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10/30/2017 10:34 __ RECAP LIBRARY ANNEX PRODUCTION SYSTEM PG 66 RPTH 01910341 mgeffrar cpyrept EDD RETRIEVAL RECEIPT 470623 EDD 10/30/2017 10/31/2017 952478908 Patron E-Mail: sk3560@columbia.edu oth Patron Info Def PickUp Loc: EDD-ReCAP EDD Delivery Meth: EDD Item BarCode: cU69165971 Item Title: Is there an esoteric doctrine in the Tractatus theologico-po Item Author: Harris, Errol BE. Item Call Number: 193Sp4'GS3 v.38 Item Vol/Part: Article Title: Article Author: Art Vol/Part All of it, this is a single article Beg Page: 1 End Page: the end Total Pages: 0 Other Info Notes: 8 TOTAL COUNT: 4 atc) | PROF..DR. ERROL E|HARKIS °° ~ IS THERE AN \ ESOTERIC DOCTRINE : TRACTATUS THEOLO( GICO. POLITICUS? ? ‘MEDEDELINGEN £XXVill - VANWEGE HET SPINOZAHUIS: 1:REDEN wo /BJBRILE , pod 1978 30/1) — ‘ < . ~ 18 THERE AN ESOTERIC DOCTRINE IN THE ‘TRACTATUS THEOLOGICO-POLITICUS? That Spinoza wrote with double intent, especially in the Tractaus Theologico- Polircus’ isan opinion strongly and insistently maintained by Leo Strauss, whose influence upon more sober and unbiassed thinkers seems to me to be excessive. For the view goes beyond, and frequently misrepresents, the evidence, which rightly understood, supports more strongly the opposite position. OF course, Strauss is not the first to have held this opinion, for Spinoza was accused in the ninctecath century, by Jacobi and Carl Thomas, even of using the name of God, let alone of attributing to him infinite atteibutes, as an accommodation to the common sentiments of the pious as a cover to shield his true heterodoxy from the scratiny and censure of the Church. Why he should have done this in his weitten works, when his refusal to simulate Jewish orthodoxy had already cost him his member: ship of the Synagogue, it is difficult to see; unless one is to argue that the con- sequences of his youthful frankness had taught him caution which dicated duplicity and deviousness in later life. If this were so, however, we should either have to interpret his ethical teaching as hypocritical, or to believe that he failed to practice what he preached. Tn the final essay of his book, Persecution and the Art of Writing, Strauss intains that there are two distinct teachings in the Tractatas Theologico- Politcus, and, indeed, in the Esbics itself’ (if not in all Spincza's writings), an exoteric teaching which appears on the face of the text and an esoteric one which is addressed to an entirely different audience. ‘The former is what the average, superficial, or uninitiated reader would naturally gather from the explicit state- ‘ment; the latter is what the initiated, or the perspicacious student, will discover, by careful comparison of different passages, by inference from obvious incon: sistencies, and by reading judiciously between the lines. ‘The exoteric teaching, according to Professor Strauss, is used as a cloak to veil the true beliefs of the philosopher, and in Spinoza’ case Strauss takes these be- liefs to be always theologically heterodox — in fact, atheistic end anti-religious. ‘The exoteric doctrine makes apparent concessions to popular opinion and orthodox requirements while it goes #5 far as prudence dates to suggest (often by in- nuendo) & hidden meaning, which contradicts and is to be substituted for the apparent and explicit statement. ‘The plea is dismissed that what is known of Spinoza's character, even through tributes paid to him by those, like Colerus, who thought his doctrine pernicious, is inconsistent with the kind of dishonesty and prevarication implicit in any such practice as Strauss alleges. Spinoza, we are told, would not have considered it feprehensble to propagate his true beliefs in this disingenuous manner; for, al- though he says in the Esbier that the free man will never act dolo malo, ‘he does not mean that the wise man will never employ any ruses; for he explicitly admits that there are good or legitimate ruses’ in several passages of the Theologico- Political Treatise. Not did he accuse the Biblical writers of duplicity because they ‘wrote and spoke ‘ad ecptum valg?. Moreover, the standard and example had already been set by such distinguished precursors as the philosopher in Yehuda Halevi's Kuzeri taken as a model by Maimonides, and the Arab philosopher, 1 Al Farabi. Even Descartes and Bacon among his immediate predecessors are said to have behaved in this way and to have advocated a similar practice, Tis moral judgement on Spinoza, whether it be censure or exoneration, I do not intend to discuss. Our estimate of his character comes largely though tot wholly, from our understanding of his writings and our assessment of it would be different if we thought they had a doable enfendre, from what it would be if we thought they meant frankly and sinightforwardly what Spinoza intended. ad Spinoza be- lieved it morally acceptable to insinuate his true beliefs under a mask of appessive presentation, that in itself would affect our judgement of his intellectual integrity. ‘What 1 propose to do is to examine Professor Straus’ thesis in the light of the truth or falsity of what Spinoza has written. If what is alleged to be his exoteric doctrine is demonstrably true, there would be no point in his using it as a stalking-horse for a hidden teaching which must, in the circumstances, be false. And if we should find that what is alleged to be the esoteric meaning of the text is, afterall, not divergent from its exotetic purport, then the whole hypothesis of ambiguous foundation (‘dubbele bodem’ to quote Dr. den Tex) 3 falls to the ground. {cis improbable that Strauss himself would admit the force of any such test of his hypothesis, for he seems to adopt an historical relativism which would not admit of ny claim to truth, Spinoza, indeed, he acknowledges, believed that his own teaching was te truth, and never considered ‘the possibility which to us is so obvious: the possibility that the whole orientation of a period may give way to a radically different orientation, and that after such a change has taken place one cannot bridge the gulf between the thought of the later age and that of the earlier age but by means of historical interpretation.’ « Which of the two alleged doctrines that Spinoza taught he considered she truth, we can decide by applying cules of interpretation, which, Strauss claims, Spinoza himself provides. But to judge whether indeed it is the truth, or which doctrine objectively considered is to be preferred, would (presumably) be to fall into the error of thinking that the orientation of one’s own period was final and ‘must take precedence over, and must be used as a standard to judge, all others. But if this attitude to truth were correct and justified, could we not convict Dr Strauss of committing this same error? It is surely merely the otientation of cour period that dictates historical relativity and we have no right to impose that upoa other periods in our assessment of the value of theit beliefs. In fact, this very doctrine of the sole way to bridge the gulf between one period and another smust become suspect, 2s a merely temporary belief typical of a particular age, and not generally applicable. That the age happens to be the present does not give the belief any special force, for if we adopt it, we must hold that it will in all probability be redically modified in the future. Tn short, we must recognize relativism of any sort as a form of scepticism — as a denial of any ultimate truth, ‘And the answer to scepticism we have already learned from Spinoza: that the consistent sceptic can but remain silent, 6 However, it may be