G.R. No.
218628 September 6, 2017 estate brokers/appraisers were appointed as commissioners to
EVERGREEN MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, Petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, Respondent
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 218631
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
Petitioner, vs. EVERGREEN MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, Respondent.
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:\
FACTS:
Evergreen is the registered owner of a parcel of land
(Subject Property). Republic-DPWH seeks to expropriate a
portion of the Subject Property which will be used for a public
purpose.
Based on the zonal, industrial classification and valuation of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the properties have an
appraised value of 6,000.00 per square meter. While
Republic-DPWH offered to acquire the Subject Premises by
negotiated sales Evergreen declined this offer. Thus, Republic-
DPWH filed a complaint for expropriation on 22 March 2004.
Evergreen prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
After depositing 1,038,480.00 which is equivalent to
100% of the value of the Subject Premises based on the BIR
zonal valuation of P6,000.00 per square meter, Republic-
DPWH filed a Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession.
A Writ of Possession was issued by the RTC. Republic-DPWH
filed a Motion for Issuance of a New Writ of Possession as the
first writ of possession was not implemented. Subsequently,
Evergreen filed a Motion to Withdraw the Initial Deposit. This
was opposed by Republic-DPWH as it was not yet allowed entry
into the Subject Premises. On 21 April 2006, the parties
entered into an agreement allowing Republic-DPWH to enter
into and/or possess the Subject Premises. The RTC granted the
Motion to Withdraw Initial Deposit.
During the pre-trial, Evergreen and Republic-DPWH
agreed that the issue to be resolved in the expropriation
complaint was the amount of just compensation. Three real
determine the current fair market value of the Subject
Premises. (Appraiser 1 - 15,000.00 per square meter;
Appraiser 2 - 37,500.00 per square meter; Appraiser 3 -
30,000.00)
RTC RULING:
RTC fixed the just compensation at 25,000.00 per
square meter. It directed Republic-DPWH to pay Evergreen the
amount of 3,288,520.00, which was the amount due after
deducting the deposit made by Republic-DPWH which had
already been withdrawn by Evergreen.
Both Republic-DPWH and Evergreen filed their
respective Motions for Partial Reconsideration. Republic-DPWH
argued that the just compensation should be fixed only at
15,000.00 per square meter while Evergreen argued that the
RTC erred in fixing it at merely 25,000.00. Evergreen further
asked for the payment of consequential damages as a result of
its lost income with its billboard lessee and decrease in value
of the Subject Property and legal interest on the amount of just
compensation.
RTC denied the motions. Thus, both parties appealed to the
CA.
CA RULING:
CA increased the amount of just compensation at
35,000.00 per square meter. It denied the claim of
consequential damages or interest by Evergreen. The CA found
the Subject Premises did not include and would not encroach
on the residential building and billboard owned by Evergreen.
Evergreen also failed to present any evidence to prove that its
remaining properties would be adversely affected or damaged
by the expropriation. As for the issue regarding the interest on
the amount of just compensation until final payment, the CA
held that Evergreen is not entitled to such interest as Republic-
DPWH's payment was deposited in the account of Evergreen
months before it was able to take possession of the Subject
Premises pursuant to the Writ of Possession issued by the RTC.
Hence, this consolidated petitions.
ISSUE:
 1. W/N CA correctly fixed the just compensation
2. W/N Evergreen is entitled to legal interest on the
balance of the just compensation computed from the
time of the filing of the complaint until the judgment
attains finality
RULING:
1. NO. Compensation in expropriation cases is defined "as the
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. The Court repeatedly stressed that the
true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss.
The word 'just' is used to modify the meaning of the word
'compensation' to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial,
full and ample."
The determination of just compensation in expropriation
proceedings is essentially a judicial prerogative. This
determination of just compensation, which remains to be a
judicial function performed by the court, is usually aided by
the appointed commissioners.
While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be
disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own
estimate of the value, it may only do so for valid reasons;
that is, where the commissioners have applied illegal
principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they
have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or
where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or
excessive. Thus, "trial with the aid of the commissioners is
a substantial right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all."
Two of the appraisers relied on several documents to
support their finding of just compensation that were found
by the SC as insufficient and misleading. The cases relied
on by the commissioners were decided in the year 2000,
while the taking of the Subject Premises in this case
happened in 2004 when Republic-DPWH filed a case for
expropriation against Evergreen. Moreover, the BIR Zonal
Valuations considered by the commissioners were also for
the year 2000. Just compensation must be the value of the
property at the time of taking. If there were other
documentary evidence to show the value of the property at
a point nearer to the time of the taking, in this case the
year 2004, then consideration of year 2000 documents
would not be fatal. However, if the only documents to
support the finding of just compensation are from a year
which is not the year when the taking of the expropriated
property took place, then this would be plainly inaccurate.
In 2000, this Court found that the just compensation for
similar properties situated in the vicinity was 26,100.00.
In 2008, the commissioners found the selling price of the
properties in the surrounding area to be from 35,000.00
to 40,000.00 per square meter. The time of taking was in
2004, or right in the middle of 2000 and 2008. Thus, we
may consider the mean of the prices of the properties for
the years 2000 and 2008 to arrive at the amount of just
compensation in 2004. Taking the higher value of the range
of price in 2008 and the amount of just compensation as
affirmed by this Court in 2000, we find that the amount of
just compensation in 2004 is 33,050.00 per square meter
or a total of 5,720,294.00.
2. YES. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides
that "no private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation." Just compensation in
expropriation cases has been held to contemplate just and
timely payment, and prompt payment is the payment in full
of the just compensation as finally determined by the
courts. Thus, just compensation envisions a payment in full
of the expropriated property. Absent full payment, interest
on the balance would necessarily be due on the unpaid
amount.
In the present case, we find that there is still unpaid
compensation due to Evergreen. Republic-DPWH complied
with Republic Act No. (RA) 8974, the applicable law for
expropriation in this case. Section 4 of RA 897 4 provides
in part:
Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation
Proceedings. - Whenever it is necessary to acquire
real property for the right-of-way, site or location
for any national government infrastructure project
through expropriation, the appropriate
implementing agency shall initiate the
expropriation proceedings before the proper court
under the following guidelines:
(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due
notice to the defendant, the implementing
agency shall immediately pay the owner of the
property the amount equivalent to the sum of
(1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value
of the property based on the current relevant
zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the
improvements and/or structures as
determined under Section 7 hereof;
xxxx
Upon compliance with the guidelines
abovementioned, the court shall immediately issue
to the implementing agency an order to take
possession of the property and start the
implementation of the project.
Before the court can issue a writ of possession, the
implementing agency shall present to the court a
certificate of availability of funds from the proper
official concerned.1wphi1
In the event that the owner of the property
contests the implementing agency's proffered
value, the court shall determine the just
compensation to be paid the owner within sixty
(60) days from the date of filing of the
expropriation case. When the decision of the
court becomes final and executory, the
implementing agency shall pay the owner the
difference between the amount already paid
and the just compensation as determined by
the court. (Emphasis supplied)
Republic-DPWH had complied with the requirements of Section
4, paragraph (a) of RA 8974 when it deposited the equivalent
of 100% of the value of the Subject Premises based on the BIR
zonal valuation of the property for the account of Evergreen.
This deposit was made before Republic-DPWH was able to take
possession of the Subject Premises through the issuance of the
writ of possession. Verily, under the law, the initial payment is
a prerequisite for the issuance-of the writ of possession.
However, this payment alone and by itself does not constitute
just compensation. We note that this is only the first of the two
payments the government must make. Section 4 of RA 8974
specifically provides that "when the decision of the court
becomes final and executory, the implementing agency shall
pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid
and the just compensation as determined by the court." Thus,
under RA 8974, there must be a completion of two payments
before just compensation is deemed to have been made.
The delay in the payment of just compensation is a forbearance
of money. As such, this is necessarily entitled to earn
interest. The difference in the amount between the final
amount as adjudged by the court and the initial payment made
by the government - which is part and parcel of the just
compensation due to the property owner - should earn legal
interest as a forbearance of money.
In the present case, Republic-DPWH filed the expropriation
complaint on 22 March 2004. As this preceded the actual taking
of the property, the just compensation shall be appraised as of
this date. No interest shall accrue as the government did not
take possession of the Subject Premises. Republic-DPWH was
able to take possession of the property on 21 April 2006 upon
the agreement of the parties. Thus, a legal interest of 12% per
annum on the difference between the final amount adjudged
by the Court and the initial payment made shall accrue from
21 April 2006 until 30 June 2013. From 1 July 2013 (BSP
Circular No. 799) until the finality of the Decision of the Court,
the difference between the initial payment and the final
amount adjudged by the Court shall earn interest at the rate
of 6% per annum. Thereafter, the total amount of just
compensation shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from
the finality of this Decision until full payment thereof.
 DANILO CALIVO CARIAGA vs. EMMANUEL D. SAPIGAO
and GINALYN C. ACOSTA
G.R. No. 223844. June 28, 2017
FACTS:
Cariaga filed a complaint affidavit before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, accusing respondents Emmanuel D.
Sapigao (Sapigao) and Ginalyn C. Acosta (Acosta; collectively,
respondents) of the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents,
False Certification, and Slander by Deed.
In the said complaint, Cariaga alleged that respondents, in
their respective capacities as Barangay Chairman and
Secretary of Brgy. Carosucan Sur, Asingan, Pangasinan, made
two (2) spurious entries in the barangay blotter stating that
(a) an unnamed resident reported that someone was firing a
gun inside Cariaga's compound, and that when Sapigao went
thereat, he was able to confirm that the gunfire came from
inside the compound and was directed towards the adjacent
rice fields; and (b) stating that a concerned but unnamed
resident reported to Sapigao that Cariaga and his companions
attended the funeral march of former Kagawad Rodrigo Calivo,
Sr. (Calivo, Sr.) with firearms visibly tucked in their waists
(blotter entries). According to Cariaga, the police authorities
used the blotter entries to obtain a warrant for the search and
seizure operation made inside his residence and cattle farm on
December 18, 2012. While such operation resulted in the
confiscation of a firearm and several ammunitions, the criminal
case for illegal possession of firearms consequently filed
against him was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of
Urdaneta City. 9
In his defense, 11 Sapigao denied the accusations against him,
maintaining that the blotter entries were true, as he personally
