Department of the Classics, Harvard University

in Plato's "Lysis"
Author(s): David Wolfsdorf
Source: Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 103 (2007), pp. 235-259
Published by: Department of the Classics, Harvard University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30032224 .
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 DtXiaIN PLATO'SLYSIS
DAVIDWOLFSDORF

INTRODUCTION
LYSIS HAS HAD A PARTICULARLY over the lasthalf-century.
SORRYRECEPTION
Oftenviewedas deficient in comparison withPhaedrus and Sym-
posium,1scholarswhoattendto it do so in a defensive posture.How
manyarticlesbeginwiththe objectiveofshowingthatLysisin fact
containssubstantive contentregarding friendship?Amongthese,a
common themeis theattempted rescueofthetextfrom claimsthatits
treatment offriendship is non-altruisticor instrumental-as though
therewerea sympathetic needto preserve Platofromaccusationsof
weakmorals.2
Morerecently andespecially followingGadamer'sarticle,scholars
arguethatthedramatic enactment of<ptia amongthepersonaefulfills
whatthephilosophical inquiry properdoesnot.3Conceived ina nega-
tivelight,one mightsaythatsuchliterary interpretations-however
muchtheyclaimtobe grounded inanimportant hermeneutic orphilo-
sophicalposition-succeed inilluminating thevalueofthetextat the
costofdemonstrating thattheinquiry inthetextisindeedlacking. And
yetthishasbeenconceivedas partofthepoint.Whatfriendship truly
is cannotbe said,it can onlybe shown.Hence,aporiais inevitable. Or
so itis argued.

1 See, forinstance,Laszlo Versenyi's(1975n1)remarkson his predecessors.

2 W.K.C. Guthrie's
criticism
is commonly
cited.See Guthrie
19754:143.Thosewho
conception
argueforan instrumentalist includeTerence for
Irwin(1977:300)-although
Irwin,ofcourse,excellenceis conceivedas instrumental-andDon Adams(1992).Those
whoarguefora non-egoisticviewincludeGregory Vlastos(1981:3-11);T. F.Morris(1986);
D.Roth(1995);Lorraine
Michael Pangle(2001).
Smith
3 Gadamer1980,Tindale 1984,Tessitore1990,Gonzalez1995.Cp.also Haden 1983.
236 DavidWolfsdorf

Theattitude I advancehereis thatthephilosophical investigation

in Lysisisjust as sophisticated and interestingas thosein theother
earlydefinitional dialogues-however sophisticated and interesting
thosemaybe.Thereis no needto defendthephilosophical content of
merely
Lysis, to explainitaccurately. Thishas almostalwaysnotbeen
welldone.Themainreasonis thatthetextis consistently approached
withpresumptions aboutthenatureoffriendship, as thisreciprocal,
oftenexclusively humanpsychological, particularly
emotional relation-
shipis nowconventionally experienced and conceived. Thisis anach-
ronisticand otherwisemisguided.Considerthatthe psychological
conditions ofempathy andcompassion so commonandfundamental to
ourexperiences ofloveandfriendship findno placeinthediscussion.
Ofcourse,thedramatic dimensions ofthetextseemto encourage the
viewthatthedialogueis in essenceabouthumanfriendship, insofar
as thecharacters, Socrates,Ctesippus, Hippothales, Menexenus, and
Lysis,areall involved invariousformsof tXia. Butinfact,as I have
arguedelsewhereand as NaomiReshotkohas rightly emphasized,
inLysisPlatodevelopstheviewthathuman ptMia is one,albeitforus
humansespecially important, instanceofa muchmoregeneralcondi-
tion.4Remarkably, theconception of ptiMaadvancedis notnecessarily
psychological orevenhuman.Oncethisis appreciated, themisapplica-
tionoffamiliar moralconcerns becomesclear.5
Furthermore, it is falsethattheE'pyov ofypia thatthepersonae
actoutfulfillswhattheirX6yoq doesnotandcannot.Sucha viewaims
at an enlightened synthesis offormand contentin thetext.Butit
fundamentally misunderstands therelationbetweenthedramatic and
explicitargumentative dimensions ofthetext.Thetheorizing, which
is the centerpiece ofthedramaand fromwhichconclusionsabout
the relationships ofthe personaeare drawn,preciselyattempts to
understand whatunderlies thefamiliar experiences wehumansshare
in whatwe call ourloves,affections, and friendships, includingthe
relationships ofthepersonae.Thisis theaimoftheearlydialogues:

4 Wolfsdorf
1997:198-254,
Reshotko1997.
5 Whether of pthiain Lysisis an unsatisfactory
thetreatment treatment
of Xthia
seemstomeofsecondary
importance.
 EiAiainPlato'sLysis 237

to philosophizeabouthumanconductin an effort to fosterethical

knowledge. But-and thisis thecrucialpoint-inso doing,thetexts
reinterpretthe meaningofthatconductcontrary to conventional
andtraditionalunderstanding and in lightofPlatonicphilosophical
conceptions.Thus,itis revealedthatthings arenotas theyappearand
thatvaluescommonly heldareheldforthewrongreasonsor should
notbe heldatall.
The following discussionparticularly focuseson the conception
of pthiathatSocratesdevelops,namelytheconceptionofyqtia as
belonging Oncethisis clarified,
(OiKE16trCJ). itwillbe explainedwhy
theaporiain whichthe investigation endsdoes notjeopardizethis
conceptionas well as whythe aporiaitselfhas nothingto do with
theineffability thediscussionwilltouchuponthe
of ptAia.Finally,
significanceoftheconceptofbelonging inRepublicI and Gorgias
and
thereby clarifythe conceptofthefirstfriend(r6RtpWrov in
qpiXov)
Lysis.