unfair to accuse Strauss of taking this relativist position whole-heartedly, for he does say that the incentive to read and to try to under- stand Spinoza is ‘the suspicion that Spinoza’s teaching is te true teaching,” 2 Fe ‘Andshe does conclude his discussion of the function of historicism and his account of the modern coalescence of history with philosophy, with the judge- ment: ‘Historical understanding lost its liberating force by becoming historicism, which is nothing other than the petrified and self-complacent form of the self-criticism of the modern mind.’ 7 His main position is that we may not judge Spinoza's claims until we have properly interpreted his teaching and that interpretation (which must be mainly historical) precedes explanation. Further, he is prepazed to adopt, and even ‘idvocates, the principles which Spinoza himself lays down for the interpretation ofthe Sips esting the tppliation of them to Spinone own wings which Spinoza held were exempt from them, by the historical considerations {0 which allusion has been made. Why Spinoza exempted his own writings from interpretation, as he maintained we should interpret the Bible, is that the Bible is « hieroglyphic corpus unintelligible scientifically, whereas his own works are philosophical and their meaning must thus be epperent, on their face and from theic argument, esa product of the natural light of reas. This is rather Strauss statement of the matter than my own, and I shall seck to qualify it in what follows; but supposing it to be accepted, it has rather different consequences from those which Strauss wishes to draw. For, if we may adopt Spinoza's own principles of interpretation, we should attend aot only to whit he writes in TTP but also elsewhere, in Td1E and in the Esbicr. Then we should extract his meaning solely from his own writings and judge of their validity by their own consistency and coherence. Pethaps in the nd we shall be able to say that we know whether ot not they are tae, because to have a true idea is to know that it is true, the truth being the standard both of itself and of falsehood. 8 1 Straus, however, is not wholly consistent in his contentions on this matter, for first he argues that we need to interpret Spinoza by his own hermeneutic rules for historical reasons (as indicated above), although Spinoza himself explicitly asserts that he is writing philosophy for philosophers, ® and classified philosophical sagument with those simple and cleat writings (like Buclid's) which do not fequire the sort of interpretation he recommends for the Bible, Yet again, Stauss also contends that Spinoza inserted Chapter VIL, on biblical interpretation, into the Treaire deliberately, a8 a guide, for the astute and observant reader, to the interpretation of his own work, and a cryptic indication of his own irony (ot, ‘what one might be tempted to call, his own insincerity). If that were trae, 00 historical predicament facing the modern reader would be needed to serve 25 pretest for applying Spinoza's rules to his own work against his own explicit directions. On the other hand, if this historical predicament is the reel grounds for the procedure Strauss adopts, and if its incentive is (as he says) the suspicion tint Spon’ done is the tt, it would, to sy the let be diconceting to find that Spinoza did not mean what he professes; or meant only some state- ‘ments, ot only their implication, to be taken seriously. Moreover, if this really 3 were the case, we could hardly treat the arguments by which Spinoza supports his position with respect, nor regard them a6 cogent. But that again is virtually ‘what Straus asserts, for he maintains that Spinoza contradicts himself ia numerous respects, so that his book is well-nigh unintelligible. If Strauss ever suspected that Spinoza’s teaching was se truth, this essay indicates that he has been dis lusioned, and, if we have a similar suspicion, agreement with Strauss would 40 far to dispel cit To make anything of Strauss’ thesis and to judge either its soundness or Spinoca’s sincerity and credibility, we must begin by considering just what Spinoza [himself writes about Biblical interpretation. ‘The sight method of interpreting the Bible, he tells us, differs litle from that of interpreting nature, that is, it proceeds’ by first deducing definitions of terms and subjects from their histories, as from certain data (ex certis dats). Just as we gather from the facts of natural phenomene what natural objects are and how to define them, so we should gather from the actual statements of the biblical writers how we should define the subjects of which they write end the ‘meaning of their terms. Spinoza’s primary precept is that the Scriptures them- selves and alone should be the source of evidence for our interpretation of them, and we should not import into them philosophical opinions which cannot be derived from their own pronouncements. The legitimate evidence, however, includes the history of the writings and of their authors, and we mistake Spinoza's meaning if we understand this primary precept (as Strauss persistently does) to ‘mean that the only admissible evidence must be derived from the explicit written text. Strauss, however, accuses Spinoze of inconsistency because he edmits evidence ‘extraneous to the Bible in order to determine the character and intention of the biblical writers, or the circumstances and language in which they were written. 10 This is clearly either mistepresentation or misunderstanding of Spinoza’s her- ‘meneutical method, for Spinozx’s actual words ace: 4 nimirum nulla alia princpia, neque date ad interpretandam Scripteram af de rebus, quae in eater continentur, dsserendum, admisert, nisi ea antummodo, quae ex ipsa Scriptura ejusque historia depromunter (ay emphasis). 12 For this purpose we need knowledge under three heads: I. the nature and properties of the language (namely, Hebrew) in which they were written (The New Testament, he says, though published ia Greek, was writen by Hebrews who ‘hebraiz’ in their expression); 1 an analysis and tematic arangenent of abject trated in. ach book, jving cortelstion and synoptic compatison of passages trating of like matters; TLE the history of the books, the circumstances tn which they were writen; to whom they were addressed and for what purpose; who their actual authors were, their temperaments, opinions and beliefs; in what language they were ‘written and whether the writings 2s we have them are translations; whet happened to them, whether and by whose hand additions or alterations ‘may have been made, and by whom they were selected for inclusion in the canon. 12 4 Next) Spinoza insists, the object of our interpretation is to discover the ia- tended ‘meaning end not the traib of the Scriptures; and for this the only legitimate evidence is whet the scriptural writers themselves say, understood in the light of their history. Spinoza freely admits that much of the requisite evidence has been isretrievably lost and that we lack much of the knowledge necessary for adequate and reliable interpretation of many parts of the Bible; so that frequently we can only guess or suspend judgment concerning their intended meaning. 