IN PRAISE OF VAGUENESS

Diffuse Perception and Uncertain Thought

(2010)

A PERSONAL CON FESSION

390 Among the books that have had the most dccisiw imp<KI on my think-
ing since my student years in the late 1950s and early 1960s arc two
books hy Anton Ehrenzweig ( 1908- 1966), practically forgotten by
today's academia :' The Psychoanalysis of Artistic Vision a11d Heari11g:
An Introduction to a Theory of Unconscious Perceprion 2 (1953) and Tile
Hidden Order of Art (1970). 1 I was educated in the postwar positivist
and rationalist manner to sec and 1hink clearly and to seek precision
and cettainty. However, in Lhc mid 1970s, I found Ehrenzweig's psy-
choanalytical studies that explained the insislenl demand for preci-
sion in academic education and professional practices "as a defensive
secondary process in a psycho-a nalytic sense.''" Ehrcnzwcig argued
391 provocativdy and con vi ncingly that creativity arises from vague, jux-
taposed, and diffusely inl erncring images, and unconscious perceptions
and processes, not liom fo cused percepts, precision, and logical clariry.
In his scholarly mission, .Ehrcnzweig quoles 1he declaralion of rhe pio-
neering American psychologist and philosopher William James (1842-
1910) as the motto of his ftrst book: "I t is, in short, Lhe reinstatement
of Lhe vague t"o it"s proper place in mcmallifc which I am so anxious to
press on the aue n1ion."5
This perspective shook the very fo undations of my education and
newly acquired professional bel ief~. Ehrenzweig's two books and his
essay entitled "From Conscious Planning to Unconscious Scanning"6
gave my early interests in the mental foundalions of artistic phenomena
and the psychoanalytic approach Lo artistic creativity a new direcLion.
Evenrually this perspective opened up LO me the phenomenological
understanding of existential and artistic phenomena.

224
 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

In the 1>rcface to his f1rst book, Ehrenzwcig makes the thought-p ro-
voking argument: An's substructure is shaped by deeply uncon -
scious proces:;cs and may display a complex organization that is
superior to the logical structure of conscious thought." 7 For all the
strength and suggestiveness of rhis statement, I do not recall hav-
ing heard the concept of the unconsciousness even once during the
years of my education. Ehrenzweig suggests further that, "In order
to become aware of inarticulate forms [nrlistic expressions rhat seep -
into rhe work past conscious intentionality and control] we have
to adopt a mental attitude not dissimilar to that which the psycho-
analyst must adopt when deali ng with unconscious material, namely
some kind of diffuse attention.'" 8 The laycrcd nnd "polyphonic
structure of 1>rofound artworks, appreciat ed through "multi-dimen-
sional attemion," has also been pointed out by anists, such as Paul 392
Klee. Ehrenzweig cmphasizcs the sign ificance of this layeredness
and merging of motifs, and observes that it calls for a specifiC mode
of attention. "All artistic structure is cssemially 'polyphonic' : it
rvolves not in a single line of thought, but in several superimposed
mands at once. lienee creativity requires a diffuse, scattered kind of
attention that contradicts our normal logical habits of thinking.'"' 0
This requirement for diffuse attention co1H.:crns both the condition
of creative llcrccprion and thought. Ehrenzweig also uses rhe notions
of "allover strucrure and or-or structure" to describe layered and
vague anistic images.'1
The overwhelming role of the unconscious realm over our con-
scious awareness is revealed by a theoretical calculation of rhe in forma-
tion nansrnission capacities of our conscious and unconscious neural
systems in the brain. The ability of a nerve flhcr to transmit in formati on
is approximately 20 bits per second or, according tO some estimaks, a
maximum of 100 birs per second. As there arc some 1015 nerve f1hers in
the brain, the total information conveying CaJ>acity of rhe brain is about 390
10'7 bits pt>r second. Yet, we arc only capable of conveying a maximum Anton Ehrenzweig, The Psychoanalysis of Artistic
Vision and Hearing: An Introduction to a n>eory
of an estimated 100 bits per second of conscious information coment.
of Unconscious Perception. Sheldon Press, t967.
Thus the total information transmission capacity of the brain is 10" Cover.
times its conscious capacity.' 2
391
Anton Ehrenzweig. The Hidden Order of Art.
THE DYNAMICS OF VISION Paladin. 1973. Cover.

Dynamic vagueness and absence of focus arc also rhe conditions of
our normal system of visual perception, ;Jilhough we do not usually
acknowledge these qualities. Most of us who have normal eyesight
tend to believe that we see the world around us in relative focus at
392
Paul Klee. Room Perspective with lnhabi!illlts,
1921. wate1color and oil on paper mounted on
cardboard, 48.5 x 31.7 em. Klee Foundation.
Kunstmuseum. Bern.