SOCRATES'FIRST CONCEPTIONOF (ptiXa

Throughout Lysispthiais analyzedas a two-placerelationwhose
participants mayormaynotbe humansor evenhavewhatwe
(qpiXot)
wouldcallmentalstates,althoughmostexamplesconsidered do infact
involvehumans.6'7The coreoftheanalysisbeginswiththeconven-
and Empedoclean
tional,traditional, is basedon like-
viewthat pthica
Threearguments
ness(6poot6rlq). aremadeagainstthisposition.8 All

6 Ofcourse, insofaras hiXta is enactedthroughSocrates'engagementwithLysisand

Menexenus thisrelationisthree-place.
7 Cp.Reshotko 1997:1:"Plato'sLysisiscommonlyreadas anearlydialoguewhichtakes
upthequestion: 'whatis friendship?' However,ifwereadtheLysiswiththesoleinten-
tionofunderstanding Socrates'viewsconcerning whenhumanbeingsmightproperly
becalledfriends tooneanother wewilllikelybeconfused anddisappointed.
IntheLysis,
Socratesdevelops a generaltheory ofattraction
towhichherefersusingthewordqtXia.
Socratesalsousesthetermqtlia torefer tohumanfriendship,becausehe takeshuman
friendshipto be a specialcase ofdesirewhichis itself
a formofattraction.In orderto
appreciatewhatSocratessaysaboutyptiabetween humans, wemustfirstunderstand
whathesaysaboutqtXlagenerally." Cf.alsoReshotko
1993andBolotin 1979:130.
8 Ly.213e4-215c2.
238 DavidWolfsdorf

presumethatptXhia is beneficial,9
an assumption thatSocratesmain-
tainsthroughout thediscussion.10
First,it is agreedthatthatwhichis bad (rs KcK6v,hereafter the
bad) is notqpixov tothebad,becausethosewhoarebadareharmful."
As such,thebad cannotbe a participant in pXicaat all. Second,it is
agreedthatlikes(r&6pota),insofar as theyarealike,cannotparticipate
in ptXiasince,insofar as theyarealike,theydonotneedanything from
oneanother andsocannotderivebenefit from oneanother."2 Third,itis
agreedthatthatwhichis good(TO&ya06v, hereafterthegood),insofar
as it is good,cannotparticipate in qtXiasincethegood,insofar as it
is good,needsnothing, and so cannot be benefited.'3
Accordingly, the
goodcannotbe a participant in ptXia at all.In sum,if pthiais benefi-
cial,then pitXia cannotbebasedonlikeness.
Subsequently, Socratesand Menexenusbrieflyentertainthe
contrary view thatctXiais based on opposition(Evavwt6rlq). This
viewisinitially thought tobe attractive sincecertainrelations between
oppositesappearbeneficial. Forexample,therichmayassistthepoor,
thewisetheignorant.'4 However, thisviewis notseriously entertained
is
sinceit assumed to imply that itia exists between the badandthe
good,andthiswaspreviously rejected."'
Socratesnowquestions theassumption thatparticipants in ptXia
shouldbe distinguished according to thedichotomy ofgoodandbad
types.He suggests thatthereexistnotsimplythelikeandtheoppo-
site,butalso thatwhichis inbetween,theneitherlikenoropposite.

9 Thisideahasbeenrepeatedlyassumedinthediscussion Forexample,
already. when
Socratesconverses withHippothalesaboutHippothales' treatment ofLysis,Socratesis
interested to knowwhether Hippothales is treatingLysiswell.Socratessubsequently
rebukesHippothales forspoilingLysis.In Socrates'exchangewithLysis,it is implied
thatSocrates isbenefiting
Lysisbyhumbling andinstructinghim;andLysisisostensibly
benefited bybeingprovokedintophilosophical investigation.
10So,forinstance,attheendoftheinvestigation, Socratesclaims"toadmitthatthat
whichisuseless(iXprlorov)
isypiXov
wouldbe mistaken" (Ly.222c1).
11 Ly.214b7-c3.
12 Ly.214e2-215a4.
13 Ly.215a4-c2.
14 Ly.215d4-7.
15is ofclaiming
theirrationality
stresses
Socrates that6 ~Xp6q (thehateful
orthehated)
couldbeengaged withitsopposite
in<pitXa (Ly.216a6-bl).
 PtAl'ain Plato'sLysis 239

Accordingly, arecategorized
entities toa trichotomy
according oftypes
(ylvrl):thegood,thebad,and thatwhichis neithergoodnorbad (rb
prTE yaOibvpr'rEKaK6V,hereafterthe neithergood nor bad).16Since
thebad cannotparticipate in ptiiaandsinceptXiacannotbe based
on likeness,
itremainsthattheneither goodnorbadandthegoodare
participantsin ptXfia.
Notethatthisdoesnotcontradict
theprevious
claimthatthegoodcan deriveno benefit fromanother,forSocrates
doesnotassumethatthebenefit Asinthis
ofyptiamustbe reciprocal.
case,itisunilateral.
Socratesthensuggeststhatthecauseof ptXiais thepresenceof
thebadintheneither Thispointcompels
goodnorbad."7 himtodistin-
guishtwowaysinwhichan entitymayhavea property."' Precisely,
if
thebadis presentto theneithergoodnorbad,thenitmustbe present
insucha waythattheneither goodnorbadisnotitself
bad.So Socrates
claims:
somethingsare suchas thatwhichis present(rbtrap6v)
to
them,
andotherthings are not.19
Socratesgivesthefollowingexample: ifonetintsone'sblondehair
withwhitelead,thenthewhiteness is presenttothehair,butthehair
itselfremains
blonde.However, ifoldageturnsone'shairwhite,then
thewhitenesspresent tothehairis,as hesays,"suchas"thehair.20
The
passagemayhaveimplications fortheinterpretation oftheself-attri-
butionofproperties andtherelationofpropertiesandtheirinstances.
ButI willnotdwellon thesehere.It sufficesto notethatthiswayof
therelationofthebadandtheneither
conceptualizing goodnorbad
accommodates theallegedcauseof piXiawiththenotionthatthebad
cannotparticipatein ptiMa.

16Ly.216d5-7.
17 In the passage under consideration,Socrates uses the expression "Sa& KaKO)
napovoaiv" (Ly.217b5-6). However,when he laterrejectsthiscausal account Socrates
uses thewordai'rov (Ly.221c2).
18However,Socratesdoes not use any wordforproperty; he simplyspeaks of entities
beinga particularway.
19Ly.217c3-4.
20 T6TEEYvOVrool6vEp "b Tnap6v,XEUKOiO (Ly.217d8-el).
tIapOUMgAXEUKaL.
240 DavidWolfsdorf

