alienable lands.
Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 (1990)
LAUREL v GARCIA
FACTS: The subject Roppongi property is one of the properties acquired by the Philippines from
Japan pursuant to a Reparations Agreement. The property is where the Philippine Embassy was
once located, before it transferred to the Nampaidai property. It was decided that
the properties would be
available to sale or disposition. One of the first properties opened up for public auction was the
Roppongi property, despite numerous oppositions from different sectors.
HELD: NO. It is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become
patrimonial. The respondents have failed to do so.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and payment, in
application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The
purpose is not to serve the State as the juridical person but the citizens; it is intended for the
common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service
doesnt automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if
the property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the public
domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such.
Miners Association v. Factoran, 240 SCRA 100 (1995)
MINERS ASSOCIATION vs. FACTORAN
EO 211 and 279, issued by Pres. Corazon Aquino, authorizes the DENR Sec to enter into
joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration,
development, and utilization of mineral resources.
By virtue of which the DENR issued:
o AO 57 which provides that all existing mining leases or agreements which were
granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitutionshall be converted into
production-sharing agreements.
o AO 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and Mineral
Production-Sharing Agreement shall cause the abandonment of the mining,
quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates.
Petitioner Miners Association now questions the validity of the two AOs.
Dr Pascual and his group, after having granted permission to search for marble deposits
in Biak-na-Bato, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits.
They then applied in with the Bureau of Mines(now MGB) for the issuance of license to
exploit said marbles, which was later on issued to them.
Maceda, the new minister of DENR, thereafter cancelled the said license.
On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision granting the Petition
and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as
well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the
finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution.
The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts, which,
though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being
antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they
allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice
of the Filipino nation.
ISSUE: Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration of our natural resources
limited to technical or financial assistance only?
RULING: Only technical assistance or financial assistance agreements may be entered into, and
only for large-scale activities. Full control is not against the day-to-day management by the
contractor, provided that the State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set
aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is similar
to that which is exercised by the board of directors of a private corporation: the performance of
managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other functions may be delegated to
subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the board retains full residual control
of the business.
Philippine Geothermal v. Napocor, GR No. 144302, May 27, 2004
PHIL. GEOTHERMAL INC. vs. NAPOCOR
NPC entered into a service contract with PGI (US Corp.) for exploitation of geothermal
resources covering Tiwi and Mak-ban geothermal fields.
One of the provisions in the contract was The term of this contract shall be twenty-five
(25) years renewable for another twenty-five (25) years upon the option of PGI under
the same terms and conditions set forth herein.
The service contract was to expire but NPC was doubtful whether a renewal would be
constitutional in light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Respondent filed an application for the registration of a certain lot. He claims that:
He acquired the land from his mother.
He has been in open, public, continuous and notorious possession of the land in
the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years.
He had also verified in a notation on the right side portion of the plan that the lot
is within the alienable and disposable area.
The Petitioners filed an appeal to the ruling of the MTC that granted the registration and
claims that the respondent failed to prove that the land has been classified as alienable
or disposable.
Issue: Whether the land has been classified as alienable or disposable?
Ruling: NO. A review of the records shows that other than the notation on the advanced survey
plan stating in effect that the subject property is alienable and disposable and respondents self-
serving testimony, there is an utter lack of evidence to show the actual legal classification of the
disputed lot. Respondent was not able to show proof that the property was alienable or
disposable.
The classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest land is the prerogative of the Executive Department. Under the Regalian doctrine, which
is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural
land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.
Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015
Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015
Facts:
The Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to P.D. 1113 with the
right, privilege, and authority to construct, and operate toll facilities Toll expressways, in
a series of agreements transferred authority to perform operations of the South Metro
Manila Highway to Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO). The Legislators and the Union
of PNCC oppose the said transfer. They argue that the Toll & operation Certificate issued
by the the Toll Regulatory board (TRB) to SOMCO is highly irregular and that the transfer
of authority is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
One of the contention of the Petitioners is that SOMCO is not qualified to operate a toll
facility, because it does not meet the nationality requirement for a corporation. They
contend that 40% of SOMCO is owned by CMMTC, a foreign company.
Issue: Whether SOMCO is not qualified to operate because it does not meet the nationality
requirement?
Ruling: NO. Petitioners have not shown how SOMCO fails to meet the nationality requirement
for a public utility operator. It is axiomatic that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it. On this matter, the court found that petitioners have failed to prove their allegation that
SOMCO is not qualified to operate a toll facility for failure to meet the nationality requirement
under the Constitution.
Spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna v. Republic, G.R. No.173423, March 5, 2014
Spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna v. Republic, G.R. No.173423, March 5, 2014
Facts:
Petitioners filed an application of a lot claiming that through themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted
possession of the lot for more than 50 years, and submitted as evidence the lots survey
plan, technical description, and certificate of assessment.
The Republic claims that the petitioners did not present an official proclamation from the
government that the lot has been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land.
Issue: Whether the disputed lot has been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land?
Ruling: NO. Public land that has not been classified as alienable agricultural land remains part of
the inalienable public domain. This right to classify is vested to the executive department. Thus,
it is essential for any applicant for registration of title to land derived through a public grant to
establish foremost the alienable and disposable nature of the land.