28 None of this would be rejected today by any sound biblical scholar quite irrespective of his belief about the sanctity and divinely inspired nature of the Scripture. What in it is authentic could be determined only by applying methods and principles such 2s Spinoza advocates and what is chiefly remarkable about them is that they are here enunciated in a work written at least a century before they became generally recognized as the basis of biblical scholarship and criticism. Precisely why Spinoza considered it necessary to use the method which he prescribes to interpret the Bible, it is important to understand, and, as we shall sey isnot understood, oat all flly appreciate, by Str, In the fit place a large patt of the Bible is history and only incidentally ‘theology’. It must therefore be treated as an historical document and must be interpreted by scien- tific historical methods. Spinoza is perhaps the first thinker to develop and elucidate such a method, for his principles are an advance upon any contemporary writer, even including Giambattista Vico. But, secondly, and what for Spinoza's purpose is perhaps most important, the Bible presents certain theological doctrines about God and his relation to nature and to man. But these are not scientifically demonstrated of, with some exceptions, philosophically argued, but are presented in the form of prophecy, and that, 25 literally stated, is not straightforwardly intelligible by the natural light of resson. It, therefore, requires interpretation in the way that Spinoza recommends. He frequently says that it surpasses the human understanding: “quod Scipturs de rebus sacpissime agit, quie ex princpis tumine satiali notis Geduci noquent; jus enim patie historia et reveationes Componuat.athistoraemutacula pois continent hoc ex ati superone Gp eens) cane rr inl, tne, opin jalicshistoricoram, qui cas scripeerunt, acommodetas, revelations, autem Opinionibus eam Prophetaram accommodate sunt. pst revera capt nanan aspera! 1 ‘What Spinoza meant by this is a matter of consequence yet is subject to some dispute, He could mean that the biblical revelations surpass the capacity of human season in principle, but that is very improbable for seasons shortly to emerge. He could mean, on the other hand, chat they surpass the intellectual capacity of the historians who recorded them of even of the prophets themselves who expounded them; and there is much to suppott this interpretation, He might also mean, not only this, but that with the knowledge at our disposal we cannot give a rational explanation of the matters reported. Or, finaly, that what the prophets say and some of the events which the historians relate, are, as they recount them, scien- tifically unintelligible. It is for this reason that the Scriptures are described as ‘hietoglyphical’, a8 is apparent from his remark that difficulties of interpretation arise ‘when we try to follow the meaning (mentem) of the prophets sbout things 5 which are inconceivable (imperceptbiler) snd which are only imagined’, and from his note to this passage. 16 Strauss assumes only the first of these possible meanings of Spinoza's phrase and never seems so much as to consider the others, Yet itis the least plausible in the light of what Spinoza has written elsewhere and of his genetal philosophical position. Strauss maintains that the position is inconsistent, but his grounds for doing so depend to a significant extent on this interpretation of ‘captum humanum superare’, for he asserts that the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is x hieroglyphic document, in need of interpretation by Spinoza’s own prescribed method, because of its internal contradictions, of which the chief and most persistent is his claim that the Bible and its prophecies surpass human understanding, while at the same time Spinoza holds and asserts that there can be no such thing as supernatural knowledge. If however Strauss is wrong in his reading of ‘captum dxmanum rare’ Spinoza may well be consistent, and if he is, the whole of Strauss’ thesis will collapse. ‘We must note further that the criterion adopted by Strauss for clasifying the Treative as hieroglyphical is not that offered by Spinoza. It is not because there are contradictions in the Bible that it ‘exceeds all belief. In fact, Spinoza main tains that in its chief and only essential doctrine the Bible is wholly consistent and perfectly cleat. What are hicroglyphical are certain ‘bistoriae’ because they are incredible, or incomprehensible scientifically, or both. And these, he contends, smay well be false without affecting the validity or sencity of the central doctrine. Vv ‘We may now tun to Strauss’ main theses. They are that because the Treatise is ‘hicroglyphical’, it requites interpretation; and that i is ‘hieroglyphical’, or unintelligible as written, because it is full of contradictions; that the Key to its interpretation is the method Spinoza himself recommends the deliberate of which is to direct the wary reader and apprise him of the trae meaning of the doctrine. At the same time, what Spinoza says of the prophets and prophecy is to be taken as equally applicable to his own procedure. 1) The Treatize begins end ends with the implicit assertion that prophecy oF revelation is in fact possible and defines it as certain knowledge of truths which scpass the capacity of human reason. 18 Strauss gives numerous references to sup- pott this statement, but the support they give it is dubious. It is unclear on what tvidence he says that the Treatise ends with any such implicit assertion, and the statement with which it begins is certainly very different. However, it would be excessive and tedious to comment on every reference given by Strauss, who seems to operate on the assumption that scholarship consists in listing numerous pas- sages without due regard to their relevance or appropriateness. I shall therefore confine myself to those instances where the references are germane to the argu- ment, whether favourably or otherwise, and only to the most important of them. ‘The assertion, he says, is repeated, explicitly or implicitly, ia a sumber of places throughout the book. Yet in other contexts Spinoza denies the possibility of any supra-rational kaowledge. This, moreover, is the ceatral topic of the work, and fon it Spinoza contradicts himself. A sincere believer in the possibility of supra- tational knowledge, says Strauss, would not declare, as Spinoza does, that man hhas no access whatever to truth’ except through sense-perception and reasoning, 6 that reason alone, as distinct from revelation and theology, justly claims and possesses truth, that belief in what cannot be demonstrated by reason is absurd, and that teachings claiming to be ‘above reason’ aze dreams and fictions ‘far below reason’. Where and whether Spinoza says these things I shall consider below. 2) Spinoza assets that Theology (or faith) and Philosophy are radically separate. The first aims only at obedience, the second only at truth, But he also ‘maintains that ‘Theology rests on the fundamental dogma that obedience without knowledge suffices for salvation end that this is « supra-rational trath. But he also asserts that suprarational truth is impossible. It should follow that Theology and Philosphy contedict one another and are nt (es Spinoes minis) in pesfect accord. 17 3) Theology, or the Bible, or prophery, so Spinoza is said to assert, is not authoritative regarding speculative matters. But he also maintains that with regard to some speculative matters, eg. divine providence, it agrees with Philosophy. ‘Yet aguin it does not because only Philosophy and not the Bible teaches that God cares equally for all men meting out the same fate to the just and the “unjust (in other words, that there is no divine providence at all) 4) For Spinoza the Bible and prophecy are virtually synonymous, and he asserts that the Bible is the sole source of our knowledge of prophecy. Yet he also argues that pagan augues and soothsayers were true prophets. 