BROTHERHOOD LABOR UNITY MOVEMENT vs HON.

ZAMORA (1991)

FACTS:

Petitioners-members of Brotherhood Labor Unit Movement of the Philippines (BLUM), worked

as cargadores or pahinante since 1961 at the SMC Plant. Sometime in January 1969, the
petitioner workers numbering 140 organized themselves and engaged in union activities.
Believing that they are entitled to overtime and holiday pay, the petitioners aired their gripes and
grievances but it was not heeded by the respondents. One of the union member was dismissed from
work. Hence, the petitioners filed a complaint of unfair labor practice against respondent SMC on the
ground of illegal dismissal.
On the other hand, SMC argued that the complainant are not or have never been their employees
but they are the employees of the Guaranteed Labor Contractor, an independent labor contracting
firm
Labor Arbiter Nestor Lim rendered a decision in favor of the complainants which was affirmed
by the NLRC
On appeal, the Secretary set aside the NLRC ruling stressing the absence of an employer-
employee relationship

Issue: Whether an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and respondent San
Miguel Corporation

HELD: YES. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are
generally considered are the following: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the
payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee with
respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. It is the called "control test"
that is the most important element

In the CAB, petitioners worked continuously and exclusively for an average of 7 years for the company.
Considering the length of time that the petitioners have worked, there is justification to conclude that they
were engaged to perform activities necessary or desirable in the usual business of trade of the
respondent. Hence, petitioners are considered regular employees.

Even assuming that there is a contract of employment executed between SMC and the said labor
contractor, the court ruled that Guaranteed and Reliable Labor contractors have neither substantial capital
nor investment to qualify as an independent contractor under the law. The premises, tools and
equipments used by the petitioners in their jobs are all supplied by the respondent SMC. It is only the
manpower or labor force which the alleged contractors supply, suggesting the existence of a "labor only"
contracting scheme prohibited by law

It is important to emphasize that that in a truly independent contractor-contractee relationship, the fees
are paid directly to the manpower agency in lump sum without indicating or implying that the basis of such
lump sum is the salary per worker multiplied by the number of workers assigned to the company.

In the CAB, the alleged independent contractors were paid a lump sum representing only the salaries the
workers were entitled to, arrived at by adding the salaries of each worker which depend on the volume of
work they had accomplished individually. Therefore, there is no independent contractor-contractee
relationship. WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED.

SAN MIGUEL v. BERSAMIRA

G.R. No. 87700 June 13, 1990
J. Melencio-Herrera

FACTS: Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with
Lipercon and D'Rite (independent contractors duly licensed by the DOLE). In said contracts, it was
expressly understood and agreed that the workers employed by the contractors were to be paid by the
latter and that none of them were to be deemed employees or agents of SanMig. There was to be no
employer-employee relation between the contractors and/or its workers, on the one hand, and SanMig on
the other.

Petitioner San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PTWGO (the Union, for brevity) is the duly
authorized representative of the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of SanMig with whom the latter
executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement.
In a letter, dated 20 November 1988 (Annex C, Petition), the Union advised SanMig that some Lipercon
and D'Rite workers had signed up for union membership and sought the regularization of their
employment with SMC.

On 12 January 1989 on the ground that it had failed to receive any favorable response from SanMig, the
Union filed a notice of strike for unfair labor practice, CBA violations, and union busting
Beginning 14 February 1989 until 2 March 1989, series of pickets were staged by Lipercon and D'Rite
workers in various SMC plants and offices.

On 6 March 1989, SMC filed a verified Complaint for Injunction and Damages

ISSUE: Whether, or not the case at bar involves, or is in connection with, or relates to a labor dispute

HELD: A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code includes "any controversy or
matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."

A labor dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relationship of employer and employee"

That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist herein is evident. At bottom, what the Union seeks
is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite in effect, that they be
absorbed into the working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on the working relationship
between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure and conditions of their employment and the
arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the matter within the purview of a labor dispute.
Further, the Union also seeks to represent those workers, who have signed up for Union membership, for
the purpose of collective bargaining. SanMig, for its part, resists that Union demand on the ground that
there is no employer-employee relationship between it and those workers and because the demand
violates the terms of their CBA.