witnessed their details. In this regard, he presented the Joint
Affidavit 12 executed by Barangay Kagawads Elpidio Cariaga,
Metrinio Dela Cruz, Greg Turalba, and Ex-Barangay Kagawad
Jaime Aguida attesting that:
(a) during the funeral march of Calivo, Sr., they observed that
Cariaga and his employees had handguns tucked into their
waists; and
(b) the firing of guns was a common occurrence in Cariaga's
farm. 13
For her part, 14 Acosta averred that she was merely
performing her duties as Barangay Secretary when she
certified as true copies the photocopies of the aforesaid blotter
entries requested by the police authorities.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) dismissed the
complaint for lack of probable cause. It found that the
questioned blotter entries were all made in good faith done in
the performance of the respondents official duties, and based
on personal knowledge of what actually transpired. Filed an
MR, denied.
The Office of the Regional State Prosecutor's Ruling
In a Resolution 22 dated January 5, 2015, the ORSP affirmed
the OPP's ruling. Filed an MR, denied.
The CA Ruling
The CA dismissed Cariagas petition for review before it.
The ORSP is not the final authority in the hierarchy of the
National Prosecution Service, as one could still appeal an
unfavorable ORSP ruling to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ). As
such, Cariaga's direct and immediate recourse to the CA to
assail the ORSP ruling without first filing a petition for review
before the SOJ violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Thus, the dismissal of Cariaga's
petition for review is warranted.
MR denied.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA
correctly dismissed Cariaga's petition for review before it on
the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The Court's Ruling
The petition must be denied.
The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Department Circular No. 70
33 dated July 3, 2000, entitled the "2000 NPS Rule on Appeal,"
which governs the appeals process in the National Prosecution
Service (NPS), provides that resolutions of, inter alia, the RSP,
in cases subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation
shall be appealed by filing a verified petition for review before
the SOJ. 34 However, this procedure was immediately
amended by the DOJ's Department Circular No. 70-A 35 dated
July 10, 2000, entitled "Delegation of Authority to Regional
State Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in Certain Cases.
Department Circular No. 70-A delegated to the ORSPs the
authority to rule with finality cases subject of preliminary
investigation/reinvestigation appealed before it, provided that:
(a) the case is not filed in the National Capital Region (NCR);
and
(b) the case, should it proceed to the courts, is cognizable by
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs)
which includes not only violations of city or municipal
ordinances, but also all offenses punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years, irrespective of the amount of fine,
and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties
attached thereto. 36 This is, however, without prejudice on the
part of the SOJ to review the ORSP ruling should the former
deem it appropriate to do so in the interest of justice.
The foregoing amendment is further strengthened by a later
issuance, i.e., Department Circular No. 018-14.
A reading of the foregoing provisions shows that the prevailing
appeals process in the NPS with regard to complaints subject
of preliminary investigation would depend on two factors,
namely: where the complaint was filed, i.e., whether in the
NCR or in the provinces; and which court has original
jurisdiction over the case, i.e., whether or not it is cognizable
by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs. Thus, the rule shall be as follows:
(a) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is cognizable
by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OPP may be
appealable by way of petition for review before the ORSP,
which ruling shall be with finality;
(b) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is not
cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OPP
may be appealable by way of petition for review before SOJ,
which ruling shall be with finality;
(c) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is cognizable by
the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OCP may be
appealable by way of petition for review before the Prosecutor
General, whose ruling shall be with finality;
(d) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is not cognizable
by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OCP may be
appealable by way of petition for review before the SOJ, whose
ruling shall be with finality;
(e) Provided, that in instances covered by (a) and (c), the SOJ
may, pursuant to his power of control and supervision over the
entire National Prosecution Service, review, modify, or reverse
the ruling of the ORSP or the Prosecutor General, as the case
may be.
In the instant case, Cariaga filed a complaint before the OPP in
Pangasinan (i.e.,
outside the NCR) Of the crimes charged, only False
Certification and Slander by Deed are cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, 38 while Falsification of Public
Documents is cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts. 39
Applying the prevailing rule on the appeals process of the NPS,
the ruling of the ORSP as regards Falsification of Public
Documents may still be appealed to the SOJ before resort to
the courts may be availed of. On the other hand, the ruling of
the ORSP pertaining to False Certification and Slander by Deed
should already be deemed final at least insofar as the NPS
is concerned and thus, may already be elevated to the
courts.
Verily, the CA erred in completely dismissing Cariaga's petition
before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, as only the ORSP ruling regarding the crime of
Falsification of Public Documents may be referred to the SOJ,
while the ORSP ruling regarding the crimes of False
Certification and Slander by Deed may already be elevated
before the courts. Thus, the CA should have resolved Cariaga's
petition on the merits insofar as the crimes of False
Certification and Slander by Deed are concerned. In such an
instance, court procedure dictates that the instant case be
remanded to the CA for resolution on the merits.
"However, when there is already enough basis on which a
proper evaluation of the merits may be had as in this case
the Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure
of remand in order to prevent further delays in the disposition
of the case and to better serve the ends of justice." 40 In view
of the foregoing as well as the fact that Cariaga prayed for
a resolution on the merits the Court finds it appropriate to
resolve the substantive issues of this case.
II.
In the recent case of Hilbero v. Morales, Jr., 41 the Court
reiterated the guiding principles in determining whether or not
the courts may overturn the findings of the public prosecutor
in a preliminary investigation proceedings on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of his/her functions,
viz.:
A public prosecutor's determination of probable cause that
is, one made for the purpose of filing an information in court
is essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally
lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. The exception to this
rule is when such determination is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion and perforce becomes correctible through the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. It is fundamental that the
concept of grave abuse of discretion transcends mere
judgmental error as it properly pertains to a jurisdictional
aberration. While defying precise definition, grave abuse of
discretion generally refers to a "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."
Corollary, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross so
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law. To note, the underlying principle behind
the courts' power to review a public prosecutor's determination
of probable cause is to ensure that the latter acts within the
permissible bounds of his authority or does not gravely abuse
the same. This manner of judicial review is a constitutionally
enshrined form of check and balance which underpins the very
core of our system of government.
In the foregoing context, the Court observes that grave abuse
of discretion taints a public prosecutor's resolution if he
arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential parameters of
probable cause. In particular, case law states that probable
cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists
when the facts are sufficient to engender a well founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof. It does not mean "actual and positive
cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. Rather, it is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief and, as such,
does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.
In the instant case, a judicious perusal of the records reveals
that the ORSP correctly ruled that there is no probable cause
to indict respondents of the crimes of Slander by Deed and
False Certification. As aptly found by the ORSP, there was no
improper motive on the part of respondents in making the
blotter entries as they were made in good faith; in the
performance of their official duties as barangay officials; and
without any intention to malign, dishonor, or defame Cariaga.
Moreover, the statements contained in the blotter entries were
confirmed by disinterested parties who likewise witnessed the
incidents recorded therein. On the other hand, Cariaga's
insistence that the blotter entries were completely false
essentially rests on mere self-serving assertions that deserve
no weight in law. 43 Thus, respondents cannot be said to have
committed the crime of Slander by Deed. Furthermore, suffice
it to say that the mere act of authenticating photocopies of the
blotter entries cannot be equated to committing the crime of
False Certification under the law. In sum, the ORSP correctly
found no probable cause to indict respondents of the said
crimes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 Arlyn Almario-Templonuevo v. Office of the
Ombudsman
G.R. No. 198583 June 28, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioner was elected as Sangguniang Bayan Member
of Caramoan, Catanduanes during the May 2007 elections
where she served from July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2010. In the
May 2010 elections, she was elected as Municipal Vice Mayor
of the same municipality.
A complaint was filed administratively charging
petitioner before the ombudsman for violation of Sec. 2, par.
1 of R.A. 9287 (illegal gambling). The ombudsman found her
guilty of simple misconduct and imposed the penalty of 1
month suspension without pay. At the time she received her
copy of the January 6, 2010 Decision on September 27, 2010,
her term as Sangguniang Bayan Member had expired. She,
however, was elected as Vice Mayor of the same municipality.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, she directly
filed before the CA an original petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. She claimed
that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in
ordering her suspension at a time when her term of office as
Sangguniang Bayan Member had already expired and she had
been elected as Vice Mayor. This was however dismissed on
the ground of failure to file a motion for reconsideration.
Hence, she filed a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the CA. She claims that there was no need to file
for reconsideration considering that the Ombudsman's decision
has become final, executory and unappealable, citing the Rules
of Procedure of the Ombudsman.
She also states fact that the misconduct for which she
was penalized was committed when she was still a
Sangguniang Bayan Member. As she was elected Vice Mayor,
she claims that such election resulted in the condonation of her
administrative liability on acts committed during her previous
post. Consequently, the decision of the Ombudsman is in her
view a patent nullity.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the condonation doctrine should apply in the
case.
RULING:
Yes, the condonation doctrine applies in this case. When the
case was appealed to the CA, it should have considered
Templonuevo's election as Vice Mayor as rendering the
imposition of administrative sanctions moot and academic on
the basis of the condonation doctrine. Said doctrine, despite its
abandonment in Conchita Carpio-Morales v. CA, still applies in
this case as the effect of the abandonment was made
prospective in application.
In Giron v. Ochoa, the Court recognized that the doctrine can
be applied to a public officer who was elected to a different
position provided that it is shown that the body politic electing
the person to another office is the same.
In this case, those who elected Templonuevo into office as
Sangguniang Bayan member and Vice Mayor were essentially
the same. Stated otherwise, the electorate for the Vice Mayor
of a municipality embraces wholly those voting for a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan. Logically, the condonation doctrine