18 5) Spinoza avers that the mind of Christ was supethuman and is prepared to acknowledge that in him divine wisdom assumed human form. Yet again he denies the possibility of super-natural phenomena since the laws of nature, par- ticularly human nature, are never violated and are always the same, 19 In effect the doctrine is that Jesus was the greatest of all philosophers, 2 view confirmed by what is said elsewhere in the Treatise. But if this thesis were true it would conflict with the main contention that Philosophy end ‘Theology (The Bible) are radically separate. In fact, Spinoza also praises Solomon 2s a philosopher despite his ignorance of mathematics). Yet, again, he asserts that the Bible teaches only ‘simple things’ and not ‘philosophic things’ 20 6) Ostensibly the Treatire demonstrates that there is one fandamental_ moral teaching throughout the Bible, ia the Old and New ‘Testament alike; yet Spinoza admits, while he explains awey, the difference between the Mosuic injunction to “hate thine enemy’ and the exhortation of Jesus to ‘love thine enemy 7) Spinoza's arguments concerning Christ and Christianity ere in fact com- plex and devious. In cgntrast with what is stated above, he implies that Jesus’ teaching like Solomon's was only popular wisdom and rational morality, and yet that it was more than thet (being an immediate revelation of the mind of God). He also implies that both Old and New Testaments present moral precepts a5 commands of God (as a ruler and’ judge) — and so conflict with philosophical demonstration. They also teach that God is merciful in contradiction to philo- sophical teaching. It would follow that the New Testament is not more rational than the Old and the Apostles in theic belief in the resurrection were under the spell of popular prejudices (Epp. LXXV, LXXVI). Yet, as argued eater, the New Testament is held to teach 2 universal doctrine in agreement with philosophy including the views of many of the Ancients. 2 8) The Treatire argues that the Bible tcaches a simple doctcine and that, soughout, if we understand its language and interpret it by the right method, it is easily intelligible, Yet it also asserts that it is hieroglyphical. In his letters Spinoza-admits that he does not understand the Bible, which implies that it is 7 rich in mysteries and supra-sational illumination, but this he also denies, and, in any case it runs counter to the mesning and purpose of the Treaire, which contends that no supra-ational knowledge is necessary for biblical interpretation (nor, in fact, possible). 22 Consequently Strauss considers it necessary and permisible to use Spinoza’s own hermeneutics in order to interpret the Treatire. Spinoza maintains that the prophets adapted their message to the opinions and understanding of their audience, 29 and in TATE, the first rule of conduct he prescribes is "ad caprum sulgi logu?. We may assume then, Steauss holds, that Spinoza himself speaks in this way. He believed that it was the philosopher's duty to obseeve caution and to conceal the truth if it endangers piety. 2¢ His private motto inscribed upon his signet, was ‘Catt’ ‘Accordingly, Strauss avers, Spinoza purposely alternates between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. In each chapter he refutes some orthodox doctrine while he supports or allows the rest. The intention is that the lay reader will not add up the refutations and so will not convict Spinoza of atheism, while the perspicacious will see that Spinoza's real aim is to deny the supetnatural, undermine the authority of the Bible and repudiate the need for teligion (which, a8 Strauss has ‘maintained elsewhere, 25 Spinoza identified with superstition). By this device Spinoza reveals his serious views to the attentive reader, while he conceals them from the valgae. He ‘addresses potential philosophers while the vulgar are listening. He speaks therefore in such a way that the vulgar will not understand what he means. It is for this reason that he expresses himself contradictorily: those shocced bby his heterodox statements will be appeased by more or less orthodox formulae 26 v ‘The primary premiss upon which Strauss rests his case is the bewildering (ot hieroglyphic) character of Spinoze's Treatire consequent upon its aumerous con- tradictions, and almost all of these depend upon the key question whether ot not, in Spinoza’s view, super-natural knowledge is possible; for, if not, he cannot consistently allow exceptions in the case of prophecy, the mind of Jesus, or the fundamental dogma of theology; nor should he allege that the Bible is hiero alyphical as surpassing the grasp of human reason. We must accordingly, con- sider first what Spinoza meant by ‘captum bumanum superar If supernatural knowledge is taken to mean knowledge involving contravention of the laws of nature, Spinoza leaves us in no doubt that he rejects its possibility. ‘The laws of nature ate universal, eternal and inviolable and nothing can exist ot ‘occur which is not in accordance with them. But this, he maintains, is because the Jaws of nature are the laws of God, who does not and cannot contradict himself. Tt does not therefore follow from the denial of super-natural knowledge, ia this sense, that no legitimate meaning can be given to divine inspiation. Tn fact, Spinoza regards all natural (philosophical) knowledge as divine so fat, at the very least, as it is knowledge of the thied Kind, or sciensia intuitive, for that con- sists of adequate knowledge of individual things derived from adequate ideas ‘of Gods’ attributes — that is, ideas as they arc in the divine intellect. So he says in the Theologico Political Treatire: | i ‘Nem e2, quae lumine natural cognescimus, « sola Dei cognition, ejesque scternis decors dependent. attamen riblominas equali jure, a dia, {quaecunque ila st, divina voceri pote? (Ch. 1 Geb. Mh, p. 13) Natural knowledge, then, is not improperly described as ‘rei alicujus certa cognitio 4 Deo hominibus revelad. Bot this is the definition of prophecy with which the Treatise opens, and Spinoza does say almost at once that from this definition it follows that natural Knowledge could rightly be called prophecy, and it is only the vulgar preference for the unusual that excludes it from the common connot tion of the term. “The difference between natural, or philosophical, knowledge (what we know by ‘the natural light’) and what is commonly called prophecy is not the source of the revelation but the medium. The source of both (as of all truth) is the divine intellect; but whereas rational knowledge is revealed to man through his intelligence, prophecy is revealed to the prophet through his imagination. ‘The pertinent question of contstency, which Strauss never raises, is how it is possible for certa cognitio to be revealed through the imagination, for Spinoza haa suid in the Evbics that imaginatio isthe sole source of ertor (EH, Pr 41). He does not say, however, that it necessarily gives rise to falsehood; on the contrary, he allows that the mind docs not eer because it imagines, but only in so far as it lacks ideas of what excludes the existence of those things it imagines to be present. Error and imagination are not therefore identical or even coincident, for in its positive content imaginato is not false; 2¥ so the possibility of the revela- tion of truth through its means is left open. In the Treatire Spinoza asserts that this does in fact occur, is he then committing himself to the admission of super- natural Knowledge? Certainly not io the sense in which he denies it, for he says that prophecy is a special gift enjoyed only by some persons. 