G.R. No.

137599 October 8, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GILBERT BAULITE and LIBERATO BAULITE, accused-appellants.

PARDO, J.:

Appeal seeking to reverse the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court,

Cotabato, at Kidapawan City, Branch 17 finding accused Gilbert Baulite
and Liberato Baulite guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide
and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of Delia Jacobo Lano in the sum of P50,000.00, with costs.

On December 1, 1993, Eddie Arguelles, a farmer, passed by a river on his

way to Old Bunawan, Tulunan, Cotabato. In the river, he saw two men
Gilbert and Liberato Baulite washing their bloodied hands. Eddie
continued on his way after seeing them. Upon reaching the road, he hear a
boy shouting that somebody was found dead.

Jonathan Cando, a civilian volunteer, was on horseback crossing a river on

his way to Bunawan. He heard a woman crying "indi" "indi". He checked his
left, and approximately six (6) meters away, he saw a person mounting
somebody, as if choking the one mounted. He went to the barangay
captain and related what he heard and saw. The barangay captain,
however, dismissed the incident, speculating that the two were "only
sweethearts."

Around 3 to 4 in the afternoon of the same day, a boy found the body of
Delia Jacobo Lano, Delia was a public school teacher at Old Bunawan,
Datu Paglas and a resident of Maybula, Tulunan, Cotabato. An
examination of her body revealed that Delia suffered a three-inch-deep
punctured wound between her eyes, a smashed face (left side) and a
bruised neck (upper portion). Vaginal smear test also found her positive for
(dead) spermatozoa. However, there were no indications that Delia's
genitalia sustained any laceration. The medical examiner opined that Delia
had probably delivered several children. The examination was conducted
approximately five (5) to six (6) hours after Delia died.

On December 7, 1993, 2nd assistant provincial prosecutor of Cotabato

Alfonso B. Dizon, Jr., filed with the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato, at
Kidapawan an information for rape with homicide against Gilbert Baulite
and Liberato Baulite, the two men caught wshing their bloodied hands by
the river. The information reads:

"That on or about December 1, 1993. At Barangay New Bunawan,

Municipality of Tulunan, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the above
named accused, with lewd design, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with one DELIA JAGOBO LANO against
her will, and thereafter said accused, with intent to kill with personal
violence, strangulated the victim with the use of a hand as shoen by
finger nails marking which caused hematoma of the upper portion of
the neck and likewise with the use of a sharp object, inflicted
punctured wound (sic) located just above and between the eyes,
three (3) inched deep, directed and posteriorly and superiorly and
multiple fracture of the bone of the left face with hematoma of both
eyes, which injuries is (sic) the direct and proximate cause of death of
said DELIA JOCOBO LANO."2

On June 23, 1994, the trial court arraigned the accused. They each
pleaded not guilty.3

After due trial, on November 25, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision
finding the two accused guilty of rape with homicide, the decretal portion of
which reads as follows:

"Prescinding from the foregoing facts and considerations, the Court

finds accused Gilbert Baulite and Liberato Baulite guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime charged, accused Liberato Baulite and
Gilbert Baulite are hereby sentenced each to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua. Consonant with the recent jurisprudence, both
accused are hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Delia Jacobo
Lano the sum of P50,000.00

"With costs de oficio. 1wphi1.nt

IT IS SO ORDERED.4

On December 29, 1998, the accused filed a notice of appeal.5

The issues in the appeal are: (1) Was the guilt of the accused-appellants
proved beyond reasonable doubt? (2) Is circumstantial evidence sufficient
to convict the accused-appellants?

The Trial court convicted the accused on the basis of the following
circumstantial evidence, namely:

a) A witness saw accused-appellants Gilbert and Liberato Baulite

washing their bloodied hands;

b) A boy was heard shouting that somebody was found dead;

c) A witness hear a woman shouting "indi" "indi" who was being

choked and later the dead body of Delia Lano was found.6

An autopsy revealed that the body of Delia Lano sustained a three-inch-

deep punctured wound between the eyes and a smashed face.7

Accused-appellants explained that the blood in their hands was that of a

chicken that they had dressed recently.8

Witness Jonathan Cando heard a woman shouting "indi", "indi", then saw a
person mounting somebody as if choking the person mounted. However, in
the absence of an eye-witness identifying the person choking, accused-
appellants would not necessarily be incriminated in the crime. Subsequent
examination of the body of Delia Lano revealed that she was choked, as
evidenced by the finger markings or hematoma on the upper portion of her
neck. The fact that the upper portion of the neck was the one severely
injured is physical evidence consistent with the scenario that one in a
mounting position applied pressure or choking in the upper portion of the
neck of person "mounted." The prosecution, unfortunately, failed to
positively identify the person "mounting and choking" the victim.9

In light of the prosecution's evidence, we are not convinced that the guilt of
the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. "The rule is clear.
The guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution, on its part, must rely on the strength of its own evidence and
must not simply depend on the weakness of the defense. The slightest
possibility of an innocent man being convicted for an offense he has never
committed, let alone when no less than the capital punishment is imposed,
would be far more dreadful than letting a guilty person go unpunished for a
crime he may have perpetrated."10 "On the whole then, the scanty evidence
for the prosecution casts serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused. It
does not pass the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to rebut the
presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees the accused.
It is apropos to repeat the doctrine that an accusation is not, according to
the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt; the prosecution must
overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt."11

Where the evidence is purely circumstantial, there must be an even greater

need to apply the rule that the prosecution depends not on the weakness of
the defense but on the strength of its own evidence. Conviction must rest
on nothing less than a moral certainty of the guilty of the accused. "For
circumstantial evidence to convict, the Rules of Court require that: (1) there
is more than one circumstance: (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. On the latter,
decided cases expound that the circumstantial evidence presented and
proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to accused, to the exclusion of all others, as
the guilty person."12

The Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of the accused.13 We

agree.

