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HANKINSON
The Aristotelian universe was finite; ours is infinite. The Earth was at
the centre of that older model; it has no special position now. Man,
says Alexandre Koyre (1958, p. 1), has "lost his place in the world".
The scientific revolution has brought forth "the destruction of the Cos-
mos, the disappearance ... of the conception of the world as a finite,
closed, and hierarchically ordered whole".
It was perhaps inevitable, certainly understandable, that early cos-
mology would tackle questions like these, about the relationship of
humanity to God, and the place of humans in the ontological order of
the universe. In the seventeenth century, the thought that if humans
are not placed at the centre of the universe they can lay no claim to
special status in the 'great chain of being' may have done something to
delay the end of geocentrism. The proponents of heliocentrism were
not innocent of this sort of concern either. As Koyre says:
The displacement of the earth from the centrum of the world was not felt to be a
demotion. Quite the contrary: it is with satisfaction that Nicholas of Cusa asserts its
promotion to the rank of noble stars, and as for Giordano Bruno, it is with burning
enthusiasm - that of a prisoner who sees the walls of his jail crumble - that he announces
the bursting of spheres that separated us from the wide open spaces and inexhaustible
treasures of the ever-changing, eternal and infinite universe. (Ibid., p. 43)
For Aristotle, and for the ancients generally, the most striking cosmo-
logical observation is this: the stars seem to move around and around
eternally, and correlatively the Earth seems to be at rest. Aristotle's
predecessors attempted to explain this phenomenon in a variety of
ways. Some placed the Earth on a firm foundation, water (Thales) or
an infinite column of earth (Xenophanes), and others (Anaximenes)
tried to expfain how it might float on a cushion of air. Famously,
Anaximander thought that the Earth needed no cause for its stillness
- since it has no reason to move in any particular direction, it has no
reason to move at all. But Aristotle sought to solve the problem in a
novel fashion, rejecting all of these accounts on the ground that they
do not explain both the fact that the Earth is stationary and the fact
that pieces of earth move downwards.
It is an anesthetized mind that is not at all puzzled to find that the smallest portion of
earth, let loose in mid-air, moves and will not remain still, the more of it there is the
faster it moves. Yet the whole Earth suspended in mid-air does not move: such a great
weight at rest. (Cael. II 13, 294all-16; cf. II 14, 296a24-34)
or else there would have to be other worlds beyond the starry sphere,
and there cannot be more than one world (I 8-9).
Aristotle's universe is the opposite of apeiron in another sense of
that term as well: it is structured, possessing a centre and a periphery. 1
This is not merely a geometrical feature of the universe, accruing to it
as a result of its finite extent and spherical form. The centre and the
periphery figure essentially in the laws that govern the motions of
the elements, and so they are natural places possessing more than
conventional significance (Phys. IV 1, 208b8-22). They impart causal
concreteness to what would otherwise be a purely mathematical notion
of place (Phys. V 4, 211a3-6, 212a20-28; 5, 212b29-13a3). The occur-
rence of these natural places has always been a controversial feature
of Aristotle's system. It had already been attacked in ancient times,
but not in a way that touched on Aristotle's basic framework of cosmo-
logical explanation. But to do without natural places requires a com-
pletely new physical science, not just a retooling of Aristotle's system,
as some Hellenistic philosophers believed. As we shall see, Galileo's
criticism of natural places was part of the revolution of the scientific
world view in the seventeenth century.
The argument we have sketched is plainly empirical, but according
to Aristotle it is not explanatory. The rotation of the heavens, apparent
or real, does not cause, and therefore does not explain, the existence
or nature of the aether; rather that motion is caused and explained by
the nature of the aether. To understand the motion of the stars and
the aether that causes it, we must explain these things by reference to
their causes, and for Aristotle this means that we must show why the
aether must exist by reference to first principles.
to Book IV, he says that the consideration of the cause (aitia) why
things possess heaviness and lightness is proprietary to the theory of
movement. To a reader familiar with Aristotle's terminology and scien-
tific method, these are signs that Aristotle's endeavour is explanatory.
It is evident that, in this treatise, he is content with only a few asides
about how the phenomena come to be known.
It is therefore quite surprising to find that, in a recent treatment of
the theory of the elements in Cael. I 2-4, Christian Wildberg (1988),
modifying somewhat an earlier (more sympathetic) account by Wolf-
gang Kullmann (1965), construes the proof of the existence of the
aether in Chapter 2 as a "syllogism of fact". A syllogism of fact does not
explain; its purpose is to give one reasons for believing that something is
so without explaining why it so (APo. I 13); the empirical argument
rehearsed above could be recast in the form of syllogisms of fact.
According to Wildberg (1988, pp. 56-60), the argument for the aether
is cast in this form:
Some simple movements are circular movements.
All simple movements are movements of simple bodies.
