A New Look at J.S. Beck's "Doctrine of The Standpoint"

A New Look at J.S.
Beck's "Doctrine of the Standpoint"

by Ingrid M. Wallner, Montreal
The reference to Jacob Sigismund Beck's philosophy s the 'doctrine of the stand-
point* (Standpunktslehre) goes back to K. L. Reinhoid, who first used the term in this
way. It represents a short form of the title of Beck's most important and innovative
work, Einzig-mglicher Standpunct aus welchem die critische Philosophie beurtheilt
werden mu (1796) (Only Possible Standpoint from which Critical Philosophy Must Be
Judged), the third volume of an Explanatory Ahstract from Kant's Critical Writings
upon the Advice of Same1.
To the Kant scholar, Beck is above all known for having carried on an important
intellectual exchange with his mentor and benefactor, Immanuel Kant. This exchange is
well documented in their philosophical correspondence which traces their relationship
from the time of Kant's active promotion of the career of his favourite Student to his
final disillusionment and break with Beck over the independent course taken in the
Standpunct.
It is generally acknowledged that Beck did an excellent Job s a Kant commentator
and that he caused Kant to rethink a number of his positions, to the point of "virtually
adopt[ing]M Beck's position "s his own2." Where a reassessment of Beck's work is
required, however, is in the area of his significance s a thinker in his own right: With
few exceptions, critics and historians of philosophy alike assigned to Beck a relatively
insignificant place in a dialectical continuum between Kant and Fichte. Within that
development, he is generally considered to have stopped "mid-way" and to represent
no more than a preparatory phase to Fichte who had left him behind3. As one
1
Jacob Sigismund Beck, Erluternder Auszug aus den critiscben Schriften des Herrn Prof. Kant
auf Anrathen desselben. Vol. 3: Einzig-mglicher Standpunct aus welchem die critiscKe
Philosophie beurtheilt werden mu (Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1796; reprint 'Aetas
Kantiana', Brssels: Culture et Civilisation, 1968).
2
Kant. Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99. Edited and translated by Arnulf Zweig (The
University of Chicago Press, 1967). Introduction, p. 28.
3
This view, of course, has first been promoted by Fichte himself. (Johann Gottlieb Fichte,
Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre (1. Einleitung), in /. G. Fichte - Ge-
samtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften^ Vols. 1-4. Hrsg. von Reinhard
Lauth und Hans Gliwitzky unter Mitwirkung von Richard Schottky [Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt:
Friedrich Frommann Verlag (Guenther Holzboog), 1970], p. 203 n). Among the 'exceptions' to
the predominant view of Beck I refer above all to HJ. de Vleeschauwer, Arnulf Zweig, Lewis
W. Beck, s well s recently J. Schmucker-Hartmann, who (all in different ways recognized
Beck's outstanding and independent achievement. [Cf. Vleeschauwer: Beck, neanmoins, n'etait
pas fichteen du tout. - La deduction transcendentale dans l'oeuvre du Kant, Vol. 3 (University
of Gent, 1937), p. 538.] /
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J. S. Beck's "Doctrine of the Standpoint" 295
commentator put it, Fichte came along and, "s a greater thinker," "overtook" Beck:
"History in its course had no time for the Standpunktslehrer (teacher of the 'stand-
point')4,"
A very different profile of Beck emerged in my recent research for a comprehensive
study of his work. For, contrary to the prevailing view, I found that in addressing the
difficulties of Kant's critical System with remarkable rigour and consistency, Beck came
to develop a unique and truly original epistemological approach: In fact, what was to be
merely a more effective method of presenting the issues of the Critique resulted in a
whole new way of looking at the problem of cognition and at philosophical inquiry s
such. In the end, Beck's conception and exposition of transcendental philosophy
differed in essential respects not only from Kant's classical position, but from the
thought of every "semi-Kantian"5 and post-Kantian of the period s well, including
Fichte's speculative idealism.
I have identified and elaborated elsewhere in detail the nature of Beck's innovative
epistemology s a proto-phenomenological approach6. To be sure, even though Beckcs
thought can be shown to anticipate aspects of contemporary phenomenological theory,
it would be a mistake to read present-day phenomenology back into Beck's work. Such
an approach would not only be anachronistic, but would produce no less a distorting
effect than interpreting Beck s an incomplete Fichtean. Instead, any 'phenomenologi-
caP Interpretation of Beck's doctrine of the standpoint, if it is to be tenable, must be
anchored and organically developed from within the historical context of the period, |
beginning with Lambert's proposal to incorporate a science of "Phnomenologie" into }
any theory of knowledge and with the effect of this move on Kant. t
Let us now examine what Beck's "only possible standpoint" consists of and what it is |
intended to accomplish:
Beck was convinced that the source of all misunderstandings and confusions Standing
in the way of an adequate grasp of Kant's critical theory could be traced back to various
way s of misconceiving or neglecting the "nerve centre" of all intelligibility: the
transcendental unity of apperception. In Beck's view, such difficulties invariably
stemmed from the mistaken attempt to account for the elements of cognition in
abstraction from their synthetic-objective unity in consciousness, and the related
attempt to deduce the 'possibility of experience', by way of discursive argumentation,
from an area that is inherently transcendent to consciousness and, eo ipso, to experi-
ence. In a letter to Kant he states the problem on the occasion of outlining his
conception of the exegetical task s follows:
4
Max Ernst Mayer, Das Verhltnis des Sigismund Beck zu Kant. Dissertation (Heidelberg: Carl
Winter, 1896), p. 50.
5
Lewis W. Beck's term for those Kantian scholars, Beck included,, ewho were forced by
difficulties in Kant's position to criricize, reconstruct, and ultimately to some extent to transcend .
it." - German Philosophy, in The Encyclopaedia of Pfrilosophy, cd. Paul Edwards, Vol. 3 (New
York: MacmiUan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press, 1967), p. 301. .
6
Jacob Sigismund Beck's Phenomenological Transformation of Kant's Critical Philosophy. Disser-
tation (McGill University, Montreal, Fall of 1979). .

296 Ingrid M. Wallner
[In the coursc of working on the Explanatory Abstraa from your critical writings], I have time
and again cast my cye upon that which is propcrly transcendcnt al (das eigentliche Transcendentale)
in our cognition and attempted to capture that point s rigorously s I possibly could. In the
process, I have become awarc that the "possibility of experience % inasmuch s it constitutes itself
the actual transccndental standpoint, is something quite different from that merely derived,
discursive represcntaon of the possibility of experience which is no more than, and a largely
incomprehensible, play with hypotheses giying rise to a thousand questions7.
Too many efforts had already been directed by this time, by K. L. Reinhold and
othcrs, toward "heaping petty sophistries (Spitzfindigkeiten) upon petty sophistries"
in their exegeses of Kant's work. Such hair-splitting subtleties only conveyed a
semblance of critical thinking, whereas the underlying fundamentally dogmatic attitude
- e. g., with regard to the thing in itself - remained unchanged. Consequently, critical
theory itself ended up being generally presented s a form of dogmatism (Standpunct,
Preface). Unfortunately, Kant's own discursive and dichotomized method of presenta-
tion did not help much to clarify matters and required a special effort by the reader to
penetrate through the words of the Critique to its a true spirit."
Only when one has reached the true standpoint of transcendental philosophy and has thus
translated, s it were, the spirit of your synthetic-objective unity of consciousness into its
expression in thought, having transposed oneself, so to speak, into the Operation of the original
activity (of the synthesis according to the categories) and of the original recognition (of the
transcendental schematism), is one in a position to comprehend the Cntique from beginning to
end and to gain an overview of it.. ,8
The task Beck set himself for his Standpunct, then, was to cut through the maze of
difficulties of the Critique and to ensure that once found, the genuine transcendental
"standpoint" was consistently maintained s the focal point of all critical inquiry. To
achieve this end, nothing short of a new way of presenting critical theory was required:
On the positive side, the cognitive factors sensibility and understanding were to be
exhibited exclusively from the standpoint of their interaction in the transcendental
unity of apperception; negatively, rigorous adherence to that standpoint was to
preclude all illegitimate abstractions from the synthetic-objective unity s well s the
injection of any ready-made, i.e. not critically founded elements such s pre-given
concepts and presuppositions.
Beck's strategy in methodically anchoring these requirements in his Explanatory
Abstract9 was twofold:
\
7
Letter from Beck to Kant of September 16,1794, in Kant's gesammelte Schriften. Vols. X-XIII:
Kant's Briefwechsel. Hrsg. von der Kgl. Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Vols.
X-XII: Berlin, Georg Reimer, 1900-02; Vol. XIII: Berlin und Leipzig, (Vereinigung wissen-
schaftlicher Verleger, Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1922), Vol. XI, p. 505.
8
Ibid. \
9
A substantial part of the discussion leading up to the adoption of this strategy in the Standpunct
consists of arguments aimed at refuting any notion of a 'bond* or connection between our world
of experience and an underlying reality in itself. This preliminary 'clearing device', being
directed primarily against Reinhold's Theorie des Vorstellungsvermgens, was at once to
undermine any lingering dogmatism and t demonstrate the necessity of using a different
sequence and method of inquiry.

