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Understanding Overpressure Scenarios

and RAGAGEP

71stAnnualInstrumentationandAutomationSymposiumfortheProcessIndustries
January2628,2016

RonNichols DaveGrattanP.E.,CFSE
SeniorPrincipleSpecialist ProcessSafetyEngineer
aeSolutions aeSolutions

Disclaimer
Thefollowingpaperisprovidedforeducationalpurposes.Whiletheauthorshaveattemptedtodescribe
thematerialcontainedhereinasaccuratelyaspossible,itmustbeunderstoodthatvariablesinanygiven
applicationorspecificationcanandwillaffectthechoiceoftheengineeringsolutionforthatscenario.All
necessaryfactorsmustbetakenintoconsiderationwhendesigninghazardmitigationforany
application.aeSolutionsandtheauthorsofthispapermakenowarrantyofanykindandshallnotbe
liableinanyeventforincidentalorconsequentialdamagesinconnectionwiththeapplicationofthis
document.

Introduction to Using RAGAGEP for Overpressure Risk Mitigation


ProcessHazardAnalysis(PHA)isakeytoolusedbythechemical,oil,andgasindustriestoassist
companiesinidentifying,implementingandmanagingthecriticalsafeguardsneededtoachievetheir
risktolerancecriteria.TheProcessHazardanalysisforsomesitesmayberegulatorydriven(e.g.,
Occupational,HealthandSafetyAdministrations(OSHAs)29CFR1910.119ProcessSafety
ManagementofHighlyHazardousChemicals(PSM),ortheUnitedStatesEnvironmentalProtection
Agencys(USEPAs)40CFR68ChemicalAccidentPreventionProvisions(RMP)).
DuringthePHAtheteamidentifiesconsequencesofconcernarisingfrompotentialprocessdeviations,
identifiesexistingsafeguards,orifLOPA(LayerofProtectionAnalysis)isrequired,theIndependent
ProtectionLayers(IPLs)availabletoreducethelikelihoodoftheconsequencetoatolerablerisklevel.If
theteamidentifiesagapbetweenthepotentialeventlikelihood,severityandtheminimumtargetset
bythecompany,theteamwillproposerecommendationstoclosethegap.
Anoverpressurescenariocanbeasignificantcontributortotheriskofafacility.Overpressureof
pressurevessels,piping,andotherequipmentcanresultinlossofcontainmentofflammableortoxic

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materials.ThispaperwilldevelopguidanceincludingrelatedRAGAGEP(RecognizedandGenerally
AcceptedGoodEngineeringPractice)tohelpengineersanddesignersparticipateinthesafetylifecycle
formanagingtheriskofoverpressure.

Role of the Control Systems Engineer (CSE) in PHA/ LOPA


CSEpersonnelareanimportantpartofaPHA/LOPAteam.Specificallyrelatedtooverpressure
scenarios,theCSEwilloftenbeabletoprovideinputtothefollowingissues:

developoverpressurescenariosrelatedtofailureofautomaticcontrols
assistteamtounderstanddependencebetweenautomaticcontrols(forexclusionofdouble
jeopardy)
understandthetypesofpressurereliefhardwarethatisspecifiedorinstalled(e.g.pilot
operatedvs.conventionalrelief)
understandreliefvalvecodesandpractices
assisttheteamwithdevelopingalternategapclosuresolutions(e.g.,systemdesign(SIS),High
IntegrityPressureProtectiveSystem(HIPPS),criticalalarms,etc.)
IftheprocessengineeringrepresentativetothePHAhasnotspecificallyworkedinthedisciplineof
pressurereliefdesign,theCSErepresentative,ifknowledgeable,canfillinmostofthisknowledgegap.
TheCSEmayinheritrecommendationsoractionitemsrelatedtomitigatingoverpressuregaps,ormay
haveresponsibilityforthemaintenanceandongoingintegrityrelatedtooverpressuremitigation.Asolid
understandingoftheRAGAGEPrelatedtomanagingtheriskassociatedwithoverpressurescenariosis
requiredinallofthesecases.

Introduction to Codes and Recommended Practices related to Overpressure


ThefollowingRAGAGEPareusedtomanagetheriskassociatedwithoverpressure.

ASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionVIIIPressureVessels
TheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionVIIIPressureVessels(ASMESectionVIII),is
consideredtheauthorityforminimumsafetyandperformancerequirementsofpressurereliefdevices.
Itiswidelyusedinindustryasareferenceandbasecode.ASMESectionVIIIhasbeencodifiedbymany
stateandlocalregulatoryauthorities,meaningitisrequiredbylaw[1].

APIStandard520,Sizing,Selection,andInstallationofPressurerelievingDevices,Parts1
(Sizing)and2(Installation)
APIStandard520,Sizing,Selection,andInstallationofPressurerelievingDevices(API520),supplements
thematerialandinformationinASMESectionVIII,andprovidesmorecompleteinformationon
relievingdevices,includingthedeterminationofreliefrequirements,disposalsystems,pipingand
installationpractices,thanwaspreviouslyavailablefrompublishedsources[1].


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APIStandard521,PressurerelievingandDepressuringSystems
APIStandard521,PressurerelievingandDepressuringSystems(API521),Providesanadditionalsource
ofknowledgeandexperiencegainedbythepetroleumprocessingandrelatedindustries.Itrecommends
economicallysoundandsafepracticesforpressurerelief.Thissourceconsidersthecomplexdesignand
operationofmodernprocessingplantsandthevastamountofenergystored.Itsuggestanalysisguides
fordeterminingcapacityrequirementsanddesignconceptsfordischargeanddisposalsystems[1].

NFPA30,FlammableandCombustibleLiquidsCode
NFPA30,FlammableandCombustibleLiquidsCode,closelyparallelstheinformationinAPIStandard
2000,VentingAtmosphericandLowPressureStorageTanks[1].OSHAsStandard,29CFR1910.106,
FlammableLiquids,isitscodifiedcousin.

ANSI/ISA84.00.012004Parts1(IEC61511Mod),FunctionalSafety:SafetyInstrumented
SystemsfortheProcessIndustrySector
WhenASMESectionVIIIUG140isusedasthebasistoprotectavesselfromoverpressurebysystem
design(e.g.,SIS)thenthesafetylifecycleinANSI/ISA84.00.012004Parts1(IEC61511Mod),
FunctionalSafety:SafetyInstrumentedSystemsfortheProcessIndustrySector(S84)wouldbefollowed
fortheSISdesign,installation,maintenance,andtesting.

