X.

PATERNITY AND FILIATION

A. Concepts of paternity, filiation and legitimacy, FC 163

B. Legitimate children, FC 164 cf. FC 165 in rel to NCC 256-257, 166, 167, 168 in relation to
Republic Act No. 10655, An Act Repealing the Crime of Premature Marriage under Article 351 Of Act No.
3815, otherwise known as The Revised Penal Code, March 2015, FC 169

Angeles vs Maglaya, 469 SCRA 363

September 2, 2005
Legitimate Children, FC 164, 165

-Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA-

Facts:
The petitioner, Belen Sagad Angeles seeks to set aside the decision of the CA which dismissed the
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Francisco Angeles.

The respondent, Aleli Corazon Angeles-Maglaya, filed a petition for letters of administration and
her appointment as the administratix of the estate of Francisco. She alleges that Francisco died intestate
leaving behind four parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties; there is a need to
appoint the an administrator; she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genova Mercado (1st
wife); she has all the qualifications required of an administrator.

However, the petitioner opposed and prayed that she be the administratix of Franciscos estate;
alleging that she was married to the deceased Francisco and that the respondent could not be the
daughter of Francisco. Although, Maglaya was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter however, the
birth certificate was not signed by Francisco. In addition, there was no marriage contract between
Maglayas supposed parents (Francisco and Genoveva) and debunked the petitioners claim that she was
the only child of Francisco, petitioner likewise allege that she and Francisco legally adopted Concesa A.
Yamat.

Respondent in reply during trial said that records of January to December 1938 records were
destroyed where the alleged 1938 wedding of Francisco and Genoveva took place; that she has been the
open and continuous possession of the status of the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva as stated
in her birth certificate; produced four witnesses to testify in her behalf; and the wedding pictures of the
respondent to Atty. Guillermo Maglaya, in which the deceased gave the respondents hand in marriage;
student and government records.

The trial court ruled that the respondent, Maglaya, failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child
of Francisco.

The CA reversed the trial court decision and directed it to appoint respondent as administratix of
the aforementioned estate.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is the legitimate child of the decedent, Francisco Angeles, and
Genova Mercado.

Ruling/Fallo:
 No. The assailed decision of CA was reversed and set aside, order of the trial court was
reinstated.

Ratio:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element
of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and children.

Article 164 of the FC, Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

According to Tison: (a) a child is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock; (b) the
presumptive legitimacy of such child cannot be attacked collaterally.

The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of FC may be availed only upon convincing proof of the
factual basis, i.e, the childs parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred
during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption that a child is legitimate does not arise.

Since there was no marriage certificate or contract of Francisco and Genoveva, if one had been
solemnized, was produced as evidence; No solemnizing officer was called to the witness box to declare
that he officiated or solemnized the marriage.

The respondents birth certificate does not prove the marriage of Francisco and Genoveva. According to
Jurisprudence, for a birth certificate to be an instrument pf recognition, it must be signed by the father
and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses. The birth certificate that was presented
was not signed by Francisco, not even Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician, who certified
to having attended the birth of a child.

None of the four witnesses could say anything about, let alone affirm, the supposed marriage of Francisco
and Genoveva. Their testimonies, at best, proved that Maglaya was Franciscos daughter. Respondent did
not produce any witness to testify her supposed parents really held themselves out to the public as man-
and-wife.

No evidence was presented of the execution of Francisco and Genovevas marriage contract; the
whereabout of the marriage; the persons present and significant details.

SSS vs. Aguas, G.R. 165546, Feb. 27, 2006

Suntay v Suntay, GR 183053, October 10, 2012

Facts:
1. On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay
(Federico), died intestate.
- In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both
Cristina and Federico.
- At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and
several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay

2. Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely: herein respondent,
Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II
3. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two
children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by two different women,
Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.
4. Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother on Balete
Drive, Quezon City, separately from their father and paternal grandparents.

5. Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights over his
grandchildren. It was altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by
respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her grandparents.

6. After her spouses death, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on September 27, 1993,
adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita

7. On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor. Federico filed his opposition. Being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering
her estate and he should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of
conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the administration

8. After a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation
dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedents estate on
his behalf. Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his
interest in the outcome of the case.

9. In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.

10. The trial court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as
administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate.What matters most at this time is the welfare of the
estate of the decedent in the light of such unfortunate and bitter estrangement. The Court honestly
believes that to appoint the petitioner would go against the wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III]
from infancy in her home in Baguio City as her own child. Certainly, it would go against the wishes of the
surviving spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as administrator.

11. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III. In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on
Emilio IIIs status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his deceased
father in the estate of the latters legitimate mother, the decedent. That he cannot be appointed for the ff
reasons:

i. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition, i.e., Federicos
appointment as administrator of the estate
ii. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate offspring
(Emilio III) of decedents son, Emilio I, respondent is preferred, being the "next of kin"
referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
iii. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 of the Civil Code bars the
illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother.

ISSUE:
In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof, which should
prevail? Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabels parents a case of a void or voidable marriage?
Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?

HELD:

Petition dismissed

Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and
binding upon courts in relation to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states
that the marriage be declared null and void, the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85
of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time.

Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between the
body and the dispositive portion of the decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The
fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to
have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are
provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural
children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children
under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad
faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it
is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment
of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express
provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.

The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89
which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate;
and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged
natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel
would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that children
conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.

1. Who are considered legitimate children

(a) Conceived during marriage cf. ROC Rule 131 Sec. 3(dd), FC Art. 168 in relation
to Republic Act No. 10655, An Act Repealing the Crime of Premature Marriage under Article 351
Of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as The Revised Penal Code, March 2015, NCC 40-41.

1. Valid marriage

Arbolario v CA, G.R. No. 129163, April 22, 2003

FACTS:

The original owners of the controverted lot, spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, had 5
children. Everyone mentioned is dead. The first child, Agueda Colinco, was survived by her two children,
namely, Antonio Colinco and Irene Colinco (respondent); Antonio Colinco predeceased his three
daughters, respondents Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco. The second child, Catalina
Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario and their union was blessed with the birth of only one child,
Purificacion Arbolario, who, in 1985, died a spinster and without issue. Juan Arbolario, consorted with
another woman by the name of Francisca Malvas and from this cohabitation petitioners Voltaire
Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Taala, Fe Arbolario, Exaltacion Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario (referred to
hereinafter as Arbolarios) were born. All the foregoing petitioners were born well before the year 1951.

In 1946, the third child, Eduardo Baloyo, sold his entire interest in the lot to his sister, Agueda (first
child), by virtue of a notarized document. In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was executed by
and between Agueda, Catalina, Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and Julian, who extrajudicially
declared themselves to be the only heirs of the late spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan. The
fourth child, Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her interest in the said lot in favor of her two nieces, Irene
Colinco to one-half (1/2) and Purificacion Arbolario to the other half. Purificacion Arbolario was then
allowed to take possession of a portion of the disputed parcel until her death sometime in 1984 or 1985.

Respondents Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco, and Goldelina Colinco, believing themselves to
be the only surviving heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a Declaration of Heirship
and Partition Agreement, dated May 8, 1987 where they adjudicated upon themselves their
proportionate or ideal shares: Irene Colinco, to one-half (1/2); while the surviving daughters of her
(Irenes) late brother Antonio, namely Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina Colinco, to share in equal, ideal
proportions to the remaining half (1/2).

On October 2, 1987, the Colincos filed a case against Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay and Carlito
Salhay, seeking to recover possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot occupied by respondent spouses
(Salhays hereinafter) since 1970. The Salhays alleged in their defense that they have been the lawful
lessees of the late Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978; and that said spouses allegedly
purchased the disputed portion of Lot from the deceased lessor sometime in September 1978.
On May 9, 1988 before the case was tried the Arbolarios and spouses Carlito Salhay and Rosalita
Rodriguez Salhay (all respondents in the case) filed another case [f]or Cancellation of Title with
Damages. The Arbolarios, joined by the Salhays, contend that the Declaration of Heirship and Partition
Agreement executed by the Colincos was defective and thus voidable as they (Arbolarios) were excluded
therein. The Arbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate to the inheritance of their alleged half-sister,
Purificacion Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they should be included in the distribution of the aforesaid
lot.

ISSUE:

(1) WoN Arbolarios are illegitimate children

HELD:

(1) YES, they are illegitimate.** There is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that Juan
Arbolarios marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid. It does not follow that just because his first
wife has died, a man is already conclusively married to the woman who bore his children. A
marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage as an
undisputable fact. Since they failed to prove the fact (or even the presumption) of marriage
between their parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot invoke a
presumption of legitimacy in their favor. Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship
that must be judicially established.
NOTES:
LOWER COURT RULINGS:
o RTC: Arbolarios were the brothers and the sisters of the deceased Purificacion Arbolario,
while the Colincos were her cousins and nieces. The Colincos could not inherit from her,
because she had half-brothers and half-sisters (CC, Article 1009). Their 1987 Declaration
of Heirship and Partition Agreement was made in bad faith, because they knew all along the
existence of, and their relationship with, the Arbolarios. The Salhays, on the other hand,
had no document to prove their acquisition and possession of a portion of the disputed lot.
o CA: Arbolarios are illegitimate. Illegitimate children are barred by Article 992 of the Civil
Code from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father or
mother. As the illegitimate siblings of the late Purificacion Arbolario, petitioners cannot
conveniently undermine the legal limitations by insisting that they were treated as half-
brothers and half-sisters by the deceased.
**(other reasons for illegitimacy, seemed less important): A review of the 1951 Declaration
reveals that the year of Catalinas death was intercalated. The first two numbers (1 and 9) and the
last digit (3) are legible; but the third digit has been written over to make it look like a 0.
Further, the paragraph quoted by petitioners should show a chronological progression in the heirs
years of death: Agueda died in 1940 and Eduardo in 1947. Hence, if Catalina had indeed died in
1903, why then was her name written after Aguedas and not before it? Moreover, the document,
being in Spanish, requires an official translation. We cannot readily accept the English translation
proffered by petitioners, since respondents did not agree to its correctness. Besides, it consisted
of only a paragraph of the whole document.
OTHER ISSUES IN THE CASE:
o WoN CA committed a serious error when it disregarded the testimony that the Salhays had
purchased the portion of the lot they had been occupying since 1970; SC says NO, though
the sale was not expressly assigned as an error in their Brief, respondents (as petitioners in
the CA) still assailed the existence of the sale
o WoN CA overstepped its bounds when it ruled that since respondents did not raise the
issue of partition on appeal, the RTC had no jurisdiction to divide the disputed lot; SC says
NO, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the
individual interests of co-owners, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property
and a right to enjoy the allotted estate without supervision or interference.

Continental Steel v Montano, Oct. 13, 2009

2. Terminated marriage under FC 42 in rel. to FC 43(1)

3. Void marriages under FC 54
4. Voidable marriages, FC 45

Suntay v Suntay, GR 132524, Dec. 29, 1998

(b) Born during marriage, FC 164

(c) Conceived by artificial insemination cf. NCC 40, FC 164
 (d) Adopted children, RA 8552, Sec. 17
(e) Legitimated children, 177, 178

2. Rights of legitimate children, FC 173-174, NCC 364, 374, 376, NCC 888, NCC 979

Moore v. Republic, 8 SCRA 282

Facts:
Petitioner Elaine Moore (American citizen) is married with Joseph Velarde (also American) had a
son out of wedlock William Michael Velarde (now 14 yrs old) born also at US.

Said marriage however was dissolved through a decree of divorce from SC of California on
5/31/49. Elaine had 2nd marriage with Don Moore on 9/29/56 at LA, CA. William (minor) lived
with them.

Elaine filed @ CFI Rizal a motion to have her childs surname be changed into Moore instead of
Velarde. TC denied such petition therefore this appeal.

Issue: Government of the Phil. Opposed such petition with the following issues
a) WON law permits minor to adopt surname of the 2nd husband of his mother
b) WON justifiable reason exists to allow change of name
c) WON mother has the authority to ask such

Held: Regarding the 1st issue, RP said that through NCC 364 legitimate child should use the
surname of his father. NCC 369 moreover cites that in case of annulment, child conceived before
such decree shall use the surname of his/ her father. Likewise, same concept rules over decree of
divorce; therefore law does NOT sanction such change of name. SC upheld such position, saying
that confusion may arise wrt (with respect to) paternity and that said change may even redound to
the prejudice of the child. Moreover, the child is still a minor and therefore aforesaid action is
premature. Said child may in his mature age decide for himself to instigate such change of name.

CASE:

Elaine A. Moore filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that her child by a
former marriage, William Michael Velarde, be permitted to change his name so as to read William
Michael Velarde Moore.

After publishing the petition as required by law, trial was held during which the parties submitted a
stipulation of facts. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order denying the petition whereupon
petitioner interposed the present appeal.

Petitioner is an American citizen formerly married to Joseph P. Velarde, also an American citizen,
out of whose wedlock a child by the name of William Michael Velarde was born. This child, now 14
years old, was born on January 19, 1947 at Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

The marriage of petitioner to Velarde was subsequently dissolved by a decree of divorce issued by
the Superior Court of the State of California on May 31, 1949. After said decree became final,
petitioner contracted a second marriage with Don C. Moore on September 29, 1956 at Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., and thereafter the minor lived continuously with the spouses up to the present
time. He was supported by Moore who has always treated him with love and affection as if he were
his true father. In view of this harmonious relation it is petitioner's desire that the minor be able to
use the name Moore after his family name Velarde.

The government opposes the petition and now poses the following issues: (1) whether under our
laws a minor may be permitted to adopt and use the surname of the second husband of his mother;
(2) whether justifiable reasons exist to allow such change of name; and whether petitioner, as
mother of the minor, has the authority or personality to ask for such a change.

Anent the first issue, the government sustains a negative stand for the reason that our laws do not
authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person who is not his father, for, as a matter of
fact, Article 364 of Civil Code specifically provides that legitimate children shall principally use the
surname of their father. Mention is also made of Article 369 of the same Code which provides that in
case of annulment of avoidable marriage the children conceived before the annulment she
principally use the surname of the father, and considering by analogy the effect of a decree of
divorce, it concluded that the children who are conceived before such a decree should also be
understood as carrying the surname of the real father, which, in this case, is Velarde.

We find tenable this observation of government's counsel. Indeed, if a child born out of a lawful
wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, should the first
husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion to his real
paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community.

While the purpose which may have animated petitioner is plausible and may run along the feeling
of cordiality and spiritual relationship that pervades among the members of the Moore family, our
hand is deferred by a legal barrier which we cannot at present overlook or brush aside.

Another factor to be reckoned with is the fact that the child concerned is still a minor who for the
present cannot fathom what would be his feeling when he comes to mature age. Any way, if the time
comes, he may decide the matter for himself and take such action as our law may permit. For the
present we deem the action taken by petitioner premature.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed. No cost

Naldoza v. Republic, 112 SCRA 658

Facts:
Zosima Naldoza married Dionesio Divinagracia on 5/30/70. They had 2 children: Jr. and Bombi
Roberto. Dionesio abandoned conjugal home after Zosima confronted him about his previous
marriage. Also, he allegedly swindled 50k from Rep. Maglana and 10k from a certain Galagar, etc.
Classmates of Jr. and Bombi were teasing them because of their swindler father. To obliterate any
connection between her children and Dionesio (thereby relieving the kids of the remarks of
classmates), Zosima filed @ CFI Bohol on 4/10/78 a petition to change surname of her 2 children
from Divinagracia into Naldoza (her maiden name).
TC dismissed pet. saying that aforementioned reasons (swindling, abandoning, previous marriage of
Dionesio <but their marriage has not yet been annulled nor declared bigamous> ) were not
sufficient grounds to invoke such change of surname. Furthermore, change of name would give false
impression of family relations.

Issue: WON two childrens prayer to drop their fathers surname is justified
Held:
NO. Following NCC 364, since Jr. and Bombi are LC (legitimate children), therefore they should use
their fathers surname. Said minors and their father should be consulted about such, mothers
desire should not only be the sole consideration. Change of name is allowed only upon proper and
reasonable cause (Rule 103 Sec 5 ROC). Change of name may even redound to the prejudice of the
children later on, may cause confusion as to the minors parentage and might also create the
impression that said minors are ICs, which is inconsistent with their legal status.
In Oshita v. Republic and in Alfon v. Republic, their petition to change names have been granted, but
petitioners in said cases have already attained mature age. In this case, when these minors have
attained the right age, then they can already file said action for themselves.

Rep. vs CA, 300 SCRA 138

Facts:
The petitioner was born at Capitol Medical Center in Quezon City on January 19, 1971 to parents
Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres. On January 10, 1927, after a marital
disagreement, Vicencio left their Meycauayan Bulacan conjugal property and never returned nor
gave support to his family. Leabres found an ally in Ernesto Yu who would later end up as her
husband. On June 29, 1976, Leabres filed a petition, known as Civil case number E-02009 with
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the dissolution of her conjugal partnership with
Vicencio.

In a decision given by Hon Regina C. Ordoez Benitez dated July11, 1977, the petition was granted.
The petitioners mother filed another petition in 1983 to drop the surname of her husband there
from and this, known as Special Proclamation 8316346 was again approved in a decision rendered
by Hon. Emeterio C. Cui of Branch XXV. Yet again, under Special Proclamation number 84-22605,
Leabres filed a petition to declare Pablo Vicencio an absentee.

Hon. Corona Ibay- Somera decided in favour of the petitioners mother on April 26,1984. The
positive results of these petitions paved the way for the marriage of the petitioners mother and
Ernesto Yu on April 15, 1986.Evidence was established that the petitioner had not remembered
much her real father, Pablo Vicencio, and that in his absence, it was Ernesto Yu who had taken
Vicencios place. Although petitioner uses the surname Vicencio in her school and other related
activities, she contends that in such situations, confusion arose as to her parentage leading to
inquiries as to why she is using Vicencio as surname; causing much embarrassment on her part. In
two occasions when she ran as a beauty contestant for Lions Club Affair and Manila Red Cross, her
name was registered as Cynthia L. Yu.

His stepfather had given his consent thereto upon prior consultation with him. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) having participated in the cross examination of Cynthia Vicencio and her
witnesses, manifested opposition over the petition. The court argued that there was no valid cause
for the denial of the petition and that taking into account the fact that the court cannot compel the
stepfather of the petitioner to consider adoption, failure to observe the process should not be a
cause for disallowing petitioner to legally change her name, in addition to the opportunity of the
respondent to improve her personality and welfare under a socially recognized surname, that of her
stepfather. On August 31, 1987, the Manila Regional Trial Court Branch 52 granted private
respondent Cynthia Vicencios petition for change of surname from Vicencio to Yu. The same was
affirmed by the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28, 1989.
 Issue :
Whether or not the appellate court made a mistake or violated standards in affirming the decision
of the trial court to allow the change in private respondents surname to that of her stepfathers
surname.

Decision:

Recognized inter alia in Republic vs. Hernandez, the following are sufficient grounds to warrant a
change in name; a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce, b) when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption , c. ) when the
change will avoid confusion, d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name and was unaware of an alien parentage, e) when the change is based on sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase sign of former alienage, in good faith without prejudice to
anybody and f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that desired
change of name was far a fraudulent purpose or would prejudice public interest.

Private respondent asserts that she falls under one of the justifiable grounds, specifically under
avoidance of confusion since she has been recognized by society as the daughter of Ernesto Yu
although she admits to having used Vicencio in beauty pageants and in her debut. In the argument
of the Solicitor General , it argues that change in surname might give rise to legal complications
since her stepfather has two other children with her mother and such complications may affect
even the issue of inheritance should the stepfather die.