28 Tt is gift of the same general kind as poetry or music of any other artistic talent. We do not regard these 25 super-netural although we frequently describe them as inspired. ‘Yet we cannot explain them psychologically — that is, on rational scentfi principles — not because they are in principle inexplicable, but simply becuse of out lack of knowledge. In this sense, limites nostri intellectes excedunt. Like- ‘wise prophecy is a special gift, for which, Spinoza admits, we can give no ex planation (except to say that God is its cause, which é no explanation because God is the cause of everything) 29 Spinoza docs, however, in several places, say that what is revealed to the peophet through his imagination, exceeds the limits of the intellect, 80 or surpasses hhuman apprehension and what exactly he means by these phrases is not imme- diately obvious. But it is well-nigh impossible that he means by them what his principles exclude — namely, that prophecy is the revelation of what in principle is inaccessible to reason. He says: ‘I proceed to treat more fully the other causes and media by which God reveals to men those things which exceed the limits of natural knowledge, and also those which do not exceed them (for nothing prevents God from ‘communicating’ to men by other means those things which we know by the light of nature).' #2 First, this statement strongly suggests that Spinoza considered the contents of prophecy to be the same things as we know by the light of nature, a suggestion 9 confirmed by his later contention that the central revelation of prophecy is a ‘moral truth to which reason also leads. Secondly, ‘the limits of natural knowledge’ ‘annot mean here the limits of the intellect 25’ such, for the intellect as such is Strictly God's intellect, and so far as, in scientia intuitiva, man’s intellect coin ides with God's, nothing revealed ‘by other means’ can surpass it. Res limites nostri intellecius excedentes, concerning which we must consult the Scriptures, fare such things as we cannot deduce from first principles because they are either historical or such 28 lie beyond the scientific and empicical evidence at our idsposal. Among the latter are future events, the prediction of which, though le impossible by reason, if our knowledge of all the relevant facts were sufficient, is nevertheless not deducible because we rarely if ever do know Sufficient beforehand, Yet matters such as these may be revealed to prophets through dreams, or visions or other imaginative means. If there is such @ pheno- ‘enon as extra-sensory perception, we cannot with our present knowledge ¢x- plain it mtionally, but it does not follow that it is super-natural in the sense excluded by Spinoza. Tn sach cases, of coutse, the revelation exceeds the capacity of the intellect of the prophet himself to whom it is made; and in most contexts where Spinoza uses soch phrases as caplum intellectus superare this seems to have been uppet- most ia his mind, for he is emphatic in his declaration that the prophets were fot learied, of wise, or intellectually outstanding. Some were soldiers, some politicians, some craftsmen, others were simple rustics and even servants, but none ‘were scholacs, scientists or philosophers. "Not merely was the prophets’ intellectual capacity surpassed by the revelations they received, however, but the revelations were of matters which are not sus- ceptible of demonstration geometrco ordine, and if they are to be made inteli- ible they must be interpreted by a different method. That this is what Spinoze ffas ia mind is born out by what he says in Ch. Vil, in the passage already quoted: “But that it may be clearly established that this way of interpreting is not only certain, but also the only way, and that it agrees with the method of interpreting nature, itis to be observed that Scripture most frequently deals ‘with matters which cannot be deduced from principles known by the natural Light, for the greatest pact of them consists of histories and revelations: and the histories for the most pact contain miracles, that is, (as we have shown in a previous chapter) stoties of events of unusual character accommodated to the views and opinions of the historians who wrote them.” eis hardly likely that Spinoza would have alligned his method of interpreting the Bible with that of interpreting nature, had he believed that the matter to be interpreted was super-natural. But historical events and extraordinary occurrences recorded uascientifially by unlearned chroniclers cannot be deduced from first principles and must be understood by other methods. The one recommended by Spinoza is the method of scientific history, as it has been formulated in our own dy by such writers as R. G. Collingwood, B. H. Carr and Marc Bloch, whom Spinoza anticipates by three centuries. ’A further reason for the necessity of interpretation by a systematic hermeneutics is that prophecies are ‘hieroglyphical’. Strauss invariably understands this word to imply an incomprehensbiity by the natural intellect that involves 2 supra- 10 tational source. But this isnot at all what the contexts in which itis used require. ‘Repracsentetiones Propbeticae, et hieroglyphica, quamvis idem significarent, serkahanstemen wits Spoor 2 ante follows with examples of vations visions and images in which the prophets Ezekiel and Isuiah express thelr pro- phecies. Hieroglyphica here obviously means symbols or imagery. We do not fegard the metaphors of poetey as supernatural, sublime and transcendent though they may be. They are the creatures of the imagination, and so likewise, according to Spinoza’s teaching, are the prophetic visions of the Scriptures. Hence they require interpretation; and Spinoza means no more than this in the passages to which I have drawn attention above, in Section 1. It is for the stme reason that the prophets ‘could perceive many things beyond the limits of the intellect. They did so with the aid of the imagination, which is far more prolific in ideas than the intellect, if only because it does aot recogni the same restains, ‘for from words and images far more ideas can be put together, than from those principles and concepts only on which the whole of our natural Knowledge is founded’. 8 Clearly then, a prophet can imagine much that he cannot understand, although it may well be true; and we can understand it (if at all) only by interpreting it historically oa the evidence of what the prophet actually said and in the light of the circumstances in which he ssid it. ‘We can see now why Spinoza could say quite truthfully and consistently in his letter to van Blyenbergh 8 that he does not understand the Holy Scripture. For so far as it reports visions and images, and teaches parabolice ef aenigmatice it is opaque to the understanding. But he also consistently maintains that these hicroglyphical postions of the Bible as well as the speculative views expressed by its writers are not germane nor relevant to its universel teaching, They vary ia character and import from one writer to another. 