First, he changed the order of exposition of the Critique, starting at once with the
original employment of the understanding in its application to experience (Transcen-
dental Analytic and Transcendental Schematism), instead of preceding that core of the
critical enterprise with a separate discussion of sensibility (Transcendental Aesthetic).
Second, he introduced s a central methodoglocial requirement the Posttilate "to
represent to oneself an object originally" (Standpunct 139), also referred to briefly s
the act of "original representing" or the "original activity." This Postulate requires that
every philosophizing subject deliberately and directly enact the process whereby he
comes to know an object in concrete experience. Instead of merely talking about
cognition and arguing for the possibility of experience discursively, the original
employment of the understanding may thus be studied with direct reference to the way
phenomena, s they are given, are being gathered into organized, meaningful wholes to
yield unified and identifiable objects. In point of fact, such reflective acts of originally
thinking through what goes on in cognition while contemplating the evidence for it,
Beck argues, constitute the highest principle "not just of philosophy... but of all
employment of the understanding* (Standpunct 124). And even though Beck provides
an independent argument for this claim and for the adoption of the Postulate, he also
points out that the Postulate merely articulates and puts to work Kant's own concep-
tion of critical inquiry s "self-knowledge," Kant having first established "the art of
.understanding oneself." Beck even uses the expressions "to understand oneself and
"original representing" interchangeably: "This [requirement] to 'understand oneself is,
in my eyes, the highest principle of all philosophy..." (Standpunct 348-49)10.
10
In view of the variety of meanings of the term 'Postulate' to be found in Kant, a note on Beck's
usage of it in the Standpunct appears to be in order. Beck never actually defined the term
'Postulate'. Essentially, his use of the term coincides with the following general definition:
"... a demand, an assumption necessitated by material or logico-intuitive (denkerische) reasons;
lacks strict 'proof, but must be posited and made plausible on the basis of facts or for systematic
or practical considerations" (Philosophisches Wrterbuch. Begrndet von Heinrich Schmidt
[Stuttgart: Alfred Krner, 1974], p. 521). In lieu of a definition, Beck offers the following
oomparisons to characterize his Postulate: On the one hand, he frequently refers to the
geometer who proceeds with his science "...on the basis of the postulate *to represent to
oneself space*. He asserts neither this nor that of this object (of space), neither that it is the form
of outer Lntuitions, nor that it is the order of things insofar s they exist simultaneously. On the
contrary, he requires of the apprentice that he be able to represent space all by himself. Hence,
he , intends (meint) the original representation of space in which every derived [representa-
tion] must be grounded, and it is actually from this original represeming that the latter must be
derived" (Standpunct 124). Similarly, the Postulate qua highest principle of philosophy consists
*...in the requirement that one should place oneself into the original manner of representing
itself. Hence, it does not assert anything at all, and yet it is the ground of all possible assertions"
(Standpunct 124). On the other hand, Beck points out that his Postulate should be viewed s
having the same rolc and significance for transcendental inquiry s such, s Kam's three
principles of modality have for judgmcnts concerning the possibility, real existencc (actuality)
and necessity of an object of experience. For the three principles of modality, too, postulate
"... the original employment of the understanding in the categories. It is on this postulate, that
is to say, on this original employment of the understanding, that all logical employment of the

298 Ingrid M, Wallner
We can scc right away that thc very design of the Postulate Signals a fundamental
changc vis-a-vis Kant's own attitudc to concretc cxpcrience and examples, and in fact
amounts to a completc rcvcrsal of Kant's prcferencc for "discursive (logical) clearness,
through concepts99 ovcr "intuitive (acsthetic) clearness, through intuitions, that is,
through examples and concrete illustrations" (Kr. . r. V. Axxviii). Whereas discursive
clearness was "csscntia!" for Kant's exposition, he considered concrete examples s
helpful up to a point, but truly "necessary only from z populr point of view... Such
assistance is not required by genuine students of the science.,." (Kr.d.r. V. Axviii).
For Beck, by contrast, the evidence of direct experience provides the very stuff of the
epistemological enterprise11,
Essential for an understanding of Beck's epistemological concerns is an appreciation
of what has been called a "very profound insight* on Beck's part, namely, Beck's
fundamental distinction between 'logical understanding', or understanding by means or
on the basis of concepts, on the one hand, and 'transcendental understanding', or that
kind of understanding which is involved in first building up the meaning of a concept
by originally determining the nature of an object of experience, on the other12. This
distinction goes deeper than the Kantian differentiation of the logical and the transcen-
dental employment of the understanding, inasmuch s the latter term still refers to the
application of (pure) concepts to experience13. In fact, it is one of Beck's major
contentions that the formation of the 'pure' concepts, too, ought to be the object of
transcendental investigation, no less than the formation of empirical concepts - a
requirement that the method of the Postulate is indeed intended to meet. In this, s in a
understanding, all Operation with concepts, must rest" (Standpunct 483). In other words, just s
the principles of modality require that we turn to experience for a validation of our judgments
about (specific or specific types of) empirical objects, the same is required, if on'a more
reflective, self-conscious level, for transcendental inquiry and judgments about its object, the
conditions for the possibility of an object in general.
11
To be sure, Kant recognized very well the decisive epistemological import of an exemplary
Intuition s proof for the objective reality of a concept: ... die Handlung der Hinzufgung der
Anschauung zum Begriffe heit ... Darstellung (exhibitio) des Objects, ohne welche (sie mag
nun mittelbar, oder unmittelbar geschehen) es gar kein Erkenntni geben kann." - "Die erste
Mglichkeit kann man die logische, die zweyte die reale Mglichkeit nennen; der Beweis der
letzteren ist der Beweis der objektiven Realitt des Begriffs, welchen man jederzeit zu fordern
berechtigt ist. Er kann aber nie anders geleistet werden, als durch Darstellung des dem Begriffe
correspondirenden Objects; denn sonst bleibt es immer nur ein Gedanke, welcher ... 50 lange,
bis jenes in einem Beyspiele gezeigt wird, immer ungewi bleibt" [Preisschrift ber die
Fortschritte der Metaphysik, Beylagen. Zweyter Abschnitt, in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Vol.
XX: Kant's handschriftlicher Nachla, Vol. VII, pp. 325-26, emph. add.]. Beck, however,
demands no less for the justification of our knowledge claims, their objective validity, by means
of transcendental reflection according to the Postulate. \
12
Leonard Nelson, Progress and Regress in Philosophy. From fiume and Kant to Hegel and Fries.
Edited by Julius Kraft. Translated by Humphrey Palmer, Vol. 2 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell &
Mott Ltd., 1971), p. 32. /
13
Beck's distinction anticipates, rather, W. James* and E. Husserl's distinction between predica-
tive and pre-predicative experience.

