GRECO ANTONIOUS BELGICA, ET AL. v. HON.
EXECUTIVE which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, ET AL. G.R. No. 208566/G.R.
No. 208493/G.R. No. 209251, 19 November 2013, EN BANC (Perlas-
Bernabe, J.) [This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No.
209251.]
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines
since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum,
discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the
latest Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The
allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following
manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to
P40 million for hard projects (infrastructure projects like roads,
buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects
(scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for
hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million
for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds
whereby certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of
funds into their department provided that the request for realignment
is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in
the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two
sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project
this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund
around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy,
exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel
system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been
helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20
bogus NGOs (non-government organizations) which would make it
appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects
but are in fact going to ghost projects. An audit was then conducted
by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with
the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed
various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is
constitutional.
2. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
RULING:
1. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is
unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the
release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other
hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to which the
PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but
under the pork barrel system, whats happening was that, after the
GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to
which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle of
separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs
Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the
Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the
legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the
executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator
concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone.
(The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only
insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned).
That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it
cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the
Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall
involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or
other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to
identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a
violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The
power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two
houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual
members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the
Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the
president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be
inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of
the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now
identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under
such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by
the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the
GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local
affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs
can develop their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members
of the house of representatives, whats happening is that a
congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and
later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with
the affairs of the local government and this is contrary to the State
policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if
thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse,
the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
2. Yes.The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential
pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29
(1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides: No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law. Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork
comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not
from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created
the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993),
which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation,
to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others,
collected from certain energyrelated ventures shall form part of a
special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further
finance energy resource development and for other purposes which
the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of
PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the
Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29,
Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated
therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a
general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C.
AQUINO III G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014 J. Bersamin
Appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of
the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the
legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be
used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors.
Facts: Jinggoy Estarda delivered a privliege speech in the Senate to
reveal that some Senators, with him, have been given an additional
P50 Million for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice
Corona.
Responding to this, Secretary Abad issued a statement explaining that
the funds for these were part of the DAP, a program designed to
hasten economic expansion. This DAP have been sourced from
savings which comes from the pooling of unreleased and the
withdrawal of unobligated allotments also meant for slowmoving
programs amd projefcts. Aruallo then brogutht the case to the Court
alleging that the DAP is unconstitutional alleging that its
implementing arm direcrted the withdrawal of unobligated
allotments of government agencies and offices with low levels of
obligations, both for continuing and current allotments.
Issue: Whether there is a law necessary to implement the DAP.
Ruling: NO. The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed
to stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context
of the DAPs adoption and implementation being a function
pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the Budget
Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute
the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to
adopt or to implement the DAP. Congress could appropriate but
would have nothing more to do during the Budget Execution Stage.
Indeed, appropriation was the act by which Congress "designates a
particular fund, or sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue
or of the money in the public treasury, to be applied to some general
object of governmental expenditure, or to some individual purchase
or expense.
In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than
the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that
money may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by
law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a
particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues
from the State to its creditors.
The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws,
had sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt
the budget to changes in the countrys economic situation. He could
adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings
and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of
savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be
funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict
sense because the money had been already set apart from the public
treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the
Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section
29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
TEODOSIO LANSANG RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI
ALCALA, v. BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA,
Chief, Philippine Constabulary G.R. No. L-33964, December 11,
1971, CONCEPCION, C.J.
When there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has
overridden private rights secured by that Constitution, the subject is
necessarily one for judicial inquiry.
Facts: While the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public
meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its
candidates in the general elections, two (2) hand grenades were
thrown, one after the other, at the platform where said candidates and
other persons were. As a consequence, the President of the
Philippines announced the issuance of Proclamation No. 889, wherein
the President suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
Petitioner assailed the validity of the proclamation. The respondents,
on the other hand, averred that the determination thus made by the
President in suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
"final and conclusive upon the court and upon all other persons.
Issue: Whether the proclamation is subject to judicial inquiry.