We find the circumstantial evidence adduced not sufficient to support a

finding that both accused-appellants were guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of rape with homicide. To begin with, witness Jonathan Cando was no able
to identify either the woman victim or the person choking the victim.14

We cannot conclude with certainly that the blood in the hands of the
accused-appellant was the blood of the victim, and that the person choking
her was one of the accused-appellants. Speculations and probabilities
cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.15 In a criminal case, every circumstance favoring
the innocence of the accused must be duly taken into account.16

In our criminal justice, the overriding consideration is not whether the court
doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable
doubt as to his guilt.17 Where there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused, he must be acquitted even though his innocence may be doubted
since the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
can only be overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.18

In conclusion, because of reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused-

appellant, they must be acquitted. "Every accused is presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved; that presumption is solemnly guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights. The contrary requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that
degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Short of
this, it is not only the right of the accused to be freed; it is even the
constitutional duty of the court to acquit them.19

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED. Accused-appellants

Gilbert Baulite and Liberato Baulite are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged in Criminal Case 2834 of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato,
Kidapawan, on reasonable doubt. 1wphi 1.nt

G.R. No. 100354 May 26, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DIONISIO TADEPA y MERIQUILLO, defendant-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

In the apprehension of illegal drug dealers, law enforcers have resorted to

entrapment or buy-bust operations where ways are devised and means
employed to ensnare and capture the malefactors in flagrante delicto while
engaged in their illicit trade. Entrapment has since received judicial
sanction as long as it is carried out with legal and constitutional
circumspection. 1 It must be distinguished from inducement or instigation where the criminal intent
originates from the mind of the instigator and the accused, in effect, is lured into the commission of the
offense charged in order to prosecute him. In instigation the instigator practically induces the would-be
offender into the commission of the offense and becomes a co-principal. 2

In determining whether what took place was an entrapment or an

instigation, the manner in which the initial contact between the poseur-
buyer and the alleged pusher was made is material. All the elements of the
sale transaction must be clearly and adequately shown starting from the
initial contact between the buyer and the pusher until the sale is
consummated with the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. 3

To secure a conviction, the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 4 Nevertheless the burden of proof still
rests on the state. The accused, if he so chooses, need not present evidence. He merely has to raise a
reasonable doubt and whittle away from the case of the prosecution. The constitutional presumption of
innocence demands no less.

In the case at bench, to prove that accused Dionisio Tadepa sold 25 sticks
of marijuana to a peace officer, the prosecution presented two witnesses:
Buy-bust Operation Team Leader Sgt. Luis Alfiler of NARCOM, Region 8,
stationed in Ormoc City, and Forensic Chemist Capt. Liza Madeja-Sabong
who certified that the specimens submitted to her for examination were
indeed marijuana leaves.

Sgt. Alfiler testified that on 12 May 1989, acting on a tip from an informer,
he organized a three-man buy-bust team to entrap the accused. Pat. Noel
Triste was designated as the poseur-buyer. At around four-thirty in the
afternoon, the buy-bust team proceeded to the Ormoc Bus Terminal where
they saw the accused sleeping inside a passenger jeep. Accordingly, Pat.
Triste approached the accused while Team leader Sgt. Alfiler stayed
behind some seven (7) to eight (8) meters away. Sgt. Alfiler saw Pat. Triste
give to the accused two (2) P20-bills and a P10-bill although he did not
hear the actual conversation between Pat. Triste and the accused. The
accused then left the place briefly, and upon his return, handed over to Pat.
Triste marijuana sticks wrapped in an empty Marlboro pack. After finding
the goods to be marijuana, Pat. Triste executed the pre-arranged signal.
Forthwith, Sgt. Alfiler together with the third member of the team closed in
and arrested the accused from whom they recovered one (1) marked P20-
bill. The 25 sticks delivered by the accused were then sent to the PC Crime
Laboratory in Palo, Leyte, where Forensic Chemist Capt. Sabong after
conducting a series of tests confirmed them to be marijuana.

The accused, for his part, narrated that on 12 May 1989, at around four-
thirty in the afternoon, he was awakened by four (4) gun-toting men who
gave him a P50-bill and ordered him to give the money to a certain "Jojo"
who was then at the side of the city stage. He did as he was told, and in
return, "Jojo" handed him something wrapped in a stapled newspaper.
After giving the package to the group, he went back to sleep. Later he was
again awakened, this time by the sudden handcuffing of his wrists. He was
brought to a hotel where he was questioned by a certain "Alfiler" after
which he was taken to the INP Ormoc Station where he was detained for
peddling marijuana.

On 10 October 1989 the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Br. 12, 5 found
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, R.A. 6425, as amended, and
sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, five (5) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal minimum, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum. On 21 June 1991 the Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction but increased the penalty to reclusion perpetua considering that the accused was found guilty
of selling marijuana and thus cannot just be meted an indeterminate sentence. Nevertheless the appellate
court refrained from entering judgment and certified and elevated instead the records to this Court for
review pursuant to Sec. 13, Rule 124, Rules on Criminal Procedure. But while the appellate court
correctly observed the erroneous imposition of an indeterminate penalty, the proper imposable penalty,
as provided in R.A. 6425, as amended, is life imprisonment and not reclusion perpetua which, it has been
stressed, is distinct in duration, nature and accessory penalties. 6 The trial court does not have the
discretion to change the penalty expressly mandated by law. Its duty is simply to interpret and apply the
law.

In the case at bench, we are not convinced that the state has presented
sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the
fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused. Accordingly, we reverse
his conviction on reasonable doubt. The prosecution built its case solely on
the testimony of Team Leader Sgt. Alfiler who admitted that he was some
seven (7) to eight (8) meters away from where the actual transaction took
place. As a consequence, he said that he did not hear the conversation
which transpired between Pat. Triste and the accused. We find this
testimony of Sgt. Alfiler insufficient evidence considering that the accused
in effect claimed that he was not merely lured but in fact directed under
threat to buy marijuana from the real drug pusher amounting not merely to
entrapment but to instigation. In People v. Lapatha, 7 this Court held that where there
is instigation the defendant would have to be acquitted.

Thus the failure of the prosecution to present Pat. Triste, the alleged
poseur-buyer, is fatal. In People v. Polizon 8we said

We agree with the appellant's contention that the non-

presentation of Boy Lim, the alleged poseur-buyer, weakens
the prosecution's evidence. Sgt. Pascua was not privy to the
conversation between Lim and the accused. He was merely
watching from a distance and he only saw the actions of the
 two. As pointed out by the appellant, Sgt. Pascua had no
personal knowledge of the transaction that transpired between
Lim and the appellant. Since appellant insisted that he was
forced by Lim to buy the marijuana, it was essential that Lim
should have been presented to rebut accused's testimony.