number of other points, he agrees with Schulze-Aenesidemus, maintaining that unless

we account for how we arrived at such 'pure* concepts, we are basically s dogmatic s
the rationalist who postulates 'innates ideas', without providing any further justifica-
tion. Beck emphasizes throughout that there is an important difference between
categories s derived concepts, and categories understood in the functional sense of
original cognitive acts, just s we must distinguish between ready-made concepts of an
object and the categorial acts first giving rise to such concepts. Strictly speaking, the
"original employment of the understanding" is never to be understood s the applica-
tion of a finished concept. The proper object of a transcendental study of cognition is
not the frame of reference of derived concepts, but that of the original cognitive acts.
Transcendental understanding, then, the level of original representing in first-hand
experience, is always prior to logical understanding which is derivative of the formen
Not only are these two kinds of cognition fundamentally different, Beck maintains, but
transcendental understanding is the virtual "opposite" of a representation through
concepts (Standpunct 137).
What are we to make of this claim? Is it not the case, s philosophers in our time have
come to insist more urgently and poignantly than ever, that we cannot get "outside of"
language that all intelligent operations are necessarily conceptual?
Indeed, Beck does not presume to be able to get outside of language, nor does he
wish to do so. He acknowledges explicity that the very idea of the Postulate and the
procedures in enacting it can be expressed and conveyed to others only through
conceptual representation. What he proposes, however, is to focus - not on finished
concepts but on the cognitive acts whereby we grasp the nature of an object, or the
very process of forming a "concept" of it. In one of many introductory and paradigma-
tic illustrations, Beck asks the reader to
... imagine himself to be transposed into a region (for instance, another planet) where he would be
exposed to things which he had never before encountered. In this Situation he would be engaged
exclusively with his original representing, since he would lack the concepts by means of which he
could grasp these objects and thus represent them to himself in derived representations (Stand-
punct 125).
The same, this time deliberatively naive approach, may also be used in studying the
cognition of objects for which concepts are already available. Only in thus retracing our
steps in the knowing process will we truly be able to understand ourselves in judging,
"This object has such and such qualities" or "This object exists," and to justify our \
judgments on a critically founded basis. ' l
Here is an example of Beck's operational Schema for some of the categorial
conceptualizing acts of original representing, which he offers s a guide to the reader
who is to assume the proper transcendental standpoint for himself:
I see a piece of wood. Disregarding emirely the fact that the object is governed by the concept
*wood\ l direct my attention solely to the [act of] original representing whereby it is an object for
me. In this way, I find, first, an" original synthesis of the homogeneous proceeding from parts to
the whole, that is, space. This [original synthesis] attains determinateness in the original recogni-
tion in that the time which originales for me in this synthesis is being determined. Thereby I

300 Ingrid M. Wallncr
obtain a dctcrminate shape or figurc (Figur). Second, l noiice an original synthesis of the
homogeneous procccding from the whole to parts, which constitutes the reality, the filJing of
space. [This second synthesis] is the synthesis of Sensation which is being determined by means of
the [act of] original recognition, whereby a determinate degree comes to be represented. Third, l
am positing a 'somcthing* (the abiding real) s underlying this original synthesis, to which I relate
its prcdicatcs, [and it is in this] original positing that these very predicates are obtained. In the
original recognition, I determine time in that I posit this substratum s an abiding [substratum]
(ein Beharrliches) in relation to which I first represent to myself time itself, positing the abiding
[substratum] in relation to its states at various times (Standpunct 151-52).
In the passage under consideration, then, Beck asks us by way of example to attend
to our own cognitive acts in the process of experiencing a concrete object. Although we
may be able to identify the object which we choose for our paradigmatic epistemologi-
cal excercise by means of an appropriate concept, we are required to suspend the fact of
its ready-made logico-linguistic identity and to study instead how this 'fact' first comes
into being. Focusing only on our cognitive acts in 'grasping' an object of experience, we
become aware of the various facets which make up this process, both in the more literal
sense of gathering or collecting certain aspects of the phenomenal manifold (original
synthesis) and in the sense of recognizing the objective meaning of the synthesis thus
obtained (original recognition). Every step on the way of forming a concept of the
object - every category - may thus be found to encompass two integral phases: the act
of Original synthesis' and the act of 'original recognition'. (From a systemic point of
view, of course, this binary feature of the originative cognitive operations corresponds
to Kant's Subjective Deduction of the First-Edition Critique and the Transcendental
Schematism, respectively.) ,;
Clearly, Beck's Version of the 'deduction' of the categories is far removed from
Kant's more formalistic and deductive "presuppositional framework14." None of the
cognitive factors is formally deduced s a necessary condition for the possibility of
experience, or is attributed to an "an concealed in the human soul" (Kr.d. r. V. B 181).
Rather, Beck operates within a phenomenological perspective which accounts for the
"logos" of phenomena strictly from within phenomenal experience in the fll sense of
the term, viz., s exemplified in the direct experience of the epistemologist himself.
This development was, of course, already prefigured in Kant's own auncoupling"l5-of
the object from the context of a reality in itself and in his critical restriction of cognitive
import to the domain of phenomena. But Beck pushes these beginnings to their logical
conclusion: He eliminates the assumptioh, of an (absolutely mind-independent,
unknowable) reality or thing in itself from theoretical philosophy altogether and insists
that the entire cognitive process is by its riature open in principle to transcendental
investigation. \
14
Gerd Buchdahl, Metaphysics and The Philosophy of Science, The Classical Origins Descartes to
Kant (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), pp. 473 n, 561.
15
Gerd Buchdahl, Transcendental Reduction: A concept for the Interpretation of Kant's critical
method, p. 32. Akten des 4. Internationalen^ Kant-Kongresses Mainz, 6.-10. April 1974, Teil I:
Kant-Studien 65, Sonderheft. Hrsg. von Gerhard Funke und Joachim Kopper (Berlin: Walter
de Gruyter, 1974). /

This brief outline of Beck's approach is bound to raise a number of questions s to

the possible merits and viability of such an enterprise: Is it not the case that Beck's
Postulate lends itself to no more than a psychological account of our experience of an
object, the very 'psychologistic' fallacy, s it came to be called later, that Kant was so
concerned to rule out? What about the pitfalls of subjectivism in Beck's method which
clearly amounts to a position of methodological solipsism? Furthermore, does not
Beck's doctrine of the standpoint merely presuppose, and therefore stand or fall with,
the findings and framework of the Critique?
On thorough examination of his epistemology, I found that, apart from minor
deficiencies, Beck can be defended on all these counts. (The problem is mainly that
Beck does not always make suitable adjustments to the new frame of reference of lived
experience. Still, the deficiencies are not really falsehoods, but - in Beck's own words -
rather * Unbestimmtheiten*> i.e., subject to further determination. The necessary ingre-
dients for further development are indeed present in his System.) For now, however,
we shall only be able to consider how Beck's thought differs from Kant and his
contemporaries and furthermore, s one concrete application of Beck's method of the
Postulate, to follow up its impact on the problem of the 'given'.
The single most important feature of Beck's framework of the Postulate is its
systematic exclusion of any extra-experiential cdeduction' s a justification of our
knowledge claims. It is this policy of strict and methodologically enforced 'immanent-
ism' s a safeguard for a balanced and genuinely critical account of cognition, which sets
him apart from all the Kantians and post-Kantians of the period. Let us now examine
how the new direction of Beck's epistemology affects an important problem for
transcendental philosophy viz., the problem of the 'given'. In particular, we shall
examine the contention that Beck should have gone the way of Fichte in deducing
Sensation further. The latter point is of special interest, since it represents the piece de
resistance against any position of subjective idealism. Ironically, Kant finally repudiated
Beck just because he was led to believe that Beck had followed Fichte in this respect.
One of Beck's foremost concerns in embarking on his Standpunct had been to
neutralize the potentially misleading effect of Kant's method and sequence of presenta-
tion of critical theory. This was particularly true for the Transcendental Aesthetic
which discusses sensible objects and the manifold of intuition prior to and in Separation
from the conceptualizing activities of the mind. In this way, Beck believed, the Critique
may give the impression that the sensible 'given* is somehow accessible to the mind and
knowable independently of its cognitive grasp, and that brte sense input or the things
's given* are epistemologically prior to the contribution of the understanding. But, he
cxpiains, Kant only used realistic language initially to adopt an ostensible common
ground with his reader, for the purpose of leading him gradually away from his
unreflective common sense view. Take the opening passage of the Transcendental
Aesthetic, for example:
In whatever manner and by whatevcr tncans a mode of knowledge may rclate to objects,
intuition is that through which it i$ in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought s a
means is directed. But intuition takes placc only in so far s the object is givcn to us, This again is