The OSG further argues that change of name would be easy through adoption which Ernesto Yu did
not opt for. The court contends that though confusion may arise with regard to parentage, more
confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if private respondent is to use his stepfathers
surname even if she is not legally adopted by him. Legal constraints lead the court to reject private
respondents desire to use her step-fathers surname and no assurance exists that the end result
would not be even more detrimental to her person, as it may trigger deeper inquiries regarding her
parentage. It is also noteworthy that as a result of Republic Act 6809, the private respondent
although already 18 when the appellate court rendered its decision, was still considered a minor.
The court reversed and set aside the appealed decision to allow private respondents change of
name from Vicencio to Yu and granted the instant petition to retain surname due to lack of legally
justifiable cause for allowing such change.

Heirs of Basbas v. Basbas, G.R. No. 188773, September 10, 2014

FACTS:

1. Case arose when the petitioners filed a case for reconveyance against the respondents a parcel of
land the respondents inherited from the decedent Severo Basbas.
1.1 during trial it was already stipulated that
petitioners are direct descendants of Valentin Basbas, who is a son of Severo Basbas.

2. MTC: TCT in the name of the respondents are annulled.

2.1 Petitioners fully established their filiation with the decedent Severo, the original titleholder
of the lot in question and from whom all parties trace their claim of ownership over the subject
 property.

2.2 The court found wanting, lacking documentary evidence, the claims of herein respondent
Ricardo.

3. On appeal to RTC.

4. RTC: affirmed MTC (in favor of petitioners)

5. On appeal to CA.

6. CA:reversed the MTC and RTC decisions. 6.1 CA held that MTC erred in ruling on the heirship
of Valentin because it is only in a special proceeding where it can be determined. 6.2 Heirs
of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario: it was ruled that it is decisively clear that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as it involves the
establishment of a status or right.

7. Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not a declaration of Heirship is necessary in the case of Valentin?

HELD: No. Valentins long possessed status as a legitimate child and thus, heir of Severo, need no
longer be the subject of a special proceeding for declaration of heirship as envisioned by the CA.

RATIO: In all, Valentins long possessed status as a legitimate child and thus, heir of Severo, need no
longer be the subject of a special proceeding for declaration of heirship as envisioned by the Court of
Appeals. There is no need to re-declare his status as an heir of Severo. And, contraposed to the fact that
Valentins status as a legitimate child of Severo is already established, Nicolas status as a purported heir
of Severo can no longer be established, Nicolas right thereto expiring upon his death. Glaringly, there is
no pretension from respondents end that Nicolas was born of a valid marriage, only that he is Severos
son. Nonetheless, even if respondents were minded to establish the status of Nicolas, whether he is a
legitimate or an illegitimate child of Severo, such can no longer be done.

C. Illegitimate children

1. Who are considered illegitimate

(a) Under NCC

(b) FC 165
(c) FC 166

Uy v Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner filed for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent. She alleged in
her complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa
and that the respondent and Irene had two children namely, petitioner (Joanie) and her brother,
Allan. Respondent attended at the birth of the latter instructed that petitioners birth certificate be
filled out with the following names: ALFREDO F. SURPOSA as father and IRENE DUCAY as
mother.

Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irenes father, and Ducay was the maiden surname of Irenes
mother. However, respondent Chua financially supported petitioner and Allan and even provided
employment for her. He and Allan were introduced to each other and became known in the Chinese
community as respondents illegitimate children. During petitioners wedding, respondent sent his
brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his representative and Respondents relatives even attended the
baptism of petitioners daughter.

Later, Respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his
daughter. Hearings then ensued and petitioner presented documentary evidence to prove her claim
of illegitimate filiation. Petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of
illegitimate affiliation against respondent. And latter filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground
that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 barred by res judicata. A Compromise Agreement was
made between the two parties prior where petitioner Joanie declares, admits and acknowledges
that there is no blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand
and the respondent, in exchange the latter paid the Two Million Pesos each. The court ruled in favor
of the respondent hence this appeal

Issue:
Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to judgments predicated upon a
compromise agreement on cases enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

Held:
Res judicata is based upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely
public policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there should be an end to
litigation and that the hardship of the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause.

The requisites must also concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court
rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action.
The court rules held that res judicata does not exist in this case.

The compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v.
Republic, the Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment
based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. A contract must have requisites and
no according to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, one of the requisites of such to be valid is that the
compromise must not pertain to the Civil Status of a person and the issue of Future Support and
Future Legitime.
The agreement in this case is intended to settle the question of petitioners status and filiation, i.e.,
whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan
acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and
Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said
Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and future
legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18
February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035
of the Civil Code as espoused in the case of Advincula v. Advincula.

It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially
established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or
agreement of the parties. Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated
18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and
creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered
operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prostrations.
Decision Reversed and Set Aside

2. Rights of illegitimate children, FC 173, 172, 175-176

Osmea de Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil 222

Facts:
- Plaintiffs say that they are the legitimate children of the defendant Pio Valencia in the latters
lawful wedlock with plaintiff Catalina Osmena
- Defendants on the otherhand are the illegitimate children of defendant Pio Valencia with Emilia
Rodriguez his common-law wife.
- Plaintiffs allege that they alone have the right to the surname Valencia

Issues: WON the illegitimate children could use the surname Valencia

Held: Yes

Ratio: This cannot happen since if plaintiffs were correct then they could stop numerous inhabitants
from using the surname Valencia as well. Moreover, Pio Valencia has acquiesced to this as well.
Finally, there is no law granting the exclusive ownership over a surname.

PARAS, J.:

In an action instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the plaintiffs prayed for an injunction
restraining the defendants, from using the surname "Valencia." The defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, and this sustained by the lower court. Hence this appeal by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs allege, on the hand, that they (except Catalina Osmea) are the legitimate children of
the defendant Pio E. Valencia in the latter's lawful wedlock with plaintiff Catalina Osmea; and,
upon the other hand, that the defendants, (except Emilia Rodriguez and Pio E. Valencia) are the
illegitimate children of Pio E. Valencia with his common-law-wife, defendant Emilia Rodriguez. It is
accordingly contended by the plaintiffs that they alone have the right to bear the surname
"Valencia," in accordance with article 114 of the Civil Code which provides that legitimate children
have the right to bear the surname of the father. To complete their argument, the plaintiffs point out
that, under articles 139 and 845 of the Civil Code, illegitimate children (who are not natural) are
entitled only to support.

We concede that the plaintiffs may use the surname of their farther as a matter of right by reason of
the mere fact that they are legitimate children; but we cannot agree to the view that article 114 of
the Civil Code, without more, grants monopolistic proprietary control to legitimate children over
the surname of their father. In other words, said article has marked a right of which legitimate
children may not be deprived, but it cannot be interpreted as a prohibition against the use by others
of what may happen to be the surname of their father. If plaintiff's theory were correct, they can
stop countless inhabitants from bearing the surname "Valencia."

The defendants' case becomes the stronger when it is remembered that, from all appearances, Pio E.
Valencia (the father) acquiesces in the adoption of his surname by the defendants. But even if he
objects, the defendants can still use the surname "Valencia," in the absence of any law granting
exclusive ownership over a surname.

The appealed order is affirmed, and it is so ordered with costs against the plaintiffs and appellants.

Moran, C.J., Perfecto, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Feria, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

OZAETA,. J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the affirmance of the order appealed from on the following ground: It appears from
paragraph 5 of the complaint that the defendant Pio E. Valencia has allowed his illegitimate children
by his codefendant Emilia Rodriguez to bear his surname even after they had reached the age of
reason. From this allegation it may be inferred that since their birth these illegitimate children have
been given and have borne the surname of their father with the latter's consent. The plaintiffs
predicate their case upon Articles 114, 139, and 845 of the Civil Code and Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court. Article 114 says that legitimate children shall have the right to bear the surnames of their
father and mother; and articles 139 and 845 say that illegitimate children who have not the status
of natural children shall be entitled only to support. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court prescribes the
procedure for change of name. Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, these statutory provisions
are not sufficient, in my opinion, to entitle the plaintiffs to the relief sought by their complaint. The
mere fact that legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of their parents and
illegitimate children are entitled only to support, does not necessarily imply that the father may not
voluntarily permit his illegitimate children to bear his surname. Rule 103 is not applicable because
it is not alleged in the complaint that the twelve defendants who are alleged to be illegitimate
children of their codefendant Pio E. Valencia have illegally changed their surname from some other
to that of Valencia. On the contrary we infer from the complaint that since their birth they have
always borne that surname with the knowledge and consent of their putative father.
 I dissent from so much of the majority opinion a may convey the idea (1) that a person who claims
to be the illegitimate child of another may use or adopt the surname of the latter even against his
will and without his consent, and without authorization from the court; and (2) that any person is
free to use any surname he may have a fancy for without the authorization of the court even though
he may not have originally borne that surname. Concerning the first idea, I am of the opinion that a
person cannot adjudicate to himself a status which adversely affects another without the latter's
consent or without the intervention of the court. And as to the second idea, it is clear from Rule 103
that a person cannot adopt a new name, or use one other than that he has originally borne, without
complying with the requisites provided for in said rule.

Briones vs. Miguel, 440 SCRA 455, October 18, 2004

FACTS: (chronological order)

1. On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor
child Michael Kevin Pineda.

2. On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother
of the minor, as one of the respondents.

3. The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent
Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth
Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is
presently residing in Japan.

4. The petitioner further alleges that on November 4, 1998 he caused the minor child to be brought
to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school. In the school year
2000-2001, the petitioner enrolled him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in
Caloocan City, where he finished the nursery course.

5. According to the petitioner, his parents, who are both retired and receiving monthly pensions,
assisted him in taking care of the child.

6. On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to the house of the
petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and requested
that they be allowed to bring the said child for recreation at the SM Department store. They
promised him that they will bring him back in the afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed.
However, the respondents did not bring him back as promised by them.

7. The petitioner went several times to respondent Maricel P. Miguel at Tanza, Tuguegarao City but
he was informed that the child is with the latters mother at Batal Heights, Santiago City. When he
went there, respondent Francisca P. Miguel told him that Michael Kevin Pineda is with her
daughter at Tuguegarao City.

8. He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social Welfare to locate his son and
to bring him back to him, but all his efforts were futile.

9. A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the respondents to
 produce before this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at
2:00 oclock in the afternoon.

10. CA: Applying Article 213 (paragraph 2) of the Family Code, awarded the custody of Michael Kevin
Pineda Miguel to his mother, Respondent Loreta P. Miguel. While acknowledging that petitioner
truly loved and cared for his son and considering the trouble and expense he had spent in
instituting the legal action for custody, it nevertheless found no compelling reason to separate the
minor from his mother. Petitioner, however, was granted visitorial rights.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his own
child in the absence of the mother who is away.

HELD: Mother. An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of
that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody,
absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and care.

RATIO: Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over their minor child. He
insists, however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan and during the
period that she stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the minor, such that the mother
would have custody when she is in the country. But when she is abroad, he -- as the biological father --
should have custody.

RULING: Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides
that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. This is the rule regardless of whether the
father admits paternity.

Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category,
without any distinction between natural and spurious.The concept of natural child is important only for
purposes of legitimation. Without the subsequent marriage, a natural child remains an illegitimate child.

Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing in the
records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth.
Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental
authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his fathers recognition of
him.

David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground
for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to the
mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father
assume custody and authority over the minor. Of course, the putative father may adopt his own
illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.
There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental authority
over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her company. She
cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renounce or transfer it except in the cases
authorized by law.

Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise.

Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mothers unfitness to exercise sole parental authority,
shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone else. In the past,
the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable disease.

Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the controlling factor, we hold that the
CA did not err in awarding care, custody, and control of the child to Respondent Loreta. There is no
showing at all that she is unfit to take charge of him.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the
exercise of that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her
of custody, absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and care.

Maramag vs De Guzman, GR 181132, June 5, 2009

no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the
insured

FACTS: A petition was filed in the RTC against respondents for revocation and/or reduction of
insurance proceeds for being void and/or inofficious. The petition alleged that:

(1) petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto), while
respondents were Loretos illegitimate family;

(2) Eva de Guzman Maramag (Eva) was a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the latter,
thus, she is disqualified to receive any proceeds from his insurance policies from Insular Life Assurance
Company, Ltd. (Insular) and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife);

(3) the illegitimate children of Loreto: Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were entitled only to one-
half of the legitime of the legitimate children, thus, the proceeds released to Odessa and those to be
released to Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie were inofficious and should be reduced; and

(4) petitioners could not be deprived of their legitimes, which should be satisfied first.

Petitioners also alleged, among others, that part of the insurance proceeds had already been released in
favor of Odessa, while the rest of the proceeds are to be released in favor of Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie,
both minors, upon the appointment of their legal guardian.

In answer, Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and Odessa, Karl Brian,
and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, and that they filed their claims for the insurance proceeds
of the insurance policies; that when it ascertained that Eva was not the legal wife of Loreto, it disqualified
her as a beneficiary and divided the proceeds among Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, as the
remaining designated beneficiaries; and that it released Odessas share as she was of age, but withheld
the release of the shares of minors Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie pending submission of letters of
guardianship. Insular alleged that the complaint or petition failed to state a cause of action insofar as it
sought to declare as void the designation of Eva as beneficiary, because Loreto revoked her designation
as such in Policy No. A001544070 and it disqualified her in Policy No. A001693029; and insofar as it
sought to declare as inofficious the shares of Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, considering that no
settlement of Loretos estate had been filed nor had the respective shares of the heirs been determined.
Insular further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies designating the children of
Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code.

On the other hand, Grepalife alleged that Eva was not designated as an insurance policy beneficiary; that
the claims filed by Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were denied because Loreto was ineligible for
insurance due to a misrepresentation in his application form that he was born on December 10, 1936
and, thus, not more than 65 years old when he signed it in September 2001; that the case was premature,
there being no claim filed by the legitimate family of Loreto; and that the law on succession does not
apply where the designation of insurance beneficiaries is clear.

Both Insular and Grepalife countered that the insurance proceeds belong exclusively to the
designated beneficiaries in the policies, not to the estate or to the heirs of the insured. Grepalife
also reiterated that it had disqualified Eva as a beneficiary when it ascertained that Loreto was
legally married to Vicenta Pangilinan Maramag.

The RTC considered the allegations of Insular that Loreto revoked the designation of Eva in one
policy and that Insular disqualified her as a beneficiary in the other policy such that the entire
proceeds would be paid to the illegitimate children of Loreto with Eva pursuant to Section 53 of the
Insurance Code. It ruled that it is only in cases where there are no beneficiaries designated, or when the
only designated beneficiary is disqualified, that the proceeds should be paid to the estate of the insured.
As to the claim that the proceeds to be paid to Loretos illegitimate children should be reduced based on
the rules on legitime, the trial court held that the distribution of the insurance proceeds is governed
primarily by the Insurance Code, and the provisions of the Civil Code are irrelevant and inapplicable.
With respect to the Grepalife policy, the trial court noted that Eva was never designated as a
beneficiary, but only Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie; thus, it upheld the dismissal of the
case as to the illegitimate children. It further held that the matter of Loretos misrepresentation was
premature; the appropriate action may be filed only upon denial of the claim by Grepalife of the named
beneficiaries for the insurance proceeds.

The CA dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the decision of the trial
court dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action involved a pure question of law.

Petitioners contention: their petition before the trial court should not have been dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action because the findisng that Eva was either disqualified as a beneficiary by the
insurance companies or that her designation was revoked by Loreto, hypothetically admitted as true, was
raised only in the answers and motions for reconsideration of both Insular and Grepalife. They
argue that for a motion to dismiss to prosper on that ground, only the allegations in the complaint should
be considered. They further contend that, even assuming Insular disqualified Eva as a beneficiary, her
share should not have been distributed to her children with Loreto but, instead, awarded to them, being
the legitimate heirs of the insured deceased, in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

ISSUE: WON the insurance proceeds should be awarded to Loretos legitimate children, the petitioners in
this case

HELD: No. Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus,
are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal
obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in
one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment considering that the
designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loretos insurance policies remains
valid.

RATIO: In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are
the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by
Insular and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners claim is that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a suspect
in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the insurance policies, and that
Evas children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of the
policies. They also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of the Insurance Code, Evas share in the proceeds
should be forfeited in their favor, the former having brought about the death of Loreto. Thus, they prayed
that the share of Eva and portions of the shares of Loretos illegitimate children should be awarded to
them, being the legitimate heirs of Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes.

It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable
judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code, which expressly provides that insurance
contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of the Insurance
Code states:
SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in
whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy.

Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are
either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the
maturation of the policy. The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was
intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or
indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.

Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are
not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal
obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a
beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment
considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loretos insurance
policies remains valid.

Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the
insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the
prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons
based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated
beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated
any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds,
that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.

De la Cruz vs Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Jenie, 21-year old, and Dominique, 19-year old, lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.

They resided in the house of Dominiques parents. Dominique died. After almost two months, Jenie who
continued to live with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian
Dela Cruz Aquino at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.

Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the
City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth,
Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of
Acknowledgement executed by Dominiques father Domingo Butch Aquino.

Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously
acknowledge his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to
the AUSF a document entitled AUTOBIOGRAPHY, which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own
handwriting acknowledging his unborn child. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City denied Jenies
application for registration of the childs name.

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against respondent
before the RTC of Antipolo City. The Complaint alleged that the denial of registration of the childs name
is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father.

They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity in
a private handwritten instrument within the contemplation of the provision of law. The trial court
dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, as the Autobiography was unsigned. The trial court
held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten Autobiography, he same does not contain
any express recognition of paternity.

ISSUE(S): WON the unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father of minor Christian Dela Cruz
can be considered as a recognition of paternity in a private handwritten instrument.

HELD: YES. It is to petitioner minor childs best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now
deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.

RATIO: Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private
handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act
of acknowledgment of the childs paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten
instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision
must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that
recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.

xxxx Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his
signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1,
Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not unduly expand the import of Article 176
as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques Autobiography, though
unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.

First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. Second, the relevant matters in the
Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the
testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.Third, Jenies testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch
Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the
child. These circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child give life to his statements in his
Autobiography that JENIE DELA CRUZ is MY WIFE as WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER and NOW
SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.

In Herrera v. Alba, the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation,
discoursing in relevant part:

Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence Establishing Filiation

The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of
Rule 130 provide:

SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received
in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received
in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and
the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.

This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish
filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be
resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by
the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be
made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To
be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing
must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is
admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a
good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions,
together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a
written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent,
cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures
are sufficient to establish filiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominiques Autobiography
have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein that
Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses for several
months in 2005 at his parents house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when
Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child
they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominiques.

In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting
the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the paramount consideration in resolving
questions affecting him.Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the
Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:

Article 3

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration.
It is thus (t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and
filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x xx.Too, (t)he State as parenspatriae affords
special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.

In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner
minor childs best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it
in his birth certificate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to
immediately enter the surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of
petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the Register of
Births.

Manungas v Loreto, GR 193161, August 22, 2011

FACTS:
1. Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas (no children of their own).
2. They adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila) on August 12, 1968.
3. Florentino Manungas died intestate on May 29, 1977, while Avila predeceased his adoptive
mother.
4. Avila was survived by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
5. Engracia Manungas (administatrix) filed a Motion for Partition of Estate on March 31, 1980 in the
intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas (she stated herself, Avila and Ramon
Manungas [natural son of Florentino] as forced heirs). Avilas widow executed a Waiver of Rights
and Participation on October 29, 1980.
6. Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate estate proceedings (distributing the
properties to Engracia Manungas and Ramon Manungas).
7. October 25, 1995, the RTC of Panabo City, appointed Parreo, the niece of Engracia Manungas, as
the Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent aunt.
8. Engracia Manungas, through Parreo, instituted a Civil Case against the spouses Diosdado Salinas
Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and damages with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) in Panabo City (theyre occupying the property because they said Diosdado is an
illegitimate son of Florentino). Answer was filed beyond the reglementary period, not considered
by the MTC = summary judgment was issued in favor of Engracia. Spouses Salinas appealed in the
RTC of Davao City(affirmed decision of MTC).
9. August 7, 1998, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over
the Estate of Engracia Manungas (Estate of Manungas) in his favor before the RTC, Branch 2
in Tagum City, Davao (Diosdado is Florentinos illegitimate son = Engracias heir).
10. Petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto (Loreto) and Parreo alleging that Diosdado was
incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of Manungas claiming that a) he was not a
Manungas, b) that he was not an heir of Engracia Manungas, c) he was not a creditor of Engracia
Manungas or her estate and d) that he was in fact a debtor of the estate (liable to Engracia
Manungas for PhP 177,000 because of the MTC decision).
11. RTC appointed Parreno AGAIN as the administrator of the Manunga Estate.
12. Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. Parreos appointment as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas
a) ceased upon Engracia Manungas death (her appointment as special administrator was without
basis),
 b) Parreo was not fit to become a special administrator (already been fined by the court for
failing to render a timely accounting of Engracia Manungas property as her judicial guardian), c)
Parreo is a mere niece, a collateral relative, of Engracia Manungas, while he is the illegitimate son
of Florentino Manungas.
13. RTC reversed decision, appointed Diosdado as administrator. CA reversed RTC, appointed Parreno
as Administrator.
ISSUE: WON Diosdado should be an administrator of the Manungas Estate (on the basis that hes an
illegitimate child of Florentino).