6 But there is one central and ‘universal doctrine that appears throughout, from the Pentateuch to the New ‘Testament: that salvation depends upon love of God and one's neighbour. Tn effect, Spinoza maintains that in these two precepts are contained all the Law and the Prophets. It is this doctrine which is divine and holy and this doctrine lone that makes the Scriptare sacred. This, moreover, is taught straightforwacdly and simply and is comprehensible equally to the learned and to the ignorant, 96 ‘There is, therefore, no conflict between Spinoza’s assertions, on the one hand, that the Scriptures are (or contain) hieroglyphical writings which surpass the limits of the intellect and which he does not himself understand, and, on the other, his claim that the central and! only essential doctrine of the Bible is simple and intelligible to all. ‘This central doctrine is, moreover, true, for it accords with the dictates of reason as demonstrated ia the fourth Part of the Erhics. There is only one feature of the biblical doctrine which here diverges from the rational. The prophets and ‘evangelists teach that obedience to the precepts, to love God and one's neighbour, is sufficient for salvation without knowledge, whereas reason deduces it as 4 conclusion from first principles and finds salvation precisely in knowledge — in the emor intellectualis Dei. We cannot elicit from first principles that obe- dence without understanding effects salvation and this has to be accepted on faith as an act of divine grace. 87 Is Spinoza inconsistent in this account of the nature of faith? ‘The notion of divine grace is an imaginative idea, picturing God as a ruler dispensing salvation as a reward for obedience; and’ the pious who believe in the doctrine of grace observe the precepts to love God and their neighbours. The u tational conception of salvation is the blessedness and peace of mind that super- vyenes upoa the true knowledge of God and his attributes, with the appropriate Conduct which that knowledge prompts. The conduct is the same in both cases (for behaviour prompted by passion may coincide with genuine action $8) and 30 likewise is the peace of mind. Further, very few are capable of acquizing virtue purely under the unaided guidance of reason, 80 so that apart from faith salvation ‘would be beyond the reach of the vast majority. Accordingly, although nobody has ever succeeded in proving by reason that salvation can be achieved simply by obedience and faith in God's grace, we may be morally certuin, as were the prophets, in the truth of their message. 40 ‘This moral certainty, however, is Enything but super-natural cognition, Te is not in conflict with reason for even though the imapioatve idea were false, its truth or falsity is irrelevant to is oral effect, and that coincides with the moral effect or practical expression of reason. No contradiction, therefore, is involved in Spinoza’s exposition of this sattet. “Another important matter, not unconnected with what we have so far discussed, is Spinozs’s view shout Chest and his attitude to Christianity. To this we must next turn our attention. We now sce what Spinoza means, and to what he is refercing, when he spesks of what is not contained in or deducible from the foundations of our naturel knowledge. Tt is no super-natural cognition but + belief the truth of which is not absurd, and of which we can be morally certin, although we cannot deduce it from first principles — namely the belief that salvation is attainable, not only through intellectual comprehension of God's divine nature and the Tove and blessedness that it entails, but also through faith and devotion to moral principles ted by the imagination The first is Tred to nan samedi in tle nea. Grice has 38 ‘much right to be called prophecy as any other form of cognition). The second is revealed through bieroglyphica in the pronouncemeats of the prophets to whom it was imparted by way of the imagination. The one exception to this, as appears from the Gospel records, i Jesus, who was immediately aware of the truths of faith without the intermediation of visions or signs. Thus, sola mente, he perceived ‘what is not contained in the first principles of natural knowledge not can be Ueduced from them. 41 Such a mind, 288 Spinoza, is superior to and far more excellent than human. 42 Accordingly, we may say that, in Jesus, the wisdom of God assumed human form. Spinozs’s statement here is precisely in agreemeit with what he writes to Oldenburg in Ep, XXII ©. cit is not entitely necessary for salvation to know Christ according to the flesh; but we must think far otherwise of the eternal son of God, #8 that is the eternal wisdom of God, which has manifested itself in all ‘especially in the human mind, and most of all in Christ Jesus.” ‘There is no more admission here of super-natural knowledge than in the case of what is known by the natural light, of which Spinoza says likewise that ‘we may clearly understand that God can reveal (communicare) himself to men im- mediately, for he communicates his essence to our minds using no corporeal media’. 44 Nor docs it necessarily follow that Jesus must have been the greatest of all philosophers for what was directly revealed to and in him was the trath of faith which is not philosophically derivable. 2 VI Enough has now been stid to demolish the central pillac of Strauss’ argument. ‘There is no contradiction in the Treatise on the issue of the possibility of super natural knowledge. What ‘surpasses the capacity of the intellect is the deduction of historical fact and the demonstration of the teuth of what is expressed in symbols and imaginative imagery. No super-natural knowledge is involved in faith nor even in its direct revelation in the mind of Cheist — except, of course, in the sense that all knowledge of truth, whether by reason or faith, may be called divine revelation. With the removal of this contradiction most of the others that Strauss alleges disappear. 1) Spinoza nowhere says that man has no access to truth except through sense- pefcepton and resoning, Sense perception he includes in imaginati an, s bas been shown, while that is the sole source of error, it can also be the medium of revelation. He does not say that what cannot be demonstrated by reason is absurd; coaly what is contrary to reason. 45 And he castigates what claims to be ebove reason as ‘far below reason’ only on the merits of the doctrines which make the aim. 46 2) In his assertion that theology and philosophy are separate and have no mutual inter-communication (commerciam), 4T as is now fully apparent, Spinoza is wholly consistent. Strauss confuses the issue by using ‘theology’, ‘the Bible’ ‘prophecy’ and ‘faith’ ss inter-changeable. Spinoza himself frequently substitutes the First for the third and the last but, as I shall presently show, he does not use “the Scripture’ 2s synonymous with ‘prophecy’. At all events what theology is concerned with ia his view is obedience and piety, which depend on faith, and that, we have seen, is not a philosophically demonstrable doctrine. Philosophy is concerned solely with truth and the perfection of the intellect. The practical ‘concomitant of that coincides with that of faith. But neither can theology dictate its conclusions to philosophy, nor philosophy prescribe the requirements or, the effects of faith, 3) Spinoza indeed maintains that the prophets (not the Bible) are not author- itative in speculative matters. They are not scientists or learned men. But some of theic pronouncements agree with the conclusions of reason. It is moreover only, season, in the last resort fhat cen judge of their authority even in matters of faith. For if they teach an immoral doctrine their prophecy is to be declared spurious. It is only reason which can judge of the genuineness of prophecy even it cannot prove the fundamental thesis of faith. 4) Spinoza does not say that the Bible isthe sole source of prophecy but only that it is all the evidence that remains to us of the nature of prophecy. 