only possible, to man at least, in so far s the mind is affected in a certain way (Kr. d. r. V. A197
B 34).
In Beck's view, the prcsentation of Intuition s an 'immediate* relation to an object
can be misleading; it could be interpreted to mean that all that takes place in the
Intuition of an object is a non-mediated, external pick-up of the sensible objects by the
mind. Adding to the difficulty is the claim that such Intuition arises only through an
affection of the mind by the object which is 'given' to us in a certain way, Hence, the
reader is at once led to think of the cognition of 'things in themselves* and thus quite
naturally to the untenable assumption of a 'bond* between *my representation of this
object affecting me and the object itself" (Standpunct 366-67).
Beck had raised the same point with Kant already long before working on the
Standpunct and before developing his own distinct terminology and method. His
Suggestion to Kant at that time was to omit the definition of an 'intuition' s an
immediate relation to an object, in order not to obliterate the fact that "a representation
does not become objective until it is subsumed under the categories.. .* and "intuition
similarly acquires its objective character only by means of the application of categories
to it.. ,"16 Kant was agreeable to Beck's Suggestion and conceded that it may indeed be
preferable not to define sensibility in terms of 'receptivity' - "right at the outset" - and
that it might be wise to keep the section preceding the exposition of the a priori
principles at work in cognition s brief s possible. In his own plan of a future "System
of Metaphysics", Kant had already thought of avoiding such difficulties by using a
different order of exposition from that followed in the Critique, starting with the
categories instead17. ^
16
Letter from Beck to Kant of November 11, 1791, in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XI, pp.
297-98; translated in Zweig, Kant. Pbilosophical Correspondence, p. 180. As- startling s the
latter part of Beck's almost casual, matter-of-fact assertion may seem to the Kant scholar who
looks in vain for a major and sustained substantiation of this Interpretation of Intuition in the
body of Kant's work, Beck did not mean to teach Kant anything new on this point. Rather, his
observations are one of many reminders of a position which Kant had held s his own at least
some of the time and which to Beck represented the true spirit of the Critique. Thus he referred
repeatedly to (isolated) passages wherein Kant calls Intuition a 'representation' and singled out
one passage, in particular, in support of his overall Interpretation of the transcendental
standpoint (Standpunct 424): "The same function which gives unity to the various representa-
tions in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an
intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the
understanding" (Kr. d. r. V. A 79). See also Lewis W. Beck's Did the Sage of Knigsberg Have
No Dreams? for a discussion of how Kant had indeed recognized the function of the categories
in turning sensible awareness into an Intuition. In this paper, the author develops the
implications of Kant's new functional conception of Intuition for allowing Kant to account for a
type of experience that at its minimum is coherent (dreams, illusions) and may even be objective
and/or cognitive in a certain sense ('judgments of perception', aesthetic judgments). (In Essays
on Kant and Hume [New Haven and London: Yale Univeirsity Press, 1978], pp. 38-60.)
17
Letter from Kant to Beck of January 20,1792, in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XI, pp. 302,
300; translated in Zweig, Kant. Pbilosophical Correspondence, pp. 183-84, 182. Beck's later

The combined effect of these considerations and of Beck's functional adaptation of

the categories proved to be a vastly more powerful mixture than either Kant or Beck
had anticipated, however, This can best be seen from Beck's reinterpretation of Kant's
presentation of 'pure' and 'empirica!' Intuition and its effect on the problem of the
'given':
In his example of the cognition of a "piece of wood," Beck accounts for a first
cognitive grasp of an object in general by focussing on the reflective awareness of our
spontaneously and selectively gathering (originally synthesizing) 'homogeneous* parts
or aspects of the manifold of experience into a body, a spatial unit; in an act of (original)
recognition, we then become aware of its objectively being "this" body or spatial unit
outside of us, at a determinate moment in time. In this way, space and time are being
originally constituted s objective characteristics of the experienced object. Now, it is
this phase of the cognitive process, Beck submits, that Kant means by 'pure Intuition'
or 'pure intuitmg*, rather, s Beck prefers to call it to emphasize that we are dealing
with an activity. Evidently, then, Beck has come to assimilate space and time into the
categories and at the same time tacitly equates the acts of the productive Imagination
according to the Critique with the originative activity of the understanding: "The
original employment of the understanding comprises the category of extensive mag-
nitude which produces space and time" (Standpunct 473). (This is not to be construed
s 'production' in the strong sense of 'creation', s if postulating a metaphysical
dependence, nor s mere subjective form, Beck warns repeatedly; such claims have no
merit in a critical theory of objectivity and merely play into the hands of the skeptic18.)
By 'empirical intuition' or intuitwg, by contrast, Beck interprets Kant to mean the
next phase of conceptualization, that of the category of 'reality*, also called 'materiality'
(Sachheit) or Intensive magnitude*. In this second mode of original representing, we
originally synthesize and recognize certain sensible qualities s objectively real features
of the experienced object (the real, the cause). That is to say, whereas in the first phase
we have constituted the spatio-temporal unity of an object of experience - its nature s a
'whole* , we are now determining details about the objective 'reality* of the experi-
enced body, or the precise nature of its 'filling... space' in terms of the sensible
qualities found in direct experience. Although intimately linked with the category of
causality (to be considered later on), the cognitive activity in the category of 'reality' is a
defense in the face of Kant's scorn ovcr the Standpunct was indeed that he had only reversed
Kant's method of exposition in the Critiquc, startin g immediately with the categories. This is
why he had called his work 'transccndemal philosophy' and omitted the division into Transcen-
dental Aesthetic and Transccndental Logic. - Letter from Beck to Kant of June 20t 1797, in
Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XII, p. 166.
11
Of course, Beck points out, we can also look at the category of extensive magnitude s a concept
- s a prcdicate to be employed in representing an object. But such usc is always derivative,
being based and dependent on prior constitutivc acts. Wc may ascribe the predicatc of
magnitude to the object and think of the object by incans of this prcdicate only because the
understanding itself is operative in our cognition of the object s an original symhesis
(Standpunct 404-5). ,

distinct phase and not s such affirming anything about causation. It merely determines
that certain sensations which we are experiencing pertain s sensible qualities and
objective characteristics to the nature of the object of the experience, rather than being
mere subjective states of mind and s such psychological determinations of the subject.
Before going on to assess the overall significance of Beck's treatment of pure and
empirical intuition for the problem of the 'given', I will illustrate briefly the sort of
difficulty mentioned earlier which arises whenever Beck does not seem to be^fully
aware of the substantial changes resulting from his new standpoint, or at least neglects
to translate their implications into corresponding adjustments in presentation and
terminology.
For one thing, Beck's retention of the distinction between 'pure' and 'empirical'
intuition would seem to be of no more than perfunctory significance, and perhaps even
an embarrassment for Beck: In Beck's phenomenological transformation of critical
inquiry, the former radical Opposition of two heterogeneous and mutually exclusive
elements of cognition and correlatively, of form and matter of sensibility, has been
softened to a mere difference in focus of two complementary cognitive acts. For, both
'pure* or formal and 'empirical' or material intuition, just s any other mode of the
original employment of the understanding, involve an active contribution by the
understanding s well s operate "only upon Sensation" (Standpunct 369). The differ-
ence is merely that in the former case, the cognitive subject attends to the 'that' of parts
of the sensible manifold being 'homogenous', or uniformly Standing out in his
perceptual field, so s to yield a unified shape or body ('the whole'). The actual nature
or 'whatness' of the (sensible) parts making up the whole does not s yet enter into the
constitution of the object in pure intuiting, but the sensible qualities themselves only
become a factor in 'empirical intuiting'. Clearly, then, in the perspective of original
representing, there is no essential difference between the determination that parts of the
sensible manifold are homogeneous such that they form a unified whole, on the one
hand, and that the body exhibits such and such sensible qualities, on the other. In any
event, the distinction is not really central to Beck's purposes and presumably served
only to maintain consistency with Kant's terminology and systematic divisions. After
all, Beck has maintained all along that he wanted to be no more than a Kant
commentator.
Another instance where Beck did not quite follow up the implications of replacing
Kant's presuppositional framework with that of direct experience, is his presentation of
the category of 'reality' (also 'intensive magnitude' or 'materiality'). Here he continues
to use Kantian language based on a constructivist model of quality in quantitative terms
which in turn rests on the dictum: "... Sensation is just that element which cannot be
anticipated" (Kr. d. r. V. A 167, B 209): \
The filled space is called a material space (ein materieller Raum)19.
* /
19
J. S. Beck, Propdeutik zu jedem wissenschaftlichen Studio '(Halle: Renger, 1799), p. 38.