is applicable in her case. The Court is, thus, precluded from
imposing the administrative penalties of one-month
suspension on account of the same people's decision to elect
her again to office.
 City of Batangas v. Pilipinas Shell Corporation
GR No. 195003 June 7, 2017
DOCTRINE: The policy of ensuring the autonomy of local
governments was not intended to create an imperium in
imperio and install intra-sovereign political subdivisions
independent of the sovereign state. As agents of the state,
local governments should bear in mind that the police power
devolved to them by law must be, at all times, exercised in a
manner consistent with the will of their principal.
FACTS:
Batangas City is a local government unit.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod is the legislative body of
Batangas City.
Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) is a duly
organized Philippine corporation engaged in the
business of manufacturing, refining and distribution of
petroleum products; they also own and operate a
refinery situated in Tabangao, Batangas City (Tabangao
Refinery).
Shell Philippines Exploration, B.V. (SPEX) is a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines.
In furtherance of the mandate of Presidential Decree
No. 87 (PD 87) to promote the discovery and production
of indigenous petroleum, the Department of Energy
(DOE) executed Service Contract No. 38 (SC 38) with
SPEX under which SPEX was tasked to explore and
develop possible petroleum sources in North Western
Palawan.
SPEX's exploration led to the discovery of an abundant
source of natural gas in the Malampaya field off the
shores of Palawan, which thereafter gave rise to the
Malampaya Project. The Malampaya Project required
the construction of a 504-kilometer offshore pipeline for
the transport of natural gas from Malampaya field to
Batangas, for treatment in PSPC's Tabangao Refinery.
On May 28, 2001, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod enacted the Assailed Ordinance which
requires heavy industries operating along the portions
of Batangas Bay within the territorial jurisdiction of
Batangas City to construct desalination plants to
facilitate the use of seawater as coolant for their
industrial facilities.
The Assailed Ordinance was approved by the city mayor
on June 7, 2001.
Heavy industries subject of the Assailed Ordinance had
until May 28, 2006 to comply with its
provisions. Among the facilities affected by the
Assailed Ordinance is PSPC's Tabangao Refinery.
PSPC filed against Batangas City and the Sangguniang
Panlungsod a Petition for Declaration of Nullity (PSPC
Petition) before the RTC praying that the Assailed
Ordinance be declared null and void. The PSPC Petition
was raffled to Branch 84, and docketed as SP Civil Case
No. 7924. Thereafter, SPEX filed a petition-in-
intervention (Intervention) praying for the same relief.
PSPC averred that the Assailed Ordinance constitutes
an invalid exercise of police power as it failed to meet
the substantive requirements for validity. Particularly,
PSPC argued that the Assailed Ordinance contravenes
the Water Code of the Philippines (Water Code), and
encroaches upon the power of the National Water
Resources Board (NWRB) to regulate and control the
Philippines' water resources. PSPC alleged that the
Assailed Ordinance unduly singles out heavy industries,
and holds them solely accountable for the loss of water
and destruction of aquifers without basis, resulting in
the deprivation of their property rights without due
process of law.
RTC and CA declared that said ordinance is INVALID.
ISSUE: whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC
Decision which declared the Assailed Ordinance invalid?
 the use of ground water which, by virtue of the provisions of
the Water Code, pertains solely to the NWRB. By enacting the
RULING:
Assailed Ordinance, Batangas City acted in excess of the
The CA is correct. powers granted to it as an LGU, rendering the Assailed
The Assailed Ordinance is void for being ultra vires, for Ordinance ultra vzres.
being contrary to existing law, and for lack of evidence Being ultra vires, the Assailed Ordinance, in its entirety, is null
showing the existence of factual basis for its enactment. and void. Thus, it becomes unnecessary to still determine if it
The requisites for a valid ordinance are well established. Time complies with the other substantive requirements for a valid
and again, the Court has ruled that in order for an ordinance ordinance - i.e., that the ordinance is fair and reasonable.
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the concerned LGU to enact, but must also be passed in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Moreover,
substantively, the ordinance (i) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (ii) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (iii) must not be partial or discriminatory; (iv)
must not prohibit, but may regulate trade; (v) must be general
and consistent with public policy; and (vi) must not be
unreasonable.70
Batangas City claims that the enactment of the Assailed
Ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of its police power. This
claim is erroneous.
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and
general welfare of the people. As an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, police power primarily rests with the State. In
furtherance of the State's policy to foster genuine and
meaningful local autonomy, the national legislature delegated
the exercise of police power to local government units (LGUs)
as agents of the State. Such delegation can be found in Section
16 of the LGC, which embodies the general welfare clause.
Since LGUs exercise delegated police power as agents of the
State, it is incumbent upon them to act in conformity to the
will of their principal, the State. Necessarily, therefore,
ordinances enacted pursuant to the general welfare clause may
not subvert the State's will by contradicting national statutes.
There is no doubt, therefore, that the Assailed Ordinance
effectively contravenes the provisions of the Water Code as it
arrogates unto Batangas City the power to control and regulate
 REPUBLIC VS SALVADOR
G.R. No. 205428 June 7, 2017
FACTS:
Spouses Salvador are the registered owners of a parcel of land
with a total land area of 229 square meters, located in Kaingin
Street, Barangay Parada, Valenzuela City.
The Republic, represented by the DPWH, filed a verified
Complaint before the RTC
for the expropriation of 83 square meters of said parcel of land
(subject property), as well as the improvements thereon, for
the construction of the C-5 Northern Link Road Project Phase
2 (Segment 9) from the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) to
McArthur Highway. 5
Sps. Salvador received two checks from the DPWH
representing 100% of the zonal value of the subject property
and the cost of the one-storey semi-concrete residential house
erected on the property amounting to 161,850.00 and
523,449.22, respectively. The RTC then issued the Writ of
Possession in favor of the Republic.
On the same day, Salvador signified in open court that they
recognized the purpose for which their property is being
expropriated and interposed no objection thereto. They also
manifested that they have already received the total sum of
685,349.22 from the DPWH and are therefore no longer
intending to claim any just compensation.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of the Republic condemning
the subject property for the purpose of implementing the
construction of the C-5 Northern Link Road Project Phase 2
(Segment 9) from NLEX to McArthur Highway, Valenzuela City.
The RTC likewise directed the Republic to pay respondents
consequential damages equivalent to the value of the capital
gains tax and other taxes necessary for the transfer of the
subject property in the Republic's name.
ISSUE: Whether the capital gains tax on the transfer of the
expropriated property can be considered as consequential
damages that may be awarded to respondents.
RULING: NO.
This is clearly an error. It is settled that the transfer of property
through expropriation proceedings is a sale or exchange within
the meaning of Sections 24(D) and 56(A) (3) of the National
Internal Revenue Code, and profit from the transaction
constitutes capital gain. 32 Since capital gains tax is a tax on
passive income, it is the seller, or respondents in this
case, who are liable to shoulder the tax.
In fact, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), in BIR Ruling
No. 476-2013 dated December 18, 2013, has constituted the
DPWH as a withholding agent tasked to withhold the 6% final
withholding tax in the expropriation of real property for
infrastructure projects. 11ms, as far as the government is
concerned, the capital gains tax in expropriation proceedings
remains a liability of the seller, as it is a tax on the seller's gain
from the sale of real property.
Besides, as previously explained, consequential damages are
only awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining
property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease
in value. 35 In this case, no evidence was submitted to prove
any impairment or decrease in value of the subject property as
a result of the expropriation. More significantly, given that the
payment of capital gains tax on the transfer of the subject
property has no effect on the increase or decrease in value of
the remaining property, it can hardly be considered as
consequential damages that may be awarded to respondents.
 SOFRONIO B. ALBANIA vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 226792
FACTS:
1. In the 2007 Elections, Respondent (Tallado) and Jesus O.
Typoco were both candidates for Governor in Camarines Norte,
Typoco was proclaimed as the winner.
2. Tallado questioned Typoco's proclamation by filing with the
COMELEC, a petition for correction of a manifest error which
was decided in respondent's favor. Tallado assumed the
position of Governor of Camarines Norte from March 22, 2010
to June 30, 2010.
3. Tallado ran again in the 2010 and 2013 Elections where he
won and served as Governor of Camarines Norte, respectively.
4. Tallado filed his Certificate of Candidacy as Governor of
Camarines Norte in the 2016 elections. Petitioner Albania, a
registered voter of ,Camarines Norte filed a petition for
respondent's disqualification alleging that (1) he violated the
three term limit I rule under Section 43 of RA No 7160, and (2)
respondent's suspension for one year without pay, after he
was found guilty of oppression and grave abuse of authority in
the Ombudsman's Order.
5. In his Verified Answer, respondent argued his suspension
from office is not a ground for disqualification, he denied
violating the three-term limit rule as he did not fully serve
three consecutive terms since he only served as Governor for
the 2007 elections from March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010.
6. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for
being filed out of time. It ruled that a violation of the three-
term limit rule and suspension from office as a result of an
administrative case are not grounds for disqualification of a
candidate under the law; that the alleged violation of three-
term limit rule is a ground for ineligibility which constituted
false material representation under Section 78 of the OEC; and
such petition must be filed within 25 days from the time of
filing of the COC, which respondent failed to do.
ISSUES:
1. Was Tallado's Suspension from office a ground for petition
for disqualification?
2. Was there a violation of the three-term limit provided in the
Constitution and Local Government Code?
RULING:
1. NO, Respondent's suspension from office is indeed not a
ground for a petition for disqualification as Section 40 (b) of
RA 7160 clearly speaks of removal from office as a result of an
administrative offense that would disqualify a candidate from
running for any elective local position. In fact, the penalty of
suspension cannot be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent
so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications for the
office.
SECTION 40. Disqualifications - The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentence by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year
or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case; .
xxx
2. NO
Procedural Aspect
As the petition filed is indeed a petition under Section 78 of the
OEC, the filing of the same must be made not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. In this case, respondent filed his COC for Governor
of Camarines Norte for the 2016 elections on October 16, 2015,
and he had 25 days therefrom to file the petition for denial of
due course or cancellation of COC on the ground of violation of
the three-term limit rule, which fell on November 10, 2015. in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one
However, the petition was filed only on November 13, 2015 term for purposes of counting the three term threshold.
which was already beyond the period to file the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated
Substantial Aspect August 24, 2016 of the Commission on Elections En Banc is
hereby AFFIRMED.
We held that two conditions must concur for the application of
the disqualification of a candidate based on violation of the
three-term limit rule, which are: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.

