BEDANA, JOY GABRIELLE A.

2010-019022 2B

HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK

CORPORATION and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioners-
in-Intervention, vs. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL; SECRETARY
NASSER PANGANDAMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM;
ALYANSA NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG HACIENDA LUISITA, RENE
GALANG, NOEL MALLARI, and JULIO SUNIGA and his SUPERVISORY GROUP OF
THE HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. and WINDSOR ANDAYA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 17110 July 5, 2011

FACTS:

RA 6657 or the CARP law is a program aimed at redistributing public and private agricultural
lands to landless farmers and farm workers. One of the lands covered by this law is the Hacienda
Luisita which was owned by TADECO. An expropriation case against TADECO was filed to
surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform so that the land can be
distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC ruled in favour of the government. However, the
OSG subsequently moved to dismiss said case. The CA dismissed such, but the dismissal was
subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of farm worker beneficiaries
(FWB) to the Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and to ensure its implementation.

Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative modes in
distributing land ownership to the FWBs. TADECO preferred the stock distribution scheme,
hence, it created the HLI in order to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers. The proposed
Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) of TADECO was subsequently approved by the
PARC.

The HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA, however, petitioned before the DAR asking for
the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of the SDOA, claiming amongst others that they
havent actually received full benefits and that HLI violated the terms.

The DAR subsequently recommended to the PARC the revocation of the approval of the SDOA
and the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through compulsory acquisition scheme. Consequently,
the PARC revoked the SDP and subjected those lands covered by the SDP to the mandated land
acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These acts of the PARC were assailed by HLI.

On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar
as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of
outright agricultural land transfer. FARM argued that such runs contrary to the basic concept of
agrarian reform enshrined in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
BEDANA, JOY GABRIELLE A. 2010-019022 2B

1. Whether or not the PARC acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking the SDP of
HLI.
2. Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is inconsistent with the concept of agrarian reform
under the Constitution.

HELD:

1. The Court ruled in the affirmative.

Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve the plan for
stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC. It may be that RA 6657 or other
executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the PARC with the power to revoke
or recall an approved SDP, but such power or authority is deemed possessed by PARC under the
principle of necessary implication (i.e., that which is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as
that which is expressed.) Following this doctrine, the conferment of express power to approve a
plan for stock distribution of the agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily includes the
power to revoke or recall the approval of the plan.

2. The Court ruled in the negative.

The SC ruled that Sec. 31 of the CARP is consistent with the constitutional provision regarding
agrarian reform. The Constitution allows for indirect ownership of land and not just outright
agricultural land transfer. This is in recognition of the fact that land reform may become
successful even if it is done through the medium of juridical entities composed of farmers. Albeit
land ownership for the landless appears to be the dominant theme of the policy, Sec. 4, Article
XIII of the Constitution does not constrict the Congress to pass an agrarian reform law planted
on direct land transfer to and ownership by farmers and no other. If the intention were otherwise,
the framers of the Constitution would have worded said section in a manner mandatory in
character.
BEDANA, JOY GABRIELLE A. 2010-019022 2B

ROSALINA BONIFACIO, surviving wife; and children, petitioners, vs. HON.

NATIVIDAD G. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Branch
XIII, and PASTORA SAN MIGUEL, respondents.

G.R. No. 79416 September 5, 1989

FACTS:

The subject matter in this particular case belongs to Olimpio Bonifacio. Pastora San Miguel, on
the other hand, was an agricultural lessee of the said two hectare land. On July 1, 1968, Olimpio
filed for the ejectment of San Miguel. The CAR ruled in favour of Bonifacio. However, such
judgement was modified by the CA with respect to San Miguels counterclaim by ordering
Bonifacio to pay her in P1,376.00. During the pendency of the case, Olimpio died and was
succeeded by his heirs. However, no notice of such death was given to the Court, hence no order
of substitution of his heirs was made. The SC then denied the petition of San Miguel for lack of
merit, while affirming the decision of CA. Subsequently, the heirs of Olimpio moved for the
execution of the decision but San Miguel filed a motion to quash the said execution. RTC then
denied the motion for demolition. The heirs of Bonifacio, however, contended that the CAR
case, being an ejectment case survives the death of a party. San Miguel, on the other hand,
argues that the action is not an ordinary ejectment but an agrarian case for the ejectment of the
agricultural lessee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs may inherit the favourable judgement obtained by the deceased
Bonifacio.