Using a Pressure Relief Device as a Safeguard or IPL in PHA/ LOPA


OnetypicalsafeguardorIPLthatisidentifiedduringaLOPAstudyisapressurereliefdevice.Thistype
ofIPLisidentifiedbytheteamtomanagetheriskofanoverpressureconsequencetoanacceptable
level.Apressurereliefdevice(i.e.,apressurereliefvalveorrupturedisk)isusedasaconsequence
mitigationsystemtoprotectagainsthazardsofoverpressureresultinginlossofcontainmentdueto
ruptureorleakandpotentialexposuretoatoxicrelease,fireorexplosion.Therelianceonthepressure
reliefvalve(PRV)(agenericterm)asasafeguarddependsonitsproperdesignforthepotential
overpressureevent,installation,andmaintenance.
Oneoftherequirementsin29CFR1910.119[2]istheemployershallcompleteacompilationof
writtenprocesssafetyinformationbeforeconductinganyprocesshazardanalysisrequiredbythe
standard.Twocategoriescalledoutasprocesssafetyinformation(PSI)inthestandardare:1)relief
devicedesignbasisandcalculationsshallbedocumented,and2)bedesignedinaccordancewith
RAGAGEP.
Thispaperdoesnotrecommendthattheteamperformadetailedreviewofthepressurereliefdesign
calculationsduringthePHA.AnunderlyingassumptionofaPHAistheengineeringcalculationsare
correct(unlesstheteamhasknowledgetheyarenot).Alsobecausetheteamtimetoreviewaprocess
nodeduringaPHAsessionmustbemanagedefficiently,anauditofthePSIisnotfeasible.However,
PHArecommendationsareroutinelycapturedtoaddressPSIdeficienciesidentified;suchastheneedto
updateP&IDs,updateofoperatingprocedures,updateofsafeoperatinglimits,orthereviewofaPRV


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designbasisandtheassociatedsizingcalculationtoconfirmitprovidesoverpressureprotectionfora
PHA/LOPAscenariotowhichitiscredited(inadherencetoRAGAGEP).
ThefollowingarerecommendedquestionstoraisewiththePHAteamwhenperformingthestudyto
assessthehealthofthepressurereliefmanagementsystem.Thesourcesofinformationavailableto
answerthesequestionsaretypicallytheP&IDs,teammemberknowledgeandexperienceand
observationsmadeduringthewalkaroundtouroftheprocessarea.Notethatthesequestionsfocuson
pressurereliefforpressurevesselsandnotforlowpressureoratmospherictanks,thoughsimilar
questionsmaybedevelopedforthose.Althoughpressurereliefdevicesareusedtoprotectpressure
vesselsandpiping,theprovisionofpressurereliefonpipingisalsonotcoveredinthispaperas
requirementsforpipingoverpressureprotectionaregenerallymorespecificforthematerialbeing
handledandwouldbedrivenbyapplicationofthecorrectRAGAGEPforthatindustry(e.g.,Cl2Institute
guidanceonthermalexpansionpressurereliefofliquidchlorinetrappedinpipe).

PRV/ Overpressure RAGAGEP Deviation Questions for PHA


ThefollowingpotentialdeviationsrelatedtooverpressurebasedonRAGAGEPwillbeaddressedindetail
inthissection.
1. Isapressurereliefdevicerequired?
2. Isoverpressureprotectionavailablethroughaconnectedvesselthathasapressurerelief
device?
3. IsthepressurereliefdevicesetpointbelowtheMAWP?
4. IsthevesselnozzleorinletpipetothePRVasmallerareathantheinletofthePRV?
5. IsthePRVmountedbelowthenormalliquidlevelthatisnotadequatefornoncompressible
relief?
6. ArethereanyPSE/PRVcombinationsontheP&ID?
7. IsthereaPRVinstalledontheshellortubesideofaheatexchanger?
8. Istheopeninginthevesseldesignedtoprovideunobstructedflowbetweenthevesselandthe
pressurereliefdevice?
9. DoesthePRVventtoasafelocation?
10. Isthereliefpathkeptfreeofaccumulatedliquid?
11. Isthereacrediblecontingencyforhydraulicoverpressure?
12. Isdoublejeopardyclaimedforanoverpressurescenario?
WhatthePHAteamislookingforfromthesequestionsarepotentialdeviationsfromRAGAGEPfor
pressurereliefdesign(includingbasis),installationandmaintenance.Thequestionraisedmaybe:

AnsweredduringthemeetingiftheappropriatePSIcanbequicklyaccessed,asthereisalimited
timetosearchforinformationduringthemeetingsession,(rapidaccess);
Capturedasaparkinglotitemtoberesearchedandansweredoutsidethemeetingtimebut
beforetheendofthemeetingsessions(availablefromfieldorrecordreview);


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MadeintoarecommendationtoverifythedesignmeetsRAGAGEPandifnottoinitiatethe
developmentofthePSIoradesignmodification(e.g.prolongedrecordsearch,workorderor
studyneeded).
Thefollowingdiscussionsofeachquestionbelowincludeareferencetotheapplicableandsupporting
RAGAGEP(s).Theinformationprovidedisintendedtobeusefultoafacilitatorinleadingahazard
analysis.Thecodifiedrequirementsarealsodetailedinatableattheendofthispaper.

1) Is a pressure relief device required?


ASMESectionVIIIrequiresthatpressurevesselsbeprotectedbyapressurereliefdevice.Inmostcasesit
iseasytoidentifyapressurevesselbyinspectionoftheP&ID.Insomecasesitisnot.
ThefollowingcriteriawillexcludeavesselasbeingconsideredanASMESectionVIIIpressurevessel:

Vesselratedforlessthan15psig(100kPa)
Vesseldiameterislessthan6(152mm)
SourceRAGAGEP:ASMESectionVIIIU1(h),U1(j)
LookateachpressurevesselidentifiedinthenodeandontheP&ID.LookforthePRVandwhereitvents
toduringthefieldtour.
Arethereanypressurevesselsnotprotectedbyapressurereliefdevice?If,soinquireperthenext
sectionbelow.

2) Is overpressure protection available through a connected vessel that has a pressure


relief device?
ASMESectionVIIIallowsavesselthatisopentoaconnectedvesseltobeprotectedbythatvesselsPRV.
Inthiscase,ensurethedesignbasiscontainedinthereliefvalvefolderincludestheconnectedvesselin
itsscope.
Doesthereliefdesignbasisincludetheconnectedvesselinitsscope?
SourceRAGAGEP:ASMESectionVIIIUG133(c),AppendixMM5

2.1) What if there is no path to a pressure relief (no pressure relief device)?
VerifyifthevesselinvolvedhasbeenevaluatedperASMESectionVIIIUG140tonotneedoverpressure
protection.Thiscouldbethecaseifthesystempressureisselflimiting(thesourceofpressurecannot
exceedtheMAWPofthepressurevessel)andthereisnocrediblefirecase(suchaswhenapressure
vesseliselevated).IfnodocumentationexiststosupportapplicationofASMESectionVIIIUG140,
proposearecommendationtoperformastudyandinitiatemodificationasneededtoprovideadequate
overpressureprotection.


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AHIPPSmaybeusedinlieuofapressurereliefdevice.ThisisalsogovernedbyASMESectionVIIIUG
140,whichrequiresmakingthelikelihoodofanoverpressureofavesselprotectedbyaHIPPStobenon
credible.Consequencecriteriaisnottakenintoconsideration.Mitigatingtononcredibleimpliestheuse
ofaSIL3HIPPSwhichisbestavailabletechnology.SISdocumentationshouldbereviewedtoconfirm
theHIPPSisdesignedandmaintainedtothislevelofintegrity.
UG140appliestonewprojectsornewpressurevessels.
WhenusingaHIPPSinlieuofaPRV(ornoPRVisrequired)informthevesselmanufacturerinwriting
(fillingoutmanufacturersdatasheetforUG140)andthevesselshouldbestampedforUG140etc.
SourceRAGAGEP:

ASMESectionVIIIUG140(formerlyCodeCase2211)
GuidancenoteforUG140isWRCbulletin498.AhowtoapplyguideforUG140.