225
all times. The fact is thai we see a blur. and only a tiny fraction of
the visual field at any time- about one-thousandth of the entire field
of vision- is seen distinctly. The f1eld outside of this minute focused
center of vision turns increasingly vague and hazy towards the periph-
ery of the visual field. Focal vision covers ahout four degrees of 1he
approximate 1otal angle of 180 degrees. llowever, we are unaware of
this funda men tal lack of accuracy because we constanlly scan the f1eld
of vision with movements of our eyes-that for the most part remain
unconscious and unnoticed- to bri ng one part of the blurred periphery
at a time into the narrow beam of vision that is brought to a focal
pinpoint at thejo1;ea.
Experiments have revealed the surprising fac t that the unconscious
eye movements are not merely aids to dear vision, bu l :111 absolute pre-
requisite or vision altoget:her. When the subjecl's guze is experimemally
forced to remain eomplel'ely f1xed on a stationary obj ect, the image of
the object disintegrales and keeps disa ppearing, and reappearing again
in distorted shapes and fra gments. ''S1aric vision docs not ex ist; there
is no seeing without exploring," argues Hungarian-born writer and
scholar Arthur Koestler ( 1905- 1983).' 1
We could think that our visually acquired image of the world is
nol <~ single picmre" at all, but a continuous plastic construct thai
keeps inlegr<lting singular percepts through memory. In fac1, visual per-
cepts are integra1ed and memorized as embodied haptic enlilies rather
than singulur retinal pictures, "haptic snapshots," as it were. Finally,
the presence. permanence, and continuity of our experiential world is
established and maintained as an emhodied and haptic understanding
of "the flesh of the world" (a nolion of Mnurice Merleau-Ponty) that
we share with our bodily existence. In fac t, the sense of Self and 1he
world could be regarded as one of our sensory :systt:ms, and, indeed, rhe
Steinerian philosophy theorizes twelve senses. one of which is the ego
sense, the sense of Self.' 5 This sense is crucial f'o r ou r ex perience of the
world and ourselves as a l'empora l continuum and relative conslancy.
Recent neurological studies have revealed another surprising
dynamic characteristic of vision. Experiments that measured the rela-
tive times that it takes to perceive color, form, and motion. show that
these three attributes of visual perception are not perceived at the same
lime. Color is perceived before form which is perceived before motion;
the difference in time bet\een the perception or color and motion is
60- 80 milliseconds. This suggests that the different perceptual systems
are functionally special ized.' 6 The manner in which certain artists sepa-
rate color and form has 1hus a molivation in the faculties of our per-
ceptual mechanism.

226
 Koestler s uggests u c<lutious ana logy between vis ual scanning <Jnd
memal scanning, ''between the blurred, peripheral vis io n outside the
foc;1l beam, and the hazy, half- formed notions wh ich acco mpany think-
ing on the fringes of consciousness.''' 7 "If one auempts to hold fast to a
mental image or conecpt-ro hold it immobile and isolated, in the focus
of awareness, it will disintegrate, like the stalk, visual image on the
fovea ... thinking is never a sharp, neat, linear process," Koestler argues
and distinguishes focal awareness from peripheral awareness.' 8 Even
pronouncing a familiar word repeated ly makes it gradually d issolve and
lose its mea nin g.
William James made a similar remark o n t-he fundamental dyna-
mism a nd historicity of thought: ''Every def1nit e image in the mind is
steeped and dyed in the free water rhat nows around it. With it goes
the sense of its relatio ns, nea r a nd remote, Lhc dying echo of whence it
came to us, the dawnin g sense of whither it is to lead. The significance,
the value of the image, is nil in th is halo or penumbra that surrounds
and escorts ir."' ~

GESTALT-FREE PERCEPTION AND UNCONSCIOUS VISION

Gestalt lheory established the view of the arriculaling, or gestalt ten-

dency, of su rface perception that selecrs and organizes images and their
clements in accordance with distinct formal properties, such as simplic-
ity, similarity. compactness, coherence, and closure. At the same time,
tl1c theory completely neglects the inarticulate form elements which
are not part of th e gestalt. In constrast, Sigmund Freud has previ-
ously observed that form experiences arising from lower levels of U1e
mind-such as dream visions- tend to appear ina rric:ul ate and chaotic
for the conscious mind, and arc thus diff1cull' or impossible to grasp
co nsciously. However, this undef1ned, formless. nnd involuntmily inter-
acting mcdlc:y of images, associati o ns, <1nd recollections seems to be
exactly the necessary mental ground for crcative insight, as well as for
the richness and plastic i1y of a rlis Lic expression-the "shock of li fe" and
the "sensation o f bren lhing" LhaL Constantin Brancusi req uires from a
profou nd WOrk Of <lrt,lO
Ehrenzweig dearly disLingu ishcs surface vision from unconscious
vision: "While surface vision is disjunctive, low level [u nconscious pri-
ma ry level] vis ion is conjunctive and seriaL"21 The superior efficiency
of unconscious vision in scanning the tolal f1eld has been con fumed by 393
A typical Rorschach figure.
experiments in subliminal vision, such as our capacity to grasp split-
second tachistoscopic exposures of consciously invisible, subliminal 394
Willem de Koomng. Atric, t949, oil, enamel, and
images. ll1is capaciry is shrewdly deployed in methods of subliminal
newspaper transfer on canvas. 157.2 x 205.7 em.
advertising and other forms of mental conditioning. The Muriel Kallis Stemberg Newman Collection.

227

395
395
Jackson Pollock, Untitled, c. 1951, black and septa
ink with green gouache on mulberry paper, 62.5 x
95. 5 em. Museum of Modern Art, New York.
Ehrenzweig convincingly esl<lhlishes the priority of unconscious
perception and thinking in the cre<J iive process. He even suggests that,
"any act of creativeness in the human mind involves the temporary
paralysis of the (menta]] surface fu nctions and a longer or shorter
reactivat'ion of rnore archaic and less differentiated fun ctions."22 Thus,
instead of merely adding detail to the multiplicity of artistic form, the
inarticulare ingredients of d1e artistic language may well be its very
origin and essence. Ehrenzwcig ;.rgues for 1 he central importance or
'gestalt-free vision" [modes of vision that take place outside the gesralr
principles], ;md assumes that the capability of the superimposed per-
ception of simultaneous and juxtaposed images implies that normal
focused perception has to be suppressed. In accordance with Henri
Bergson's views, he argues that, "all creative thinking begins wirh a
state of Ouid vision comparable to intuition from which ... later rational
ideas emerge. ~lJ Ehrenzwcig concludes that, "all artistic perception pos-
sesses a ges ta lt-free element," and this "gestalt-free diffuse vision ... is
the artistic way of seeing the world. "24
In his studies in the psychology of mathematical thought, the
french mathematician Jacques Iladamard ( 1865-1 963) proposes that
even in mathemarics the ultimate decision must be left to the uncon-
sciousness, as a clear visualization of the problem is usually impossible.
Hadamard, like his mathcmal ician predecessor Henri Poincare (1854
1912), stales categorically thai it is mandato1y to "cloud one's con-
sciousness in order to make the right dccision . "2~ Hadamard makes an
inl eresting l'urther suggestion: "Greek geomcl ry lost its creative impetus
in Hellenistic times because of loo precise visualization. It produced
generations or clever computers and geometers, but no true geometri-
cians. Development in geometric theory stopped altogethc:r."26
By extension, I have made the worried suggestion that the absolute
mcuic precision of computerized design horh in architectural education
and practice has a negative impact on the innately shapeless and meas-
ureless flow of images and ideas in human imagination. 27
The method of "clouding" one's attention seems to have other
applications too. Richard Buckminster Fuller ( 1895- 1983), the American
engineering genius, once explained his extraordinary capacity to read a
book as a process of scanning, in which he saw the pages as meaning-
less grey surfaces witl1ou t details, until his unconsciousness spotted a
piece of information that was new to him. Only at that moment did his
eyes focus on the text, but the text swiftly rerurncd to an unarticui<Jted
visual blur again as he had read I he passage that contained novel infor-
mation for his consciousness.28
In Ehrenzweig's pioneering studies in the role of unconscious pcrccp-
228
tion in creativ ity, he shows how the two difT~r~nt manners of perception
also apply to artistic he<Jring <Jnd music, wh~rc the surface gestalt of visual
ilrts is represented by the musical melody which draws conscious attention
to itself and also represents the mcm01ized pattern of the musical piece.
Yet, music contains numerous inarticulate inflections of the melody, such
as vibrato, po1Tame11to, and rubaro. which are not articulate enough to be
expressed by musical notation, although they contribute signi ftcanlly to
the emotional impact of musical ex perience <lnd a re part of its essential
stmcrure. They a re left to l.he spontaneous execution of the pcrformcr. 29