To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this
case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim with
favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the
state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its rights over the same as do minus.
Gaerlan v. Republic, G.R. No. 192717, March 12, 2014
Gaerlan v. Republic, G.R. No. 192717, March 12, 2014
Facts:
Petitioner applied for an application of title for a parcel of land that she acquired by virtue
of a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land and presented the following documents:
(a) Original Tracing Cloth Plan together with the three (3) Blue print copies
(b) Technical Description of the parcel of land;
(c) Surveyor's Report of Survey or Surveyor' s Certificate;
(d) Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land.
(e) Tax Declaration No. 99893.
The Republic filed an opposition claiming that the subject land is a portion of the public
domain, hence, not registrable.
Issue: Whether the disputed land is alienable?
Ruling: NO. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The
burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable and disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and
disposable.
Petitioner failed to prove that:
(1) the subject property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public
domain; (2) she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier.
Peza v. Carantes, G.R. 181274, June 23, 2010
Peza v. Carantes, G.R. 181274, June 23, 2010
Facts:
Respondents was in possession of a parcel of land where they fenced the premises and
constructed a residential building thereon. Respondents received a letter from Philippine
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) informing them that the house they built had overlapped
PEZAs territorial boundary and told them to demolish the same.
Without answering PEZAs letter, respondents filed a petition for injunction, with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction
which was granted by the court. The court further ruled that that respondents are entitled
to possess, occupy and cultivate the subject lots on the basis of their Certificate of
Ancestral Land Claim (CALC).
Issue: Whether the respondents can build a fence and house on the disputed land?
Ruling: NO. Respondents being holders of a mere CALC, their right to possess the subject land is
limited to occupation in relation to cultivation. Even if respondents had established ownership of
the land, they cannot simply put up fences or build structures thereon without complying with
applicable laws, rules and regulations.
PEZA acted well within its functions when it demanded the demolition of the structures which
respondents had put up without first securing building and fencing permits from the Authority.
Section 3. Lands of the Public Domain
Director of Lands v. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296 (1990)
FACTS: This case involves a limestone-rich land in Abra of which are, according to
petitioners, within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve.
ISSUE: WON the land was alienable?
HELD: The fact that the contested parcels of land have long been denuded and
actually contains rich limestone deposits does not in any way affect its present
classification as forest land.
The change the location of a communal forest, such executive action does not
amount to a declassification of a forest reserve into an alienable or disposable
land.: n
That forest lands or forest reserves are incapable of private appropriation and
possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private properties.
This ruling is premised on the Regalian doctrine enshrined not only in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions but also in the 1987 Constitution Article XIII of which provides
that:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal . . . , forests or timber,
. . . and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated."
The land must first be released from its classification as forest land and reclassified
as agricultural land because the classification of public lands is an exclusive
prerogative of the executive department of the government and not of the
courts.
Republic v. CA, 160 SCRA 228 (1988)
Apex Mining v. Southeast Mindanao Gold, Inc, GR No. 152613, June 23, 2006
Dir. of Lands v. IAC, 146 SCRA 509 (1986)
Ten Forty Realty v. Lorenzana, GR No. 151212, Sept. 10, 2003
Chavez v. PEA, GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002
Section 3. Lands of the Public Domain
Francisco Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, Amari Coastal Bay Development Corp (GR
No. 133250, July 9, 2002)
FACTS:
PEA (created in 1977 by then-President Marcos), as the government agency tasked with
reclaiming lands was able to acquire the Freedom Islands thru a Special Patent issued
by then-President Aquino
o The Freedom Islands is a 157-hectare part of the reclaimed land in the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project of the government and a private
company
Later, in 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with private
respondent Amari to develop the Freedom Islands (without bidding) plus the reclamation
of another 250 hectares which then-President Ramos approved
o However, the JVA was questioned by the Senate because the land covered by
such was inalienable
Nevertheless, in 1998, PEA and Amari renegotiated the JVA prompting petitioner
Chavez, as taxpayer, to institute this present action on the ground that the transfer of
these lands to Amari will cause the government to lose billions of pesos
o He argues that the lands are part of the public domain and thus inalienable
o Further, he seeks the disclosure of all terms of the renegotiation
The renegotiation resulted to an Amended JVA which was approved by then-President
Estrada in 1999
ISSUE:
Whether the reclaimed land/about-to-be-reclaimed land may be sold to Amari
RULING:
As to the 157-hectare reclaimed land, NO
o Although such lands are already part of the alienable lands of public domain, PEA
is only allowed to lease it to private corporations f or a period not exceeding 25
years, renewable for not more than 25 years, and not to exceed 1,000 hectares
o PEA may only sell it Filipino citizens subject to Constitutional limitations (12
hectares only by purchase, homestead or grant)
As to the about-to-reclaimed land, NO (they are inalienable and outside the commerce of
men)
o The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands
open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land in Iloilo. He had
four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta
Later, he died without a will and was survived by his four children.
Alberta filed a complaint against her brother Florentino for delivery of her inheritance
share
She alleged that the shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in advance by
way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, during their fathers lifetime
She averred that because of her marriage, she became an American citizen. For this
reason, no formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering these lots
during her father's lifetime.