2.2) What if the existing pressure relief device is not sized for a specific relief
contingency?
APHAteammayfindthatavesseloverpressurescenariobeingconsideredisnotprotectedbyan
existingpressurereliefdevice(butotherwisethevesselhasapressurereliefdevicethatisproperlysized
forotherscenarios,e.g.,afirecase).InthesecasesthePHAteamcould(ifmechanicalreliefprotection
forthespecificcontingencywereimpractical)recommendtheuseofaHIPPStomitigatetheriskof
overpressureforthespecificcontingency.
IfaHIPPSisusedtoeliminatearelievingscenario(butthevesselotherwisehasaPRV)youonlyneeda
riskbasisdocumented(LOPA)forthatscenario.ItisnotsubjecttoASMESectionVIIIUG140.
Aslongasthereisaproperlydesigned,installed,andmaintainedPRVonthevesselsizedforsome
scenario,UG140doesnotapply(thisallowslessthanSIL3foraHIPPS).API521istheapplicable
RAGAGEP.Thisisaninterpretationofcodeandshouldbeverifiedindependentlybyeachenduser.
API521supportstheuseofariskanalysisusingLOPAandallowstheconsequencetobetakeninto
considerationwhenmitigatingwithaHIPPS(ASMESectionVIIIdoesnot).Thisiswhythedesignbasisfor
theHIPPSmaybeSIL1or2.

2.3) Are there maintenance valves (or control valves) in the flow path between the vessel
and the pressure relief device or its downstream vent point?
Valves(manualorautomatic)intheflowpathwithapressurereliefdeviceshouldbereviewedcarefully
withthePHAteam.TheypotentiallycandefeatthesafeguardorIPL.
ASMESectionI(forfiredequipment,e.g.,boilers)doesnotallowvalvesinthereliefpath.
ASMESectionVIII(unfiredpressurevessels)allowsvalvesinthepathofareliefdevice,howeverthey
mustbemanagedopen.


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DovalvesinflowpaththroughPRVonP&IDshowcarsealopen(CSO)orchainlockedopen(CLO)?
SourceRAGAGEP:ASMESectionVIIIUG135(d)(1),(d)(2)andAppendixM.

3) Is the pressure relief device setpoint below the MAWP?


TheP&IDshouldshowthedesignratingforavessel(i.e.,pressureandtemperature).Eitherthevessel
designpressureortheMAWP(MaximumAllowableWorkingPressure)maybeshown.Thedesign
pressureissetbytheprocessrequirements.TheMAWPiswhatthevesselisbuilttowithstandbythe
manufacturer.TheMAWPshouldbeequaltoorhigherthanthedesignpressure.Thesetpressureforat
leastonePRVonavesselshallnotexceedtheMAWPofthevessel.
IfthevesseldesignpressureisshownontheP&ID(butnottheMAWP),investigatetheMAWPbecause
thismaylowertheoverpressureratioifthevesselwasfabricatedwithahigherMAWP.
TheP&IDmayshowmultiplePRVsprotectingasinglevessel.ThePHAteamshouldunderstandwhy
therearemultiplePRVs.ArethePRVsprotectingthesamereliefcontingency,oraretheyprotecting
differentcontingencies.Inanycase,itiscommontostaggerthe(multiple)reliefvalvesetpointsto
ensureproperperformanceofeachreliefdevice(e.g.,toavoidchattering).
ComparesetpointofPRVwiththeMAWPofalltheequipmentitisprotectingagainsttheRAGAGEP
criteria.
SourceRAGAGEP:ASMESectionVIIIUG134(a)Whenasinglepressurereliefdeviceisused,theset
pressureshallnotexceedthemaximumallowableworkingpressureofthevessel.Whentherequired
capacityisprovidedinmorethanonepressurereliefdevice,onlyonepressurereliefdeviceneedbeset
atorbelowthemaximumallowableworkingpressure,andtheadditionalpressurereliefdevicesmaybe
settoopenatthehigherpressuresbutinnocaseatapressurehigherthan105%ofthemaximum
allowableworkingpressure,exceptasprovidedin(b)below[3].

4) Is the vessel nozzle or inlet pipe to the PRV a smaller area than the inlet of the PRV?
TheproperdesignofaPRVinstallationmustconsiderandlimitthepressuredropontheinletlinetoa
PRVandthebackpressuredevelopedonthedischargelineofaPRV,bothofwhichmayreducethe
capacityofthePRVandcauseperformanceissues(e.g.,chattering).DoestheP&IDshowanozzleor
pipewithasmallerdiameterthantheopeningofthePRVontheP&IDorobservedduringatour?
SourceRAGAGEP:ASMESectionVIIIUG135(b)(1)


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5) Is the PRV mounted below the normal liquid level that is not adequate for non-
compressible relief?
ThePHAteammaybeawareofissuesrelatedtoaPRVinstallation,oritmightbecomeapparentduring
thetouroftheunit.Forexample,inonefacility,agroupofPRVswereinstalledbelowthecenterlineof
theflareheaderwherethePRVsdischargedto.
VerifywiththePHAteamifaPRVmountedbelowanormalliquidlevelisspecifiedaspercompressible
fluid.Potentialissuesthatshouldbeidentifiedbytheteaminclude;operatinglevelchanges,repurposed
vessel,inadequatenozzleselection(design),orbadinstallation,etc.
SourceRAGAGEP:ASMESectionVIIIUG135(a)

6) Are there PSE/PSV combinations on the P&ID?


IfaPSE(rupturedisk)isinstalledinserieswithaPRV,theremustbeawaytomonitorpressureinthe
interstitialspace.Iftherupturediskweretoleak,pressurecouldbuildupinthespacebetweenthePSE
andPRV,puttingbackpressureonthePSE,effectivelyraisingtheburstingpressureofthePSE.Atell
talepressureindicationshouldbeinstalledtomeasurepressureintheinterstitialspace.Inaddition,an
inherentlysaferdesignsolutionistoventtheinterstitialspacetotheflareheader(thuspreventing
buildupofpressure)atthesametimemonitoringforblownrupturedisk.
IsthereatelltaletomonitorthespacebetweentherupturediskandPRV?
Howisitmonitored:checklist,SOP,DCSalarm?
Ataminimumthetelltaleshouldbemonitoredbyperiodicoperatorroundstoinspectthereadout
(althoughthetelltalemaynotbeagauge,e.g.atrycock).DuringthePHAtheremaybeanopportunity
torecordandreviewtheprocedurethatdocumentsthemonitoringrequirementsoftheseindications,
e.g.howaredeviceinspectionsdocumented,frequencyofmonitoring,andrequirementforcorrective
action.
SourceRAGAGEP:ASMESectionVIIIUG127(b)(4):Thespacebetweenarupturediskdeviceanda
pressurereliefvalveshallbeprovidedwithapressuregage,atrycock,freevent,orsuitabletelltale
indicator.Thisarrangementpermitsdetectionofdiskruptureorleakage53.

7) Is there a PRV installed on the shell or tube side of a heat exchanger?