THE LIVED WORLD AND UNFOCUSED V ISION

Beyo nd th ~ specirtc realm ol'artbtic perception and creativity, an essen-

tial prerequisite l'or the everyday experience of the enveloping spatial-
ity. interiority, and hapticity of the world is the del iberate suppress io n
of sharp, focused v ision. We perceive and grasp overall e nlili~s and
structures only at the expense of precision and detail. Yet this important
observation has hardly emerged in th e lht:orelicat discourse of archi-
tecture. Architectu ra l theoriz ing and teaching continue to be interested
in focused vision, a strong gestalt, conscious intentionality, and the
perspectival understanding of space.
The historical development of representational techniques of space
arc closely tied with the history of architecntre itself. Represema1ional
techniques reveal d1c concurrent understanding of rhe essence of space;
conversely, modes of spatial representation guide the understanding of
spatial phenomena. The human system of sensory perception is a result
of evolutionary processes, determined and limited by our fundamental
primordi;JI exislenlial condition:;, whereas our intellect and imagination
are ca 1n1bl~ of engaging in conccr>tualizcd spatial characteristics beyond
the scope of direct scnsoty perception. Scientific constructs of mull i-
dirncnsional space that arc impossible to be visualized exempl i(y this
extraordinary menta l capacity.
Today's computer-generated renderings of a rchitectun: appear
as if they would rake place in a valueless and homogenous space, an
abstracted, maJhemalicn l, nnd m t:aningl~ss world, rather than in exis-
tential and lived human rea lity. Th~ Jived human condition is always
an "impure" or '' di rty" mixture of a score of ineconcilable ingredients.
The lived world is beyond formal description because it is a multiplicit y
of perception and dream, observation and desire, unconscious processes
and conscious intentionalities, as well as aspects of past, present and
future. As the design process itself in mdays compu t~rized practice is
distanced from this "impure human reality, the existential life force of
arch itecrure tends 10 he weakened or enLirdy lost.

229

396
396
Jost Amman. Portrait of Jamniczer in His Studio
with a Perspecttve Machine, ca . 1565. Bri1ish
Museum, London.
397
Georges Braque, Stili Life with Harp and Violin,
191 1, oil on canvas. 116 x 81 em. Kunst sammlung
Nordrhe-in -West lalen. Dusseldorf.
EMBODI ED EXPERIENCE OF SPACE
Sinct: its invention in [he Renaissance, the perspectival understanding
of space has emphasized and strengthened the architecture of vision.
By its very dt"r1ni1'i on, perspectival space turns us into outsiders and
observers; Lhe picture frame and vantage poin t push us outside the
realm of the obj ect or rocused perception. SimuiLaneous and hap-
tic space encloses and enrolds us in its embrace, making us insiders
and participants. In the relinal understanding of space we observe it,
whereas haptic space conslitut~::s a shared and lived existential condi-
tion. The world and the pcrceivt:r are not separated and polarized as
they art: borh ingredients of the shared "flesh of the world."
The quest to libera te the eye from iLs perspectival Ftxation has
gradually brought nbout conceptions of mul ti-perspectival, simultane-
ous, and haptic space. This is the perceptual and psychological essence
of Impressionist, Cubist, and Abstract Expressionist painterly spaces, an
essence that pulls us inlo lhe painting and make us cxpcrknce space
as insiders in a fully cmboclil:d s~::nsat ion. Visual space thus is trans-
fomlt:d into an embodied and cxislt:ntinl space. a qualitative space thai
is essentially n dialogue and exchange belween the space of the world
and the internal space of the perceiver's mental world. The experience
of intetiority and belonging is a merging of the outside and inside
worlds, the cvoccJ lion of a Weltinnenra.um-the inlerior experience
or the world (a bcau til'u l notion of Rainer Maria Rilkc). 10 "Th(' world
is wholly inside, and I am wholly outside myself," as Merleau-Pomy
states. 31 This is the unique, personal existential space that we occupy
in our lived experience. In an ex pnience of place, particularly that of
one's home, the external world and space become internalized: they
arc sensed as intrapersonal conditions, ratht:r lh<m ns external material
objects and perct:pls.
The heightened presence and reality of profound artworks derive
from the way they engage our perceptual and psychological mecha-
nisms and articulate the boundary beiween the viewer's experience of
sd r and the world. Works or arl hnve two simultaneous cxistcnces:
their ex istence as a material objecl or as a performance (music, theater,
dance), on the one hand, and as an imaginative world of image and
ideal, on the other. The experiential reality of ari is always an imagina-
tive reality. 12
Gaston Bachelard, another touchstone author ror me, was an
authoritative philosopher n r science until his mid-career, when ht: {a me
to the conclusion that on ly a poetic approach, not scientific inqu iry and
rn!."lhodology, can touch upon Lhe essence of lived human reality. Lived
reality always fuses observation, memory, and fantasy into the lived
230
 existential experience. As Lhc consequence of this ;,impurity" or experi-
ence, it is beyond objective, scientific descripl ion, and approachable
only through poetic evocation. This is 1he innate structural vagueness
of human consciousness.
In architecture, a clear cli!Terentt:: exists between an architecture
rhat invires us to a multi-sensory and full embodied experience, on the
one hand, and that of cold and distant visuality, on the other. The works
or Frank Lloyd Wright, Alvar Aalto, Louis Kahn, and more recently, of
Renzo Piano. Glenn Murcutt, Steven Holl. Peter Zumthor, Tod Williams
and Billie Tsicn, and Patricia and John Patkau, among those of numer-
ous other profound architecrs of today, are examples of a multi-sensmy
architecrure that draws us into ils sp<H.:e and reinforces our experience
of ourselves and rhe sense or the real.
Works of this rlr.~ IH h root us in the complexities and mysteries of
perception and 1he real world, instead of confming us in an alien-
ating, construclcd artil'tciality. Again, artistic phenomena take place
simultaneously in two worlds: the realm of mauer and that of mental
imagery. In meaningful architectural works, even the imaginaty world
of architccrure is rooted in the realily, malt'riality, and processes of
construction. This narralive and logic of construction and utility also
distinguishes archilecture from other art tonns that also utilize space.
Without the tension between its simultaneous material reality and its
imaginary mental suggcsLion, an architectural work remains shallow
and semimcntal.

