Allison, Taste

Recordar que el Esquematismo tiene como fin mostrar las instancias particulares o sea los
esquemas de los conceptos puros y slo a partir de estas determinaciones es posible que los
conceptos se apliquen a las intuiciones.
En la Analtica Trascendental a Kant le interesa la determinacin y la justificacin de los principios
a priori que hacen posible la experiencia.
El principio del juicio reflexivo es el de la finalidad de la naturaleza, sobre su significado:
[] it clearly signifies the contingent agreement of the order or nature with our cognitive needs
and capacities [] the basic idea is that we look upon nature as if it had been designed with our
cognitive interests in mind; though, of course, we have no basis for asserting that it was in fact so
designed. 30
En la Segunda introduccin Kant argumenta que no slo se sistematizarn las leyes empricas, sino
que adems se fundara su necesidad.
32. The logical use of judgment is to be distinguished from its transcendental use, which,
according to the first Critique, is to provide the schemata that are the sensible conditions for the
application of the categories. The former consists in the formation of empirical concepts and their
organization into genera and species, which makes possible the subordination of these concepts in
judgments and the connection of the judgments in syllogisms. Insofar as our concepts are
orderable in a single set of genera and species, they have the form of a logical system, and insofar
as this order reflects the actual order of nature, the latter may be thought of as a logical system
under empirical laws.
40. [] it is rather that we must act as if we were free, which is just what it means to act under the
idea of freedom. In other words, the idea of freedom has an essentially normative force. To act
under this idea is to place oneself in the space of [practical] reasons, and therefore to take
oneself as subject to rational norms (of both a moral and prudential sort), rather than merely to
causal conditions.
Presuponer que hay una finalidad formal en la naturaleza es pensarla como si tuviera una
normatividad o una fuerza prescriptiva. Al investigar la naturaleza debemos tratarla como si
tuviera fines, eso significa lo de aplicar la lgica a ella.
44: [] reflection and determination are best seen as complementary poles of a unified activity of
judgment (the subsumption of particulars under universals), rather than as two only tangentially
related activities pertaining to two distinct faculties. Accordingly, every ordinary empirical
judgment involves moments of both reflection and determination: The former consists in finding
the concept under which the given particulars are to be subsumed, and the latter in the
determination of the particulars as being of such and such a type by subsuming them under the
concept. What we now learn from the First Introduction is that this reciprocity is not complete.
Although every determinative judgment involves reflection (as a condition of the very concepts
under which particulars are subsumed), not every reflective judgment involves a corresponding
determination.
O sea hay juicios que slo son reflexionantes
Los juicios de gusto estn basados en el sentimiento.
69: [] Kant understands by pleasure and displeasure something like a sense of the increase or
diminution of ones level of activity, particularly ones activity as a thinking being. This also
explains why, as we have already seen, Kant claims that a pleasurable mental state is one which
the subject endeavors to preserve and an unpleasant state one which determines the subject to
change its state.
El sentimiento de agrado o desagrado no es una facultad pasiva, sino una que evala o valora.
Mediante el sentimiento nosotros percibimos una finalidad subjetiva de una representacin dada
para el ejercicio de nuestras facultades cognoscitivas.
Para Allison, la organizacin de la Analtica de lo Bello est organizada como la tabla de funciones
lgicas de la primera Crtica. Esto para Allison establce la tesis de que la Analtica est concentrada
en una quid facti del gusto.
El gusto es la facultad de apreciar la belleza de objetos particulares por medio del sentimiento.
El sentimiento puede ser considerado desde la cantidad, o sea con su fuerza; o con su cualidad, o
sea con el tipo. La segunda (cualidad) es la distintiva en un juicio de lo bello.
Si el juicio de gusto es puro tiene que tener una cualidad (ser desinteresado) y una cantidad (ser
subjetivo y universal).
El sentimiento surge de la armona de las facultades, que es ocasionado por la finalidad de la
forma del objeto.
El arte genera un placer en la reflexin.
Cuando Kant dice que el arte tiene que parecer naturaleza quiere decir esto:
276. Clearly, this does not mean that it must seem to be nature in the sense of a faithful copy or
representation. It is, rather, that it must seem natural in the sense of being spontaneous,
unstudied, or, as Kant puts it, unintentional [unabsichtlich] that is, as if it were a product of mere
nature rather than art.
276[]in viewing something as a work of fine art, we must take it as an intentional product,
executed in accordance with a plan (be conscious of it as art), while, at the same time, it must look
to us as if precisely the opposite were the case, that is, as if it were mere nature. The former
condition is requisite for being able to take it as a work of art at all, and therefore as even a
potential candidate for aesthetic evaluation; the latter is necessary for actually making such an
evaluation and therefore for treating it as fine art.
El arte puede ser visto como naturaleza, porque es un producto del genio que es una extensin de
la naturaleza.