J.S. Beck's Doctrine of the Standpoint" 305
Or again:
Of a piece of matter (Materie) in my band I shall say that it contains the more materiality
(Sacbbeit) in itself, the greater the Sensation of resistance which I feel in attempting to reduce the
space which the body occupies20.
But now, in Beck's frame of reference, where every cognitive act is shown concretely
to infuse the sensible content of experience with conceptual organization, there is no
longer any reason to exclude qualitative content from our theoretical account of
cognition. Indeed, we find at least one example in Beck to support this comention:
The original employment of the understanding upon which the predicate materiality (Sachbeit)
is founded... is that of the synthesis of the sensations whereby the object is said to cgive itself'. A
body of red colour gives itself to me21.
The upshot of Beck's reinterpretation of "pure* and 'empirical' Intuition and its
import for the problem of the 'given' is this: Beck's Integration of space and time into
the conceptualizing acts of the understanding cuts across the rigid division between
sensibility and understanding along the lines of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the
Transcendental Analytic. There is no need now to posit any unconscious processes in
order to join the two levels of analysis for an account of experience, but we can draw on
what is revealed at a strictly conscious level. Thus the method of the Postulate
demonstrates concretely that at the very inception of the cognitive act, that is, s soon
s the understanding gets involved in grasping the nature of an object, the stuff or
content of experience is first made 'coherent' through the selective and spontaneous acts
of combination and identification by the understanding. Any attempt to account for the
elements of cognition in isolation from such cognitive acts, then, can only mean one of
the following: (1) an abstraction from what has first originally been apprehended by the
understanding, referring back to the unity and identity established in the cognitive act;
(2) an illegitimate deduction outside the limits of intelligibility - beyond the realm of
possible experience, or eise (3) a mere hypothesis, which by its nature can never be the
foundation of objective knowledge. Consequently, Beck insists,
[a] completely mistaken Interpretation, and one totally opposed to the intention of the Critique, is
the view that space and time s well s the 'real' (das Reale) of things, constitute a manifold given
prior to the original synthesis and recognition (Standpunct 149).
Notice, however, in this passage Beck's reference to the 'intention' of the Critique:
All along, in his commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic, he had kept making
allowances for Kant's treatment of sensibility, pending a progressively. more explicit
account of the original employment of the understanding according to critical princi-
20
J.S.Beck, Grundri der critischen Philosophie (Halle: Renger, 1796; reprint 'Aetas Kantiana',
Brssels: Culture et Civilisation, 1970), p. 9. .
21
J. S. Beck, Commentar berjtant's Metaphysik der Sitten. Erster Theil, welcher die metaphysi-
schen Principien des Naturrechts enthlt (Halle: Renger, 1798; reprint 'Aetas Kantiana',
Brssels: Culture et Civilisation, 1970), p. 9-

ples. At last, Deck simply cannot conceal any longer his unhappiness when toward the
end of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, where the authentic transcen-
dental standpoint should finally have been attained, Kant still maintains:
But in the above proof there i$ one feature from which I could not abstract, the feature, namely,
that the manifold to be intuited must be given prior to the synthesis of understanding, and
independendy of it (Kr. d. r. V. B 146).

Such formulations, Beck complains, are bound to confuse the reader who is
struggling to grasp the spirit of the critical doctrine. Even more seriously, they promote
the assumption that the connection (of the manifold) which the understanding brings
about in its categorial conceptualizing acts is actually located in the things themselves -
the very position which the Deduction of the Categories is supposed to undermine
(Standpunct 451-52).
Beck never tires to insist that after Kant there is no longer any room in critical
inquiry for any obscure and unfounded conceptual dogmatism, even though this is not
always clear from the letter of the Critique: Every concept and in turn every
combination of concepts into full-fledged judgments must be capable of being traced
back to the original employment of the understanding, if they are to be granted
objective validity. The concept of a 'given manifold' is no exception to that rule. If we
take it to refer to space and time, then careful attention to our primary cognitive acts in
the category of 'extensive magnitude' will show that the term 'given' in this connection
is, strictly speaking, a misnomer; or eise it is used in a new and peculiar sense.
Generally, when we say that something is 'given', we refer to something encountered in
experience s just 'being there', s a presence to consciousness, and this 'givenness' is
not our doing, but has an independent origin. As Beck puts it in his mature work, the
Propdeutik zu jedem wissenschaftlichen Studio:
In a cognition, the 'given' is opposed to that which isproduced. But what is given in a cognition
is that with regard to which we are not conscious of any act of our spontaneity (Willkhr) to have
brought it about, and ori the contrary are conscious of it s the effect of quite a differeni cause
(Propdeutik 25, emph. add.).
Now, even though common sense does not take cognizance of this fact, space and
time are not simply "there" s " given " or the effect of some independent cause, but afe
being brought about by means of and in the original employment of the understanding
(Standpunct 424). As to the assumption of van 'unconnected' manifold of space and
time, on the other band, Beck points out that .we always think of space and time s
connected. Yet only on transcendental reflection according to the Postulate do we
realize that this 'connectedness' lies in the very nature of cognitive acts s modes of
original connecting. It is in this original synthesis alone, and not prior to it, that space
and time constitute a manifold (Standpunct 445). (Note that for Beck there is not a
complete disjunction between ordinary experience and the - more reflective - level of
transcendental inquiry, but the latter serves to elucidatejand qualify the former.)
Similarly, with respect to the concept of a manifold 'given a posteriori', the evidence
of original representing in the category of 'reality' shows unequivocally that at no time

in the cognitive process do we experience a mere collection of discrete (unconnected)

sensible elements which we would somehow add up to yield an object s its sum. Our
experience is just not like that. We only grasp the sensible manifold in the process and
on the basis of combining it into meaningful wholes. Unlike space and time, on the
other hand, the 'empirical datum' of Sensation meets indeed the criteria of 'givenness'
both with respect to its presence to" consciousness and our awareness of an independent
origin. (Beck rarely uses the term cmanifold of intuition', presumably to preclude a
phenomenalist reading of it.)
When it comes to identifying this independent origin or "different cause," however,
we arrive at a crossroad of transcendental philosophy: Both K. L. Reinhold and S.
Maimon - like Beck - had adopted a deliberately immanent stance in their treatment of
the 'given*, but nevertheless ended up including transcendent deductions s part of their
account. Whereas Reinhold found it indispensable to postulate the things in themselves
s 'givers' of the Objective stuff of Sensation*, Maimon presented a curious blend of
'empirical skepticism' and "rational dogmatism' (his own terms) in both denying the
possibility of knowing the origin of the sensible manifold and speculating that it must
be engendered by the understanding. Fichte similarly maintained we must assume that
the understanding produces Sensation, even though we have no theoretical basis to
support this claim, and postulated a metaphysical dependence of the stuff of Sensation,
and hence of the object, on an absolute seif.
The question we must ask, then, is whether Beck's account of the 'given', too, is
incomplete without the assumption of an extra-experiential origin of the sensible given.
That is to say, does he have to concede after all that the sensible manifold is 'given' prior
to the conceptualizing activities of the understanding, inasmuch s the origin of
Sensation lies outside of our conscious experience? Or how exactly does he propose to
account for the "different cause" of Sensation?
In addressing this problem, Beck complains in a letter to Kant that "even the friends
of the Cntique... don't know where they ought to locate the object that produces
Sensation22." Yet a consistently non-dogmatic, transcendental perspective cannot but
exhibit the cause of the sensible given within the area of possible experience, s
something that is itself accessible to consciousness s an appearance. Quite clearly,
then, .
The object that here affects my senses is called appearance, and not thing-in-itself.23
Beck places his account of 'empirical affection' squarely within Kant's Deduction of
the Categories, s he interprets it. Just s 'pure' and 'empirical' intuiting in the
categories of extensive magnitude and reality are complementary, but distinct phases in
the constitution of an object of experience, Beck explains,
22
Letter from Beck to Kant of June 17, 1794, in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XII, p. 491;
translated in Zweig, Kant. Philosophical Correspondehce, p. 215.
23
Letter from Beck to Kant of June 20, 1797, in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XIIp. 167;
translated in Zweig, Kant. Philosophical Correspondence, p. 230.