I willspeakofthisas Socrates'first ofyptia,thatis,the

conception
firstconceptionthathe himselfdevelops.His initialreactionto it is
this:
So now,LysisandMenexenus,I said,wecan countonhaving
what 6 q(piXov
discovered is and whatit is not.Forwe say
thatinthesoulandinthebodyand everywhere theneither
goodnorbad,whichhasthepresenceofthebad,is pitovof
thegood.21
Twoexamplesaregiven.First,thehumanbody,whichis neither
goodnorbad,is saidtobe qfiXov ofmedicine,whichisgood,onaccount
ofdisease,whichis bad.22Second,the humansoul,whichis neither
goodnorbad,is saidtobe cpiXov ofknowledge (oopia),whichis good,
on accountofignorance,whichis bad.23Observe thebroadconnotation
ofthe verb ptX~hv.
The second examplemakessensebecauseloving
condition.
is a psychological However, thefirstexamplein whichthe
diseasedbodylovesmedicineonlyseemssensibleifinterpreted figu-
But,as mentioned
ratively. above,throughout LysisptXiais notmerely
treatedas a humanpsychological relationship.
'thAaincludes relations
ofbotha psychologicalanda physicalnature.In fact,thesecategorical
distinctionsarenotcrucial
totheanalysis.Forexample, inanalyzing the
viewofytXiabasedon opposition, Socratesspeaksofthewetdesiring
(rTt0Ulpd)thedryandthecolddesiring thehot.24 Notealso,again,that
whileweconceiveoffriendship as involvingmutualaffection,thetype
ofpthiaintheseexamplesis non-reciprocal. The ignorant soulloves
wisdom, butwisdomdoesnotlovein return;thediseasedbodyloves
medicine, butmedicine doesnotlovethediseasedbody.25 In short,it
is prudentin interpretingthe conceptionof ptXiadevelopedin the

21 Ly.218b6-c2.
22 Ly. 217a4-b6.
23 Ly.218a2-b3.
24 e ydp-toy-Uli'
touotoO EKaaorov, &'X oTroo 6po{iourti iV y&p
a 0ypo0,
pb v Ti
6S PuXp v 0eploo,T 8S~E% &i60 f3Xo, rT68 KE"vvrtptp0o0wx,
pros Kai XqfipE8&KEVCra6eq
(Ly.215e4-8).
25 The viewthat ptXhia in Lysisis treated as non-reciprocalhas been noted by other
scholars.See,forexample,Robinson1986.Cf.also Reshotko1997:2-3.
 inPlato'sLysis
<PtAt" 241

textnotto importcertainfamiliar
preconceptions
aboutthenature
offriendship. thatLysisis primarily
Indeed,Reshotkohas suggested
concernedwiththenatureofattraction.
Onemightalsosayitconcerns
thenatureofbonds.

SOCRATES'SECOND CONCEPTIONOF iptCMa

withhis firstconceptionof ptAialastsonly

Socrates'satisfaction
momentarily.Atoncehe is overcomewitha sensethatthisconception
is incorrect:26
cameovermethattheconclusion
suspicion
[A]moststrange
to whichwe had agreedwas nottrue... I am afraid,I replied,
thatin our searchconcerning
qpiXov we havecomeupon
argumentsthatarenobetterthana setofbraggarts.27
In theensuingdiscussionSocratescriticizes thefirstconception
ofpia anddevelopsan alternative. He perceives twoproblems with
thefirstconception: theyconcerntheobjectandthecauseofyptXia.
First,Socratessuggeststhata qpio(lover)is qpixo(loving)ofsome-
thinggoodbecauseof (6ta) something bad and also forthesake of
(EVEKa)something good.28Forexample,a patient lovesa doctorbecause
ofdiseaseandforthesakeofhealth.Thisnotionpresents twodifficul-
ties.First,
a qiXoq(lover)becomespiXoq (loving)ofa qihXo(beloved),
and,as Socratessays,"thuslikebecomespi'Xoq (loving)oflikewhich
we saidwas impossible."29 However, thisis a trivialdifficulty, forit
prevents participantsin piMa fromexisting at all sincetheyarealike
insofaras eachis a participant ofthia. Butin thiscase,
ina relation
qpiXoiareonlyalikeinsofaras theyareparticipants intherelationof
qpiMa,theyarenot piXot becausetheyarealike.Furthermore, sincethe
relationof ytia is non-reciprocal
eachparticipant is not oihXo;
inthe
sameway;oneloves,theotheris loved.AsSocrates' firstexchange with

26 Ly.218c4ff.
27 Ly.218c5-7,d2-4.
28 Ly.218d6-219b8.
29Ly.219b6-cl.
242 DavidWolfsdorf

Menexenus hasalreadymadeevident, theadjectivepifxoqcanbe used

inbothsenses.30
Thesecondpointis treatedas moresubstantial. Theclaim,here-
(lover)is(pikoq(loving)ofa qlXo (beloved)forthe
afterL,thata qpikoq
sakeofa qpioq(beloved)entailsa regress, forifa belovedis in every
case lovedforthesakeofanotherbeloved,thebelovedforwhosesake
thebelovedis lovedwillin turnbe lovedforthesakeofa belovedad
infinitum.
Socratesexpresses thispointas follows:
Noware we not bound to wear ourselvesout withgoingon
in thisway,unlesswe can arriveat somegoverning prin-
ciple(apxi~)thatwillnotkeepleadingus on fromoneypilov
to another,
butwillreachthefirstfriend (t6onprTovqpi'ov)
forwhosesakeall theotherthingsare said to be beloved
(cpYjXC)?31

Socrates'pointis thatL misrepresents thecondition of thiMa.The

drivethatgovernsptiMa is,in fact,notinterminable. Thereis some
objectthatis desiredforitsownsake,forthesakeofnothing else,and
forthesakeofwhicheveryotherbelovedobjectis loved.Notethat
thisideais notdefended.32 (Thenatureofthisobjectwillbe discussed
below.)
Theintroduction oftheconceptofthefirst friendenablesSocrates
to distinguishtypesof ptiMaaccordingto theirobjects.He saysthat
pi'kathatarelovedforthesakeofotherqpiXka cannotbe thoughtof
as cpikaproper,insofar as therealqpiov is thatwhichis pursuedfor
thesakeofnothing else.Accordingly, thefollowing divisionof txicat
results.'thia between the neithergood nor bad and thefirstfriend
is intrinsicptXia.
'thia betweentheneithergoodnorbad and some
beneficialypiovthatis notthefirstfriend is extrinsic Socrates
ptXica.
describesextrinsiccptXiaas a phantom (E&'go)ov)of intrinsic ptia.