HELD: NO. The mere fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not mean
that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
RATIO: Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies within the
discretion of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel,[24] it was stated that:

It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of
certain persons to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the
statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section
653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of
special administrator. x x x As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special
administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has
discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound,
that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.

While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate,
such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal
principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is to
preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. As stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules:

Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. Such special administrator

shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the
deceased andpreserve the same for the executors or administrator afterwards appointed,
and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only
such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall
not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.

Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and
reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the
heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that would
effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart from such
reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise
a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.

Hence, the CA ruled that the trial court erred in issuing the November 4, 2002 Order, acting with
grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as the special administrator of Engracia Manungas
estate:

In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila
Parreo as Special Administrator on the ground that it found merit in Diosdados
contention that he is the illegitimate child of the late Florentino Manangus. The evidence on
record shows that Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia and so he is not interested in
 preserving the latters estate. On the other hand, Florencia, who is a former Judicial
guardian of Engracia when she was still alive and who is also the niece of the latter, is
interested in protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt Engracia, as by doing so
she would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the decedents estate. Hence, the
Order of the lower court revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreo as special
administrator constitutes not only a reversible error, but also a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower court exercised its
power in a despotic, arbitrary or capricious manner, as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.

To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia Manungas. It must be
remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the subject of intestate proceedings that
have long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the issuance of a Decree of
Final Distribution.[27] With the termination of the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas,
Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is
not entitled to receive any part of the Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and
would have no interest in preserving its value. There is no reason to appoint him as its special
administrator. The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special
administrator of the Estate of Manungas. The CA correctly set aside the November 4, 2002 Order of the
RTC.

Gotardo v Buling, GR 165166, August 15, 2012

SUMMARY
Single mother seeking child support through establishing filiation with ex-fiancee.

FACTS:

In 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the RTC for compulsory recognition and
support pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze, whose imputed
paternity the petitioner denied. Trial ensued. She met the petitioner in 1992 in a bank where they
both worked. They became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993. Sometime in September
1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the respondent in the formers rented
room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the respondents uncle.

The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more frequent in June 1994; eventually,
on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she was pregnant. When told, the petitioner was
happy and made plans to marry the respondent but eventually backed out. The respondent gave
birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did not show up and failed to
provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on demanding recognition of and
support for their child.

When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory
recognition and support pendente lite. The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for
himself. He denied the imputed paternity, claiming that he first had sexual contact with the
respondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for 3 months
when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 1994. During the pendency of the case, the
RTC, on the respondents motion, granted a P2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from
March 1995. RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The CA consequently set
aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also
 reinstated the RTC order for monthly child support. The petitioner argues that the CA committed a
reversible error in rejecting the RTCs ruling, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove
paternity.

ISSUE:

W/N the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTCs findings and ordered the
petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze

DECISION:

The Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the ruling of the CA, sustaining the award of
P2,000.00 monthly child support, not finding any reversible error in the CAs ruling. In this case, the
respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through
testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her
conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had
intimate relationship. However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and
insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of
evidentiary support. The petitioners denial cannot overcome the respondents clear and categorical
assertions. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is
obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation,
in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

Grande v Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived
together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else.Out of
this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, both minors. The children
were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the
Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United
States with her two children. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of
Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of
Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, appending a notarized Deed of
Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.

The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the City Registrar to cause the entry of the name
of Antonio as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth and
causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of
Live Birth from Grande to Antonio; granting the right of parental authority over the minors; granting the
primary right and immediate custody over the minors; and ordering Grande to immediately surrender
the persons and custody of the minors to Antonio.

Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial
court.

Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for
allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother
over her illegitimate children.

The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the Offices of the Civil Registrar General and
the City Civil Registrar of Makati City to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of the minors in their
respective certificates of live birth, and record the same in the Register of Births; ordering Antonio to
deliver the custody to their mother; Antonio shall have visitorial rights upon Grandes consent; parties are
directed to give and share in support of the minor children.

The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by
respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally
protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."

Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration,
particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors surname to
"Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children
upon his recognition of their filiation.

HELD: The petition is partially granted

CIVIL LAW Filation

Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:

Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall
consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in
the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may
use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the
surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two
children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to
Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial
conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children's surname
as Antonio.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or
not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the
right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean
what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.Respondents position
that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must
abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children

Heirs of Basbas v. Basbas, G.R. No. 188773, September 10, 2014

FACTS:

Case arose when the petitioners filed a case for reconveyance against the respondents a parcel of land the
respondents inherited from the decedent Severo Basbas. during trial it was already stipulated that
petitioners are direct descendants of Valentin Basbas, who is a son of Severo Basbas.

2. MTC: TCT in the name of the respondents are annulled.

2.1 Petitioners fully established their filiation with the decedent Severo, the original titleholder
of the lot in question and from whom all parties trace their claim of ownership over the subject
property.

2.2 The court found wanting, lacking documentary evidence, the claims of herein respondent
Ricardo.

3. On appeal to RTC.

4. RTC: affirmed MTC (in favor of petitioners)

5. On appeal to CA.

6. CA:reversed the MTC and RTC decisions. CA held that MTC erred in ruling on the heirship of
Valentin because it is only in a special proceeding where it can be determined. Heirs of Guido
and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario: it was ruled that it is decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as it involves the establishment of a
status or right.
 7. Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not a declaration of Heirship is necessary in the case of Valentin?

HELD: No. Valentins long possessed status as a legitimate child and thus, heir of Severo, need no
longer be the subject of a special proceeding for declaration of heirship as envisioned by the CA.

RATIO: In all, Valentins long possessed status as a legitimate child and thus, heir of Severo, need no
longer be the subject of a special proceeding for declaration of heirship as envisioned by the Court of
Appeals. There is no need to re-declare his status as an heir of Severo. And, contraposed to the fact that
Valentins status as a legitimate child of Severo is already established, Nicolas status as a purported heir
of Severo can no longer be established, Nicolas right thereto expiring upon his death. Glaringly, there is
no pretension from respondents end that Nicolas was born of a valid marriage, only that he is Severos
son. Nonetheless, even if respondents were minded to establish the status of Nicolas, whether he is a
legitimate or an illegitimate child of Severo, such can no longer be done.

Calimag vs. Heirs of Macapaz, G.R.191936, June 27, 2016

Notes:
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage.

EMERGENCY RECIT: Calimag and Silvestra were co-owners of the subject property. 3 years after
Silvestras death (died without issue), the TCT was cancelled pursuant to a Deed of Sale allegedly
executed by Calimag and Silvestra. Hence, respondents, as children of Silvestras brother, Anastasio, Sr.,
and Fidela. Calimag argues that respondents have no legal standing to sue since they are illegitimate
children of Anastasio and Fidela, and are prohibited from inheriting from Silvestra pursuant to Art. 992 of
the Civil Code. In other words, Anastasio and Fidela were allegedly not married. RTC ruled in favor of
respondents. CA affirmed. SC: Anastasio and Fidela were married therefore respondents are legal heirs of
Silvestra. Respondents presented their respective Certificates of Live Birth to prove filiation. Item no. 24
of said documents show the date and place of marriage of Anastasio and Fidela as May 25, 1955 in
Alang-alang, Leyte. Moreover, the respondents certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr.
and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had
two children the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years after their first child,
Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to establish the validity of marriage. A man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.

FACTS:
Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with Silvestra
N. Macapaz (Silvestra).
Respondents are children of Silvestras brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O.
Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).
The subject property was duly registered in the names of the petitioner and Silvestra under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088. In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry No. 02671 is an
annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of the said
 property measuring 49.5 sq. m.
November 11, 2002: Silvestra died without issue.
July 7, 2005: TCT No. 183088 was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466,7 was
issued in the name of the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale8 dated January 18, 2005 whereby
Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq.-m. portion to the petitioner for P300,000.00.
Included among the documents submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an
Affidavit dated July 12, 2005 purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated
therein that the affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of
Deeds of Makati City, making the same legally ineffective.
September 16, 2005: Fidela passed away.
Respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of Deed
of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with Damages against the petitioner and the Register of
Deeds of Makati City.
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,13 the petitioner averred that the respondents have no
legal capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate children of
Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over Silvestras estate pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil
Code which prohibits illegitimate children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and
relatives of their father and mother.
RTC found for the respondents. CA affirmed.

ISSUE(S): WoN Anastasio, Sr. and Fidela were married, therefore, respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra.
YES.

RATIO:
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents.
Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their respective
Certificates of Live Birth issued by the NSO where Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of
both documents.
A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were apparently born to the same parents
their fathers name is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their mothers maiden name is Fidela Overa
Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof where it asks: 24. DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For
legitimate birth) it was stated therein that respondents parents were married on May 25, 1955 in
Alang-alang, Leyte.
The respondents certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly
cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had two children
the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily,
such fact is admissible proof to establish the validity of marriage.
Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what other proofs can be offered to establish the
fact of a solemnized marriage, viz.:
In Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of marriage may be presented:
a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony; b) the couples public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal certificate of children born
during such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours)
Moreover, in a catena of cases, it has been held that, [p]ersons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a
 woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage.

San Agustin vs. Sales, G.R. N0. 189289, August 31, 2016

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Gloria
Zoleta-San Agustin (petitioner) assails the Decision[2] dated May 29, 2009 and the Resolution[3] dated
August 25, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90302.

Factual Antecedents

On March 14, 1994, brothers Teodoro Sales (Teodoro) (now deceased) and Ernesto Sales (Ernesto)
(collectively, the plaintiffs) filed an action for the judicial approval of their recognition as the illegitimate
children of the late Louis C. Fernandez (Louis) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
docketed as Civil Case Nu. Q-94-19781 and raffled to Branch 110.[4] Subsequently, an Amended
Complaint was filed on March 13, 1996, before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 225, where it was alleged
that Ernesto and Teodoro were born in Pasay City on March 20, 1948 and October 22, 1943, respectively.
They are the illegitimate children of Louis and his common-law wife named Epitacia Sales (Epitacia) who
was a house helper in the Fernandez household. Louis[5] and his legal wife, Marie Louise Fernandez
(Marie Louise)[6] (Spouses Fernandez), a French national, did not have any child. According to the
plaintiffs, Louis formally recognized them as his children by Epitacia in two public documents bearing his
thumb marks, viz: (1) a notarized document dated November 11, 1980 jointly executed by Louis and
Epitacia formally recognizing the plaintiffs as their children; and (2) a document solely executed by Louis
on December 2, 1980, dominated as Acknowledgement of Children.[7]
The plaintiffs, having no knowledge of any relatives of Spouses Fernandez, directed the action against
unknown defendants. However, on May 30, 1994, the petitioner raised her opposition. She alleged in her
Amended Answer filed on July 26, 1994 that she is the niece of Louis and that the Spouses Fernandez
informally adopted her as their child when she was only 2 years old. She insisted that the father of the
plaintiffs is Corpus Micabalo (Corpus), the former houseboy of the Fernandez household.[8]

One of the principal allegations in the amended answer of the petitioner is that the documents presented
by the plaintiffs to sustain the complaint were spurious. These documents of recognition were forwarded
by the RTC to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. Bayani Palad (Palad), a
Fingerprint Examiner of the NBI, compared the thumbprint of Louis on the documents of recognition
with the other documents containing his thumb marks. Thereafter, Palad concluded that all the
thumbprints in the disputed documents belong to Louis.[9]

On February 17, 2001, the petitioner filed a motion to allow deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) Testing on
Louis who already died on January 1, 1987. The RTC, in its Resolution dated June 4, 2001, denied the
petitioners motion. Subsequently, the presentation of evidence proceeded.[10]

On April 15, 2002, the RTC issued an order denying the admission of the photographs presented by the
petitioner seeking to prove that she was treated by the Spouses Fernandez as their own child. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order of denial, but it was denied by the RTC on
July 10, 2002.[11] Thereafter, the petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA
ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction against the RTC judge for
declaring the photographs irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of recognition submitted before the
RTC. In a Decision[12] dated September 29, 2003, the CA denied the petition for lack of merit. It ruled that
even if the photographs were admitted, they remained to be immaterial and irrelevant to the issue of
recognition of the plaintiffs as the illegitimate children of Louis.[13]

Teodoro died on July 23, 1997 and was substituted by his mother Epitacia who subsequently died on
March 19, 2004 leaving Ernesto the lone respondent in the present case.

Ruling of the RTC

After trial on the merits, the RTC in a Decision[14] dated July 12, 2007 ruled in favor of the recognition of
the plaintiffs as the illegitimate children of Louis. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiffs prayer for judicial approval of
the recognition made by [Louis] during his lifetime. Accordingly, [Ernesto] and [Teodoro] (deceased) are
hereby declared the illegitimate children of the deceased [Louis] with the appurtenant rights of
illegitimate children under the law.

SO ORDERED.[15]

The petitioner elevated the adverse judgment of the RTC before the CA. The parties filed their
respective briefs. The petitioner filed her Reply Brief (with Application for DNA Testing of
Louis).[16] Ernesto filed his Comment[17] objecting to the proposed DNA Testing. In a
Resolution[18] dated February 10, 2009, the CA deferred its determination of the petitioners
application for DNA Testing.

Ruling of the CA

In a Decision[19] dated May 29, 2009, the CA found the appeal devoid of merit. The CA gave due weight to
the deeds of acknowledgment executed by Louis. The self-serving denial of the petitioner did not prevail
over the presumption of regularity accorded to the deeds of recognition in favor of the plaintiffs. Quoted
hereunder is the dispositive portion of the decision of the CA, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated 12 July 2007 of the [RTC], Branch 225,
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-94-19781, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[20]

On June 22, 2009, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[21] contending that the CA failed to act
on her application for DNA Testing despite its previous Resolution on February 10, 2009 that it would
treat the same as one of the assigned errors in the appeal. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration
in a Resolution[22] dated August 25, 2009.

The Issues

Undaunted, the petitioner urges the allowance of her Petition for Review on Certiorari enumerating the
following as errors committed by the CA:
I.
THE CA GROSSLY MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS AND MANIFESTLY IGNORED THE UNDISPUTED AND
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED,
WOULD HAVE JUSTIFIED A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.
A. The CA gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the two notarized documents
submitted by Ernesto despite the petitioners overwhelming contrary documentary evidence.

B. The CA gravely erred in giving credence to the testimony of Ernestos so-called expert witness.

II.

THE CA ARBITRARILY REFUSED AND/OR FAILED TO RULE ON THE PETITIONERS APPLICATION FOR
DNA TESTING DESPITE ITS EARLIER PRONOUNCEMENT THAT IT WILL RESOLVE THE SAME AS AN
ASSIGNED ERROR.
A. The CAs failure to act on the petitioners Application for DNA Testing is a substantial departure from this
Honorable Courts decisions favoring DNA Testing. Moreover, it is contrary to the CAs very own Resolution
dated February 10, 2009 wherein it undertook to resolve the petitioners application in the resolution of
the main appeal. The exercise of the Courts power of review and supervision is, thus, proper and necessary
under the circumstances.[23]

Ruling of the Court

The Court denies the instant petition and upholds the assailed decision and resolution of the CA.

The petitioner calls for the relaxation of the general rule that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari. It is a well-settled principle that the findings of fact of the CA especially
those upholding the trial court are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme
Court. The following are the recognized exceptions to the said rule:

(a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (b) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (f) when the [CA], in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) where the [CA] manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and (h) where the findings of fact of the [CA] are contrary to those of the trial court,
or are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the
petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the [CA] are premised on
absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record. x x x.[24] (Citation omitted)

None of these enumerated exceptions exists in the case at bar. Nonetheless, the Court will take up the
petitioners other assignment of errors to the extent that they touch upon legal issues and in order to
support the Courts ruling that the RTC and CAs factual findings are sufficiently justified by evidence and
jurisprudence.

At the center of the present controversy are the documents executed by Louis evidencing his voluntary
recognition of Teodoro and Ernesto as his illegitimate children. The petitioner, in an effort to oppose the
judicial approval of Teodoro and Ernestos status as illegitimate children, mainly argued that the subject
documents are spurious. The legitimate filiation of a child may be established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[25]

These requirements likewise apply to establish the filiation of illegitimate children.[26] In order to cast
doubt as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence presented by Ernesto, the petitioner purported
that the circumstances surrounding the execution and notarization of the said documents are highly
suspicious thereby warranting the overturn of the presumption of regularity in favor of these documents.
The petitioner claimed that during the execution and notarization of the documents, Louis could still
write, rendering incredible the mere affixing of his thumbprints to the contested documents.[27] However,
Ernesto testified before the RTC that Louis was no longer capable of writing his name as he was already
blind and bedridden at the time he affixed his thumb mark to the document dated November 11, 1980.
The witnesses to the document were Margarita Almeda, the hairdresser of Louis sister, and Romeo
Gadones, Teodoros acquaintance.[28] A thumb mark has been repeatedly considered as a valid mode of
signature. The Court, in the case of Dr. Yason v. Arciaga,[29] held that a signature may be made by a
persons cross or mark.[30]

There being no cogent reason to deviate from the conclusion of the RTC finding the testimony of Ernesto
worthy of belief, the Court adopts such testimony and considers it against the contention of the
petitioner. It is settled in a catena of cases that the findings of fact of trial courts are given weight on
appeal because they are in a better position to examine the real evidence, and observe the demeanor of
the witnesses and therefore discern whether they are telling the truth.[31]

The other inconsistencies cited by the petitioner are of no importance and insufficient to overcome the
presumption of regularity in favor of the notarized documents. A notarized document is a public
document and as such it enjoys the presumption of regularity which can only be overthrown by clear and
convincing evidence.[32] It serves as a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a
conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution.[33] The bare allegations of the petitioner
cannot qualify as clear and convincing evidence to overturn such presumption.

The petitioner maintained that the real father of Teodoro and Ernesto is Corpus. She presented various
evidence like school report card and death certificate wherein Teodoros surname followed that of
Corpus. The use of Corpus surname by Teodoro does not in itself negate the illegitimate filiation of
Teodoro and Ernesto. As correctly observed by the CA, Louis existing marriage to Marie Louise must
have prevented him from making any declaration that would have exposed his relationship with Epitacia.
The use of Louis surname by his children during the lifetime of Marie Louise would run counter to his
intention to cover such relationship. It is no less than the putative father who voluntary recognized that
Teodoro and Ernesto are his illegitimate children. It is emphatically underscored that it is the law and
only the law that determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for ones legitimacy or
illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised.[34]
All told, the authenticity of the documents of recognition executed by Louis which is the core of the
present controversy, as well as the credibility of the expert witness in the person of Palad, are questions
of fact for they involve the examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.
There exists a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of
facts while a question of fact concerns itself with the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. [35] To reiterate, a
petition for review on certiorari covers only questions of law.

