Randy Aclan

Substituted by: Emmylou F. Bagares 1st Year

Te v. Choa
G.R. No. 126446, Nov. 29, 2000
Katipunan, J.:

Facts:

In 1988, Arthur Te and Lilian Choa married in civil rites. Although they did
not live together, they would usually see each other. In 1989, Liliana gave
birth to their daughter. Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting her. In 1990,
Arthur contracted another marriage while still married to Liliana. Hence,
Liliana filed a bigamy case against Te and administrative case for the
revocation of his and his mistress engineering license. Te filed a petition for
nullity of marriage. RTC rendered a decision on the bigamy case even the
petition for annulment was pending.

Issue:

Whether the annulment should be resolved first before the criminal and
administrative case be decided upon.

Ruling:

NO. The outcome of the annulment case had no bearing on Tes guilt in the
bigamy case. The ground cited by Te for the annulment was for voidable
marriage. Hence, he was still validly married when he committed bigamy.

Vicente Q. Ang III

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner

Vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent

G.R. No. 173540

PEREZ,J.:
Principle: Absence of Impediments

Facts:

Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted a complaint for declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against Peregrina Macua Va de Avenido on Nov 11, 1998 on the ground that Tecla is the
lawful wife of the deceased Eustaqui Avenido (Eustaqio). Tecla alleged that she was
married to Eustaquio on Sept 30, 1942 in Talibon, Bohol officiated by the Parish Priest of
the said town. However due to World War II, the records were destroyed thus only a
certification was issued to the LCR.

Tecla and Eustaquios union, they begot four (4) children, namely: Climaco, Apolinario,
Editha, Eustaquio Jr. In 1954 Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts unknown. In
1958 Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with
Buenaventura Sayson which later on died. Eustaquio remarried to Peregrina which
marriage Tecla claims should be null and void for being bigamous, an action she sought
to protect the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaqio. On 1999,
Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counter claim. She averred that she is
the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on September 22, 1989, and that their
marriage having been celebrated on March 30, 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City.
She contends that the case was instituted in bad faith to deprive her of the properties she
owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.

The trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage, and
relies on Teclass failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. The
certification issued by the considered useless. The same thing was said as regard to the
Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The CA, on the other hand,
concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio
as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot 4 children. The
presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certification
disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of
Adelina-Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of
marriage. Contrarty to the trial courts ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the
evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the rules of
Court.
Issue:
Whether there are legal impediments to the union of Eustaquio and Peregrina
Held:

Yes, there are legal impediments to the union of Eustaquio and Peregrina. The Supreme
Court upheld the reversal by the CA on the decision of the trial court, siting precedents
that. While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it
is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches
that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate. Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents.

The RTC committed a reversible error when it disregarded the testimonies of Adelina, the
sister of Eustaquio who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration
of her older brother and Tecla. Climaco, the eldest son of Eustaqio and Tecla, who
testified that his mother was married to his father Eustaquio. It should be stressed that
the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, presents an essential condition
to introduction of secondary evidence, which were disregarded by the court. Also there is
a certification of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of
Talibon, Bohol. All secondary evidences pointing to the fact that indeed Eustaquio and
Tecla were married, and that his marriage to Peregrina is void.
 st
EMMYLOU F. BAGARES 1 Year BL5-A

AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Facts:

Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were spouses married in 1954,however

Palaroan filed an action for annulment of their marriage on the ground that his consent
was obtained through force and intimidation. The petition was dismissed. Hence, marriage
is subsisting. Later on, Palaroan confessed to Anaya that he had pre-marital relationship
with his close relative. Aurora claimed that the non-disclosure of such pre-marital
relationship constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She then prayed for annulment of
their marriage on such ground.

Issue:

Whether the non-disclosure of a husband to her wife of his pre-marital relationship

is a ground for annulment of marriage?

Ruling:

No, non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is

not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment ot
that would render marriage void ab initio or just voidable. Article 46 of the Family code
enumerated characteristics of Fraud in relation to the provision of Article 45 that marriage
maybe annulled for any of following reasons and paragraph 3 states That consent of
any party was obtained with fraud it is excluded by the last paragraph of the article 46,
that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to... chastity" shall give ground for an action
to annul a marriage.

Princess Helen Grace M. Bebero

Villanueva v. CA

505 SCRA 564

Principle: Effect of Force, Intimidation and Undue Influence

Facts: Orlando Villanueva and Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988. On
November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his
marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who
was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never
cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's
child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition,
arguing that Orlando freely and voluntarily married her; that he knew about the progress
of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely.

Issue: Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent

Ruling: No. Orlando Villanueva freely and voluntarily married Lilia Canalita-Villanueva and
that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so.

Orlando anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did
not freely consent to be married to Lilia. He cited several incidents that created on his
mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life
and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from the appellee and strangers as well as
the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of the East after his
classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member
of the New Peoples Army whom Orlando claimed to have been hired by Lilia and who
accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.

The Court is not convinced that Orlandos apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It
is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, he worked as a security
guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that
appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep
himself out of harms way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to
bear upon Orlando, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security
personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were
threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to
solemnizing their marriage.
Efren Ceasar C. Beljeda, LLB 1A
Jimenez v. Caizares
109 Phil 27
Padilla, J.
Principle: Effect of Physical Incapacity / Impotence
Facts:
On August 3, 1950, the petitioner Joel Jimenez and defendant Remedios
Caizares got married before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga City. Two
nights and one day after their marriage, Joel left their conjugal home because he
found out that her wifes vagina was too small for penile penetration during
copulation which existed since the time of their marriage.

After a couple of years of his marriage, Joel filed a complaint on June 7, 1955
in CFI of Zamboanga praying for a decree annulling his marriage to Remedios on the
ground of her wifes physical incapacity to copulate due to the small office of her
genitals for penile penetration. Remedios was summoned and served a copy of the
complaint, however, she did not file an answer. On 17 December 1956 the Court
ordered the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady
physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten
days from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof. However,
Remedios did not submit herself to medical examination.

After hearing, at which the defendant Remedios was not present, on 11 April
1957 the Court entered a decree annulling the marriage between petitioner Joel and
defendant Remedios. The CFI of Zamboanga denied the motion for reconsideration.
Issue:

Whether the marriage between Joel and Remedios be annulled on the strength
only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was
and is impotent.
Ruling:

No. Remedios impotency has not been proven by indubitable evidence as

required by law because she did not submit herself to medical examination. The
presumption is in favor of potency unless proven otherwise. The lone testimony of the
husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear
asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

Marriage is an institution in which the community is deeply interested to prevent

the bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to
its destruction. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity,
continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely
dependent upon it. The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the
parties.

The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance
with the Supreme Courts decision.
Isaac Medel A. Bontia
Veronica Alcazar vs Rey Alcazar
GR No. 174451, October 13, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J
Facts:

On October 11, 2000 Veronica and Rey were married. However, On October 23,
2000, Rey left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where he was employed. While
working, he did not communicate with Veronica by phone or letter. Veronica tried calling
him but he never answered. About a year and a half, Rey was about to return but Veronica
was not advised of his arrival.

Veronica further averred that from the time Rey arrived, he never contacted her.
Veronica then concluded that Rey was physically incapable of consummating his
marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to
Article 45 of the Family Code.

Rey did not answer nor participated. Consequently, on June 9, 2004, the RTC
denied Veronicas complaint as well as her motion for reconsideration filed before the CA.
Issue:

Whether Rey was physically incapable and can be a ground for the annulment of
marriage
Held:

No. Rey was not proven physically incapable. Physical incapability of

consummating the marriage refers to impotency or inability of the parties organ of
copulation to perform its proper function or to perform the complete act of sexual
intercourse. Article 45 provides that potency is presumed and the party that claims
impotency has the burden of proof. If Rey was proven having absolute or incurable
impotency and the condition of such existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
then it can be a ground for their marriage to be annulled.
However, Veronica admitted that she and Rey had sexual intercourse after their
wedding and before Rey left for abroad. As stated, there was no physical incapacity on
Reys part. Therefore, there is no ground for annulling the marriage.
7 LYDIA O. BUSTAMANTE

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI,
and FERNANDO SY, respondents.
G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000
Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:

The Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted

marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both
were then 22 years old.. Their union was blessed with two children. On September 15,
1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately
and their two children were in the custody of their mother. On February 11, 1987,
Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando,
Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for separation of property. Judgment
was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime
of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by
the spouses. In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide
against her husband. RTC Manila convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of
slight physical injuries and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Petitioner filed a
petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of
psychological incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC and Court of Appeals denied the petition and
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by certiorari, petitioner for the first time,
raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its
celebration. The date of issue of marriage license and marriage certificate is contained
in their marriage contract which was attached in her petition for absolute declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date of the actual celebration of their
marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license
are different and inconsistent.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from
the beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony?

2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of

said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity?
Held:

A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage

void ab initio. The pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly
and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license.
The marriage contract also shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in
Carmona, Cavite yet neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in Carmona. From the
documents she presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year after
the ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case, there being
no claim of exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The
marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. The remaining
issue on the psychological capacity is now mooted by the conclusion of this court that the marriage
of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time
their marriage
KRISTELLE MAY O. CAGATIN

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, PETITIONER,

vs.

ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008

Tinga, J.:

Facts: Petitioner and respondent became sweethearts in 1991 and planned to get married. In 1994, they
secured a marriage license from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City. When the couple went back
to the said office, the license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife
for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date but after the ceremony they both went
back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. Respondent gave birth to
a child which petitioner denies being a father of. Respondent filed a complaint for support but petitioner
insisted he had never seen nor does he acknowledge the child.

Issue: Whether the marriage was void ab initio since the affidavit in lieu of the marriage license was fake.

Ruling: Yes. The marriage of the de Castros was void ab initio.

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio. It is clear in the case that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they
contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit which had been found out fake and was
admitted by the respondent herself. The false affidavit executed has no value. They were not exempt from
the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain the marriage license renders their marriage void
ab initio.


9 KAROL VINCENT S. CAJES

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO-ABBAS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Syed, a Pakistani citizen, he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan and they were
married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the Philippines in
December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at
his mother-in-laws residence, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He was told
that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the
Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and
Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a
marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona,
Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area.

Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain
Maria Corazon Buenaventura.