The ruling in People v. Yabut 9 is further instructive

Well established is the rule that when the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations, one
of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and
the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction. In the present case, accused-appellant's version of
the circumstances leading to his apprehension constitutes a
total denial of the prosecution's allegations. In this regard this
Court has ruled that when there is such a divergence of
accounts

. . . it becomes incumbent upon the prosecution to

rebut appellant's allegation by presenting . . . the
alleged poseur-buyer. This it failed to do giving rise
to the presumption that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced (Rule
131, Sec. 5 [a]). This failure constitutes a fatal flaw
in the prosecution's evidence since the so-called
(poseur-buyer) who was never presented as a
witness . . . is the best witness for the prosecution . .
..

Both the trial court and the appellate court gave much weight to the
testimony of Sgt. Alfiler. However the prosecution did not present as
witness Pat. Triste, the alleged poseur-buyer. Such omission casts serious
doubt on appellant's guilt because without the testimony of the poseur-
buyer there is no convincing evidence to show that the accused was a
marijuana peddler and not merely a victim of instigation. Thus in People v.
Fider 10 we decreed that "[w]e have held in many cases that the testimony of the poseur-buyer
becomes material and well-nigh indispensable when the accused denies having committed the prohibited
act," and failure to present him is fatal. 11
In fine, we find the uncorroborated testimony of the state's star witness Sgt.
Alfiler, even if coming from a police officer who enjoys the presumption of
regularity, insufficient to induce moral certainty. For, the presumption of
regularity of performance of duty of a peace officer cannot prevail over the
constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused. The public
prosecutor should have been so minded that corroborating evidence was
necessary to complete the testimony of Sgt. Alfiler; but no corroborative
evidence was submitted.

We thus hark back to the constitutional doctrine that the state carries the
burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, and it is not incumbent upon him to disprove his guilt. If the state
fails in its burden the accused must be discharged.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the

conviction of the accused by the trial court is REVERSED and accused
DIONISIO TADEPA y MERIQUILLO is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt
and for insufficiency of evidence. His immediate release from custody is
ordered unless he is held for another lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172873 March 19, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ROLDAN MORALES y MIDARASA, Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in
our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal
prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance, both because of
the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of
the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a
society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should
not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable
doubt about his guilt.1 Due process commands that no man shall lose his
liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of convincing the
factfinder of his guilt. To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is
indispensable, for it impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching
certitude of the facts in issue.2

Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to

command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of
criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law not be diluted
by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men
are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every
individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.3

Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the
reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged.4

On appeal is the Decision5 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on

April 24, 2006 affirming in toto the Decision6 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 103 finding appellant Roldan Morales y
Midarasa guilty of the crimes of possession and sale of dangerous drugs.

Factual Antecedents

Appellant was charged in two separate Informations before the RTC with
possession and sale of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), to wit:

Criminal Case No. Q-03-114256

That on or about the 2nd day of January, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any
dangerous drug, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have
in her/his/their possession and control, zero point zero three (0.03) grams
of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Criminal Case No. Q-03-114257

That on or about the 2nd day of January, 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and
unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the
said transaction, zero point zero three (0.03) gram of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to

both charges read in Filipino, a language known and understood by
him.9 On motion of the City Prosecutor, the cases were consolidated for
joint trial.10Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

The testimonies of PO1 Eduardo Roy (PO1 Roy) and PO3 Armando Rivera
(PO3 Rivera) were presented by the prosecution:

PO1 Roy testified that on January 2, 2003, at about 2:00 p.m., he was on
duty at Police Station 9 where he made a pre-operation report on the buy-
bust operation to be conducted on the herein appellant that same
afternoon.11He then proceeded to Brgy. San Vicente, Quezon City with
PO3 Rivera for the operation.12 At a point near Jollibee, they met the
informant who, upon seeing the subject appellant, went with him to meet
PO1 Roy.13 After being introduced to the appellant as a buyer of "piso"
worth of "shabu", appellant immediately produced a sachet containing the
alleged drug. When appellant received the marked money amounting
to P100.00,14 PO1 Roy raised his left hand, at which point his back-up
officer, PO3 Rivera appeared and immediately arrested the appellant.15 The
appellant was immediately brought to the Police Station for investigation,
while the two sachets of "shabu" and aluminum foil discovered on the said
appellant were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination.16

PO3 Rivera testified that he was the back-up officer of PO1 Roy, the
poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation conducted against the appellant in
the afternoon of January 2, 2003.17 In preparation for the said operation, he
conducted a short briefing and recorded the particulars of the operation
they were about to carry out: the place of the operation which is at the
parking lot of Jollibee Philcoa; the identification of the suspect as the
appellant; and the preparation of the buy-bust money to be used.18 With
respect to the buy-bust money, he prepared one P50.00 bill, two P20.00
bills and one P10.00 bill, by making the appropriate marking on the top
portion of each bill and recording their respective serial numbers.19 Later
that afternoon, police officers proceeded to the meeting place. PO3 Rivera
positioned himself in a parked vehicle20 about 20 meters from the situs of
the transaction.21He thus had a clear view of the appellant with the
informant and PO1 Roy.22 Shortly thereafter, he saw PO1 Roy make the
pre-arranged signal at which point he approached the appellant to arrest
him.23 He recovered the marked money from the appellant and proceeded
to frisk the latter.24 Upon conducting the body search, he found another
sachet which he suspected to be "shabu" and two aluminum foils. Appellant
was brought to the Police Station for detention, while the items seized from
him were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination.25The two
sachets tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu)
while the aluminum foil sheets tested negative of the aforementioned
substance.26

Both PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera identified a Joint Affidavit dated January 3,
2003 during their respective testimonies, which they acknowledged to have
executed subsequent to the buy-bust operation.27

The defense presented the testimonies of Joaquin Artemio Marfori, Arsenia

Morales and the appellant:

