DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of
whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. Only diplomatic agents, under the terms of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The
Convention defines :diplomatic agents as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly
withholding the same privileges from all others. (Minucher v. Scalzo, GR. No. 142396, February 11, 2003)

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS:

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

There is no double jeopardy in the following:

(1) Estafa through falsification of a public document under the RPC and violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019. xxx Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 reads: Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following should constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx It is clear then that one may be charged
of violation of R.A. No. 3019 in addition to a felony under the Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is,
either concurrently or subsequent to being charged with a felony under the Code. (Ramiscal, Jr. V.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 169727-28 August 18, 2006)

(2) Falsification of a public document under the RPC and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. A
comparison of their elements shows that there is neither identity nor exclusive inclusion between the offenses, No
double jeopardy attaches, as long as there is a variance between the elements of the offenses charged. The
constitutional right against double jeopardy protects from a second prosecution for the same offense, not
for a different one. The differences between the elements needed to establish the commission of the two
charges imply that the evidence required to prove the guilt or the innocence of the accuse would likewise differ in
each case. (Suero v. People, G.R. No. 156408 January 31, 2005)

(3) Direct Bribery under the RPC and violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. There is neither identity
nor necessary inclusion between the two offenses. While they have common elements, not all the essential
elements of one offenses are included among or form part of those enumerated in the other. (Merencillo v.
People, G.R. Nos. 142369-70 April 13, 2007)

Double Jeopardy in Cybercrime Law

Libel by means of writing or similar means is already punishable under the RPC, Cybercrime Law merely
establishes the computer system as another means of publication, hence, online libel is not a new crime. Similarly,
Cybercrime Law merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (ACPA) so as to include
identical activities in cyberspace. ACPAs definition of child pornography in fact already covers the use of
electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means. Thus, charging the offender under both the
Cybercrime Law and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy. (Disini, Jr.et. al. v. Secretary of Justice , G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)

MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA

When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are
punished by a special law. Accordingly , criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of
the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts
are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. Here, tampering,
increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate in any election or refusal, after proper
verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes is inherently immoral
(dagdag-bawas). It is mala in se requiring criminal intent of the accused. (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
157171, March 14, 2006)
 Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation, The law punishes the act of diverting public
property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. It is mala
prohibita. (Ysidoro v. People, G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012)

CRIMINAL INTENT

General Intent is presumed in the commission of a felony. Specific Intent must be proven as an element of a
felony. Motive is the reason which impels one to commit an act for a definite result. Intent is the purpose to use a
particular means to effect such result. Intent is an element of a crime, whereas motive is not.

Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through external manifestations, to wit: (1) the
means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the
conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. (Fantastico, et. al. v.
People, Malicse, Sr., G.R. No. 190912, January 12, 2015)

If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. In
such case , even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is homicide because with respect to crimes of personal
violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor
responsible for all the consequences thereof. (Wacoy v. PP/ Quibac vs. People, G.R. No.213792/ G.R. No.
213886, June 22, 2015)

ARTICLE 4, REVISED PENAL CODE

Proximate Cause - that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events xxx such that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have the reasonable ground to expect at that
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. Thus, the hacking of
the victims head though inflicting a superficial wound, which cause the victim to fall down and seconds later a
vehicle run over him. (People v. Illigan, 191 SCRA 843)

In aberratio ictus, treachery applies to the unintended victim. Logically, Bulanans death was random and
unintentional and the method used to kill her, as she was killed by a stray bullet, was, by no means, deliberate.
Pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal liability for the acts committed in violation of law,
the accused is liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom, While it may not have been
Adrianos intention to shoot Bulanan, it was the natural and direct consequences of Adrianos felonious deadly
assault against Cabiedes. The presence of the aggravating circumstances of treachery, although Bulanans death
was by no means deliberate, qualified both killings to murder. (People vs. Adriano, G.R. No. 205228, July 15,
2015)

CONSPIRACY

The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two
or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically interacts with the hub rather than with another
spoke. In the event that the spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However,
in the instances when each spoke is unconcerned with the success of the other spokes, there are multiple
conspiracies.
 An illustration of wheel conspiracy occurs wherein there is only one conspiracy involved was the conspiracy
alleged in the information for plunder filed against former President Estrada and his co-conspirators. Former
President Estrada was the hub while the spokes were all the other accused individuals. The rim that enclosed the
spokes was the common goal in the overall conspiracy, I.e,. the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth. (Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. People, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016) Responsibility of a
conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral
acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. (People v. Montanir, G.R. No. 187534,
April 4, 2011)

All the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation
because the act of one is the act of all. Evidence as to who among the appellants delivered the fatal blow is
therefore no longer indispensable since in conspiracy, a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another.
(People v. Agacer, G.R. No.177751, December 14, 2011) Here, for falling to inflict mortal wounds, both appellants
Ventura and Flores were held liable for attempted murder since they were shown to have acted in conspiracy with
each other although Ventura did not directly participate in stabbing Jaime. Also, while appellants original objective
may have only been the killing of Jaime, appellant Ventura was correctly held liable for murder with appellant
Flores who stabbed Jaimes wife Aileen to death who just shouted for help after seeing his husband in mortal
danger. (People v. Ventura, G.R. No. 188601, June 29, 2010)

Accused-appellant who took no part in seizing the vehicle, an act not included in the common criminal plan,
is not liable for carnapping. Well-settled is the rule that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done in pursuant to
the conspiracy, not for other acts done outside their contemplation or which are not the necessary and
logical consequence of the intended crime. (People v. Napalit, G.R. No. 142919 and 143876, February 4,
2003) There was no evidence to prove that all the appellants assisted Robito in killing Leonilo. It is settled that acts
done outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not necessary and logical logical consequence
of the intended crime do not affect the other accused. Co-conspirators are criminally liable only for acts done
pursuant to the conspiracy on how and what are the necessary and logical consequences of the intended
crime. (People v. Caballero, G.R. No. 149028-30, April 2, 2003)

Physical participation at the scene of the crime is not always necessary in conspiracy. Even though there is
no showing of a prior agreement among the accused, their separate acts taken and viewed together show unity of
criminal design and purpose. Tangians complicity was manifest from the fact that he personally transported the
stolen items. Yongco was seen to be in connivance because of his failure to demand a gate pass. And lastly,
Laojan was tagged to be the instigator who marshaled the entire scheme. Despite Laojans lack of physical
participation in hauling the items to Tangians truck and bringing them to the junk shop, the act of giving the
thumbs-up sign is clear proof of meeting of minute betwen Laojan and Tangian thus he can still be liable for
Qualified Theft via conspiracy. (Yongco vs. People, G.R. No. 209373, July 30, 2014)

Relationship, association and companionship do not prove conspiracy. It must be