The petitioner sought the conduct of DNA Testing to resolve the issue of paternity. However, the RTC
already arrived at a definitive conclusion that Teodoro and Ernesto are the illegitimate children of the
deceased Louis rendering the petitioners request for DNA Testing immaterial.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals,
the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 29, 2009 and the Resolution dated August 25, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90302 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

D. Action to impugn legitimacy

Reyes vs. Mauricio, G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010

FACTS:
1. Eugenio owns a parcel of land in Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan (4,527 square meters, more or less, and
covered by a TCT --- property was adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement
among the heirs following the death of his parents).
2. Librada F. Mauricio (Librada, DECEASED) and her daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) filed a
complaint before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan alleging that theyre the legal heirs of Godofredo
Mauricio who was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-
interest to the subject land( that from 1936 until his death in May 1994, Godofredo had been
working on the subject land and introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees,
seasonal crops, a residential house and other permanent improvements; that through fraud,
deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document
denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to eject respondents from the subject
property, and had the same notarized by Notary Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro
Manila; that Librada never appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the
contents of the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantage
of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada in the
execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been
employing all illegal means to eject respondents from the subject property).
3. Leonida and Librada prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for
Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject property.
4. According to Eugenio: Godofredos occupation of the subject premises was based on the formers
mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor
authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He maintained that Librada, accompanied by a
relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the
contents of the document. Moreover, Librada receivedP50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same day
of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since
the principal relief sought by respondents is the annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction
is vested on the regular courts.
 Provincial Adjudicator Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being the surviving
spouse, should have peaceful possession of the land.

DARAB - Mauricios are former tenants of Spouses Reyes.

CA - affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB.

ON APPEAL, Leonidas legal standing as a party was also assailed by Eugenio. Eugenio submitted that the
complaint was rendered moot with the death of Librada, Godofredos sole compulsory heir. Eugenio
contended that Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.

ISSUE: WON Eugenio can question the filiation of Leonida in a case regarding land dispute.
Whether Leonidas filiation may be attacked collaterally?

HELD: NO.

RATIO: We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio cannot collaterally
attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition.

It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino, in his book Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, noted that the
aforecited doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He explained thus:

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral

issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action
directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article
335) which provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs
must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any
other way is void. This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of
the code confirm this view, because they refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy. This
action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the
present articles.

In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court stated that legitimacy
and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not
through collateral attack.

The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral
attack. In Reyes v. Sotero, this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a
proceeding for the settlement of a decedents estate. Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, the Court declared
that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that
purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.

1. Grounds, FC 166

(a) Physical impossibility of access

Andal v. Macaraig, 89 Phil 165

 FACTS:

Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of
the ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned by Emiliano Andal and Maria
Duenas. Eduvigis Macaraig, herein defendant, donated the land by virtue of donation propter
nuptias in favor of Emiliano. The latter was suffering from tuberculosis in January 1941. His
brother, Felix, then lived with them to work his house and farm. Emiliano became so weak that he
can hardly move and get up from his bed. Sometime in September 1942, the wife eloped with Felix
and lived at the house of Marias father until 1943. Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the wife
did not attend the funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth to a boy who was, herein petitioner.

ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased.

HELD:

Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the
former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he was born within 300 days
following the dissolution of the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted by
proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the
first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by
husband to wife includes absence during the initial period of conception, impotence which is patent,
and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through
corrupt violation of prison regulations. Marias illicit intercourse with a man other than the
husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation between husband and wife.

Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner of the
parcel land.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueas, as guardian ad litem, brought an action in
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel
of land situated in the barrio of Talacop, Calabanga, Camarines Sur.

The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas; that
Emiliano Andal died on September 24, 1942; that Emiliano Andal was the owner of the parcel of land in
question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter
nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former; that Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the
land from 1938 up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advantage of the abnormal situation then
prevailing, entered the land in question.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano Andal the legitimate
son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal
owner of said land; and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the case to this
Court upon the plea that only question of law are involved.

It appears undisputed that the land in question was given by Eduvigis Macaraig to her son Emiliano Andal
by virtue of a donation propter nuptias she has executed in his favor on the occasion of his marriage to
Maria Dueas. If the son born to the couple is deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the land in
question. If otherwise, then the land should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to
succeed him under the law. The main issue, therefore, to be determined hinges on the legitimacy of
Mariano Andal in so far as his relation to Emiliano Andal is concerned. The determination of this issue
much depends upon the relationship that had existed between Emiliano Andal and his wife during the
period of conception of the child up to the date of his birth in connection with the death of the alleged
father Emiliano Andal.

The following facts appear to have been proven: Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in January
1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to help
him work his farm. His sickness became worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak
that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife,
eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the middle of 1943. Since
May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. On
January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On
June 17, 1943, Maria Dueas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal. Under these
facts, can the child be considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano?

Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:

Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of the celebration of
marriage or within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband
to have had access to his wife during the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred
next preceding the birth of the child.

Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is
presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within three hundred
(300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that
it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the
300 next preceding the birth of the child. Is there any evidence to prove that it was physically impossible
for Emiliano to have such access? Is the fact that Emiliano was sick of tuberculosis and was so weak that
he could hardly move and get up from his bed sufficient to overcome this presumption?

Manresa on this point says:

Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1) absence during the initial period of
conception, (2) impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable, and (3) imprisonment,
unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison
regulations. Manresa, 492-500, Vol. I, cited by Dr. Arturo Tolentino in his book "Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p.90)."

There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial period of conception,
specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which is
included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary,
there is enough evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still
living under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same house, and he and the wife
were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation between
Emiliano and his wife. We admit that Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition
then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from bed, his feet were swollen and his voice
hoarse. But experience shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where
persons suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage because they are
more inclined to sexual intercourse. As an author has said, "the reputation of the tuberculosis towards
eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably dependent more upon confinement to bed than the
consequences of the disease." (An Integrated Practice of Medicine, by Hyman, Vol. 3, p.2202). There is
neither evidence to show that Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable,
nor was there evidence that he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in
favor of the child has not, therefore, been overcome.

We can obtain the same result viewing this case under section 68, par. (c) of Rule 123, of the Rules of
Court, which is practically based upon the same rai'son d'etre underlying the Civil Code. Said section
provides:

The issue of a wife cohabiting with the husband who is not impotent, is indisputably presumed to
be legitimate, if not born within one hundred eighty days immediately succeeding the marriage, or
after the expiration of three hundred days following its dissolution.

We have already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had access one to the
other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within three (300) days following the
dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is
legitimate. We have also seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was
physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no such
proof. The fact that Maria Dueas has committed adultery can not also overcome this presumption
(Tolentino's Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 92).

In view of all the foregoing, we are constrained to hold that the lower court did not err in declaring
Mariano Andal as the legitimate son of the spouses Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Macadangdang v. CA, 100 SCRA 73

FACTS:
Elizabeth Mejias, married to Crispin Anahaw, had sex with Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March
1967. Because of the affair, she and her husband allegedly separated. On October 30, 1967, she gave birth
to a baby boy named Rolando Macadangdang. Elizabeth filed with the CFI a recognition and support
against Antonio. The lower court dismissed the complaint, applying the provisions of Articles 255 and
256 of the Civil Code. CA reversed the decision and declared Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio.
CA denied Vicente's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. Sometime in Marcg 1967 she allegedly had
intercourse with Antonio Macadangdang. Elizabeth alleges that due to the affair, she and her
husband separated in 1967.
October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days after the illicit encounter) she gave birth to a baby boy
who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December 24, 1967.
April 25, 1972 Elizabeth filed a complaint for recognition and support against Rolando.
 February 27, 1973 lower court dismissed the complaint.
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. They ruled that minor Rolando to be an
illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was
denied.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of Elizabeth and Crispin.
2) Whether or not Elizabeth may institute an action that would bastardized her child without giving her
husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.

RULING:

SC held that CA made judgement based on misapprehension of facts and the its finding of facts
contradicted by evidence on record.

Under the Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of
Elizabeth and Crispin.

Rolando was born only 7 months after the incident took place, and also 7 months after their alleged
separation. The birth of Rolando came more than 180 days following the celebration of said marriage and
before 300 days following the alleged separation between the spouses. The fact that the child was born in
the rented house, normally delivered, and raised normally by the yaya, according to the testimony of the
yaya Patrocinia Avila. If he was otherwise born prematurely, he would have needed to be placed under
special care, attended by a physician.

The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse. This presumption
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the
spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This presumption is
actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by only one evidence the physical
impossibility of access between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded
the birth of the child. This physical impossibility of access may be caused by any of these:

1. Impotence of the husband;

2. Living separately in such a way that access was impossible and
3. Serious illness of the husband.

Article 256 of the Civil Code which provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Hence, good
morals and public policy require that a mother should not be permitted to assert the illegitimacy of a
child born in wedlock in order to obtain some benefit for herself.

The law is not willing that the child be declared illegitimate to suit the whims and purposes of either
parent, nor Merely upon evidence that no actual act of sexual intercourse occurred between husband and
wife at or about the time the wife became pregnant. Thus, where the husband denies having any
intercourse with his wife, the child was still presumed legitimate.

With respect to Article 257, it must be emphasized that adultery on the part of the wife, in itself, cannot
destroy the presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is still possible that the child is that of the
husband.
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral or
economic interest involved.

It has, therefore, been held that the admission of the wife's testimony on the point would be unseemly
and scandalous, not only because it reveals immoral conduct on her part, but also because of the effect it
may have on the child, who is in no fault, but who nevertheless must be the chief sufferer thereby.

It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the responsibility and
consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and above all her
own son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the bastardization of respondent's son would give
rise to serious and far-reaching consequences on society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married
women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the children born during
such immoral relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the form
of wrecking the stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality.
Concepcion vs. CA, G.R. No. 123450, Aug. 31, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioner Gerardo Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almontewere married in 1989.
Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. In 1991, however, Gerardo filed a petition to
have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that 9 years before he
married private respondent, the latter had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she
married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to
be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa
while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that
Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during his first marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of Mario and
not petitioner Gerardo.

RULING:

Yes. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, a child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his
parents is legitimate. In the present case, since the marriagebetween Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void
ab initio, the marriage between Mario and Ma. Theresa was still subsisting at the time Jose Gerardo was
conceived, and thus the law presumes that Jose Gerardo was a legitimate child of private respondent and
Mario. Also, Gerardo cannot impugn the legitimacy of the childbecause such right is strictly personal to
the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void
from the very beginning; he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn
the legitimacy of her child.

The petition was denied.

(b) Biological or other scientific grounds

 A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC (RULE ON DNA Evidence)

Agustin v CA June 15, 2005

Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner
Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an intimate
relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnels insistence on
abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The babys birth certificate was
purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later
refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even
suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.

On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club
parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to
the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing
chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support.

Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and
moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.

The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at
the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.

ISSUE: WON DNA testing is self-incriminatory and violates privacy of person

HELD: NO

Being the first case where DNA testing was the focal issue the court examines the history of DNA testing

The court opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v.
Court of Appeals

In People v. Vallejo where the rape and murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of
the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain
whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples
collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile

The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.

right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle
scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions
into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common
good.

where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

No evidence to show this

If criminal can be subject to it at expense of death, what more in a civil case for paternity?

Herrera vs. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005

SUMMARY: Herrera, the putative father of Rosendo, did not want to undergo a DNA paternity test
ordered by the RTC in a paternity proceeding against him; so he questioned the order before the CA and
the SC. Upholding the lower courts, SC ordered him to undergo the test, brushing aside his arguments
that: DNA testing is not legally accepted; DNA testing is unreliable; and DNA testing is self-incriminatory.
SC also laid down standards for the consideration of DNA evidence with respect to its weight and
probative value, which later formed part of the basis for the DNA evidence rule.

DOCTRINE: DNA evidence has already been accepted in the Philippine jurisdiction, subject to the basic
principle that in the assessment of its probative value, courts should consider, among other things, the
following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the establishment of paternity through DNA evidence, the probability of paternity W must at least be
99.9%. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of
paternity. This refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.

NATURE: Appeal from a CA decision affirming an RTC order. Original action for compulsory recognition,
support, and damages.

FACTS
May 14, 1998 Then only 13 y/o, ROSENDO Alba, represented by his mother ARMI Alba, filed a
petition for compulsory recognition, support, and damages against his alleged father, Rosendo
HERRERA, before the RTC of Manila.
Aug. 7, 1998 In his answer with counterclaim, Herrera denied paternity of Rosendo. He also
denied having any physical contact with Armi.
Rosendo moved for the taking of DNA paternity testing.
o Rosendo presented as expert witness Dr. Saturnina Halos, a molecular biologist and
professor at DLSU and UP, who had experience heading a DNA analysis laboratory in UP.
o Dr. Halos testified to the process of DNA paternity testing and asserted that it was
99.9999% accurate in establishing paternity.
o Herrera opposed the motion, arguing that DNA paternity testing has not gained
acceptability, and that it violates his right against self-incrimination.
 Feb. 3, 2000 The RTC granted the motion. Herrera was ordered to undergo DNA paternity
testing.
June 8, 2000 Herreras MR was denied.
July 18, 2000 Herrera filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA, advancing the following
arguments:
o RTC misapplied the ruling in Lim v. CA
o DNA testing was accepted without considering the limitations and conditions for its
admissibility and regardless of the constraints affecting the reliability of the test as
admitted by Dr. Halos herself
o The scientific findings relied upon by the RTC are unfit for judicial notice and are not
supported by experts
o DNA testing, under the circumstances, is inconclusive, irrelevant, coercive, and
unconstitutional
Nov. 29, 2000 CA DECISION
o RTC affirmed.
o Since the thrust of the petition is to seek a reevaluation of the evidence, the remedy of
appeal is available.
o DNA paternity testing does not violate the right against self-incrimination, which refers
only to testimonial compulsion.
o An adverse DNA paternity test result may still be refuted anyway.
May 23, 2001 CA denied MR. Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUES (HELD)
1) W/N DNA testing should be allowed despite lack of official recognition and presence of technical and
legal constraints to its implementation (YES, DNA analysis has been accepted as evidence)
2) W/N DNA testing is a valid probative tool to determine filiation under Philippine law (YES, but
subject to relevant standards)
3) W/N DNA testing violates the right against self-incrimination (NO)

RATIO
1) PRELIMINARY: OVERVIEW OF THE PATERNITY AND FILIATION SUIT
Filiation proceedings are instituted not only to adjudicate paternity but also to secure legal rights
associated with paternity, e.g., support or inheritance.
BURDEN OF PROOF is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of
the child
4 SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
o PRIMA FACIE CASE
exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative father.
corroborative proof is required to shift the burden of proof to the putative father
CASE AT BAR: Armi asserted that Herrera is the biological father of Rosendo. She
presented corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures.
o AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
two are available to the putative father: incapability to have sexual relations (due
either to physical absence or impotency) or proof that the mother had sexual
relations with other men around the time of conception.
CASE AT BAR: Herrera raised both defenses, denying that he ever had intercourse
with Armi.
o PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY
 A child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate (FC 165, 167). The
presumption may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law.
o PHYSICAL RESEMBLANCE BETWEEN PUTATIVE FATHER AND CHILD
trial technique unique to paternity proceedings
may be offered as evidence of paternity
although likeness is a function of heredity, no quantitative formula or standard can
be used to measure likeness. This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions/senses
of the judge.
CASE AT BAR: Armi submitted pictures of Rosendo and Herrera side by side, to
show how much they resemble each other.
LAWS, RULES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON FILIATION
o FC 175: Illegitimate children may establish their filiation in the same way as legitimate
children.
o FC 172: Establishment of filiation by legitimate children can be made by:
record of birth in the civil registry or in a final judgment
admission made in a public document or in a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing, by open and continuous possession of legitimate
status or by any other means allowed by the RoC and special laws.
o RoC 130, Secs. 39-40 relate to acts, declarations, family tradition and reputation relating to
pedigree. Pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces
also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
o Lim v. CA: SC adopted a wary attitude towards DNA testing; held that paternity still has to
be resolved by conventional evidence.
o To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the
writing must be the writing of the putative father.
o A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father
was considered acceptable evidence.
o Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative
father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth,
proved filiation.
o However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a fathers operation, or a
marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic
writing.
o Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to
establish filiation.
Scientific advances have widened the range of evidence available to establish paternity; it is now
no longer limited to evidence of incriminating acts. Blood grouping tests have been upheld as
conclusive of non-paternity and have been allowed by the SC in Co Tao v. CA and in Jao v. CA.

2) DNA ANALYSIS AS EVIDENCE CONCEPT AND PROCESS

Deoxyribonucleic acid is the basic building block of the human genetic makeup. It is found in all
human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Since genetic identity is unique, a
persons DNA profile can determine his identity.
DNA analysis is a procedure where a biological sample from an individual is processed to form a
DNA profile and then examined.
Quoting from the trial court order (sorry for the copypasta, Carpio quoted it verbatim):
o Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular
sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework,
 nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known as polymorphic loci, which are the
areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting, or analysis/DNA
fingerprinting/genetic tests or fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing simply means
determining the polymorphic loci.
o PROCEDURE FOR DNA TYPING
From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist may proceed to
analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct DNA typing.
They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism); reverse dot blot
or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287 cases that were admitted as evidence
by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; mtDNA process; VNTR (variable
number tandem repeats); and the most recent which is known as the PCR-
([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as
of 1996, was availed of by most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the
process of replicating or copying DNA in an evidence sample a million times through
repeated cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA polymerize enzyme. STR,
on the other hand, takes measurements in 13 separate places and can match two (2)
samples with a reported theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
o Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, matches are determined. To
illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case,
the evidence collected from the crime scene is compared with the known print. If a
substantial amount of the identifying features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is
deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is
different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.
o As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each of
these regions, a person possesses two genetic types called allele, one inherited from each
parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable
regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile.
o Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which
half of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been
inherited from the biological father. The alleged fathers profile is then examined to
ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in
the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the
father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father.
3) AS OF 2002, THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY QUESTION ON THE VALIDITY OF THE USE OF DNA ANALYSIS
AS EVIDENCE
Prior to 2002, SC was of skeptical stance with respect to DNA analysis as evidence, as reflected in
Lim v. CA (1997) and People v. Tijing (2001), although in the latter case, the SC recognized that UP
had already set up a laboratory capable of performing STR analysis and DNA analysis will prove
useful in the future.
The Vallejo case, decided in 2002, represented the change in the SCs stance. Vallejo was meted the
death penalty, partly because of the match between the DNA profile of the sample taken from the
victim and the DNA profile of Vallejo.
Said the Court in that case: In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts
should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how
they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
Thus the SC was no longer talking about admissibility, but has moved on to analyzing the
probative value of DNA evidence. It was no longer about the official recognition of DNA evidence,
as the issue is now the observance of the procedures in conducting DNA analysis.
 In 2004, the Yatar and de Villa cases followed the Vallejo trend. In both cases the Court gave
credence to DNA evidence in disposing of the issues.
NO NEED TO REFER TO AMERICAN JURISPRUDENTIAL STANDARDS REGARDING ADMISSIBILITY OF
DNA EVIDENCE
o Both Herrera and Rosendo cite US cases in support of their positions regarding the
admissibility of DNA evidence.
o Frye v. US: Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone
the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well recognized scientific principle or discovery,
the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
o Frye-Schwartz standard: While [the US Circuit Court agrees] that forensic DNA typing has
gained general acceptance in the scientific community, we hold that admissibility of specific
test results in a particular case hinges on the laboratorys compliance with appropriate
standards and controls, and the availability of their testing data and results.
o Failure to meet Frye standards with respect to expert testimonies in product liability cases
led to the development of the Daubert-Kumho standard, which in turn led to the
amendment of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Procedure.
o Expert witness may testify as to specialized knowledge if:
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case.
o However, in the Philippines, the Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-Kumho standards go into the
weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. American jurisprudence is merely
persuasive.
o The Philippine Rules of Court are more liberal evidence is admissible when it has such
relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief or non-belief in its existence and is not
excluded by law or the rules. Neither does Rule 130, Sec. 49 on expert testimony preclude
the admissibility of DNA evidence.
o SC: Rule 130, Sec. 49 does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as
evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed when it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.
4) GUIDELINES ON THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA EVIDENCE
Basic principle has been enunciated in Vallejo: see No.3, 3rd bullet.
With respect to paternity:
o In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an
individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child,
it is possible to determine which half of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The
other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged fathers profile is
then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the
paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of the child, the man
is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father.
o It is not enough to state that the DNA profiles of the putative father and the child match. A
complete match of DNA profiles does not necessarily establish paternity.
o PROBABILITY OF PATERNITY MEASURE
Following the Louisiana standard, courts should require a minimum of 99.9% W
prior to a paternity inclusion
 W stands for Probability of Paternity. It is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of
paternity of a putative father compared to the probability of a random match of two
unrelated individuals. An appropriate population database is required to compute
for W.
Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will never equal 100%
(hence it is a limit :])
Accuracy of W estimates is higher when the mother, child, and putative father are all
subjected to DNA testing.
SC: DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be
conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results
of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value
of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity. This
refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.
5) NO VIOLATION OF RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
It has been repeatedly stated in jurisprudence that the protection of the constitution
against self-incrimination extends only to testimonial compulsion.
The protection relates to forced extraction of communicative evidence. Bodily or object
evidence is not covered. Thus the SC has allowed forcible spitting of morphine, compulsory
pregnancy tests, and trying on of pants for size as admissible evidence over self-
incrimination objections.
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and
filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the
putative parent to claim his or her own defenses.
Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern
science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by
the law, rules, and jurisprudence.

DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed; judgment affirmed.

Estate v. Diaz, G.R. No. 171713, Dec. 17, 2007

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REMANDED THE
CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NO
LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG

HELD: NO, the decision is affirmed

RATIO:

In its decision, the Supreme Court discussed the Family Code provisions on filiation,
presumption of legitimacy of a child (Article 167), basis for establishing legitimacy
(Articles 172 and 175), among others.

[1] As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor
Joanne for purposes of support in favor of the said minor.

But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is
the biological father of the minor, through DNA testing.

[2] DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic make-up. DNA
is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic
identity is unique. Hence, a persons DNA profile can determine his identity.

DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample

obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a
pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken. This
DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins.

[3] Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is no
longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged impossibility of
complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible
than real. Petitioners argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA
Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon
application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation.

From Section 4 Application for DNA Testing Order, it can be said that the death
of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for
as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.

As defined above, the term biological sample means any organic material
originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is
susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues,
hairs and bones.

Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as

enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this
case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate
biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.

2. Effect of a mothers declaration, FC 167

Chua Keng Giap v. IAC, 158 SCRA 18

Facts:
Chua Keng Giap, filed a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao .
Private respondent moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of action and of the
petitioner's capacity to file the petition. The latter, it was claimed, had been declared
as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao in S.P. No. Q-12592, for the
settlement of the estate of the late Chua Bing Guan. The decision in that case had
long become final and executory.
The motion was denied by Judge Jose P. Castro, who held that the case invoked
decided the paternity and not the maternity of the petitioner. Holding that this was
mere quibbling, the respondent court reversed the trial judge in a petition for
certiorari filed by the private respondent. The motion for reconsideration was
denied for late filing. The petitioner then came to this Court to challenge these
rulings.
The petitioner argues at length that the question to be settled in a motion to dismiss
based on lack of a cause of action is the sufficiency of the allegation itself and not
whether these allegations are true or not, for their truth is hypothetically admitted.
CONTENTIONS:
Respondent:
A. Res judicata: The latter, it was claimed, had been declared as not the son of the
spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao in S.P. No. Q-12592, for the settlement of the
estate of the late Chua Bing Guan.
B. Mothers testimonials: SY Kua herself testified that she is not her son.
Petitioner:
A. paternity and not the maternity of the petitioner is to be decided. Therefore, the
testimony of the mother should not be credited.
ISSUE: W/N Chua Keng Giap is the son of Chua Bing and Sy Kua.
Held: NO.
The petitioner is beating a dead horse. The issue of his claimed filiation has long
been settled, and with finality, by no less than this Court. That issue cannot be
resurrected now because it has been laid to rest in Sy Kao v. Court of
Appeals, decided on September 28, 1984. In that case, Sy Kao flatly and
unequivocally declared that she was not the petitioner's mother.
Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap was really her son?
More than anyone else, it was Sy Kao who could say as indeed she has said these
many years--that Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb.

3. In subsequent marriages, FC 168 in relation to Republic Act No. 10655, An Act

Repealing the Crime of Premature Marriage under Article 351 Of Act No. 3815,
otherwise known as The Revised Penal Code, March 2015, 169

People v Quitoriano, January 20, 1997

FACTS

Edgardo Quitoriano was charged of the crime of rape. He allegedly raped the victim,
Edna Pergis, on December 24, 1992.In June 1993, her aunt, Teresa Pergis,
discovered that Edna was pregnant. On August 2, 1993, private complainant filed a
complaint for rapeagainst accused-appellant. She gave birth on October 31, 1993.
Private complainant gave birth more than ten months after the alleged rape;
therefore, the child could not have been the accused

ISSUES : WON the child could have been the accuseds child

HELD
Yes. The fact that private complainant gave birth more than ten months after the
alleged rape does not discredit her testimony. Dr. Honesto Marquez, a physician
from the Marinduque Provincial Hospital, explained that the normal gestation
period is 40 weeks or 280 days, but it can also extend beyond 40 weeks if the
woman is having her first pregnancy. It is undisputed that the child delivered by
private complainant on October 31, 1993 was her first. Hence, it is not impossible
that the child was conceived in December, 1992, the date of the alleged rape.

DOCTRINE:
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE FACT THAT THE VICTIM GAVE BIRTH MORE THAN TEN (10)
MONTHS AFTER THE ALLEGED RAPE DOES NOT DISCREDIT HER TESTIMONY;
CASE AT BENCH. The fact that private complainant gave birth more than ten
months after the alleged rape does not discredit her testimony. Dr. Honesto
Marquez, a physician from the Marinduque Provincial Hospital, explained that the
normal gestation period is 40 weeks or 280 days, but it can also extend beyond 40
weeks if the woman is having her first pregnancy. It is undisputed that the child
delivered by private complainant on October 31, 1993 was her first. Hence, it is not
impossible that the child was conceived in December, 1992, the date of the alleged
rape.

4. Presumptions, FC 170, 171

5. Who may impugn, FC 170-171

Benitez-Badua v. CA, 229 SCRA 468

FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian had various properties. They both
died intestate. The special proceedings for administration of the properties were
filed with the trial court. Vicente's sister Victoria B. Lirio filed for issuance of letters
of administration in favor of the nephew. Marissa opposed the petition, saying that
she is the sole heir of deceased Vicente and that she is capable of administering his
estate. She submitted the pieces of documentary evidence and testified that the
spouses treated her as their own daughter. The relatives of Vicente tried to prove
through testimonial evidence, that the spouses failed to beget a child during their
marriage. Victoria categorically declared that Marissa was not the biological child of
the spouses who were unable to physically procreate.

Trial court relied on Arts. 166 and 170 of the Family Code and ruled in favor of
Marissa. On appeal, the CA reversed the lower court decision and declared Marissa
Benitez-Badua is not the biological child of the late spouses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Marissa Benitez-Badua is the legitimate child and the sole heir of the
late spouses.

RULING:
No. The SC find no merit to the petition.

Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be applied in the case at
bar. The above provisions do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged
not to be the biological child of a certain couple.

In Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of the child by:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of
the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his
child;
(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence.

Articles 170 and 171 speak of the prescription period within which the husband or
any of his heirs should file an action impugning the legitimacy of the child. In this
case, it is not where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that Marissa is not
his child or a child by Isabel, but they are contending that Marissa was not born to
Vicente and Isabel.

Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses. Marissa's Certificate of Live
Birth was repudiated by the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
late Isabel by Vicente, saying that he and his brother-in-law are the sole heirs of the
estate.

Liyao, Jr. vs. Tanhoti-Liyao, 378 SCRA 563

FACTS:
Petitioner, represented by his mother Corazon, filed an action for compulsory
recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the late William Liyao against
herein respondents, the legitimate wife and children of the deceased.

Corazon is legally married but living separately from her husband allegedly
for more than ten years at the time of the institution of this civil case. She cohabited
with the late William until his death. Petitioner alleged that he was in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao, having
been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his
lifetime and presented witnesses and evidence to prove his allegations. On the other
hand, respondents painted a different picture of the story. RTC rendered judgment
in favour of petitioner.

CA reversed the ruling of RTC, favoured the presumption of legitimacy of the child
and gave weight to the testimonies of the witnesses of the respondents that Corazon
and her husband were seen together during the period she cohabited with the
deceased.

ISSUE:
WON the petition initiated by Corazon to compel recognition by respondents can
prosper.
WON petitioners action to impugn his legitimacy is proper.

RULING:
No. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even
though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.(Art 167,FC)
 No. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert
the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances,
his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting
marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband,
presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the
status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his
mothers alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is
overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully
defeated the presumption. (Art 170-171, FC)

Republic v Magpayo, GR 189476, Feb. 2, 2011

FACTS: Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng

Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique
Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondents certificate of live birth shows,
contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.

Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on
July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change
his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed
as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled "IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMEOF
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON
MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG."

In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National

Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its]
National Indices of Marriage. Respondent also submitted his academic records
from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and
the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the
1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of
Quezon Citys 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."

On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent amended his petition by
alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2,
Rule 103] of the Rules of Court.

The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in
the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November
7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008. And a copy of the notice was furnished the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was
entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex
parte
By Decision of January 8, 2009, the trial court granted respondents petition and
directed the Civil Registrar ofMakati City to:

1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF
MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein respondents Certificate of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent]
to "COSETENG";
3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent];
and
4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for FATHER of the
[respondent] (emphasis and underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original)

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged
the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of
civil status should be made through appropriate adversarial proceedings.
2. Whether or not the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it
directed the deletion of the name of respondents father from his birth
certificate.
HELD:

The petition is impressed with merit. (in favor of the Republic)

1. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using
valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by
a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is
no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
the change of name would prejudice public interest.

*** Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or
analogous to, recognized grounds, however.

The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the

Philippines. In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use
the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion.
Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname
of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the
Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mothers surname, adding that
the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the
present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.

The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to affect his legal
status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of
illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondents supplication.

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that "changes which may affect the
civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial
alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . ."

******** Since respondents desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.

SEC. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is

sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)

2. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status should be
filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected
that of Makati in the present case, and "all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding.

As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where
his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned
title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil
registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.

Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct.
Aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all
affected parties as respondents in the case."A petition for a substantial correction or
change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar,
as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be
affected thereby."

Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors."
The first notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second
(which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in
the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such
as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section
4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for
two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an
opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).

The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the
subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even
parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were
inadvertently left out.

Geronimo v Santos, G.R. No. 197099, Sept. 25, 2015

Civil Law; Family Code; Filiation. The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code
actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be
attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited
by law.

FACTS: Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, the defendants, executed a document

declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo.
Consequently, they took possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of
the subject property to their names.

Karen Santos, on the other hand, claims to be the only child of deceased
Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. She filed a complaint for the annulment of document
and recovery of the possession against the defendants, brothers of his father. She
alleged that with the death of her parents, the property belonging to her parents
was passed on to her by the law of intestacy.

The defendant denied the allegation that the plaintiff was the only child and
sole heir of their brother stating that the deceased Rufino and Caridad were
childless and took in as their ward Karen, the child of Caridads sister. To strengthen
their defense, they claimed that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated
document. The birth certificate had alterations as confirmed by an NSO
representative.
 They alleged that it is impossible for Rufino and Caridad to register the
plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they never lived or sojourned in that place.
Also, Caridad, an elementary teacher in Bulacan, never filed a maternity leave during
the period of her service, as supported by a certification from the Schools Division
Superintendent.

The RTC ruled that the respondent is a legitimate child of the putative
parents. The trial court found that respondents filiation was duly established by the
certificate of live birth which was presented in evidence. It dismissed the
petitioners claim that the certificate was tampered. It further stated that even
granting arguendo that the birth certificate is questionable, the filiation of
respondent has already been sufficiently proven by evidence of her open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of the
Family Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that under Article 170, the action to
impugn the legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either of these two dates:
the date the child was born to the mother during the marriage, or the date when the
birth of such child was recorded in the civil registry. The appellate court found no
evidence or admission that Caridad indeed gave birth to respondent on a specific
date.

It further resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case does not
qualify as the valid registration of birth in the civil register because it was not signed
by the physician or midwife in attendance at the childs birth or the parents of the
newborn child, contrary to what the law required. However, the CA ultimately ruled
that the respondent was able to prove her filiation via open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child as supported by secondary evidence
presented.

The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her
putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and
sent her to school paying for her tuition and other school expenses; (3) she was the
beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death of
Rufino, Caridad applied for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and
property of the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the
plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of
the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the deceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the introduction of
secondary evidence and rendered judgment notwithstanding the existence of
primary evidence of birth certificate.

HELD: NEGATIVE. Secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action

under Article 172 because the said provision of law is meant to be instituted as a
separate action, and proof of filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the
instant case which is an action for annulment of document and recovery of
possession. However, this rule is applicable only to actions where the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child is at issue.

In the case at bar, filiation is not an issue. What petitioner alleges is that the
respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses at all. Thus, both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals correctly admitted secondary evidence similar to the proof
admissible under Art. 172 of the Family Code.

However, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower courts declaration that the
respondent is a legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased spouses is based on
misapprehension of facts. The irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries
on the date of birth and the name of the informant made the document questionable,
as supported by the corroborating testimony of the NSO representative. In addition,
even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities.
These irregularities and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the alleged
birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity
attached to the respondents birth.

With the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or falsity ruled then
the respondent is not the child of Rufino, and therefore not entitled to inherit from
the estate.

6. Prescription of action to impugn legitimacy

Gaspay v. CA, 238 SCRA 163

Facts:
Flaviano Gaspay died intestate on 10/14/83, then married to Agueda Denoso
(childless). On 7/6/88 private respondent Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro alleged at trial
court that shes acknowledged Illegitimate Child of Flaviano with Claudia Pason,
prayed for issuance of letters of admin of Flavianos estate.

Petitioners are Jr. (adopted son) and Eriberta (next of kin) who filed for an MTD
(motion to dismiss) saying that Guadalupe is a stranger.

TC denied the motion to dismiss saying that such was based on indubitable grounds
but TC nonetheless dismissed petition saying that testimonial and documentary
evidence failed to prove status of Guadalupe, failed to show Guadualupe consenting
to the acknowledgement as Illegitimate Child and that such action should have been
filed in the lifetime of Flaviano.

CA reversed TC on 9/30/91 saying that:

Evid is ample to prove filiation as Illegitimate Child
Evid is sufficient to show that Guad consented to the acknowledgement as
Illegitimate Child
 Action can be instituted after death of putative father

Issue: WON Guadalupe is an Illegitimate Child?

Held:
YES. TC did not discount the testimony of Martin Garin (agent to logging
concessionaire of Flaviano for 18 years) who verified handwriting and signature of
Flaviano in a letter addressed to Lupe and Toming (Guadalupe and his husband
Bartolome Alfaro) regarding the hospitalization expenses of Guadalupes daughter.
CA said that TC must have assumed that Flavianos handwriting must have
metamorphosed during the years but it could be possible that handwriting of
Flaviano never changed at all. Also when Guadalupe filed said action, she still used
Gaspay affixed to her legal surname as married to Alfaro, thereby shouting to the
world her consent to the acknowledgment of an Illegitimate Child. As to the action
being instituted after death of putative father, CA said action based on
acknowledgement may be brought even after death of putative father. She thereby
proved entitlement to the admin of estate. Moreover, the petitioners neglected to
apply for a letter admin 30 days after the death of Flaviano Gaspay.

E. Proof of Filiation

1. Of legitimate children, FC 172-173

Ong v CA, 272 SCRA 725

FACTS:
-Respondents Alferdo Ong Jr. and Robert Ong are children of Saturnina Caballes
allegedly by Manuel Ong.

-Manuel (representing himself as Alfredo Go) was introduced to Saturnina by

Vicente Sy and Constancia Lim (in 1953 at a night club in cebu). They had a
relationship and lived together for 4 months. It was also established that prior to
meeting Manuel, Saturnina cohabited with a paralytic.

-Alfredo Ong Jr. (registered as Alfredo Go Jr.) was born in 1955 and Robert Ong
(registered as Roberto Caballes) 1956. Roberto is surnamed Caballes because the
midwife informed Saturnina that it should be the case since she werent married
with Manuel. Manuels support dwindled. He stopped seeing her. She discovered his
identity and asked for support but he refused.

-In 1961 they asked for support but Manuel denied them. In two occasions Dolores
Dy, Manuels commonlaw wife, treated private respondents like close relatives of
Manuel Ong by giving them on November 2, 1979 and January 6, 1977 tokens of
affection, such as family pictures of Dolores Dy and Manuel Ong and by visiting them
in their house on A. Lopez Street in 1980.
-Manuel Ong also gave money to Alfredo, first, as the latters high school graduation
gift and second, for the latters educational support. Manuel Ong even told Alfredo to
comeback with a list of what he needs for school but when he came back with some
friends in September 1982, Manuel turned down his request and ordered him to
leave and threatened to call the police if he did not leave.

-September 30, 1982, Alfredo filed a complaint for recognition and support against
Manuel Ong. The complaint was amended on November 25, 1982 to include Robert
as co-plaintiff. Manuel died in May 1990 while the case is pending.

TC-declared Alfredo and Robert illegitimate children of Manuel in accordance with

Art. 283, pars. 2 and 4 of the Civil Code.

CA-affirm TC, cited Art. 283, par. 3 as an additional ground for ordering the
recognition of private respondents as illegitimate children.

Issue: WON Alfredo and Roberto are illegitimate children of Manuel

Held/Ratio:
Yes. Alfredo and Roberto are sons of Manuel.
Using Article 283 Paragraph. 4 (The father is obliged to recognize) when the child
has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

Art. 283 operates as a blanket provision covering all cases in the preceding ones, so
that evidence, even though insufficient to constitute proof under the other
paragraphs, may nonetheless be enough to qualify the case under par. 4.

In this case, the testimony of Saturnina Caballes that she had illicit sexual relation
with Manuel Ong over a long period (1954-1957) which, had it been openly done,
would have constituted cohabitation under par. 3 is proof that private respondents
were conceived and born during such relationship and constitutes evidence of Ongs
paternity. This relationship was further established through the testimony of
Constancia Lim. The evidence for private respondents is not negated by the
admission of Saturnina Caballes that she had relation with another man before,
because the relationship terminated at least a year before the birth of Alfredo Ong,
Jr. and two years before the birth of the second child Robert Caballes.

SC agree that this DOES NOT fall in Art 283 (2) When the child is in continuous
possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or
his family--- the times during which Manuel Ong met Alfredo and gave the latter
money cannot be considered proof of continuous possession of the status of a child.
The fathers conduct toward his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this
ground to exist.

Does NOT fall in Art 283 (3) When the child was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father----------While Saturnina Caballes
testified that she and Manuel Ong lived together for four months as husband and
wife in order to justify a finding of cohabitation, the relationship was not open and
public so as to constitute cohabitation.
Petitioner claims that Manuel is sterile (due to illness during World War). For
despite living with 2 other women, Dolores and Victoria Veloria (later established as
Victoria Balili) but they didnt have a child. CA dismissed this for there is no medical
proof and Manuel acknowledged a Lourdes Balili (born 1939) as his natural child
with a Victoria Balili.

An adult male is presumed to have normal powers of virility and the burden of
evidence to prove the contrary rests upon him who claims otherwise. Petitioner has
not overcome this presumption.