30 Ly.211d6-213d5.
31 Ly.219c ff.
32 The claimofa npdrovq(pkovhas bothan ethicaland a psychological-orrather,since
ptiManeed notinvolveentitieswithsouls,motivational-implication.
On theone hand,it
entailsa speciesofethicalmonism;on the otherhand,it impliesthatlove dependsupon
a stateofdeficiency.
 'tAtainPlato'sLysis 243

Furthermore, extrinsic MtXiat

shouldbedistinguishedfrom inauthentic
which,as we willsee,are relations
piXftat, that,according to conven-
tionalunderstanding, appear tobe but
tXicat, areactually harmful and
so not,properly speaking,ptMaicatall.
Socrates'secondcriticism ofhisfirst
conceptionof pthiaconcerns
itscause.Socratessuggests thatthepresenceofthebadintheneither
goodnorbad doesnotcause pitia.33 he arguesthatifthebad
Instead,
didnotexist,theneithergoodnorbadwouldnonetheless desireand
lovethefirstfriend. Socratesgrantsthatitis difficult
to imagine just
howthingswouldbe ifbads(r&KaKd)didnotexist.34 Buthe suggests
thatsomedesires,suchas hungerand thirst, are notin themselves
harmful or beneficialand so neitherbad norgood.Rather, theyare
goodor bad insofaras theirobjectsarebeneficial orharmful. Thus,
he says,thereis no reasonwhydesiresthatareneither goodnorbad
wouldceaseto existifbadsdid.Onecouldstillhavethesedesires, but
theywouldonlybe forthegood.35 Therefore,he concludes thatdesire,
notthepresenceofthebad,causesyptica.
Socratesnowexplainsthenatureofdesireas follows. Thatwhich
desiresis deficient(v56Efq)and desiresthatinwhichit is deficient.36
Sincedesireis the cause of pthia,thatwhichis deficient lovesthat
in whichit is deficient.37
Anentityis deficientwhenitis deprivedof
something(rta That of whichan entityis deprivedis its
& qaipirat).38
belonging(r6 oiKE"OV).39Therefore, whatbelongsto an entityis the
objectofitslove (ZEpxq),
friendship
((ptia), and desire(~rint8va).40

33 Cf.Socrates'question:"Foriftherewerenothingleftto harmus, we shouldfeelno

wantofanyassistance... Is notthisthe natureofthegood-to be belovedbecause ofthe
bad byus who are midwaybetweenthe good and thebad,whereasseparatelyand forits
ownsakeit is ofno use?" (Ly.220c7-d2).
34 Cf.his statement,"Or is thisa ridiculousquestion-as to whatwillexistor not exist
in sucha case? Forwho can tell?"(Ly.222a).
35 Thisargumentis presentedat Ly.221a-b.
36 Ly.221d7-el.
37 Ly. 221el-2.
38 Ly.221e2-3. Cf.the use of the verbd&qalpWtto describethe confiscationof one's
propertyat Gorg.466c1,468d2,511a7).
39 Thispropositionis notexpressed,butis derivablefromthatwhichprecedesand that
whichfollowsit.
40 Ly.221e3-4.
244 DavidWolfsdorf

Itshouldbe emphasized thatinLysis tEtu

via is treatedas a condi-
tionmoregeneralthanwhatwe calldesire.In thesamewaythatwhat
we call friendship is conceivedas one manifestation ofthebroader
condition of<pXia,so whatwe calldesireis conceivedas onemanifes-
tationofthebroadercondition of rimOupia.
Entities thatdo nothave
soulsexperienceinteOupia. Again,recallSocrates'claimsthatthebody
desiresmedicine andthatthewetdesiresthedryandthecoldthehot.
Socrates'
conception ofdesireamongtheearlydialoguesisa subject
ofconsiderable debate.The controversy turnson whetherSocrates
commits totheviewthateveryone desireswhatis reallygoodorrather
whatonefallibly regards as good.41Themainpassagesdiscussed inthe
debateareMeno77b2-78b6, Gorgias466a4-468e5,andProtagoras352b1-
357e8.
Regarding theMenopassage,I haveelsewheredefended theview,
consistentwiththedominant interpretationofthepassage,thatdesire
foran objectfollows upona fallibleevaluationofthatobjectas good.42I
willrefertothisas thesubjectivist conceptionofdesire.
Regarding theGorgias passage,I supporta viewsomewhat akinto
theoneadvancedbyMcTighe.43 McTigheargues that Socrates'argu-
mentagainstPolusis ad hominem andtherefore thattheclaimwithin
the argument thateveryonedesiresthe good-whichheremeans
everyone desireswhatisreallygood-doesnotprovidesoundevidence
ofSocrates'orPlato'sconception ofdesireamongtheearlydialogues.
UnlikeMcTighe, I do notregardtheargument as ad hominem;however,
I do regardthepremisethateveryonedesiresthe goodas a dialec-
ticalexpedient. Notethatthispremisefollowstheclaimthathealth,
wealth,and onare(intrinsic)
so goods.Thissurelyis nota positionthat
Platoendorsesamongtheearlydialogues.It is,however, convenient

41 Forexample,somewhohaverecently arguedthatSocratesis committed

totheview
thatall peopledesiretherealgoodincludeHedaSegvic(2000),TerryPenner(1991),
ThomasC.Brickhouse D. Smith(1994:87-102);
andNicholas Terry PennerandC.J.Rowe
(1994),NaomiReshotko(1997). But cf.McTighe1984.Note thatBrickhouseand Smith's
andPenner'sargumentsareofa verydifferent
character.
Crucially, andSmith
Brickhouse
suggest iscommitted
thatSocrates toa trueself.Pennerrejectsthismove.
42Wolfsdorf2006a.
43McTighe 1984.
 inPlato'sLysis
<LMca 245

in thepresentcontext, forSocratesmerely needsPolusto assentthat

theAthenians normally pursueas endssuchobjectsas wealth,health,
andso on.In short,I regardtheclaiminGorgias thateveryone desires
thegoodas carrying no weightinthedebateoverSocrates'orPlato's
conception ofdesireamongtheearlydialogues.
TheProtagoras passagestrongly supports thesubjectivist concep-
tionofdesireinMeno.Thedenialandintellectualist analysisofakrasia
concludes thatall desiresforparticular objectsorcoursesofactionare
rationaljust insofar as all actionsfollow upona fallible evaluation ofa
givencourseofaction,including objectspursued, as good.
Theconceptionofdesirein Lysis, whichI willcallthedeficiency
conception, explainsthecauseofdesire:desireis motivated bydefi-
ciency;moreprecisely, a subject'sdeficiency ofitsbelonging causes
desire.Hereitbecomesan important questionwhether belongings are
For
tokensortypes. example, consider thatMenexenus maybe hungry
and desirea particular fishat thefishmonger's stallin theagora.Is
Menexenus' belonging thatparticular fish,fishingeneral, orstillmore
generally food?Thefirst option,thattheparticular objectofanydesire
is thesubject'sbelonging, seemsabsurd, forthenwhatever particular
objectone desiresis one'sbelonging. Charity,therefore, suggests that
belongings mustessentially be types.Buthowgeneralthesetypes
are andaccordingto whattaxonomy theyare to be conceivedis not
discussed inLysis.
Itsuffices forthepresentdiscussion thatbelongings aretypesand
ofan unspecified degreeofgenerality. Consequently, thedeficiency
conception can be conceptualized as compatible withthesubjectivist
conception as follows.Deficiency ofa belonging, whichis a type,causes
desire.Forexample,Menexenusis deficientin foodand therefore
desiresfood.Desirefora particular objectis governed bydesirefora
corresponding type.Forexample,Menexenus desiresthisparticular
fishbecauseMenexenus desiresfood.Belongings arenotgoodorbad;
thereis goodfoodandbad food.Particular objectsofdesirearegood
orbad.Forexample,theparticular fishat thefishmonger's stallmay
be spoiledorfresh. Thesubjectmayerrinhisevaluation ofthepartic-
ularobjectofdesire.In short,pre-rationally andpre-evaluatively the
motivation arisingfromdeficiency orientsus toward therighttypeof
246 DavidWolfsdorf