To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo.In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of
their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. The
Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11,
2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract
he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage
license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
 The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC
on the ground that there was no diligence to search for the real source of the marriage
license issued to Abbas (for it could be that the marriage license was issued in another
municipality).

ISSUE:

The marriage between Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo is void ab initio due to lack of marriage
license.

HELD:

Yes. Marriage license is an essential requisite for a valid marriage.

The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of RTC. The Local Civil
registrars certification enjoyed probative value as her duty was to maintain records of
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. There is a presumption of regularity
of official acts in favor of the local civil registrar. Gloria was not able to overcome this
presumption hence it stands to favor Abbas.

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted
and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid
marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, The absence of any
of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio. Article 35(3)
of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void
from the beginning.
JESSETTE AMIHOPE CASTOR

JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,

vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
July 31, 2006
G.R. No. 167684

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts:
Jaime O. Sevilla filed a complaint claiming that his marriage on 19 May 1969 was
through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N.
Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of
the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were
introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel.
On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage
contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for
a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain
any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was
presented to the solemnizing officer.

For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she
and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May 1969 and in a church ceremony thereafter on
31 May 19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were
registered with the local civil registry of Manila with the same marriage license no.
2770792 used and indicated. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license
after having been married to her for 25 years.

However, Local Civil Registrar of San Juan issued two certifications both bear
the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force
locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine
the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both
certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was
issued.

Issue:
1. Whether the certification from the Local Civil Registrar stating that no
marriage license was issued, sufficient to declare the marriage null and void.
Held:
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in
the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the
first and second certifications. Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive
proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we
believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of
showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that
absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic

social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find
no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families
weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the
family members alone.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward
the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look
upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary,
the presumption is of great weight. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. The parties have comported themselves
as husband and wife and lived together for several years producing two offsprings, now
adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for declaration
of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991. We are not ready
to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom
and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.
Michelle U. Catayas

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Ninal vs Bayadog

G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000

Facts : Teodulfa Bellones and Pepito Ninal was married on September 26, 1974. In the
span of their marriage, they produced three children. Pepito shot teodulfa Bellones on
April 24, 1985. Resulting to the death of the latter. One year and8 months thereafter or
on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got marriedwithout any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and were thusexempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is null and

void ab initio

(2) Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file a decleation of nullity of Pepitos
marriage after death

HELD: As to the first issue, YES. The two marriages involved herein having been
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code whichwas the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the
Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio. Pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. However, a marriage
license is dispensed with, as provided in Article 76 of the Civil Code, referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived togetherand exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage.In this case, at the time of Pepitoand respondents marriage, it cannot be
said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
their wedding day. From the timePepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage
with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and
his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had
started living with each other that has already lasted for five years,the fact remains that
their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law.It
should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only bythe absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he startedcohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had alreadybeen separated in
fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there
wasactual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation byeither spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife"
Geralene C. Clarito
1st Year BL-5A

Title : MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ

354 SCRA 1

Ponente: Davide, Jr., C.J.

Principle: Marriage exempt from marriage license requirements.

FACTS:

Herminia Borja- Manzano was the lawful wife of the David Manzano having been married
on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children.
On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao
before respondent Judge Sanchez. In their marriage contract, it clearly stated that both
contracting parties were separated thus respondent Judge ought to know that the
marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of
David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for
seven years without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit that they
both left their families and had never communicated with spouses due to constant
quarrels. Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent judge with gross
ignorance of the law.

ISSUES:

Whether the Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnize the
marriage without marriage license and solemnize marriage between two contracting
parties who both have existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been
cohabiting for 5 years under Article 34 of family code.

HELD:

Yes, the Judge can solemnize marriage without marriage license because Article 34 of
the family code provides that No license be necessary for the marriage of a man and
woman who lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. But, the
solemnization of marriage between two contracting parties who both have existing
marriage is a null and void because among the requisites of article 34 is that parties
must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has
a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both
separated is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage without legal
effect. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at
least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly,
respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized
a void and bigamous marriage.

ANALYN V. FERNANDEZ
LLB 1 Section A (5-Year Program)

DAYOT vs. DAYOT

G.R. No. 179474, March 28, 2008
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Facts:
On 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married. In lieu of a marriage
license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage with the RTC. According to Jose, sometime in 1986, Felisa
requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall so she could claim a package
sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. There, a man bearing three folded pieces
of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that
the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused but Felisa cajoled him, and
told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned
about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed. It was in February 1987 when he
discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa.

Felisa denied Joses allegations. She declared that they had maintained their
relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980.
She had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.

Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter
contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990.
 On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently,
she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman
which found him administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct.

On 26 July 2000, the RTC dismissed the. The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling.

ISSUE:

Would the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in
truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively render the marriage
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license?

Ruling: YES

For the exception to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the
woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The minimum requisite of five
years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. It is
embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a
mandatory character.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five
years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The
Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or
barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also
noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita
Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986. The appellate court also cited Felisas
own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her
house. Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose
and Felisa, is beyond question.
 If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of
paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was
celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license.
RANNEL F. FLORES Prof. Atty. Resci Angeli Rizada
BL5-A Persons and Family Relations

Title : Dayot vs. Dayot

Case No. : 550 SCRA 435 / G. R. No.: 179474
Principle : Marriages Exempt from License Requirements

Facts:

On November 1996, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. In lieu of a marriage license, Jose
and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit the same date, attesting that both of them had attained the age of
maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

On July 1993, Jose filed a complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage, contending
that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that
he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least
five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filling of the same. In opposing the
Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that
they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of
1990, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. Felisa
expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual. Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative
complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of
the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio.

HELD:

Yes. It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on November 1986, prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil
Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract.
ART. 53 No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent; freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The instant case pertains to a ratification of martial cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
 ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the
age of majority and who, being unmarried have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license.
However, the falsity of an affidavit of martial cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of
the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license.

Marriage of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the
formal requisite of a marriage license. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to
those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other.
The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation.
For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is
embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is
worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts
in an administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state
in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with
the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage
without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the
perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought
to prevent by making a prior license of a prerequisite for a valid marriage. It is indubitably established that
Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit dated
24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license,
is beyond question.
Henry G Funda, Jr.

Carlos v. Sandoval
574 SCRA 116, Dec. 16, 2008

Facts: On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad
and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Petitioner-Carlos Sandoval and respondent
Felicidad entered into compromised agreements to divide the land equally. In August
1995, Carlos filed an action with the following causes: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage;
(b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (c) sum of money
and damages. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late
brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was nullity in view of the absence of the required
marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the
natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is a proper party to seek the declaration of nullity of
the marriage in controversy.

Ruling: The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks
the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity
of marriage case against the surviving spouse. Hence, only the party who can
demonstrate a proper interest can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule
means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgement
of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere
incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not real party in interest, the case
is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. Thus, in pursuant of Sec 2. Petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages the petitioner Carlos Sandoval isnt
the proper property to file such petition.
Ivan Nalada
(substituted by: Bai-Hasnairah M. Guinzon)

Araes vs. Occiano

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390, April 11, 2002
Puno, J.

Principle of Law:
Authority of the solemnizing officer

Facts:
Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, Judge
Occiano, Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnize
the marriage of Araes and late Dominador Orobia. He was informed that Orobia had a
difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located
almost 25 km from his residence in Nabua. He was then requested to solemnize the
marriage in Nabua. After careful examination of the documents, Judge Occiano
discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to
solemnize the marriage but out of human compassion, he proceeded to do so.

However, since the marriage was a nullity, Araes right to inherit the vast properties left
by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of
Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

Issue:
Is Judge Occiano liable due to the solemnization of marriage outside of his jurisdiction
and without the prerequisite marriage license even it was done out of human
compassion?

Rulings:
Yes. Judge Occiano is administratively liable.

The territorial jurisdiction of Judge Occiano is limited to the municipality of Balatan,

Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of Araes and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His
act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the
marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating
the law on marriage.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within
said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official
to administrative liability.

Judge Occiano should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. A marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void,
and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota
of validity of the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that
gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Nhassie John G. Gonzaga
LLB 1A (5 Year Program)

Navarro vs. Domagtoy

AM No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996
Romero, J.:

Principle: Authority of Solemnizing Officer

Facts:

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa,

Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two
specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law.

First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between
Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife.

Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano

Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27,
1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the
respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45
kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his
having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario
outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be
held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at
the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request
of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that
either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover,
the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one
party, Gemma del
Rosario.
Issue:

Does Judge Domagtoy have the authority to solemnize marriage outside his
jurisdiction?

Ruling:

No, Judge Domagtoy doesnt have the authority to solemnized marraige outside
his jurisdiction.

The elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the

solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the
"authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by,
among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction."
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony
and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the
preceding provision. Non- compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta.

Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as
grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated
a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Bai-Hasnairah M. Guinzon

VILAR vs PARAISO
G. R. No. L-8014, March 14, 1955
Bautista Angelo, J.

Principle of Law:
Authority of solemnizing officer

Facts:

In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V. Vilar and Gaudencio V.
Paraiso were among the candidates registered and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal,
Nueva Ecija. After the canvass was made and as a result, the municipal board of
canvassers proclaimed the latter as the mayor duly elected.

However, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he was
then a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was disqualified
to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, Vilar also
prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of respondent
Paraiso.

Paraiso denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines on August 21, 1951, that his resignation was accepted
by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting on August 27, 1951.

The evidence for Vilar tends to show that Paraiso was ordained as minister of the
Evangelical Church of the Philippines in 1944 and as such was given license to solemnize
marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries; that since 1944 up to 1950 he acted as
minister continuously and without interruption and has been renewing his license to
solemnize marriages as prescribed by the regulations of the Bureau of Public Libraries;
that on April 7, 1951, respondent applied for, and was issued, a license to solemnize
marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries as minister of the new church up to the end
of April, 1952; that said license has never been cancelled, as neither the head of the
united church nor respondent has requested for its cancellation; and that respondent has
been publicly known as minister of the United Church of Christ, but he has not attached
to his certificate of candidacy a copy of his alleged resignation as minister.

Issue:
Whether Paraiso is ineligible to take the municipal position.
Ruling:
Yes. It is therefore constrained to hold that Paraiso is disqualified to hold the office of
mayor.