308 Ingrid M, Wallncr
.,, thcrc is intimatcly conncctcd with ihc coniciousnes$ of [thc] cmpirical datum the original
cognitive act of causality, whcrcby this Sensation is cxpcricnced s an event (Begebenheit) and
rclatcd to a caute (Propdcutik 236),
I laving dctermincd, in original rcprcsenting, that an cxpcricnccd body i$ of a ccrtain

shapc and is prcscnt to my consciousncss at a ccrtain momcnt in timc, cxhibiting such
and such sensible qualitics, I rcali/c {hat the sensible qualities encountcred in dircct
cxpcricnce arc not subjcct to my control, or depcndent on my productive acts In thc
samc way s products of thc Imagination, the "recall" of scnsations from mcmory, or
halludnations. The scnsations cxpcricnccd in the cognition of an cmpirical object are
objcctivcly 'givcn* by virtue of an (indcpcndcnt) object 'giving itself' to me, affecting
me. Thcre is a ccrtain scqucncc to my expcrience of the object, a scquence which is
irreversible and indcpendent of the particular configurations of my pcrccptual acts: The
prcscnce or accessibility of the object always prcccdcs my pcrccption of its sensible
qualities, In the category of causality, then, wc focus on the flow of perccptions and
perform an original synthcsis relating our experience of thc sensible qualitics to thc
cxpcricnccd object s its cause. Ncxt, we originally 'fixate', or determine, in an act of
original rccognition thc "alternation of the determinations of our own subject"
(Standpunct 162) s an objcctive succession and posit thc cause of the sensations
accordingly (Standpunct 423-24):
I posit a 'something* (cause), whereby the modification of my own subjective state - from my
being without this reprcscntadon to my having this rcpresentation - attains the corrcsponding
dctermination of time (Standpunct 156).
But now, we might ask, s many critics, including Reinhold and Schelling, have
indccd argucd in favour of 'transccndcnt affection': If Beck's solution of 'empirical
affection* - of appcaranccs causing appcarances - entails that the cause of the given is
itself somcthing given, does it not lead to an infinite regress (and conscquently to a
'bottomless transcendental idealism', s Fichte will have it)? Perhaps Beck did oot take
'nature* seriously enough, failing to rccognize that thc object which causcs scnsations in
us, is something more and essentially diffcrcnt than its 'appearance' in consciousness?
Here it is of the utmost importancc, for a proper undcrstanding of Beck's position,
to be vcry clear about thc cpistcmological Status of thc object of the exemplary act of
original rcpresenting. The cxpcricnccd object is not, qua 'appearance', a pale reflection
of thc 'real thing', but is is the full-bodied sensible object which is not rcducible to our
consciousncss of it, but cxists in its own right and may be touched, kicked about or
blocked fromc one's view, For, given his elimmation of the thing in itself and his
rigorous emphasis on dircct expcrience, Beck has cffcctively and morc consistently than
Kant himsclf eliminated the last vcstiges of traditional reprcscntationalist theorics of
pcrception. We have now evcry right to assert of the object of (direct) experience,
which manifcsts a dccisivc indcpendence relative to our subjective statcs, that it causes
our experience of it and thus provides a 'Stimulus1, in a certain sensc, for the occurrence
of sensations, Thcre is nothing "bchind" that object, only the object itself in its myriad
concrete determinations.

J.S. Beck's "Doctrine of the Standpoint" 309
With the final elimination of the representationalist legacy, all the aporias connected
with the epistemological bllndspot of a reality in itself which is held to underlie - we
know not how - our world.of experience, have disappeared s well. There is no
difficulty now, Beck points out, in answering the question
...how I arrived at the representation of the object which I see in front of me...: The object
affects me. This object which I see or touch engenders in me a Sensation by means of the light or of
its impenetrability (Standpunct 156).
Unlike the impossible (philosopher's) question for the 'bond' or connection between
our representations and a 'thing in itself considered to be totally Other' than its
phenomenal counterpart, the assumption of empirical affection is in agreement with the
common sense view of ordinary experience - "for we are on its ground" (Standpunct
163). We have no difficulty, therefore, in accounting for that and how our experience of
an object, our perception and knowledge of it (the determinate representation) con-
forms to the nature of the object of experience (the determinate object):
For example, the fact that the representation of the table which I see in front of me is different
from the representation of a chair which is also situated in front of me, is due to the fact that the
first object is a table and the second a chair, and that both (objects) affect me differently
(Standpunct 163).
Beck's seemingly simplistic Statement of the problem, to be sure, is backed up by
sophisticated analyses of the application of concepts to experience centered around the
distinction between logical and transcendental understanding. Like Fichte, Beck rejects
Kant's two-dimensional model of subsumption, maintaining that subsumption is only
one of the processes involved in applying concepts - a priori s well s a posteriori to
experience (logical understanding), and by no means the most basic. Acts of original
representing (transcendental understanding) always remain a fundamental factor in the
cognition of an object of experience, with reflective acts mediating between the
synthetic-objective unity of concrete experience and the analytic unity of the concept,
before any act of subsumption can take place.
The object qua 'appearance' is, of course, not 'given' in the same way s Sensation, s
essentially a datum, but represents the combined 'product' (in the Order of cognition) of
the given of Sensation and the conceptualizing input of the understanding24. Now, s
24
Beck's explicit treatment of and insistence on this difference is an important factor in allowing
him to neutralize the so-called 'paradox of the object' in Kantian thought, which has been the
sabject of a recent paper by Michel Meyer. [Le paradoxe de l'objet chez Kant, in Kant-Studien,
VoL 68, No. 3 (1977), pp. 290-304.] Briefly, the 'paradox of the object' consists in the apparent
contradiction in transcendental philosophy arising from the object's being said both to be
'given' to and constituted by the subject of cognition. According to Meyer, the problem in Kant
derives partly from certain ambiguities and shifts in the use of the concept of 'experience'
affecting the concept of the Object' s well s the rple and nature of the 'given' of sensible
intuition in relation to the categories. But independendy of considerations of terminology and
consistency, there remains the difficulty that the "understanding constitutes the object through
its synthetic activity, and projects its result, at a level where it is not yet possible to speak of an