objects,butwe mustjudgewhether tokensofthosetypesaregoodor

bad.
In sum,Socrates'secondconception of pthiais this:Theneither
good norbad lovesthe firstfriendbecause the firstfriendis its
belonging. Thefirst isthebelonging
friend oftheneither goodnorbad
becausetheneither goodnorbadis deprivedofandso deficientinand
so desiresthefirst
friend.
Finally,
SocratesapplieshissecondconceptionofytXiatotherela-
tionshipsoftheinterlocutors:
"Then,ifyou two [Lysisand Menexenus]are qi0Xoiwith
one another, youwouldbelongto one anothersomehow
bynature(p6aGEt)." "Precisely,"
theysaid."Andif,boys,one
persondesiresorlovesanother, he wouldnotdesireorlove
orbefriend himunlesstheloverbelongedin somewayto
thebeloved, eitherinsoulorsomecharacteristic, manner,or
formofsoul.""Yes,entirely," saidMenexenus. ButLysisfell
silent."Well,'I said,"ithasbeenshownthatwhatbelongsto
usbynature(p6uoEt) isnecessaryforustolove.""Soitseems,"
he [Menexenus] said."Thenit is necessaryforthegenuine
(yvrlaip)and nottheinauthentic (npooTrotnrcy)
admirer44
(pacoTfi)to be lovedbyhis darling(rzv xat~xKOV)."Then
Lysisand Menexenusgave a faintnod of assent,whereas
Hippothales, fullofpleasure(i6n6rfq ijSoviq),turnedall
manner ofcolors.45
Thepassageclarifies
howhumanpsychological relationships
canbe
instancesofqynia.Theostensibleproblemwithhuman relationships
as
instancesofpthiaisthatthesoulsofmosthumansareneither goodnor
bad.ButwhenSocratessuggests thatpeoplecanbelongto oneanother
manner,
withrespectto theirsouls,he adds"or somecharacteristic,
or formofsoul."Accordingly,he allowsthatthe soulis complexand
so thatsomepartsor aspectsmaybe extrinsicallygoodwhileothers
arenotorneithergoodnorbad.In thatcase,humancptia can occur

44 I refrain
fromtranslating
"ipaotijq"as "lover"sincethatwouldlead to confusion.
45 Ly.221e5-22b2.
 inPlato'sLysis
itALa 247

in cases where one person possesses some psychologicalbenefitthat

anotherlacksand so desires.Human pticatare,then,extrinsicqinXat.
Grantedthis, Socrates distinguishesbetween a genuine and an
inauthenticadmirerand saysthatthedarlingoughttolovethegenuine
admirer. Herehe employsthevocabularyofhomosexualdiscourse.He is
makinga generalstatementabouthomosexualrelations,butalso specif-
icallyalludingto Hippothales'love forLysis.This is clearfromthe fact
thatSocratesnotes Hippothales'responseto his remarksand thatthis
is the firsttimesince the beginningof Socrates'conversationwiththe
boysthatHippothales'presencehasbeen mentioned.Thisalso explains
Lysis'and Menexenus'distinctreactionsto Socrates'statements.When
Socratessaysthatwhen "one persondesiresor lovesanother,he would
not desireor love or befriendhimunlessthe loverbelongedin some
way to the beloved,"Menexenusconsents,but Lysisfallssilent.This
is because Lysis assumes that Socratesis implyingthat Hippothales
and Lysisbelong to one anotherbecause Hippothalesis attractedto
Lysis-whereasLysisdoes not wantto reciprocateHippothales'affec-
tionand does notwantto feelthathe oughtto. However,once Socrates
makesthe distinctionbetweena genuineand an inauthenticadmirer,
thisrevealsto Lysisthe possibility thathe need notfeelboundto recip-
rocateHippothales'affectionsince Hippothalesmaynot be a genuine
admirer.Finally,Hippothalesassumesthathe is a genuineadmirerand
so interprets Socrates'statementas compellingLysisto reciprocatehis
affection.Accordingly, he is filledwithpleasure.Thereare severalindi-
cationsthatHippothalesis deceived.The firstis thatthewordSocrates
uses forinauthentic (admirer),"npoono-ulr6q, alludes to the bathetic
and hackneyedpoetryHippothalescomposes forLysis.The second,
more obvious indication is that Hippothales is described as being
filledwithpleasure (igSovri), whichsuggeststhe hedonisticmotivation
governinghis interestin Lysis.Insofaras goodnessandpleasurearenot
identicaland Hippothales'hedonisticinterestin Lysisis not beneficial,
Hippothalesis not a genuineadmirer.Recallthatearlyin the dialogue
SocratescriticizesHippothalesfornotknowinghowto conducthimself
withrespectto his darlingand therebycorrupting him.46

46 Ly.210el-5.
248 DavidWolfsdorf

The distinction betweenthe genuineand inauthentic admirer

impliesthedistinction betweengenuineandinauthentic desireas well
as piXia.Hippothales doesnotauthentically desireorloveLysis,where
"authentically" meansbeneficiallyand so in accordancewithnature.
Accordingly, betweengenuineand inauthentic
a distinction belong-
ingscanbe inferred, wherea genuinebelonging is a goodtypeofthe
belonging andan inauthenticbelonging is a badtypeofthebelonging.
Moreover, a naturalbelonging
is an authentic belonging.