As per examination of the so-called minute book wherein are entered the minutes of all
the meeting of the church, because upon an examination thereof one would at once get
the impression that it was prepared haphazardly and not with such seriousness and
solemnity that should characterize the religious activities of a well established religious
order. All these lead the court to believe with Vilar, that the supposed resignation and
acceptance were made at a later date to cure the ineligibility of Paraiso.

The importance of resignation cannot be underestimated. The purpose of registration is

two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the minister to discharge religious
functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This
information is necessary for the protection of the public.

This is specially so with regard to the authority to solemnized marriages, the registration
of which is made by the law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It is no argument
to say that the duty to secure the cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not
upon Paraiso, but upon the head of his organization or upon the official in charge of such
registration, upon proper showing of the reason for such cancellation, because the law
likewise imposes upon the interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation, who in
the instant case is the Paraiso himself. This he failed to do. And what is more, he failed
to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister
knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office.
ERNIE Y. GULTIANO 1st Year Section A

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Facts:

Vicenta Escao, 27 years of age exchanged marriage vows with Pastor

Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock,
without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in
the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. Subsequently, the Escao spouses sought
priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to
be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority
from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the
marriage. Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal
that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted
by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition.
The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing

Issue:

Is an irregularity in the requisite of marriage be a ground to declare marriage void

ab initio?

Ruling:

No, lack of authority of a solemnizing officer cannot render marriage void ab initio
but merely voidable. Article 3 paragraph 1 of the Family code states that even if the
solemnizing officer is not authorized, the marriage would be valid if either or both of the
parties believe in good faith in the authority of the solemnizing officer to solemnize the
marriage.
Jonathan Jr. Sison Hermino

Martinez v. Tan
12 Phil 731
Willard, J:

Principle: Marriage Ceremony

Facts:
On September 25, 1907, a marriage ceremony was celebrated by Rosalia
Martinez (plaintiff) and Angel Tan (defendant) before the Justice of Peace, Jose
Ballori.

Plaintiff claimed that what took place before the justice of peace did not
constitute a legal marriage. She admits that she signed the document in
question, but says that she signed it in her own home, without reading it, and at
the request of defendant, who told her that it was a paper authorizing him to ask
the consent of her parents to the marriage.
On the other hand, defendant testified that he and the plaintiff signed and
appeared before the Justice of Peace for the marriage ceremony. His statement
were supported by witnesses Zacarias Esmero, Pacita Ballori, and Jose
Santiago who were present on the day of ceremony.
Moreover, there were series of letters from the plaintiff. It states that they
(plaintiff and defendant) should be careful informing her father that they were
already civilly married because she is afraid to be turned out of their house.
Another letter states that she can hardly go out from their house in the morning
because her sister in law did not allow her. Instead, she moves it to 5 or 6 oclock
to meet the defendant. That day was the day and time when the ceremony was
held.

Issue:
Is the marriage of the plaintiff and defendant valid?

Ruling:

Yes, the marriage of the plaintiff and defendant is valid. Under, General
order No. 68, section 6; No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is
required, but the parties must declare in the presence of the person solemnizing
the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife.
The admission of the plaintiff that she signed as well as the defendant can
only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared
and signed the said document which so states before the justice of the peace
Jonathan Jr. Sison Hermino

who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant
were able to read and write the Spanish language, and that they knew the
contents of the document which they signed; and under the circumstances in this
particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the justice
of the peace on this occasion amounted to a legal marriage.
21- IGNACIO, JACQUELINE LESLIE S.

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:

Almost one year after her marriage with the appellant Lucio Morigo,
Lucia Barrete filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17,
1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992,
appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago. On September
21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No.
6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of
accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony
actually took place. Appellant was then charged with Bigamy. The trial court
found Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty of bigamy.

ISSUE:

Whether Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy.

RULING:

No, Lucio is not guilty of bigamy for his marriage with Lucia Barrete
was null and void ab initio from the very beginning because no marriage
ceremony actually took place.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for
the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, the trial court found that
there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and
Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing
of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing
officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in
accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. This simply means
that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and
purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as
void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused
was, under the eyes of the law, never married.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must
have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner
was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to
speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared
void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract
of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its
logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at
the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and
the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of
bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of
BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral
certainty.

Vanessa Mae Jaspe
(substituted by: Bai-Hasnairah M. Guinzon)

Madridejo vs. De Leon

G. R. No. L-32473, October 6, 1930
Villa-real, J.

Principle of Law:
Issuance of marriage certificate

Facts:
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de Leon.
The wife and son survived Eulogio, who subsequently died. During her widowhood,
Flaviana lived wih Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. A child was born to Pedro and Flaviana
which was named Melecio Madridejo. Flaviana, being at deaths door, was married to
Pedro by the Parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary.

Issue:
Whether the failure of the parish priest in sending a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary invalidated the marriage of Flaviana and Pedro.

Rulings:
No. The marriage of Flaviana Perez and Pedro Madridejo is still valid.

The mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does
not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites
required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding a copy of the
marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.
JASPER JAY Q.LIM

People v. Borromeo

133 SCRA 106

Ponente: Relova, J.

Facts:

At high noon of July 3, 1981, the four-year old niece of Elias and Susana
Borromeo reported to Matilde Taborada, mother of Susana, that Susana was shouting
frantically for help because Elias was killing her. The 71-year old Matilde Taborada told
the child to go to Geronimo Taborada, her son, who was then working in their mango
plantation. Upon hearing the report of the child, Geronimo informed his father and
together they went to Susana's hut. The windows and the door were closed and
Geronimo could only peep through the bamboo slats at the wall where he saw Susana
lying down, motionless, apparently dead beside her one-month old child who was
crying. Elias Borromeo was lying near Susana still holding on to a bloody kitchen bolo.

The father of Susana called for the Mabolo police.After a few minutes, police
officer Fernando C. Abella and three policemen arrived. The peace officers shouted and
ordered Elias to open the door. Elias answered calmly that he would smoke first before
he would open the door. When he did, the peace officers found Susana already dead
with her intestine having spilled out of her abdomen. A small kitchen bolo was at her
side.

The accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding as it did, that
appellant and Susana Taborada were legally and validly married in a church wedding
ceremony, when the officiating priest testified otherwise and there was no marriage
contract executed on the occasion or later on.Hence, the accused could only be liable
for homicide and not parricide. He thinks such because there was no marriage contract
issued on their wedding day and after that.

Issue:

Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?

Ruling:

In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married,
are presumed married unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order
of society. Furthermore, the validity of a marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence
of the requisites of the marriage which are : legal capacity and consent. The absence of
the record of such marriage does not invalidate the same as long as the celebration and
all requisites are present.

Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of

any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency
and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216). And, the mere fact that no record of
the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long
as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of
a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites. (Pugeda
vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849). The appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity
increased from P12,000 to P30,000.
Richard T. Macanlay 1st Year BL5-A

Substituted by: Jonathan S. Hermino

Yao Kee, et. al, petitioners, vs. Sy-Gonzales, et.al respondents.

G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
CORTES, J.:

Facts:
Sy Kiat is a Chinese national who died on January 17, 1977 in
Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal
properties here in the Philippines worth about P300,000. Aida Sy-Gonzales
et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration and alleged that
(a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their
knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's
marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him. The petition was
opposed by Yao Kee et al who alleged that she is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat
whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China and the other oppositors
are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee.

Probate court ruled that Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee and
the other oppositors were legitimate children of Sy Mat. On appeal, CA
simply modified probate courts judgment and stated that Aida Sy-Gonzales
et al are natural children of Sy Mat. They filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in
accordance with Philippine laws.

HELD:

For a marriage to be recognized as valid, the existence of foreign law

as a question of fact and the alleged marriage must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. In the case at bar petitioners did not present any
competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage.

The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as

proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-
serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are
competent to testify on the subject matter.

For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the
validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage
between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Sherwin P. Maganda
LLB 1 Section A (5-Year Program)

Republic vs. Orbecido III

G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting respondents
petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married
in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros
left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an
American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was living
with his wife in the States that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree.
Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of
Art. 26 of the Family Code.

Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry.

The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that,
petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant
case.
Issue:

Whether Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.?

Ruling:

The Decision and Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is
hereby set aside and the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is granted.

Respondent Orbecido III, who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent
evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried.

Art. 26, par. 2 states, where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under the Philippine laws. It only applies to cases where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. This case is
one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens,
but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained
a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen
while residing in the U.S. Therefore, par. 2 of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case.

However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason
must be applied. The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be construed and
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be a sanction of absurdity and injustice. Were the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of
the law. A stature may therefore be extended to case not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent.
26 LADY DIANNE E. MARAMION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS L. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Facts:
Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City.

Crasus alleged that after the celebration of their marriage, he discovered that Fely was
hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United
States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six
years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A.,
respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce
papers. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to
their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child.

Fely, on the other hand, refuted Crasus allegation and said that she may had been
indignant at Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness,
womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the
maintenance of their household. Indeed, she left for abroad for financial reasons as Crasus
had no job. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American
husband and acquired American citizenship.

The recognition of the divorce decree obtained by Fely is now sought for.

Issue:

Is Article 26 of the FC applicable in the case at bar?

Ruling: NO

As it is worded, Article 26 of the FC, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein

one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the
marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be
applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained
her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely
herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she
married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been
an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino
citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status,
condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then
and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely
could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

Hence, the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains
valid and subsisting.
Moncano, Iris Karen

Corpuz vs. Sto.Tomas

Brion, J.

Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization. In 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn Sto. Tomas. Gerbert left
Canada to surprise Daisylyn but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an
affair with another man. Gerbert went back to Canada and filed a divorce decree which
took effect on 2006. Two years after, he met another Filipina so he went to Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree but the official of NSO
informed him that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists. Gerbert filed petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved.

Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens
the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.

No. Alien spouse can no longer claim right under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse. In both cases of Van Dorn vs Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera, the Court
refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign
courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of
the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her
alien spouse. Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare
that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.
 The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the
marital bond between the spouses. the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses
assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and
the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed
the marital bond between the spouses.
ROMMIL P. NUEZ [BL-1A-5YR]

FUJIKI VS. MARINAY

GR No. 196049
June 26, 2013
CARPIO, J.