THE DIMMING OF VISION AND SOFTENING OF BOUNDARIES

In heightened emotional states-ca ressing our loved ones, recalling a

strong memory, listening to deeply feli mu~ic -we often close our eyes,
hoping to eliminate lhe o l~jec tifying and distancing sense of vision
alrogether. The spatial, rorrual, nncl color integration in a painring is
also often appreciated l1y dimming the sharpness of vision ; the dynamic
composilinn;l l loL;l lily can on ly be appreciated by means of suppressing
detail.
Maximum color inte raction in painting, in fact, calls for a weak
formal gestalt that obscu res the boundary of form, thus permitting an
unrestricted imeraction of the color f1elds. The inleraction ben-veen ftg-
ure and ground in visual perceplion stands in inverse proportion ro the
strength of the ges/a/1 of the f1gure. The strong gestalt generates and
maimains a srrict perceptu<ll boundary, whereas liberated "gestall- free"
perception weakens the structuring impact of boundaries, rhus permit-
Ling form and color imcraction across boundary lines and between
ground and f1gure.

231
 The vagueness and softn ess of boundary has yet another meaning
in c reative tho ught, and that concerns Lhc experience of self. In Salman
Rushdie's 1990 essay written in memory of I Icrben Read, he observes
the softening of the boundary between the world and Lhc self that takes
place in the artistic experience: "Literature is made at the boundary
between self and the world, and during the creative acr this borderline
softens, rums penetrable and allows the wo rld to flow into rhe arrist
and the artist flow into the world." 33 At th e moment of creative fusion,
even the artist and architect's se-nse o r self becomes momentarily fused
with the world and with the object of the creative efforr. In psychoana-
lytic li terat ure this experience of sameness with Lhe world is frequently
called an "ocea nic" fusion.
Creative activity and deep thinking s urely call for an unfocused,
undifferentiated, and sub conscious mode of v ision which is fused
with integrating tactile ex peri ences an d e mbodied identification. The
creative vision mrns towards th e ins ide, o r in fact, it is directed om-
wards and inwards at the same lime. Deep thought takes place in a
t ransformed reality, a condition in which Lhe existential priorities and
alarms are momentarily forgotten. The obj ect of the c reative acr is not
only identified and observed by the eye and touch, it is inlrojected
(the psychoanalytic notion for the internalization of an object through
the interior of Lhe mouth at the earliest phases of infancy), and identi-
fied with one's own body and existential condition. In deep thought,
focused vision is blocked, and thoughts travel with an absent-minded
gaze accompanied by a momentary loss of surface control of tl1e exis-
tential situation. This is why deep think ing ca nnor rake place in the
unguarded outdoors, but usually occurs only in the protective embrace
of architecture, in th e ~crad l e of the house," to usc a notion of Gaston
Bachclard.3 '1 Bachelard points out that a rchitecture allows one to dream
in safety: "The chief benefit of th e house [is that] the house shellers
daydreaming, the house protects th e dreamer, the house allows one to
dream in peace. "1 s

T HE POOL OF VAGUENESS, PERIPH ERAL VISION

Photographed architectural images are centrali zed and precise pictures

of focused perceptions. Yet. the quality ol' a lived a rchitecrural real-
ity seems to depend fundamentally on the nature of peripheral vision,
and a deliberate suppression of sharpness thar enfolds the subject in
the space. PhoLOgraphed imagery, particularly ones taken with wide
angle and deep focus, are alien to the fundamental faculties of vision.
Consequently, t11crc is an evident discrepancy between architecture as
experienced through photographs and a rea l lived experience, to the