Inolderplantsitiscommontofindoneormoreheatexchangersnotprotectedforthetuberupture
contingency.Tuberupturemayoverpressuretheshellsideoftheexchanger,orpressuremaydevelop
ontheexchangerheads(fromtheshellside)andoverpressurethatway.Inanycase,alwaysverifyfrom
theP&IDdesignspecinformationfortheheatexchangertheratioofdesignpressureofhighsidetolow
side.Iftheratioexceeds1.3(10/13thsrule),thenlookforpressureprotection(aPRD)onthelowside.
Forexample,ifthepressureratingofthetubesideis375psig,andthepressureratingoftheshellsideis
100psig,theratiois3.75.Forthisexample,verifyaPRDdeviceisprotectingtheshellside.Iftheshell


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sideisratedfor375psig,andthetubesideisratedfor100psig,thenlookforaPRDprotectingthetube
side(theexchangerheads).
Isthereapressurereliefdeviceprotectingtheshellortubeside?Ifpressurereliefisprovidedby
connectedequipment,isitdocumentedandisthepathtothatreliefmanagedopen?
SourceRAGAGEP:ASMESectionVIIIUG133(d)

8) Is the opening in the vessel designed to provide unobstructed flow between the
vessel and the pressure relief device?
Thisistheopencommunicationrule.ThepathbetweenavesselandthePRDprotectingitshallbe
open.Byopenitismeantthatnomanualvalvesorcontrolvalves,orotherprocessequipment(e.g.,
exchangers,filters,etc)thatcouldblockflow,reducefloworcreatebackpressuretoanunacceptable
degreebetweenthevesselanditsPRD.Thisisespeciallyimportanttolookforwhenavesselisbeing
protectedbyareliefvalvenotfitteddirectlytothevesselbutinsteadislocatedonanothervesselor
pipe.Forthecaseofmanualvalves,iftheyarelockedopen(CLO)thisisconsideredacceptableto
maintainopencommunication.Beaware,thatifclosureofthevalve(controlormanual)orpluggageof
thefilteristhecauseofhighpressure,butatthesametimeisolatesthevesselfromhighpressure,then
thisisnotanoverpressureconcernforthatvessel.
OpencommunicationinthepathofthePRVdischargetoitsdestination(e.g.,atmosphere,flareheader,
etc.)mustbeunobstructedaswell.
SourceRAGAGEP:ASMESectionVIIIUG135

9) Does the PRV vent to safe location?


AchallengeplacedonaPRDtopreventoverpressurewillcreateasecondscenarioforconsideration.
Wheredoestherelievedfluidventto?IfaPRVdischargestoflare,ataminimumtherecouldbea
potentialenvironmentalimpactcausebynonpermittedflaring.
Otheritemstoconsiderare:

Willdischargeraindownliquidtoanoccupiedarea?
Istherehistoryofinadequateliquidknockout(disengagement)priortoventing?
Isliquidoverfillcrediblebutnotpartofthereliefdesignordischargedesign?
CanthePRDdischargecreatehumanriskofexposuretoflammablevaporortoxicvaporin
occupiedareas?
WhatistheelevationofthePRDventdischargerelativetoelevatedworkingsurfaces?
WhatisthedirectionofthePRDdischarge(verticalorhorizontal)?
Isthedischargeaimedatanoccupiedarea,workingareas,steps,etc?
SourceRAGAGEP:API5216.3andASMESectionVIIIUG135


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9.1 Are any toxic or flammable reliefs discharging inside a building?


SourceRAGAGEP:NFPA302.3.4.6.1,29CFR1910.106

10) Is the relief path kept free of accumulated liquid?


AretheretrapsinthepathofaPRVdischargetotheKOdrum/flareheader?InonefacilitythePRV
dischargeheaderwasrunundergroundandthenbackuptoflare.Accumulatedliquidonthedischarge
ofaPRVwillincreasebackpressureandreducerelievingcapacity.
SourceRAGAGEP:ASMESectionVIIIUG135(f)

11) Is there a credible contingency for hydraulic overpressure?


Inadditiontoahighleveldeviationinavessel,thePHAteamshouldreviewthepotentialfor
overpressurecausedbyhighlevelhydraulicoverpressure.ThisisespeciallyimportantasmanyPRV
studieswilldeemtheliquidoverfillcaseasnotcrediblebasedonfavorableOperatorresponseallowed
inAPI521.ThePHAteamshouldindependentlyverifythisisso.
Highpressuredevelopswhentheliquidratecannotflowoutofavesselfasterthanitisputin.Thiscould
resultinanoverpressureuptothesourcedeadheadpressure(i.e.pump,compressor,upstreamline
pressure,nitrogenheader,etc.)
SourceRAGAGEP:API5214.2.5and4.4.7

12) Is double-jeopardy claimed for an overpressure scenario?


Doublejeopardyisusedinpressurereliefvalvedesigntoexcludemultipleindependentfailuresasa
basisfordesign.DonotletaPHAteameasilyclaimdoublejeopardy.ThefolderforaspecificPRVmay
indicateascenarioisdoublejeopardy.ThePHAteamdoesnothavetoagreewiththatassessment.
Forhighseverityconsequencesthatresultfromdoublejeopardy,LOPAallowsaneasyandconservative
meanstoevaluatethescenario.
Failuresmayberelatedtoequipment,humanerror,orexternalevents.Followtheseguidelines[4]:

Anysinglefailureiscredible.
Twoormoresimultaneousfailuresarecredibleifrelatedbycommoncause.
Twoeventsinsequencearecredible(onelatentfailurefollowedbyanotherfailure).
Threeormoreeventsinsequencemaybecredible(iflatentfailuresarenotdetected).
SourceRAGAGEP:API5214.2.3


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Taking Overpressure Scenarios to a Layer of Protection Analysis


Inaccordancewithacompanysriskanalysisprocedures,iftheconsequenceseverityishighenough,
overpressurescenariosidentifiedinaPHAmaybefurtherassessedinaLayerofProtectionAnalysis
(LOPA).LOPA,inconjunctionwiththePHA,hasbecomearoutinetoolusedbythechemical,oil,andgas
industriestoassistcompaniesinidentifying,implementingandmanagingthecriticalsafeguardsneeded
toachievetheirrisktolerancetargets.LOPAisusedtoidentifythenumberofIndependentProtection
Layers(IPLs)andtheirintegrityneededtoreducethelikelihoodtoanacceptablylowfrequencythatan
initiatingcausewillprogresstoanundesiredconsequence.LOPAquantifiesifthereisagapbetweenthe
existingMitigatedEventLikelihood(MEL)andtheTargetMitigatedEventLikelihood(TMEL)established
andisreflectiveofacompanysrisktolerancerequirements.IftheLOPAfindsagapwherethe
undesiredconsequenceismorefrequentthanthecompanysrisktargets(TMELs),theteamwillpropose
additionalIPLstoclosetheriskgaporsuggestdesignchangestoreducethecredibleconsequence
severity.

Pressure Relief Devices used as an IPL


IPLscanbecategorizedaspreventiveorconsequencemitigationsystems.Apressurereliefdeviceacts
asaconsequencemitigationIPLasitdoesnotpreventtheoverpressure,butitminimizesthe
consequencebycontrollinganddirectingthelossofcontainmenttoasafelocation(ascovered
earlier).IfthepressurereliefdeviceistobetreatedasanIPL,itmustmeetthefollowingcriteriafor
acceptanceasanIPLperCCPSRAGAGEP.
Specificity:TheIPLbyitselfcanpreventthecausefromprogressingtotheundesiredconsequence.
Verifythereliefdesignbasis(foundinthePRVfolder)includesthedeviationthatresultsinthis
overpressurecase.
Independence:ThisIPLisindependentfromtheinitiatingcauseandotherIPLsinthatLOPAscenario.
VerifythatcommonfailuresdonotdefeatthePRVprotection(e.g.,undesirablereactionputting
demandonPRVatsametimecreatesamaterialthatplugsthePRV).
Dependability:TheIPLcanbereliedontofunctionwithanexpectedprobabilitytosuccessfullyprevent
theundesiredconsequencewhenplacedindemand.RefertocompanyspecificIPLcredittablesfor
specificguidance.
Auditability:TheIPLcanbeandisroutinelytestedthroughtheprocesslifecycletomaintainits
dependability.ThisistypicallysupportedbytestingandinspectioninconformancewithAPIRP576,
InspectionofPressurerelievingDevices.AgoodquestiontoaskthePHAteamisHowoftenarePRVs
removedfromservicefortesting?
AccessSecurity:ChangestothePSVdesign(includinginletanddischargepiping)aremanagedunder
ManagementofChange(MOC).