FACTS:
In this case, the petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004.
Eventually they separated because Fujiki cannot bring Marinay to Japan where he resides.
Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). They got married on 15 May
2008 in Quezon City without the first marriage being dissolved. They lived together in Japan;
however, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara prompting her to leave
Maekara. While in Japan, Marinay started to contact Fujiki. They met in Japan and they were
able to re-establish their relationship.
In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14
January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it did not meet standing and venue
requirements. Fujiki file a Motion for Reconsideration, he claimed that the case should not be
dismissed as the rule in (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) should not apply to cases of bigamy. This was
affirmed by the Solicitor General who was asked to comment.

ISSUE:
Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy?

HELD:
Yes, there is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from
it.
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.

Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate the proceedings.
Santino B. Puertollano

TERESITA C. YAPTINCHAY, Petitioner

vs.
HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES, Respondent
G.R. No. L-26462 June 9, 1969
SANCHEZ, J.:
Principle: Common Law Marriages

Facts:
Teresita Yaptinchay alleged that she and deceased Isidro Yaptinchay had
lived continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for 19 years (1946-
1951). The deceased died without a will and left an estate consisting of personal
and real properties.Petitioner likewise alleged that certain parties took away from
the residences certain personal properties belonging to the deceased together
with others exclusively owned by her.
Upon the foregoing allegations, the court issued an order appointing
Teresita as special administrator of the estate. An opposition was subsequently
registered by Josefina Yaptinchay, allegedly the legitimate wife, and Ernesto
Yaptinchay and other children of the deceased upon the ground that Teresita, not
being an heir, had no right to institute the proceeding for the settlement of Isidros
estate, much less to procure appointment as administrator thereof. They likewise
prayed for the appointment of Virginia Yaptinchay, daughter of the deceased, as
special administrator and Josefina as regular administrator. The probate court
granted the counter-petitioners prayer and named Virginia as special
administrator.
Included among the properties in the preliminary inventory of assets was a
residential house at North Forbes Park, Makati. Petitioner then filed in another
CFI branch an action for replevin and for liquidation of the partnership
supposedly formed during the period of her cohabitation with Isidro and for
damages.
Pending hearing on the question of the issuance of the writs of replevin
and preliminary injunction prayed for, respondent judge Guillermo E. Torres
issued an order temporarily restraining defendants therein (private respondents
here) and their agents from disposing any of the properties listed in the complaint
and from interfering with plaintiff's (herein petitioner's) rights to, and possession
over, amongst others, "the house now standing at North Forbes Park, Makati,
Rizal."
The CFI held that: While the Court is still considering the merits of the
application and counter-application for provisional relief, the Court believes that
for the protection of the properties and considering the Forbes Park property is
really under the responsibility of defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, by virtue of her
being appointed Special Administratrix of the estate of the deceased Isidro
Yaptinchay, the Court denies the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction of the plaintiff with respect to the Forbes Park property and the
restraining order issued by this Court is lifted. The Court also orders the plaintiff
to cease and desist from disturbing in any manner whatsoever the defendant
Virginia Y. Yaptinchay in the possession of said property.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on
the provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code is decisive.

Ruling:
NO. Article 144 says that: "When man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership." .
But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship
envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the existence of which
must first be shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to
accrue. One such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the
petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the
property involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's
interests in the property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right"
or title that would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of
injunction. For, the existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial
protection is wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future
rights; nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right.
 At any rate, it would seem to us that the interests of the parties would be
better safeguarded if the controverted North Forbes Park property be in the
hands of the bonded administratrix in the estate proceedings. For then, her acts
would be subject to the control of the probate court.
Finding no error in the disputed orders of respondent judge, the herein
petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed, and the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued by this Court is hereby dissolved and set aside.
Jebelle Q. Puracan

Title : Estrada vs Escritor

Citation : A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003
Ponente : Puno, J.
Principle : Common Law Marriages

Facts:
Petitioner Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of
Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of
rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, herein respondent who is a court interpreter in
said court, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen
to twenty years old. Respondent is not personally related either to the respondent or her
partner. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against the respondent as he believes that
she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court wherein he
believed that employees of the judiciary should be respectable, and the respondent
being in a live-in arrangement did not command such respect. Thus she should not be
allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.

Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary, she was already a
widow. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the
benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the
religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract
Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. She
explained further that her congregation allows her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio
and it does not consider it immoral. In fact, after ten years of living together, she
executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness signed by three witnesses. At the time
Escritor executed her pledge, her husband was still alive but living with another
woman. Quilapio was likewise married at that time, but had been separated in fact from
his wife.
The execution of the declaration finds scriptural basis in Matthew 5:32 that when the
spouse commits adultery, the offended spouse can remarry.

Respondent also invokes religious freedom under Article III, Section 5 of the
Constitution, which provides, viz:

Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross
and immoral conduct under the Revised Administrative Code.

Ruling:

The case is remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator where the burden of
evidence should be discharged by such proper agency of the government. The Solicitor
General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to
examine the sincerity and centrality of respondents claimed religious belief and practice;
(b) to present evidence on the states compelling interest to override respondents
religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing
its interest is the least restrictive to respondents religious freedom.
ROLAN J. QUIOS

Title : RENATO REYES SO VERSUS LORNA VALERA

G.R. NO. 150677, JUNE 5, 2009
Ponente : CHIEF JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO
Facts :
At a party in 1973, Renato (17 years old) and Lorna (21 years old) met that led to a courtship and to a 19-year common-law
relationship, culminating in the exchange of marital vows at the Caloocan City Hall on December 10, 1991. They had three
children- Jeffrey, Renelee and Loni. They eloped 2 months after their meeting and lived at the house On May 14, 1996
Renato filed a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Lorna with reasons: (1) their marriage was null
and void for want of the essential and formal requisites (2) the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise
the essential obligations of marriage as Lorna failed and refused to cohabit and make love to him, did not love and respect
him, did not remain faithful to him, did not give him emotional, spiritual, physical and psychological help and support, failed
and refused to have a family domicile, and failed and refused to enter into a permanent union and establish conjugal and
family life with him.

The Regional Trial Court nullified the marriage on November 8,1999 declaring respondent psychologically incapacitated to
comply with essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code, declaring the marriage contracted by Renato
So and Lorna Valera on Dec. 10, 1991 null and void an initial, Dissolving the conjugal partnership between spouses and
awarding custody of the minor children to petitioner.

The republic through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
RTC decision and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The petitioner failed to prove the respondents psychological
incapacity.

Issue :

1. Did the Court of appeals err in not ruling on the alleged lack of the essential and formal requisites of marriage?
2. Did the petitioner establish the respondents psychological incapacity?

Ruling :

1. No. The CA did not err in not ruling on the alleged lack of the essential and formal requisites of marriage. The
petitioner himself offered the Marriage Contract as evidence that it is registered with the Civil Registry of Kalookan
City. As duly registered document, it is a public document and is prima facile evidence of the facts it contains, namely,
the marriage of the petitioner with the respondent. To contradict these facts and the presumption of regularity in the
documents favor, the petitioners contrary evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.
To be sure, a married couple cannot simply nullify their marriage through the non-appearance of one spouse and the
uncorroborated declaration by the other spouse that the marriage did not really take place. At the very least, the
 declaration that marriage did not take place must be supported by independent evidence showing a physical
impossibility, a forgery or the disavowal by the supposed participants, to name a few possible reasons.
2. No. The totality of evidence presented by the petitioner failed to establish the respondent psychological incapacity
to perform the essential marital obligations.

Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different
from incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity
or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.
SECOND DIVISION

RENATO REYES SO, G.R. No. 150677

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, Chairperson,
*
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
VELASCO, JR.,
**
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

LORNA VALERA, June 5, 2009

Respondent.
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

For our review is the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Renato Reyes So (petitioner) against the
Decision dated July 4, 2001[2] and the Resolution dated October 18, 2001[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 65273. The challenged decision reversed the decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
143, Makati City declaring the marriage of the petitioner and respondent Lorna Valera (respondent) null and void on
the ground of the latters psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The assailed resolution denied
the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

The petitioner and the respondent first met at a party in 1973 after being introduced to each other by a common
friend. The petitioner at that time was a 17-year old high school student; the respondent was a 21-year old college
student. Their meeting led to courtship and to a 19-year common-law relationship,[5] culminating in the exchange of
marital vows at the Caloocan City Hall on December 10, 1991.[6]They had three (3) children (Jeffrey, Renelee, and
Loni)[7] in their relationship and subsequent marriage.
On May 14, 1996, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with
the respondent.[8] The case was docketed as JDRC Case No. 96-674. He alleged that their marriage was null and void
for want of the essential and formal requisites. He also claimed that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated
to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as shown by the following circumstances: the respondent failed and
refused to cohabit and make love with him; did not love and respect him; did not remain faithful to him; did not give
him emotional, spiritual, physical, and psychological help and support; failed and refused to have a family domicile;
and failed and refused to enter into a permanent union and establish conjugal and family life with him.[9]

The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his charges.

The petitioner testified that he and the respondent eloped two (2) months after meeting at a party.[10] Thereafter,
they lived at the house of his mothers friend in Bulacan, and then transferred to his parents house in Caloocan City.
They stayed there for two (2) months before transferring to MuntinlupaCity.[11]

The petitioner likewise related that respondent asked him to sign a blank marriage application form and
marriage contract sometime in 1986. He signed these documents on the condition that these documents would only
be used if they decide to get married. He admitted not knowing what happened to these documents, and maintained
that no marriage ceremony took place in 1991.[12] As noted below, the petitioner, however, submitted a certified true
copy of their marriage contract as part of his documentary evidence.

The petitioner further alleged that the respondent did not want to practice her profession after passing the
dental board exam; and that she sold the dental equipment he bought for her.[13] He also claimed that when he started
his own communication company, the respondent disagreed with many of his business decisions; her interference
eventually led to many failed transactions with prospective clients.[14]

The petitioner narrated that he often slept in the car because the respondent locked him out of the house when
he came home late. He felt embarrassed when his employees would wake him up inside the car. When he confronted
the respondent the next morning, she simply ignored him. He also claimed that respondent did not care for their
children, and was very strict with clients. Moreover, the respondent went out with his employees to gamble whenever
there were no clients.