232
degree that imposing images of arch itectu re in photographs often prove
to be decisively less impressive when experienced live.
A forest context. a Japanese garden, a richly molded architectural
space, as well as an ornamented or decorated interior, provide ample 398
stimuli for peripheral vision. These settings weave us into the fabric
of the space, and center us in it in a haptic manner. As we move our
position in the space, even slightly, the unconsciously and peripherally
perceived details and distortions invigorate the experience of interio rity
like an unconscious haptic massage. Rega rdless of the object- like exter-
nality, the very strictly bounded na ture o f o ur fo cused gaze, and the
cont inuous fl ow of individual fragm entary images, we sense the conti-
nuity and completeness of space a round us as we sense a n embrace. We 399
even sense th e s pace behind our backs ; we live in worlds tha l surrou nd
us, not in fro ntal rel'inal images, or mere perspectival pictu res fac ing us.
The im1ate ~ pati a l i ty of perceprio n is refl ected in the fact that ou r ~kin
has the surp rising capacity Lo d isting uish and identify light and color. 16
The preconscious perceptual realm w hich is experienced outside
the sphere of focused v ision is existentia lly as importa nt as the focused
image. In fact, there is medical evidence that peri pheral visio n has a
higher priority in our perceptual and mental system. Eh renzweig offers
the medical case of hemianopia as a proof of the priority of peripheral
vision in the psychological hierarchy of our mechanism of sight. In
this r<trt: illness, one half of the visual field becomes blind while the
other retains vision. In some cases, rhe field of v ision reorganizes itself
into a new completely new circular f1eld of vision with a new focus
of sharp vision in the center and an u nfocused periphery zon e. As the
new focus is formed, the reorgan ization necessarily implies that parts
of the fo rm er peripheral field of inaccu rate vision acqui re visual acuity.
and more sig nifican tly, the area o f former focused vision gives up its
capacity for sha rp vision as it tra ns forms into a part of the new un fo -
cused periphera l fi eld. Ehre nl.we ig notes, "These case histories prove, if
proof is needed, t:hul. a n overw helming psychological n eed exists that
requires us to have the large r pa rl o f 1he v is ua l field in a vague medley
of images. J'

LOSS OF SPECIFICITY A ND SE N SE OF CONTINU ITY

These observations of the existential signifiCance of un focused periph-

eral vision suggest that one of the reasons why the architectural and
urban settings of our time often project a weak sense of spatiality, inte- 398
riority, and place, in comparison with the stronger emotional engage- Katsura ViUa and Garden, the Pine Lute pavilion.

ment of historical and natural seuings, could be in their impoverished 399

stimulation of peripheral perception. In ou r modern world, we live in Forest in Eastern Finland. Photo Seppo Hilpo.

233
a more focused world than was the case in earlier times. The fact Utat
the human sensory world has dramatically changed through time has
been convincingly argued in literature. Th is rather newly ucquired pre-
cision-in an evolutionary perspective-could well have been supponed
by the central role of reading and pictures in our culture, as both call
lor a foc used and ftxed eye. The visual experience of the world clearly
has ga ined strength at the expense of auditory, haptic, and olfm:t01y
experiences, a message emphasized in Walter J. Ong's significant book
Orality and Literacy. 38
The current ly unchallenged hegemony or the eye m;ly be a fairly
recent conditiou, regardless of its philosophical grounding in Greek
thought and optics. In lucien rcbvres view : "The sixteenth centllly clid
nol sec fnst': iL heard and smelled, it sniffed the air <Jnd caught sound~.
IL was only later that it seriously and actively became engaged in
geometry, focusing attention of the world of forms with Kepler (1571-
1630), and Desargues of Lyon ( 1593-1662). lr was then that vision was
unleashed in the world of science as it was in the world of physical
sensations, and the world of hcauty as well."19
Unconscious peripheral perception transforms sharp and fragmen-
rnry retinal imngcs into vague spatial, embodied, and haptic experiences
lh<tl constitute our full ex istential and plastic experience and sense
of continuum. We live in a plastic and continuou:; world due 10 our
dynamic system of perception, awareness, and mt:mory that continues
to const ruct an entity out of discontinuous fragments. PeripheraJ vision
integrate:; us with space, while focused vision makes us mere ocular
observers. In physical training, our physical skills are deliberately maxi-
mized for the purposes of the specifrc spCli'L, but the mental processes
of creative perception and thought are h;1rdly touched upon directly in
education. It is time to give vagueness iLS proper role in human con-
:;dousness as well as in artistic and architectural thought and education.

THE VIRTUE OF UNCERTAINTY

The issue of vagueness and indefmitencss is related with the notion of

uncertainty. We are usually taught to seck certainty in our rh inkin!j and
work, but a self-assurance of the tccling of certainty tends to stop the
flow of sensitive creative exploration, and consequemly, tum counrer
-productive.
Joseph Brodsky poinrs out the value or insecurity and uncertainty
for the creative endeavour. "I n the business of writing what one accu-
mulates is not expertise but uncertainties, "40 the poet confesses, and
a true archi tect likewise ends up accumulating unccnainties. Brodsky
connects uncertainty with a sense of humility: "Poetry is a tremendous