Halaguea, et al. vs PAL

GR No. 172013 October 2, 2009
Facts: Petitioners were employed as flight attendants of respondent on different dates prior to November
1996. They are members of FASAP union exclusive bargaining organization of the flightattendants, flight
stewards and pursers. On July 2001, respondent and FASAP entered into a CBA incorporating the terms
and conditions of their agreement for the years 2000 to 2005 (compulsory retirement of 55 for female and
60 for males).
In July 2003, petitioner and several female cabin crews, in a letter, manifested that the provision in CBA
on compulsory retirement is discriminatory. On July 2004, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for
Declaratory Relief with issuanceof TRO with the RTC Makati. The RTC issued a TRO. After the denial of
the respondent on itsmotion for reconsideration for the TRO, it filed a Petition with the CA. CA granted
respondents petition and ordered lower court to dismiss the case. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the regular courts has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling: Yes. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, exclusively cognizable by the
RTC. Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.
Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions between employees and employer where the employer-
employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of
obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court.
Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.The said issue cannot
be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor
statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, and the power to apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial
courts, a court of general jurisdiction. In GeorgGrotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani, this Court held that not
every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC
can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters
and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to dispute arising from an employer-
employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code other labor statutes, or
their collective bargaining agreement.

HAWAIIAN-PHILIPPINE COMPANY vs GULMATICO (1994)

FACTS:

Respondent-Union, the National Federation of Sugar Workers-Food and General Trades, filed an
action against petitioner Hawaiian Phil Co. for claims under RA 809 (The Sugar Act of 1952).
Respondent Union alleged that they have never availed of the benefits due them under the law.
Under the said act: the proceeds of any increase in participation granted to planters under this
Act and above their present share shall be divided between the planter and his laborers in the
following proportions. 60% of the increase participation for the laborers and 40% for the planters.
Petitioner argued that respondent Labor Arbiter Gulmatico has no jurisdiction over the case
considering their case does not fall under those enumerated in Article 217 of the Labor Code which
provides the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. Further, petitioner contends that it has
no ER-EE relationship with the respondent sugar workers and that respondent union has no cause of
action because it is the planters-employers who is liable to pay the workers share under LOI No. 854.

Issue1: Whether public respondent Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case against
petitioner

HELD: NO. While jurisdiction over controversies involving agricultural workers has been transferred from
the Court of Agrarian Relations to the Labor Arbiters under the Labor Code, said transferred jurisdiction is
however, not without limitations. The controversy must fall under one of the cases enumerated under the
Labor Code which arise out of or are in connection with an ER-EE relationship

In the CAB, there is no ER-EE relationship between petitioner company and respondent union. Hence,
respondent Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case against petitioner.

Issue1: Whether respondent union has a cause of action

HELD: NO. To have a cause of action, the claimant must show that he has a legal right and the
respondent a correlative duty in respect thereof, which the latter violated by some wrongful act or
omission.

In the instant case, it would show that the payment of the workers share is liability of the planters-
employers, and not of the petitioner milling company. It is disputed that petitioner milling company has
already distributed to its planters their respective shares. Hence, it has fulfilled its part and has nothing
more to do with the subsequent contribution by the planters of the workers share.WHEREFORE,
PETITION IS GRANTED.

NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES vs LAZARO (1988)

FACTS:

The Commercial Bank and Trust Company entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
Commercial Bank and Trust Company Union, representing the file and rank of the bank with a
membership of over 1,000 employees
In 1980, the union, together with the National Union of Bank EEs submitted to bank management
proposals for the negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement. The following day, however,
the bank suspended negotiations with the union. The bank entered into a merger with BPI which
assumed all assets and liabilities.
The Union went to the CFI Manila, presided over by respondent Judge Lazaro, and filed a
complaint for specific performance, damages, and preliminary injunction against private respondents.
Private Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court.
Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint partook of unfair labor
practice dispute and jurisdiction over which is vested in the labor arbiter.

Issue: Whether courts may take cognizance of claims for damages arising from labor controversy

HELD: NO
The SC sustained the dismissal of the case and held that the act complained of involves collecting
bargaining which is categorized to be an unfair labor practice. Under the Labor Code, all cases involving
unfair labor practices shall be under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiters.