long s thc primary proccss of concept Formation is going on, the cognitive subject is
still absorbed in the Business of originally determining the very nature of an object of
experience. Beck should not be expected, therefore, to incorporate into his account of
"original representing" the reflective Opposition between the concept of the object thus
formed and the object itself "out there" - simply because such finished concept is not
yet available at this stage to be appliecUo the object on the (derived) level of predjcative
experience. Nonetheless, Beck certainly distinguished between our concept of an
object, the "determinate representation," and the actual object which affects us
materially, the "determinate object," just s the acts of original representing already
point beyond themselves to a transcendent referent. Only, the *transcendence'
involved, both on the more obvious level of first-hand experience and on the derived
level of the application of finished concepts, must never be interpreted s an absolute
transcendence, lest we abandon our critical stance and fall back on some form of pre-
critical dogmatism.
By the time we are in a position to make full-fledged cognitive judgments on the
derived level of predicative experience, still further original cognitive acts must have
preceded the fll determination of an 'appearance', in addition to those aleady
discussed. Causal judgments of perception involving a specific (fully determined)
object, for instance, are already a combination of the finished concepts of the affecting
object and of the affected subject, in addition to drawing on various generalizations
from experience.
Briefly, among the remaining categories there are, then, the remaining categories of
relation (viz., 'substantiality' and 'reciprocity' or 'commercium') which together.with
the other categories form the basis for judgments concerning existence, "whereby I get
beyond my own seif and say, 'Here is (exists) an object that affects me'25." Of particular
interest for epistemology are the categories of modality in that they confer scientific
Status on our concepts of an object of experience. An object of experience is not
constituted s an object of science by the simple immediate awareness of it, but f equires
the reflective evaluation of the possibility of experience s a condition for the object of
experience to measure up s an object of knowledge. In the category of modality, then,
we are reflectively Standing back to bring a new judgment to bear s to the degree <of
certainty (probability, actuality, necessity) of our determinations of an object, and
hence s to the scientific legitimacy of our judgments. The important thing ro keep in
mind always in evaluating the possibility of experience, however, is that
"\
\
\
object." (My translation, p. 297.) It is Meyer's contention that the difficulty can (only?) be
removed in Kant on the basis of his phenomena-noumena\distinction, and by postulating the
existence of things in themselves. Leaving aside the question whether or not this is indeed so,
Beck clearly does not have to resort to this kind of a solution, given his two-level analysis of
predicative and pre-predicative experience, respectively, and his account of both the 'givenness*
and the constitution of the object - "in different respects" 4 on the latter level.
25
Letter from Beck to Kant of June 24, 1797," in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XII, p. 173;

... [so] long s one still thinks of this 'possibility of experience' purely discursively and does not
follow up the original activity in just such an activity s this, one has insight into virtually nothing,
having merely substituted one incomprehensible thing for another26.
The genuine critical position can only be that the possibility of experience IS the
transcendental unity of apperception (the objective-synthetic unity of consciousness),
and nothing more - an insight that must itself be gained through original representing
(Standpunct 471).
For the remainder of this paper we shall examine the objection that Beck should have
deduced sensations still further27 and that he might have learned from Fichte in this
respect who wem beyond the theoretical confines of immanence to consciousness in
answering the question, "whence the stuff that is subsumed under these forms."28 In the
light of this controversy, we shall also consider the Status of psychological factors of
perception in Beck's work.
The issue between Fichte and Beck is this: On the one hand, Fichte approved of
Beck's rejection of transcendent affection on the object side. Like Beck, he considered
the norion of a 'thing in itselP to be mistaken and entirely avoidable, and (unlike
Maimon) he<lid not deny empirical affection. So, too, he commended Beck for his view
that the understanding "creates" (erzeugt) the object, much to the dismay of Beck
himself who did not want to be falsely identified with a subjective idealist position. On
the other band, Fichte sharply .criticized Beck for not having gone far enough in
deducing the conditions of cognition on the side of the subject, thus ending up with a
"bottomless transcendental idealism and an incomplete philosophy...*29
As for the problem of the 'given', Fichte agrees with Beck in that he, too, considers
Sensation s a stopping point beyond which no (theoretical) transcendental explication
is possible. However, he accuses Beck of having forgotten simple 'feelings' such s the
'feeling* of sweetness, redness or coldness. (Fichte prefers to use the term Gefhl- the
equivalent of contemporary notions of 'raw feels' - in reference to Kant's manifold of
Sensation prior to synthesis.) Admittedly, a feeling "becomes a Sensation only by the
reference to an object by means of thinking." But such feelings, Fichte contends,
impose a constraint on one's practical capacities such that philosophy is "driven from
the theoretical into the practical domain30." It is here that the philosopher must take an
additional deductive step, attributing the origin of these 'feelings' to the self-affection
by the subject.
Beck, for his part, to be sure, was no less opposed to the subjective idealist
Integration of sensations into the productions of a seif in itself than to any deduction of
sensations from a thing in itself. While we indeed experience the sensible given s an
26
Letter from Beck to Kant of June 17, 1794, in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XI, p. 491;
27
Myer, Das Verhltnis des Sigismund Beck zu Kanttp. 40. -
21
Fichte, Versuch einer neuen ^Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre (2. Einleitung), p. 202.
29
Ibid., p. 243. -
30
Ibid.. pp. 242-43. ' .

312 Ingrid M. Wallncr
'affcction', thc allcgcd fact of '$e//-affection', being transcendent to consciousness, is

cvidcntly not somcthing that could be corroboratcd in experience. On the contrary, all
the evidcncc of cxpericncc points prcciscly to a "different cause" which is (relatively)
mind-indcpcndent, Not only would such a position represent a rclapse to dogmatism,
incvitably inviting skcptical attack, but it is tantamount to the absurd claim that the
object in toto was the literal 'product* pf thc cognizing subject, not just the determina-
tion of its laws and objective meaning.
It might be argucd, on the other hand, that Fichte's deduction of sensuous affection
mcrcly makes explicit what Beck's method of the Postulate entails implicitly, since it
requires a deliberate enactment of the 'Tathandlung' of the perceiving subject whereby
an object first becomes an object for us. This assumption appears indeed to be largely
rcsponsible for the frequent equivocation of Beck's position with that of Fichte. But
that would mean to overlook a fundamental difference between their respective
frameworks. There is in Beck no deductive System into which the 'facts of conscious-
ness' would have to be integrated, and no assumption of a pure a l = I" s the
foundation of that System, from which all other principles are to be deduced. Instead,
the Postulate is designed in such a way that it does and must speak for itself, and on the
level of strictly theoretical insight, precisely to rule out any speculative deductions - the
very raison d*etre of transcendental philosophy.
Of course, a refusal to deal with a certain problem does not of itself constitute a
solution to that problem. If Beck refuses to deal with a non-conceptual manifold of
'raw feels' and to probe the causal relationship between the affecting object and our
awareness of sensible qualities at a deeper level than that of 'appearances', is his theory
of cognition not hopelessly removed from certain undeniable empirical facts, well
known already long before his time, e. g., the fact that perception involves a complex
causal chain of physiological processes? W, Sellars, for instance, commends Kant
precisely for having retained the "radical non-conceptual" character of Sensation, in the
interest of integrating the data of scientific research with ordinary experience31. Perhaps
Beck's account will have to be dismissed outright for being incompatible in principle
with the methods and findings of experimental psychology?
In defense of Beck it must be said that he has not really forgotten about simple sense
data or 'feelings', nor is he oblivious to the physiological processes taking place in
perception. Rather, his special contribution in this area is (a) to work out a division of
labour between a distinctively philosophical, normative, theory of cognition, on the
one hand, and the explanatory framework of empirical psychology, on the other, and
(b) to apply the critical injunction to staking out what appear to be intrinsic limitations
in elucidating the causal chain of perception. \
Like Fichte, Beck distinguishes between the (psychological) content of introspec-
tion, the stuff of "inner sense", and the content of the cognitive act directed at and
31
Wilfred Sellars, Science and Metaphysics. Variation on Kantian Themes (New York: Humanities
J>ress Inc., 1968), pp. 16,111.