So, there is a simple body which moves in a circle.
principles; they are judged at least in part by the success with which
they are able to account for the phenomena - as Aristotle says later:
"It seems both that the argument confirms the appearances and the
appearances the argument" (I 3, 270b4).
It is clear that there is no progression to some other type, as there is from length to
plane, and to body from plane, for in that case this kind of magnitude would not be
complete, since necessarily every advance is in respect of some defect, and it is not
possible for the complete to be defective: for it is in every way. (268a30-b5)
body. There are two sorts of individuals that result from imposing form
on body.
All bodies in the form of a part are of such a kind according to this definition, since it
has all the dimensions. But each is determined by contact with what is close to it, and
hence in a way each of these bodies is many. But the totality of which these things are
parts is necessarily complete, and totally so, as the name indicates, and not in one way
but not in another. (I 1, 268b5-10)
Bodies 'in the form of a part' are spatial sub-regions of the universe.
Here Aristotle is speaking of a body, of this body, or of bodies (plural),
not merely of body, which is indeterminate continuous extension in
space, but of a spatially delimited entity. Bodies are 'determined' (that
is, delimited, and given definite size) "by contact with what is close".
This does not mean that a body is defined by reference to particular
things that it touches, at least not in the sense that it is essential to a
body that it be in contact with that which it currently touches. At the
same time, bodies considered as such have no intrinsic unity, "in a
sense they are many" (268b7-8). 7
The totality is defined by contrast with "bodies in the form of a
part", as "that of which these are parts", "necessarily complete", and
complete "in every way, not complete in one way, incomplete in ano-
ther". It is perceptible, hence, it is an individual. And since it is an
individual, it consists of form in matter (Cael. I 9, 277b27-78a16). The
matter of the totality is body; thus it is a bodily thing, it is made of
body. But obviously it is not a "body in the form of a part". Further,
it is not "determined by contact", since there is nothing outside itself
with which it could come into contact. Thus it is not in place, and
cannot move, except accidentally (Phys. IV 5, 212bll-22). For these
reasons, the totality is probably not suitably considered to be a discrete
body.
The form of the totality is, simply, completeness.
Everything, the totality, and the complete do not differ from one another in form, but
if at all then in their matter and that of which they are said. (I 1, 268a20-22)
Putting the form and the matter together we get this result: the
totality is all the body there is. Thus, even though the form of the
totality is distinguishable from its matter:
We are not compelled to assert a plurality of worlds. Such a plurality is indeed impossible
if this world is made from the entirety of matter, just as it is. (278a25-28)
The case is very different with a wall in which the parts are put
together in order to maintain the whole:
As if a wall necessarily came to be because what is heavy is naturally carried downwards
and what is light to the top, wherefore the stones and foundations take the lowest place,
with earth above because it is lighter, and wood at the top of all as being the lightest.
(Phys. II 8, 199b36-200a4)
Natural things come to be the way they are always or for the most part, but this is never
true of the products of chance and spontaneity. It seems not to be by chance or happenst-
ance that it rains frequently in winter, but it does seem so when it rains during the dog
days. Nor is it happenstance when it is hot during the dog days, but it is so, when it is
hot in winter. (Ibid., 198b35-99a3)
In any case, the introduction of the centre of the totality into the
definition is highly significant in two ways. 11 It has the effect that the
elements are defined in terms of the totality of which they are parts.
And it imports an absolute frame of reference into physical law. We
now take these points up in order.
prior existence of lines. Thus, the parts required by a formula are prior
to the whole defined by the formula (1035b5-6).
There is another sort of part that is involved in the form of the whole,
namely, a part identified by means of the formula of the whole. As we
have seen the acute angle is a material part of the right angle. But the
acute angle is identified by means of a formula that mentions the right
angle, for an acute angle is simply an angle less than a right angle.
More significantly, a finger is a part of a human, identified by means
of a formula that states the role that it will play in human functioning.
"Therefore the parts which are of the nature of matter and into which
as its matter a thing is divided, are posterior" (1035bll-12). In these
cases, the whole is prior not only in definition but also in existence:
For [such parts] cannot even exist if severed from the whole; for it is not a finger in any
state that is the finger of a living thing, but the dead finger is a finger only homonymously.
(Met. VII 10, 1035b22-25)
For it is not a hand in any state that is a part of man, but the hand that can fulfill its
work, which therefore must be alive; if it is not alive it is not a part. (1036b31-32)
Parts defined with respect to the whole depend for their existence on
the whole, for they cannot perform their characteristic activities without
the existence of the whole. In this sense, then, these parts are posterior
to the whole whether they are considered concretely or formally.