234
school of insecurity and uncertainty ... !P]oetry- writing it as well as
reading it- wi ll teach you humility, and rather quickly at lhat. Especially
if you are holh writing and reading it." 41 This observation surely applies
to architecture as well, and is pmticularly humbling if you arc both
maldng architectun and theorizing about it! But !he poet suggests thaT
these mental states Lhat are usually considered det rimental, can actually
be turned into a creative advantage: If this (uncertainty or insccuriry]
does not destroy you, insecurity and unceJtai nty in the end become
your intimate friends and you almost attrihu1.e to them an intelligence
all their ow n," Brodsky advjses.2 Uncertai nty and insecurity are espe-
cially receplivc states of mind that sensit ize it for crcutive perception
and insight As Brodsky clarifu:s, "... When uncertainty is evoked, then
you sense bcaurys proximity. Uncertainty is simply a more ulcrt state
than cerlitude, and Lhus it crt:ales a beLLcr lyrica l climate. "43
l fully share the poet's views. In both wriling and drawing, the
tm and image need to be emancipated from a pre-conceived senst:
of purpose, goal, and path. When one is young and narrow-minded,
one wants lhe word and the line to concretize and prove a precon-
ceived ide;l, to give the idea nn instant and precise formulation and 400
shape. Through a growing capacity to tolerate uncertainty, vagueness,
lack of defmition, <Jnd precise rendering, as well as momentary illogic
and open-endedness, one grudually le<Jrns the skill of cooperating with
ones work and <JIIowing the work to make its suggestions and take iLs
own unexpected turns and moves. Instead of dictating a though1, the
creative process becomes an act of listen ing, collabomlion, dialogue,
and patient waiting. The object of one's work is inside lhe space of the
mind while the mind is simultaneously projected out into the work;
the inside and oul.side space constinne a Moebius strip with one single
surface. The wo rk then becomes a jourm:y that may expose visions and
ideas that one has never before conceived, or whose existence has been
unknown prior to having been guided the re by the work or one's own
hand and imagination, as well as one's combined attitude of hesitation
and curiosity, fused 1ogether by genuine un.certainty.
There is an inherent opposilion between Lhe defmit e and the indcti-
nile in art. An artistic phenomenon wants to escape dctinition until it
has reachl'd its self-sufficient existence. Tme creative fusion always
achieves more !han can he projected by any theory, and profound
design always <H.:hieves more than the brief or anyone parLicipating
in the process could amicipatc. This is why Milan Kundera suggests a
"wisdom of 1he novel'' and believes that all greut writ"ers listen to this
400
supra-individual wisdom. In his view great novels are always wiser Juhana Blomstedt. Far Away (1065). from lhe
than d1eir writers. Moebius Series. 2003, oil on canvas 90 x 60 em.

m
 I began my essay with a personal conlcssion, and I am going to end
it with another. The modes of 'diffuse <~ltemion" and "empty" or "unfo -
cused stare" have gradually also become my method of working, both
in design work and writing, and these modes have helped to emancipate
my perception and thought from the constraints of constricting focus
and rationality.~ Only after having learned to confrom my tasks as
open- ended explorations without any preconceived ideas of the entity,
or its essence and boundaries, have 1 felt capable of wo rking in a man-
ner that can lead to new grounds of vision and thought.
Ever since the foolishly self-assured days of my youth (that cer-
ta inly disguised genuine unce rtai nty, narrowness of u nderstanding, and
shortsighted ness), my sense of u ncertainty has g row n constantly ro the
degree tha t it has become nea rly intolerable. Every issue, every ques-
t ion, each th.ought is so det:ply embedded in Lhe mysteries of human
existence that often a satisfactory o r clear res ponse or rend i!io n seem
inconceivable. In a fund<.~ mental sense, I can say that instead or becom-
ing a professional, possessing immed iate and ass ured responses, one
becomes increas ingly more an amateur by age and experience. Bur
o ne also learns to tolerate u ncerl<ti nty and vagueness, and even take
advantage of Lhesc mental stales tha[ are normally seen as psychic
weaknesses and threats to ones sense of security and self.

Whar is most human is not rarionalism but tlu? uncontrolled and
incomrollable continuous surge of creati11c radical imagination in and
th rough the flu.r of rcpresc11tarion, affects and desires.'6
- Cornelius Castoriadis

