SEC 5 FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

VICTORIANO V. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKER'S UNION

FACTS:
Benjamin Victoriano is a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been
in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc.. As such employee, he was a member of the
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement
containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:

Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent
employees workers covered by this Agreement.
Under Republic Act No. 875, the employer was not precluded
"from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees. "Then
Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an
amendment to section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not
cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such
labor organization". Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation
of its members with any labor organization, Victoriano presented his resignation to Union. The
Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate him from the service
in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. The management of the
Company in turn notified Victoriano and his counsel that unless Victoriano could achieve a
satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him
from the service.
ISSUE:
WON Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their
members from joining labor unions
HELD:
NO. The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or
religious or holy and eternal. It was
intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise
of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or
be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means
of livelihood, by reason of union security
agreements.Congress acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of a
burden that is imposed by union security agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed that
burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act(Republic Act 875), and, certainly, Congress, if
it so deems advisable, could take away the same burden. The means adopted by the Act
to achieve that purpose exempting the members of said religious sects fromcoverage of
union security agreements is reasonable. It may not be amiss to point out here that the
freeexercise of religious profession or belief is superior tocontract rights. In case of conflict, the
latter must, therefore, yield to the former. The Supreme Court of the United States has also
declared on several occasions that the rights in the First Amendment, which include freedom of
religion, enjoy a preferred position in the constitutional system. Religious freedom, although
not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, and has a preferred position in the
hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only
where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to
the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.

Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers Union 59 SCRA 54

Facts: Plaintiff is a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union who later resigned from his affiliation to the
said union by reason of the prohibition of his religion for its members to become affiliated with any labor
organization. The union has subsisting closed shop agreement in their collective bargaining agreement with
their employer that all permanent employees of the company must be a member of the union and later was
amended by Republic Act No. 3350 with the provision stating "but such agreement shall not cover members of
any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".. By his
resignation, the union wrote a letter to the company to separate the plaintiff from the service after which he was
informed by the company that unless he makes a satisfactory arrangement with the union he will be dismissed
from the service. The union contends that RA 3350 impairs obligation of contract stipulated in their CBA and
discriminatorily favors religious sects in providing exemption to be affiliated with any labor unions.

Issue: WON RA 3350 impairs the right to form association

Held: The court held that what the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the
"right" to form or join associations which involves two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the
absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and
second, power, whereby an employee may join or refrain from joining an association. Therefore the right to join
a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. The exceptions provided by the assailed Republic
Act is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said
unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement,
members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground
that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. Thus this exception does not infringe upon the
constitutional provision on freedom of association but instead reinforces it.

Benjamin Vidoriano Vs Elizalde Rope Workers union GR No. L-25246

FACTS:

Benjamin victoriano a member of iglesia ni cristo had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope factory
Inc since 1958. Her was a member of elizalde rope workers union which had with the company a
CBA containing a closed shop provision which reads as follow Membership union shall be required
as a condition of employment for all permanent employees worker covered by this agreement. RA
3350 was enacted introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of RA 875
as follows but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit
affiliation of their member in any such 0labor organization Benjamin victoriano presents his
resignation to appellant union thereupon the union wrote a formal letter to separate the appellee from
the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the union as member of the company
notified the apellee and his counsel that unless the appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement
with the union the company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service . this prompted
appellee to file an action for injunction to enjoin the company and the union from dismissing apallee.

ISSUE: WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional

HELD:

The constitution provision only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the
modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or
the chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. RA 3350 does not require as a
qualification on condition in joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion on in
any religious sect neither does the act requires affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its
member from joining a labor union as a condition on qualification for withdrawing from labor union RA
3350 only exempts member with such religious affililiation from the required to do a positive act to
exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted from form the coverage of any
closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into. Therefore RA 3350 is never an
illegal evasion of constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result which is lawful
in itself by vering or following a legal way to do it

Benjamin Victoriano vs Elizalde Rope Workers Union

59 SCRA 54 Political Law Primacy of the Constitution over Contractual Rights
Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) member, has been an employee of the Elizalde Rope
Factory (ERF) since 1958. He was also a member of the EPWU (Elizalde Rope Workers Union). Under
the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between ERF and EPWU, a close shop agreement is being
enforced which means that employment in the factory relies on the membership in the EPWU; that in
order to retain employment in the said factory one must be a member of the said Union. In 1962,
Victoriano tendered his resignation from EPWU claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the
close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of the INC because apparently in the INC, one is
forbidden from being a member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that his resignation from the Union
was acted upon by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF then moved to terminate Victoriano due to his
non-membership from the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the close shop
agreement because RA 3350, which provides that close shop agreements shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization, is unconstitutional
and that said law violates the EPWUs and ERFs legal/contractual rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an INC member may
refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where
he was employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority
therein. Further, the right to join a union includes the right not to join a union. The law is not
unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of contracts and
at the same time it recognizes the workers right to join or not to join union. RA 3550 recognizes as well
the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right