Ruling: YES. In Sterling v. Constantin, in which the Supreme Court
of the United States, declared that when there is a substantial showing
that the exertion of state power has overridden private rights secured
by that Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial inquiry
in an appropriate proceeding directed against the individuals charged
with the transgression. To such a case the Federal judicial power
extends and, so extending, the court has all the authority appropriate
to its exercise.
In the Courts resolution, it stated that "a majority of the Court" had
"tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to
satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of
Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A ... and thus determine
the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the
requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par
2, of the Philippine Constitution...." Upon further deliberation, the
members of the Court are now unanimous in the conviction that it has
the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in
order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.
ARNALDO M. ESPINAS, et al. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R.
No. 198271, 1 April 2014, EN BANC (PERLAS-BERNABE, J.)
Petitioners are department managers of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) who, together with 28 other LWUA officials,
sought reimbursement of their extraordinary and miscellaneous
expenses (EME) for the period January to December 2006. According
to petitioners, the reimbursement claims were within the ceiling
provided under the LWUA Calendar Year 2006 Corporate Operating
Budget approved by the LWUA Board of Trustees and the
Department of Budget and Management.
The Office of the CoA Auditor issued Audit Observation
Memorandum (AOM) No. AOM2006-27, revealing that the 31 LWUA
officials were able to reimburse P16,900,705.69 in EME, including
expenses for official entertainment, service awards, gifts and plaques,
membership fees, and seminars/conferences. Out of the said amount,
P13,110,998.26 was reimbursed only through an attached certification
attesting to their claimed incurrence ("certification"). According to the
AOM, this violated CoA Circular No. 2006-01 dated January 3, 2006
(CoA Circular No. 2006-01), which pertinently states that the "claim
for reimbursement of such expenses shall be supported by receipts
and/or other documents evidencing disbursements."
During the CoA Exit Conference held sometime in April 2007, LWUA
management officials, including herein petitioners, manifested that
they were unaware of the existence of CoA Circular No. 2006-01,
particularly during the period January to December 2006.
After the post-audit of the LWUA EME account for the same period, a
Notice of Disallowance was issued disallowing the EME
reimbursement claims of the 31 LWUA officials, in the total amount of
P13,110,998.26, for the reason that they "were not supported by
receipts and/or [other] documents evidencing disbursements as
required under [Item III(3)] of [CoA Circular No. 2006-01]."
Pursuant to the CoAs 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure, petitioners
appealed the notice of disallowance to the CoA Cluster Director
which was later denied. The CoA affirmed Notice of Disallowance.
ISSUE: Did CoA commit grave abuse of discretion in its ruling in this
case?
a. Was the certification falling under the term other documents? b.
Was the circular violative of the equal protection clause?
RULING: The petition lacks merit. The CoA did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion as its affirmance of Notice of Disallowance
No. 09-001-GF(06) is based on cogent legal grounds.
a. The "certification" submitted by petitioners cannot be properly
considered as a supporting document within the purview of Item
III(3) of CoA Circular No. 2006-01. Similar to the word "receipts,"
the "other documents" pertained to under the above-stated
provision is qualified by the phrase "evidencing disbursements."
That said, it then logically follows that petitioners "certification,"
so as to fall under the phrase "other documents" under Item III(3)
of CoA Circular No. 2006-01, must substantiate the "paying out of
an account payable," or, in simple term, a disbursement. However,
an examination of the sample "certification" attached to the
petition does not, by any means, fit this description. The signatory
therein merely certifies that he/she has spent, within a particular
month, a certain amount for meetings, seminars, conferences,
official entertainment, public relations, and the like, and that the
certified amount is within the ceiling authorized under the LWUA
corporate budget. Accordingly, since petitioners reimbursement
claims were solely supported by this "certification," the CoA
properly disallowed said claims for failure to comply with CoA
Circular No. 2006-01. b. The Court upholds the CoAs finding that
there exists a substantial distinction between officials of NGAs
and the officials of GOCCs, GFIs and their subsidiaries which
justify the peculiarity in regulation. Since the EME of GOCCs,
GFIs and their subsidiaries, are, pursuant to law, allocated by their
own internal governing boards, as opposed to the EME of NGAs
which are appropriated in the annual GAA duly enacted by
Congress, there is a perceivable rational impetus for the CoA to
impose nuanced control measures to check if the EME
disbursements of GOCCs, GFIs and their subsidiaries constitute
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
government expenditures. Case in point is the LWUA Board of
Trustees which, pursuant to Section 69 of PD 198, as amended, is
"authorized to appropriate out of any funds of the Administration,
such amounts as it may deem necessary for the operational and
other expenses of the Administration including the purchase of
necessary equipment." Indeed, the Court recognizes that denying
GOCCs, GFIs and their subsidiaries the benefit of submitting a
secondary-alternate document in support of an EME
reimbursement, such as the "certification" discussed herein, is a
CoA policy intended to address the disparity in EME
disbursement autonomy. As pertinently stated in CoA Circular
No. 2006-01, the consideration underlying the rules and
regulations contained therein is the fact that "[g]overning boards
of [GOCCs/GFIs] are invariably empowered to appropriate
through resolutions such amounts as they deem appropriate for
extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses."