Lastly, he testified that sometime in 1990, he found all his things outside their house when he came home late
after closing a deal with a client. He left their house and stayed at a friends house for two (2) months. He tried to go
back to their house, but the respondent prevented him from entering. The respondent also told him she did not love
him anymore. He attempted to reconcile with her for the sake of their children, but she refused to accept him back.[15]
 Summons was served on the respondent on July 17, 1996, but she failed to file an answer. The RTC ordered
the public prosecutor to investigate if there had been collusion between the parties and to intervene for the State to
see to it that evidence was not fabricated. Prosecutor Andres N. Marcos manifested that he was unable to make a
ruling on the issue of collusion since the respondent failed to appear before him. [16]

Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented certified true copies of the birth certificate of their three
children;[17] certified true copy of their marriage contract;[18] and the testimony, original curriculum vitae,[19] and
psychological report[20] of clinical psychologist Dr. Cristina Rosello-Gates (Dr. Gates).

In her Psychological Report, Dr. Gates noted as follows:

xxx

PARTICULARS

- Parties met in a party when Petitioner was 17 years and Respondent was 21 years old; both were studying
but Petitioner was also working in his fathers business;

- During the first time they met, Respondent hugged Petitioner and stayed close to him; she also taught him
how to smoke marijuana; after their first meeting, Respondent would fetch petitioner from school, and they
would go out together;

- Within the next two months, Respondent dropped out of school without informing her parents; she applied
for a job and was purportedly raped by her employer;

- When Respondents parents found out that she quit school, she sought petitioners help to look for a place to
stay; Renato brought her to his friends house in Bulacan but her hosts did not like her frequent outings and
parties; Respondent then asked Petitioner to live with her in a rented apartment; she told him to execute an
Affidavit of Loss so he can withdraw his savings with a new bankbook without the knowledge of his father;

- Parties were fetched by Petitioners parents to live with them in Caloocan; petitioner sent Respondent to
school to wean her away from her friends; when she passed the Dentistry Board Examinations, he put up a
dental clinic for her; after 2 months, she quit her dental practice and joined Petitioner in his communications
business;

- Respondent had problems dealing with Petitioners clients; she interfered with his decisions, and resented his
dealings with clients which would, at times, last till late at night; one incident in 1990, Respondent locked
Petitioner out of house prompting the latter to sleep in the car; other similar incidents followed where
employees would wake up Petitioner when they report for work; one night, Petitioner found all his things
thrown out of the house by Respondent;

- Respondent was not the one who took care of their children; the second child, for instance, cries whenever
said child sees Respondent as the latter is not familiar with the former;

- While parties lived together since 1973, they applied for a marriage license only in 1986; Respondent asked
Petitioner to sign both license and marriage contract without any public appearance at City Hall; their marriage
was registered in 1991 after the couple separated.[21]

and concluded that:

 An examination of the parties respective family background and upbringing, as well as the events prior to
their marriage point to psychological impairment on the part of Respondent Lorna Valera.

From a simple existence in the province, Lorna Valera was thrust in the big city for her college education.
It was in Sampaloc, Manila where she lived and groped, and eventually found herself in bad company. Thus, her
so-called culture shock was abated by pot sessions lasting several days at a time making her temporarily forget
the harsh reality in the metropolis. Her escapist and regressive tendencies stunted her psychological growth and
prevented her from fully functioning as a responsible adult.

Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), the international standards of psychological
disorders, Respondent Lorna Valera is plagued with an Adjustment Disorderas manifested in her impulsiveness,
lack of restraint, lack of civility and a sense of decency in the conduct of her life. Compulsive Behavior
Patterns are also evident in her marijuana habit, gambling and habitual squandering of Petitioners money. Lorna
Valeras Adjustment Disorder and Compulsive Behavior Patterns were already existing prior to her marriage to
Petitioner Renato So. Continuing up to the present, the same appears to be irreversible.[22]

The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the marriage of petitioner and respondent in its decision of November 8, 1999. The decision, a
relatively short one at four (4) pages, single-spaced, including the heading and the signature pages, made a short
summary of the testimonies of the witness with the statements that

Petitioner and respondent became common law husband and wife from 1973 to 1991. Out of this relationship were born
three children, namely Jeffrey, Renelee and Lino all surnamed Varela.

Sometime in 1987 petitioner was induced by respondent to sign a blank Marriage Contract and a blank application for
marriage license.The petitioner freely signed the documents with the belief that the documents will be signed only when
they get married.[23]

Thereafter, the RTC decision wholly dwelt on the question of the respondents psychological incapacity based on the
testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Gates, his expert witness. The decisions concluding

paragraphs stated:

Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that respondent Lorna Valera is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligation of marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the celebration thereof (Art. 36 F.C.).

It should be borne in mind that marriage is a special contract of permanent union and the foundation of the Family. The husband
and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual help and support (Art. 68 F.C.). It includes the giving of love and affection,
advice and counsel, companionship and understanding (Art. 230 F.C.). Respondent failed to observe all these things.[24]

The dispositive portion of the decision that immediately followed reads:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner and against respondent:

1. Declaring respondent psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
under Art. 36 of the Family Code;
 2. Declaring the marriage contracted by Renato Reyes So and Lorna Valero on December 10, 1991, null
and void ab initio;

3. Dissolving the conjugal partnership between the spouses in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the
Family Code;

4. Awarding the custody of the minor children to petitioner.

xxx

SO ORDERED.[25]

The CA Decision

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC
decision to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 65273. The CA, in its Decision dated July 4, 2001, reversed and
set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.[26]

The CA ruled that the petitioner failed to prove the respondents psychological incapacity. According to the CA, the
respondents character, faults, and defects did not constitute psychological incapacity warranting the nullity of the
parties marriage. The CA reasoned out that while respondent appears to be a less than ideal mother to her children,
and loving wife to her husband, these flaws were not physical manifestations of psychological illness. The CA further
added that although the respondents condition was clinically identified by an expert witness to be an Adjustment
Disorder, it was not established that such disorder was the root cause of her incapacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The prosecution also failed to establish that respondents disorder was incurable and permanent in such
a way as to disable and/or incapacitate respondent from complying with obligations essential to marriage.

The CA likewise held that the respondents hostile attitude towards the petitioner when the latter came home late was
a normal reaction of an ordinary housewife under a similar situation; and her subsequent refusal to cohabit with him
was not due to any psychological condition, but due to the fact that she no longer loved him.

Finally, the CA concluded that the declaration of nullity of a marriage was not proper when the psychological disorder
does not meet the guidelines set forth in the case of Molina.

The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution[27] dated October 18,
2001.

The Petition and Issues

 The petitioner argues in the present petition that the CA seriously
erred[28]

1. in reversing the RTC decision without ruling on the trial courts factual and conclusive finding that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent was null and void ab initio;

2. in departing from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings that factual findings of the trial
courts are entitled to great weight and respect and are not disturbed on appeal; and

3. in totally disregarding the undisputed fact that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations.[29]

The Republic, as intervenor-appellee, alleged in its comment that: (a) the trial court never made a definitive
ruling on the issue of the absence of the formal and essential requisites of the parties marriage; and (b) petitioner was
not able to discharge the burden of evidence required in Molina.[30]

The petitioner filed a reply;[31] thereafter, both parties filed their respective memoranda reiterating their
arguments. Other than the issue of the absence of the essential and formal requisites of marriage, the basic issue before us is
whether there exists sufficient ground to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent null and void.

THE COURTS RULING

We deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code. No case of lack of essential and formal requisites of marriage has been proven or validly ruled upon by the
trial court.

1. The CA did not err in not ruling on the alleged lack

of the essential and formal requisites of marriage

The petitioner cites as ground for this appeal the position that the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision without
touching on the trial courts ruling that there was absence of the essential and formal requisites of marriage.

We find this argument baseless and misplaced for three basic reasons.

First. The argument stems from the mistaken premise that the RTC definitively ruled that petitioners marriage to
respondent was null and void due to the absence of the essential and formal requisites of marriage.
 A careful examination of the RTC decision shows that the trial court did not discuss, much less rule on, the absence of
the formal and essential requisites of marriage; it simply recited the claim that [S]ometime in 1987 petitioner was induced
by respondent to sign a blank Marriage Contract and a blank application for marriage license. The petitioner freely
signed the documents with the belief that the documents will be signed only when they get married. The trial court
did not even mention the certified true copy of the Marriage Contract signed by the officiating minister and registered
in the Civil Registry of Kalookan City.The petitioner introduced and marked this copy as his Exhibit D to prove that
there is a marriage contract registered in the Civil Registry of Kalookan City between petitioner and respondent.[32]

Out of this void came the dispositive portion [D]eclaring the marriage contracted by Renato Reyes So and
Lorna Valera on December 10, 1991null and void.[33] Faced with an RTC decision of this tenor, the CA could not
have ruled on the validity of the marriage for essential and formal deficiencies, since there was no evidence and no
RTC ruling on this point to evaluate and rule upon on appeal. Even if it had been a valid issue before the CA, the
RTCs declaration of nullity should be void for violation of the constitutional rule that [No] decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.[34]

Second. The same examination of the RTC decision shows that it concerned itself wholly with the declaration
of the nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. After its recital of the testimonies of witnesses,
part of which are the facts relied upon to support the claimed psychological incapacity, the decision dwelt on the
evidence of Dr. Gates, the expert witness, and, from there, proceeded to its conclusion that psychological incapacity
existed. In this light, the dispositive portion declaring the marriage...on December 10, 1991, [is] null and void, must
be based on psychological incapacity as found by the trial court, not on the absence of the essential and formal
requisites of marriage.

Third. We note that the petitioner himself offered the Marriage Contract as evidence that it is registered with
the Civil Registry of Kalookan City.[35] As a duly registered document, it is a public document, and is prima
facie evidence of the facts it contains, namely, the marriage of the petitioner with the respondent. To contradict these
facts and the presumption of regularity in the documents favor, the petitioners contrary evidence must be clear,
convincing, and more than merely preponderant.[36]To be sure, a married couple cannot simply nullify their marriage
through the non-appearance of one spouse and the uncorroborated declaration by the other spouse that the marriage
did not really take place. If the biased and interested testimony of a witness is deemed sufficient to overcome a public
instrument, drawn up with all the formalities prescribed by the law, then there will have been established a very
dangerous doctrine that would throw the door wide open to fraud.[37] At the very least, the declaration that the
marriage did not take place must be supported by independent evidence showing a physical impossibility, a forgery,
or the disavowal by the supposed participants, to name a few possible reasons.