Appellant denied the charges against him.28 He testified that he is a

resident of Dolores, Quezon where he worked in a fertilizer store.29 He was
in Manila at that time to bring money for his parents who live at Cruz na
Ligas.30 As his mother did not give him enough money for his fare back to
Quezon, he sidelined as a parking attendant at Philcoa in order to earn the
balance of his bus fare.31 However, sometime that afternoon, two male
persons in civilian clothes suddenly approached him and his co-attendant,
identified themselves as policemen and poked their guns at them.32 The
said policemen handcuffed them and proceeded to frisk them.33 He averred
that nothing was found on him and yet the policemen still brought him to
the police station.34 He denied the allegation made against him that he sold,
much less possessed, the "shabu" subject of this action.35 He further
testified that in the tricycle on the way to the police station, PO1 Roy took
out a plastic of "shabu" from his (PO1 Roys) pocket and once at the
station, the said policeman showed it to the desk officer and claimed that
the plastic sachet was found on the appellant.36
He likewise denied having received the buy-bust money and claimed that
the P50.00 bill and the two P20.00 bills, totaling P90.00, were given to him
by his mother for his bus fare to Quezon.37 He disclaimed any knowledge of
the P10.00 bill.38 He further testified that he personally knew PO3 Rivera
prior to the arrest, since his first cousin and PO3 Rivera had a quarrel
which he had no involvement whatsoever.39 He noted the fact that it was
PO3 Rivera who arrested him.40

Witness Joaquin Artemio Marfori testified that he is the employer of the

appellant in his agricultural and poultry supply store in Babayan, Calamba,
Laguna.41 He further stated that he allowed the appellant to go on vacation
on December 12, 2003 to celebrate the New Year with his family in
Manila.42 However, the appellant failed to report back for work at the start of
the New Year.43

Finally, witness Arsenia Morales (Arsenia) corroborated the testimony of

her son that she gave him P90.00, consisting of one P50.00 bill and
two P20.00 bills as bus fare back to Laguna where he worked.44 Thinking
that her son was already on his way home, she was surprised to receive a
call from her daughter informing her that her son, the appellant, was
arrested for possession and sale of "shabu".45

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On April 29, 2004, the trial court rendered a Decision finding the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, judgment is hereby

rendered finding the accused ROLDAN MORALES y Midarasa, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. Q-03-114257 for violation of
Section 5, Article II, R.A. [No.] 9165 for drug pushing [of] zero point zero
three (0.03) gram of white crystalline substance containing
Methylamphetamine hydrochloride and is hereby sentenced to suffer Life
Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00)
pesos.

The Court likewise finds the accused ROLDAN MORALES y Midarasa

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. Q-03-114256 for
violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. [No.] 9165 for drug possession x x x
of zero point zero three (0.03) gram of white crystalline substance
containing Methylamphetamine hydrochloride and is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment term of Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Month to
Thirteen (13) Years and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand
(P350,000.00) Pesos.

The sachets of shabu subject of these cases are ordered transmitted to the
PDEA thru Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition after this
decision becomes final.

SO ORDERED.46

The trial court held that the prosecution witnesses positively identified the
appellant as the person who possessed and sold to the poseur-buyer the
"shabu" subject of this case, during the buy-bust operation conducted in the
afternoon of January 2, 2003.47 The trial court found that from the evidence
presented, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the following:
(1) the fact of the buy-bust operation conducted in the afternoon of January
2, 2003 at the parking lot of Jollibee Philcoa which led to the arrest of the
appellant; and (2) the corpus delicti, through the presentation in court of the
two sachets of white substance which was confirmed by the Chemistry
Report to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride ("shabu"), found in the
possession of and sold by the appellant.48

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court in toto. It found that contrary
to the allegations of the appellant, there was no instigation that took
place.49 Rather, a buy-bust operation was employed by the police officers
to apprehend the appellant while in the act of unlawfully selling drugs.50 The
appellate court further held that what is material in a prosecution for illegal
sale of prohibited drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti.51 Stripped of non-essentials, the CA summarized the antecedent
facts of the case as follows:

PO1 Eduardo Roy prepared a pre-arranged report on the buy-bust

operation to be conducted against appellant at Barangay San Vicente,
Quezon City upon an informants tip that appellant was selling "shabu" in
the said area. On the other hand, PO3 Armando Ragundiaz Rivera
recorded the briefing, summary, identification of appellant and the buy-bust
money to be used in the operation consisting of one (1) fifty peso bill, two
(2) twenty peso bill[s] and one (1) ten peso bill. PO1 Roy who acted as the
poseur-buyer and PO3 Rivera as his back-up proceeded to University
Avenue corner Commonwealth Avenue, Barangay San Vicente, Quezon
City together with the informant.

PO1 Roy and the informant met appellant at the parking lot of Jollibee
restaurant while PO3 Rivera positioned himself at the side of a parked car
where he can easily have a clear view of the three. After PO1 Roy was
introduced by the informant to the appellant as a buyer of "shabu", the
latter immediately produced a sachet containing the said prohibited drugs
and handed the same to him. PO1 Roy raised his left hand as the pre-
arranged signal that the transaction was consummated. Thereafter, PO3
Rivera went to the area, introduced himself as a police officer and frisked
appellant from whom he recovered the marked money and a matchbox,
where the suspected "shabu" was placed, and two (2) aluminum foils. They
informed appellant of his constitutional rights and brought him to the police
station while the two (2) small transparent heat sealed sachets containing
the suspected prohibited drugs and paraphernalia were turned over to the
crime laboratory for examination, and which [was] later, found to be positive
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (commonly known as "shabu").52

Thence, the CA rendered judgment to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Regional

Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103 dated April 29, 2004 is hereby
AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.53

Appellant elevated the case to this Court via Notice of Appeal.54 In our
Resolution dated July 12, 2006, we resolved to accept the case and
required the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs
simultaneously, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice.55 Both parties
adopted their respective appellants and appellees briefs, instead of filing
supplemental briefs.56

Our Ruling

Appellant claims that he should not be convicted of the offenses charged

since his guilt has not been proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt.57 In support of his contention, appellant alleges that the arresting
officers did not even place the proper markings on the alleged shabu and
paraphernalia at the time and place of the alleged buy-bust
operation.58 Appellant hence posits that this created serious doubt as to the
items and actual quantity of shabu recovered, if at all.59

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, insists that the direct
testimony of the two arresting officers sufficiently established the elements
of illegal sale and possession of shabu.60

At the outset, we draw attention to the unique nature of an appeal in a

criminal case: the appeal throws the whole case open for review and it is
the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the
appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.61 On the
basis of such review, we find the present appeal meritorious.

Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial courts findings of fact,
especially when affirmed by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great
weight and will not be disturbed on appeal.62 However, this rule admits of
exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with
direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.63 After due consideration of the
records of this case, evidence presented and relevant law and
jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls under the exception.

In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following

elements must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale
took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit
drug as evidence.64

On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous

drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or
an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such
possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.65 Similarly, in this
case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond
reasonable doubt.66

With respect to corpus delicti, Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165
provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources or dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

In People v. Partoza,67 we held that the identity of the corpus delicti was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. In the said case, the apprehending
policeman did not mark the seized drugs after he arrested the appellant in
the latters presence. Neither did he make an inventory and take a
photograph of the confiscated items in the presence of the appellant. There
was no representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or
any elected public official who participated in the operation and who were
supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof.
Hence, we held in the afore-cited case that there was no compliance with
the statutory safeguards. In addition, while the apprehending policeman
admitted to have in his possession the shabufrom the time the appellant
was apprehended at the crime scene to the police station, records are
bereft of proof on how the seized items were handled from the time they left
the hands of the said police officer.

We declared in People v. Orteza,68 that the failure to comply with

Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 implied a concomitant failure
on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of the corpus delicti:

In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated
marijuana immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court
held that the deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics
operations produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana.
Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish
the identity of the corpus delicti.

The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom
operatives failed to place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the
accused was arrested and to observe the procedure and take custody of
the drug.

More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material
inconsistencies with regard to when and where the markings on
the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created
reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus
acquitted the accused due to the prosecution's failure to indubitably show
the identity of the shabu.

Likewise, in People v. Obmiranis,69 we acquitted the appellant due to flaws

in the conduct of the post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug allegedly
recovered from the appellant, together with the failure of the key persons
who handled the same to testify on the whereabouts of the exhibit before it
was offered in evidence in court.

In the instant case, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody
and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs, as mandated in Section 21
of RA 9165, were not observed. The records utterly failed to show that the
buy-bust team complied with these procedures despite their mandatory
nature as indicated by the use of "shall" in the directives of the law. The
procedural lapse is plainly evident from the testimonies of the two police
officers presented by the prosecution, namely: PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera.

PO1 Roy, in his testimony, failed to concretely identify the items seized
from the appellant. Moreover, he confirmed that they did not make a list of
the items seized. The patent lack of adherence to the procedural mandate
of RA 9165 is manifest in his testimony, to wit:

Fiscal Jurado

x x x You mentioned that you gave the pre-arranged signal, what is

that?

Witness
A- Raising my left hand.

Q- And what happened next?

A- My back up PO3 Rivera came.

Q- What [did] your back up do when you raised your hand?

A- He arrested Morales.

Q- What were you doing when he arrested Morales?

A- I put the informant away from the scene.

Q- And what happened next after that?

A- We brought him to the police station.

Q- How about the shabu, what did you do with it?

A- We brought it to the crime lab.

Q- How did you send it to crime lab?

A- Shabu and paraphernalia recovered by my companion from the

suspect.

Q- How many items were sent to the crime lab?

A- 2 shabu and paraphernalia.

Q- What are the paraphernalia?

A- Foil, sir.

Q- How many foil?

A- I cannot recall.

Q- What happened to the accused in the police station?

A- He was investigated.
Q- Do you know the accused?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- What is his name?

A- Roldan Morales.

xxxx

Fiscal Jurado

Q- If the said sachet and paraphernalia will be shown to you, how

would you be able to identify the said items?

Witness

A- I could not recall "pare-pareho yung shabu"

Atty. Mosing

I will object because that would be leading on the part of the

prosecution because he could not identify on what shabu.

Court

That question is overruled.

Fiscal Jurado

I am showing to you an item, would you be able to identify?

Court

Fiscal showing several shabu.

WITNESS

A- This one.

Fiscal Jurado
Q- There is another plastic sachet?

Witness

A- Recovered.

Q- How about these two?

A- I was not the one who confiscated that.

Q- What happened to the said item submitted to the crime lab?

A- Positive, sir.

xxxx

Fiscal Jurado

xxxx

Q- How about the specimen forwarded to the crime lab?

Witness

A- My companion brought that.

Q- What was your participation in the case?

A- Poseur buyer.

xxxx

Atty. Mosing

xxxx

Q- After the arrest you brought the suspect and the items to the
station?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- Did you not make a list of items you have confiscated in this case?
A- No, we turned it over to the investigator.

Q- You have presented the buy bust money a while ago, was that buy
bust money suppose to be turned over to the investigator?

A- No, inquest. Upon request, I was the one who received

it.70 (Emphasis supplied)

The testimony of the other arresting officer, PO3 Rivera further

confirms the failure of the buy-bust team to observe the procedure
mandated under Section 21 of RA 9165:

Court

Q- Where did you position yourself?

Witness

A- Parked vehicle.

Fiscal Jurado

Q- What did you notice?

Witness

A- The confidential informant introduced our poseur buyer to the

suspect and after a few conversation I waited and I saw the pre-
arranged signal. And when he raised his left hand that is the signal
that the transaction is consummated.

Q- After he made that signal, what did you do?

A- I rushed to the area and arrest[ed] the suspect.

Q- Who was the person you took x x x custody [of]?

A- Roldan Morales

Q- And what did you do with him?

A- Because he ha[d] a marked money I got hold of it and arrest[ed]
him.

Q- And what did you do with him?

A- I frisked him.

Q- And what was the result of your frisking?

A- A box of match which I was able to recover [containing] another

suspected shabu.

Q- Where did you find that on his body?

A- Front [pocket of] pants.

Q- How about the match?

A- The same.

Q- What else did you find?

A- Aluminum foil.

Q- And after you recovered that evidence, what did you do with the
accused?

A- We informed him of his constitutional rights and brought him to the

station.

Q- How about the items you recovered?