-The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite

period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold
an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period
during which an office may be held.

A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, reiterated that

term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold
office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another.

In this case, while respondent ran as Governor of Camarines

Norte in the 2007 elections, he did not win as such. It was only
after he filed a petition for correction of manifest error that he
was proclaimed as the duly-elected Governor. He assumed the
post and served the unexpired term of his opponent from
March 22, 2010 until June 30, 2010. Consequently, he did not
hold the office for the full term of three years to which he was
supposedly entitled to. Thus, such period of time that
respondent served as Governor did not constitute a complete
and full service of his term. The period when he was out of
office involuntarily interrupted the continuity of his service as
Governor. As he had not fully served the 2007-2010 term, and
had not been elected for three consecutive terms as Governor,
there was no violation of the three-term limit rule when he ran
again in the 2016 elections.

-Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which

Abundo 's opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to
be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo 's
continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot,
 NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION vs.
OROVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 223366. August 1, 2017
MENDOZA, J:
FACTS:
In 1983, National Transmission Corporation (TransCo)
constructed a power transmission line known as the Tagoloan-
Pulangi 138 kV transmission line, on two (2) parcels of land
belonging to Oroville Development Corporation (Oroville).
On November 17, 2006, TransCo offered to buy these
properties from Oroville to be used for the construction of the
Abaga-Kirahon 230 kV transmission line in Mindanao. The
parties however did not arrive with an agreement. Oroville
informed TransCo that Oroville has not been paid just
compensation for the construction of the Tagoloan-Pulangi 138
kV transmission line in its property.
Subsequently, on August 8, 2011, per nomination of the
parties, the trial court appointed three (3) Commissioners,
namely, Engr. Marilyn P. Legaspi(P78.65 per square meter),
Engr. Norberto Badelles(P1.20 per square meter) and Atty.
Avelino Pakino(P2,000.00 per square meter), to determine the
just compensation of the properties affected.
RTC Decision
RTC set aside the Commissioners report and fixed the just
compensation at the rate of P1,520.00 per square meter with
legal interest of 12% per annum reckoned from April 20, 2007,
the date of ling of the complaint. The RTC opined that the just
compensation should not be reckoned from 1983, the time of
taking, because it was established by the landowners that
entry into their property was without their knowledge.
CA Decision
Ruled that TransCos entry into Oroville's lots in 1983 was
made without warrant or color of authority because at the time
TransCo constructed the Tagoloan-Pulangi 138 kV transmission
line over the disputed properties in 1983, it was made without
intent to expropriate. It added that TransCo constructed the
transmission line without bothering to negotiate with the owner
to purchase or expropriate the disputed lots. The CA concluded
that there was no actual taking of the subject properties in
1983 when TransCo constructed the Tagoloan-Pulangi 138 kV
transmission line. Accordingly, the computation of the just
compensation should be reckoned at the time of the filing of
the complaint in 2007.
ISSUE:
(1) WHETHER THE COMPUTATION OF JUST COMPENSATION
FOR THE EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY SHOULD BE BASED ON
ITS VALUE AT THE TIME OF THE TAKING OF THE PROPERTY.
RULING:
(1)THE COMPUTATION OF JUST COMPENSATION FOR
THE EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY SHOULD BE BASED
ON ITS VALUE AT THE TIME OF THE TAKING OF THE
PROPERTY.
Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Order of expropriation. If the objections to and
the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the
property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as
required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of
expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use
or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of
just compensation to be determined as of the date of the
taking of the property or the ling of the complaint,
whichever came first. x x x
As further pointed out in Republic v. Lara, et al., thus:
x x x "The value of the property should be fixed as of the date
when it was taken and not the date of the ling of the
proceedings." For where property is taken ahead of the filing
of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be
enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry
by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its
value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in
the value of the property from the time it is taken to the time
the complaint is led, due to general economic conditions. The
owner of private property should be compensated only for what
he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall
extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the
actual value of his property at the time it is taken x x x