236
2 Bachelard, 'f'hc Poetics of SpiH'I', 6.
3 Louis Kahn, "form and Design," ( t960), Louis I. Kahu:
Writiugs, l.rtlures, lmcrvicw~. t>dited by AJess:mdra
Larour (N<'w York: Rizzoli, 1991) 116.
4 Yi-Fu Tuan. /.am/sea pes of F<'ar (Minneapolis: University
of M in ncsol:l Press, 1979), G.
'> Cited in Mohsen Mostafavi and David leatherbarrow,
Weatlu:riug, (Cambridge, Massachusells and london.
England: The Mrr Press. Cambridgl", 1993), 76.
6 Michel Foucault Discipliuc nud l'uuish: The Bini of till!
Prisou (New York: Vintage, 1979), 200.
7 .Ju hani Pallasma~l. "The Arch itectu re of Terror," Tile
Artllifecture of lmngr: E.ristculinl Spnt'e iu Ciuemn
[Helsinki: Rakennustieto Oy, 200t), t41-176.
8 Peter Wollen, 'i\rkkitchtuuri ja clokuva: paikat ja eptlpaikat'
(Architt"Cturc and cinema: )Jiates and non-plat.'l~) Museum
of i"innish Architecture Mt"mlcrs Newsletter 4, 1996, I 5.
9 Paul Va lt'y. unidentified source.
10 Paul Valery, "Eupalinos, or tht: architect," Dialo!fuCs,
translaterl by William McCausland Stewart (New York:
Pantheon !looks, 1956). 86.
II Richard Sennett, "The Glass Age. Harpers Mngaziue,
June 2004, 1'1.
12 John Ruskin as quoted in Gary J. Coates, Erik Asmussen,
Archil'cct. [Srockholrn : Byggtllrlaget, 19 97), 230.
11 Alvar Aa lto, "The Human Factor," Al11ar /1alro in his Own
Wortls, edited hy Giirnn Schidt. (llelsinki: Otava, 1997),
280. (translation modired by the author).
14 Alvar /\alto, "Spt"t"ch at the llelsinki University of
Technology Centenn ial Celebration," Sch ildt ed., A/tillY
Aalto In His Own Words, 265.
I 5 Peter Eisenmann, "En samtal med Carsten Juel-
Christian~en," Skala 12, 1987.
16 Cited in Anthony Vidler, 1lrc Ardritccwral U11t:llllll)'
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London. England: The
MIT Press, 1999), 7 5-76.
I7 Vidler, 'fir e Architcctllml l111C11111ry, 224.
18 frnntz Kafka, Lt:trcr to Fathl'r (Prague: Vita lis. 1999), 25.
19 Fern and LeJ.(cr, Functions of l'lrinli11g (London: Thames
and lludson, 1973), 132. 13~.
20 Rcyncr Banham, "A Home Is Not a House," ( I %!>)
Arclritc:ctml' Culture 1948- 19611, edited by Jo~u1 Ockman
(New York: IUzzoli, 1993), 371-'3'/8.
21 Herbert R e<~rl, Art aud Society (Ntw York: Schockcn
!looks, 1974).
TOWARDS A BIOMIMETIC ARCH ITE CTURE
Joseph Brodsky. "An Immodest Proposa l,'' On Gri~f 1111d
Reaso11 (New York: Farrdr, Strnus and Giroux, 1997), UJI.
2 Virruvius, Tlr<: Tt:ll Books 011 Arclritrcture. translated by
Morris Hicky Morgan (New York: Dover Publications,
New York, 1960), 36-39.
3 D octo r No ld Egen ter at th~ University o f La usam1e in
particular has studied the hui lding behaviou r of 3Jles in
northern Japan.
307
4 Dcrnanl Ruclo fsky, A rl"ltitecturc Witlwut llrcllitects [New
York: The Museum of Modern Art, l'l61).
5 The Reverend J.G. Wood, Hom<:s Witlroul Hauds (London:
longmans, Green and Co., 1865).
6 Karl von Frisch, Auimnl Arclrift:clflr<' [New York and
london: ll arco urL Drace .Jovanov ich, 1')79).
'I Hansell, M it hael H.: A nim al Archicecttr rt> and Building
Behaviour. l.ongman, london (1971)
HanscU, Mil'had tL: Animal Construction Company.
Humcrian Museum and Art Gallery, Glasgow (1999)
6 Gaston BachdanJ. Tire Pocrics of Space (Rosto n: Beacon
J>r~ss, 1969).
9 Part! Ambroise. 1.1' li1rc des a11imtw.r er de l'i~rtclligcm:e
tlr 1'/wmm<:. Oeuvres <:ompli:trs, Vall//. (Paris: Editions J.
F. Malgaignc, t840), 74.
10 $l't' for instance: Klaus Bach ct aL under the direction of
J.G. l-lelnskc anrl r:rri Ouo, N<:ts i11 Na ture nud Tetlruics
(Stuttgart : lnstitutt for Lightweight Structures. 1975);
Kl;~us Bach, et al. under the dircctim1 of Eda Schaur,
Pncus in Nature n111i "l'echnics [Stulll{llrl: Institute for
Lightweight Stnlctures,J976): Frci Otto et al. Liglrlll't>iglrt
Structures i11 Arclrit<'Ciure tllld Nnturr (Jl 32). [Stunl(art:
Institute for lightweight Structurcs. l 963).
II Svcrrc fehn, personal communication with the author 1985.
I 2 Gaston R;Jcbelard, Tile Pnrtks of Space [!lost on: Deacon
Press, 1969).
I 1 Julian Jaynes. T11c Origi11 of Conscious11~ss i11 tire
Brcakdormr of tire Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton
Mirmn Company, 1982).
14 As quoted i n .Jarrirrc M. Benyus, BiomirlliCiy. (New York:
Quill Willi am Murrow, t997), 132.
t5 "Does even more limn a spid<:r tan: How to make something
useful of spider silk," Tire Ecouomisr, January 31. 2009, 81.
16 Edward 0. Wilson, Hioplrilia (Cambridge, Massachusetts
and London, Enghmd: Harvard University Press. 1984), 37.
17 A lv~r Aalto, ''At and 'lh:bnology," inaugural lctnn1' as
memher oftl1e Fi nnish Academy, 0<1ohl' r 3, 1955. Alvur /\alto
111 /lis Own Words, ffiited and annotated by G6rnn Schildt
(I lclsinki: Otava Publishing Company, Ud., 1997). 174.
IN PRAISE OF VAGUE NESS
Arrlon Ehrenzwdg was born and educated in Vienna.
lie was traint>d as a la'II'Jer hut also deeply interested in
modern an and music and ~gnized as a pianist and
singer. After th~ "Anschluss" with Germany. Ehrenzwcig
~<tiled in England in 1938, abandoned his formal educa-
tion ;md made a tarcer as a lecturer in Art Education at
Goldsm ith College, llrriversity of London.
2 Anton Ehrcnzweig, '17re Psydroa11alysis of Artistic Visiou
nnd Heariug: An lmroduciiou ro a 'JIIcory of U11conscious
l'~rcepli.OII (1953). [London: Sheldorr Press, 1975).
3 Anton Ehrcnzwcig, '11re Hidde11 Orrlu of Art [1970).
(i"rogmore, Sr A I hans: Palad in, 197'l).
Along with Rudolf Arn heim's An a111/ Visual Perceptiou.
and Herschel Chipp's 'nreories of Morlmr Art,
...
Ehrenzweigs second book is considered one of the three