Returning now to the elements, we have seen that Aristotle defines
them in terms of the sphere that constitutes the totality. The perfor-
mance of their characteristic activities thus presupposes the existence
of that whole - they move towards the centre and the periphery of this
sphere. So they are ontologically posterior to the whole: they cannot
pre-exist the sphere, because without the sphere they would lack their
defining innate tendencies. Thus the doctrine of natural places is how
Aristotle's notions about the explanatory priority of the whole come in
the end to be cashed out in his cosmology.
The doctrine of natural places was controversial from the very begin-
ning. Richard Sorabji (1987, pp. 16-18) summarizes an ancient contro-
versy generated by this doctrine. Theophrastus, Aristotle's colleague
and successor as head of the Peripatos, argued that Aristotle was wrong
to suggest (Phys. IV l, 208bl0-22) that place is an entity in its own
ARISTOTLE'S UNIVERSE 431
not self-movers in this way, they are not moved by something else
either. They are in an intermediate class of things that move on account
of their own nature to what the actuality of that nature is. These things
move whenever this actuality is not realized, if they are not hindered
(ibid., 255b13-24).
It is in the context of this doctrine of place constituting the intrinsic
actuality of the elements that one can best appreciate how modern
physics achieves the elimination of natural places. In his preface to
Stillman Drake's translation of the Dialogues (Galileo, 1953), Albert
Einstein assesses Galileo's attitude to natural places as follows:
A close analogy exists between Galileo's rejection of the hypothesis of a centre of the
universe for the explanation of the fall of heavy bodies, and the rejection of the hypothesis
of an inertial system for the explanation of the inertial behaviour of matter. (This latter
is the basis of the theory of general relativity.) Common to both hypotheses is the
introduction of a conceptual object with the following properties
(1) It is not assumed to be real, like ponderable matter (or a "field").
(2) It determines the behaviour of real objects, but is in no way affected by them.
The introduction of such conceptual elements, though not exactly inadmissible from a
purely logical point of view, is repugnant to the scientific instinct. (Galileo, 1953, p. xiii)
what they failed to realize was that the problems lie not at its centre
but in its whole.
NOTES
* This work was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada.
1
The term derives from peras, and its connotation of limitlessness carries with it a lack
of internal structure as well as external boundaries. It is an important part of Aristotle's
thinking about the infinite that there can be no distinguished places in a boundless
universe, and so no elemental capacities defined in terms of such places. Koyre (1957)
is the classic discussion of the historical opposition between the structured and the
unstructured conceptions of the universe. See also Furley (1987, Chap. 1).
2
We derive this criterion not from Aristotle but from Simplicius's discussion of the
simplicity of lines (Heiberg, 1893, 13.6-14.29). It is, however, plausible that (as Simplicius
implies) Aristotle had some such criterion in mind, though he was certainly unaware of
the various difficulties that lead to the complexities in the above definition.
3
It is clear that Aristotle's arguments are supposed to have this universal form despite
the necessary uniqueness of the universe (Cael. I 9, 277b26-78a16).
4
Pace Nussbaum (1978, Chap. 2), the observation that principles proprietary to a more
inclusive domain are admissible into a science suffices to account for the argument of the
De Motu Animalium. That short treatise begins with two chapters on the unmoved
mover in animal motion, continues with two chapters concerning the unmoved mover in
cosmology, followed by three chapters on the soul, with a few comments on how it
instantiates general principles concerning the unmoved mover, and how it is itself actual-
ized in animal bodies. Only in the last two chapters of the work does Aristotle deal
specifically with such things as pneuma, which are specific to animal bodies. Nussbaum
suggests that the references to cosmology constitute an application of the principles of
the cosmological domain to that of animals, in violation of the methodology of Posterior
Analytics, presaging a more flexible inter-disciplinary Aristotelian approach. But in fact
the first four chapters of De Motu Animalium discuss animal motion and cosmology only
insofar as they shed light on the principles of change, in much the same spirit as these
same topics are discussed in Physics VIII (see Kung, 1982). What we find in De Motu
Animalium is an inductive discussion of appropriate principles of motion, drawing from
two separate areas of application.
5
The gloss on continuity given here will strike the modern reader as careless. Infinite
divisibility does not suffice for continuity: to be continuous a thing must be free of internal
gaps, and infinite divisibility does not secure that, since an expanse that contains some
continuous parts will be infinitely divisible even if it has internal gaps. However, it is
unlikely that Aristotle knew that these two conceptions were non-equivalent: he some-
times uses the no-gap criterion to define the continuous (e.g., in Phys. V 3, 227a10-13
and Cat. 6, 5al-14), and at other times the infinite divisibility criterion (Phys. VI 1,
231b14-18: note that this reference appears to use both definitions as if they were
interchangeable).
6
Mathematically, a curved n-dimensional space implies the existence of an n + 1th
434 MOHAN MA TTHEN AND R, J. HANKINSON
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Matthen:
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alb. T6G 2E5
Canada
Hankinson:
Department of Philosophy
University of Texas
Austin, TX 78712-1180
U.S.A.