Thus, pursuant to the Rules of Court and in accordance with

prevailing jurisprudence, the Court rules that just
compensation must be ascertained as of the year 1983 when
TransCo commenced construction of the transmission lines.
Just compensation is therefore fixed at P78.65 per square
meter, which is the fair market value of the property at the
time of taking.
 Rep. Baguilat vs Speaker Alvarez
GR. No. 227757
FACTS:
1. Prior to the opening of the 17th Congress on July 2017, news
surfaced that Rep. Suarez sought endorsement from President
Duterte for his appointment as Minority Leader in the House.
That to this effect, some members of the House Majority
coalition feigned membership in the Minority to ensure
appointment of Rep. Suarez.
2. Prior to the election of the House Speaker, then-acting floor
Leader Rep. Farias and Rep. Atienza agreed that all who voted
for the winning speaker shall be members of Majority and all
who will abstain or vote in favor of other candidates will be
members of the minority, no one objected.
3. Rep. Alvarez won the election of House Speaker with 252
votes. Rep. Baguilat got eight votes, Rep. Suarez got 7 and 21
abstained.
4. Herein petitioners hoped that the long-standing tradition
where the second candidate who garnered the second highest
vote automatically becomes Minority Leader, in this case, Rep.
Baguilat. Despite numerous follow-ups from House Speaker
Alvarez, Baguilat was never recognized as such.
5. One of the abstentionists, Rep. Abayon, manifested that all
those who did not vote for Alvarez have voted for Suarez as
minority leader. Farias moved for the recognition of Suarez
but Rep. Lagman opposed on the ground that Suarez is a
majority member, hence cannot be voted in the minority and
that those who voted for him are independent members.
6. Petitioners filed herein Petition for Mandamus to the
Supreme Court for the recognition of Baguilat as minority
leader on the ground of the aforementioned long-standing
tradition and irregularities in the election of Suarez.
7. Suarez maintains that the court has no jurisdiction as the
election of Minority is an internal matter to the HoR. The OSG,
in behalf of the respondents insisted that the principle of
separation of powers and political question applies to the
instant question.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents may be compelled via
mandamus to recognize Rep. Baguilat as the Minority leader.
RULING:
No, Mandamus is an extraordinary relief to one who has
a CLEAR legal right to the performance of the act to be
compelled which is not attendant in this case. The election
proceeded without anyone objecting to the agreement
between Farias and Atienza stating that all who voted for the
winning speaker shall be members of Majority and all who will
abstain or vote in favor of other candidates will be members of
the minority. This unobjected procession was reflected in the
Journal of the house, which according to jurisprudence is
conclusive.
Moreover, Section 16, (1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution provides that: 1. The Senate shall elect its
President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a
majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
Under this provision, the house may decide to have
officers other than the Speaker and that the method and
manner as to how these officers are chosen is something within
its sole control. In the case of Defensor-Santiago vs Guingona,
the court observed that the Constitution is dead silent on how
the election of all leaders except the House Speaker must be
done.
Corollary, paragraph 3 of the same section in Article 16
vests in the HoR the sole Authority to determine the rules of
proceedings, as they are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the House. As a general rule, the
court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into
that exclusive realm. As an exception, it may strike down such
determination in case of grave abuse of discretion, which is not
present herein. As may be gleaned from the circumstances of
the case as to how the house conducted the questioned
proceedings, such grave abuse of discretion is absent. To rule
otherwise will not only embroil this court to the real of Politics
but will will breach the separation of powers doctrine.
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.
 Alexander Padilla vs. Congress
G.R. No. 231671 25 July 2017
Leonardo-De Castro, J.:
Detailed Version
FACTS:
On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No.
216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Mindanao group of
islands on the grounds of rebellion and necessity of public
safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution.
Within forty-eight ( 48) hours after the proclamation, or on
May 25, 2017, and while the Congress was in session,
President Duterte transmitted his "Report relative to
Proclamation No. 216 dated 23 May 2017" (Report) to the
Senate, through Senate President Pimentel, and the House of
Representatives, through House Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez
(House Speaker Alvarez).
On May 30, 2017, the Senate deliberated on these proposed
resolutions: (a) Proposed Senate (P.S.) Resolution No. 388,
which expressed support for President Dutertes Proclamation
No. 216; and (b) P.S. Resolution No. 390, which called for the
convening in joint session of the Senate and the House of
Representatives to deliberate on President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216.
P.S. Resolution No. 388 was approved, after receiving
seventeen (17) affirmative votes as against five (5) negative
votes, and was adopted as Senate Resolution No. 49 entitled
"Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate Not to Revoke,
at this Time, Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, Entitled
'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao. " P.S.
Resolution No. 390, on the other hand, garnered only nine (9)
votes from the senators who were in favor of it as opposed to
twelve (12) votes from the senators who were against its
approval and adoption.
After the closed-door briefing, the House of Representatives
resumed its regular meeting and deliberated on House
Resolution No. 1050 entitled "Resolution Expressing the Full
Support of the House of Representatives to President Rodrigo
Duterte as it Finds No Reason to Revoke Proclamation No. 216,
Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of
Mindanao. '" The House of Representatives proceeded to
divide its members on the matter of approving said resolution
through viva voce voting. The result shows that the members
who were in favor of passing the subject resolution secured the
majority vote. The House of Representatives also purportedly
discussed the proposal calling for a joint session of the
Congress to deliberate and vote on President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216. After the debates, however, the
proposal was rejected.
These series of events led to the filing of the present
consolidated petitions.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of these consolidated petitions; YES
2. Whether or not the petitions satisfy the requisites for the
Courts exercise of its power of judicial review; YES
3. Whether or not the Congress has the mandatory duty to
convene jointly upon the Presidents proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
Habeas Corpus under Art. 7, Sec. 18 of the 1987
Constitution(MAIN ISSUE); NO and
4. Whether or not a writ of mandamus or certiorari may be
issued in the present cases. NO
RULING:
1. YES. Contrary to respondents' protestations, the Court's
exercise of jurisdiction over these petitions cannot be deemed
as an unwarranted intrusion into the exclusive domain of the
Legislature. Bearing in mind that the principal substantive
issue presented in the cases at bar is the proper interpretation
of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, particularly
regarding the duty of the Congress to vote jointly when the
President declares martial law and/or suspends the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, there can be no doubt that the Court
may take jurisdiction over the petitions. It is the prerogative of
the Judiciary to declare "what the law is.
2. YES.
3. NO. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to
convene in joint session except to vote to revoke the
Presidents Declaration or suspension.
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution fully reads:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of
all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation
or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress,
if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
Outside explicit constitutional limitations, the Commander-in-
Chief clause in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution
vests on the President, as Commander-in Chief, absolute
authority over the persons and actions of the members of the
armed forces, in recognition that the President, as Chief
Executive, has the general responsibility to promote public
peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, the more specific duty to
prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence. However,
to safeguard against possible abuse by the President of the
exercise of his power to proclaim martial law and/or suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the 1987
Constitution, through the same provision, institutionalized
checks and balances on the President's power through the two
other co-equal and independent branches of government, i.e.,
the Congress and the Judiciary. In particular, Article VII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requires the President to
submit a report to the Congress after his proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and grants the Congress the power to revoke,
as well as extend, the proclamation and/or; and vests upon the
Judiciary the power to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis for such proclamation and/or suspension.
There are four provisions in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution specifically pertaining to the role of the Congress
when the President proclaims martial law and/or suspends the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, viz. :
a. Within forty-eight ( 48) hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to the Congress;
b. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President;
c. Upon the initiative of the_ President, the Congress may, in
the same manner. extend such proclamation or suspension
for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist; and
d. The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty four
hours (24) following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of call.
There is no question herein that the first provision was
complied with, as within forty-eight (48) hours from the
issuance on May 23, 2017 by President Duterte of Proclamation
No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao, copies of
President Duterte's Report relative to Proclamation No. 216
was transmitted to and received by the Senate and the House
of Representatives on May 25, 2017. The Court will not touch
upon the third and fourth provisions as these concern factual
circumstances which arc not availing in the instant petitions.
The petitions at bar involve the initial proclamation of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and not their extension; and the Congress was still in
session 68 when President Duterte issued Proclamation No ..
216 on May 23, 2017.
It is the second provision that is under judicial scrutiny herein:
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority
of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke
such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President.
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is
clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room
for construction or interpretation. There is only room for
application. According to the plain meaning rule or verba legis,
when the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is expressed in the maxims index
animi sermo or "speech is the index of intention[,]" and verba
legis non est recedendum or "from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.
The provision in question is clear, plain, and unambiguous. In
its literal and ordinary meaning, the provision grants the
Congress the power to revoke the President's proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and prescribes how the Congress may exercise
such power, i.e., by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members, voting jointly, in a regular or special session. The
use of the word "may" in the provision - such that "[t]he
Congress x x x may revoke such proclamation or suspension x
x x" - is to be construed as permissive and operating to confer
discretion on the Congress on whether or not to revoke, but in
order to revoke, the same provision sets the requirement that
at least a majority of the Members of the Congress, voting
jointly, favor revocation.
It is worthy to stress that the provision does not actually refer
to a "joint session. While it may be conceded, subject to the
discussions below, that the phrase voting jointly" shall already
be understood to mean that the joint voting will be done "in
joint session," notwithstanding the absence of clear language
in the Constitution, still, the requirement that [t]he Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members
in regular or special session, x x x" explicitly applies only to the
situation when the Congress revokes the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. Simply put, the provision only
requires Congress to vote jointly on the revocation of the
President's proclamation and/or suspension.
Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional
provision does not support the petitioners' argument that it is
obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session
following the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, under
all circumstances.
4. NO. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus
that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required. Mandamus never
issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that
the ministerial duty be absolutely expressed, it must however,
be clear. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties.
It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed
and to perform a duty already imposed.
Although there are jurisprudential examples of the Court
issuing a writ of mandamus to compel the fulfillment of
legislative duty, we must distinguish the present controversy
with those previous cases. In this particular instance, the Court Premises considered, the Congress did not gravely abuse its
has no authority to compel the Senate and the House of discretion when it did not jointly convene upon the President's
Representatives to convene in joint session absent a clear issuance of Proclamation No. 216 prior to expressing its
ministerial duty on its part to do so under the Constitution and concurrence thereto.
in complete disregard of the separate actions already
undertaken by both Houses on Proclamation No. 216, including
their respective decisions to no longer hold a joint session,
considering their respective resolutions not to revoke said
Proclamation.

In the same vein, there is no cause for the Court to grant a

writ of certiorari.