48 3) We have seen that the opinion about Christ is in keeping with Spinoza's philosophical position. He alleges no violation of the laws of nature, either in this connexion or in the case of prophecy generally. For what in fact we cannot explain scientifically does not necessarily violate nature in principle. As there is no necessary implication that Jesus was the greatest of philosophers, the rest of Strauss’ objection falls away; but even if there were, it would not involve Spinoza in any contradiction. He does not equate the Bible with theology and Imits that some of the Scriptures are philosophical — Proverbs, Ecclesiastes and the Wisdom of Solomon, for instance. 4° The separation of theology from philo- 3 sophy occu inthe Bible Hef, It is ony the commentators 8 who confuse the twos 6) The moral teiching which is pervasive throughout the Scriptures, Old Testament and New, i ‘ndspuably the paramount mora precept to love God and thy neighout. This is Spinons contetion and itis te, Seas quibbles Concening i are therefore fale 7), ‘The alleged confusions about Christ and Christianity we have already dis pulled. With respect to Spinoa’s remarks to Oldenburg in Epp. LXXV. and Hooevmr, they ate tothe effect thatthe dsiples min teching would not be vitited had they been mistaken in their (admittedly sincere) beliefs about the resection of Jes asthe eros of so any fhe poops on speculative mates do oot effect the mally of ther fundamental wesige, Agata Spinots con Sitengy is faly matin 8) The simple doctrine which the Bible teaches is now plain, That is not hieroglyphic, nd it desenble bythe wie ofthe ittnod of histortal inter pretton pretrbed forthe reasons given, What is hieroglyphicl mostly concerns Speculative matters which Spinoes says sce tore crows than wef 2 var As Spinoza's theory turns out to be consistent throughout, there can be n0 pretext for seeking a second and hidden doctrine beyond that which is expressely stated. And if the exoteric theses are true, there could be no reason for Spinoza to insinuate another doctrine for more perspicacious readers to winkle out, And Spinoza's assertions about the Bible are true. Its moral teaching from beginning to end is substantially one, even if in the course of its development its emphases change in detail. The distinction Spinoza makes between divine law and cere- ‘monial law has a sound basis in the text, and the exhortation of the later prophets to the genuine practice of righteousness in preference to sacrifices and ‘ceremonies is obvious and widely recognized. That the New Testament develops this same theme further is beyond controversy. Again, the prophets were the sort ‘of people Spinoza alleges. They did express their message in symbolic forms; the revelations came to them in the ways he described. ‘They were not learned men and their beliefs about nature were for the most past false. Yet, for all that, their spiritual and moral teaching is clear and unassailable, ‘The Bible, moreover, is for the most part historical, and even its prophetic and moral teachings are conveyed through historical nasrative, To be understood properly, therefore, it requires interpretation by historical methods, whether or rot we believe it to be divinely inspited, and in order to establish whether and in what sense it was 50 inspired. The method of interpretation set out by Spinoza is, by and large, that which quite independently of his prescription, competent historians have come to recognize as appropriate to their subject matter. There are, then, no grounds to suggest that Spinoza inserted the seventh chapter into the Treatise as a cryptic guide to the interpretation of his own writing, In these circumstances, why should commentator make any such allegation? If Spinoza's main theses are patently correct, the allegation that they are stated merely to appease vulgar prejudices would appear to spring from a somewhat perverse interpretation prompted by some ulterior motive. ‘Strauss persistently contends that Spinoza adopted his own rule, as enunciated “4 a in the Tractatas de Intellectur Emendatione: ad captum vulgi logai, Bot it is first to be noted that the rule is stated there only as a temporary practical precept to be observed until the correct method of discovering the truth has been found. Secondly, acpi vue lg inno sense mans 10 deve the, pope, et | ide the truth from them. On the contrary its meaning is (and itis always used in the works and letters of Spinoza in this sense) to express the truth in such language and by such means as the vulgar cin understand. For instance, if one wants to persuade the masses that they should act justly and be charitable, it ‘would be futile to ceite to them geometrical proofs that such conduct is ia theie best interests. It would be far mote effective to teach them that God, an almighty judge and ruler of the world, commands the practice of justice end mercy and will reward men accordingly. It is far from plausible to suggest thet Spinoza intended this precept, in accordance with his motto ‘Cane’, to mean that one should be careful to conceal trath which might be dangerous! He did insist on care in two respects; first, fot to advertise arguments to those who are likely to misunderstand and mis- represent them, and, secondly, to exercise great caution in developing one's own ition, so as to argue always validly and fall into no inadvertent error. ‘Indeed’, he waite, "....to deduce things solely from intellectual concepts most often requires long chains of insights (perceptionsm), and, besides, the greatest Caution, penetration of mind (ingenii), and the highest self-restraint (cont. nentia)” 82 ‘Caute, therefore, as likely as not, refers to meticulousness and care in reasoning aright rather than to any craven concealment of beliefs one holds to be true lest they prove socially or politically dangerous. ‘tis Strauss thea rather than Spinoza whose argument is marred by inconsisten cies, inaccuracies and misinterpretations. He alleges that Spinoza wrote ad captam tnlgi, yet acknowledges that in the preface to the Tracalus the vulgar are urged to leave the book alone and not to fead it because it is intended only for philo sophers. 63 This, says Strauss, is not sincerely menat; because Spinoza says, ia the same context, that he writes for those who would philosophize moze if only they did not believe that reison must be subordinated to theology. So, in fact, Spinoza wrote for ‘potential philosophers while the vulgar listened’ — for he knew that all educated people of his time could read Latin. 4 Yet again Strauss says that Spinoza did not write for his contemporaries but for posterity. 95 Strauss asserts also that Spinoza dgspised the Ancients and respected only contemporary ‘writers, but admits that he admized Lucretius, Epicurus and Democritus and quotes Seneca and Cicero with approval. 68 Again, Strauss acknowledges in one place that Spinoza considered his own writings clear and intelligible, in no need of Fistorieal interpretation, 67 yet he also implies that Spinoza deliberately inserted his hermeneutical instructions to enable the wary to interpret his own writings. 