ISSUE:
YES. A natural born citizen of Philippines who has lost his/her Philippine citizenship may
be a transferee of private lands or may inherit (through hereditary succession) such
lands.
This case is about the partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (Filipino
who died in Spain) among: his widow Marcelle (French); his two grandnephews Roberto
and Jorge; and his companion Wanda (Austrian).
o Jose willed usufructuary rights over real property to Wanda who is an Austrian
Roberto and Jorge argues that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the
Philippines in favor of Wanda, who is an alien, violates the Constitution
ISSUE:
NO. Usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it
is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Sections 10
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy controlled by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments,
goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the
international community. The WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and
developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN
where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO,
decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each members vote equal in weight
to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively
through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the
WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more
decisively than outside the Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical alliances but
a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement
recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to share in the growth in
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.
BAGATSING v COMMITTEE
During the presidency of Corazon Aquino, Petron was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
Philippine National Oil Corp., and served as the oil refining company of the government.
Consistent with the thrust for the privatization of state-owned enterprises from the Marcos
presidency, the subsequent administration, that of Fidel Ramos, approved the privatization of
Petron. One of the major bidders for the purchase of more than 40% of shares of Petron as
Aramco, a company registered in Saudi Arabia. Aramco was eventually declared the winner of
the bid for the bulk of shares in Petron.
ISSUE: W/N Petron is a public utility, which would mean that the bidding won by Aramco is void
HELD: NO. Accdg to the Constitution and the Public Service Law, a public utility is one organized
for hire or compensation. Since Petron does not engage in oil refining for hire or
compensation, it is not a public utility.
Albano v. Reyes, 175 SCRA 36 (1997)
Albano vs Reyes
Facts: In 1987, the Phil. Ports Authority adopted a resolution to prepare for the public bidding
of the development, mgmt., and operation of the Manila Intl. Container Terminal. The PPA
published an Invitation to Bid with the reservation that it had the right to reject any bid and to
accept such bid it may deem advantageous to the govt. Seven companies submitted bids. The
Committee recommended that the contract be awarded to Intl. Container Terminal Services on
the ground that it offered the best technical and financial proposal. Secretary Reyes awarded
the contract to ICTSI. Before the contract could be signed, two cases were filed questioning the
legality or regularity of the bidding.
The President approved the proposed MICT contract. The PPA and ICTFSI perfected the
contract. Rodolfo Albano, a member of the House of Representatives filed the present case
assailing the award of the contract on the ground that since the MICT is a public utility, it needs
a legislative franchise before it can legally operate as a public utility.
Issue: WON a legislative franchise is necessary to obtain an authority to operate
Held: Not exactly.
A franchise specially granted by Congress is not necessary for the operation of the MICT
by a private entity. Even if the MICT be considered a public utility or a public service on the theory
that it is a wharf or a dock as contemplated by the Public Service Act, its operation would not
necessarily call for a legislative franchise. Legislative franchises are not required before each and
every public utility may operate. The law has granted certain administrative agencies the power
to grant licenses for or to authorize the operation of certain public utilities [1. LTFRB Certificates
of Public Convenience authorizing the operation of public land transportation services provided
by motorized vehicles; 2. ERB operation of electric power utilities and services except electric
coops]
Reading EO 30 and PD 857 together, the PPA has been empowered to undertake by it or
to authorize the operation and mgmt. of the MICT by another by contract. The latter power
having been delegated to the PPA, a legislative franchise is no longer necessary. In this case, the
PPA contracting with ICTSI is wholly within its jurisdiction and powers.
Tatad v. Garcia, 243 SCRA 436 (1995)
TATAD v GARCIA
In 1989, the government planned to build a railway transit line along EDSA. No bidding was
made but certain corporations were invited to prequalify. The only corporation to qualify was
the EDSA LRT Consortium which was obviously formed for this particular undertaking. An
agreement was then made between the government, through the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC), and EDSA LRT Consortium. The agreement was
based on the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme provided for by law (RA 6957, amended by RA
7718). Under the agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium shall build the facilities, i.e., railways, and
shall supply the train cabs. Every phase that is completed shall be turned over to the DOTC and
the latter shall pay rent for the same for 25 years. By the end of 25 years, it was projected that
the government shall have fully paid EDSA LRT Consortium. Thereafter, EDSA LRT Consortium
shall sell the facilities to the government for $1.00.
However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmea, and Rodolfo Biazon opposed the
implementation of said agreement as they averred that EDSA LRT Consortium is a foreign
corporation as it was organized under Hongkong laws; that as such, it cannot own a public utility
such as the EDSA railway transit because this falls under the nationalized areas of activities.
ISSUE: W/N the EDSA LRT Consortium may be allowed to operate the public utility
HELD: No. The SC ruled that EDSA LRT Consortium, under the agreement, does not and will not
become the owner of a public utility. Hence, the question of its nationality is misplaced. It is true
that a foreign corporation cannot own a public utility but in this case what EDSA LRT Consortium
will be owning are the facilities that it will be building for the EDSA railway project. There is no
prohibition against a foreign corporation to own facilities used for a public utility.
Telecom v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998)
TELECOM vs. COMELEC
Petitioners challenge the validity of 92 of BP881 (Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines) on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and
without just compensation; and(2) that it denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws;
o Section 92 provides that the COMELEC shall procure radio and television time
whichshall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates. This is
free of charge.