As earlier discussed, under the Court's expanded jurisdiction,

a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act
of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions.95 Grave abuse of discretion
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other
words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such
exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It bears to
mention that to pray in one petition for the issuance of both a
writ of mandamus and a writ of certiorari for the very same act
- which, in the Tafiada Petition, the non-convening by the two
Houses of the Congress in joint session - is contradictory, as
the former involves a mandatory duty which the government
branch or instrumentality must perform without discretion,
while the latter recognizes discretion on the part of the
government branch or instrumentality but which was exercised
arbitrarily or despotically. Nevertheless, if the Court is to
adjudge the petition for certiorari alone, it still finds the same
to be without merit. To reiterate, the two Houses of the
Congress decided to no longer hold a joint session only after
deliberations among their Members and putting the same to
vote, in accordance with their respective rules of procedure.
 JUANITO VICTOR C. REMULLA vs SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 218040 April 17, 2017
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Remulla filed a criminal complaint against Maliksi before the
Ombudsman for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. He
alleged that Maliksi, as governor of Cavite, caused the
purchase of certain medical supplies from Allied Medical
Laboratories Corporation without conducting any public
bidding, thereby giving unwarranted benefit or preference to
it. Maliksi then filed his counter-affidavit.
The Ombudsman Ruling
After almost 9 years, the Ombudsman found probable cause
against Maliksi for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Maliksi filed his MR, arguing that there was no probable cause
and that there was a violation of his right to a speedy
disposition of his case. The Ombudsman denied the motion.
The Ombudsman filed an information for violation of Section 3
(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Maliksi before the Sandiganbayan.
Maliksi then filed his Motion to Dismiss alleging that the finding
of probable cause against him was null and void, and that his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case was
violated. According to him, the 9-year delay in the proceedings
caused him undue prejudice.
The Sandiganbayan Ruling
The Sandiganbayan found that Maliksi's right to a speedy
disposition of his case was violated. Thus, it dismissed the case
against him. The explanation provided by the Ombudsman was
insufficient to justify its 9-year delay in the resolution of the
case. The Sandiganbayan noted that the interval was caused
by the delay in the routing or transmission of the records of
the case, which was unacceptable. In the case of Coscolluela,
it was inconsequential to determine whether an accused had
followed up on his case because it was not his duty to do so.
The Sandiganbayan opined that it was the Ombudsman's
responsibility to expedite the resolution of the case within a
reasonable time.
The OSP filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration arguing that
the delay in the preliminary investigation was neither
whimsical nor capricious, considering that Maliksi did not
complain on the delay. The motion was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST
RESPONDENT
RULING: NO.
The petition was filed by a private party
Procedural law mandates that all criminal actions, commenced
by a complaint or an information, shall be prosecuted under
the direction and control, of a public prosecutor. In appeals of
criminal cases before the CA and the SC, the OSG is the
appellate counsel of the People. In certain instances, the OSP
represented the People, when it involved criminal cases within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The present case challenges the dismissal of a criminal case
due to the violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases.
The petition filed before this Court was initiated by Remulla in
his capacity as a private complainant without the intervention
of either the OSG or the OSP. Although he claims that he has
legal standing as a taxpayer, the present case is criminal in
nature and the People is the real party in interest. Remulla
captioned his petition as "People of the Philippines v.
Sandiganbayan (Second Division) and Erineo S. Maliksi" but it
is clear that he does not represent the People.
Only on rare occasions when the offended party may be
allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf such
as when there is a denial of due process, or where the dismissal
of the case is capricious shall certiorari lie. Remulla failed to
qualify in any of these exceptional circumstances. Accordingly,
he has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the
criminal case against Maliksi on the ground of violation of the
right to a speedy disposition of his case.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases is a relative concept
The "balancing test" to determine whether a defendant's right
to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of cases has been
violated is subject to four-fold factors, to wit: (1) length of the
delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion or
non-assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to defendant
resulting from the delay. None of these elements, however, is
either a necessary or sufficient condition; they are related and
must be considered together with other relevant
circumstances.
In this case, Remulla argues that the cases of Tilendo,
Guerrero, Bernat, and Tello dictate that it is mandatory for a
respondent or accused to actively assert his right to a speedy
disposition of his case before it may be dismissed on the said
ground. He insists that Maliksi failed to follow up on his case
during the preliminary investigation, hence, he cannot invoke
his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Further, he avers
that the doctrine in Coscolluela, where the Court held that
there was no need for the respondent to follow up his case, is
not controlling and it is only applicable when the respondent is
completely unaware of the preliminary investigation against
him.
In Tilendo, Guerrero, Bernat, and Tello, the criminal cases
were not dismissed because of the non-assertion of the
accused of their right to a speedy disposition of cases or speedy
trial. Other factors in the balancing test were also considered
by the Court, particularly, the reason for the delay in the
proceedings and the prejudice caused by the delay.
In Coscolluela, the lengthy delay in the proceeding against the
accused therein was not satisfactorily explained. The Court
found in this case that the State miserably failed to give an
acceptable reason for the extensive delay. Due to the manifest
prejudice caused to the accused, the Court no longer gave
weighty consideration to their lack of objection during the
period of delay. It was emphasized that it was the duty of the
prosecutor to expedite the prosecution of the case regardless
if the accused failed to object to the delay.
In fine, it has been settled that the factors in the balancing test
must be given different consideration and weight based on the
factual circumstances of each case. Applying such principle in
this case, the Court can now determine whether or not the
Ombudsman committed inordinate delay and violated Maliksi's
right to a speedy disposition of his case.
The Ombudsman failed to justify the delay in the proceedings
The delay in Maliksi's case started from the fact-finding
investigation of the Ombudsman when he filed his counter-
affidavit in Remulla cases on December 15, 2005 until the
completion of the PCSO case on October 24, 2008, or a span
of 3 years. The preliminary investigation began until it was
terminated on August 27, 2014 and the information was filed
before the court in November 2014, or a period of 6 years.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan observed that the delay incurred in
the proceedings lasted for a total period of 9 years. Even if the
Court excludes the fact-finding stage of 3 years, there was still
6 years of inordinate delay.
The Court did not give great weight to Maliksi's lack of
objection over the delay because the OSP miserably failed to
defend the Ombudsman's inaction. The prosecution could not
give an acceptable reason to justify the 9-year interval before
the case was filed in court. The proceedings were marred by
the delay in the mechanical transfer of documents and records.
No steps were taken by the Ombudsman to ensure that the
preliminary investigation would be resolved in a timely
manner. Clearly, the failure of the prosecution to justify the 9-
year interval before the case was filed in court far outweighs
Maliksi's own inaction over the delay.
Therefore, the Sandiganbayan, after properly taking into
consideration all the relevant factors in the balancing test and
gave different weight on each factor based on the particular
circumstances of this case, came to a conclusion that the
Ombudsman committed inordinate delay. The case underwent
the intricate and difficult balancing test before Maliksi's right to
a speedy disposition of his case was sustained.