5¢ Strauss argues that Spinoza denied the possiblity of miracles and would make | no concessions on this point, but he allowed the supra-ational character of pro + Bhecy (to placate the vulgsr) while maitaining that it was a natural phenomenon. No such doctrine, however, would make sense, for if the only natural knowledge is rational, supratational knowledge must be supernatural. One cannot say in defence of Strauss that the incoherence was Spinoza's, for I have shown that it is not; so this muddle is either Strauss’ misunderstanding or a deliberate con- fasion of the ‘With respect to miracles Strauss is undoubtedly right in his assertion that 3 Spinoza refused to compromise. His firm doctrine is that the laws of nature ax Gods’ eternal decrees which cannot be and never are violated. For God to trans gress his own laws would be for him to contradict himself, which is absucd. Ba Spinoza does not deny that miracles occurced and are recorded in the Scriptures All that he denies is that the miraculous events are violations of natucal law. B the biblical writers they are ascribed directly to God and represented as hi actions, but (Spinoza explains) it is a persistent Hebrew custom to ascribe al things directly to God's will. Further, the writers were not scientists and thei object was not to explain the events they described. Nor were their description always accurate but often based on hearsay and embellished by imaginativ accretions. ‘Moreover, he points out, the Bible nowhere teaches that the miraculous event violated natural law, but, on the contrary, expressly states that the decrees of Goi are eternal. In many cases the natural causes are actually recorded. The Red Sea we are told, parted because God blew with his wind, and Saul came to Samue in search of his father's asses. In other cases we know what the naturel cause: ‘were — of the rainbow, given as a sign to Noah, the refraction of the sun's ray — and in yet others we can imagine and hypothesize probable causes, It is misleading, therefore, to say as Strauss does that Spinoza denied the occurrence of ‘miracles proper’, and quite wrong te accuse him of inconsistency in departing from his own hecmencutical rules in Ch. VI of the Treatise. Spinozs openly explains that here he is dealing with a philosophical and not merely an historical issue, Even so, he does observe his own interpretive method in quoting ‘what the Bible actually says and in explaining the writers’ forms of expression and nacration on historical principles, Te would be merely tedious to extend the list of incoherencies and inaccuracies in Strauss’ argument, althought it would not be difficult to do so. It would be possible also to show that among his numerous references some, so far. from supporting his argument, run counter to it. One example is his attempt to con: firm his assertion that Spinoza thought deceptive uses to be “justifiable. He refers here to the passage in the Treatise (Ch. XVI) 59 where Spinoza actually says that nobody can promise to forego his right over absolutely everything with. out dishonesty, which docs not mean that we may legitimately make such 4 deceptive promise, but that if we did we should be disingenuous. The explanatory ‘ote asserts that while deception in the civil state may be classified as\ good of bad because the Isw provides criterion (N.B. the civil, not the moral, law), ‘n0 such distinction is possible. in the state of nature. These references give no SUpPoR fo the thesis Wat Spinoa belived deliberate deception to be justifiable, but rather to the contraty. Etbics IV, 72, which is listed by Strauss in the same footnote, is a flat and emphatic denial of the thesis maintained, a denial thet is driven home by Spinoza in the Scholium, where he argues that it would be absurd to try to justify breach of faith even under the threat of instant death, I shall not weary the reader with a long enumeration of other similar incon. ‘gnuities, for we already have sufficient before us to cripple the thesis being ad- ‘ooated’ by Strauss. ur conclusion should be, by Strauss’ own argument, that his essay is hiero- glyphical and needs interpretation in the way he supposes Spinoza to be recom ‘mending. We should, if we took his advice, conclude that he, Strauss, is writing ‘ad captum valgi, and that the astute and waty will discover behind his exoterie doctrine another which he really intends to convey. ‘The esoteric argument is 16 that Spinoza was truly an atheist, trying to justify his defection from Judaism by while, at the same time, undermining the authority of the Bible. The insinuation is also made that Spinoza’s favourable comments on Christianity are insincere and unsupportable, while his professed lack of comprehension coupled with his castigation of Church dogma as absurd, 62 are to be taken seriously. In short the esoteric argument of Strauss’ essay wold transpire as an advocacy of orthodox Judaism and the authority of the Old Testament against the alleged attacks of an atheist,and a renegade, on the one hand, and against the superiority of Chris- tianity, on the other. The explanation of such writing could be found only in historical evidence provided by investigation of the background and circum- stances of Strauss’ thinking, and whether its motive were the one suggested only historical research could ascertain, 4 u NOTES 4 In what follows I shall use the following abbreviations: TTP for Tractatar Theologeo- Poltcar, E for Brbic, the Pact being indicated in Roman numerals and the Propositions numbered in Arabic numerals; T4IB for Tractatns de Intellectar Pmendatione 21 Strauss, Persecution and The Art of Writing, (The Pree Press, Glencoe, lino, 1952), Gh V, p. 179. 3°Ck Spinoza over de Tolerantie, Mededelingen XXIII vaawege het Spinosthuis, 1967 4 0p. et, p. 1586 5 Ch Tai Gebhardt, Vol. Mh, p. 18. © Op. et, p. 152, thd, p58, 8 CE Fal. and BM, Pe. 4358, 9 TTP, Prack; Suauss, op cit, p. 162 38 Straus, op. cits p. 146. 2 TTP, "Vi; Gebbarét It, p. 98. 32 Ibid Gebbarde II, pp. $9102. 1H Ibidy; Gebhard TV, pp. 109-11. 34 tbid Gebhardt I, pp. 89-50. 4% CE Adnotatio VIII to Ch VII, Gebhacdt p. 253: ‘Caeterum hieroplyphica, t historias, quae fide omnem excedee videatar, impercepibiles die” IP Strauss, op. cit, § Ill, p. 169. 2 bid, p. 170. 38 Ibid B. 171 wa 2 Bid, p. 173, 2B Ibid, pp. 172474, 2 Ibid! pp. 175-6 a Fre. Gs iW. 2M Sernuss, op. typ 180. Cf. TTP, Ch, XIV, Gebbatdt pp. 173, 178. 3 CE! Spinands Crbiqne of Religion, New York, 1965. Die Religions Spinora ss, Grandlege rin Bibhuitrenchfp, Basin, 1930. ‘a Stnosn Perseation and the drt of Wiig, p94 HET Pe 178. 2 Ct. TTP, Ch, 1, Geb. I, p. 29. 2 Tip, Ch, 1 Geb It p. 28 20 TYP, Ch. 1 Geb IL, pp. 16, 2: “de rebar, limites note: intlectas ecodentiby’ “mate evita italics limites porcpore’, Co. Vi, Geb ll, 98: ‘de Proper, quando: ‘hidem spre eaptum bumenam rapera; Ch. Vil, Geb Il, p.995 ee ‘TTB, Che |, Geb il, p. 1 TTP Gh th Gah i, 94 oon 93 TTP” I, Geb: Ill p. 26. By “naturel knowledge’ Spinans is apparently referring here to Rai, acetic knowledge delucel from commen oovons and principles CE TTP, Chs Ul and XIE. 3 CE TTP, Cos XI, XII] and XIV. CE TTP, Gh. XV. 38 CE. BV, Pr. 945, Pr. 50 and §, Pr. 59; V, Pr 48. CE, TTP,” Ch. XV’ ad fin, Geb. 1, p. 188. Bid, Geb. TV, p18. 4 TTP, Ch. 1, Geb. I, p. 20f, 42 It is'by no means obvious that this means that Jesus’ miad was superhuman, That it was diving, in ao far as it coincided with the divine intellect, Spinoea undoubtedly held. But the seatence is ‘sjas mens praciantion wecsiario, igus bumana Tonge extellention ette ddeberet, which may toean spy that Jesus mind, though human (which after all is (good Christian doctrine), was moce excellent and admirable in its moral perfection than was human. SCE Short Treative of God, Man and Haman Welfare, 1, Ch. IX, Geb. 1 p48 TTP. le. ch 18 t TIP, Ch. VI, Geb. I, p. 9, Trp, Ch. VM, Geb, IH, pp. 112-113. TIP, Ch. XIV, Geb. Tt, p. 179, ‘Trp, Gh 1, Gebhardt Ui, 'p. 16. Trp, Ch, Il, Geb, Mi, p19 Ch. IV, Geb. UN, pp. 6667. Eg, Maimonides, Ch. TTP, Ch, VI af fia; Ch. XV, Geb. I, p. 181, ‘ib, Ch. Vit, Ge. TH, p. Tie ‘TIP, Ch. V, Geb. Up. 77. Susans, op. cit, p. 162. Ibid, p. 187, bids p. 153, Ibid; pp. 1323, id, p. 48. Ibid) p. 178: ‘Ie is no accident Ibid, p. 179. CE. Straus, op. cit, p. 1648. CE Bid, p. 176. 2 CE, also, p. 187, Deze publikatie kwam tot stand met steun van de Dr. C. Louise Thijssen-Schoute Stichting. 19

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