HELD:

The Court ruled in the affirmative.

Sec. 36 (1), R.A. 3844 provides for the continuation in the enjoyment and possession of an
agricultural lessee of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the
Court in a judgement that is final and executory. Under such provision, the ejectment of an
agricultural lessee was authorized not only when the landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the
landholding, but also when a member of his immediate family so desired. The right of cultivation
was extended to the landowners immediate family members evidently to place the landowner-
lessor in equal footing with the agricultural lessee who is allowed to cultivate the land with the
aid of his farm household. Whether used in reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term
personal cultivation cannot be given restricted connotation to mean a right personal and
exclusive to either the lessor or lessee. The right extends to the members of the lessors or
lessees immediate family. The CAR case not being a purely personal right, the same was
transmitted to herein petitioners as heirs.
BEDANA, JOY GABRIELLE A. 2010-019022 2B

CELSO PAGTALUNAN and PAULINA P. PAGTALUNAN, petitioners, vs. HON.

ROQUE A. TAMAYO, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Bulacan, Branch VI, REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES and TURANDOT, TRAVIATA, MARCELITA, MARLENE
PACITA, MATTHEW and ROSARY, all surnamed ALDABA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-54281 March 19, 1990

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines filed for expropriation of a parcel of land owned by private
respondents herein. The CFI ruled in favour of the government provided that it makes deposit of
P7,200.00 as provisional value of the land. Petitioners subsequently alleged that Celso
Pagtalunan has been the bona fide agricultural tenant of a portion of the land. Petitioners asked
the trial court to order payment to Pagtalunan of just compensation for his landholding or, in the
alternative, to order payment of his disturbance compensation as bona fide tenant in an amount
not less than P15,000.00 per hectare. On December 8, 1978, Judge Tamayo denied the
petitioners motion, holding that to admit such complaint would be tantamount to allowing a
person to sue the State without its consent since the claim for disturbance compensation is a
claim against the State.

The Supreme Court originally denied the petition filed by the petitioners for lack of merit but it
subsequently granted their motion for reconsideration which limited the discussion on the issue
of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the expropriation case. The OSG subsequently filed
a notice of appeal to the CFI, and thereafter, to the CA. Both courts dismissed the appeal. The
case was then elevated to the Supreme Court, who then directed the trial court to approve the
Government's record on appeal and to elevate the same to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have the right to intervene in the expropriation proceedings.

HELD:

The Court ruled in the negative.

What qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to
be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court
or an officer thereof. In the present case, petitioners anchors their claim that Celso Pagtalunan
possesses legal interest in the matter in litigation for he is the party entitled to just or disturbance
compensation on the Certificate of Land Transfer issued to them, where the tenant
farmer/grantee is "deemed owner" of the agricultural land identified therein.
BEDANA, JOY GABRIELLE A. 2010-019022 2B

The Court ruled, however, that mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in
the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. The certificate simply evidences the
government's recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the statutory
mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him.

In the present case, petitioners have not been issued an emancipation patent. Furthermore, they
do not dispute private respondents' allegation that they have not complied with the conditions
enumerated in their certificate of land transfer which would entitle them to a patent. In fact,
petitioners do not even claim that they had remitted to private respondents even a single
amortization payment for the purchase of the subject property.

Anent petitioners' claim for disturbance compensation, the Court finds that the petitioners
reliance on Section 36 (1) of Rep. Act No. 3844 is misplaced. Said section is applicable only
when it is the owner/lessor who voluntarily opts for the conversion of his land into non-
agricultural land. In the present case, it is the State, not the private respondents, who disturbed
petitioners' possession of the subject property.

Considering, therefore, that petitioners are not entitled to just compensation for the expropriation
of the subject property, nor to disturbance compensation, the Court finds that the trial court
committed no reversible error in denying petitioners' motion for leave to intervene.
BEDANA, JOY GABRIELLE A. 2010-019022 2B

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and

COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. 76759 March 22, 1990

FACTS:

Ramos Plantation Company, Inc. assigned its rights under the subject Land Transfer Claim unto
Ramon A. Gonzales. The latter subsequently filed an action to compel Land Bank to issue Land
Bank Bonds for the amount of P400,000.00 in the name of petitioner instead of in the name of
the aforesaid corporation as the original and registered owner of the subject property which had
been brought under the land transfer program of the government. Land Bank filed an answer
alleging that the complaint states no cause of action since there is no privity of contract between
plaintiff and itself and that it deals only with the landowner whose land was subjected to
operation land transfer of the government under Presidential Decree No. 27.