2. Petitioner failed to establish respondents psychologicalincapacity

 As the CA did, we hold that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to establish the respondents
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations.

The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides
that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[38] the Court first declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.[39]

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals[40] (the Molina case) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally
inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
 in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[41] further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration
of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert
opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.[42]

The factual background of this case covers at least 18 years. The petitioner and the respondent first met in
1973 and lived together as husband and wife, without the benefit of marriage, before they got married in 1991. In the
course of their relationship, they had three (3) children; established a business, and even incurred indebtedness
amounting to P4 million; had differences due to what the CA described as character faults and defects; and had a
well-described quarrel which the CA observed to be the common reaction of an ordinary housewife in a similar
situation. Thus, unlike the usual Article 36 cases this Court encountered in the past, where marriage, cohabitation,
and perception of psychological incapacity took place in that order, the present case poses a situation where there
had been a lengthy period of cohabitation before the marriage took place. To be sure, this factual unique situation
does not change the requirement that psychological incapacity must be present at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. It does, however, raise novel and unavoidable questions because of the lapse of time the couple has been
together and their intimate knowledge of each other at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Specifically, how
do these factors affect the claim of psychological incapacity that should exist at the time of the marriage, considering
that marriage came near or at the end of the parties relationship?

Ideally, the best results in the determination of psychological incapacity are achieved if the respondent herself
is actually examined. This opportunity, however, did not arise in the present case because the respondent simply
failed to respond to the court summons and to cooperate in the proceedings. Thus, only an indirect psychological
examination took place through the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings and clinical interviews of the
petitioner which lasted for about three (3) hours.[43] In light of the differences in the appreciation of the psychologists
testimony and conclusions between the trial court and the appellate court, we deem it necessary to examine the
records ourselves, as the factual allegations and the expert opinion vitally affect the issues submitted for resolution.

Our own examination of the psychologists testimony and conclusions leads us to conclude that they are not
sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that
prevented the respondent from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In the first place, the
facts on which the psychologist based her conclusions were all derived from statements by the petitioner whose bias
in favor of his cause cannot be doubted. It does not appear to us that the psychologist read and interpreted the facts
related to her with the awareness that these facts could be slanted. In this sense, we say her reading may not at all be
completely fair in its assessment.We say this while fully aware that the psychologist appeared at the petitioners
bidding and the arrangement between them was not pro bono.[44]While this circumstance does not disqualify the
psychologist for reasons of bias, her reading of the facts, her testimony, and her conclusions must be read carefully
with this circumstance and the source of the facts in mind.

In examining the psychologists Report, we find the Particulars and the Psychological Conclusions
disproportionate with one another; the conclusions appear to be exaggerated extrapolations, derived as they are from
isolated incidents, rather than from continuing patterns. The particulars are, as it were, snapshots, rather than a
running account of the respondents life from which her whole life is totally judged. Thus, we do not see her
psychological assessment to be comprehensive enough to be reliable.

For example, the psychologists statements about the parties sexual relationship appear to us to be rash, given
that no parallel examination of the petitioners own pattern of sexual behavior has been made. Sex with a partner is a
two-way affair and while one partner can be more aggressive than the other, aggressiveness is not per se an aberrant
behavior and may depend on the dynamics of the partners relationship. To infer prior sexual experience because the
respondent allegedly initiated intimate behavior, and to cite an unverified incident of a previous rape to characterize
the respondents sexual behavior, are totally uncalled for. That the respondent did pass her Dental Board Exam was
glossed over and unverified unsavory incidents related to her exam were highlighted. Her alleged failure to practice
was stressed, without emphasizing, however, that she quit her dental practice and joined petitioner in his
communications business.

The respondents business behavior is a matter that needed full inquiry, as there could be reasons for her
interference. With respect to employees, while the petitioner charged the respondent with being strict, he, at the same
time, alleged that she gambled with the employees when there were no clients. The psychologist did not pursue these
lines and, significantly, the petitioners testimonies on this point are uncorroborated. The respondents reaction to her
husbands nights out was singled out and slanted to indicate negative traits. It took the CA to observe that her hostile
attitude when the petitioner stayed out late at night is merely a usual common reaction of an ordinary housewife in a
similar situation. To further quote the CA citing the transcripts, [I]n fact, petitioner-appellee admitted that the reason
respondent got angry and threw his things outside is because he came home late and drunk, which petitioner-appellee
had done several times already on the pretext of closing business deals, which sometimes included going out night-
clubbing with clients.[45] Why and how the couple incurred indebtedness of about P4 million may be usual in the
communications business, but is certainly a matter that the psychologist should have further inquired into in relation
with her alleged strictness in business affairs.

As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note that she lived with the petitioner for 18 years and
begot children with him born in 1975, 1978 and 1984 developments that show a fair level of stability in the
relationship and a healthy degree of intimacy between the parties for some eleven (11) years. She finished her
Dentistry and joined her husband in the communications business traits that do not at all indicate an irresponsible
attitude, especially when read with the comment that she had been strict with employees and in business affairs. The
petitioners Memorandum[46] itself is very revealing when, in arguing that the Marriage Contract was a sham, the
petitioner interestingly alleged that (referring to 1987) [S]ince at that time, the relationship between the petitioner
and respondent was going well, and future marriage between the two was not an impossibility, the petitioner signed
these documents.

More than all these, the psychologists testimony itself glaringly failed to show that the respondents behavioral
disorder was medically or clinically permanent or incurable as established jurisprudence requires. Neither did the
psychologist testify that the disorder was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. To directly quote from the records:
ATTY. RODOLFO BRITANICO
Q: All right, what was basically your conclusion in your qualitative research with regards to the psychological
incapacity of the respondent to comply with the marital obligation?
DR. CRISTINA R. GATES
A: There is a strong indication that the respondent was not able to carry out her marital obligation her marital
duties and responsibilities. And going through the TSN, it is evident that in their conjugal relation, it was
petitioner who was responsible, but he in fact gave her opportunity to develop and to become responsible
herself. [sic]
For instance, he sent her back to school to take Dentistry, he supported her during that time and during
the exam and after that he built her a clinic. In all these, the respondent proved to be irresponsible. [sic]
When she was taking pre-dental, most of the time she was out of the house, and in one instance petitioner
discovered that respondent was having an extra-marital affair with her classmate. And in her board exam
she failed the first time. And even if it is questionable, petitioner approached one of the commissioners
and through his efforts the respondent was able to pass the second time around. [sic]
And in the matter of dental clinic, after merely two months respondent refused to practice, she not only
refused and without the knowledge of the petitioner sold all the dental equipments at a loss. [sic]
Q: How about their relationship?
A: From the start respondent is older, she had, like, prior sexual experience, and she was the one who introduced
to him the use of marijuana. x x x x
Q: How about respondent. How would the respondent compliment the responsibility?
A: There is no mutuality, because if she run away and asked for petitioner to rent an apartment for them to live
together, petitioner continued to work and study and went home to her in the evening, but respondent on
the other hand she quit schooling and she did push through with working, and worst she allowed her friend
to live with them, allegedly in that apartment, and respondent and friend would engage in pot sessions.
[sic]
Q: What did you find out with regards to the duty of respondent to live together with the petitioner? [sic]
A: She was frequently out, in [sic] her friends. .
Q: How about love and respect?
A: Love is rather complicated. Because she made love to him in her own will. [sic]
Q: But did they show respect?
A: No, because she had extra-marital affair, and demanding lot of money.
Q: How about to render emotional, spiritual and physical help? How would respondent comply?
A: She was not able to comply, except maybe for the sexual obligation, but in terms of physical and emotional
support she was not there for him. When she quit, she hang out with him on their business, but instead of
helping him, she would quarrel him, interfere in his decisions, she would embarrass petitioner in front of
his clients and employees, and if petitioner would have a deal with his clients and sometimes would come
home late, she would refuse to listen to his explanation and would lock him out and shout at him. [sic]
Q: And in your Psychological findings, when did this [incapacity] of the respondent start, her incapacity to comply
with the marriage obligation?
A: In the testimony of the petitioner, I think he did mention that she came to Manila for her studies, and during
the interview I found out that upon arrival in Manila she was alone, by herself, she had difficulty adjusting
to city life, because all her life were spent in the province with her parents and siblings, and she lived in
Sampaloc where she got herself in the company of bad friends like going into marijuana and frequent
parties and pot sessions, [which] would last for 3 to 4 days, and in effect disallowed her from going to
school regularly.
Q: In clinical psychologist [sic], what is the effect?
A: It is traumatic for her, because there is a separation of her parents, and not only that she was thrown to a
situation of her being alone, at that time she had no guidance, it would assume that she would just
study[sic]
Q: In your conclusion of your Psychological Report, you stated here and I quote: Based on the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM IV), the international standards of psychological disorders, Respondent Lorna is
plagued with an Adjustment Disorder as manifested in her impulsiveness, lack of restraint, lack of civility
and a sense of decency in the conduct of her life. Can you please explain to us.
A: Lorna Valera is like a person who is not in control of herself, impulsive. x x x
Q: How about lack of restraint?
A: Impulses. Like for example, when the husband comes home late, instead of looking means and ways to
rationalize, she would just shout and lock him out.
Q: And what about lack of civility, what is your basis?
A: She did not consider the welfare of her children, her frequent outings, like she would conduct her extra marital
affairs through phone calls. When they separated, I understand that she was always out of the house,
gambling at night. In fact, petitioner in one of his visits to respondent and children intercepted the letter
of a younger child asking for an appointment to see the mother because the childs report is that he hardly
sees the mother.
 xxxx
Q: You mentioned also in your psychological conclusion that Adjustment Disorder and Compulsive Behavior of
Lorna Valera existed prior and continuous up to the present, can you please explain?
A: If Lorna Valera somewhere in her life changes all of a sudden, then the psychological incapacity is not
obtaining but in mal-adopting behavior, like you remove the stimulus of the petitioner in her life. Then
the same behavior pattern as I learned from the children, then the incapacity is irreversible because it is
there.[47] [sic]

These statements, lopsided as they are as we observed above, merely testify to the respondentsimpulsiveness, lack
of restraint, and lack of civility and decency in the conduct of her life. The psychologist, however, failed to
sufficiently prove that all these emanated from a behavioral disorder so grave and serious that the respondent would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; that it was rooted in the respondents medical
or psychological history before her marriage; and that a cure was beyond the respondents capacity to achieve.