APORIAIN LYSIS

ThecoreoftheanalysisofqtXa inLysisbeginswiththeconventional
and traditionalconceptionofqXhiabasedon likenessand concludes
withSocrates'second,novelconception of pldiabasedon belonging.
Theaporiainwhichtheinvestigationendsoccursas a conflict
between
thesetwopositions.After hissecondconcep-
Socrateshas articulated
andapplieditto therelationships
tionof pliXia betweenthepersonae
in thetext,he urgesLysisandMenexenus to drawa conclusionfrom
thediscussion:
Ifthereis anydifference
betweenthe belongingand the
like,it seems to me ... thatwe mightgive some accountof
what0pioq
6 is. Butiflikeandbelonging arethesameitis
noteasyto getridofourformer statement thatthelikeis
uselesstothelikeinsofar as theyarealike;andtoadmitthat
theuselessisqpiXov wouldbe a grossmistake.So howaboutif
weagreenow... sincewe areratherdrunkfromthediscus-
sion,to saythatthebelonging andthelikearetwodifferent
things? [LysisandMenexenus consent.]
Thenshallwemain-
tainthatthegoodbelongs toall(Travzi),
whilethebadisalien
(&AXX6ptov)?Ordoesthebadbelongto thebad,thegoodto
thegood,andtheneither goodnorbad to theneither good
norbad?[LysisandMenexenus agreethatthelastthreepairs
belongtogether.]So hereagain,boys ... we have droppedin
theverystatements
regarding piXiathatwerejected
at first;
fornowtheunjustwillbe as much(piXoqoftheunjust,and
the bad of the bad as the good of the good ... Andwhat is
 inPlato'sLysis
ODUia 249

more,ifwesaythatthegoodandthebelongingarethesame,
we cannotavoidmakingthegood piXovonlytothegood...
Butthisagain,youknow,is a viewofwhichwethoughtwe
do you not? ... So
had disabused ourselves;you remember,
Oris itclearthat
whatmorecan we do withourargument?
we can do nothing?... We havenotyetbeen able to discover
what6 qpixois.47
Atthe end of a denseconversation,
theparticipants vergeon a
mutuallysatisfactoryaccountof ptXia.Socratessuggeststhatthis
requiresa distinction
betweenthelikeandthebelonging. Theboys
agreetomakethedistinction.
However, whenaskedwhichpixotbelong
together, ina contradiction
theyclaimthatlikesdo.Thischoiceresults
ofwhatSocratescalls
regarding
theverystatements ptia thatwerejected
atfirst;
fornowtheunjustwillbe as mucha friend
oftheunjust,
and
thebadofthebad,as thegoodofthegood.48
Socratesis referring to thefirststageofthecoreoftheanalysis
where, as wehaveseen,threearguments aremadeagainstthepopular
viewof tiXabasedonlikeness. Indescribingthesearguments I empha-
sizedtheirsharedassumption thatpltia must be beneficial.
Attheend
oftheinvestigation Socratesagainstresses thatptXiamustbe benefi-
Thus,Lysis'andMenexenus'
cial.49 failure thebelonging
to distinguish
andthelikedrawstheargument backto thegrounds uponwhichthe
conception of taia basedonlikeness wasrejected.
If,however,the belongingand the like are distinguished, as
Socratesadvises,and thealternative is adopted,a consistent account
of iAtiabasedon belonging canbe maintained. TheoptionLysisand
Menexenus do notchooseis thatthegoodbelongstoall (tavwt), while
thebad is aliento all.50It is notobviouswhatnravtf refersto in this
sentence.According to thetrichotomization ofall entitiesas either

47 Ly.222b3-223b8.
48 Ly.222dl.
49 Ly.222b8-c9.
50 Ly.223c3-5.
250 DavidWolfsdorf

good, bad, or neithergood nor bad, it mightbe thoughtthat naywri

rangesoverall threekinds.However,the factthatin thesame sentence
it is statedthatthe bad is alien to all underminesthisinterpretation.
Nothingcan belongto the bad; therefore,inavricannotrangeoverall
kindsofentities.Furthermore, navrscannotrange overonlythegood
sincein thiscase thegoodwouldbelongto the good,thebelongingand
likewouldbe indistinguishable, and, accordingto boththe arguments
that likecannotbe qpov ofthe like insofaras theyare alike and the
good cannotbe qpiXov ofthe good insofaras theyare good,thiswould
lead to the same contradictionas the option Lysis and Menexenus
choose.Itremainsthatnawrirangesoverthe neithergood norbad,and
I suggestthat Socratesintendsthis interpretation.In short,Socrates
mustbe usingnavri as a masculineratherthan a neuternoun where
"everybody"or,withemphasison human relationships,"each one of
us [humans]"is to be understood.This makes sense since although
piXiais not necessarilya humanrelationship,in the movementofthe
discussionimmediately precedingthe passage underdiscussionwhere
Socratesapplieshis secondconceptionofyptia to the relationships of
the personae,the focus narrows to human relationships.
In conclusion,the alternativeoptionyields a conceptionof pthiia
that is consistentwiththe second one Socrates developed,whilethe
optionLysisand Menexenuschoosedependson the conceptionofctXia
based on likenessthatwas rejectedearlyin the investigation. Thus,the
answertothequestionofwhobelongsto whomis thatthegoodand the
neithergood norbad belongto one another.In makingthispoint,I am
merelydrawingattentionto the factthat,as interpreters, we have no
compellingreason to believe that the aporia itselfin whichthe inves-
tigationends is an indicationthatPlato did not intendto advancethe
conceptionof pthiXa based on belongingthatSocratesdevelops.Rather,
as I will suggestbelow,the treatmentof the concept ofbelongingin a
couple otherpassagesamongthe earlydialoguesstrengthens the view
thatPlatodid intendto advancethisconceptionofq~ia.
As I have argued elsewhere,the aporia in which the discussion
ends reflectsa particulardramatictheme common amongthe early
dialogues,thetensionbetweenconventionaland traditionalbeliefsand
novel Platonicones, and serves a distinctphilosophical-pedagogical
 PtAlainPlato'sLysis 251