Thus, the Court rules that the Sandiganbayan did not commit
a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal case
against Maliksi. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
 Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v DSWD
"An Act to Maximize the Contribution of Senior Citizens to
Nation-Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and For
Other Purposes," was enacted. Under the said law, a senior
citizen, who must be at least 60 years old and has an annual
income of not more than P60,000.00,4 may avail of the
privileges provided in Section 4 thereof, one of which is 20%
discount on the purchase of medicines.
To recoup the amount given as discount to qualified senior
citizens, covered establishments can claim an equal amount as
tax credit which can be applied against the income tax due
from them.
The law was subsequently amended the tax treatment of the
discount was modified: from tax credit to tax deduction from
gross income, computed based on the net COGS.
The change in the tax treatment of the discount given to senior
citizens did not sit well with some drug store owners and
corporations, claiming it affected the profitability of their
business. Thus, drug store owners filed a Petition for
Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
I and/or Preliminary Injunction before this Court, assailing the
constitutionality of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 primarily on
the ground that it amounts to taking of private property
without payment of just compensation. SC: constitutional
Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was enacted. Same discount
(20%) and tax treatment (covered establishments shall claim
the discounts given to PWDs as tax deductions from the gross
income, based on the net cost of goods sold or services
rendered.)
Petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition with Application for
TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction9 with the CA,
seeking to declare as unconstitutional (a) Section 4(a) of R.A.
No. 9257, and (b) Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 and Section 5.1
of its IRR, insofar as these provisions only allow tax deduction
on the gross income based on the net cost of goods sold or
services rendered as compensation to private establishments
for the 20% discount that they are required to grant to senior
citizens and PWDs. Further, the petitioner prayed that the
respondents be permanently enjoined from implementing the
assailed provisions.
CA: dismissed the petition, the assailed provisions are valid
exercise of police power
ISSUE:
1. whether or not the assailed provisions of the law are
constitutional
2. whether or not the laws violate the equal protection clause
RULING:
1. YES.
The change in the tax treatment of the discount was a valid
exercise of police power.
The duty to care for the elderly and the disabled lies not only
upon the State, but also on the community and even private
entities. As to the State, the duty emanates from its role
as parens patriae which holds it under obligation to provide
protection and look after the welfare of its people especially
those who cannot tend to themselves. Parens patriae means
parent of his or her country, and refers to the State in its role
as "sovereign", or the State in its capacity as a provider of
protection to those unable to care for themselves. 33 In
fulfilling this duty, the State may resort to the exercise of its
inherent powers: police power, eminent domain and power of
taxation.
It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress
enacted R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, the laws mandating a 20%
discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens
and PWDs. It is also in further exercise of this power that the
legislature opted that the said discount be claimed as tax
deduction, rather than tax credit, by covered establishments.
The petitioner, however, claims that the change in the tax
treatment of the discount is illegal as it constitutes taking
without just compensation. It even submitted financial
statements for the years 2006 and 2007 to support its claim of
declining profits when the change in the policy was
implemented. (The Court is not swayed. The power being
exercised here is police power and not eminent domain.)
In the exercise of police power, "property rights of private
individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
State."38 Even then, the State's claim of police power cannot
be arbitrary or unreasonable. After all, the overriding purpose
of the exercise of the power is to promote general welfare,
public health and safety, among others. It is a measure, which
by sheer necessity, the State exercises, even to the point of
interfering with personal liberties or property rights in order to
advance common good. To warrant such interference, two
requisites must concur: (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the! State; and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the: attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the
police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and
a lawful method.39
Not confiscatory no taking of property without just
compensation. To reiterate, the subject provisions only affect
the petitioner's right to profit, and not earned profits.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, the right to profit is not a
vested right or an entitlement that has accrued on the person
or entity such that its invasion or deprivation warrants
compensation.
Right to profits does not give the petitioner the cause of action
to ask for just compensation, it being only an inchoate right or
one that has not fully developed50 and therefore cannot be
claimed as one's own. An inchoate right is a mere expectation,
which may or may not come into existence. It is contingent as
it only comes "into existence on an event or condition which
may not happen or be performed until some other event may
prevent their vesting."51Certainly, the petitioner cannot claim
confiscation or taking of something that has yet to exist. It
cannot claim deprivation of profit before the consummation of
a sale and the purchase by a senior citizen or PWD.
Corollary, whether to treat the discount as a tax deduction or
tax credit is a matter addressed to the wisdom of the
legislature. After all, it is within its prerogative to enact laws
which it deems sufficient to address a specific public concern.
And, in the process of legislation, a bill goes through rigorous
tests of validity, necessity and sufficiency in both houses of
Congress before enrolment. It undergoes close scrutiny of the
members of Congress and necessarily had to surpass the
arguments hurled against its passage. Thus, the presumption
of validity that goes with every law as a form of deference to
the process it had gone through and also to the legislature's
exercise of discretion.
The legislature may also grant rights and impose additional
burdens: It may also regulate industries, in the exercise of
police power, for the protection of the public. R.A. Nos. 9257
and 9442 are akin to regulatory laws, the issuance of which is
within the ambit of police power. The minimum wage law,
zoning ordinances, price control laws, laws regulating the
operation of motels and hotels, laws limiting the working hours
to eight, and the like fall under this category. 58
Indeed, regulatory laws are within the category of police power
measures from which affected persons or entities cannot claim
exclusion or compensation.
I.t was ruled that it is within the bounds of the police power of
the state to impose burden on private entities, even if it may
affect their profits, such as in the imposition of price control
measures. There is no compensable taking but only a
recognition of the fact that they are subject to the regulation
of the State and that all personal or private interests must bow
down to the more paramount interest of the State.
This notwithstanding, the regulatory power of the State does
not authorize the destruction of the business. While a business
may be regulated, such regulation must be within the bounds
of reason, i.e., the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable,
and its provision cannot be oppressive amounting to an
arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of
regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the
guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by
the exercise of police power. 64 After all, regulation only
signifies control or restraint, it does not mean suppression or
absolute prohibition.
The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and
harmless enterprises, but is the power to protect, foster,
promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the
interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and
of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an
effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an
arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is
void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties
of due process and equal protection of the laws. 66
2. NO.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words,
should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
some and unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee
means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or
other classes in like circumstances.68 (Citations omitted)
"The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from another."69 For a
classification to be valid, (1) it must be based upon substantial
distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law,
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) it
must apply equally to all members of the same class. 70
To recognize all senior citizens as a group, without distinction
as to income, is a valid classification. The Constitution itself
considered the elderly as a class of their own and deemed it a
priority to address their needs. When the Constitution declared
its intention to prioritize the predicament of the
underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children,71 it did not make any reservation as to income, race,
religion or any other personal circumstances. It was a blanket
privilege afforded the group of citizens in the enumeration in
view of the vulnerability of their class.
The same ratiocination may be said of the recognition of PWDs
as a class in R.A. No. 9442 and in granting them
discounts.1wphi1 It needs no further explanation that PWDs
have special needs which, for most,' last their entire lifetime.
They constitute a class of their own, equally deserving of
government support as our elderlies. While some of them
maybe willing to work and earn income for themselves, their
disability deters them from living their full potential. Thus, the
need for assistance from the government to augment the
reduced income or productivity brought about by their physical
or intellectual limitations.
There is also no question that the grant of mandatory discount
is germane to the purpose of R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, that is,
to adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development and make essential goods and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost, with
special priority given to the elderlies and the disabled, among
others. The privileges granted by the laws ease their concerns
and allow them to live more comfortably.
The subject laws also address a continuing concern of the
government for the welfare of the senior citizens and PWDs. It
is not some random predicament but an actual, continuing and
pressing concern that requires preferential attention. Also, the
laws apply to all senior citizens and PWDs, respectively,
without further distinction or reservation. Without a doubt, all
the elements for a valid classification were met.
 Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. v.
National Council on Disability Affairs (NCDA)
G.R. No. 194561 September 14, 2016
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
RA 9442 was issued amending RA 7277 to read as Magna
Carta for Persons with Disability and granted the PWDs a 20%
discount on the purchase of medicine, and a tax deduction
scheme was adopted wherein covered establishments may
deduct the discount granted from gross income based on the
net cost of goods sold or services rendered.
The NCDA issued an order prescribing guidelines for the
issuance of a PWD ID, which was the basis for providing
privileges and discounts to bona fide PWDs. The DOF issued a
Revenue Regulation stating that drugstores can only deduct
the 20% discount from their gross income subject to some
conditions. The DOH also issued an order stating that the grant
of the discount applied to the purchase of branded and
unbranded medicine from all establishments dispensing
medicine for the exclusive use of the PWDs.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition before the CA
to annul and enjoin the implementation of the laws and orders
for being unconstitutional. The CA upheld their
constitutionality, hence the petition.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the mandated PWD Discount is a valid
exercise of police power.
2) Whether or not RA 7277 as amended by RA 9442
violates the due process clause, for only requiring
identification cards that do not prove any medical
finding of disability, and for not providing any process
for identification of a PWD.
3) Whether the PWD Discount violates the equal protection
clause because it singles out drugstores to bear the
burden of the discount.
RULING:
1) Yes, the PWD Discount is a valid exercise of police
power. A legislative act based on the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. In more
familiar words, (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, should justify the
interference of the state; and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
R.A. No. 7277 was enacted primarily to provide full
support to the improvement of the total well-being of PWDs
and their integration into the mainstream of society. Hence,
the PWD mandatory discount on the purchase of medicine is
supported by a valid objective or purpose. It has a valid subject
considering that the concept of public use is no longer confined
to the traditional notion of use by the public, but held
synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare,
and public convenience. As in the case of senior citizens, the
discount privilege to which the PWDs are entitled is actually a
benefit enjoyed by the general public to which these citizens
belong. The means employed in invoking the active
participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the
purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and directly
related. Also, the means employed to provide a fair, just and
quality health care to PWDs are reasonably related to its
accomplishment, and are not oppressive, considering that as a
form of reimbursement, the discount extended to PWDs in the
purchase of medicine can be claimed by the establishments as
allowable tax deductions pursuant to Section 32 of R.A. No.
9442 as implemented in Section 4 of DOF Revenue Regulations
No. 1-2009. Otherwise stated, the discount reduces taxable
income upon which the tax liability of the establishments is
computed.
2) No, it did not violate the Due Process clause. RA 7277
as amended, must be read with its IRR which stated that upon
its effectivity, NCWP would adopt the ID issued by the LGUs for
purposes of uniformity in the implementation. Thus the NCDA
order provides the reasonable guidelines in the issuance of IDs
to PWDs as proof of their entitlement to the privileges and
incentives under the law and fills the details in the
implementation of the law.
Petitioners' insistence that the order is void because it
allows allegedly non-competent persons like teachers, head of
establishments and heads of NGOs to confirm the medical particular, a large discretion is necessarily vested in the
condition of the applicant is misplaced. It must be stressed that legislature to determine, not only what interests of the public
only for apparent disabilities can the teacher or head of a require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of
business establishment validly issue the mentioned required such interests. Thus, the Courts are mindful of the fundamental
document because, obviously, the disability is easily seen or criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should
clearly visible. It is, therefore, not an unqualified grant of be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. The
authority for the said non- medical persons as it is simply burden of proof is on him who claims that a statute is
limited to apparent disabilities. For a non-apparent disability or unconstitutional. Petitioners failed to discharge such burden of
a disability condition that is not easily seen or clearly visible, proof.
the disability can only be validated by a licensed private or
government physician, and a medical certificate has to be
presented in the procurement of an ID. Also, to avail of the
discount, the PWD must not only present his I.D. but also the
doctor's prescription stating, among others, the generic name
of the medicine, the physician's address, contact number and
professional license number, professional tax receipt number
and narcotic license number, if applicable. A purchase booklet
issued by the local social/health office is also required in the
purchase of over-the-counter medicines. Likewise, any single
dispensing of medicine must be in accordance with the
prescription issued by the physician and should not exceed a
one (1) month supply. Therefore, R.A. No. 7277 as amended
complies with the standards of substantive due process.