JESUS C. GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON,
et al. G.R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013, EN BANC (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
Petitioner Jesus C. Garcia married Rosalie Jaype-Garcia in 2002. They
had three children. Rosalie describes her husband as dominant,
controlling and demands absolute obedience from his wife and
children. Things turned worse when Jesus took up an affair with a
bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the
godmother of one of their sons. Jesus' infidelity spawned a series of
fights with his wife and on one occasion, he also turned his ire on
their daughter, who had seen the text messages he sent to his
paramour. Rosalie is determined to separate from her husband but
she is afraid that he would take her children from her and deprive her respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect
of financial support. Jesus had previously warned her that if she goes the family and its members particularly women and children, from
on legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo. Jesus is violence and threats to their personal safety and security. Towards
the President of the three family businesses. this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed
against women and children in keeping with the fundamental
Rosalie filed a verified petition before the Regional Trial Court of
freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the
Bacolod City for the issuance of Temporary Protection Order ("I PO)
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the
against her husband pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
of physical abuse, emotional, psychological, and economic violence as
Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human
a result of marital infidelity on the part of Jesus, with threats of
rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. RTC
issued a TPO and a modified TPO in favor of Rosalie. Moreover, the applicationof R.A.9262isnotlimited to the
existingconditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions
During the pendency of the civil case,Jesus filed before the Court of
as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their
Appeals a petition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 or An
children are threatened by violence and abuse.
Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing
For Protective Measures For Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefore, Second, R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the
and For Other Purposes for being violative of the due process and Constitution. The fear of Jesus of being "stripped of family, property,
equal protection clauses and undue delegation of judicial power. guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in
a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere
ISSUE: Is R.A. 9262 unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to
protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of
be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
judicial power to barangay officials?
evidence one may have in support of one's defense.
RULING: No. R.A. 9262 is not unconstitutional. First, R.A. 9262 does
Lastly, there is no undue delegation of judicial power to barangay
not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. The unequal
officials. As clearly delimited by Sec. 14 of Barangay Protection
power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are
Orders, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his
more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the
gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences
perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or
justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre
her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child
succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence
physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely
of true equality."
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local
Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to
"maintain public order in the barangay."
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose
of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women
and children. As spelled out in its Declaration of Policy Section 2, the
State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full
BLAS F. OPLE, v. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS,
CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO
VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL
COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION
ON AUDIT G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, PUNO, J.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the
President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the
official conduct of his agents.
Facts: Senator Blas F. Ople prays to declare Administrative Order No.
308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System" invalid on two constitutional grounds, first, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and second, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
According to Senator Ople, A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of
identification that is allencompassing in scope, affects the life and
liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, violates their
right to privacy and also not a mere administrative order but a law
and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue.
Issue: Whether Administrative Order No. 308 is beyond the power of
the President.
Ruling: YES. While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws,
the President executes the laws. The executive power is generally
defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the
power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance. A.O. No. 308 does not merely implements
the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a
National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a
System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state
policies the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy
interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of
policies, etc. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of
some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line
that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules
and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it
deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES AND HON. ANGELO T. REYES, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY OF DENR GR No.175368, 11 April 2013, EN BANC
(Peralta, J.)