Petitioners contend that their air time is taken without payment of just compensation.
The primary source of revenue is the sale of air time to advertisers.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due
process of law and without just compensation.
RULING: All broadcasting stations is licensed by the government. This is, therefore, a franchise,
which is a privilege subject to amendment by Congress. The Art. XII sec 11 of the Constitution
authorizes the amendment of franchises for the common good. In this case, the common good
involved is for the voters who have the right to be fully informed of the issues in an election.
JG Summit Holdings v. CA, 345 SCRA 143 (2000)
JG SUMMIT vs CA
National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC) and Kawasaki entered into a
Joint Venture Agreement in a shipyard business named PHILSECO, with a shareholding
of 60-40 respectively. NIDCs interest was later transferred to the National Government.
Through a series of transfers, NIDCs rights in PHILSECO went to the National
Government. It was decided that PHILSECO should be privatized by selling 87.67% of its
total outstanding capital stock to private entities. After negotiations, it was agreed that
Kawasakis right of first refusal under the JVA be exchanged for the right to top by five
percent the highest bid for said shares. Kawasaki said that Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHI),
in which it was a stockholder, would exercise this right in its stead.
Because of the right to top the highest bid, it was able to top JG Summits bid. JG
Summit protested, contending that PHILSECO is a public utility, the subsequent bidding
granted Kawasaki more than 40% of its ownership.
On 1994, MOU between broadcasting groups and NTC was established which requires a
congressional franchise for a broadcasting station to operate.
Petition, in the same year, tried to acquire a congressional franchise but failed due to
lack of requirements. However, petitioner was given temporary permit to operate by
the NTC which would expire in 1997.
On 1997, NTC informed that ACWS needs to acquire a congressional franchise before it
can operate. Yet, petitioner failed to gain such franchise. Therefore, NTC held an
administrative case against petitioner and concluded that it its Channel 25 shall be
recalled.
Petitioner raised it to CA and said that it already filed for a congressional franchise and
therefore the recall should be suspended. CA affirmed the decision of NTC.
ISSUE: WON congressional franchise is required before each and every public utility may
operate.
RULING: GR: NO. There is nothing in the law nor in the Constitution which indicates that a
legislative franchise is an indispensable requirement for an entity to operate. HOWEVER, a
legislative franchise will still be required as there is a law (PD 576) which requires for
broadcasting stations to secure a legislative franchise before it can operate.
Eastern Telecom v. Telecom Technologies, GR No. 135992, July 23, 2004
EASTERN TELECOM vs. TELECOM TECHNOLOGIES
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed a serious error of law in upholding the Order of the
NTC granting a PA to Respondent to operate LEC services in Manila and Navotas which are
areas already assigned to petitioner TTPI under a prior and subsisting PA.
RULING: NO. The law does not categorically state that the issuance of a PA is exclusive to any
telecommunications company. Neither Congress nor the NTC can grant an exclusive franchise,
certificate, or any other form of authorization to operate a public utility. The Constitution is
quite emphatic that the operation of a public utility shall not be exclusive.
Gamboa v. Teves, 652 SCRA 690
GAMBOA vs. TEVES
ISSUE: Does the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to the total
common shares only, or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and
non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility?
RULING: Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as
opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term capital in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred
shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term capital shall
include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or management of
the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the
term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that
can vote in the election of directors.
PAGCOR v. BIR, 645 SCRA 338
PAGCOR v. BIR, 645 SCRA 338
Facts:
PAGCOR was created pursuant to a Presidential Decree and was exempted from the
payment of any type of tax, except a franchise tax. Subsequently, R.A. No. 933710 was
enacted and certain sections of the NIRC of 1997 were amended. The particular
amendment that is at issue in this case is Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, which amended
Section 27 (c) of the NIRC of 1997 by excluding PAGCOR from the enumeration of GOCCs
that are exempt from payment of corporate income tax.
Issue: whether PAGCOR is still exempt from corporate income tax and VAT with the enactment
of R.A. No. 9337?
Ruling: NO. Article XII, Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution is explicit that no franchise for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except under the condition that such privilege shall
be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress as and when the common good so
requires.
PAGCOR was granted a franchise to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs and other
recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools. Under Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution, PAGCORs franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress such
as the amendment under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9377. Hence, the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No.
9337, amending Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 by withdrawing the exemption of PAGCOR from
corporate income tax, which may affect any benefits to PAGCORs transactions with private
parties, is not violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, GR No. 181293, 2015
Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015
Facts:
The Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to P.D. 1113 with the
right, privilege, and authority to construct, and operate toll facilities Toll expressways, in
a series of agreements transferred authority to perform operations of the South Metro
Manila Highway to Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO). The Legislators and the Union
of PNCC oppose the said transfer. They argue that the Toll & operation Certificate issued
by the the Toll Regulatory board (TRB) to SOMCO is highly irregular and that the transfer
of authority is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
One of the contention of the Petitioners is that SOMCO is not qualified to operate a toll
facility, because it does not meet the nationality requirement for a corporation. They
contend that 40% of SOMCO is owned by CMMTC, a foreign company.
Issue: Whether SOMCO is not qualified to operate because it does not meet the nationality
requirement?