Speaking of the root of the alleged disorder, the psychologist could only trace this to the time the respondent
came to Manila; the psychologist concluded that the disorder was due to her separation from her parents and lack of
guidance. Will common human experience, available through the thousands of students who over the years trooped
from the provinces to Manila, accept the conclusion that this experience alone can lead to a disorder that can affect
their capacity to marry?

In terms of incurability, the psychologist could only cryptically say -

A. If Lorna Valera somewhere in her life changes all of a sudden, then the psychological incapacity is not obtaining but
in mal-adopting behavior, like you remove the stimulus of the petitioner in her life. Then the same behavior pattern as I
learned from the children, then the incapacity is irreversible because it is there.[48]

Does this convoluted statement mean that Lorna Valera can still change, and that change can happen if the stimulus
of the petitioner is removed from her life? In other words, is the incapacity relative and reversible?

In Molina, we ruled that mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, the root cause should
be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage. In the present case, the psychologist simply narrated adverse snapshots of the respondents life showing
her alleged failure to meet her marital duties, but did not convincingly prove her permanent incapacity to meet her
marital duties and responsibilities; the root or psychological illness that gave rise to this incapacity; and that this
psychological illness and consequent incapacity existed at the time the marriage was celebrated.
 In light of the wide gaps in the facts the psychologist considered and of the patent deficiencies of her testimony
tested under the standards of established jurisprudence, we cannot accord full credence and accept the psychologists
Report as basis for the declaration of annulment of the parties marriage under Article 36. In the absence of any
contradictory statements from the respondent, the fairer approach is to read between the lines of this Report and
discern what indeed happened between the parties based on common human experience between married couples
who have lived together in the way the parties did. From this perspective, we have no problem in accepting the CA
decision as a fairer assessment of the respondents alleged psychological incapacity, and for being a more realistic
appreciation of the evidence adduced in light of the requirements of Article 36:
Such character faults and defects, We believe, do not constitute psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration
of marriage between petitioner-appellee and respondent. While she appears to be less than ideal mother to her children
and loving wife to her husband, herein petitioner-appellee, the same are not physical manifestations of a psychological
illness as described in Molina. Although the expert witness had clinically identified respondents condition as Adjustment
Disorder, allegedly resulting from respondents separation from her parents when she studied in Manila before she met
petitioner-appellee, it was not established that such disorder or illness allegedly manifested in her carefree and outgoing
behavior as a means of coping with her emotional and psychological stresses, was the root cause of her incapacity to
fulfill the essential marital obligations. Moreover, such alleged disorder was not shown to be of a serious nature, a
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effective
incapacitates the respondent from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. The
clinical findings on respondents alleged Adjustment Disorder have not established such illness to be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.And, as pointed out by the Solicitor
General, although the Psychological Report stated that respondents condition appears to be irreversible, the expert witness
did not substantiate her conclusion that respondents condition was indeed incurable or permanent.Nowhere in the
testimony of petitioner-appellee was it shown that respondents allegedly carefree ways (and smoking of marijuana) while
she was younger and had no children yet, continued throughout their marriage until their separation in 1990. On the
contrary, her strict attitude towards the clients and employees is a clear indication that she takes their business concerns
seriously, such attitude being a reflection of a mature and responsible personality.[49]

Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we have a case here of parties who have very human
faults and frailties; who have been together for some time; and who are now tired of each other. If in fact the
respondent does not want to provide the support expected of a wife, the cause is not necessarily a grave and incurable
psychological malady whose effects go as far as to affect her capacity to provide marital support promised and
expected when the marital knot was tied. To be tired and to give up on ones situation and on ones husband are not
necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the
remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however,
is not available to us under our laws. Ours is still a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation a
relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties, or one of them, by reason of
a grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the
obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage. Outside of this situation, this
Court is powerless to provide any permanent remedy. To use the words of Navales v. Navales:[50]
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted
on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
 immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article
36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due
to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.[51] [Emphasis ours]

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 4, 2001 and October 18, 2001, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
65273. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
 Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

* Designated additional Member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 645 dated May 15, 2009.
** Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective May 11, 2009 per Special Order No. 635 dated May 7, 2009.
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Associate Justice Sergio L.

Pestao; rollo, pp. 30-37.

[3] Id., p. 39.
[4] Penned by Judge Salvador Abad Santos.
[5] TSN, August 14, 1997, pp. 4-6.
[6] Annex B, rollo, p. 62.
[7] Annexes A, A-1, and A-2, id., pp. 56-61.
[8] Id., pp. 40-44.
[9] Id., p. 42.
[10] TSN, August 14, 1997, p. 8.
[11] TSN, April 2, 1998, pp. 2-4.
[12] Id., pp. 5-7.
[13] Id., pp. 7-8.
[14] Id., pp. 9-10.
[15] Id., pp. 10-13.
[16] Records, p. 33.
[17] Id., pp. 6-8.
[18] Rollo, p. 62.
[19] Exhibit F, id., pp. 63-64.
[20] Exhibit E, id., pp. 65-69.
[21] Id., pp. 65-66.
[22] Id., pp. 68-69 (Emphasis in the original).
[23] RTC Decision, id., p. 74.
[24] Id., p. 75.
[25] Id., pp. 75-76.
[26] CA Decision, id., p. 36.
[27] Id., p. 39.
[28] Id., pp. 3-28.
[29] Id., pp. 8-9.
[30] Id., pp. 130-150.
[31] Id., pp. 177-184.
[32] See Annexes B and G, id., pp. 53 and 62.
[33] RTC decision, id., p. 75.
[34] CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 14; See People v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 148821, July 18, 2003, 406 SCRA 658, and Yao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

132428, October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 202.

[35] Supra note 30.
[36] See Yturralde v. Azurin, G.R. No. L-22158, May 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 407; Calahat v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 75257-58, February 15, 1995,

241 SCRA 356.

[37] Yturralde v. Azurin, supra.
[38] G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
[39] See Dimayuga-Laurena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159220, September 22, 2008.
[40] G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
[41] G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755.
[42] See Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 123 (Emphasis ours).
[43] TSN, September 15, 1998, pp. 6-14.
[44] See Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. No. 168328, February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 123; Choa v. Choa, G.R. No. 143376, November 26, 2002, 392 SCRA 641.
[45] CA Decision, rollo, p. 36.
[46] Id., pp. 200-227.
[47] TSN, September 15, 1998, pp. 6-14.
[48] Id., p. 14.
[49] CA Decision, rollo, pp. 35-36.
[50] G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008.
[51] Id. (citations o
Gerry R. Rana

Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Vincent G. Mercado, petitioner, vs. Consuelo Tan,
respondent.
G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000

Panganiban, J.:

Facts:
1. Accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married
on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by
reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the
parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was single.

2. At the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was
actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a
marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares,
CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith,
which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10,
1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City.

3. In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and complainant was
confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A.
Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City.

4. On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant

through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City but On November 13,
1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors
Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma.
Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993
the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was
declared null and void.

Issue:

Whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a

subsequent one can be legally contracted

Ruling:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a

subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies
even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.

The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre which
involved an administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting
the lawyers argument that he was free to enter into a second marriage because the first
one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage
was null and void ab initio is essential. The Court further noted that the said rule was
cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code. Significantly, it observed that
the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first marriage was
void, was bigamous and criminal in character.

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was
yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition
to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-
complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first
was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then.
Antonette Raneses 1st Year BL5-A

Substituted by: Emmylou F. Bagares

Imelda Marbella-Bobis, petitioner, vs. Isagani D. Bobis, respondent.

G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000
Ynares-Santiago, J.:

Facts:

On October 21, 1985 was the first marriage of Isagani Bobis, the respondent
to Maria Dulce Javier. Their marriage was not annulled, nullified or
terminated.

On January 25, 1996, second marriage with petitioner Imelda

Marbella-Bobis. Third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. On
February 25, 1998, Imelda Bobis filed bigamy.

Thereafter , Isagani initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of

absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated
without a marriage license.

Petitioner Imelda argues that respondent should have first obtained a

judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the
second marriage. After petitioner sued for bigamy, its just when the
respondent filed a declaration of absolute nullity.

Issue:

Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity
of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case
for bigamy.

HELD:

In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having

obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be
said to have validly entered into the second marriage. In the current
jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of
such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage
will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its
nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting.
 In the case, respondent Isagani was for all legal intents and purposes
regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage
with petitioner Imelda.

Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question
JENNILYN G. SANTIAGO

TENEBRO VS COURT OF APPEALS

G. R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
YNARES SANTIAGO, J

BIGAMOUS AND POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE

FACTS:

Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990.
Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter
part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a
certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986.

On January 25, 1993, Tenebro contracted yet another marriage, this one with a
certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from
Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to Tenebro. In a handwritten letter,
Villareyes confirmed the said inquiry, thereafter, filed a case against Veronico Tenebro
for bigamy.

Tenebro contended that theres no existence of his first marriage to Villareyes,

for there was no record of such marriage in the City Civil Registry of Manila and
National Statistics Office. He also argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that
his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Veronico Tenebro is criminally liable for bigamy.

HELD:

The wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office and that
by the City Civil Registry of Manila would plainly show that neither document attests as
a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and
Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the
respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as
to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the
absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence

as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, especially
considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract
needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a
marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the
marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. Villareyes letter, Ancajas
testimony that Tenebro informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and the
latters own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the
requisites for validity.

Subsequent marriage contracted will be rendered void ab initio completely

regardless of Tenebros psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of
this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of
the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.
Glo Marie Sillote 1st Year BL5-A

Substituted by: Emmylou F. Bagares

Cenon Teves vs. People

G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011
Perez, J:

Facts:

On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon

Teves (Cenon) and Thelma Jaime-Teves (Thelma). After the marriage,
Thelma left to work abroad and would only come home to the Philippines
for vacations.

In 2002, Thelma was informed that her husband had contracted

marriage with a certain Edita Calderon. Thelma then went to the National
Statistics Office and secured a copy of the Certificate of Marriage indicating
that her husband (Cenon) and Edita contracted marriage on 10 December
2001 in Bulacan.