A- Delivered it to the crime lab for examination.

Q- What else did you deliver [to] the crime lab?

A- Request, sir.71 (Emphasis supplied)

Other than PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera, the prosecution did not present
any other witnesses. Hence, the investigator, referred to by PO1 Roy
in his testimony as the one who took delivery of the seized items, was
not identified nor was he presented in court. More importantly, the
 testifying police officers did not state that they marked the seized
drugs immediately after they arrested the appellant and in the latters
presence. Neither did they make an inventory and take a photograph
of the confiscated items in the presence of the appellant. There was
likewise no mention of any representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated
in the operation and who were supposed to sign an inventory of
seized items and be given copies thereof. None of these statutory
safeguards were observed.

Even PO1 Roy, the poseur-buyer, was not certain as to the identity of
the confiscated shabu, to wit:

Fiscal Jurado:

Q- If the said sachet and paraphernalia will be shown to you, how

would you be able to identify the said items?

Witness

A- I could not recall "pare-pareho yung shabu".72

The procedural lapses in the handling and identification of the seized items

collectively raise doubts as to whether the items presented in court were

the exact same items that were confiscated from appellant when he was
apprehended.

While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the buy-bust team with
Section 21 of RA 9165 is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground
therefor, for and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
siezed items are properly preserved by the apprehending team,73 these
conditions were not met in the case at bar. No explanation was offered by
the testifying police officers for their failure to observe the rule. In this
respect, we cannot fault the apprehending policemen either, as PO1 Roy
admitted that he was not a PDEA operative74and the other witness, PO3
Rivera, testified that he was not aware of the procedure involved in the
conduct of anti-drug operations by the PNP.75 In fine, there is serious doubt
whether the drug presented in court was the same drug recovered from the
appellant. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the corpus delicti.
1avvphi1
Furthermore, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to reveal the
identity of the person who had custody and safekeeping of the drugs after
its examination and pending presentation in court. Thus, the prosecution
likewise failed to establish the chain of custody which is fatal to its cause.
1avvphi1

In fine, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. There was likewise a break in the chain of custody which
proves fatal to the prosecutions case. Thus, since the prosecution has
failed to establish the element of corpus delicti with the prescribed degree
of proof required for successful prosecution of both possession and sale of
prohibited drugs, we resolve to ACQUIT Roldan Morales y Midarasa.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated April 24, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00037 affirming the
judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
103 dated April 29, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant
Roldan Morales y Midarasa is ACQUITTEDbased on reasonable doubt,
and is ordered to be immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is
confined for any other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections

is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the
action taken hereon within five days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

G.R. No. 157943 September 4, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

vs.
GILBERT REYES WAGAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed

innocent until the contrary is proved. In order to overcome the presumption
of innocence, the Prosecution is required to adduce against him nothing
less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such proof is not only in relation
to the elements of the offense, but also in relation to the identity of the
offender. If the Prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not
only the right of the accused to be freed, it becomes the Courts
constitutional duty to acquit him.

The Case

Gilbert R. Wagas appeals his conviction for estafa under the decision
rendered on July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu
City (RTC), meting on him the indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 30 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum.

Antecedents

Wagas was charged with estafa under the information that reads:

That on or about the 30th day of April, 1997, and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent,
with intent to gain and by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, to wit:
knowing that he did not have sufficient funds deposited with the Bank of
Philippine Islands, and without informing Alberto Ligaray of that
circumstance, with intent to defraud the latter, did then and there issue
Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No. 0011003, dated May 08, 1997 in
the amount of P200,000.00, which check was issued in payment of an
obligation, but which check when presented for encashment with the bank,
was dishonored for the reason "drawn against insufficient funds" and
inspite of notice and several demands made upon said accused to make
good said check or replace the same with cash, he had failed and refused
and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage
and prejudice of Alberto Ligaray in the amount aforestated.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

After Wagas entered a plea of not guilty,2 the pre-trial was held, during
which the Defense admitted that the check alleged in the information had
been dishonored due to insufficient funds.3 On its part, the Prosecution
made no admission.4
At the trial, the Prosecution presented complainant Alberto Ligaray as its
lone witness. Ligaray testified that on April 30, 1997, Wagas placed an
order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone; that he and his wife would
not agree at first to the proposed payment of the order by postdated check,
but because of Wagas assurance that he would not disappoint them and
that he had the means to pay them because he had a lending business and
money in the bank, they relented and accepted the order; that he released
the goods to Wagas on April 30, 1997 and at the same time received Bank
of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 0011003 for P200,000.00 payable
to cash and postdated May 8, 1997; that he later deposited the check with
Solid Bank, his depository bank, but the check was dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds;5 that he called Wagas about the matter, and the
latter told him that he would pay upon his return to Cebu; and that despite
repeated demands, Wagas did not pay him.6

On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet

Wagas because they transacted through telephone only; that he released
the 200 bags of rice directly to Robert Caada, the brother-in-law of
Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt upon receiving the rice.7

After Ligaray testified, the Prosecution formally offered the following: (a)
BPI Check No. 0011003 in the amount of P200,000.00 payable to "cash;"
(b) the return slip dated May 13, 1997 issued by Solid Bank; (c) Ligarays
affidavit; and (d) the delivery receipt signed by Caada. After the RTC
admitted the exhibits, the Prosecution then rested its case.8

In his defense, Wagas himself testified. He admitted having issued BPI

Check No. 0011003 to Caada, his brother-in-law, not to Ligaray. He
denied having any telephone conversation or any dealings with Ligaray. He
explained that the check was intended as payment for a portion of
Caadas property that he wanted to buy, but when the sale did not push
through, he did not anymore fund the check.9

On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a letter

dated July 3, 1997 apparently signed by him and addressed to Ligarays
counsel, wherein he admitted owing Ligaray P200,000.00 for goods
received, to wit:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 23, 1997 which is
self-explanatory. It is worthy also to discuss with you the environmental
facts of the case for your consideration, to wit:

It is true that I obtained goods from your client worth P200,000.00 and I
promised to settle the same last May 10, 1997, but to no avail. On this
point, let me inform you that I sold my real property to a buyer in Manila,
and promised to pay the consideration on the same date as I promised with
your client. Unfortunately, said buyer likewise failed to make good with
such obligation. Hence, I failed to fulfill my promise resultant thereof. (sic)

Again, I made another promise to settle said obligation on or before June

15, 1997, but still to no avail attributable to the same reason as
aforementioned. (sic)

To arrest this problem, we decided to source some funds using the subject
property as collateral. This other means is resorted to for the purpose of
settling the herein obligation. And as to its status, said funds will be
rele[a]sed within thirty (30) days from today.