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Risk Reduction Credits for Overpressure Scenario


Thefollowingrangesofriskreductioncredit(1credit=1IPLcreditedwithaRiskReductionFactor(RRF)
of10)aretypicallyusedduringaLOPA,andarereportedintheliteratureasnoted.
OpenPipe:Typicallyconsideredaninherentlysafesolutionaslongastheventcapacityofthepipeis
sufficientforthescenarioandpluggageisnotcredible.Ofteninventoriedasapressurereliefstreamin
processsafetyinformation.
SinglePRV:Typically23credits,dependingonthedatacited[6].Choosethelowendifusingmanaged
blockvalvefittedbeneaththePRV.
MultiplePRVs(eachsizedforfullload):OneadditionalcreditbeyondasinglePRV[6].
MultiplePRVs(eachnotsizedforfullload):SameasasinglePRVcredit.
Plugging(orotherfouling)Service:Reductionofonecreditunlessdesignedout(byinstallation,PRV
type,etc.).Ifdesignedout,theinstallationshouldbemonitored(flushes,freezeprotection,telltale,
etc.).
RuptureDiskInstalledBeneathPRV:Arupturedisk(orburstingdisc)maybeinstalledbeneathaPRV
toprotectthePRVfromtheserviceconditions.Performancedataforastandalonerupturediskis
sparse.Thisislikelybecauselegacyinterpretationsoftheregulatorycodes(ASME,etc.)discouraged
theiruse,andthereforetheinstalledbasetogatherdatawaslean.Oneindustrysource[5]indicates
thataburstingdiaphragmisworthyof2credits.Inanycase,morerecentguidancefromCCPS[6]
gives2creditsforarupturediskintandemwithaPRV.
PilotoperatedPRV:Thepilotoperatedreliefvalveisparticularlyusefulforoperationclosetotheset
pressure.Positiveopeningandclosingactionsavoidthesimmeringandchatteringcharacteristicsof
conventionalandbalancedvalves.Productlossesarereduced,andmaintenancecoststorepair
damagedseatsareconsiderablylower[1].Thedisadvantageofapilotreliefvalveismorepartsthat
cangivetrouble[1].Specificmentionismadeofthepilotlineswhichmayplugorbecomecrimpedthus
makingthepilotreliefvalveinoperative.PERDdata[7]showapilotoperatedreliefvalvetobeless
reliablethanaconventionalspringloadedreliefvalve,byanorderofmagnitudehigherPFD(probability
tofailondemand).ItmaybeusefultoraisetheseissueswiththePHAteamifrelevanttothecontextof
thestudy.Useof2creditsforapilotreliefvalveislikelyacceptablebecausethefailuredatareportedin
PERD,eventhoughhigherthanaconventionalreliefvalve,isstillgoodenoughfor2credits.
RestorationofaBlockValveFittedUnderaPRV:Restorationisdefinedastoreturnequipmenttoits
normalstatusforproductionmodeafterthecompletionofmaintenance,testing,calibration,etc.[8].A
PRVmayberemovedfromonlineserviceforbenchtestingandmaintenance.Itisnecessarythento
restorethePRVtoservicewhichwouldincludereopeningtheblockvalvesthatisolatethePRVfromthe
processandflareheader(ifprovided).Thereareseveraltoolsthatcanincreasethelikelihoodof
successfulrestorationactivities,suchasuseofrestorationprocedures,arobusttaggingsystem(e.g.
CLO/CSOprogram),andaculturethatpromotesuseofadministrativecontrols.Evenwhenthese


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systemsareinplace,performanceofaPRV(orotherIPL)toprotectmaybelimitedbyhumanfactors.It
maybeusefultoraisetheseissueswiththePHAteamifrelevanttothecontextofthestudy.
UsinganSISinlieuofaPRV:TowhatlevelofreliabilityshouldtheSISbedesigned?T.A.Kletzsuggests,
Becauseoftheuncertaintiesinthefiguresanddifferencesinthemodeoffailure(areliefvalvethat
failstooperateatsetpressuremayopenatahigherpressure,butthisisnottrueofatrip),Isuggest
thatatripsystemusedinsteadofareliefvalveshouldhaveareliability10timesgreater[13].Ifa
standardcreditforasinglePRVof2isassumed,atripusedinsteadshouldbeworthyof3credits(SIL3).
Thisisonlyasuggestion.Someendusersmaychoosetoapplytheriskbasedapproachmentioned
earlier.

Overpressure IPL solutions other than PRV (and any concerns)


AsituationthatmayoccurinaPHA/LOPAiswhenthegapofahighhazardoverpressurescenario
cannotbeclosedbyaproperlydesignedandinstalledPRV.Inthiscasealternatesolutionstoclosethe
gaparenecessary.Aslongasindependenceismet,someoptionsinclude:

QuantitativeRiskAnalysis(sharpenthepenciltoverifyrisk)
LiningupSparePRVforextraIPLcredit(multiple100%PRVs)
Highpressurealarm(orhighlevelalarmforcontingencyofhydraulicoverpressure)
Interlockstoinitiateshutdownofequipmentorprocess
QRAcouldincludeconsequencemodellingbeperformedoutsidethePHAasarecommendationor
parkinglotitem.Dispersionmodelingsoftwarecouldbeusedtomodeltheeffectsoffire,explosion,or
toxiceffects.Probitmodelscouldbeusedtofurtherrefineprobabilityofimpacttopersonnel.QRA
couldalsoincludelikelihooddeterminationusingfaulttreeanalysisorhumanreliabilityanalysisfor
estimatingmoreprecise(lessconservative)initiatingcausefrequencies.
IfasmallgapexistsforanoverpressurescenariothePHA/LOPAteammaybetemptedtorecommend
liningupasparePRVtoservicetogainanextracredit(multiple100%PRVs).Thedrawbacksassociated
withthisaredocumentedin[9]andshouldbelookedatcarefully.
Highpressurealarmstypicallydonotgiveenoughoperatorresponsetime.Processsafetytimeto
overpressureshallbeestimatedbycalculation.Highlevelalarmresponsetimeismorelikelytobe
sufficientandshouldbeverifiedbycalculation.
Sometimestheonlysolutiontocloseahighpressuregapistoinitiateatripofequipmentortheprocess
toremovethesourceofoverpressure.Thisistypicallynotdesired,andthetripsystemshouldbe
designedwithreliabilityinmind.

Conclusion
ThispaperhaspresentedguidanceontheuseofRAGAGEPforoverpressurescenariosandtheir
associatedprotectivedevicesinthecontextofPHAandLOPA.Deviationquestionsrelatedto
overpressureandthegoverningRAGAGEPwerereviewed.ProtectivedevicesusedasIPLsinLOPAwere

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reviewedforrequirementsandtypicalcredits.Gapclosuresolutionswerepresented.CSEpersonnel
shouldbecomefamiliarwiththisRAGAGEPandassociatedprotectivedevicestobeabletosupport
overpressureriskmitigationinthesafetylifecycle.