Ruling: NO. Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "[n]o franchise, certificate, or
any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the
Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens x x x." Clearly,
under the Constitution, a corporation at least 60% of whose capital is owned by Filipinos is of
Philippine nationality. Considering this constitutional provision, petitioners' silence on the
ownership of the remaining 60% of the corporations cited is very telling.
Petitioners have not shown how SOMCO fails to meet the nationality requirement for a public
utility operator. It is axiomatic that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. On this
matter, the court found that petitioners have failed to prove their allegation that SOMCO is not
qualified to operate a toll facility for failure to meet the nationality requirement under the
Constitution.
Section 12. Filipino First Policy
Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997)
Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997)
Facts:
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement. Wherein the WTO opens access to foreign markets,
especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports,
particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the
service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the
country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by
the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
It is petitioners position however, that the foregoing national treatment and parity
provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on
the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First
policy of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether the WTO impairs the Filipino First Policy?
Ruling: No. while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the
rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
Section 16. Corporations
NDC v. PVB, 192 SCRA 257 (1990)
NDC v. PVB, 192 SCRA 257 (1990)
Facts:
The Agrix Marketing, Inc. (AGRIX) had executed in favor of private respondent Philippine
Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage over three (3) parcels of land. During the existence
of the mortgage, AGRIX went bankrupt. Hence, PD No. 1717 was enacted by President
Marcos which ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Companies to be
administered mainly by the National Development Company.
Section 4(1) of the decree, quoted above, extinguishing all mortgages and other liens
attaching to the assets of AGRIX. This was questioned by the PVB and claims that the
decree impairs the obligation of the contract between AGRIX and the private respondent
without justification.
Issue: Whether the decree impairs the obligation of contract?
Ruling: YES. PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police power, not being in conformity with the
traditional requirements of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The extinction of the mortgage
and other liens and of the interest and other charges pertaining to the legitimate creditors of
AGRIX constitutes taking without due process of law, and this is compounded by the reduction
of the secured creditors to the category of unsecured creditors in violation of the equal
protection clause.
Moreover, the new corporation, being neither owned nor controlled by the Government, should
have been created only by general and not special law. And insofar as the decree also interferes
with purely private agreements without any demonstrated connection with the public interest,
there is likewise an impairment of the obligation of the contract.
Section 17. Temporary Take-Over
Agan v. PIATCO, 420 SCRA 575
Agan v. PIATCO, 420 SCRA 575
Facts:
The Government, through then DOTC and PIATCO signed the "Concession Agreement for
the Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport Passenger Terminal III".
The Government granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal
during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other charges in
accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the agreement. The Agreement
provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years.
The agreement provides that in times of emergency, the government may immediately
take over the operations of the Terminal and/or the Terminal Complex. Which was
opposed by Piatco.
Issue: Whether the Temporary Take-over of operations by the government is valid?
Ruling: YES. Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a situation wherein the
exigencies of the times necessitate the government to temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest. It is the
welfare and interest of the public which is the paramount consideration in determining whether
or not to temporarily take over a particular business.
However, the concessionaire shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for the duration of
the temporary take over by GRP, which compensation shall take into account the reasonable cost
for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex, any loss or damage to the Development
Facility, and other consequential damages.
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 2006
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 2006
"In cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against government and
in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak
FACTS: As the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency; elements in the political opposition
have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the
extreme Right, represented by military adventurists in a plot to unseat or assassinate President
Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of
government as a clear and present danger
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under
PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees x x
x" but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during
the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP
1017?
The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports
to grant the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct
the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
ISSUE: Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President
Arroyos inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislatures
emergency powers.
HELD: This Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare "a state of national
emergency" and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section
18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can
be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The
taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency
powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may,
during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over
or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise
such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing
the reasonable terms thereof.
Section 18. Nationalization
Republic v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 (1968)
Republic v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 (1968)
FACTS: PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc., (foreign corp.) entered into an agreement
whereby telephone messages, coming from the United States and received by RCA's domestic
station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected
by the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United States.
Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government
Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of
the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties.
Its application for the use of these trunk lines was in the usual form of applications for telephone
service, containing a statement, above the signature of the applicant, that the latter will abide by
the rules and regulations of the PLDT which are on file with the Public Service Commission. One of
the many rules prohibits the public use of the service furnished the telephone subscriber for his
private use. The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948, using the same
trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule
of rates. Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS) subscriber could make
a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way that the latter could make a call to the former.
The Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc.,
for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone
overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from local residents. PLDT complained that the
Bureau was violating the conditions for using the trunk lines not only for the use of government
offices but even to serve private persons or the general public. PLDT gave a notice that if violations
were not stopped, PLDT would sever the connections -which PLDT did.
Republic sued PLDT commanding PLDT to execute a contract, through the Bureau, for the use of
the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and
conditions as the court finds it reasonable.
Issue:
Whether or not Republic can command PLDT to execute the contract.
[Under Section 18, may the state compel a public utility to render service in the public interest?]
generally yes, provided just compensation is paid therefor.
Held:
No. The Bureau was created in pursuance of a state policy reorganizing the government offices to
meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of a free Gov't of the Phil.
When the Bureau subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or should have known that their
use by the subscriber was more or less public and all embracing in nature.