In view of the foregoing, it is my sincere request and promise to settle said

obligation on or before August 15, 1997.

Lastly, I would like to manifest that it is not my intention to shy away from
any financial obligation.

xxxx

Respectfully yours,

(SGD.)
GILBERT R. WAGAS10

Wagas admitted the letter, but insisted that it was Caada who had
transacted with Ligaray, and that he had signed the letter only because his
sister and her husband (Caada) had begged him to assume the
responsibility.11 On redirect examination, Wagas declared that Caada, a
seafarer, was then out of the country; that he signed the letter only to
accommodate the pleas of his sister and Caada, and to avoid jeopardizing
Caadas application for overseas employment.12 The Prosecution
subsequently offered and the RTC admitted the letter as rebuttal
evidence.13

Decision of the RTC

As stated, the RTC convicted Wagas of estafa on July 11, 2002, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt as charged and he is hereby sentenced as
follows:

To suffer an indeterminate penalty of from twelve (12) years of pris[i]on

mayor, as minimum, to thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua as maximum;

To indemnify the complainant, Albert[o] Ligaray in the sum of P200,000.00;

To pay said complainant the sum of P30,000.00 by way of attorneys fees;

and the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.14

The RTC held that the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt
all the elements constituting the crime of estafa, namely: (a) that Wagas
issued the postdated check as payment for an obligation contracted at the
time the check was issued; (b) that he failed to deposit an amount sufficient
to cover the check despite having been informed that the check had been
dishonored; and (c) that Ligaray released the goods upon receipt of the
postdated check and upon Wagas assurance that the check would be
funded on its date.

Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration,15 arguing that the
Prosecution did not establish that it was he who had transacted with
Ligaray and who had negotiated the check to the latter; that the records
showed that Ligaray did not meet him at any time; and that Ligarays
testimony on their alleged telephone conversation was not reliable because
it was not shown that Ligaray had been familiar with his voice. Wagas also
sought the reopening of the case based on newly discovered evidence,
specifically: (a) the testimony of Caada who could not testify during the
trial because he was then out of the country, and (b) Ligarays testimony
given against Wagas in another criminal case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.
On October 21, 2002, the RTC denied the motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration, opining that the evidence Wagas desired to present at a
new trial did not qualify as newly discovered, and that there was no
compelling ground to reverse its decision.16

Wagas appealed directly to this Court by notice of appeal.17

Prior to the elevation of the records to the Court, Wagas filed a petition for
admission to bail pending appeal. The RTC granted the petition and fixed
Wagas bond at P40,000.00.18 Wagas then posted bail for his provisional
liberty pending appeal.19

The resolution of this appeal was delayed by incidents bearing on the grant
of Wagas application for bail. On November 17, 2003, the Court required
the RTC Judge to explain why Wagas was out on bail.20 On January 15,
2004, the RTC Judge submitted to the Court a so-called manifestation and
compliance which the Court referred to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) for evaluation, report, and recommendation.21 On July 5, 2005, the
Court, upon the OCAs recommendation, directed the filing of an
administrative complaint for simple ignorance of the law against the RTC
Judge.22 On September 12, 2006, the Court directed the OCA to comply
with its July 5, 2005 directive, and to cause the filing of the administrative
complaint against the RTC Judge. The Court also directed Wagas to
explain why his bail should not be cancelled for having been erroneously
granted.23 Finally, in its memorandum dated September 27, 2006, the OCA
manifested to the Court that it had meanwhile filed the administrative
complaint against the RTC Judge.24

Issues

In this appeal, Wagas insists that he and Ligaray were neither friends nor
personally known to one other; that it was highly incredible that Ligaray, a
businessman, would have entered into a transaction with him involving a
huge amount of money only over the telephone; that on the contrary, the
evidence pointed to Caada as the person with whom Ligaray had
transacted, considering that the delivery receipt, which had been signed by
Caada, indicated that the goods had been "Ordered by ROBERT
CAADA," that the goods had been received by Caada in good order and
condition, and that there was no showing that Caada had been acting on
behalf of Wagas; that he had issued the check to Caada upon a different
transaction; that Caada had negotiated the check to Ligaray; and that the
element of deceit had not been established because it had not been proved
with certainty that it was him who had transacted with Ligaray over the
telephone.

The circumstances beg the question: did the Prosecution establish beyond
reasonable doubt the existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa as
charged, as well as the identity of the perpetrator of the crime?

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,

provides:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts

executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

xxxx

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation

when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein
were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the
drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check
within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee
or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of
funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or
fraudulent act.

In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of

postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the
efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender must be
able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the
issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the
Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was delivered
would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the
issuance of the check by the offender.25

The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is
postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the
check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c)
damage to the payee thereof.26 It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the
issuance of a check that is punishable, not the non-payment of a
debt.27 Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the
drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.

The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to

Caada because of the postdated check the latter had given to him; and
that the check was dishonored when presented for payment because of the
insufficiency of funds.

In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the
crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.28 In
that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that
it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.

Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the
person with whom he was transacting over the telephone, thus:

Q:

On April 30, 1997, do you remember having a transaction with the accused
in this case?

A:

Yes, sir. He purchased two hundred bags of rice from me.

Q:

How did this purchase of rice transaction started? (sic)

A:
He talked with me over the phone and told me that he would like to
purchase two hundred bags of rice and he will just issue a check.29

Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally see and
meet whoever he had dealt with and to whom he had made the demand for
payment, and that he had talked with him only over the telephone, to wit:

Q:

After the check was (sic) bounced, what did you do next?

A:

I made a demand on them.

Q:

How did you make a demand?

A:

I called him over the phone.

Q:

Who is that "him" that you are referring to?