References
1. AppliedInstrumentationintheProcessIndustriesVolIIPracticalGuidelines2ndEdition,Gulf
PublishingCo.,Andrew,W.G.,andWilliams,H.B.(1980).
2. 29CFR1910.119ProcessSafetyManagementofHighlyHazardousChemicals.
3. ASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCodes,SectionVIII,PressureVessels.
4. Perry'sChemicalEngineers'Handbook,EighthEdition.McGrawHill,2008.
5. NPRD95(NonelectronicPartsReliabilityData)RiAC,1995.
6. CCPS.GuidelinesforInitiatingEventsandIndependentProtectionLayersinLayerofProtection
Analysis.CenterforChemicalProcessSafety,AmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers,NewYork,
NY,2015.
7. CCPS.GuidelinesforProcessEquipmentReliabilityDatawithDataTables.CenterforChemical
ProcessSafety,AmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers,NewYork,NY,1989.
8. NUREG/CR1278.HandbookofHumanReliabilityAnalysiswithEmphasisonNuclearPowerPlant
ApplicationsFinalReport,SwainandGuttmann,August1983.
9. UsingReliefValvesinParallel,MaryKayO'ConnorProcessSafetyCenter,InternationalSymposium,
BeyondRegulatoryCompliance,MakingSafetySecondNature,October2628,2010,JamesR.
LawrenceSr.
10. APISTD521.PressureRelievingandDepressuringSystems.AmericanPetroleumInstitute.
11. 29CFR1910.106.FlammableLiquids.
12. NFPA30.FlammableandCombustibleLiquidsCode.
13. DispellingChemicalEngineeringMyths3rdEd.,TaylorandFrancisPublishing,TrevorA.Kletz,1996.


2016aeSolutions GrattanandNichols Jan28,2016
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Table1ofRAGAGEPExcerpts

RAGAGEP[3][10][11][12] Extract
ASMESectionVIIIU1(h) ExcludedfromASMEVIIIif(h)(1)vesselshavinganinternalorexternalpressurenotexceeding15psi(100
kPa)(i)vesselshavinganinsidediameter,width,height,orcrosssectiondiagonalnotexceeding6in.(152
mm),withnolimitationonlengthofvesselorpressure;
ASMESectionVIIIU1(j) ExemptedfromInspectionifU1(j)Pressurethatdonotexceedthefollowingvolumeandpressurelimits
maybeexemptedfrominspectionbyInspectors,(j)(1)5cuft(0.14m3)involumeand250psi(1.7MPa)
designpressure;orU1(j)(2)3cuft(0.08m3)involumeand350psi(2.4MPa)designpressure;U1(j)(3)1
cuft(0.04m3)involumeand600psi(4.1MPa)designpressure.
Note:Theexclusionofreliefdeviceforthesevesselsshouldbeverifiedperlocaljurisdiction.
ASMESectionVIIIUG133(c), (c)Vesselsconnectedtogetherbyasystemofadequatepipingnotcontainingvalveswhichcanisolateany
AppendixMM5 vessel,andthosecontainingvalvesincompliancewithAppendixM,M5,maybeconsideredasoneunitin
figuringtherequiredrelievingcapacityofpressurereliefdevicestobefurnishedIsthereaconnectedvessel
thatmayprovidepressurerelief
ASMESectionVIIIUG140 (a)Apressurevesseldoesnotrequireapressurereliefdeviceifthepressureisselflimiting(e.g.,the
maximumdischargepressureofapumporcompressor),andthispressureislessthanorequaltotheMAWP
ofthevesselatthecoincidenttemperatureandthefollowingconditionsaremet:
(1)Thedecisiontolimitthepressurebysystemdesignistheresponsibilityoftheuser.Theusershall
requestthattheManufacturersdatareportstatethatoverpressureprotectionisprovidedbysystem
designperUG140(a).
(2)Theusershallconductadetailedanalysistoidentifyandexamineallpotentialoverpressure
scenarios.TheCausesofOverpressuredescribedinANSI/APIStandard521,PressureRelievingand
DepressuringSystems,shallbeconsidered.Otherstandardsorrecommendedpracticesthataremore
appropriatetothespecificapplicationmayalsobeconsidered.Amultidisciplinaryteamexperiencedin
methodssuchashazardsandoperabilityanalysis(Hazop);failuremodes,effects,andcriticalityanalysis
(FMECA);whatifanalysis;orotherequivalentmethodologyshallestablishthattherearenosourcesof
pressurethatcanexceedtheMAWPatthecoincidenttemperature.
(3)Theresultsoftheanalysisshallbedocumentedandsignedbytheindividualinresponsiblechargeof


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RAGAGEP[3][10][11][12] Extract
themanagementoftheoperationofthevessel.Thisdocumentationshallincludeasaminimumthe
following:
a.
a. detailedprocessandinstrumentflowdiagrams(P&IDs),showingallpertinentelementsofthesystem
associatedwiththevessel
b. adescriptionofalloperatingandupsetscenarios,includingscenariosinvolvingfireandthosethat
resultfromoperatorerror,andequipmentand/orinstrumentationmalfunctions
c. ananalysisshowingthemaximumcoincidentpressureandtemperaturethatcanresultfromeachof
thescenarioslistedinitemUG140(a)(3)(b)abovedoesnotexceedtheMAWPatthattemperature
(b)Ifthepressureisnotselflimiting,apressurevesselmaybeprotectedfromoverpressurebysystemdesign
orbyacombinationofoverpressurebysystemdesignandpressurereliefdevices,ifthefollowingconditions
aremet.TherulesbelowareNOTintendedtoallowfornormaloperationabovetheMAWPatthecoincident
temperature.
(1)Thevesselisnotexclusivelyinair,water,orsteamserviceunlesstheseservicesarecriticalto
preventingthereleaseoffluidsthatmayresultinsafetyorenvironmentalconcerns.
(2)Thedecisiontolimittheoverpressurebysystemdesignistheresponsibilityoftheuser.Theusershall
requestthattheManufacturersdatareportstatethatoverpressureprotectionisprovidedbysystem
designperUG140(b)ifnopressurereliefdeviceistobeinstalled.Ifnopressurereliefdeviceistobe
installed,acceptanceofthejurisdictionmayberequired.
(3)Theusershallconductadetailedanalysistoidentifyandexamineallscenariosthatcouldresultinan
overpressureconditionandmagnitudeoftheoverpressure.TheCausesofOverpressureasdescribed
inANSI/APIStandard521,PressureRelievingandDepressuringSystems,shallbeconsidered.Other
standardsorrecommendedpracticesthataremoreappropriatetothespecificapplicationmayalsobe
considered.Amultidisciplinaryteamexperiencedinmethodssuchashazardsandoperabilityanalysis
(Hazop);failuremodes,effects,andcriticalityanalysis(FMECA);whatifanalysis;orotherequivalent
methodologyshallconducttheanalysis.
(4)Theoverpressurescenarioshallbereadilyapparentsothatoperatorsorprotectiveinstrumentation
willtakecorrectiveactiontopreventoperationabovetheMAWPatthecoincidenttemperature.