It is worth noting that, amongst the stipulation of facts provided by the parties, it has been stated
that Land Bank informed Ramos Plantation, Inc. that it has approved its Land Transfer Claim in
the aggregate amount of P565,717.50 payment of which is subject to the submission and/or
accomplishment of the requirements of defendant bank, however, said corporation failed to
comply with six of the requirements of Land Bank.

The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Consquently, Land Bank filed an appeal before the
Court of Appeals, which subsequently reversed the trial courts decision on the ground that even
if there was compliance with the remaining requirements, still, the Land Bank bonds will have to
be issued in the name of the corporation and not to the plaintiff. It is only thereafter that Ramos
Plantation Co., Inc. may indorse the same to plaintiff.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Land Bank can be compelled to issue Land Bank bonds in the name of petitioner
by virtue of the Deed of Assignment executed by the landowner-assignor favor of petitioner.

HELD:

The Court ruled in the negative.

It will be noted that respondent bank in denying the issuance of the bond in the name of the
petitioner-assignee was guided by a resolution promulgated purposely to govern, among others,
the issuance of Land Bank Bonds to assignees by virtue of Deeds of Assignment. Thereunder the
Land Bank can only issue bonds in the name of the assignor-landowner. It is only after the
issuance of bonds in the landowner's name that he shall be required to make the necessary
indorsement of the bonds to his assignee.
BEDANA, JOY GABRIELLE A. 2010-019022 2B

When Ramos Plantation Company, Inc. assigned its rights, title and interest in favor of Gonzales,
the latter acquired the same subject to the restrictions on assignment of rights in the resolution
passed by the Board of Land Bank.

However, the Court modified the decision of the CA insofar as the directive for Ramos
Plantation Company, Inc. to comply within thirty (30) days from notice with the six (6)
requirements listed in paragraph 1 of the Supplemental Stipulation of Facts dated September 10,
1985, and as soon as the bonds are released in its name, to immediately endorse the same to
petitioner as assignee thereof is reinstated.
BEDANA, JOY GABRIELLE A. 2010-019022 2B

VICTOR TALAVERA and VISITACION AGUSTIN TALAVERA, petitioners, vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE LAXAMANA, respondents.

G.R. No. 77830 February 27, 1990

FACTS:

On July 10, 1984, an action for recovery of possession was instituted by the private respondent
against the petitioners over the subject agricultural land. The complaint alleged, among others,
that Laxamana had been a bona fide tenant of the aforesaid parcel of land since 1958 until the
petitioners took possession thereof sometime in 1984 and that the petitioners planted palay
thereon through force and intimidation and without the knowledge of Laxamana. The petitioners
cotended, however, that their tenancy relationship with respondent Laxamana was terminated
when the latter sold his rights and interests over the agricultural landholding under litigation for a
consideration of P1,000.00. The lower court ruled in favour or Laxamana and such was affirmed
by the CA, the latter holding that the Casunduan even if assumed to be valid did not constitute
"voluntary surrender" as contemplated by law, hence, respondent Laxamana ought to be
reinstated as tenant of the petitioners' landholding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject landholding was voluntarily surrendered.

HELD:

The Court ruled in the negative.

The evidence on record and the petitioners' arguments are not enough to overcome the rights of
the private respondent provided in the Constitution and agrarian statutes. The very essence of
agricultural tenancy lies in the cardinal rule that an agricultural tenant enjoys security of tenurial
status. To protect the tenant's right to security of tenure, voluntary surrender, as contemplated by
law, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenant's intention
to surrender the landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by mere implication.

Tenancy relations cannot be bargained away except for the strong reasons provided by law which
must be convincingly shown by evidence in line with the State's policy of achieving a dignified
existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices.
BEDANA, JOY GABRIELLE A. 2010-019022 2B

GRACIANO BERNAS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

NATIVIDAD BITO-ON DEITA, respondents.

