LEGAL ETHICS
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-
TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to
steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters.
Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much
reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen
hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught
wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed
the annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the
decision of the trial court to respondent Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the
Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and
correspondingly denied the motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14,
1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by
the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were
preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the
defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros
Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract.
(Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding
reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the
same room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her
expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed
to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse,
with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept
on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to
sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them
during the first night. The same thing happened on
the second, third and fourth nights.
BANINS
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private
place where they can enjoy together during their first
week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City.
But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle,
his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by
the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio
City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there
was no sexual intercourse between them, since the
defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during
siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair
located at the living room. They slept together in the
same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988
until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there
was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
[S]he claims, that she did not even see her husband's
private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for
medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a
urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January
20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that
she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of
her husband's examination was kept confidential up
to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for
her, the doctor prescribed medications for her
husband which was also kept confidential. No
treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was
asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a
closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She
said, that she had observed the defendant using an
eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream
of his mother. And that, according to her, the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or
maintain his residency status here in the country and
to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her
husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant
that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with
his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he
loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his
part and he is physically and psychologically capable;
and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if
there is any differences between the two of them, it
can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if
either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
LEGAL ETHICS
certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims,
that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on
May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual contact between them.
But, the reason for this, according to the defendant,
was that every time he wants to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and
whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he
forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he
did not continue because she was shaking and she did
not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the
defendant, why the plaintiff filed this case against
him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will
be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will
consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain
valid because they are still very young and there is still
a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical
examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio
Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he
is impotent. As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted
his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated
there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-
B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to
masturbate to find out whether or not he has an
erection and he found out that from the original size
of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of
the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one
centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had
only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its
full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in
that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable
of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that
there is no collusion between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
BANINS
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the
plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the
Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev.
Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of
this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of
Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that
there was no sexual intercourse between the parties
without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to
have sexual communion with petitioner is a
psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is
totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological incapacity
of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between
the parties decreed by the lower court without fully
satisfying itself that there was no collusion between
them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the
burden of proving the allegations in her complaint;
that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties,
there remains no other basis for the court's
conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that
public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to
invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the
trial court on the admissions and confessions of the
parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial
LEGAL ETHICS
is misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint
shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the
pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is
annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed
decision was not based on such a judgment on the
pleadings. When private respondent testified under
oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by
oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by
the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in
form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to
present his side. He admitted that since their
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse
between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the
reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code
provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall
be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and
the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without
trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner
does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only
shows that there is no collusion between the parties.
When petitioner admitted that he and his wife
(private respondent) have never had sexual contact
with each other, he must have been only telling the
truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the
challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by
Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by
this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The
issue of whether or not the appellant is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic
BANINS
marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both
the documentary and testimonial evidence on record.
Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual
relations with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering
from any physical disability. Such abnormal
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly
demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court
erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological incapacity
of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial
court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged
psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of
the reasons for such refusal which may not be
necessarily due to physchological disorders" because
there might have been other reasons, i.e., physical
disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts,
why private respondent would not want to have
sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15,
1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor
the respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have
sexual contact with the other. The fact remains,
however, that there has never been coitus between
them. At any rate, since the action to declare the
marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even
the psychologically incapacitated, the question of
who refuses to have sex with the other becomes
immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent
evidence on record to show that any of the parties is
suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner
also claims that he wanted to have sex with private
respondent; that the reason for private respondent's
refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder
as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner
could have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and
avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual
LEGAL ETHICS
intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is
nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find
out or discover what the problem with his wife could
be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's
Medical Report that there is no evidence of his
impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is
petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological
but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private
respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove
such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply
refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal
of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is "To procreate children based
on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation
will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the
husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he
was not physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May
22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the
same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for
her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having
asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins
vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code,
at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife
was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant
did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity
weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the
wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were
frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering
the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard
to believe that she would expose her private life to
BANINS
public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her
husband if it were not necessary to put her life in
order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what
the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is not
phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved
"through proper motivation." After almost ten
months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the
sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love
very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches,
is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious
personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants
within the contemplation of the Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife
are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the
sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not
any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is
shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the
cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could
not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven
self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy
which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between
petitioner and private respondent. That is a shared
feeling which between husband and wife must be
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual
intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive
interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed
by the other can go a long way in deepening the
marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for
children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social
institution.
LEGAL ETHICS
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed
relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29,
1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
FACTS
Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila
Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their
marriage contract. After the celebration they had a
reception and then proceeded to the house of the
Ching Ming Tsois mother. There they slept together
on the same bed in the same room for the first night
of their married life.
Ginas version: that contrary to her expectations that
as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making
love that night of their marriage, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, Ching however just
went to bed, slept on one side and then turned his
back and went to sleep. There was no sexual
intercourse between them that night. The same thing
happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honey moon in a private
place where they can enjoy together during their first
week as husband and wife they went to Baguio City.
But they did so together with Chings mother, uncle
and nephew as they were all invited by her husband.
There was no sexual intercourse between them for
four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking
a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a
rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the
same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage)
until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this
period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. Gina claims that she did not even see
her husbands private parts nor did he see hers.
BANINS
Because of this, they submitted themselves for
medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag.
Results were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a
virgin while Chings examination was kept
confidential up to this time.
The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said she
had observed him using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She
also said her husband only married her to acquire or
maintain his residency status here in the country and
to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man
Chings version: he claims that if their marriage shall
be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the
fault lies with Gina. He does not want their marriage
annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very
much (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable (3) since the
relationship is still very young and if there is any
differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that according to him, if either one of
them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty
that this will not be cured.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there
was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason
for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with
his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
caresses her private parts, she always removed his
hands.
ISSUE
WON Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial
court and Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID the
marriage entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22,
1988. No costs.
The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of
a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable
but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
LEGAL ETHICS

refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent

to psychological incapacity.

One of the essential marital obligations under the

Family Code is to procreate children basedon the
universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation
will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.

While the law provides that the husband and the wife
are obliged to live together, observer mutual love,
respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually
the spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love
is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no
man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say I could not have cared less. This is
so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The
egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it
is sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation
in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.

BANINS
LEGAL ETHICS
G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz,
Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor
O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of
conviction by the lower court is whether or not the
appointment to and holding of the position of a secret
agent to the provincial governor would constitute a
sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We
hold that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above
offense in an information dated August 14, 1962
reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO
MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in
connection with Section 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act
No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the
13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and
under his custody and control one home-made
revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with
six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having
secured the necessary license or permit therefor from
the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September
3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the
counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that
the accused was found in possession of the gun
involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or
license to possess the same and that we can submit
the same on a question of law whether or not an
agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a
permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After
counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he
would not question the authenticity of his exhibits,
the understanding being that only a question of law
would be submitted for decision, he explicitly
specified such question to be "whether or not a secret
agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."
BANINS
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should
examine the document so that he could pass on their
authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question:
"Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22
revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in
the information was found in his possession on
August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first
having secured the necessary license or permit
thereof from the corresponding authority?" The
accused, now the appellant, answered categorically:
"Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made
a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his
counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused
admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing
to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the
accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits
consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the
Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas,
dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise
issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused
directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon
City on a confidential mission;2 the oath of office of
the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated
March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a
secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the
accused then stated that with the presentation of the
above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on
the question of whether or not a secret agent duly
appointed and qualified as such of the provincial
governor is exempt from the requirement of having a
license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and
the parties were given time to file their respective
memoranda.1wp
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court
rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the
crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one
day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and
ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in
favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was
taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter
specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any
person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of
firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument
or implement used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
LEGAL ETHICS

ammunition."5 The next section provides that
"firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the
Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors,
and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not
covered "when such firearms are in possession of
such officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties."6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made
for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task
is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of
courts is to apply the law. "Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the
accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.
firearm. The defendant also showed a certification
that he was appointed as such.
ISSUE
WON an agent of the governor can hold a firearm
without a permit issued by the Philippine
Constabulary
RULING
In the present case, there is no room for
interpretation or construction because the law is
clear. The law provides for the class of people who are
not covered in the prohibitive law. No exemption was
provided for secret agents. Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."

Accused however would rely on People v.

Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted
on appeal on the assumption that the appointment
"of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and
detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the
category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police expressly covered by
section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not
within the power of this Court to set aside the clear
and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the
extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what
was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer
speaks with authority.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

DIGEST

FACTS

On or about August 13, 1962, Mario Mapa was

apprehended due to possession of an unlicensed
firearm. The defendant admitted before the trial
court that he was carrying the unlicensed firearm and
that he does not have a permit to carry such a
weapon. In his defense, he said that he is a secret
agent of the Governor of Batangas and that he is
exempt from the requirement of securing a license of

BANINS