In 2006, the uncle of Thelma, filed a complaint accusing petitioner

Cenon of bigamy. Petitioner was charged with bigamy under Article 349 of
the RPC on June 2006. However, during the pendency of the criminal case
for bigamy, the RTC of Caloocan City, rendered a decision dated May 2006
(one month before the case for bigamy was decided) declaring the marriage
of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is
physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations
pursuant to Article 36, Family Code. Said decision became final by a
Certification of Finality issued on 27 June 2006.

Petitioner Cenon appealed before the CA contending that the court a

quo erred in not ruling that his criminal liability had already been
extinguished. Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was
declared null and void, there is in effect no marriage at all, and thus, there
is no bigamy to speak of.

Petitioner Cenon further contends that the ruling of the Court in

Mercado v. Tan is inapplicable in his case because in the Mercado case the
prosecution for bigamy was initiated before the declaration of nullity of
marriage was filed. Petitioner says that in his case, the first marriage had
already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in court.

Issue:
 Whether petitioner may be held guilty for the crime of Bigamy (Article
346, RPC) despite the judicial declaration that his previous marriage with
Thema is null and void.

Ruling:

YES. The court held that it does not matter whether the case for
declaration of nullity was filed before the case for bigamy was instituted, for
as long as the offender contracted a subsequent marriage while his previous
marriage is subsisting thereby not being able to secure a Declaration of
Nullity of the First marriage at the time he contracted the second marriage.

At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with
Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the decision
declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June
2006 or about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita.

Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has

all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not disputed the
validity of such subsequent marriage.

His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the

declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. A declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void.

Parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their

marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
marry again.

With the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. A judicial declaration of nullity
is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
Al Ammen B. Silo

NOLLORA vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 191425, September 7, 2011
Carpio, J.

Principle of Law:
Bigamous and polygamous marriage

Facts:

While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her husband
of two years has another wife. She returned to the Philippines and learned that indeed,
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., contracted second marriage with a certain Rowena Geraldino on
December 8, 2001.

Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano and Rowena for bigamy. When asked
about the moral damages she suffered, she declared that money is not enough to
assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for return of her money in the amount of
P 50,000.

Atilano admitted having contracted 2 marriages, however, he claimed that he was a

Muslim convert way back to 1992. He presented Certificate of Conversion and Pledge
of Conversion, proving that he allegedly converted as a Muslim in January 1992. And as
a Muslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry wives as allowed under the Islam
belief.

Accused Rowena alleged that she was a victim of bigamous marriage. She claimed that
she does not know Jesusa and only came to know her when the case was filed. She
insisted that she is the one lawfully married to Nollora because she believed him to be
single and a Catholic, as he told her so prior to their marriage. After she learned of the
first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert. After learning
that Nollora was a Muslim convert, she and he also got married in accordance with the
Muslim rites.

ISSUE:

Whether the second marriage is bigamous.

RULING:

Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is bigamous under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, and as such, the second marriage is considered null and void
ab initio under Article 35 of the Family Code.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is legally
married to Jesusa; 2) that their marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date
of the second marriage; 3)that Atilano admitted the existence of his second marriage to
Rowena; and 4) the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except
for the lack of capacity of Atilano due to his prior marriage.

Before the trial and appellate courts, Atilano put up his Muslim religion as his sole
defense. Granting arguendo that he is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration
of both marriages, he cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted
in accordance with Articles 14, 15, 17 up to 20 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws .

In Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that any marriage between
a Muslim and a non-Muslim solemnized not in accordance with the Muslim law, hence
the Family Code of the Philippines shall apply. Nollora's religious affiliation or his claim
that his marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his
professed religion, he cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
Junel A. Suaybaguio

Title: MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAES vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO,

G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012

Ponente: PERALTA, J

Principle: Void Marriages (Bigamous Marriage)

Facts:

The case concerns a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul an
order which dismissed the information for Bigamy filed against respondent Lourdes
Tajolosa Cipriano. The facts of the case are as follows:

On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo,

Aklan.

On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage,

respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna.

In 2001, Cipriano filed a petition for the Annulment of her marriage with
Socrates on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity as defined
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, rendered an Amended Decision

declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said
decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003.

On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montaez, Silverios daughter

from the first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro,
Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent.
 On August 3, 2007, the RTC found that both marriages of respondent took
place before the effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the
unsettled state of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before commencing a second marriage and the principle
that laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it declared
that the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice the
accused whose second marriage was declared once and for all valid with the
annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.

Issue:
Whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the
dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.

Ruling:

No. At the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage
was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved.

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the first
was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code.

What is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Even if the accused
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.

The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of
the first marriage.
TANZO, NERESA L.

CAPILI v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 183805, July 03, 2013
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

Shirley filed a case for bigamy against James Walter P. Capili, alleging
that he contracted marriage with her on December 8, 1999 despite the
subsistence of a previous and lawful marriage with one Karla Y. Medina-
Capili. James Walter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, alleging that
there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage
filed by Karla before the RTC of Antipolo, which if declared void would
exculpate him from the charge of bigamy. Thus, the arraignment and pre-trial
of James Walter was reset. In the meantime, the RTC of Antipolo declared the
second marriage between James and Shirley void. Because of this, James
Walter filed a Motion to Dismiss the bigamy case, on the ground that the
second marriage had been declared void. The RTC granted the motion, ruling
that the declaration by the RTC of Antipolo of the voidness of the second
marriage between James and Shirley meant that there was no more bigamy
to speak of. On petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, the latter
reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, and remanded the case to the RTC for
further proceedings. Thus, James elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
If a second marriage is declared void, will the bigamy case be
dismissed?

HELD:
The court ruled on the negative. The elements of bigamy are: (1) that
the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) That he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

When Capili married Tismo, all the above elements are present. The
crime of bigamy was already consummated. It is already immaterial if the
second was subsequently declared void. The outcome of the civil case filed
by Karla Medina had no bearing to the determination of Capilis guilt or
innocence in the bigamy case because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted. He who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.

The Supreme Court also notes that even if a party has reason to
believe that his first marriage is void, he cannot simply contract a second
marriage without having such first marriage be judicially declared as void. The
parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists.
Jose Darwin Trinidad
BL5 -1A

People v Udtuhan
Gr.No.191566,July 17,2013
Peralta,J.

Facts:

On July 2,1980,respondent Edgardo Udtuhan married Jasmin Modina. He also married Eleonor
Alagon on October 28,1993.He latter filed a Petition for annulment of his marriage to Modina, of which
the RTC granted as void ab initio for lack of marriage license.On November 10,2003,Alagon died.
When private complainant ,Evelyn Alagon learned of his previous marriage to Modina, She filed
a complaint-affidavit charging respondent of Bigamy. Respondent moved to quash the information on
two grounds:
1.That the fact do not charge an offense of bigamy;
2.That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.
3. The RTC held that the facts constitute the crime of bigamy.
There was a valid marriage between respondent and Molina,and without such marriage having
been dissolved.respondent contracted a second marriage to Alagon. It further held that neither the
information be quashed or the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished because the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage is not one of the mode of extinguishing criminal liability.
Respondent appealed to CA for certiorari, and CA concluded that RTC grossly abused its
discretion in denying respondent's motion to quash the information, considering that the facts alleged
in the information do not charge an offense.The OSG filed an appeal for review and certiorari, hence
this petition.

Issues:
1.Whether or not the motion to quash by respondent is proper;
2.Whether or not the court's judgment declaring respondent's first marriage void of initio
extinguished respondent's criminal liability.

Held:
1. No. A motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails validity of a
criminal complaint on information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for
defects which are apparent in the face of the information.In these case however,there is sufficiency of
the information to constitute the crime of bigamy.It contained all the elements of the crime as provided
by Art.349 of the Revised Penal Code:1.respondent legally married to Molina;2.without such marriage
been dissolved;3.respondent willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contracted second marriage to Alagon;
4.that the second marriage has all the essential requisite for validity.
 Respondent's showing the court's declaration that his marriage to Modina is null and void from the
beginning should not be considered because matters of defense cannot be raised in motion to quash.It
is not proper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial.

2. No.Respondent's claim that there are more reasons to quash the information against him
because he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy
against him is without warrant. Criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the
offense and from that instant, is already liability.The time of filing of the criminal complaint or information
is material only for determining prescription.

It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be contradicted.Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted of bigamy.

Petition is granted.The CA's decision is set aside.

Student Name: Dominique M Villamor

Title: ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.

G.R. No. 193902

Principle: Divorce under muslim law

Facts:

Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto,
Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the two
wed again, this time,in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC,
Quezon City. A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by
talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed byy the Shari'a Circuit District
Court, which issued a Decree of Divorce.Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married
anew. As she had previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed
Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where
she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, in order to
strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage
vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However,
unlike in Zamoranos' first marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum
was blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned
sour and the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and
Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually,
Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which vested primary
custody of the children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against
Zamoranos including a petition for annulment, a criminal complaint for
bigamy and dismissal and disbarment from the civil service.
Main Issue: Whether the divorce of Zamoranos to De guzman valid

Ruling

th
Yes

From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are
officers of the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another
Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences,
and incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083. It stands to
reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by and
Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman,
was valid and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.

The RTC branch 2, iligan city, in this case found that Zamoranos and De guzman were
both muslim at the time of marriage and therefor there marriage and marital status is
governed by P.D 1083 otherswise known as the muslim personal laws of the
Philippines

Since their marriage was contracted in muslim law and their divorce by talaq their
marriage could be considered dissolved in accordance with the muslim law and they
may remarry.

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GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO VS REDERICK A. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
Ponente.Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ.
Principle in Law.Absence of impediment

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen,

in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government. Petitioner, a
Filipina, and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual
Help Church in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent
was declared as single and Filipino.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy. The respondent allegedly had a
prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed
that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first
marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
1994.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for
the declaration of nullity was pending, respondent was able to secure a divorce decree
from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage had irretrievably broken
down.
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground
that it stated no cause of action. The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent. The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties. After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for
resolution.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

ISSUE:
Whether the failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to
present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial
requisite voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent.

HELD:
The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in
court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal
capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.

It may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry
petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, the Supreme Court believe
that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive
evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in
that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of
bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were
both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987
and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.