On February 10, 2004, Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz,
Gerardo R. Cruz and LiberatoSembrano filed with the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan their
respective Applications for Quarry Permit (APQ), which covered the
same area subject of Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration
Corporations Application for Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA). Meanwhile, on September 13, 2004, Atlantic
Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with the PENRO of
Bulacan an Application for Exploration Permit (AEP) covering the
same area of Golden Falcons Application.
As the case was still pending when Mercado, et al. filed for their
application, AMTC contends that their application fell within the
valid period. However, the Provincial Government decided that the
application of Benedicto et al. also already fell within the valid period
of application and thus, AMTC petitioned.
The Provincial Governor of Bulacan subsequently approved the
Applications for Small-Scale Mining permits to Mercado et al.
(formerly application for Quarry permits). AMTC continued their
protest up until the petition reached the DENR. On August 8, 2006,
respondent DENR Secretary rendered a Decision in favor of AMTC
and nullified the decision of the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not Section 17(B)(3)(III) of the 1991 Local
Government Code AND Section 24 of the Peoples Small-Scale Mining
Act of 1991 are unconstitutional for providing for executive control
and infringing upon the local autonomy of provinces.
 RULING: No. The power of control and review by the DENR/
DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted
by three statues (1) Section 17 of R.A. No. 7061 or the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991, 2) Section 24 of the R.A. No. 7076 or
the Peoples Small Scale Mining Act of 1991; and 3) R.A. No. 7942,
otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XIII (National Economy and
Patrimony) of the Constitution provides that the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State. Also, Paragraph 3 of Section
2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that the Congress may, by
law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens.
The Administrative Code provides that the enforcement of the small-
scale mining law is made subject to the control of the DENR under the
LGC of 1991, while the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991
provides that the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program is to be
implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other
concerned local government agencies. More importantly, the Court
has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution [Art. X, Sec.2] refers to the administrative autonomy of
local government units or, cast in more technical language, the
decentralization of government authority. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the State. It is clear that Section
17(b)(3)(iii) of the LGC is in harmony with R.A. No. 7076 or the
Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, which established a Peoples
Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the Secretary of
the DENR.
In relation to this, it must be clarified that the decision of the DENR
Secretary in declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of
AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and cancelling the
Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor,
emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary
under R.A. No. 7076 and its IRRs. This power to review is a
quasijudicial function and cannot be equated to control or
substitution of judgment. Lastly, laws are always construed in favor
of its constitutionality. Petitioner failed to raise grounds that can
topple this.
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL G.R. No. 191618, 7 June 2011, EN BANC
(Nachura, J.) Resolution
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Atty. Romulo B.
Macalintal from a decision dismissing his petition and declaring the
establishment of respondent Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as
constitutional. Macalintal reiterates his arguments on the alleged
unconstitutional creation of the PET that Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET. Thus, PET
violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. To bolster his
arguments that the PET is an illegal and unauthorized progeny of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, petitioner invokes our ruling
on the constitutionality of the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC).
Petitioner cites the concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-
de Castro that the PTC is a public office which cannot be created by
the President, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with
Congress. Thus, petitioner submits that if the President, as head of the
Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court,
likewise, cannot create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature.
ISSUE: Is the establishment of Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)
constitutional?
RULING: Yes. The decision of the Court still stands on its
constitutionality. The Court reiterated that the PET is authorized by
the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and as
supported by the discussions of the Members of the Constitutional
Commission, which drafted the present Constitution. The explicit
reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing
what was merely statutory before is not diluted by the absence of a
phrase, line or word, mandating the Supreme Court to create a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
 Suffice it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it already is, cannot
contain the specific wording required by petitioner in order for him to
accept the constitutionality of the PET. Judicial power granted to the
Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the
doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed
by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to
decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes
the means necessary to carry it into effect. Thus:
Obvious from the foregoing is the intent to bestow independence to
the Supreme Court as the PET, to undertake the Herculean task of
deciding election protests involving presidential and vicepresidential
candidates in accordance with the process outlined by former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion. It was made in response to the concern
aired by delegate Jose E. Suarez that the additional duty may prove
too burdensome for the Supreme Court. This explicit grant of
independence and of the plenary powers needed to discharge this
burden justifies the budget allocation of the PET.