G.R. No. 85041 August 5, 1993

FACTS:

Considering the need to support the schooling of her brother Benigno Bito-ons children in
Manila, Natividad Bito-on Deita gratuitously entrusted farm lots by way of dugo to the
former. Without the knowledge and consent of Natividad, Benigno then engaged in a production
sharing agreement with Graciano Bernas wherein Bernas shouldered the expenses while the
Benigno provided labor. When Benigno returned the lots to his sister, Bernas contested their
possession, claiming he was an agricultural leashold lessee. The RTC ruled in favor of Bernas,
holding him as an an agricultural leashold lessee pursuant to RA 1199and 3844. Natividad then
appealed to the CA, rasing the issue of whether or not the arrangement between Benigno and
Bernas was binding upon her. Natividad argued that since their agreement was one of
commodatum, Benigno cannot lend nor lease the properties contested. CA ruled in favour of
Natividad.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrangement between Benigno and Bernas was binding upon Natividad.

HELD:

The Court ruled in the affirmative.

Pursuant to RA 3844, Benigno was considered as a legal possessor, granting him the authority
and capacity to institute agricultural leasehold lessees and it is important to note that Natividad
did not raise the issue of terminating the leasehold. Moreover, Natividad changed the issues of
her case from court to court. It is also noteworthy that even if there was lack of authorization, no
evidence established the specifics of Natividads dugo with her brother.
BEDANA, JOY GABRIELLE A. 2010-019022 2B

POLICARPIO NISNISAN AND ERLINDA NISNISAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, PACITA MANCERA, WENCESLAO MANCERA and SILVESTRE
POLANCOS, respondents.

G.R. No. 126425. August 12, 1998

FACTS:

Spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan are the owners of a land in Davao del Sur. Policarpio,
the son of Gavino, has been cultivating one hectare of said land since 1961. In 1976, Gavino and
Policarpio executed a leasehold contract which stipulates a sharing arrangement of the harvest. In
1978, Gavino sold two hectares of the land, including the land tenanted by Policarpio, to spouses
Mancera. As a result of the sale, Policarpio and family were ousted. They then filed an action for
reinstatement of tenancy against the Manceras. The Manceras, on the other hand, countered that
spouses Nisnisan have no cause of action because they voluntarily surrendered their landholding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the tenant deemed to have voluntarily surrendered subject landholding.

HELD:

The Court ruled in the negative.

Private respondents failed to present any evidence to show that petitioners surrendered their
landholding voluntarily after the private respondents purchased the subject property. Moreover,
the filing of the complaint for reinstatement of leasehold tenancy by petitioners-spouses against
private respondents before the CAR runs contrary to the private respondents' claim that
petitioners-spouses voluntarily surrendered their landholding to them.

Under Sec. 8 of RA 3844, voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishing agricultural leasehold

tenancy relations, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The
tenant's intention to surrender the landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by
mere implication.
BEDANA, JOY GABRIELLE A. 2010-019022 2B

CECILLEVILLE REALTY and SERVICE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs., THE

COURT OF APPEALS and HERMINIGILDO PASCUAL, respondents.

G.R. No. 120363 September 5, 1997

FACTS:

Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation is the owner of the subject parcel of land.
Herminigildo Pascual occupies a portion thereof. Despite repeated demands, private respondent
refused to vacate and insisted that he is entitled to occupy the land since he is helping his mother
Ana Pascual, petitioners tenant, to cultivate the land in question. Consequently, petitioner
instituted an ejectment suit. Finding no tenancy relationship between petitioner and private
respondent, the MTC ruled in favour of the petitioner. Upon appeal, the RTC remanded the case
to the DARAB for further adjudication. The petitioner appealed to the CA, but the CA dismissed
said appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to a home lot.

Held:

The Court ruled in the negative.

A tenant is granted the right to have a home lot and the right to construct or maintain a house
thereon. In the case at bar, private respondent does not dispute that he is not petitioner's tenant.
In fact, he admits that he is a mere member of Ana Pascual's immediate farm household. Under
the law, therefore, we find private respondent not entitled to a home lot. Neither is he entitled to
construct a house of his own or to continue maintaining the same within the very small
landholding of petitioner.

Further, it is undisputed that Ana Pascual, the tenant and private respondents mother, has an
existing home lot and a house on the subject property in which private respondent may take
refuge while attending to his work. Moreover, the incidental use of his own house can very well
be provided by the existing house of his mother, who with her old and infirm condition, surely
needs the attention and care of her children, one of whom is herein private respondent. Be it
emphasized that like the tenant the landholder is also entitled to the protection of the law.
BEDANA, JOY GABRIELLE A. 2010-019022 2B

ANICETO M. QUIO, petitioner, vs COURT OF APPEALS, PURIFICACION L.