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RAGAGEP[3][10][11][12] Extract
(5)Thereshallbenocredibleoverpressurescenarioinwhichthepressureexceeds116%oftheMAWP
timestheratiooftheallowablestressvalueatthetemperatureoftheoverpressurescenariotothe
allowablestressvalueatthedesigntemperature.Theoverpressurelimitshallnotexceedthetest
pressure.CredibleeventsorscenarioanalysisasdescribedinWRCBulletin498Guidanceonthe
ApplicationofCodeCase2211OverpressureProtectionbySystemsDesignshallbeconsidered.
(6)Theresultsoftheanalysisshallbedocumentedandsignedbytheindividualinresponsiblechargeof
themanagementoftheoperationofthevessel.Thisdocumentationshallincludeasaminimumthe
following:
(a)detailedprocessandinstrumentflowdiagrams(P&IDs),showingallpertinentelementsofthe
systemassociatedwiththevessel
(b)adescriptionofalloperatingandupsetscenarios,includingthoseinvolvingfireandthosethat
resultfromoperatorerror,andequipmentand/orinstrumentationmalfunctions
(c)adetaileddescriptionofanysafetycriticalinstrumentationusedtolimitthesystempressure,
includingtheidentificationofalltrulyindependentredundanciesandareliabilityevaluation
(qualitativeorquantitative)oftheoverallsafetysystem
(d)ananalysisshowingthemaximumpressurethatcanresultfromeachofthescenarios
ASMESectionVIIIUG135 There shall be no intervening stop valves betweenvessel anditspressure relief deviceor devices, orbetween the
(d)(1),(d)(2)andAppendixM pressure reliefdeviceordevicesandthepointitdischarge,except:(1)when thesestopvalvesaresoconstructedor
positively controlled that theclosing o f t h e m a x i m u m n umberofblockvalves possible at one time will not
reduce thepressurerelievingcapacityprovidedbytheunaffectedpressurereliefdevicesbelowtherequiredrelieving
capacityor(2)underconditionssetforthinAppendixM.
ASMESectionVIIIUG135(b) (b)(1)Theopeningthroughallpipe,fittings,andnonreclosingpressurereliefdevices(ifinstalled)betweena
(1) pressurevesselanditspressurereliefvalveshallhaveatleasttheareaofthepressurereliefvalveinlet.The
characteristicsofthisupstreamsystemshallbesuchthatthepressuredropwillnotreducetherelieving
capacitybelowthatrequiredoradverselyaffecttheproperoperationofthepressurereliefvalve.
ASMESectionVIIIUG135(a) (a)Pressurereliefdevicesintendedforreliefofcompressiblefluidsshallbeconnectedtothevesselinthe
vaporspaceaboveanycontainedliquidortopipingconnectedtothevaporspaceinthevesselwhichistobe
protected.Pressurereliefdevicesintendedforreliefofliquidsshallbeconnectedbelowtheliquidlevel
Alternativeconnectionlocationsarepermitted,dependingonthepotentialvesseloverpressurescenariosand
thetypeofreliefdeviceselected,providedtherequirementsofUG125(a)(2)andUG125(c)aremet.

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RAGAGEP[3][10][11][12] Extract
ASMESectionVIIIUG127(b) (4) thespacebetweenarupturediskdeviceanda pressurereliefvalve shall be provided with a pressuregage,a
(4) try cock,freevent,orsuitabletelltaleindicator.Thisarrangement permits detectionofdiskrupture or leakage.
API5216.3 6.3Atmosphericdischarge.Thedecisiontodischargehydrocarbonsorotherflammableorhazardous
vaporstotheatmosphererequirescarefulattentiontoensurethatdisposalcanbeaccomplishedwithout
creatingapotentialhazardorcausingotherproblems,suchastheformationofflammablemixturesatgrade
leveloronelevatedstructures,exposureofpersonneltotoxicvaporsorcorrosivechemicals,ignitionofrelief
streamsatthepointofemission,excessivenoiselevelsandairpollution
ASMESectionVIIIUG135(f) (f) Dischargelinesfrompressurereliefdevicesshallbedesignedtofacilitateshallbefittedwithdrains
topreventliquidformlodgingonthedischargeofthepressurereliefdeviceandsuchlinesshalllead
toasafeplaceofdischarge.
29CFR1910.106(b)(4)(ii) "Vents."Ventsfortanksinsideofbuildingsshallbeasprovidedinsubparagraphs(2)(iv),(v),(vi)(b),and(3)(iv)
ofthisparagraph,exceptthatemergencyventingbytheuseofweakroofseamsontanksshallnotbe
permitted.Ventsshalldischargevaporsoutsidethebuildings.
NFPA302.3.4.6.1 2.3.4.6.1 Ventsfor tanks inside tank buildings shallbedesigned to ensure that vapors are
not released inside thebuilding.
ASMESectionVIIIUG133(d) (d) Heat exchangers andsimilarvesselsshall be protectedwith a pressure relief device of sufficient capacityto
avoid overpressure in case of an internal failure.
ASMESectionVIIIU1(h) ExcludedfromASMEVIIIif(h)(1)vesselshavinganinternalorexternalpressurenotexceeding15psi(100
kPa)(i)vesselshavinganinsidediameter,width,height,orcrosssectiondiagonalnotexceeding6in.(152
mm),withnolimitationonlengthofvesselorpressure;
ASMESectionVIIIU1(j) ExemptedfromInspectionifU1(j)Pressurethatdonotexceedthefollowingvolumeandpressurelimits
maybeexemptedfrominspectionbyInspectors,(j)(1)5cuft(0.14m3)involumeand250psi(1.7MPa)
designpressure;orU1(j)(2)3cuft(0.08m3)involumeand350psi(2.4MPa)designpressure;U1(j)(3)1
cuft(0.04m3)involumeand600psi(4.1MPa)designpressure.
Note:Theexclusionofreliefdeviceforthesevesselsshouldbeverifiedperlocaljurisdiction.
ASMESectionVIIIUG133(c), (c)Vesselsconnectedtogetherbyasystemofadequatepipingnotcontainingvalveswhichcanisolateany
AppendixMM5 vessel,andthosecontainingvalvesincompliancewithAppendixM,M5,maybeconsideredasoneunitin
figuringtherequiredrelievingcapacityofpressurereliefdevicestobefurnishedIsthereaconnectedvessel
thatmayprovidepressurerelief