The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with
the duty characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means
necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary
implication. The Court cannot overemphasize that the abstraction of
the PET from the explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, given
our abundant experience, is not unwarranted.
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals
a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same
vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this
authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not
contain any
limitation on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme
Court's method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election
contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of
the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court
to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is
equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals
of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET), which we have affirmed on numerous occasions.
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves
a presidential or vicepresidential election contest, it performs what is
essentially a judicial power. With the explicit provision, the present
Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with
latter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of
deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full
authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a
derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law,
expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the
Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the
PET and the Supreme Court.
The Court has previously declared that the PET is not simply an
agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again,
the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an
institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland
proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity."
The decision therein held that the PTC "finds justification under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution." A plain reading of the
constitutional provisions, i.e., last paragraph of Section 4 and Section
17, both of Article VII on the Executive Branch, reveals that the two
are differently worded and deal with separate powers of the
Executive and the Judicial Branches of government. And as
previously adverted to, the basis for the constitution of the PET was,
in fact, mentioned in the deliberations of the Members of the
Constitutional Commission during the drafting of the present
Constitution.
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION OF 2010 G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, J.
MENDOZA
Pursuant to Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution which mandates the
President to faithfully execute all laws, the President may create ad hoc
committees such as truth commissions to investigate against class of
previous administrations graft and corruptions.
Facts: This is a consolidated petition assailing Executive Order No.1
dated July 30, 2010, entitled Creating the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010, a separate body dedicated solely to investigating
and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration. Petitioners Louis
Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the
legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature
to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. In addition,
Biraogo claims that it is unconstitutional for it is not under the
Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the
President. Finally, E.O. No. 1 accordingly, violates the equal
protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration
In defense, the Office of the Solicitor General claims that,E.O. No. 1
does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office
because the Presidents executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed. Also, E.O. No. 1 does not
usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress. And that the Truth Commission does not violate the equal
protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.
Issues: 1. Whether the Creation of the Truth Commission of 2010s
basis is the Presidents power of control. 2. Whether the Creation of
the Truth Commission of 2010s basis is the Presidents duty to
faithfully execute the laws under Section 17,Article VII. 3. Whether the
Truth Commission of 2010 is constitutional.
Ruling: 1. NO. The creation of the PTC is not justified by the
Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely
different from the power to create public offices. The former is
inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a
valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully
execute the laws. Further, there is no valid delegation from the
congress that would warrant the creation of the commission because
P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772 where the respondent
anchors its legality was already held functus oficio. Thus, it begs the
question of where does the Truth Commission of 2010 finds legal
basis? This is answered by the second issue herein.
2. YES. While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass
muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the
creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that
the laws are faithfully executed. The Presidents power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in
this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency
is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the
authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create
bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such
authority.Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that
our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not
limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the
recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed.
 On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Ruling: YES. The communications elicited by the three (3) questions
Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of
allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with
other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
3. NO. It violates the equal protection clause. The intent to single out
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. In this
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second,
regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but
the communications are received by a close advisor of the President.
just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a
not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
cannot sanction.
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
ROMULO L. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
INVESTIGATIONS, et al. G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008,
broad. This is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation extends even the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.
to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it.
valid claim of executive privilege. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is
imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly
Facts: Petitioner Romulo Neri, as the former Director of NEDA, was
published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons
invited by the respondent Senate Committees to appear and testify on
appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected. The power
matters involving the controversial ZTE-NBN deal. Neri testified that
extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be
he was offered a bribe to accept the deal, but did not accept such as
exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege.
instructed by the President. When he was further asked on the details
of the matters he discussed with the President about the NBN Project,
Neri, invoking executive privilege, refused to answer particularly
three questions: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the
NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve. When called again to
testify in another hearing, Neri refused upon orders of the President,
invoking executive privilege. Thus, he was arrested for contempt of
the Senate.

Issue: Whether the communications elicited by the subject three (3)

questions are covered by executive privilege.