objective:to encouragethe intendedreaderto reachan understanding

forhimself.51 In sum, Socrates and the boys make progresstowarda
mutuallysatisfactory conceptionof pXia, but ultimatelytheydo not
reach one. Althoughthe familiarview of itia based on likeness is
Lysisand Menexenusdo notentirely
rejectedearlyin the investigation,
extirpateit fromtheirsets ofbeliefs.Thisview of ptMareemergesat
the end of the investigation,conflictswiththe conceptionof pthia
based on belonging,and perplexestheinterlocutors. The finalscene of
the dialoguecasts some lighton whythe investigation regressesin its
finalstages.In describingthe aporeticconclusion,Socratessays:
Wehavebeen unable (onho ... olo rE yEV6pEOa)
to discover
what6 qpi~o is.52
The use ofthe firstpersonpluralratherthanthesingularis signifi-
cant insofaras the limitationsowe to the limitationsof the group
AlthoughSocratescontributesto the developmentof the
collectively.
conceptionof cptiiafarmorethanLysisand Menexenus,the aporetic
conclusionofthe investigationowesto Lysis'and Menexenus'decision
to chooseone optionSocratespresentsoveranother.Despitethe prog-
ressofthe investigation, Lysisand Menexenusare ultimately boundto
theconventionalviewthat thiMa is based on likeness.
Whenthe group'spowersofinvestigation finallyreachexhaustion,
Lysis'and Menexenus'pedagoguesemergeto taketheboyshome:
Havingthus spoken,I was mindedto stirup somebodyelse
amongthe olderpeople there,whenlikeotherworldly spirits
(Sa&iPovEq), there came upon us the pedagogues of Lysis
and Menexenus.Theywerebringingthe boys'brothersand
called out to themthe orderto go home,foritwas quite late.
Atfirstwe triedwiththehelpofthegrouparoundus to drive
themoff;but theytook no noticeofus and wenton angrily
calling,as beforein theirforeignaccent(itnoPapPapi~ovczE).
We decided that they had taken a drop too much at the

51Wolfsdorf
1997.Cf.alsowolfsdorf
2004.
52 Ly.223b7-8.
252 David
Wolfsdorf

andwouldproveawkward
festival peopleto dealwith.So we
gaveinandbrokeupourparty.53
Byreferring totheslavesas "otherworldly spirits" andas speaking
in "barbarian accents,"'
Socratescharacterizes the boys' pedagogues as
foreign to thediscussion group.Sincepedagogueswereslaves,Lysis'
and Menexenus' pedagogues musthaveliterally beenforeigners. The
conclusionofLysisshowstheboysreturning to theirfamiliarroles
underthecareoftheircustomary pedagogues. ButSocrates'emphasis
on theforeignness ofthepedagogues, immediately following
an inves-
tigationthathas developeda theoryof ptXiabased on belonging,
intimates thatthesepedagogues areforeign to theirwardsina philo-
sophicalsensetoo.
Socrates,theboys,and the otherattendingyouthare reluctant
to breakoffthediscussion whenthe slavescometo fetchLysisand
Menexenus totakethemhome.Itis remarked thattheslaveshavebeen
drinking wineduringtheritesoftheHermaia,thedayon whichthe
discussion atMikkos' palaestra occurs,andSocratessaysthatitseemed
onthisaccountthattheslaveswouldbe intractable. ThewordSocrates
uses to describetheslaves'demeanoris &nopol.54 Thisimageofthe
drunkenintractable slaves serving as Lysis' and Menexenus' peda-
goguescontrasts withtheimageofSocratesas Lysis'andMenexenus'
temporary pedagogue.AtthebeginningofLysisSocratesdescribes
himself as making hiswayfrom theAcademy to theLyceum. Theword
Socratesusesto describehiswalk,thefirstwordofthedialogue,is
kntopeF6prlv("I wasmaking myway").56 The aporiaor intractability of
theslavesat theendofthedialoguecontrasts withSocrates'passage
(nt6poq)atthebeginning ofthedialogue.WhileSocratesis engagedin
philosophy, the drunken slavesliterallydisbandSocrates', Lysis',and
Menexenus' convivium (ouvouoaxv).
The drunkenness oftheslavesalso recallsHippothales' drunken-
nessandsuggests thattheslaves,likeHippothales, mayhavea detri-
mentalinfluence ontheboys.Inthisparticular case,as theyhinder the

53 Ly.223al-b2.
54 Ly.223b2.
55 Ly.203al.
 rtA"a
inPlato's
Lysis 253

boysfrom inquiry,
philosophical theyareperhapsintendedtoappearas
doingso.Tothisextenttheslavesare,likeHippothales,
also tpoaotolrlro
(piXot
(inauthentic) withwhomLysisandMenexenus donotbelong.The
harmfuldrunkenness oftheslavesandHippothales maybe contrasted
withthatbeneficial
drunkenness from describes
whichSocrates himself
andtheboysas sufferingas a resultofthetortuous
investigation:
Sinceitis as ifweweredrunk
(psE6olpEv) theX6yoq56
from
As Lysisand MenexenusleaveSocrates'companytheyleavethe
siteofbeneficial <ptia andriskthedangers
extrinsic oftheinauthentic
qpthia surroundingthem. The final scene ofthedialogue,withthe
entrance oftheslavesandthedisbanding ofthegroup,indicatesthat
thishighlyunconventional philosophical investigation
has occurred
withina spacegoverned bythecounter-philosophical conventions of
thepolis.The aporiaoftheinvestigation maybe seento resultfrom
thisconditionoftheinvestigationas well.WhileSocrates'communion
withtheboyshassoughttoprovoke inquiry
philosophical anddevelop
understanding beyondconventional, receivedviews,nonetheless,the
boysremaindeeplyentrenched intheconventional practicesoftheir
dailylives.

OiKEOt6rl IN REPUBLICI AND

ANDr6itp'rovYpiXov
GORGIAS
In RepublicI, SocratesconcludeshisdiscussionofjusticewithThra-
symachus withtheargument thatthejustpersonis happierthanthe
unustperson.Theargument beginsbydefining thefunction(Epyov)
of
anentitye as thatwhichonlye candoorthatwhiche candobest.57 The
functionofan entityis hereconceived as an operationoractivity.
For
example,seeingis thefunction oftheeyesandtrimming vinebranches
is thefunction ofa pruningknife.58
Notably, Socratesattributes
func-
tionsbothtoartifactsandtonatural kinds.

56 Ly.222c2.
57 R. I 352e2-3.
58 R.I 352e5-353a2.
254 DavidWolfsdorf

Next,SocrateselicitsThrasymachus' assentto theclaimthatthereis

a particularexcellence(&pErt)foreach thingthatis suitedto itspartic-
Thatis to say,foreach entityto performits particular
ular function.59
functionproperlyor optimallythatentitymusthave a particularexcel-
lence.Forinstance,Socratesasks:
Could the eyes performtheir distinct Epyovwell if they
lackedtheirownproperexcellence(oiKEiav&pEtljv)?60
Fromothercontexts,it is clear that sight(64ptq),conceivedas the
powerto see, is thedistinctexcellenceofthe eye.61BythisI meanthat
ifthe eye has a particularcondition,say,a particularphysicalconsti-
tution,that enables it under the appropriate conditionsto see. In
particular,noteSocrates'use ofthephraseoiKEiC paEfT ("properexcel-
lence"). This suggeststhatforeach type of entitythereis an optimal
conditionspecificallysuitedto thattypethatenables itto perform the
functionparticularlysuitedto thattype.Socratesdoes nothereuse the
correlativephraseoiKSLovEpyov("properfunction"),but it is reason-
able to supplyitas well.
These conceptsfromRepublicI suggestthat what belongsto or is
oiKEov to an entityof a certaintype is an excellence of a particular
kindand thatthe possessionofthis excellence enables thatentityto
operate properlyand optimally.In RepublicI Socrates characterizes
suchactivityor operationas happiness(E65atcpovia):
Anddidwe notagreethatthe excellenceofthe soul isjustice
... Then thejust man liveswell ... And he who liveswell is
blessedand happy(E6l5aipCv).62
Insofaras excellenceis good (&ya06v),this accordswithSocrates'
claimat theend ofLysisthatthegood is oiKEiovto all humans,who are
neithergood norbad. It is thisthathumanslack and thatwouldenable
themto functionoptimally, whichis to say,to livewell.