Diaz vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 621, June 22, 1984

FACTS:

On September 10, 1949, Leodegario (decedent) died intestate (while the Spanish
Civil Code was still in effect), leaving no surviving spouse nor descendants.
Petitioner Maria B. Diaz claims him to be the brother in full blood of her mother
Filomena and of her aunt Pastora (who are legitimate children of Isidro Azarraga).
On the other hand, private respondents claim that Leodegario was the illegitimate
son of Isidro and Valentina Abarracoso. On October 15, 1949, Maria Diaz (the
original petitioner herein before she was substituted by her legal heirs as she died
during the pendency of the suit), filed in the Court of First Instance of Capiz the basic
petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration in her favor for the settlement
of Leodegario's estate. On October 25, 1949, one Amador Azarraga (one of Isidros
illegitimate children) filed a formal opposition praying that he, instead of Maria, be
appointed as Administrator. The legal battle for the right to administer Leodegarios
estate was continued after both Maria and Amadors deaths by their heirs.
[CA ruled in favour of Amador btw]

ISSUE:

The question here is to determine who should be Leodegario's intestate heir? Is it

Maria, the legitimate daughter of Filomena (one of Isidros legitimate children)? Or
should it be the other children of ISIDRO (the illegitimate children, like Amador)?

HELD:
MARIA, Leodegario was legitimate. School records from UST list him as "Leodegario
Azarraga y Lozada". Although those records by themselves are not proof of
legitimate filiation, they constitute strong evidence thereof. The several letters
wherein he signed simply as "Leodegario Azarraga" neither disprove legitimacy.
Even nowadays, the dropping of the maternal surname in correspondence or
written documents is commonplace for convenience and/or brevity. The Last Will
and Testament of Pastora Azarrag, executed on August 3, 1961, which,
althoughstanding alone does not establish DECEDENT's legitimacy, enhances that
conclusion. That Will was duly probated on January 9, 1967 without objection and
specifically indicates that the DECEDENT (No. 8), Pastora (No. 10) and Filomena
(No. 9) [petitioner mother] are "brother and sisters of the full blood they being
children of Isidro Azarrag and Calixta Lozada". While the will alone cannot be proof
of pedigree, it is not being considered as an independent evidence but collectively
with other evidence on record.
Significant also in this regard is the narration of facts in Sison vs. Azarraga, 30 Phil.
129 (1915), of which case we can take judicial notice, eloquently showing that not
only had the decedent been already given his share of the inheritance but that he
was also appointed executor of his father Isidro's estate, as well as a guardian of
petitioner and her brother Jesus. This serves to corroborate Maria's testimony that
it was her uncle, the said decedent, who attended to her personal and proprietary
interests.
CA decision reversed, totality of evidence proves Leodegarios legitimacy

Tison vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582, July 31, 1997

Facts:
The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece and nephew of the
deceased Tedora Dezoller Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of their father
Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without
any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin
Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October
3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of
representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving
spouse executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself,
allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein private
respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, a TCT was issued in the latters name.
Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in
question by right of representation. Tedoro Domingo however, attacks the
legitimacy of Hermogenes.

During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone
witness, with documentary evidences offered to prove petitioners filiation to their
father and their aunt. Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a
written offer of the exhibits.

Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiffs Evidence on the

ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased
Teodora Guerrero.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for reconveyance. Respondent Court of
Appeals upheld the dismissal, declaring that the documentary evidence presented
by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint
affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence,
this appeal.

Issues:
1. Whether or not a third person (private respondent), not the father nor an heir,
may attack the legitimacy of the petitioners.
2. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in
question by right of representation.

Ruling:
1. The private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein
petitioners.
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the
issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the
one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his
wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose
it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional
cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these
cases, none even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an
insult to his memory.
The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is
more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: The
contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by
proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way
is void. This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the
code confirm this view, because they refer to the action to impugn the
legitimacy. This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within
the periods fixed by law.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the
presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The
obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from
being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to
settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to
the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the
conception of the child, may still be easily available.
2. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which the
estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:
 Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive,
they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles
or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and
illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the
surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of
brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property
was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his
share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory
provisions, the remaining half shall be equally divided between the widower and
herein petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence,
Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his total undivided three-fourths
(3/4) share in the entire property to herein private respondent. Resultantly,
petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the property
covered by the Transfer Certificate of Title in the proportion of an undivided
one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.

Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 188, April 20, 1998

Facts:

Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children,
namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the
above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon,
Kalibo Aklan.

Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad. Sometime after the marriage, he demanded from the defendants
to partition the land into three equal shares and to give him the (1/3) individual
share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
Arturio Trinidad filed, an action for partition of four parcels of land. Defendants
denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.
Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before
plaintiffs birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and
claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their
possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given
plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.

Arturio presented witnesses to prove his position. Jovita Gerardotestified that

Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato are the parents of Arturio; that Felix and
Lourdes as the uncle and aunt of Arturio; and also identified pictures where the
respondents were with Arturio and his family.(At this stage of the trial, Felix
Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes
Trinidad.) Another witness, ISABEL MEREN, 72 years old and a widow testified that
she knows Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad; that she knew
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as the parents of Arturio and that she was
present when they were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant pastor
by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. She further testified that upon the death of
Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him. ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself,
was presented as witness. As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and
Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism, and a certificate of loss issued
by the LCR that his birth certificate was burned during World War 2. He also
testified that he lived with Felix and Lourdes and provided for his needs.

On the other hand, defendants presented Pedro Briones who testified that Inocentes
was not married when he died in 1940s. Lourdes Trinidad also testified that she was
not aware that his brother married anybody and denied that Arturio lived with
them. Beatriz Sayon also testified that Inocentes died in 1941, and that Felicidad
Molato had never been married to Inocentes. The trial court rendered a twenty-page
decision in favor of Arturio. The CA reversed the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner presented sufficient evidence of his parents marriage
and his filation.

Ruling:
The partition of the late Patricios real properties requires preponderant proof that
petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedents estate. His right as a co-owner
would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and
subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father
(Inocentes).
When the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation,
said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage,
the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to
the matrimony, the couples public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after
the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during
such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.

In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were lost, burned
or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. Although the
marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union,
petitioners failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other
forms of relevant evidence may take its place. In place of a marriage contract, two
witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren and Jovita Gerardo. It further
gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate in which Inocentes and Felicidad
were named as the childs father and mother, and family pictures.
The totality of petitioners positive evidence clearly preponderates over private
respondents self-serving negations.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial courts decision is REINSTATED.

Heirs of Conti v CA, G.R. No. 118464, December 21, 1998

Facts:

Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti were the co-owners of property located
in Lucena City. Lourdes died intestate without issue.
Subsequently, private respondents, all claiming to be correlative relatives of
the deceased Lourdes, filed an action for partition and damages before the
RTC-Lucena City.
Ignacio Conti refused the partition on the ground that private respondents
failed to produce any document to prove that they were the rightful heirs of
Lourdes. Ignacio died and was substituted as party-defendants by his
children.
To prove their filiation to Lourdes, private respondents presented Lydia
Sampayo-Reyes and Adelaida Sampayo. Lydia testified that she was one of
the nieces of Lourdes, being the daughter of Josefina Sanpayo, the only living
sibling of Lourdes. They presented her original copy of certificate of live birth
showing that her parents are Inocentes Reyes and Josefina Sampayo.
Lydia also testified that the other siblings of Lourdes who were already dead
were Remedios, Luis, and Manuel. To prove that Josefina, Remedios, Manuel,
and Luis were siblings of Lourdes, their baptismal certificate together with a
photocopy of the birth certificate of Manuel were offered as evidence to show
that their parents, like Lourdes, were Antonio Sampayo and Brigida Jaraza.
The baptismal certificates were presented in lieu of the birth certificates
because the office of the civil registrar were burned on two separate
occasions, thus all civil registration records were totally burned.
Adelaida Sampayo testified that she was the spouse of Manuel, the brother of
the deceased Lourdes.
To rebut the claim of the private respondents, petitioner claimed that the late
Ignacio Conti paid for the real taxes of the subject property and spent for the
necessary repairs and improvements thereon because by agreement Lourdes
would leave her share of the property them.
However, the trial court found no will, either testamentary or holographic,
was presented to substantiate their claim. So it declared that the private
respondents are the rightful heirs of Lourdes. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC.
 The CA also declared that a prior and separate judicial declaration of heirship
was not necessary and that private respondents became the co-owners of the
portions of the property owned and registered in the name of Lourdes upon
her death and, consequently, entitled to the immediate possession thereof
and all other incidents/right of ownership as provided by law including the
right to demand partition under Art. 777 of the civil code.
Hence, petitioner pursued the case arguing that a complaint for partition to
claim a supposed share of the deceased co-owner cannot prosper without
prior settlement of the latters estate and compliance with the legal
requirements, especially publication, and private respondents failed to prove
by competent evidence their relationship with the deceased.

Issue:

Whether or not the argument of the petitioner is correct?

Ruling:

The Petitioner is wrong. A prior settlement of estate is not essential

before the heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the
deceased.
Conformably with Articles 777 and 494 of the civil code, from the death of
Lourdes her rights as co-owner, incidental to which is the right to ask for
partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted
to her rightful heirs. So, in demanding partition, private respondent
merely exercised the right originally pertaining to the decedent, their
predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioners theory of publication is also wrong because the action is not
for the partition of the state of Lourdes but only for the segregation of
Lourdes one-half share to the subject property which they inherited from
her through intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary
partition between co-owners over which publication is not required.

De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon, 366 SCRA 499

FACTS:

Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married in August 1964. It was
during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus,
herein petitioners, were born. In a notarized document, dated June 7, 1991, Juan G.
Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate
children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan died intestate in March 1992, leaving
behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and
some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that
petitioners filed a complaint for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the
Dizon estate with the RTC.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent, including
the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of
the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for
partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being
the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are illegitimate children of decedent Juan Dizon entitled
to inherit from him

RULING:

No. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the
valid marriage of their parents Danilo and Carolina. The certificates of birth also
identified Danilo de Jesus as their father. There is a presumption in law that children
born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses
during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of
the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living separately in such a way
that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the
periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171,of the Family Code
(which took effect on August 3, 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child
would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption
becomes fixed and unassailable.

In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan, petitioners, in

effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo and Carolina
de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the
legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The
presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only
the father, or in exceptional instances the latters heirs, can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the
husband can be rejected.

Aguilar v Siasat, G.R. No. 200169, Jan. 28 2015

FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died,
intestate and without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994, respectively.
Included in their estate are two parcels of land (herein subject properties) covered
by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070 of the Registries
of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod (the subject titles).

In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod City
(Bacolod RTC) a civil case for mandatory injunction with damages against
respondent Edna G. Siasat. Docketed as Civil Case No. 96-9591 and assigned to
Branch 49 of the Bacolod RTC, the Complaint alleged that petitioner is the only son
and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner) discovered that
the subject titles were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the Siasat
clan could have stolen the same; that he executed affidavits of loss of the subject
titles and filed the same with the Registries of Deeds of Bacolod and Bago; that on
June 22, 1996, he filed before the Bacolod RTC a Petition for the issuance of second
owners copy of Certificate of Title No. T-25896,which respondent opposed; and that
during the hearing of the said Petition, respondent presented the two missing
owners duplicate copies of the subject titles. Petitioner thus prayed for mandatory
injunctive relief, in that respondent be ordered to surrender to him the owners
duplicate copies of the subject titles in her possession; and that damages, attorneys
fees, and costs of suit be awarded to him.

In her Answer, respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving
heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar
spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or
adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his
wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal share of the former;
that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and sisters inherited
her estate as she had no issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen, but
entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt. By
way of counterclaim, respondent prayed for an award of moral and exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees.

During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar spouses
as their son. To prove filiation, he presented the following documents, among
others:

His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary School, Purok No. 2,
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company (BMMC), Bacolod City (Exhibit "C" and
submarkings), wherein it is stated that Alfredo Aguilar is petitioners parent;
His Individual Income Tax Return (Exhibit "F"), which indicated that
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his mother;
Alfredo Aguilars Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 dated October 10,
1957 (Exhibit "G"), a public instrument subscribed and made under oath by
Alfredo Aguilar during his employment with BMMC, which bears his
 signature and thumb marks and indicates that petitioner, who was born on
March 5, 1945, is his son and dependent;
Alfredo Aguilars Information Sheet of Employment with BMMC dated
October 29, 1954 (Exhibit "L"), indicating that petitioner is his son;
Petitioners Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan (Exhibit "M"), where it is
declared that the Aguilar spouses are his parents; and
Letter of the BMMC Secretary (Exhibit "O") addressed to a BMMC supervisor
introducing petitioner as Alfredo Aguilars son and recommending him for
employment.
Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry
to the effect that the record of births during the period 1945 to 1946 were
"all destroyed by nature," hence no true copies of the Certificate of Live Birth
of petitioner could be issued as requested (Exhibit "Q").

Petitioner also offered the testimonies of his wife, Luz Marie Abendan-Aguilar
(Abendan-Aguilar), and Ester Aguilar-Pailano (Aguilar-Pailano), his aunt and sister
of Alfredo Aguilar. Abendan-Aguilar confirmed petitioners identity, and she
testified that petitioner is the son of the Aguilar spouses and that during her
marriage to petitioner, she lived with the latter in the Aguilar spouses conjugal
home built on one of the subject properties. On the other hand, 81-year old Aguilar-
Pailano testified that she is the sister of Alfredo Aguilar; that the Aguilar spouses
have only one son herein petitioner who was born at BMMC; that after the death
of the Aguilar spouses, she and her siblings did not claim ownership of the subject
properties because they recognized petitioner as the Aguilar spouses sole child and
heir; that petitioner was charged with murder, convicted, imprisoned, and later on
paroled; and that after he was discharged on parole, petitioner continued to live
with his mother Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar in one of the subject properties, and
continues to live there with his family.

For her evidence, respondent testified among others that she is a retired teacher;
that she does not know petitioner very well, but only heard his name from her aunt
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she is not related by consanguinity or affinity to
petitioner; that she attended to Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar while the latter was under
medication in a hospital until her death; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilars hospital
and funeral expenses were paid for by Nancy Vingno; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar
executed an affidavit to the effect that she had no issue and that she is the sole heir
to her husband Alfredo Aguilars estate; that she did not steal the subject titles, but
that the same were entrusted to her by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that a prior
planned sale of the subject properties did not push through because when
petitioners opinion thereto was solicited, he expressed disagreement as to the
agreed price.

Respondent likewise offered the testimony of Aurea Siasat-Nicavera (Siasat-

Nicavera), 74 years old, who stated that the Aguilar spouses were married on June
22, 1933 in Miag-ao, Iloilo; that she is the sister of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that
she does not know petitioner, although she admitted that she knew a certain
"Rodolfo" whose nickname was "Mait"; that petitioner is not the son of the Aguilar
spouses; and that Alfredo Aguilar has a sister named Ester Aguilar-Pailano.

Respondent also offered an Affidavit previously executed by Candelaria Siasat-

Aguilar (Exhibit "2")announcing among others that she and Alfredo have no issue,
and that she is the sole heir to Alfredos estate.

RTC: From the evidence thus adduced before this Court, no solid evidence attesting
to the fact that plaintiff herein is either a biological son or a legally adopted one was
ever presented. Neither was a certificate of live birth of plaintiff ever introduced
confirming his biological relationship as a son to the deceased spouses Alfredo and
Candelaria S. Aguilar. As a matter of fact, in the affidavit of Candelaria S. Aguilar
(Exhibit 2) she expressly announced under oath that Alfredo and she have no issue
and that she is the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo is (sic) concrete proof that
plaintiff herein was never a son by consanguinity nor a legally adopted one of the
deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria Aguilar.

This being the case, Petitioner is not deemed vested with sufficient interest in this
action to be considered qualified or entitled to the issuance of the writ of mandatory
injunction and damages prayed for.

CA: WE cannot sustain plaintiff-appellants argument. Use of a family surname

certainly does not establish pedigree. Insofar as the SSS Form E-1 and Information
Sheet of Employment of Alfredo Aguilar are concerned, WE cannot accept them as
sufficient proof to establish and prove the filiation of plaintiff-appellant to the
deceased Aguilar spouses. While the former is a public instrument and the latter
bears the signature of Alfredo Aguilar, they do not constitute clear and convincing
evidence to show filiation based on open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child. Filiation is a serious matter that must be resolved according to the
requirements of the law. All told, plaintiff-appellants evidence failed to hurdle the
"high standard of proof" required for the success of an action to establish ones
legitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding open and continuous
possession or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Having resolved that plaintiff-appellant is not an heir of the deceased spouses

Aguilar, thereby negating his right to demand the delivery of the subject TCTs in his
favor, this Court cannot grant the writ of mandatory injunction being prayed for.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not petitioner is the legitimate child of Sps. Aguilar

HELD: Yes

RATIO:

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation
shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on
other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action
within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the
childs acknowledgment.

A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the
marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de
Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and
wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c)
serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in
proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988),
the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and
the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.

Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be

concluded that petitioner who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage
of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar28 and before their respective
deaths29 has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar
spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G")
satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar
spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes
an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned."

Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the
records covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City
were destroyed, which necessitated the introduction of other documentary evidence
particularly Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") to prove filiation. It was
erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of Article
172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph thereof,
the same being an express recognition in a public instrument.

To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an admission of

legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any authentic writing
is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court
action is required. And, relative to said form of acknowledgment, the Court has
further held that:

In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the
following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission
of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence

submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement
that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have
been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence. Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child
shall be the "paramount consideration" in resolving questions affecting him. Article
3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the
Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:

Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.

It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate
children x x x." Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to
children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development."

This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he obtained a copy
of his Certificate of Live Birth from the National Statistics Office (NSO), since the
Bacolod City Civil Registry copy thereof was destroyed. He would not have had to go
through the trouble of presenting other documentary evidence; the NSO copy would
have sufficed. This fact is not lost on petitioner; the Certification dated January 27,
1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry (Exhibit "Q") contained just such an
advice for petitioner to proceed to the Office of the Civil Registrar General at the
NSO in Manila to secure a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, since for every
registered birth in the country, a copy of the Certificate of Live Birth is submitted to
said office.

As to petitioner's argument that respondent has no personality to impugn his

legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy, and that the action to
impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of
the Family Code, the Court has held before that -Article 26331 refers to an action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man's
child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's
legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate
child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all.32

Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses,
then he is as well heir to the latter's estate. Respondent is then left with no right to
inherit from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar's. estate, since succession pertains,
in the first place, to the descending direct line.

2. Of illegitimate children, FC 175 , 176

Jison vs. CA, 286 SCRA 495

FACTS:

Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner,

Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed
20 years after her mothers death and when she was already 39 years of age.

Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he
impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Moninas mother. Monina alleged that since
childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate
child of petitioner by his acts and that of his family. It was likewise alleged that
petitioner supported her and spent for her education such that she became a CPA
and eventually a Central Bank Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11
witnesses.

ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.

HELD:

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the
same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172
thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is
established.

To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,

there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations
of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts
must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but
also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society
and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.

The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by
Monina:
1. That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her
mother was employed by the former;
2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and
conduct.

SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is
not competence evidence as to the issue of paternity. Franciscos lack of
participation in the preparation of baptismal certificates and school records render
the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to the
affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting that Francisco
was not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly not Franciscos
illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths
in order that Monina denounce her filiation. Moninas evidence hurdles the high
standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish ones illegitimate
filiation in relying upon the provision on open and continuous possession. Hence,
Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina
filed her action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A
denial then of her action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and
unjust. Petition was denied.