J.S. Beck's "Doctrine of the Standpoint" 313 \
determining the object (of "outer sense"). In the Propdeutik, he goes to great lengths
describing the psychological factors and variatons of sensible experience. Yet he insists
throughout that the proper subject matter of transcendental inquiry consists not in
psychological states and sense data, but in the "consciousness of the moments of the act
of cognition in experience" (Propdeutik 41). Describing for each of the senses the
difference between, and the transition from subjective Sensation and objective cogni-
tion, Beck explains, e. g., for the sense of touch:
... if I carry in my hand an object, say, a stone, the consciousness of spatiality reveals itself to me
s I grasp it with my hand and touch the different parts successively. Out of the act of cognition
*space* arises the cognition of something outside of me, whereof the mere Sensation on the basis of
touch does not contain anything (Propdeutik 36-37).
* What is added and transforms the modification of consciousness called "sensation"

from a psychological state to a cognitive content, even in this rudimentary Operation of
the understanding, is a cognitive act which is normative. It is normative in that it
discriminates between a psychological happening, being informative only about the
psychological states and idiosyncrasies of the subject (In touching or viewing this body,
I "feel" such and such sensations), and an objective state of affairs pertaining to an
object eoutside of me". (This body has such and such sensible qualities.) And the j
recognition of such an objective state of affairs is clearly an achievement, the product of ]
a cognitive act, rather than the bare result of 'being affected'. ;
By the same token, Beck's distinction along the lines of Kant's differentiation of
'judgments of perception' and 'judgments of experience' also provides the basis for the
division of labour in any account of experience between transcendental philosbphy and ]
empirical psychology. Accordingly, it is the business of the empirical psychologist to l
explain psychological states by examining the material and genetic conditions for their ;
occurrence, for instance in childhood developments. He proceeds by correlating the
affecting object considered s the cause, with "sensation" s the effect of such affection, .
interpolating various theoretical constructs and hypotheses in his explanation of the
causal processes involved. For example, whereas Beck fails to see what an inclusion of
the construct 'impressions' - the effect on a bodily organ - could possibly accomplish in
transcendental inquiry over and above 'Sensation', it remains for the physiologists to
further describe and explain such 'impressions' (a task which Beck suspects may be
difficult even for them) (Propdeutik 56, 45).
Now, Beck sees no basis for doubting that the causal relation between external
objects and the modification of consciousness known s "sensations" involves indeed
various intervening physiological and neurological processes. There is sufficient evi-
dence (in the order of appearances) to support this claim, even though not too much is
known s yet, Beck submits, about the precise manner of .functioning of these
processes. He cautions, however, that even at the level pf sensuous affection, the
assumption of a chain of mechanistic events may be deficient, at least in the sense of not
providing the fll story of the behayiour of organized matter, since we are dealing with
the manifestation of a force on the side of the organism (Propdeutik 27). Granted that

the rcceptivity of our sense organs constitutes the limiting condition for the rnge of
our perceptual expcrience, it is also true that we not only
... have to ascribe to oursclves this faculty of sensibility (s a capacity constitutive of the mind),
but the dcgrcc of cxcitability, too, depcnds in part on our spontaneitiy (Propdeutik 65, emph.
add.).
Granted, moreover, that the effecrof external objects on "outer sense" inyolves
material alterations in the body, the 'given' of Sensation, being a modification of
consciousness, is always different in kind from material factors (Propdeutik 26). And
even though many mechanistic aspects of this process may be ascertained empirically,
the actual 'connection' of the material, merely somatic determinations with sensations,
which are nothing external, but an inner determination, is still problematic (Pro-
pdeutik 47-48).
Beck's observations on empirical psychology are an example of his conception of the
function of critical philosophy s a 'Wchter* (watchman) over the empirical sciences.
The idea is not to teil the scientist what to do, but to examine his cognitive claims for
what they are and in what manner and to what extent they are borne out in concrete
experience and supported by transcendental principles. It is not by accident that the
transcendental philosopher who investigates the conditions of experienaVzg objects is
apt to point out the deficiencies of a purely mechanistic explanation of perception,
insofar s it cannot do justice to the active role of the subject. Another critical function
par excellence of transcendental philosophy is the drawing of lines of demarcation
between the elements of experience per se, on the one hand, and theoretical constructs,
hypotheses, or speculation, on the other. Beck's framework of direct experience can be
particularly helpful in all these tasks, s may be seen from his treatment of the 'given'.
Now, Beck acknowledges that empirical psychology, for all intents and purposes,
furnishes us with an acceptable explanatory model for the 'that' of the causal processes
of perception. But he warns that it would be quite impossible in principle to unravel the
actual 'how', or to gain actual knowledge, of the nature of the transition from somatic
determinations to the awareness of sensations in conciousness: The juncture between
unconscious events and conscious states is inherently outside the reach of possible
experience. On critical reflection, the question of the 'inner workings' of that connec-
tion is clearly something
... of which we may not form an intelligible, and no more than a negative concept, that is to say,
the concept of a substratum of nature (Propdeutik 73).
\
Accordingly, Beck submits that we are confronted with an intrinsic limit of
intelligibility for our understanding in this area. In fact, the thoroughly problematic
character of the 'connection' between material and conscious processes is such that we
cannot even know that there is something 'hidden' from\our view; quite possibly, there
may be nothing there to be found (Propdeutik 47). In other words, while we must
positively acknowledge certain limits of intelligibility for our understanding, any talk
whatsoever about an 'inner' connection in this respect must be formulated in cautious,
agnostic terms.

J.S. Beck's "Doctrine of the Standpoint" 315
On the whole, Beck's critique of causal theories of perception has a remarkably

modern ring. He anticipates not only aspects of the phenomenological theories of
perception of Scheler and Merly-Ponty, but also Ryle's criticism of carrying over into
the area of consciousness the mechanistic accounts from the domain of physical events
and processes, and his connected notion of a "category mistake" in this regard. Like
Ryle, moreover, Beck traces the mistaken conception of an 'inner' connection in this
context to the indefensible position of a metaphysical mind-body dualism.
For all the modernity of Beck's approach, do we yet have to dismiss his capitulation
in the face of a perceived a priori barrier to our understanding s a limitation of his
time, given the relatively backward state of research, or possibly s an inherent
limitation of the transcendental method s he interpreted it? j
Of course, most current attempts to explain the relation between physical processes
and conscious phenomena tend towards assimilating or reducing the latter to the
former. But this strategy, surely, succeeds only in 'explaining away' what was set out to }
be discovered^ in the first place, and is beset by insuperable difficulties. Only recently,
the problem has been referred to s the "mind-brain identity impasse" and defined s
the difficulty^o explain !
... how a process of one kind (neurophysiological) can generate a phenomena [sie] of another kind \
(consciousness) such that whe the latter is dependent upon the former it still has independent
qualities and functions within the context of immediate experience32. i
It appears, therefore, that other than a shift in focus to the mind-brain controversy,
the problem is nowhere nearer to a solution today. And the question has indeed been :
raised in this connection whether we might be left with an intrinsic limitation of i"
scientific explanation, and possibly even with "an irreducible, inexplicable dichotomy
in reality analogous to other dichotomies in physics33."
Conduuon
Reviewing the concerns of this paper, I have anempted to show that J. S. Beck merits
more attention than he has previously received. Contrary to the prevalent views, Beck's
'doctrine of the standpoim* differs in essential respects from all the other efforts of his
contemporaries to reinterpret and reconstruct critical theory, including Fichte's deduc-
tlve system. In applying the critical injunction with greater rigour and consistency than
Kant himself, Beck developed a uniquely dynamic approach which lerids itself to
greater flexibility and richness in the treatment of the a priori conditions of cognition
than the classical Kantian framework. In this, he anticipated a phenomenological
tradition which came into its own only in this Century, but which owes much to Kam's
antispeculative and emancipatory impetus.
*
12
Richard H. Schlgel, The Mind-Brain Identity Impasse, in American Philosophical Quarterly,
Vol. 14. No. 3 (1977), p.237.
33
Ibid.

In the present papcr, I have primarily dealt with Beck's application of his method of
the Postulatc to thc problcm of the 'given*. Many worthwhile themes remain to be
explored in Beck's work such s his more fully developed account of concept formation
s 'concrete universality*, his resituating of the problem of the bergang s an answer
to skeptical attack and his independent 'justification* for the adoption of the Postulate.
But these topics will have to be the object of further discussions. _


A New Look at J.S. Beck's "Doctrine of The Standpoint"

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A New Look at J.S.

Beck's "Doctrine of the Standpoint"

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number of other points, he agrees with Schulze-Aenesidemus, maintaining that unless

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This brief outline of Beck's approach is bound to raise a number of questions s to

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The combined effect of these considerations and of Beck's functional adaptation of

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in the cognitive process do we experience a mere collection of discrete (unconnected)

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I laving dctermincd, in original rcprcsenting, that an cxpcricnccd body i$ of a ccrtain

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'affcction', thc allcgcd fact of '$e//-affection', being transcendent to consciousness, is

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* What is added and transforms the modification of consciousness called "sensation"

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On the whole, Beck's critique of causal theories of perception has a remarkably

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