The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the
plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, implies assent by the
defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for a long time and
the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the public
convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at
liberty to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines.
FACTS:
The Labor Organization of Metran brought a suit against Metran.
Metran is a semi-governmental transportation entity.
In behalf of Metran, an oral petition for dismissal of the case was made on the ground
that Metran belongs to the Republic of the Philippines and as such, it cannot be sued
ISSUE:
Whether Metran can be sued
RULING:
NO. Where the government is of the people, by the people, and for the people, such
immunity from suit will only be the reaffirmation of the sovereignty of the people
themselves as represented by the government.
In a republican state, like Philippines, government immunity from suit without its
consent is derived from the will of the people themselves in freely creating a
government "of the people, and for the people"-a representative government through
which they have agreed to exercise the powers and discharge the duties of their
sovereignty for the common good and general welfare. In so agreeing, the citizens have
solemnly undertaken to surrender some of their private rights and interest which were
calculated to conflict with the higher rights and larger interests of the people as a whole,
represented by the government thus established by them all. One of those "higher
rights," based upon those "larger interests" is that government immunity. The members
of the respondent Labor Union themselves are part of the people who have freely that
government and participated in that solemn undertaking. In this sense-and a very real
one it is-they are in effect attempting to use themselves along with the rest of the
people represented by their common government-an anomalous and absurd situation
indeed.
FACTS:
4 cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad consigned to Mobil Philippines.
The shipment was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service.
The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee 3 cases only
of the shipment
Mobil Philippines filed a suit against the Customs Arrastre Service and the BOC to
recover the value of the undelivered cases plus damages
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they cannot be sued.
ISSUE:
Whether the Customs Arrastre Service and the BOC can be sued
RULING:
NO. There is implied consent to be sued given by the State when the state enters into an
operation that is essentially a business operation, unless the business operation is
merely incidental to the performance of a governmental function, as for instance,
arrastre service.
In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement (MHS), through the BLISS Development
Corporation, initiated a housing project on a government property along the east bank of
Manggahan Floodway in Pasig
The MHS entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Ministry of Public
Works and Highways (MPWH) where the latter undertook to develop the housing site and
construct thereon 145 housing units
By virtue of the MOA, MPWH forged individual contracts with petitioners EPG, Ciper,
Septa, Phil. Plumbing, Home Construction, World Builders, Glass World, Performance Builders,
and De Leon Araneta Construction for the construction of the housing units
Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding covered only around "2/3 of
each housing unit"
Petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional constructions" for the
completion of the housing units despite the fact that there was only a verbal promise, and not a
written contract, by the MPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds will be
available and forthcoming
Unpaid balance for the additional constructions amounted to P5,918,315.63
Upon a demand letter from the petitioners, on November 14, 1988, DPWH Asst.
Secretary Madamba opined that payment of petitioners' money claims should be based on
quantum meruit (what one has earned) and should be forwarded to the Commission on Audit
(COA)
In a Letter of the Undersecretary of Budget and Management dated December 20, 1994,
the amount of P5,819,316.00 was then released for the payment of the petitioners' money
claims under Advise of Allotment No. A4-1303-04-41-303
In an indorsement dated December 27, 1995, the COA referred anew the money claims
to the DPWH
In a letter dated August 26, 1996, respondent Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the
subject money claims
Petitioners filed before the RTC of QC, Branch 226 a Petition for Mandamus to order the
respondent to pay petitioners their money claims plus damages and attorney's fees.
DPWH Sec Vigilar countered that he cannot be sued as he is an agent of the State, and
therefore immune from suit
Facts:
PHILROCK filed in the RTC of Manila a complaint against the Board of Liquidators, as liquidator of
the defunct REPACOM, for: (1) the replacement of the defective rock pulverizing machinery
purchased from REPACOM, or, as alternative, to refund the purchase at 31% of its contract price;
(2) reparation for losses incurred due to the increased expenses of maintaining the plant at
Php5,000 a month and Php4,000 per day as unrealized profits and exemplary damages; and (3)
Php50,000 attorney fees plus expenses and costs of the suit.
The RTC decided in favor of PHILROCK. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the State, filed a notice
of appeal on the ground that the payment for damages are public funds, hence, exempt from
attachment and execution. Nevertheless, the RTC judge issued a Writ of Execution. Subsequently
the Board of Liquidators filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals
where the Court of Appeals set aside the Writ of Execution by the RTC. Hence, this petition for
review.
Issue: Whether or not the Board of Liquidators, as a government agency without juridical
capacity, may be sued and held liable as litigators of REPACOM.
Ruling:
No. The Board of Liquidators is a government agency, created under E.O. 372 to administer the
assets and pay the liabilities of the defunct REPACOM, thus it has no juridical personality,
separate and distinct from the government, and therefore, as a general rule, suing it is akin to
suing the State. The State enjoys immunity from suit except when it conducts business through
a government-owned and controlled corporation or a non-corporate agency set up primarily
for a business purpose, and even then, the State may not be liable for damages since the purse
of the State, or the disbursement of public funds is in the discretion of the Legislature. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate specific objectives, as
appropriated by law. Although the liability of REPACOM has been ascertained, the State is at
liberty to determine for itself how to satisfy such liability. Funds should be appropriated by the
Legislature for the specific purpose of satisfying the judgement in favor of PHILROCK before said
judgement may be paid.
Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon, GR 154705, June 26, 2003
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA v VINZON
This is a petition for review of the decision made by Court of Appeals in ruling that the Republic
of Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and
jurisdiction of Philippine courts and that petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister
Counsellor Kasim waived their immunity from suit.
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a
Maintenance Agreement with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and
Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units and
was to take effect for a period of four years.
When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration,
he allegedly found respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with
the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated
the agreement.
The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he
filed a complaint against the petitioners which opposed by invoking immunity from suit.
Issues: Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity
from suit; Whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim
may be sued herein in their private capacities.
Discussions:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. The practical justification for the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle
of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet
imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.] A
contrary attitude would unduly vex the peace of nations.
The rules of International Law, however, are not unbending or immune to change. The
increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely
connected with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of
sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii (public acts of the
government of a state), but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (the
commercial activities of a state.)
Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the republic of Indonesia cannot be deemed to have
waived its immunity to suit. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a
private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri
imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the
establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts
with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The
Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract
with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of
Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived
its immunity from suit.
Shell Philippines v. Jalos, GR No. 179918, September 8, 2010
SHELL v JALOS
In 2003, Efren Jalos et al filed a complaint for damages against Shell before the RTC of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro. Jalos et al claimed that they were all subsistence fishermen
from the coastal barangay of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro whose livelihood was adversely
affected by the construction and operation of Shells natural gas pipeline in the Malampaya
Natural Gas Project.
Shell claims that it cannot be sued without the States consent under the doctrine of state
immunity from suit. Shell said that under Service Contract 38, it served as an agent of the
Philippine government in the development of the Malampaya gas reserves.
ISSUE: May Shell use the doctrine of State immunity from suit?
HELD: NO. Shell is not an agent of the Republic of the Philippines. It is but a service contractor
for the exploration and development of one of the countrys natural gas reserves. It is not
immune from suit and may be sued for claims even without the States consent.
Sps. Ramos discovered that a portion of their land (somewhere in Baguio) was being
used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport which is
operated by ATO.
Sometime in 1995, respondents agreed to convey the subject portion by deed of sale to
ATO in consideration of the amount of Php778,150.00. However, ATO failed to pay
despite repeated verbal and written demands.
Thus, an action for collection against ATO was filed by the respondents before the RTC.
ATOs primary contention was that the deed of sale was entered into the performance
of governmental functions. RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. CA affirmed RTC.
Hence, the petition.
Mendoza, doing business under the name DSuperior Builders, won several construction
biddings under an agriculture project.
Mendozas services, due to infirmities to their construction, were recommended for
forfeiture.
Aggrieved, he brought this to the DPWH which recommended for the rebidding. It also
blacklisted Mendoza from participating in any bidding.
Mendoza brought the matter to the RTC of Manila.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the DPWH has no juridical personality of its own and
that Mendoza's action was a suit against the State.
RULING: The general rule is that a state may not be sued, but it may be the subject of a suit if it
consents to be sued, either expressly or impliedly. There is express consent when a law so
provides, while there is implied consent when the State enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation. This Court explained that in order to determine implied waiver when
the State or its agency entered into a contract, there is a need to distinguish whether the
contract was entered into in its governmental or proprietary capacity, when the contract
involves its sovereign or governmental capacity no such waiver may be implied.
The contracts that the DPWH entered into with Mendoza were done in the exercise of its
governmental functions. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the DPWH enjoys immunity from suit
Hermano Oil Manufacturing & Sugar Corporation v.Toll Regulatory General Considerations
Board, G.R. No. 167290, November 26, 2014
HERMANO OIL vs. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD
Hermano Oil Corporation owned a parcel of land at NLEX. The petitioner requested that
respondent Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) grant an easement of right of way, for it had
been deprived of its enjoyment and possession by the fence that barred its entry. TRB
denied based on the Limited Access Highway Act.
Hence, petitioner sued TRB and Engr. Dumlao demanding specific performance, the
grant of the easement of right of way and damages being deprived of its property
without due process, just compensation and equal protection of the law.
ISSUE: WON respondent TRB, although not strictly a government agency, should enjoy
immunity from suit.
RULING: YES. The TRB, Dumlao and the DPWH correctly invoked the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in their favor. The TRB and the DPWH performed purely or essentially
government or public functions. As such, they were invested with the inherent power of
sovereignty. Being unincorporated agencies or entities of the National Government, they
could not be sued as such.
Section 6. Police Force
Quilonia v. The General Court Martial GR No. 9660, March 4, 1992
QUILONA vs. COURT MARTIAL
Quilona, a policeman, was charged before the General Court Martial for 2 counts of
murder.
At the time of arraignment, the petitioner moved to be tried in a civilian court (by this
time, the PNP Law was already signed but will only take effect the next year). The
arraignment was reset to Dec 28, 1990.
On the said date, the Court Martial denied the motion and insisted on the arraignment
on the same date. Quilona refused to enter a plea, so the respondent court ordered the
entry of not guilty plea.
Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order, alleging that respondent court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in denying his motion for inhibition.