classics of art psychology.
4 Ehrcnzweig, The Hidden Order of Arl, 59.
5 As quoted in Ehrenzweig, The Hidden Order f!( Arl, IlL
6 An ton Eh renzweig, "Conscious Planning and
U nconsc: iou~ Scanning," Education in Vision. F.dited by
Gyor!{y Kepes (New York: George I:Jrazil ler, 1965), 27-49.
7 t: ltrenzweig, The Hidden Order of Art. V III.
8 Ehrenzweig, The Hidden Ortler of Art, XL
9 See Paul Klee, Tltc Thinking Eye (london: Hutchinson,
1964).
10 l:hrenzweig. Tlte Hidden Order of Art, 14.
II Ehrenzweig, "Conscious Planning and Unconscious
Scanning," Education in Vision. Edited by Gyorgy Kepes
(New York: George Braziller, 1'l65), 2.8, 30.
12 Matti Bergstrom, A iJJojenfysiologinsta jn psyykcslli [On
the Phys iology of the llnl in and the Psyche], (Helsinki:
WSOY, 1979), 77- 78.
13 Arthur Koestler, [he Act of Crention (London: Hutchinson
Cl Co LTD, 1964), 158.
14 Merleau-Ponty describes the notion or ''the nesh of the
world" by stating, "My body is made of lhe same nesh as
the world ... this nesh of my body is shared by the world
1---1' and "The Resh of the world or my own is 1---1 a
texture that returns to itself and conrom1s to itself." The
notion initially derives from Merleau-Ponty's dialectical
principl~ of the intenwining or the world and the self. He
also speaks of the 'ontology or the nesh' as the ulti mate
conclusion of his phenomenology or perct'p tion. This
on tology impl ies that mean in~ is both wil'h in and witho ut,
subjective and objective, S1Jiritual ;111d material.
Maurice IVIerleau-Pon ty, "The ln tt'rtw ining-The Chiasm,"
in Tlte Visible and the lnvisibk, ed. Claude Lefort
(F.vanston: Northwestern University Press, 1992). 248, 146
IS Albert Socsman, Our Twelve s~nsrs: Wcllspriltgs of rlre
Soul (Stroud, Glos: Hawthorne, t998).
16 Semir Zeki, lmrer Vision: An rplornrio11 of Arl and rite
Brai11 (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1999), 66.
17 Koestler, The Act of Cr~atio11. 158.
18 Koestler, The Act of Creatio11, 180.
19 William Ja mes, Principles ofPsycllology ( 1890). (Camhridge,
Massru.:husetts: Hatvard University Press, 1903).
20 As quoted in Eric Shanes, Constan ti n Bnwcusi (N ew
York: Abbevi ll e Press, 1989), 67.
2t Eb renzwe ig, Tlte 1/iddett Order of Arl, 46.
22 Ebrenzwe ig. Tlte Psychoanalysis of Artislir Vision, 18.
23 Ehrenzweig. Tlte Psychoanalysis of Arlislic Vision. 35.
24 Ehrenzweig. Tlte Psychoanalysis of Artistic Vision. 36.
25 As quoted in Ehrcnzweig, Tire Hidtlt'n Ordrr of Art, 59
26 As quoted in Eluenzwcig, Tire Hidt/~11 Ordrr of Arr, 58.
27 Juhani l'allasmaa, The Tit inking 1/and: F..ristcntial ar1d
Emllodicd Wisdom i11 Arcl!ilet'lure (Lontlon: John Wiley
ft Sons. 2009), 95-100.
20 Conversation with the au thor in New De lhi, India,
Octo ber 1969.
29 l!hrenzwcig, Tile Hidden Order of Art, 43.
JO "Lukijallc," [To the Keader) Rainer Mnrin Rilkc, Hi/jainen
raitccn sisin: kirjeitii mwsi/ra 1900-1926 [The Silem
lnnennost core or art; letters 1900- 1926] J;dited by Liisa
Enwald (Helsinki: TAl-tens, 199'1). 8.
31 Mau ri ce Merleau-Ponty, Tit~ Pltmomcnology of
Perception, Translated by Colin Smith (Londo n: Routledge
and Kcga n Paul, 1962), 407.
32 For lhc i magi n ati v~ reali ty of att, sec eg. Jea n-Pa ul
Sarlrc, ?'Ire Psychnlngy of Imagination (Secausus, New
Jersey: The Citadel Press, 1948); Jean-Paul Sa nrc, Tile
Imaginary. (London ~nd New York, Routledge, 2004),
and; Kichard Ke~mey, Tlte Wake of Jmagi1tatioll (london:
Routledge, 19AA).
33 Salman Rushdie. "Eiko mikaan ole pyhaii?" [Isn't
Anything Sacred?] Pamasso I (1996): 8.
34 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space (Bos1on: Beacon
Press, 1%9). 7.
35 Barhelard, Tile Poetics of Space, 6.
J6 .fames Turrell, "Plato's Cave and ligh1 With in", lilcplwnt
(I lid nom:rjly: permanence a.ml cltallf}e ill (//'i'hil'cctorc,
Etlitcd by l'vlikko Heikkinen (Jyviiskylii: Alvar Aalto
rounclation, 2003), 144.
7 Ehrenzweig, The Hidden Order of Art, 284.
J8 Walter J. Ong, Orality am/ Literacy- Tltc: Tcclt~~ologizillg
ofrlrc World (london and New York: Routledge, 1991).
39 As quoted in Man in Jay, Dowucast Eyes - Tile:
De1rigration of Vision in Twentietlr Century Frc:nclr
Tllougltt (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University or
Cali forn ia Press, 1994), 34.
40 J osep h Brodsky, "Less Than One", Less Titan One (New
Yo rk : 1-'flrrar, Straus (t Gi roux 1998), 17.
41 Juseph ll roclsky, On Grief and Rea sort (New Yo rk: Fa rrar,
Straus and Giroux., 1997), 473 -4.
42 Brodsky, On Grief and Reason, 473.
43 Brodsky, Le~s Tltnn One, 340.
44 Milan Kundera. Romaanin taide [The Art or the Novell.
(H<>lsinki: Werner Soderstrom Ltd., 1986). 165.
45 Ehrenzwcig, conscious Planning and Unconscious
Scanning," Educarion in Vision. Edit~d by Gyorgy Kepes
(New York: George Braziller, 1965), 32. 34.
46 As quoted in Arnold H. Modell, lmanination a111i rite
Menninafill Brain (Cambridge, Massarhusetis and Lo nd on,
r.ngland: The MlT Press, 2006, lil'le page.
ON ATMOSPHERE
Jain McGilchrisr, Tlte Masrer and His Emissary: The
Divideti/Jrain and tltc Making of /Ire Wc:s1em World (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 184.
2 Pewr Zunnhor, Atmospheres - Arclrileclllml i:lwirosmrents
- Surrouuding Objects (Bascl: Birkhauser, 2006), 13.
J .John Dewey, Art As Experic11ce (1934) as IIUO i ed in Mark
Johnson, Tile Meaning of tlte Body: Aeslllelil's <!( Human
llndersta/11/iug (Ch icago: The Un iversity uf Chil'ilgn Pr<"ss,
2007), 75.
4 Joh n Dewey, Art As E.rperience (N ew Ynrk: The Berkley
Publish ing Gro up, t980), 74.
308