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ASMESectionVIIIUG140 (a)Apressurevesseldoesnotrequireapressurereliefdeviceifthepressureisselflimiting(e.g.,the
maximumdischargepressureofapumporcompressor),andthispressureislessthanorequaltotheMAWP
ofthevesselatthecoincidenttemperatureandthefollowingconditionsaremet:
(1)Thedecisiontolimitthepressurebysystemdesignistheresponsibilityoftheuser.Theusershall
requestthattheManufacturersdatareportstatethatoverpressureprotectionisprovidedbysystem
designperUG140(a).
(2)Theusershallconductadetailedanalysistoidentifyandexamineallpotentialoverpressure
scenarios.TheCausesofOverpressuredescribedinANSI/APIStandard521,PressureRelievingand
DepressuringSystems,shallbeconsidered.Otherstandardsorrecommendedpracticesthataremore
appropriatetothespecificapplicationmayalsobeconsidered.Amultidisciplinaryteamexperiencedin
methodssuchashazardsandoperabilityanalysis(Hazop);failuremodes,effects,andcriticalityanalysis
(FMECA);whatifanalysis;orotherequivalentmethodologyshallestablishthattherearenosources
ofpressurethatcanexceedtheMAWPatthecoincidenttemperature.
(3)Theresultsoftheanalysisshallbedocumentedandsignedbytheindividualinresponsiblechargeof
themanagementoftheoperationofthevessel.Thisdocumentationshallincludeasaminimumthe
following:
b.
a. detailedprocessandinstrumentflowdiagrams(P&IDs),showingallpertinentelementsofthe
systemassociatedwiththevessel
b. adescriptionofalloperatingandupsetscenarios,includingscenariosinvolvingfireandthosethat
resultfromoperatorerror,andequipmentand/orinstrumentationmalfunctions
c. ananalysisshowingthemaximumcoincidentpressureandtemperaturethatcanresultfromeachof
thescenarioslistedinitemUG140(a)(3)(b)abovedoesnotexceedtheMAWPatthattemperature
(b)Ifthepressureisnotselflimiting,apressurevesselmaybeprotectedfromoverpressurebysystem
designorbyacombinationofoverpressurebysystemdesignandpressurereliefdevices,ifthefollowing
conditionsaremet.TherulesbelowareNOTintendedtoallowfornormaloperationabovetheMAWPatthe
coincidenttemperature.
(1)Thevesselisnotexclusivelyinair,water,orsteamserviceunlesstheseservicesarecriticalto
preventingthereleaseoffluidsthatmayresultinsafetyorenvironmentalconcerns.
(2)Thedecisiontolimittheoverpressurebysystemdesignistheresponsibilityoftheuser.Theuser
shallrequestthattheManufacturersdatareportstatethatoverpressureprotectionisprovidedby


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systemdesignperUG140(b)ifnopressurereliefdeviceistobeinstalled.Ifnopressurereliefdeviceis
tobeinstalled,acceptanceofthejurisdictionmayberequired.
(3)Theusershallconductadetailedanalysistoidentifyandexamineallscenariosthatcouldresultinan
overpressureconditionandmagnitudeoftheoverpressure.TheCausesofOverpressureas
describedinANSI/APIStandard521,PressureRelievingandDepressuringSystems,shallbeconsidered.
Otherstandardsorrecommendedpracticesthataremoreappropriatetothespecificapplicationmay
alsobeconsidered.Amultidisciplinaryteamexperiencedinmethodssuchashazardsandoperability
analysis(Hazop);failuremodes,effects,andcriticalityanalysis(FMECA);whatifanalysis;orother
equivalentmethodologyshallconducttheanalysis.
(4)Theoverpressurescenarioshallbereadilyapparentsothatoperatorsorprotectiveinstrumentation
willtakecorrectiveactiontopreventoperationabovetheMAWPatthecoincidenttemperature.
(5)Thereshallbenocredibleoverpressurescenarioinwhichthepressureexceeds116%oftheMAWP
timestheratiooftheallowablestressvalueatthetemperatureoftheoverpressurescenariotothe
allowablestressvalueatthedesigntemperature.Theoverpressurelimitshallnotexceedthetest
pressure.CredibleeventsorscenarioanalysisasdescribedinWRCBulletin498Guidanceonthe
ApplicationofCodeCase2211OverpressureProtectionbySystemsDesignshallbeconsidered.
(6)Theresultsoftheanalysisshallbedocumentedandsignedbytheindividualinresponsiblechargeof
themanagementoftheoperationofthevessel.Thisdocumentationshallincludeasaminimumthe
following:
(a)detailedprocessandinstrumentflowdiagrams(P&IDs),showingallpertinentelementsofthe
systemassociatedwiththevessel
(b)adescriptionofalloperatingandupsetscenarios,includingthoseinvolvingfireandthosethat
resultfromoperatorerror,andequipmentand/orinstrumentationmalfunctions
(c)adetaileddescriptionofanysafetycriticalinstrumentationusedtolimitthesystempressure,
includingtheidentificationofalltrulyindependentredundanciesandareliabilityevaluation
(qualitativeorquantitative)oftheoverallsafetysystem
(d)ananalysisshowingthemaximumpressurethatcanresultfromeachofthescenarios
ASMESectionVIIIUG135 There shall be no intervening stop valves betweenvessel anditspressure relief deviceor devices, orbetween the
(d)(1),(d)(2)andAppendixM pressure reliefdeviceordevicesandthepointitdischarge,except:(1)when thesestopvalvesaresoconstructedor
positively controlled that theclosing o f t h e m a x i m u m n umberofblockvalves possible at one time will not


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reduce thepressurerelievingcapacityprovidedbytheunaffectedpressurereliefdevicesbelowtherequired
relievingcapacityor(2)underconditionssetforthinAppendixM.
ASMESectionVIIIUG135(b) (b)(1)Theopeningthroughallpipe,fittings,andnonreclosingpressurereliefdevices(ifinstalled)betweena
(1) pressurevesselanditspressurereliefvalveshallhaveatleasttheareaofthepressurereliefvalveinlet.The
characteristicsofthisupstreamsystemshallbesuchthatthepressuredropwillnotreducetherelieving
capacitybelowthatrequiredoradverselyaffecttheproperoperationofthepressurereliefvalve.
ASMESectionVIIIUG135(a) (a)Pressurereliefdevicesintendedforreliefofcompressiblefluidsshallbeconnectedtothevesselinthe
vaporspaceaboveanycontainedliquidortopipingconnectedtothevaporspaceinthevesselwhichistobe
protected.Pressurereliefdevicesintendedforreliefofliquidsshallbeconnectedbelowtheliquidlevel
Alternativeconnectionlocationsarepermitted,dependingonthepotentialvesseloverpressurescenarios
andthetypeofreliefdeviceselected,providedtherequirementsofUG125(a)(2)andUG125(c)aremet.
ASMESectionVIIIUG127(b) (4) thespacebetweenarupturediskdeviceanda pressurereliefvalve shall be provided with a pressuregage,
(4) atry cock,freevent,orsuitabletelltaleindicator.Thisarrangement permits detectionofdiskrupture or leakage.
API5216.3 6.3Atmosphericdischarge.Thedecisiontodischargehydrocarbonsorotherflammableorhazardous
vaporstotheatmosphererequirescarefulattentiontoensurethatdisposalcanbeaccomplishedwithout
creatingapotentialhazardorcausingotherproblems,suchastheformationofflammablemixturesatgrade
leveloronelevatedstructures,exposureofpersonneltotoxicvaporsorcorrosivechemicals,ignitionofrelief
streamsatthepointofemission,excessivenoiselevelsandairpollution
ASMESectionVIIIUG135(f) (f) Dischargelinesfrompressurereliefdevicesshallbedesignedtofacilitateshallbefittedwithdrains
topreventliquidformlodgingonthedischargeofthepressurereliefdeviceandsuchlinesshalllead
toasafeplaceofdischarge.
29CFR1910.106(b)(4)(ii) "Vents."Ventsfortanksinsideofbuildingsshallbeasprovidedinsubparagraphs(2)(iv),(v),(vi)(b),and
(3)(iv)ofthisparagraph,exceptthatemergencyventingbytheuseofweakroofseamsontanksshallnotbe
permitted.Ventsshalldischargevaporsoutsidethebuildings.
NFPA302.3.4.6.1 2.3.4.6.1 Ventsfor tanks inside tank buildings shallbedesigned to ensure that vapors are
not released inside thebuilding.
ASMESectionVIIIUG133(d) (d) Heat exchangers andsimilarvesselsshall be protectedwith a pressure relief device of sufficient capacityto
avoid overpressure in case of an internal failure.


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