ISSUE: WON respondent court martial acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to or
excess of jurisdiction in proceeding with the arraignment of the petitioner on 28 December
1990.
RULING: YES. Although Republic Act No. 6975 was not yet in effect when petitioner was
arraigned on 28 December 1990, nevertheless, respondent court martial knew or should have
known that the said Act had already been signed and shall take effect on 1 January 1991. It is
precisely for this reason that respondent court martial decided to have the petitioner's motion
to inhibit argued on 28 December 1990 and thereafter arraigned the petitioner on the same
day despite his vehement refusal to enter a plea.
By closing its eyes to the provisions of Sections 2 and 46, indelicately asserting its military
jurisdiction rather than letting go of the case to civilian jurisdiction to effectuate and give flesh
to the avowed policy and intent of the law, respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion.
Carpio v. Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290 (1992)
Carpio v. Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290 (1992)
Facts:
Republic Act No. 6975 entitled "An Act Establishing The Philippine National Police Under
A Reorganized Department Of The Interior And Local Government, And For Other
Purposes" was passed and approved by President Aquino. This was questioned by
petitioner on the ground that it emasculated the National Police Commission by limiting
its power "to administrative control" over the Philippine National Police (PNP).
He also contends that Section 12 of the questioned Act constitutes an "encroachment
upon, interference with, and an abdication by the President of, executive control and
commander-in-chief powers.
Issue: Whether RA 6975 is valid?
Ruling: YES. Article XVI, Section 6 thereof, merely mandates the statutory creation of a national
police commission that will administer and control the national police force to be established
thereunder. The circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the
reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of
coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law
enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of
the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.
Department of Budget v. Manilas Finest, GR No. 169466, May 9, 2007
Department of Budget v. Manilas Finest, GR No. 169466, May 9, 2007
Facts:
PD 765 was issued constituting the Integrated National Police (INP) to be composed of
the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Subsequently, RA 6975 or the PNP Law was enacted.
Under Section 23 of said law, the PNP would initially consist of the members of the
Integrated National Police (INP), created under P.D. No. 765, as well as the officers and
enlisted personnel of the PC.
R.A. No. 6975 was amended by R.A. No. 8551 which reengineered the retirement scheme
in the police organization. Relevantly, PNP personnel stood to collect more retirement
benefits than what INP members of equivalent rank, who had retired under the INP Law,
received.
Hence, the INP members filed a petition for declaratory relief. INP members claims that
they are truly absorbed and equally considered as PNP-retirees and thus, entitled to enjoy
the SAME or IDENTICAL retirement benefits being bestowed to PNP-retirees by virtue of
said PNP Law.
Issue: Whether RA 6975 abolish the INP?
Ruling: NO. what the law provided was for the absorption, transfer, and merger of the INP, as
well as other offices comprising of the PC-INC with the PNP. Hence, they are not excluded from
availing themselves of the retirement benefits accorded to the PNP retirees.
Mendoza v. PNP, GR No. 139658, June 21, 2005
Mendoza v. PNP, GR No. 139658, June 21, 2005
Facts:
A affidavit-complaint for illegal arrest, illegal detention, physical injuries, and robbery was
filed against PNP members namely: PO3 William M. Mendoza and PO2 Angelita Ramos by
Teodoro V. Conti. They both denied the charge however was found guilty by the Regional
director.
appeal to the Regional Appellate Board (RAB) of the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM), National Capital Region. They went to the RTC to file a motion for
reconsideration.
The respondents claim that their case should be dismissed on the ground of failure to
exhaust the administrative remedy. They should have appealed to the DILG and CSC
before going to the court.
Issue: Whether there was failure to exhaust administrative remedy?
Ruling: YES. Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution provides that the State shall establish and
maintain one police force which shall be civilian in character. Consequently, the PNP falls under
the civil service pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX-B, also of the Constitution. Petitioners failure
to exhaust all administrative remedies is fatal to his cause. It is elementary that where, a remedy
is available within the administrative machinery, this should first be resorted to.
Article XVII. Amendments or Revisions
Section 1. Amendment or Revision
RA 6132, Constitutional Convention Act of 1970
Imbong v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28 (1970) * Constituent v. Legislative Power
Imbong v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28 (1970)
Facts:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in running
as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such
candidates.
The Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Res. No. 2 which called for a
Constitutional Convention which shall have two delegates from each representative
district. Resolution No. 4 was passed to amend resolution 2 by providing that the
convention shall be composed of 320 delegates with at least two delegates from each
representative district.
The Congress again acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Res Nos.
2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914 which previously implemented Res. No. 2.
Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law, while
Imbong questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132
Issue: Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set the
parameters of such convention?
Ruling: YES. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the constituent
assembly. The Congress also has the authority to enact implementing details, contained in Res.
Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such details are within the competence of the Congress in
exercise of its legislative power.
Lambino v. COMELEC, 505 SCRA 160 *distinction between Amendment and Revision
Section 2. Initiative
RA No. 6735, An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum
Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997); MR (1997)
Lambino v. COMELEC, 505 SCRA 160 (2006) *SC declared RA 6735 as sufficient and adequate for
a peoples initiative, effectively abandoning the ruling in Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC.
Section 4. Ratification
Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967)
Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702 (1971)
Javellana v. ES, GR L-36142, March 31, 1973