CANSON, EDITHA G. LEONARDO, CARMELITA L. MORI, JOSEFINA L. BAIS,
AIDA L. COLLYER, ANTONIO G. LEONARDO, RUDOLFO G. LEONARDO,
ROBERTO G. LEONARDO and TERESA L. REGNER, in substitution for ANTONIO
LEONARDO SR., JOSEFA GALAN and JOSE BITOON, respondents

G.R. No. 118599 June 26, 1998

FACTS:

Bernarda and Rosario Galan sold their agricultural land to spouses Antonio and Josefa Galan.
More than a decade later, petitioner Aniceto Quio filed a complaint for redemption of the
property against the vendees. He therefore prayed that he be allowed to redeem the property and
consigned the purchase price with the trial court on the same day he filed his complain.
Meanwhile, the Leonardos sold the property to Jose Bitoon. Petitioner consequently filed another
complaint against the same spouses to enjoin his ejectment from the property. Petitioner also
filed an amended complaint impleading Jose Bitoon as additional defendant. However, the trial
court dismissed the original as well as the amended complaint after finding that majority of the
essential requisites of tenancy relationship between the parties did not exist. The Court of
Appeals reversed such decision but it held that petitioner could not redeem the property from
Bitoon.

ISSUE:

The issue then is whether respondent Court of Appeals was correct in holding that petitioner
could not redeem the property from respondent Bitoon unless the latter decided to sell it.

HELD:

The Court ruled in the affirmitive.

Petitioner consigned the amount of P2000.00 paid by the Leonardos to the Galans. However,
when he amended his complaint by impleading respondent Bitoon, he did not increase the
amount consigned as would have made it equivalent to P30,000.00, representing payment by the
second vendee. In this regard, petitioner submits that he is not required to consign the latter
amount since that would put an additional burden on a tenant seeking redemption. After all, he
would be paying whatever amount would be finally determined by the trial court as reasonable
price and consideration.

Consignation of the entire price would remove all controversies as to the redemptioner's ability
to pay at the proper time. Against such rationale, petitioner's submission is rendered
insignificant. The amount so consigned by him falls short of the requirement of the law and
leaves the Court with no choice but to rule against him. For failure of petitioner to consign the
entire redemption price, there was no valid exercise by him of his legal right to redeem.
BEDANA, JOY GABRIELLE A. 2010-019022 2B

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED ITS PRESIDENT DR.

LEONARDO A. CHUA, petitioner, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, THE COURT OF APPEALS and ALVIN OBRIQUE,
REPRESENTING BUKIDNON FREE FARMERS AGRICULTURAL LABORERS
ORGANIZATION (BUFFALO), respondents.

G.R. No. 100091 October 22, 1992

Facts:

President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 467 which reserved for the Mindanao
Agricultural College, now CMU, a piece of land. Said land shall be used as its future campus.
CMU thereafter embarked on a project wherein parcels of land were leased to its faculty
members and employees. In exchange of service fee for the use of the land, the CMU shall assist
faculty members and employee groups through the extension of technical know-how, training
and other kinds of assistance. The agreement explicitly provided that there will be no tenancy
relationship between the lessees and the CMU.

When the program was terminated, the participants of the said project filed of r the declaration of
their status as tenants under the CARP. In its resolution, DARAB, ordered, among others, the
segregation of 400 hectares of the land for distribution under CARP. The land was subjected to
coverage considering that, according to DAR, the lands do not meet the condition for exemption
since it is not "actually, directly, and exclusively used" for educational purposes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject land is covered by CARP.

HELD:

The Court ruled in the negative.

The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to resolve and answer the
question of when and what lands are found necessary for its use. The Court also ruled that the
DARAB decision stating that for the land to be exempt it must be "presently, actively exploited
and utilized by the university in carrying out its present educational program with its present
student population and academic faculty" overlooked the very significant factor of growth of the
university in the years to come.
BEDANA, JOY GABRIELLE A. 2010-019022 2B

PRIMER

Question:

The power to determine just compensation is lodged in the Judicial Department. However, under
the CARL, the DAR (an administrative department) may determine the aforementioned. Does
this provision of the CARL unconstitutional?

Answer:

No. There is no law prohibiting administrative departments from determining just compensation
so as long as such is merely preliminary. If the owner of the land does not agree with the finding
of just compensation, he may go to the court to have it modified accordingly. The determination
of the court (in cases where the landowner does not agree with the price originally set) shall be
considered as the final determination.