A:

Gilbert Wagas.30

Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under
the Negotiable Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the
bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an
indorsement.31 This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the
check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Caada, his brother-in-law,
who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did
1w phi 1

not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and
thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who signed for and
received the stocks of rice was Caada.
It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must
have used the check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law
punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless
check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had
issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still
clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded
Ligaray by means of the check.

Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Caada who received the rice from him
and who delivered the check to him. Considering that the records are bereft
of any showing that Caada was then acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC
had no factual and legal bases to conclude and find that Caada had been
acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and legal bases for the RTC to infer
so obtained despite Wagas being Caadas brother-in-law.

Finally, Ligarays declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with
him over the telephone was not reliable because he did not explain how he
determined that the person with whom he had the telephone conversation
was really Wagas whom he had not yet met or known before then. We
deem it essential for purposes of reliability and trustworthiness that a
telephone conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer
of rice to be first authenticated before it could be received in evidence.
Among others, the person with whom the witness conversed by telephone
should be first satisfactorily identified by voice recognition or any other
means.32 Without the authentication, incriminating another person just by
adverting to the telephone conversation with him would be all too easy. In
this respect, an identification based on familiarity with the voice of the
caller, or because of clearly recognizable peculiarities of the caller would
have sufficed.33 The identity of the caller could also be established by the
callers self-identification, coupled with additional evidence, like the context
and timing of the telephone call, the contents of the statement challenged,
internal patterns, and other distinctive characteristics, and disclosure of
knowledge of facts known peculiarly to the caller.34

Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a
telephone communication is accorded probative weight. The identity of the
caller may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. According to
one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court:
Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are
relevant to the fact or facts in issue, and admissibility is governed by the
same rules of evidence concerning face-to-face conversations except the
party against whom the conversations are sought to be used must
ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary that the witness be able, at the
time of the conversation, to identify the person with whom the conversation
was had, provided subsequent identification is proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence somewhere in the development of the case. The
mere statement of his identity by the party calling is not in itself sufficient
proof of such identity, in the absence of corroborating circumstances so as
to render the conversation admissible. However, circumstances preceding
or following the conversation may serve to sufficiently identify the caller.
The completeness of the identification goes to the weight of the evidence
rather than its admissibility, and the responsibility lies in the first instance
with the district court to determine within its sound discretion whether the
threshold of admissibility has been met.35 (Bold emphasis supplied)

Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any
proof to definitely establish that it had been Wagas whom Ligaray had
conversed with on the telephone. The Prosecution did not show through
Ligaray during the trial as to how he had determined that his caller was
Wagas. All that the Prosecution sought to elicit from him was whether he
had known and why he had known Wagas, and he answered as follows:

Q:

Do you know the accused in this case?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

If he is present inside the courtroom []

A:

No, sir. He is not around.

Q:
Why do you know him?

A:

I know him as a resident of Compostela because he is an ex-mayor of

Compostela.36

During cross-examination, Ligaray was allowed another opportunity to

show how he had determined that his caller was Wagas, but he still failed
to provide a satisfactory showing, to wit:

Q:

Mr. Witness, you mentioned that you and the accused entered into [a]
transaction of rice selling, particularly with these 200 sacks of rice subject
of this case, through telephone conversation?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

But you cannot really ascertain that it was the accused whom you are
talking with?

A:

I know it was him because I know him.

Q:

Am I right to say [that] that was the first time that you had a transaction with
the accused through telephone conversation, and as a consequence of that
alleged conversation with the accused through telephone he issued a
check in your favor?

A:

No. Before that call I had a talk[ ] with the accused.

Q:
But still through the telephone?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

There was no instant (sic) that the accused went to see you personally
regarding the 200 bags rice transaction?

A:

No. It was through telephone only.

Q:

In fact[,] you did not cause the delivery of these 200 bags of rice through
the accused himself?

A:

Yes. It was through Robert.

Q:

So, after that phone call[,] you deliver[ed] th[ose] 200 sacks of rice through
somebody other than the accused?

A:

Yes, sir.37

Ligarays statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had ordered
the rice because he "know[s]" him was still vague and unreliable for not
assuring the certainty of the identification, and should not support a finding
of Ligarays familiarity with Wagas as the caller by his voice. It was evident
from Ligarays answers that Wagas was not even an acquaintance of
Ligarays prior to the transaction. Thus, the RTCs conclusion that Ligaray
had transacted with Wagas had no factual basis. Without that factual basis,
the RTC was speculating on a matter as decisive as the identification of the
buyer to be Wagas.
The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person
who had conversed with Ligaray by telephone to place the order for the
rice. The letter was admitted exclusively as the States rebuttal evidence to
controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of entering into any transaction
with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could be considered and appreciated only
for that purpose. Under the law of evidence, the court shall consider
evidence solely for the purpose for which it is offered,38 not for any other
purpose.39 Fairness to the adverse party demands such exclusivity.
Moreover, the high plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he had
signed the letter only because his sister and her husband had pleaded with
him to do so could not be taken for granted.

It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus
probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non
qui negat, which means that he who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove,40 and as a means of respecting the presumption of innocence in
favor of the man or woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State
has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct identification of the author
of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the offense with the
participation of the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State
beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without
solace from the weakness of the defense. That the defense the accused
puts up may be weak is inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has
failed to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability. The presumption
of innocence dictates that it is for the Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt
and not for the accused to establish innocence.41 Indeed, the accused,
being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her
shoulders. For this reason, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove
the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the
commission of the crime can be established, without competent proof of the
identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, there can be no
conviction.42

There is no question that an identification that does not preclude a

reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary
force.43 Thus, considering that the circumstances of the identification of
Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a
reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure up to
the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal
cases. Perforce, the accuseds constitutional right of presumption of
innocence until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to
an acquittal,44 even though his innocence may be doubted.45

Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held

civilly liable where the preponderance of the established facts so
warrants.46 Wagas as the admitted drawer of the check was legally liable to
pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due course.47 Consequently, we
pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the amount of the dishonored
check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision

rendered on July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu
City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R. Wagas of the crime of estafa on the ground
of reasonable doubt, but ORDERS him to pay Alberto Ligaray the amount
of P200,000.00 as actual damages, plus interest of 6% per annum from the
finality of this decision.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.