3) No, it does not violate the equal protection clause. The

equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that
is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and not arbitrary. With respect to R.A. No. 9442, its
expressed public policy is the rehabilitation, self- development,
and self-reliance of PWDs. Persons with disability form a class
separate and distinct from the other citizens of the country.
Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and
intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
classification and treatment accorded to the PWDs fully satisfy
the demands of equal protection. Thus, Congress may pass a
law providing for a different treatment to persons with
disability apart from the other citizens of the country.
Subject to the determination of the courts as to what is a
proper exercise of police power using the due process clause
and the equal protection clause as yardsticks, the State may
interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this
Dr. Rolando B. Mangune et. al. vs. Executive Secretary
GR No. 182604 September 27, 2016
FACTS:
On July 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 78425 (R.A. No.
7842) was enacted establishing, under the
administration and supervision of the Department of
Health (DOH), the Taguig-Pateros District Hospital
(TPDH).
President Arroyo issued E.O. No. 567 devolving the
administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH
to the City of Taguig. E.O. No. 567 provided that it was
issued pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991
(Local Government Code) and the President's
continuing authority to reorganize the offices under the
executive department.
the City of Taguig, through its then Mayor and
respondent Hon. Sigfrido R. Tinga (Mayor Tinga), issued
E.O. No. 053 formalizing the plan for the City of
Taguig's take-over of the operations of TPDH.
The City of Taguig and the DOH subsequently entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) providing the
details of the transition and turn-over of the hospital's
operations from the DOH to the City of Taguig.
In the meantime, petitioners, who were employees of
the DOH assigned to the TPDH, submitted a position
paper to the then Secretary of Health, respondent Hon.
Francisco Duque III (Secretary Duque), expressing
their objections to E.O. No. 567. The position paper was
received by the Office of the Secretary. However, the
DOH did not act on the Position Paper. Petitioners also
wrote a letter to the Office of the President requesting
the deferment of the implementation of E.O. No. 567,
which also took no action.
Thereafter, on January 3, 2007, Mayor Tinga issued
(E.O. No. 001) creating the TPDH Management Team
which will implement the MOA and directing the
creation of an audit team which will conduct an
inventory of all the medical supplies, materials,
equipment and other documents to be turned-over from
the DOH to the City of Taguig.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief against
respondents in the RTC of Manila. On January 26, 2007,
petitioners filed an amended Petition for Prohibition
and Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
prayer for Ex-Parte Issuance of 72-hour TRO, 20-day
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The petition
prayed that E.O. No. 567 be declared unconstitutional,
illegal and null and void for having been issued in
violation of the constitutional principle of separation of
powers and with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
RTC denied petitioners' prayer for a 72-hour TRO and
20-day TRO. As for the Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
the RTC, in its Order deemed the prayer for the same
withdrawn in light of petitioners' manifestation that
they are no longer pursuing their prayer for the writ.
On motion of petitioners and due to the Municipal
Government of Pateros' failure to file its Answer to the
amended petition despite notice, the RTC declared it in
default.
Respondents City of Taguig, Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita and DOH Secretary Francisco Duque
III, and petitioners filed their respective position
papers.
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. No. 567 is constitutional?
RULING:
Yes, EO No. 567 is constitutional.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. Thus, to be valid, an administrative issuance,
such as an executive order, must comply with the following
requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.
E.O. No. 567 satisfies all of the above requisites.
First, E.O. No. 567 itself identifies its statutory and
constitutional basis. E.O. No. 567 was issued pursuant to
Section 17 of the Local Government Code expressly devolving
to the local government units the delivery of basic services and
facilities, including health services.
It is the policy of the Local Government Code to provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure
through a system of decentralization. Thus, E.O. No. 567
merely implements and puts into operation the policy and
directive set forth in the Local Government Code.
Similarly, E.O. No. 567 is within the constitutional power of the
President to issue. The President may, by executive or
administrative order, direct the reorganization of government
entities under the executive department. This is sanctioned
under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.
The transfer of the administration and supervision of
TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig is a result of
the President's exercise of her power of control over the
executive department, including the DOH.
The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the
autonomy of local governments while Section 17 of the Local
Government Code secures to the local governments the
genuine and meaningful autonomy that would develop them
into self-reliant communities and effective partners in the
attainment of national goals. Therefore, in issuing E.O. No.
567, the President was actually carrying out the provisions of
the Constitution and the Local Government Code. She was
performing her duty to ensure the faithful execution of the
laws.
As regards the second requisite, that the order must be issued
or promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure,
petitioners do not question the procedure by which E.O. No.
567 was issued. In the absence of strong evidence to the
contrary, acts of the other branches of the government are
presumed to be valid, and there being no objection from the
respondents as to the procedure in the promulgation of E.O.
No. 567, the presumption is that the executive issuance duly
complied with the procedures and limitations imposed by law.
The third requisite provides that an administrative issuance
must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority
conferred. It must not supplant or modify the Constitution, its
enabling statute and other existing laws, for such is the sole
function of the legislature which the other branches of the
government cannot usurp.
The fourth requisite pertains to the reasonableness of an
administrative issuance. It is an axiom in administrative law
that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be
valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly
adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no
reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were
authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.
Specific to a reorganization, it is regarded as valid provided it
is pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is
carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or
to make bureaucracy more efficient.
E.O. No. 567 meets the test of reasonableness. The transfer of
the administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to
the City of Taguig aims to provide the City of Taguig the
genuine and meaningful autonomy which would make it an
effective and efficient partner in the attainment of national
goals and providing basic health services and facilities to the
community. It implements and breathes life to the provisions
of the Constitution and the Local Government Code on creating
a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization.
 MANIAGUE-STONE VS CATTLEYA LAND
G.R. No. 195975 September 05, 2016
The sale of Philippine land to an alien or foreigner, even if titled
in the name of his Filipino spouse, violates the Constitution and
is thus, void.
FACTS:
Cattleya entered into a Contract of Conditional Sale with the
Tecson spouses covering nine parcels of land, including the
subject property. Neither the Contract of Conditional Sale nor
the Deed of Absolute Sale could be annotated on the certificate
of title covering the subject property because the then Register
of Deeds of Bohol refused to annotate both deeds, because of
the writ of attachment that was annotated on the certificate of
title of the subject property.
The writ of attachment on the certificate of title to the subject
property was, however, lifted, after the reached an amicable
settlement.
Even then, however, Cattleya did not still succeed in having
the aforementioned Deed of Absolute Sale registered, and in
having title to the subject property transferred to its name,
because it could not surrender the owner's copy of TCT No.
17655, which was in possession of the Tecson spouses.
According to Cattleya, the Tecson spouses could not deliver
TCT No. 17655 to it, because according to the Tecson spouses
this certificate of title had been destroyed in a fire which turned
out to be false.
The owner's copy of TCT No. 17655 had in fact been presented
by Taina at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bohol, along
with the Deed of Sale that was executed by the Tecson
spouses, in favor of Taina covering the subject property.
It appears that when Taina's then common-law husband,
Michael (Mike) Stone, visited Bohol sometime in December
1985, decided to buy a portion of the beach lot in Doljo,
Panglao, Bohol for US$8,805.00. After completing the
payments in 1990, Troadio Tecson, Jr., the son of Col. Tecson
and Taina's brother-in-law, delivered to Taina the owner's copy
of TCT No. 17655.
In the meantime, in October 1986, Taina and Mike got married.
Taina sought to have her Deed of Absolute Sale registered with
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bohol, and on that
occasion presented the owner's copy of TCT No. 17655. Taina
also caused a Memorandum of Encumbrance to be annotated
on this certificate of title. The result was that on February 10,
1995, a new certificate of title, TCT No. 21771, was issued in
the name of Taina, in lieu of TCT No. 17655, in the name of
the Tecson spouses.
Cattleya instituted against Taina a civil action for quieting of
title and/or recovery of ownership and cancellation of title with
damages.
ISSUE: Whether the sale of land by the Tecson spouses to
Michael Stone a.k.a. Mike, a foreigner or alien, although
ostensibly made in Taina's name, was valid, despite the
constitutional prohibition against the sale of lands in the
Philippines to foreigners or aliens.
RULING:
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall
be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
Given the plain and explicit language of this constitutional
mandate, it has been held that "[a]liens, whether individuals
or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from
acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the
constitutional provision is the conservation of the
national patrimony."39
In the case at bench, Taina herself admitted that it was really
Mike who paid with his own funds the subject lot; hence, Mike
was its real purchaser or buyer. More than that, it bears
stressing that if the deed of sale at all proclaimed that she
(Taina) was the purchaser or buyer of the subject property and
this subject property was placed under her name, it was simply
because she and Mike wanted to skirt or circumvent the
constitutional prohibition barring or outlawing foreigners or
aliens from acquiring or purchasing lands in the Philippines.
Indeed, both the CA and the RTC exposed and laid bare Taina's
posturing and pretense for what these really are: that in the
transaction in question, she was a mere dummy, a spurious
stand-in, for her erstwhile common-law husband, who was not
a Filipino then, and never attempted to become a naturalized
Filipino citizen thereafter.

They cannot do indirectly what is prohibited directly by

the law.