Heirs of Gabatan vs CA, GR 150206, March 13, 2009

TOPIC: Proof of filiation of illegitimate children

FACTS:
The respondent alleges that she is the sole owner of a land located in
Cagayan de Oro City which she inherited from her mother, Hermogena, the
only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito.
Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, his land was
entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilos wife, Rita
Gabatan, for administration.
It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the
return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogenas death, respondent also
did the same but petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to
surrender the subject property.
 Petitioners denied that respondents mother Hermogena was the daughter of
Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the
rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. They further contend that Juan Gabatan died
single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one
brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners predecessor-in-
interest), Macaria and Justa.
These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan
Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous
and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than
fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the
exclusion of the whole world including respondent.
October 20, 1995 = the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent
CA affirmed such decision declaring that respondents claim of filiation with
Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established during trial.
o The proof was a Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing
such declaration which was signed by Teofilo and the latters nearest
relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they acknowledged
Hermogenas status as the daughter of Juan Gabatan.
o Teofilo formally recognized Hermogenas right to heirship from Juan
Gabatan which ultimately passed on to respondent.
o
ISSUE: W/N Hermogena Clareto "GABATAN" is the child and sole heir of Juan
Gabatan;

HELD: No.

Our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of
birth appearing the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final
judgment in the absence of these, any proof that the child enjoyed the
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child only in the absence of
these two classes of evidence is the anyone allowed to present other porrof
admissible under the Rules of Court of the proof of paternity and filiation

The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in
a special proceeding.

To prove the relationship of respondents mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate
that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the
Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of these,
respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two
classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present other proof admissible
under the Rules of Court of her mothers relationship to Juan Gabatan.
However, respondents mothers (Hermogenas) birth certificate, which would have
been the best evidence of Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never
offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did respondent present any authentic
document or final judgment categorically evidencing Hermogenas relationship to
Juan Gabatan.

Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses but none of these witnesses
had personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of
birth of Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They were not yet born or were very
young when Juan supposedly married Laureana or when Hermogena was born and
they all admitted that none of them were present at Juan and Laureanas wedding or
Hermogenas birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what they had been
told by, or heard from, others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a word,
hearsay.

Aside from the testimonies of respondents witnesses, both the RTC and the CA
relied heavily on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale presented by respondent
and which appeared to be signed by the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan
Gabatan.

However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the
signatures therein, as competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected
to by petitioners counsel for being a mere photocopy and not being properly
authenticated. After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, the Court cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.

Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself. Although the best evidence rule admits of exceptions and there are instances
where the presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed, such as when the
original is lost or the original is a public record, the basis for the presentation of
secondary evidence must still be established. Thus, in Department of Education
Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario, we held that a party must first satisfactorily
explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary
evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory
explanation for non-production of the original instrument.

In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac
Pacana (who identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows
that she gave no testimony regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it
was lost or whether it was recorded in any public office.

Filiation

To reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondents mother to Juan Gabatan, our

laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of
birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final
judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should have presented proof that her
mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in
the absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present
other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mothers relationship to Juan
Gabatan. (Heirs of Gabatan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009)

As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his
child. While Noemars birth certificate was not presented, oral evidence of filial
relationship may be considered. As earlier stated, appellant stipulated to the fact
that he is the father of Noemar during the pre-trial conference and likewise made
the same declaration while under oath. Maria also testified that Noemar and Junior
are her sons with appellant, her husband. These testimonies are sufficient to
establish the relationship between appellant and Noemar (People v. Sales, G.R. No.
177218, October 3, 2011)

Dela Cruz , et al vs. Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached
to the Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography,"
did not include the signature of the deceased father, and because he was born out
of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no
more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child.

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name
against Gracia. The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the
author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any
express recognition of paternity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of
minor Christian can be considered as a recognition of paternity.

RULING:
Yes. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate
child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized
him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private
handwritten instrument.

Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by
the putative father in the private handwritten instrument.

The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission
of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant
and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be
shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as
it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

Lucas v Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse
alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent,
Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioners
certificate of live birth; (b) petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college
diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with
a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e)
Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music;
and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a
musical prodigy.

Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting
that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served
on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which
the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed
a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of
a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses father.

Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held
that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a
paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima
facie case, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and the child.

This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A
new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied
upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-
blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that
the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held
that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a
prima facie case.

ISSUE:

Whether aprima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing
order

HELD:

Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case vis--vis the motion
for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.

RATIO:

Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural
aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called
procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective
evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial
stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed.
The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore
misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading.

Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that
are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that
the appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any
person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such
order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The
biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The
existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a
DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party,
including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This
does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right
if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a
show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause
for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is
considered a search, which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement
of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a
counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in variousjurisdictions have
differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those
jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be
made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in
paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court
may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that
there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in
which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo
a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants
issuance of a court order for blood testing The same condition precedent should be
applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment
suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

Gotardo v Buling, GR 165166, August 15, 2012 (see above)

Perla v Baring, GR 172471, November 12, 2012

Facts:

Mirasol filed a complaint for support for her son Randy against Antonio. Mirasol
testified that Antonio courted her and eventually became her first boyfriend. When
Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio assured her that he would support her.

Eventually, however, Antonio started to evade her. Mirasol gave birth to Randy. She
presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating her
and Antonio as parents of the child. According to her, when Antonio landed a job as
seaman, he abandoned them and failed to give any support to his son. Randy
recounted having met Antonio for the first time in 1994 in the house of his Aunt
Lelita, Antonios sister, where he was vacationing. During their encounter, Randy
called Antonio "Papa" and kissed his hand while the latter hugged him.

Antonio denied having fathered Randy. Although he admitted to having known

Mirasol, denied courting her and that she never became his common-law wife nor
was she treated as such. Regarding Randys Certificate of Live Birth, Antonio
testified as to several inaccuracies in the entries thereon.
Issues:
1. Are the birth and baptismal certificates competent proofs of paternity when
putative father had no hand in preparation?
2. Was Mirasol and Randy able to prove filiation through the open and
continuous possession of status of Randy?

Held:
No to both issues.
Mirasol and Randy failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio.
Issue 1. Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying
Antonio as the father. However, said certificate has no probative value to establish
Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. It is settled that
"a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father
had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.
xxx
Anent Randys baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a
good proof of Antonios paternity of Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of
participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate
renders this document incompetent to prove paternity. And "while a baptismal
certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the
entries with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, x x x baptismal certificates are per
se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted
indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.

Issue 2. Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate filiation. That
during their first encounter in 1994 Randy called Antonio "Papa" and kissed his
hand while Antonio hugged him and promised to support him; or that his Aunt
Lelita treated him as a relative and was good to him during his one-week stay in her
place, cannot be considered as indications of Randys open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child under the second paragraph of
Article 172(1). "[T]o prove open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear
manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure
charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction
of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all
relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously." Here, the single
instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and promised to support him cannot
be considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. To
emphasize, "[t]he fathers conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and
uninterrupted for this ground to exist." Here, except for that singular occasion in
which they met, there are no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son. Neither
can Antonios paternity be deduced from how his sister Lelita treated Randy. To this
Court, Lelitas actuations could have been done due to charity or some other
reasons.

3. Compulsory recognition, cf. RPC 345

People v Abella, G.R. No. 177295, January 6, 2010

Under automatic review is the Decision dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of
[1]

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02085 which affirmed with modification the
Judgment promulgated on June 3, 2003 by Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court
[2]

(RTC) of Naga City convicting accused-appellant Marlon Barsaga Abella of the crime
of rape, defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
ordering him to pay civil indemnity and damages, and further ordering him to
acknowledge and support his offspring with the private offended party.
In a Minute Resolution dated June 27, 2007, we required the parties to file their
[3]

respective supplemental briefs. The parties, however, manifested that they have
exhausted their arguments before the CA and, thus, will no longer file any
supplemental brief. [4]

The antecedent facts are culled from the records of this case. Consistent with our
ruling in People v. Cabalquinto and People v. Guillermo, this Court withholds the
[5] [6]

real name of the private offended party and her immediate family members as well
as such other personal circumstance or information tending to establish her
identity. The initials AAA represent the private complainant and the initials BBB
refer to the mother of the private complainant.
The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That sometime on December 1999, in the afternoon, at Barangay San Vicente,
Municipality of Pamplona, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with
Balisong and under the influence of liquor, by means of force and intimidation and
with lewd design, did then and there willfully and feloniously enter the house of
herein complainant and then and there have sexual intercourse with AAA, a woman
of feeble mind, against her will to her damage and prejudice.
Acts contrary to law.
Accused-appellant Abella pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. The pre-trial
[7]

conference followed and, thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, AAA, BBB, Dr. Emelito
[8] [9]

Alegre, Dr. Imelda Escuadra and Corazon Alipante, and documentary exhibits
[10] [11] [12]

consisting of the Ultrasound Report of AAA dated September 14, 2000 issued by Dr.
[13]
Alegre, the Medical Certificate of AAA dated July 14, 2000 and Clinical Record of
[14] [15]

AAA dated June 13, 2000 issued by Dr. Alcantara, the Psychiatric Evaluation of AAA
[16]

dated September 25, 2001 of Dr. Escuadra, and the Certificate of Live Birth of the
[17]

daughter of AAA issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of the City of Naga.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of the accused-
appellant and his father, Danilo Abella, and documentary exhibits consisting of
[18] [19]

two (2) Barangay Blotters dated March 15 and September 16, 2000 issued by the
[20]

Barangay Captain of San Vicente, Municipality of Pamplona, Province of Camarines

Sur.
After trial, the RTC convicted the accused-appellant. The trial court found the 38-
year old AAA as a credible witness and her testimony candid and truthful despite
her moderate mental retardation or intellectual quotient of a 7 to 8-year old child. In
contrast, the trial court found that the defenses of denial and alibi of the accused-
appellant were flimsy and farfetched. It further ruled that the child conceived and
delivered by AAA was fathered by the accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of
the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused MARLON ABELLA y BARSAGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of Rape, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused is likewise directed to recognize [xxx] as his illegitimate daughter, and
provide for her support as soon as his financial means permit. Furthermore, he is
hereby ordered to pay complainant the sum of P75,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. With costs de officio.
Considering that the accused has been undergoing detention during the pendency of
the trial of this case, the same is hereby credited in the service of his sentence.
The decision of the RTC was directly elevated to this Court. The accused-appellant
filed his Brief on August 23, 2005 while the plaintiff-appellee filed its Brief on
[21] [22]

December 19, 2005. In a Minute Resolution dated February 15, 2006, we

[23]

transferred this case to the CA for appropriate action conformably with our ruling in
People v. Mateo. [24]

The CA summarized the evidence of the parties as follows:

Dr. Emelito Alegre, a radiologist and sonologist, testified that he had conducted an
ultrasound examination on AAA on 10 July 2000.Through the conduct of the
necessary measurements and ultrasound examination, he confirmed AAAs
pregnancy. At the time of the examination, AAA was already 30.7 weeks pregnant.
The testimony of the Municipal health Officer, Dr. Marietta Alcantara, in turn, was
dispensed with on account of the admission of the defense of the existence and
genuineness of the medical certificate that she had executed in relation to the
instant case.
Dr. Imelda Escuadra of the Women and Children Protection Unit of Bicol Medical
Center, Naga City, and a specialist in the field of psychiatry testified that AAA was
referred to her clinic for examination and evaluation by the Department of Social
Work and Development (DSWD). During the first examination, she noticed that AAA
was pregnant, was coughing, but responsive, coherent and relevant with no auditory
nor visual hallucinations or delusions shown. AAA, as she had observed, was not
psychotic at the time of the examination.
Dr. Escuadra added that AAA had recurrent thoughts of the rape incident and the
threats to kill her if she would divulge the matter. It was also observed that AAA was
not oriented as regards to persons and dates and that she showed poor grasp of
general information. During the last examination on 24 July 2000, AAA looked
depressed and claimed that her baby was moving.
Dr. Escuadra further testified that AAAs mental ability particularly on the arithmetic
aspect was poor, as she could not even count from 1-100. She concluded that
although AAAs chronological age was 38 years old, she manifested a mental age of
between 7-8 years old. AAAs intelligence quotient was only 51, which is classified as
moderate mental retardation. Aside from her mental disadvantage, AAA also suffers
from dwarfism being only three (3) feet and eight (8) inches tall.
Corazon Alipante, a psychologist of the Bicol Medical Center who conducted the
psychological testing on AAA, confirmed that the latters mental capacity is
functioning within the moderate mental retardation level with an average intelligent
quotient of 51 and that her perception of reality is impaired.
AAA testified that she knew the appellant personally since he was a child because
they lived in the same neighborhood. She narrated that sometime at around 1:00
oclock in the afternoon while she was alone at home the appellant entered their
house and started molesting her.Appellant pulled down her shorts with his left hand
while covering her mouth with his right hand. Appellant then placed himself on top
of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. At that time, she did not shout as the
appellant was holding a knife. AAA recalled that when appellant inserted his penis
into her vagina, she had felt pain. Afraid for her life, she did not tell her parents
about the rape incident.
Continuing with her narration, AAA stated that several months after the incident,
her stomach became big. Thinking that she was just ill, she drank some bitter
solution upon her mothers instruction. As her stomach continued to grow, AAA was
forced to tell her mother about the rape incident. Thereafter, AAA consulted a
doctor who confirmed that she was pregnant. Consequently she gave birth to a baby
girl.
BBB, AAAs mother, on the other hand, testified that the appellant is the cousin of her
husband. She claimed that she noticed her daughter becoming pale and thinner. She
also noticed that AAAs stomach was getting bigger and thus decided to bring her to
a doctor, who in turn informed her that her daughter might be pregnant. An
ultrasound examination confirmed that AAA was indeed pregnant. BBB then asked
her daughter who was responsible for her pregnancy, AAA replied that it was the
appellant.
BBB further claimed that prior to the confirmation of the pregnancy, the appellant
had given her some mahogany seeds which he said AAA should take so that she will
have her menstruation. But since the mahogany seeds made AAA weaker, BBB
discontinued it and decided to consult a doctor instead. Upon learning that it was
the appellant who had raped her daughter, BBB immediately reported the matter to
the Municipal Hall of Pamplona. Thereafter, the appellant was arrested.
BBB also testified that appellants parents had tried to settle the case by offering the
sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). They however declined said offer, as
it was not even commensurate to the expenses they have already spent for their
daughter and her child. AAA gave birth to a baby girl on 16 August [2000] but the
appellant and his family had never given them any financial support.
Aside from the testimony of the [accused]-appellant, the defense also called Danilo
Abella, appellants father, to the stand. Both testimonies were principally anchored
on denial, and attributed that the filing of this case against the accused was ill
motivated and was due to the bad blood and personal animosities between their
family and that of the complainant. Appellant contends that a certain Mang Ben, a
construction worker of the China Geo, was the one responsible in impregnating the
complainant.
After its review of the evidence, the CA agreed with the findings of the RTC and
affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant. However, as prayed for by the
plaintiff-appellee, the appellate court deleted the award of exemplary damages in
favor of AAA for lack of basis, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the award for exemplary damages is DELETED. No costs.

The accused-appellant did not move for the reconsideration of the appellate courts
judgment. He instead elevated for review his conviction before us.
Accused-appellant reiterates the issues and arguments he has raised before the
courts below as follows:
I
The trial court gravely erred in failing to consider the motive behind the filing of the
instant case against the accused-appellant.
II
The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
charged although his actual participation in the alleged act was not proven with
certainty.
Accused-appellant asserts that he should be acquitted of the crime charged. AAA
allegedly testified unsurely as to the identity of her assailant and that she testified
incoherently as to the details surrounding the rape incident. Accused-appellant
points out that AAA mentioned that she was raped by a certain Mang Ben. AAA then
testified that the accused-appellant was holding a knife while her pants were being
pulled by him with his left hand and her mouth being covered with his right hand.
She also allegedly said that the accused-appellant opened his knife when he was
about to molest her but he left after opening the knife.
Accused-appellant insists that AAA was coached to testify against him in furtherance
of the hostility between their families. He claims that AAAs mental disability made
her so subservient to her parents that she would believe everything that they tell
her. He further argues that the alleged P20,000.00 offer of accused-appellants family
to settle this criminal case happened before this case was actually filed which
proves that the said offer was either concocted by AAAs family or they were
extorting money.
The plaintiff-appellee maintains that the prosecution has proven the guilt of the
accused-appellant of the crime charged. AAA allegedly testified clearly and
convincingly that she was raped by accused-appellant. The plaintiff-appellee points
out that AAA clarified on the witness stand that it was accused-appellant, and not
Mang Ben, who raped her; that she did not say that the accused-appellant
simultaneously pointed a knife at her, covered her mouth, and pulled down her
pants she rather testified that, after her mouth was covered and pants pulled down,
the accused-appellant forced her to lay down and then drew a knife; and that AAA
said that the accused-appellant left after raping her. Assuming there were
inconsistencies in AAAs testimony, the same pertain to insignificant details which
rather support, not destroy, her credibility.
The plaintiff-appellee claims that the contention that the crime charged against the
accused-appellant was prompted by revenge or ill-motive on the part of AAAs family
was baseless and that the mental disability of AAA did not affect her credibility and
veracity of her testimony. The psychiatric evaluation of AAA allegedly proves that
she was generally coherent and relevant and that her extensive examination on the
witness stand shows that she could distinguish good from bad and truth from lies.
We affirm the conviction of the accused-appellant.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of rape is
committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: (1) through force, threat or intimidation; (2) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (3) by means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (4) when the offended
party is under 12 years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present. In People v. Andaya, it was held that
[25]

sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate with the mental age of a
child below 12 years old constitutes statutory rape with or without the attendance
of force, threat, or intimidation.
In the case before us, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA, a demented person, through
force, threat or intimidation. AAA was psychiatrically evaluated as an adult woman
with the mental age of a 7 to 8-year old child and that she gave birth to a child
despite her mental inability to give her consent to a sexual relationship. These facts
support the allegation of sexual abuse. AAA also identified without uncertainty the
accused-appellant as her attacker and related distinctly that he forcibly laid her
down, held her at knifepoint, and sexually abused her. She testified on direct
examination as follows:
PROS. TADEO:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Do you know the accused in this Q: Since when have you known
case? Marlon?
A: Yes sir. A: Since he was a child.
Q: What is his name? Q: Why do you know him?
A: Marlon Abella. A: He is my neighbor.
Q: Is he in court, please identify him? Q: Do you have any relationship with
A: Yes sir. Marlon?
Q: Please point to him. A: None sir.
A: (Witness pointed to the accused Q: How about with the family of
Marlon Abella) Marlon, if you know, by
consanguinity?
A: None sir.
Q: In the information, it appears that
you are the offended party, why are
you accusing Marlon for rape?
A: He raped me.
Q: Do you remember when was that?
A: No sir.
Q: What time was that?
A: 1:00 oclock in the afternoon.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Where were you raped?
A: In our house.
Q: Do you mean to say that the
accused in this case entered your
house?
A: Yes sir.
Q: After he entered your house, what
happened next?
A: He raped me.
Q: When you said he raped you, how
did he start molesting you?
A: He pulled down my shorts.
Q: What hands did he use in pulling
down your shorts?
A: One hand.
Q: What hand, his right or left?
A: Left hand.
Q: While his left hand was pulling
down your short pants, what was his
right hand doing?
A: He covered my mouth.
Q: After your short pants was pulled
down, what happened next?
A: He laid on top of me.
Q: What happened next? Do you have
panty at that time?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What happened to your panty?
A: He pulled down my panty.
Q: You said a while ago that he placed
himself on top of you, what happened
next?
A: He laid on top of me.
Q: Why, what was your position?
A: I was lying down.
Q; When you lied down, was it on your
own volition?
A: No sir.
Q: Who asked you to lie down or did
the accused forced you to lie down?
A: He forced me to lie down.
Q: How?
A: He grabbed me by my shoulder.
Q: After you were forced to lie down,
what did the accused do next?
A: He inserted his organ.
Q: Before he inserted his organ, was
he wearing something on his body?
A: Only a T-shirt, without pants.
COURT:
Q: Where was his shorts?
A: He removed his shorts.
PROS. TADEO:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: While removing his shorts, what
did you do?
A: He also undressed me.
Q: How about you, what did you do?
A: I did not shout.
COURT:
Q: Why?
A: I was afraid.
Q: Why were you afraid?
A: He had a sharp weapon.
PROS. TADEO:
Q: What kind of sharp weapon was
that?
A: A knife.
Q: Where did you see that knife, in
what part of his body?
A: On his waist.
Q: While he was about to molest you,
did he remove that knife from his
waist?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Where did he place it?
A: He was holding it.
Q: What did he do with it?
A: He told me that if I tell the matter
he will kill me.
Q: Did he tell you those words?
A: Yes sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: What do you mean when you said
he did something to you? Did he insert
his penis to your vagina?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What did you do when he inserted
his penis to your vagina?
A: None because I was afraid.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did you feel when he inserted
his organ to your vagina?
A: Painful.
Q: Did you not like it?
A: I did not.
We find no real conflict in the
testimony of AAA as to the identity of
her assailant. A close scrutiny of the
testimony of AAA that a certain Mang
Ben raped her shows her evident
confusion to the suggestive questions
and insinuations of the defense
counsel and to the hypothetical
questions of the trial court, thus:
ATTY. MANLAGNIT:
Q: When you first know Marlon you
said he was still a child at that time,
you have of age, am I correct?
A: Yes sir.
Q: You said you know Marlon because
he lives nearby or he is one of your
neighbors, is that correct?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And as a matter of fact, there are
other neighbors staying near your
house?
A: Yes sir.
Q: How many neighbors aside from
Marlon?
A: Many.
Q: Would you say 10?
A: More than.
Q: 12?
A: Yes sir.
Q: You also know your neighbors?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Could you name a few for us?
A: Mang Ben.
Q: Who else?
A: Julia.
Q: Who else?
A: My sister.
Q: And your sister has already a
husband?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And your sister and her husband
are living near your house?
A: Yes sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: Do you know to distinguish truth
from lies?
A: I am not telling a lie.
Q: You are not telling a lie because
what you are telling us is the truth?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Therefore, you can tell the court
and distinguish truth from a lie?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And you know what is good from
what is bad?
A: Yes sir.
Q: You testified on cross that you
obeyed what your parents told you
that you were reminded that you were
raped by Marlon, is that right?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Was that reminder made to you by
your parents correct or wrong?
A: Correct.
Q: Why do you say that the reminder
by your parents was correct?
A: Because they told me.
Q: Supposed your parents told that it
was Mang Ben who raped you, will
you obey your parents?
A: Yes sir.
Q: So you will testify before this court
that Mang Ben raped you because that
was what your parents told you?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Did Mang Ben actually rape you?
A: Yes sir.
Q: How many times did Mang Ben
rape you?
A: Only one.
Q: Did you not tell that to your parents
that Mang Ben raped you?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Aside from Mang Ben, will you tell
the court if the penis of Mang Ben was
inserted into your vagina?
A: Yes sir.
Q: How many times did that happen to
you that the penis of Mang Ben was
inserted into your vagina?
A: Only one.
Q: Which came first, when Mang Ben
raped you or when Marlon raped you?
A: Marlon.
Q: Do you know of any person who
raped you other than Mang Ben and
Marlon?
A: None.
AAAs puzzling answers are
understandable considering her
undisputed low mental ability to
comprehend the true import of the
questions.Nonetheless, on further
clarificatory questions of the trial
court, AAA rectified her answers and
testified consistently that she was
raped by the accused-appellant, and
not by a certain Mang Ben, thus:
COURT:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Do you know the government
prosecutor?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Suppose your mother tells you that
you were raped by the government
prosecutor, will you tell that to the
court?
A: No sir.
Q: Supposed you were told by your
parents that you were not raped by
Marlon, will you testify before this
court that you were raped by Marlon?
A: I will not obey.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: On direct examination you said it
was only the accused who raped you.
However, during the clarificatory
question by the court you also said
that you were also raped by Mang Ben.
Tell the court, which is now correct,
was it only Marlon who raped you or it
was also Mang Ben who raped you?
A: Only Marlon.
Q: When you said only Marlon, are you
telling the court that Mang Ben did not
rape you?
A: He did not.
Q: Are you very sure of your answer?
A: Yes, it was Marlon.
Q: Did you not testify on clarificatory
question from the court that you were
also raped by Mang Ben?
A: No, only Marlon.
Q: So your answer which you gave to
the court a while ago when you were
asked whether you were also raped by
Mang Ben was not true?
A: It is not true.
Q: Let us assume that your parents tell
you that Mang Ben raped you, will you
testify that in court?
xxx xxx xxx
A: No sir.
Q: So if your parents will tell you
something which is not true, will you
tell the court that you will not obey
your parents?
A: I will not obey them.
Moreover, we accord great weight and respect to the conclusion of the trial court that AAA
is candid, sincere, straightforward and simple in her testimony as well as to the ruling of
the appellate court that the alleged flaws in her statements do not affect her credibility and
veracity of her testimony that the accused-appellant raped her, and that the defenses of
denial and alibi of the accused-appellant cannot prevail over the positive testimony of AAA.
By well-entrenched jurisprudence, the issue of credibility of witnesses is a question best
addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position of having
observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the
stand while testifying which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts and [a]bsent any
substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial court's assessments and
conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings, particularly
when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or
disregarded which when considered would have affected the outcome of the case. In [26]

People v. Santos, this policy has been emphasized as follows:

[27]

We stress the well-settled doctrine that the lower court's assessment of the credibility of a
witness is accorded great respect owing to its direct opportunity to observe the latter's
demeanor during trial. In People v. Ayuda, we held:
It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the
credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of observing the
victim through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush
of an insisted assertion, the sudden pallor of a discovered lie, the tremulous mutter of a
reluctant answer, the forthright tone of a ready reply, the furtive glance, the blush of
conscious shame, the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full
realization of the solemnity of an oath, or the carriage and mien. ... [Emphasis ours]
The foregoing doctrine is more stringently applied if the trial court is sustained by the
appellate court.
It has been stressed, moreover, that the bare denials and uncorroborated alibis of an
accused cannot overcome the positive identification of the accused and straightforward
recounting of the accuseds commission of a crime. In People v. Nieto, this Court held:
[28]

It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to
support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and
involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise
unavailing.Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is
negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is unacceptable
when there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible witness. Lastly, in order
that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been somewhere
else during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been
impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene.
In the present case, we do not perceive any cogent reason to justify the reversal of the trial
and appellate courts high regard of the truthfulness of AAAs testimony and we find the
bare denials and uncorroborated alibis of the accused-appellant devoid of any evidentiary
value. We quote with approval the pertinent disquisitions of the trial court on the
testimonies of the witnesses as follows:
By the very nature of the crime of rape, the same precludes any eyewitness to the incident,
except the victim and the perpetrator. Hence, to prove the same will depend largely from
the testimony of the victim, and the acquittal of the accused will not lie on the strength of
his defense. Thus, the case for the prosecution will rise or fall on the basis of the victims
testimony, which the court will consider with utmost caution.
In the instant case, victim AAA was a mental retardate, which the court finds, not only on
the basis of the expert testimony of Dr. Escuadra but also on the basis of its observations. It
noted that even if the victim had a mental age of a 7 to 8 year-old child, yet, she was candid,
sincere, straightforward and simple in her testimony in court despite the grueling cross-
examination conducted by Atty. Manlangit. The aforesaid demeanor of the complainant
only showed that she was telling the truth. Complainant never wavered in her testimony,
that it was Marlon who raped her, the circumstances or details under which she was raped;
and in positively identifying Marlon in court. The court likewise noted the limited mental
ability and poor aptitude of the complainant when she was extensively grilled and cross-
examined, and even upon clarificatory questions from the court, thus giving the impression
to the court that she was just being obedient and was coached by her parents in filing this
instant case against Marlon. She likewise admitted that a certain Mang Ben also raped her,
but, later corrected herself. Such was understandable. Even Atty. Manlangit noted that the
victim was already tired and exhausted while testifying in court. (TSN, p. 43, Sept. 24,
2002) Besides, there was no testimony from the complainant that she was merely
instructed by her parents to file the rape case against Marlon even if the same were not
true. The court considered the inconsistencies in complainants testimony as minor
inconsistencies which even strengthen her testimony. Xxx xxx xxx
The Court notes that the appellate courts own evaluation of the evidence concurred with
the findings and conclusions of the trial court as follows:
We likewise find no merit in the insinuations made by the [accused]-appellant that the
instant complaint was motivated by the malevolent design of the complainants family to
put him down or the greedy scheme of the latter to extort money from his family. At best,
these insinuations, trivial and inane, are merely conclusory and unfounded. It cannot
tarnish AAAs account of how the [accused]-appellant had sexually assaulted her.
As aptly observed by the court a quo, it is hard to fathom that a parent would use her
children as engines of malice, especially if the same would subject them to humiliation, nay
stigma. No mother would expose her child to possible public ridicule if the only motive is to
get back at the [accused]-appellant. Said the trial court:
Marlon and his father, Danilo, attributed ill-will, personal animosities and bad blood
between their family and that of the complainant as the reasons behind why a fabricated
case was filed against Marlon. It is incomprehensible to the mind of the court that because
at one time or another Marlon chased complainants father with a hoe, or the complainants
brothers unlawfully entered the premises of the accused, or that they peeped or pried upon
Marlons privacy, causing the latter to chase them with a bolo as the reasons why, out of
revenge, a rape case was concocted and filed against him. Such are flimsy excuses, which do
not deserve belief from any reasonable being. This Court could not, in the exercise of sound
judgment, accept the flimsy reasons advanced by the accused that the victim, a mental
retardate, was only coached by her parents in implicating the accused as the person
responsible for the crime. A mother will never compromise the reputation of her daughter
in order to implicate a person with a crime he did not commit. Besides, it was quite absurd
and illogical that families in feud would make their mental retardate a tool to give a
scripted and concocted testimony in court that she was raped just to send her familys
enemy to jail. It is unnatural for a parent to use his offspring as an engine of malice
especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment and even stigma. No parent in
their right mind would possibly stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the hardship
and shame concomitant to a rape just to assuage their own hurt feelings. [Citations
omitted]
The criminal information failed to allege the qualifying circumstance that the accused-
appellant knew of the mental disability of the private offended party, thus, his conviction of
statutory or simple rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon, instead of qualified
rape, is in order.
We also accord high respect to the ruling of the trial court, as well as to the appellate courts
deference thereto, that the accused-appellant was the biological father of the two-year old
daughter of AAA as a result of the rape incident and in view of their striking facial
similarities and features. The order to acknowledge and support accused-appellants
offspring is in accordance with Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code.
This Court, however, modifies the award of civil indemnity and damages in favor of AAA. In
line with recent case laws, the compensation to be awarded in favor of the private offended
party in cases of statutory rape or simple rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon
should be in the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P75,000.00 as moral
damages. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction
[29]

for the public good and when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. According to current jurisprudence, exemplary damages should be
[30]

awarded in favor of the private offended party in the amount of P30,000.00 in statutory or
simple rape cases. In the present case, the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
[31]

another P75,000.00 as moral damages in favor of AAA is appropriate. The award of

P30,000.00 as exemplary damages should also be imposed as a public example in order to
protect hapless individuals from [sexual] molestation and because of the presence of the
[32]

aggravating circumstance of the commission of the crime in the dwelling of AAA.

[33]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated September 21, 2006 of the CA in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02085, which affirmed with modification the Judgment promulgated on
June 3, 2003 by Branch 25 of the RTC of Naga City, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the private offended party
civil indemnity in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), moral
damages also in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), and exemplary
damages in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), plus interest on all
damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from this date until fully paid. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
People v. Gersamio, G.R. No. 207098, July 08, 2015
DOCTRINE: The SC affirms the deletion of the portion of the trial courts decision ordering
Gersamio to acknowledge paternity and to support AAAs child in the absence of evidence.
In this case, AAA was already five and a half months pregnant when she was medically
examined in September 2002. Obviously, the rape that happened on August 28, 2002 was
not the cause of that pregnancy. With these, Gersamio cannot be ordered to recognize and
to support AAAs child.

FACTS: August 28, 2002: In the afternoon, Gersamio, with lewd design, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force, violence and intimidation and
having carnal knowledge with the complainant [AAA], 15 years old, a minor, at the time of
the incident against her will. Evidence was established that: AAAs first sexual ordeal at the
hands of Gersamio happened sometime in 1999, when she was only 13 years old, having
been born on 11 April 1986. It was repeated for several times. The last incident of rape
occurred on 28 August 2002. On the said date, AAA was about to enter their house,
Gersamio, who was then hiding behind a coconut tree, suddenly grabbed and dragged her
towards the back of their house a banana plantation. AAA could not do anything but cry
as he pointed a knife at her neck. He commanded AAA to lie down but she resisted,
prompting the former to kick the latter in her thigh. When AAA was already lying on the
ground, he removed her t-shirt, short pants and underwear. He also threatened to kill
AAA. Defenseless, AAA simply cried. He inserted his penis inside AAAs vagina. He warned
AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone what happened between them.

On 2 September 2002, AAAs grandmother, BBB, discovered her pregnancy because of the
changes in her physical appearance. When asked about the father of her child, it was then
that AAA disclosed to BBB her harrowing experiences at the hands of Gersamio, which
began in 1999 when she was only 13 years old, the last of which was on 28 August 2002.
Such sexual advances by him resulted in her pregnancy. At once, BBB went to his house and
confronted him regarding what he did to AAA. Nonetheless, in order to save AAA and their
whole family from shame as he is AAAs uncle, being the first cousin of AAAs mother, BBB
would just like to keep the matter among themselves and merely asked him to
acknowledge and support the child of AAA. He, however, denied the accusation and he even
got mad at BBB. Leaving with no other choice, AAA, accompanied by BBB, sought the
assistance of their Barangay Captain and they told the former the whole incident. The
Barangay Captain then advised them to have a medical examination, which they did.

The Trial Court held him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, ordering
him to pay AAA for moral damages; and acknowledge or recognize AAAs offspring
resulting from the rape; and support AAAs child in the event his means improves after
serving his sentence.
The CA deleted, however, the portion ordering him to acknowledge paternity and to
support AAAs child, as the issue of whether the child is Gersamios is yet to be resolved in a
full-blown trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not AAAs child should be recognized and supported by Gersamio.

HELD: NO. A meticulous perusal of the records shows no compelling reason to overturn the
findings of both lower courts on the matter of AAAs credibility and that, indeed, Gersamio
raped her and his guilt was sufficiently proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt.

Even though the result of AAAs physical examination conducted in September 2002
showed that she was already five and a half months pregnant at that time, it does not
necessarily follow that the appellant could not have authored the 28 August 2002 rape
against her. Contrary to Gersamios view, AAAs pregnancy is immaterial to the issue since
pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. So, whether the child whom the
rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no
moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the
victim against the latters will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the
victim in a truthful manner.

The SC affirms the deletion of the portion of the trial courts decision ordering the appellant
to acknowledge paternity and to support AAAs child in the absence of evidence thereof. In
this case, AAA was already five and a half months pregnant when she was medically
examined in September 2002. Obviously, the rape that happened on 28 August 2002 was
not the cause of that pregnancy. Though there were allegations of repeated rape from 1999
up to 28 August 2002, only two Informations for rape was filed, i.e., the rape incidents in
1999 and on 28 August 2002. And, the appellant was acquitted for the rape committed in
1999 for prosecutions failure to specify with certainty the exact month in 1999 the offense
was committed. With these, Gersamio cannot be ordered to recognize and to support
AAAs child.

Needless to say, the foregoing does not affect the earlier findings of this Court on the guilt
of the appellant for the crime of rape committed on 28 August 2002. To repeat, not only is
the impregnation of the rape victim not an element of rape; it must also be stressed that
AAA stated that the appellant repeatedly rape her since 1999 until 28 August 2002.
Although the appellant cannot be held liable for such alleged rapes, as this case does not
cover other incidents of rape prior to 28 August 2002, AAAs testimony on this point
provides a possible explanation for her childbirth on 5 January 2003 as her child turned
one on 5 January 2004.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 25 April 2012 finding the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS that the appellant is further ordered to pay AAA civil indemnity and
exemplary damages in the amounts of P50,000.00 and P30,000.00.

F. Legitimated Children

who may be legitimated, FC 177, RA 9858

Abadilla vs Tabiliran, 249 SCRA 447

FACTS:

Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the
grounds of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a
judge. With respect to the charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge
scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his
marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Tabiliran and Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the
other hand, with respect to the charge on deceitful conduct, petitioner claims that the judge
caused his 3 illegitimate children with Priscilla be registered as legitimate by falsely
executing separate affidavits stating the delayed registration was due to inadvertence,
excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he knew these children cannot be legally
registered as legitimate. The judge averred that 25 years had already elapsed since the
disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married Priscilla hence the cohabitation was
neither bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as 1970, based on the record, Priscilla
had begotten her 3 children (1970, 1971 and 1975).

ISSUE: WON the 3 children can be considered legitimate.

HELD:

The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the
time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and
Teresita. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other, are natural.

Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of wedlock
of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will
destroy the sanctity of marriage;
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of
the child.

2. How legitimation takes place, FC 178, FC 180

BBB v AAA, G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015

FACTS:
AAA and BBB are husband and wife. BBB comes before the Court to modify the issuance of
a Permanent Protection Order by the RTC against him.
AAA and BBB met in 1991 when AAA was still a med student and had a chile CCC prior to
her marriage to BBB. Then after the marriage AAA bore two more children DDD and EEE.
Due to BBB alleged womanizing AAA filed for PPO against him due to immoral and illicit
environment which was granted by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
He comes before the Court raising one of his issues the support he is obligated to give in
regards to AAAs son CCC. He claims that CCC is not his biological child and that his natural
children are already in his custody hence the petition for support is moot. Hence, BBB
claims that CCC has no right to support as his legitimated child.

ISSUE:
Whether CCC is entitled from support from BBB?

HELD/RULING:
Yes.
Article 177 of the Family Code provides that Only children conceived and born
outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. Article
178 states that legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between
parents.

It is undisputed that BBB is not CCCs father but BBB falsely acknowledge CCC as his
son. However as provided for by the Code: Art. 1431. Through estoppel an
admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

The principle of estoppel finds application and it now bars BBB from making an
assertion contrary to his previous representations. He should not be allowed to
evade a responsibility arising from his own misrepresentations. He is bound by the
effects of the legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBBs son, and pursuant to
Article 179 of the Family Code, the former is entitled to the same rights as those of a
legitimate child, including the receipt of his fathers support.
 Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB from raising
before the proper court the issue of CCCs status and filiation. However, BBB cannot
do the same in the instant petition before this Court now.

Court held that the civil status [of a child] cannot be attacked collaterally. The
childs legitimacy cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different purpose. The petition sprang out of AAAs application
for a PPO before the RTC. Hence, BBBs claim that CCC is not his biological son is a
collateral issue, which this Court has no authority to resolve now.

Additional relevant provisions:

All told, the Court finds no merit in BBBs petition, but there exists a necessity to remand the
case for the RTC to resolve matters relative to who shall be granted custody over the three
children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and manner of
providing financial support.

The RTC and the CA found substantial evidence and did not commit reversible errors when
they issued the PPO against BBB. Events, which took place after the issuance of the PPO, do
not erase the fact that psychological, emotional and economic abuses were committed by
BBB against AAA. Hence, BBBs claim that he now has actual sole care of DDD and EEE does
not necessarily call for this Courts revocation of the PPO and the award to him of custody
over the children.

Pursuant to Articles 201 and 202 of the Family Code, BBBs resources and means and the
necessities of AAA and the children are the essential factors in determining the amount of
support, and the same can be reduced or increased proportionately. The RTC is reminded
to be circumspect in resolving the matter of support, which is a mutual responsibility of the
spouses.

3. Retroactivity and effects, FC 180-181

4. Action to impugn legitimation, FC 182

5. Rights of legitimated children, FC 179