59 R.I353b2-4.
60 R. I353b14-c2.
61 Thisis ratheruncontroversial.
62 R. I353e7-354al.
 OtMiainPlato'sLysis 255

In GorgiasSocrates assumes thatall that is good-"we and every-

thingelse that is good"-is good throughthe presence of a certain
excellence.63Moreover,he claims thatthe excellenceof each thing-
"whetherofan artifactor bodyor soul or anylivingcreature"-entails
a certainstructure(rzitq) and order(6pO6rrlj):
So the excellence of each thingis somethingorganizedand
orderedin a particularstructure... And so a certainorder
belonging(oiKElOq)to each thingand presentin it makes
each thinggood.64
Soon afterthisremark,Socratesmakesthe following
generalstate-
mentaboutthe natureofthe cosmos:
Wise men tell us, Callicles,thatheavenand earthand gods
and men are held togetherby communionand cpthiaand
orderlinessand sound-mindednessand justice, and this is
thereasonwhytheycall thisuniversea cosmos.65

TheseremarksfromGorgias dovetailnicelywiththosefromRepublic
I. Theyare also suggestivewithrespectto Socrates'conceptionof piXIa
based on belongingin Lysis;and theyhelpclarifythenatureofthefirst
friend.When the concept of the firstfriendis introducedin Lysis,no
clear indicationis given of its identity.
However,it is suggestedto be
desiredforits own sake and to be thatforthe sake ofwhichall other
desiderataare desired.Desireforthefirstfriendis,then,intrinsicdesire.
In Euthydemus Socrates claimsthathappiness(E6aimpovia)is the
ultimateobjectofdesireinsofaras itmakesno sense,when one speaks
of desiringhappiness, to seek a furtherexplanationforthe desire.
Vlastosdescribesthisas theeudaimonistaxiom.66 InNicomachean Ethics,
Aristotle,appropriatingPlatonicideas,writes:
Now ifthere exists an end in the realmof actionwhichwe
desireforitsown sake,an endwhichdetermines all ourother

63 Grg.506d2-4.
64 Grg.506el-4.
65 Grg.507e6-a3.
66 Vlastos1991:203.
256 DavidWolfsdorf

desires;if,inotherwords,we do notmakeall ourchoicesfor

thesakeofsomething else-forinthiswaytheprocesswill
go oninfinitelyso thatourdesirewouldbe futileandpoint-
less-thenobviously thisend willbe thegood,thatis,the
highestgood.67
Shortly hecontinues:
after,
To resumethediscussion-sinceall knowledgeand every
choiceis directed
towardsomegood,letus discusswhatis in
ourviewtheaimofpolitics, thatis,thehighestgoodattain-
As
ablebyaction. faras its name is concerned,
mostpeople
wouldprobably agree-forboththecommonrunofpeople
and cultivatedmencall it happinessand understand by
'beinghappy'thesameas 'livingwell'and 'doingwell.'But
whenitcomesto defining whathappinessis,theydisagree,
andtheaccountgivenbythecommonrundiffers fromthat
ofthephilosophers.68
toPlato:scholarly
Returning divide
principally
interpretations over
whether
thefirst
friend istheForm
inLysis ofGoodnessorhappiness.69
thediscursive
Within context thereis no mention
ofLysis ofForms
whatsoever.ForthisreasonI regardtheformeroptionas misguided.
I
endorsetheidentification
ofthefirstfriend
withhappiness.However,
thisidentification
mustbe qualified.
Wehaveseenthatthedistinction betweeninauthenticandgenuine
ptXia tothedistinction
isnotanalogous between andextrinsic
intrinsic
Intrinsic
pitfa. piXia
maybegenuineorinauthentic; extrinsic
likewise
qtXia.Thisentailsthatintrinsic is notnecessarily
piXtia good.Andthis
furtherentailsthatthatwhichis desiredorbefriended
foritsownsake
isnotnecessarilygood;inotherwords, thefirst isnotnecessarily
friend
good.Consequently,
thefirst cannot
friend be happiness
quaobjective
good.
67 1094a18-22.
68 1095a14-22.
69InVlastos
1991:230,
thefirst
friend
isidentified
withEU6atpiovia.
Scholars
whohave
that
suggested thefirst istobeidentified
friend withtheForm
ofthegoodinclude
Samb
1991.SeealsoKramer
1959:500.
 inPlato'sLysis
OtAta 257

Butthisis just as it shouldbe. Happinessqua belonging, albeit

superordinate belonging,is a typethatshouldadmitbothgoodandbad
kinds.Thisis consistent
withtheprinciple thateveryone desireshappi-
as Aristotle
ness,for, notes,thereissubstantial disagreement
overwhat
happinessis.Accordingly, whileweareallmotivated towardhappiness,
we are compelledto distinguish betweengenuinehappinessand its
inauthenticsemblances.

APPENDIX
Thispaperwas composedin 2002and acceptedforpublicationin
2003.SincethattimeI havepublished orhaveforthcominga number
ofdiscussionsofdesirein Plato'searlydialoguesthatamplifyor,in
certainrespects,supplantthepresentdiscussion.
Onpage245,endof
paragraph,
first I writethat"I regard thateveryone
theclaiminGorgias
desiresthegoodas carrying no weightinthedebateoverSocrates'or
Plato'sconceptionofdesireamongtheearlydialogues."SeeWolfsdorf:
2008.
Againon page245,beginningofsecondparagraph,I writethatthe
passagestrongly
"Protagoras supportsthesubjectivistconceptionof
desireinMeno"See Wolfsdorf:
2006b.
onpage246,endoffirst
Finally, paragraph,
I write"... butwemust
judgewhethertokensofthosetypesaregoodorbad."I providea fuller
accountofdesireinLysisinWolfsdorf
2007.
TEMPLE
UNIVERSITY

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