As correctly held by the respondent court, an unfair labor practice controversy is within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not necessarily by the nature of action. In the CAB, PD No.
442, as amended by Batas Blg. 70, has vested jurisdiction upon the Labor Arbiters, a jurisdiction the
courts may not assume. WHEREFORE, PETITION DENIED.

PIONEER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES v. TODARO

254 SCRA 153 June 8, 2007

FACTS: Antonio D. Todaro (Todaro) filed with the RTC of Makati City, a complaint for Sum of Money and
Damages with Preliminary Attachment against Pioneer International Limited (PIL), Pioneer Concrete
Philippines, Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI), John G. McDonald (McDonald) and
Philip J. Klepzig (Klepzig).

Todaro alleged that PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Australia and is
principally engaged in the ready-mix concrete and concrete aggregates business; PPHI is the company
established by PIL to own and hold the stocks of its operating company in the Philippines; PCPI is the
company established by PIL to undertake its business of ready-mix concrete, concrete aggregates and
quarrying operations in the Philippines; McDonald is the Chief Executive of the Hongkong office of PIL;
and, Klepzig is the President and Managing Director of PPHI and PCPI; Todaro has been the managing
director of Betonval Readyconcrete, Inc. (Betonval), a company engaged in pre-mixed concrete and
concrete aggregate production; he resigned from Betonval in February 1996; in May 1996, PIL contacted
Todaro and asked him if he was available to join them in connection with their intention to establish a
ready-mix concrete plant and other related operations in the Philippines; Todaro informed PIL of his
availability and interest to join them; subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein the
former consented to engage the services of the latter as a consultant for two to three months, after which,
he would be employed as the manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete operations should the company
decide to invest in the Philippines; subsequently, PIL started its operations in the Philippines; however, it
refused to comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent basis. Instead of filing an
Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
complaint states no cause of action, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint, as the same is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that the complaint should be dismissed
on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. RTC dismissed the MTD which was affirmed by the
CA.

ISSUE: W/N the RTC should have dismissed the case on the basis of forum non conveniens due to a
presence of a foreign element

RULING: NO. Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends
largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In
the case ofCommunication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that "xxx [a]
Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following
requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2)
that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and,
(3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision."

The doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because
Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a ground. This Court further ruled
that while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it
should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the
courts desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non
conveniens requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of defense.

Note: the case was also being dismissed on the ground that there was no cause of action but SC held
that there was cause of action, to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint
must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or
is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. And it was also argued in this case that jurisdiction is with the NLRC
and not with the RTC. SC held it was with RTC, SC has consistently held that where no employer-
employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by
reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the RTC
that has jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 163768 March 27, 2007 Julius Kawachi and Gayle Kawachi vs Dominie Del Quero and
Hon. Judge Taro Ponente: Tinga

Facts: Del Quero charged AJ Raymundo Pawnshop, Virgilio Kawachi and Julius Kawachi with illegal
dismissal, non-execution of a contract of employment, violation of minimum wage law and non-payment
of overtime pay. The complaint was filed before the NLRC.Del Quero also filed an action for damages
against Kawachi before the MeTC of Quezon City.

Kwachi moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and forum-shopping
or splitting cause of action. The MeTC rejected the dismissal and the subsequent motion for
reconsideration.

Kawachi then elevated the case to the RTC. RTC held that Del Quero's action for damages was based on
the tortious acts committed by her employers and did not seek any relief under the Labor code. RTC also
denied the motion for reconsideration, hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Jurisdiction over the complaint for damages.

Kawachi: NLRC has jurisdiction over the action for damages because the alleged injury is work-related
and that Del Quero should not be allowed to split her causes.

Ruling: Petition is meritorious. Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon the
Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee
relations in other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor
laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code.

In the instant case, the allegations in Del Quero's complaint for damages show that her injury was the
offshoot of petitioners immediate harsh reaction as her administrative superiors to the supposedly sloppy
manner by which she had discharged her duties. This incident was similarly narrated in both illegal
dismissal complaint and damages complaint; which shows that the injury is directly related to the
employer-employee relations of the parties.

The dismissed employee cannot be allowed to sue in two forums. NLRC has jurisdiction over the
complaint for illegal dismissal and damages arising there from.
Sulpicio lines vs nlrc
Silva vs nlrc