Ranara v. NLRC G.R. No.

100969

Issue: Whether or not in cases involving the rights of laborers, procedural lapses may be set
aside in the interest of substantial justice?

Held: Yes. The Court ruled that the failure of the petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration
of the NLRC decision before coming to this Court was not a fatal omission. In the interest of
substantial justice, and especially in cases involving the rights of workers, the procedural lapse
may be disregarded to enable the Court to examine and resolve the conflicting rights and
responsibilities of the parties. This liberality is warranted in the case at bar, especially since it
has been shown that the intervention of the Court was necessary for the protection of the
dismissed laborer.

We sustain the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter regarding the petitioner's monetary claims
on the basis of the documentary evidence submitted by the private respondents. We also agree
that it was not necessary for the NLRC to require the production of the originals thereof in the
absence of any challenge to their genuineness and due execution from the petitioner.
Amalgamated Laborers' Association v. CIR G.R. No. L-23467

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations acquired jurisdiction over the labor
dispute?
Held: Yes. The Court ruled that once the Court of Industrial Relations has acquired jurisdiction
over a case under the law of its creation, it retains that jurisdiction until the case is completely
decided, including all the incidents related thereto. It is well settled that a grant of jurisdiction
implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and every regularly
constituted court has power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of
justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of its judgments and
mandates, even though the court may thus be called upon to decide matters which would not
be within its cognizance as original causes of action. While a court may be expressly granted the
incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence
of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to
effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly
constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of its
judgments and mandates.
Kapisanan Ng Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Co. v. Fajardo G.R. No. L-33493

Issue: Whether or not 25% of the amount awarded as attorneys fees fixed by the CIR is allowed
by the labor laws?

Held: No. There is no gainsaying Attorney Fajardo's right to be paid reasonable fees by all the
members of the union who benefitted from his services. The rule was enunciated in Union de
Empleados de Trenes vs. Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa MRRCO L-14762, Dec. 20, 1961
that lawyers who represent members of the Union to secure benefits for all the employees,
should be paid corresponding fees by all those favored or benefitted by the award secured by
them.

However, We hold that the 25% fee fixed by the Court of Industrial Relations was excessive.
Section 11, Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code fixes the
attorney's fees in judicial and administrative proceedings at 10% of the amount awarded. This is
the same percentage allowed by law to lawyers prosecuting workmen's compensation cases
that reach the appellate court. Moreover, considering the low economic status of their
clientele, the slice that labor lawyers should take from the avails of their clients' suit should not
be too large as to leave the latter with only a pittance for themselves.
RFC v. International Corporate Bank G.R. Nos. 77042-43

Issue: Whether or not the amount equivalent to 8 % of the recovery or sums of money due
from the two civil complaints adjudged as attorney's fees by the trial court and affirmed by the
respondent appellate court, is fair and reasonable?
Held: No. The high standards of the legal profession as prescribed by law and the Canons of
Professional Ethics regulate if not limit the lawyer's freedom in fixing his professional fees. The
moment he takes his oath, ready to undertake his duties first, as a practitioner in the exercise
of his profession, and second, as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, the
lawyer submits himself to the authority of the court. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that
power to determine the reasonableness or the unconscionable character of attorney's fees
stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts.
Chong Guan Trading v. NLRC G.R. No. 81471

Issue: Whether or not the NLRC may disregard the procedural lapse where there is an
acceptable reason to excuse tardiness in the taking of an appeal?
Held: Yes. It is true that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has
the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. Narag v. National Labor Relations
Commission. However, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the NLRC may
disregard the procedural lapse where there is an acceptable reason to excuse tardiness in the
taking of an appeal. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides for a reglementary period of 10 days
within which to appeal a decision of the labor arbiter to the NLRC. The ten-day period has been
interpreted by this Court in the case of Vir-jen and Marine Services, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission as 10 calendar days and not 10 working days. In the instant case, while
the appeal was filed within 10 working days from receipt of the decision, it was filed beyond the
10 calendar days prescribed by law. Private respondent received a copy of the decision of Labor
Arbiter Martinez on May 3, 1984 while the appeal was filed only on May 15, 1984 or 12 days
from notice of the decision.